A SELECTION

OF

LEADING CASES IN EQUITY

Mith Aotes.

ВХ

FREDERICK THOMAS WHITE OWEN DAVIES TUDOR.

EIGHTH EDITION

 $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{Y}$

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OF THE INNER TEMPLE, : BARRISTERS-AT-LAW.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE.

[&]quot;Pray let us so resolve cases here that they may stand with the reason of mankind when they are debated abroad."—Per Lord Nortingham in Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cases, 33.

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PREFACE.

Few words are necessary by way of preface to this, the eighth edition of these leading cases.

With the exception that Savage v. Foster, 9 Modern Reports, 35, resumes its place as the leading case upon Estoppel by Representation, the selection of leading cases made in Vol. I. of the seventh edition remains unchanged. Burrowes v. Lock, 10 V. 470; 8 R. R. 33, 856, though a case of great interest and considerable value, has stood in need of much explanation, and it appeared to me that it would be well to restore Savage v. Foster to the position which it formerly occupied in this work.

I have endeavoured in the preparation of this edition to adhere to the lines marked out by my predecessors.

A collection of leading cases in any branch of the law can never be a systematic treatise; it can only illustrate the working of great principles and doctrines. In common with my predecessors, I have experienced great difficulty in the selection and exclusion of authorities; but I have done my best to include all those which come within the scope of the doctrine dealt with by the leading case. Some eight hundred cases have been added to this volume, and some four hundred cases have after consideration been rejected.

Many parts of the notes have been rewritten; the whole of the notes have been revised, and where necessary have been rearranged. I am greatly indebted to the gentlemen whose names appear with mine on the title-page; and who have worked with me in preparing this edition. To my friend Mr. A. M. W. Wells, of Lincoln's Inn, I am obliged for assistance in several questions of Company Law. I desire to acknowledge my obligations to all the text writers whose works are quoted in the notes. I would add a word of thanks to my clerk, Mr. William Parslow, for the great assistance he has given me in the work of indexing and verifying authorities.

W. J. WHITTAKER.

6, New Square, Lincoln's Inn, October, 1910.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| LEADING CASES IN VOLUME I. | vii |
|---|------|
| TABLE OF CASES | xv |
| TABLE OF STATUTES | cxxi |
| ADDENDA | ix |
| INDEX | 923 |
| | |
| LEADING CASES IN VOLUME I. | |
| ADMINISTRATION. | |
| Ancaster (Duke of) c. Primary liability of personal estate to the payment of debts. Exoneration | 1 |
| ALDRICH v. COOPER DURHAM v. LANKESTER Marshalling of assets, &c DURHAM v. Armstrong | 35 |
| Howe v. Dartmouth (Earl Conversion as between tenant for or) | 68 |
| ASSIGNMENT. | |
| WARMSTREY v. TANFIELD Assignment of equitable chose in action | 93 |
| Row v . Dawson | 95 |
| RYALL v. Rowles | 98 |
| Hornsby v . Lee Assignment of wife's choses in action | 163 |
| BOUNDARIES AND PARTITION. | |
| WAKE v. CONYERS Boundaries | 181 |
| * Agar v. Holdsworth Partition | 192 |
| COMPROMISES. | |
| STAPILTON v. S Compromise. Family arrangement. | 234 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD. | PAGE |
|--|-------|
| HUGUENIN v. BASELEY Undue influence | 259 |
| Chesterfield (Earl of) v . Unconscionable bargains | 303 |
| CONVERSION. | |
| FLETCHER v. ASHBURNER Conversion of land into money and money into land | 347 |
| Ackroyd v. Smithson purposes for which conversion has been directed | 394 |
| DONATIO MORTIS CAUSÂ. | |
| Ward v. Turner | 413 |
| ELECTION. | |
| Noys v. Mordaunt | 438 |
| Streatfield v. S. | 440 |
| | |
| EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. | |
| SAVAGE v. FOSTER | 469 |
| | |
| GUARDIAN AND WARD. | |
| Eyre (Mr. Justice) v . Shaftsbury (Countess of) | 495 |
| HUSBAND AND WIFE. | |
| Scott v. Tyler Conditions in restraint of marriage | 560 |
| Wilson v. W Separation deeds | 604 |
| STRATHMORE (COUNTESS OF) v. Bowes | 642 |
| ELIBANK v. MONTOLIEU Wife's equity to a settlement 650 | , 654 |
| MURRAY v. ELIBANK (LORD). Write's sequence to a settlement | 683 |
| • | |
| JURISDICTION. | |
| Oxford's (Earl of) Case Restraining proceedings at law | 773 |
| Penn v . Baltimore (Lord) $\left\{egin{array}{ll} 	ext{Power of Courts of Equity over} \\ 	ext{property out of jurisdiction} \end{array}. \right.$ | 800 |
| LEGACIES. | • |
| ASHBURNER v. MACGUIRE Specific legacy; ademption | 827 |
| HOOLEY v. HATTON Repetition of legacies | 910 |

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page 20, note (b). "4 V. 483" should read "9 V. 483."

Page 52, note (g). "3 K. & J. 289" should read "2 K. & J. 289."

Page 53, note (c). "P. W. 543," should read "2 P. W. 543."

Page 79, note (b). Add "Re Davy, (1908) 1 Ch. 61."

Page 83, note (e). Add "followed in Re Elford, (1910) 1 Ch. 481; 79 L. J. Ch. 385; 102 L. T. 488."

Page 107, line 14. Mortgage Debenture Act, 1865, "c. 20" should read "c. 78."

Page 110, notes (c) and (f). Add "Wilson v. Kelland, (1910) 2 Ch. 306."

Page 119, line 10 from bottom. Delete comma and word "or" after "assignment."

Page 121, note (q). Add "followed in Re Weniger's Policy, (1910) 2 Ch. 291," after "Spencer v. Clarke, 9 C. D. 137."

Page 145, note (f). "Re Assam Tea Co." should read "Re Northern Assam Tea Co."

Page 150, note (a). Add "followed in Re Weniger's Policy, (1910) 2 Ch. 291."

Page 151, note (e). Add "See Skipper and Tucker v. Holloway and Howard, (C. A.) (1910) W. N. 74; 79 L. J. K. B. 91, 496; Bowles v. Baker & Co., (C. A.) (1910) W. N. 110."

Page 152, line 10. Add "The legal right to the debt is by an assignment under the section completely transferred to the assignee and becomes as though it had been his from the beginning; Bennett v. White, C. A. (1910) 2 K. B. 1."

Page 155, note (a). Add "Cf. Butler v. Rice, (1910) 2 Ch. 277."

Page 157, line 10 from bottom. "5 Anne, c. 4," should read "5 Anne, c. 3."

Page 162, line 7. After "s. 151" add "replacing Companies Act, 1862, s. 95."

Page 228, line 16. After "supra" aild "followed in Carroll v. Harrison, (1910) W. N. 104, by Joyce, J., in preference to Belcher v. Williams, supra."

Page 228, line 22. For "Hervey" read "Harvey."


Page 252, line 14. Delete "out of" and insert "in."

Page 253, note (g). "67 L. T." should read "69 L. T."

Page 295. note (e). For "(1893) p. 1942, F. 2," read "(1901) 2335, F. 2, 65 L. T. 691."

Page 300, note (d). "Boudains v. Richardson" should read "Baudains v. Richardson."

Page 338, note (e). Add at end "94 L. T. 390."



Page 339, note (d). Add to "93 L. T. 49" "94 L. T. 390."

Page 339, note (e). Add "Michaelson v. Nichols, (1910) W. N. 69, 26 T. L. R. 327."

Page 340, note (e). Delete "An . . . subsection" and insert "Every incident of every piece of business is not required to be transacted at the money-lender's registered office: Kirkwood v. Gadd, (1910) A. C. 422, reversing." Add at end of note "Jackson v. Price, (1910) 1 K. B. 143; Hopkins v. Hills, (1910) 2 K. B. 49; Re Seed, (1910) 1 K. B. 661."

Page 340, note (b). Add to "93 L. T. 49" "94 L. T. 390."

Page 346, note (a). "Brown v. Harker" should read "Brown v. Harper."

Page 355, note (a). Insert page "350."

Page 355, note (h). Add "Cf. Re Thompson's Trusts, 22 B. 506."

Page 360, note (f). Robinson r. R., "19 B. 201" should read "19 B. 494."

Page 362, note (h). After "Cf." insert "Re Harrison, 34 C. D. 214;" and delete "Parry v. Spencer."

Page 365, note (a). Add "and see Re Dyson, (1910) 1 Ch. 750."

Page 374, note (d), line 2 from end of note. For "257 L. R. 61" read "25 T. L. R. 61."

Page 379, line 22. For "1881" read "1882."

Page 388, line 11. For "existed" read "was drawn in this matter."

Page 388, note (f). After "Wills Act" insert "s. 7."

Page 388, note (g). After "Re Jackson" insert "21 C. D. 786."

Page 392, note (a). Add "Re Quicke's Trusts, (1908) 1 Ch. 887; 77 L. J. Ch. 523."

Page 404, note (c). Add "If there is no trust for sale, but merely an absolute power of sale, the exercise of that power by trustees after the heir's death will not alter the devolution of his interest; the proceeds of sale will devolve from him as realty: Re Dyson, (1910) 1 Ch. 750."

Page 411, line 4 from bottom of page, delete "and."

Page 412, note (b). "Re Gozman, 15 C. D. 67," should read "Re Gosman, 15 C. D. 67, reversed 17 C. D. 771 as to payment of interest by the Crown."

Page 426, note (d). Add "Hudson c. Spencer, (1910) 2 Ch. 285 (distinguishing Jones c. Selby, supra)."

Page 426, note (h). For "Cook v. C." read "Cock v. Cooke."

Page 427, note (b). "257 L. R. 522" should read "25 T. L. R. 522."

Page 427, note (e). "3 V. 120" should read "2 V. 120."

Page 429, note (a). Re Kirkley, "257 L. R. 522" should read "25 T. L. R. 522."

Page 435, note (a). Delete "Duffin v. D., 62 L. T. 615."

Page 458, note (d). Add at end "82 L. T. 270."

Page 460, note (a). "3 Russ. & M. 304" should read "2 Russ. & My. 304."


Page 480, note (a). Add "(C. A.) 100 L. T. 597."

Page 527, note (d). "2 (189) 1 Q. B., p. 328," should read "(1892) 1 Q. B., p. 328."

Page 539, note (b). Insert "Re Plomley" before "Vidler v. Collyer."

Page 580, note (f). For "Newton v. N." read "Newton v. Marsden."

Page 630, note (e). "s. 25" should read "s. 24."



Page 640, note (y). Add "Harrison v. H., (1910) 1 K. B. 35, 79 L. J. K. B. 133."

Page 668, note (f). The reference "(1895) W. N. 4" should follow " ${\rm Re\ Howard.}$ "

Page 687, note (a). For "4 My. & K. 220" read "3 My. & K. 220."

Page 704, note (e). For "Re Bett" read "Re Batt."

Page 713, note (b). Add "Re James, Hole v. Bethune, (1910) 1 Ch. 157."

Page 725, note (c). "Heatley v. Thomas, 16 V. 596," should read "15 V. 596."

Page 725, note (e). For "16 Q. B. 374" read "16 Q. B. D. 374."

Page 729, note (c). For "Hill v. Roberts" read "Hill v. Cooper."

Page 741, line 4. After "s. 128" add "replacing s. 78 Companies Act, 1862."

Page 743, note (d). "In the goods of Fraser, 2 P. D. 183," should read " L. R. 2 P. & D. 40, 183."

Page 759, note (a). For "24 C. D. 625" read "24 C. D. 195."

Page 787, note (d). For "Story" read "Storey."

Page 823, note (g). Add "British S. Africa Co. v. De Beers, &c., (1910) 1 Ch. 354, 79 L. J. Ch. 345, 102 L. T. 95, 26 T. L. R. 285, (C. A.) 591."

Page 824, note (c). Add "British S. Africa Co. v. De Beers, &c., (1910) 1 Ch. 354, 79 L. J. Ch. 345, 102 L. T. 95, 26 T. L. R. 285, (C. A.) 591."

Page 852, note (e). For "Dewes v. Newington" read "Delves v. Newington."

Page 853, note (e). "Re Bacon, (1693) 62 L. T. A. 445," should read "(1893) 62 L. J. Ch. 445."

Page 900, note (b). For "Salt" read "Scott."

Page 921, note (b). For "Re Dealy" read "Re Sealy."




TABLE OF CASES TO VOLUME I.

| | • | | | A. | | | | | | |
|---------|-------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|-----------------|----------|---------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 0 1 |) To four | L. D. /100 | - 1 OT | ~oo. | 00 T | T (1 | | | | PAGE |
| A. & I | o, xmam my - Re | ts, $\it Re$, (189 (1894) 2 C | h 349 | 786; 68 T. | 56 L. | J. OI 565 | 1. 592 | • | . 041 | , 007 785 |
| Aaron | 's Reefs | v. Twiss, (| 1896) A. | C. 27 | 3: 65 | L. J. | P. C. | 54: 74 | i L.T. | 100 |
| -794 | | | | | | | | | | 477 |
| | | $33~\mathrm{B}.~475$ | | f. Ch. | 593 | | | | | 906 |
| | | er, 2 Atk. 5 | | | | | | | . 870 | , 871 |
| Acey | Simpson | on, 5 B. 35 | ; 59 R | R. 404 | ŧ. | | ٠ | | | 886 |
| Actor | v = 0 | heeler, 1 I Mer. 178 | . 14. 186 | | • | • | • | • | | 897 888 |
| | | e, 1 S. & S. | 429 - 94 | R R | 203 | • | • | | | 000 755 |
| | | 1 Sch. & . | | | | | | | . 736 | , 737 |
| Adam. | Re. 23 | O. D. 525 : | 52 L. J. | Ch. 6 | 342 | | | | 702 | , 710 |
| Adams | s, Re, 27 | C. D. 394 | ; 54 L. J | r. Ch. | 87 | | | . 37 | 4, 375 | , 378 |
| | $\cdot v. \text{ Aust}$ | in, 3 Russ | . 100, 46 | 1; 27 | R. R. | 108 | | | . 702 74, 375 | 359 |
| | $\cdot v$. Buel | C. D. 394 sin, 3 Russ sland, 2 Volble, 12 Ir. ender, McC | $\frac{1}{2}$ ern. $\frac{1}{2}$ | , | | | | • | | 509 |
| | v. Gam | ble, 12 1r. | Ch. R. I | .02. | oo 10 | D = | | • | | 717 |
| | · v. Lave | lon & Blac | Je. & 10 Jewell Pe | . 41; | 29 K. | A. 15 | ±3 (1:11) | 2 · 10 | T. T | 171 |
| | Ch | . 557; 86 | R R 37 | , . co., | . 4 1111 | | |), LO | 11. 0. | 362 |
| | v. Mev | rick. 1 Eq. | Ca. Abr. | 271 | | | | : | • • | 10 |
| | v. Mors | rick, 1 Eq. gan, 14 L. | R. Ir. 14 | .0. | · | | | | : | 118 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 692 |
| Addam | s v . Fer | mitage, 19 ick, 26 B. | 384; 28 | L. J. (| Ch. 59 | 4 | | | | 875 |
| Addeco | ott v. A., | 29 B. 460 | | | | · ~ | | | 850, | 851 |
| Addis a | v. Campi | pell, 1 B. 2 | 58; 4 B. | 401; | 8 11. | J. Ch | ı. 305 | ; 55 1 | 3. K. | 94* |
| Addisor | n a Cor | , L. R. 8 (| | 19 T. | T Ch | | | 526, 54 | 5, 5 44 , | 120 |
| Adnam | v. Cole | 6 B. 353; | 63 R. R | . 107 | о. Сп. | 201 | • | | 114, | 919 |
| | | es, 17 Si. 1 | | . 101 | | • | • | | | 369 |
| Agar-E | Illis, Re, | 10 C. D. 7 | 1; 24 C. | D. 31 | .7; 53 | L. J | . Ch. | io . | 517, | 518. |
| - | 51 | 9, 520, 533 | 5, 536, 53 | 7, 538 | , 541, | 542, | 543, 5 | 548, 54 | 9, 551, | 552 |
| Agnew | v. Belfa | st, &c. Co. , L. R. 2 C | , (1896) 2 | 2 Ir. E | t. p. 20 | 9 | | | 417, | 427 |
| Agra B | ank, Re | , L. R. 2 C | h. 391; | L. R. | 3 Ch. | 5 55 ; | 37 I | 4. J. H | 3ank. | |
| 23 . | | 721 32 /10 | | | 0 - T | · r / | | | • | 145 |
| Aind E | 26 26 W | Vilding, (18 . R. 441 | 96) I Ch | . 615; | 69 1 | ı. J. (| 11. 45 | 2 . | • | $\frac{253}{790}$ |
| Aislahi | e v. Rice | 3 Madd | 256 · 18 | B B | 230 | • | • | | | 593 |
| Aitchis | on v . Di | , 3 Madd. xon, 10 Eq | . 589 : 3 | 9 L. J | . Ch. | 705 | : | · · | 168. | 169 |
| Alabast | er v . Ha | xon, 10 Equiness, (189 | 5) 1 Q.] | 3. 339 | ; 64 J | Ľ. J. | Q.В. | 76 . | 159, | 162 |
| Alcock | v. Slope: | r, 2 My. & | K. 699; | $39~\mathrm{R}$ | . R. 3 | 34 | | | 81. 84 | . 87 |
| Aldboro | $\operatorname{ough} v$. $'$ | Frye, 7 Cl. | & Fin. 4 | 36;5 | 1 R. I | R. 32 | | . 32 | 3, 330, | |
| Alderso | $\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{E} x p.$ | , i Madd. | 53; 3 S⊽ | zan. 3 | 92; 16 | 5 R. | R. 208 | 3 . | | 114 |
| | | , 1 Sw. & ' 13 P. D. 2 | | · T 3 | 5 6 | • | • | | 5, 629, | 697 |
| | a. Fo | whom O.T. | T (1h 97 | . 1 T | 20 | . 59 | p p | . 02 943 | 9, 029, 57 | 50 |
| • | - v. Wa | illscourt, 1 | Ball. & | B. 312 | u#∪ } | , <i>o</i> = | 11. | | 12, 15 | . 16 |
| Alexani | uer v . \mathbf{A} . | , o D. 010 | ; 09 m. r | F. 000 | | | | | 12, 15 920, 0, 731, | 921 |
| | v. Be | arnhill, 21 | L. R. Ir. | 511 | | | | . 730 |), 731, | 735 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

| Alexander v. Steinhardt, (1903) 2 K. B. 208; 72 L. J. K. P. 490 . 11 | 6 8 8 5 4 1, 6 8 8 7 6 9 7 10 8 2 9 8 1 3 3 7 3 8 6 8 6 6 8 6 7 10 8 2 9 8 1 3 3 7 3 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 |
|---|--|
| M. R. 584; 21 T. L. R. 376 Ames v. Comyns, 16 W. R. 74 Amis v. Witt, 33 B. 619 Amis v. Witt, 33 B. 619 Amos v. Chadwick, 9 C. D. 459; 47 L. J. Ch. 871 v. Horner, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 112 v. Smith, 1 H. & C. 234 Amphlett v. Parke, 2 Russ. & M. 221; 9 L. J. Ch. 161; 34 R. R. 61 40; Amy's Case, 2 Ch. Ca. 128 Anandale v. A., 2 Ves. Sen. 384 Ancell v. Rolfe, W. N. (1896) 9; 40 Sol. Jo. 230 Anderson v. Abbott, 23 B. 457 v. Berkley, (1902) 1 Ch. 936; 71 L. J. Ch. 444; 86 L. T. 443; 50 W. R. 684 v. Butler, &c. Co., 48 L. J. Ch. 828 v. Butler, &c. Co., 48 L. J. Ch. 828 v. Butler, &c. Co., 48 L. J. Ch. 828 v. Radcliffe, 2 B. & E. 806; 28 L. J. Q. B. 32 Andrew v. A., 1 Coll. 690 v. Trinity Hall, 9 V. 525 Andrews, Re, L. R. 8 Q. B. 153 Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 394; 71 L. J. Ch. 676; 87 L. T. 20; 50 W. R. 569 | 34 34 37 38 37 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 |
| Andrews, Re, L. R. 8 Q. B. 153 ——————————————————————————————————— | 77 77 0, 13 11 |

| • | то | VOLU | ME . | 1. | | | | | xvii |
|--|---------------|--------------|--------|---------|--------|----------|-------------|------------|-------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | PAGE |
| Anglesey, Re, (1903) 2 Ch. Anglo-Africa, &c. Co, Re., | 727; | 72 L. | J. Ch | . 782; | 52 V | V. R. | 124 | | 135 |
| Angus v . A., West t. Hard | wicks | 22, 300 | , 00 | 11. 0. | Сп. о | 19 | • | • | $825 \\ 816$ |
| v. Clifford. (1891) 2 | Ch. 4 | 49 : 60 |) T. J | . Ch. 4 | 443 | • | • | • | $\frac{610}{477}$ |
| Ann Elliott, Re, L. R. 2 P. | & D. | 274: | 40 L. | J. P. | & M. | 76 | Ċ | | 700 |
| Ann, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 549; | 63 L | J. Ćł | ı. 334 | | | | | | 722 |
| Annondale From Amb 01 | 1 | | | | | | | | 388 |
| Anne Walker, Re, L. & G. | t. Sug | gd., 299 | €. | | | | | | 680 |
| Anon Jac 265 (n.) | | | | | | | | 546 | , 547 |
| -, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 839; -, 3 Atk, 726 | 27 L. | J. Q. 1 | 3. 184 | | | • | ٠ | 675 | ,676 |
| , 3 Atk, 726 | | | • | • | | • | | | 171 |
| , 2 Ves. Sen. 56. | | • | ٠ | | • | • | • | ٠.٠ | 545 |
| | • | | • | • | ٠ | | • | | , 546 |
| , 2 Vers. Self. 574 , Jac. 264 (n.) | • | • | • | • | • | . • | • | • | |
| | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | $\frac{889}{540}$ |
| -, Jac. 264 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 520 |
| , Gilb. 15 | • | : | • | | | • | • | • | 458 |
| , 1.V. 462 | | | • | | | • | | | 388 |
| , 1 V. 462 | I. Ch. | 47 . | | | | | · | | 159 |
| Ansley v. Cotton, 16 L. J. (| Ch. 55 | | | | | | | | 905 |
| Anson, Re. (1907) 2 Ch. 429 | 4:76 | L. J. (| Jh. 64 | 1:97 | L. T | 472 | | | 878 |
| Anstey v. Newman, 39 L. J | J. Ch. | 769 | | | | | | | 59 |
| Anstruther v . Adair, 2 My. | & K. | 51 3. | | | | | | 676, | 680 |
| Anstey v . Newman, 39 L. J Anstruther v . Adair, 2 My. Anthony, Re , (1892) 1 Ch. | 450; | 61 L. J | Ch. | 434 | | <u>.</u> | | | 31 |
| Anthony $v. A., (1893) 3 Ch.$ | . 501; | 62 L. | J. Ch | ı. 100- | £; 69 | L. 1 | ľ. 3 | 00; | |
| 41 W. R. 667 | | | | | | | | | 25 |
| Appleby, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 5 | 65; 7 | 2 L. J. | Ch. | 332 ; i | 58 L. | 1. 2 | 19; | 216 | 400 |
| W. R. 455 | D 104 | | • | • | • | • | • | o82, | 402 |
| Applin's Trusts, Re, 13 W. Apreece v. A., 1 V. & B. 36 | R. 100 | oz . | • | | • | • | • | 996 | 461 |
| Aquiler v. A., 1 V. & D. 50 | t . | • | • | • | • | • | • | 000, | 886 |
| Arab The 5 Jur (N.S.).41 | 17 | • | • | • | | • | • | .4' | 7 67 |
| Arbuthnot $Ex n \rightarrow 3 C \rightarrow 4$ | 77 | • | • | • | • | | • | | 111 |
| Aquilar v. A., 5 Madd. 414 Arab, The, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 41 Arbuthnot, Ex p., 3 C. D. 4 | ore. I | e. d. d. | 219 | | | | | | 4 |
| - v . Norton, 5 McArcher v . Hudson, 7 B. 560 | ; 15 | L. J. C | h. 21 | 1;64 | R. R | . 152 | | 255, | 281, |
| | | | | , | | | | 282, | 298 |
| v. Lavender, 9 Ir. R | . Eq. | 220 | | | | | | | 744 |
| v. Preston, 1 Eq. Ca v. Rorke, 7 Ir. Eq. I | . Abr. | . 133, p | d. 3 | | | | | 815, | 816 |
| v. Rorke, 7 Ir. Eq. I | R. 478 | | • | | | | ٠. | | 691 |
| Arden v. A., 29 C. D. 703; | 54 L. | J. Ch. | 655 | | | . 1 | 21, | 132, | 139 |
| Ardesoife v. Bennet, Dick. | 465. | 00= | ٠ | • | • | . 4 | 146, | 464, | 466 |
| Ardglasse v. Muschamp, I | vern. | 257. | • | • | • | • | • | 307, | 320 |
| Argiasse v. Muschamp, 1 ve | ern. 1 | о. 1 Опот | . 00 | • | • | • | • | 810, | 011 |
| Armit Re 5 In P. Eg. 359 | r onge | a. Frop | . 80 | • | • | • | : | | 524 |
| v. Roskon, 1 Eq. Ca v. Rorke, 7 Ir. Eq. I Arden v. A., 29 C. D. 703; Ardesoife v. Bennet, Dick. Ardglasse v. Muschamp, 1 V. Arkwright v. Huntley, cited Armitage, Re, (1893) 3 Ch. | 337 : | 63 Ť. J | r Ob | 110 . | 7 B | 290 | • | 91 | 878 |
| - v . Coates, 35 B. 1 | 557, 1 | 00 11. 0 | . Сп. | | | | | | 756 |
| Armstrong, Re , $Ex p$. Gilch | rist. 1 | 7 Q. B | . Ď. a | 521:5 | 5 L. | j. Q. | В. | 570 | |
| | ∞c, - | | | | | | | 704, | 719 |
| | 21 Q | . B. D. | 264; | 57~ m L | . J. G | l. B. | 55 3 | | 704, |
| | | | | | | | | | 758 |
| | B. 328 | 3. | | | | | | | 527 |
| v. A., 8 Ir. R. E | lq. 1 | <u>.</u> | · - | · · | | | | 700 | 280 |
| v. A., (1892) P. | 98; 6 | | | | | . 7 | 94, | 796, | 198 |
| v. Burnet, 20 B. | . 424; | 24 L. | J. Uk | 1. 473 | •, . | . 8 | , | 874, | |
| v. Lynn, 9 Ir. F | ь. да. 7 т | 180 | 99 | • | • | | • | • | $\frac{461}{55}$ |
| Arnold, Re, 37 C. D. 644; 5 v. A., 2 My. & K. 3 | 7 11. 0 | о ID ID | 220 | • | | • | • | 887, | |
| v. A., 2 My. & K. 3 v. Dixon, 19 Eq. 11 | | | | • | • | • | • | 50., | 223 |
| , - | | • • • | •. | • | | • | . 1 | • - | |
| W. & T.—VOL. I. | | | | | | | b | ' | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| II I CU'I II (1000) A IZ IA ANA TA T IZ IA 10 | PAGE |
|--|-------------------------------|
| Alexander v. Steinhardt, (1903) 2 K. B. 208; 72 L. J. K. P. 49 | $\frac{1}{1}$. $\frac{1}{1}$ |
| r. Wellington, 2 Russ. & M. 35; 9 L. J. Ch. 36; 34 R | |
| v. Young, 6 Ha. 393; 77 R. R. 154. | . 755 |
| Allan v. Gott, L. R. 7 Ch. 439; 41 L. J. Ch. 571 Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D. 181; 56 L. J. Ch. 1052. 279 | . 14 |
| Afficard T. Skinner, 50 U. D. 151; 50 fr. 5. Ch. 1052 278 | 1, 280, 281, 1 915 170 |
| 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 299, 300, 34 | 4, 040, 410 |
| v. Walker, (1896) 2 Ch. 369; 65 L. J. Ch. 660; 74 L. T. | 401; |
| 44 W. R. 661. Allday v. Fletcher, 1 De G. & J. 82; 26 L. J. Ch. 814 Allen v. A., 30 B. 403; 31 L. J. Ch. 442. | 177 870 |
| Allow at A 20 D 402 . 21 T T Ch 412 | 111, 010 |
| Allell V. A., 50 D. 405; 51 D. J. Ull. 442 | 2010 200 |
| v. A., 21 W. R. 642; 42 B. J. Ch. 659 | 159 150 |
| | 016 017 |
| " Cartor, 1 R 200 . 0 T. T Ch. 131 . 40 W D 201 | 510, 511 |
| " Toolson 1 C D 200 : 45 L T Ch 210 | 590 599 |
| * MaPhagen 1 H. L. Cas 207 - 73 P. P. 30 | n 301 309 |
| 2 Ponworth 1 Vec Sen 163 | 684 719 |
| Weller T. P. 5 Ex. 187 : 30 L. J. Ex. 152 | 717 748 |
| Allhusan a Whittall 4 Eq. 205: 36 L. J. Ch. 920 | 87 89 91 |
| Alliance &c. The v. MacIvor & Co. 7 T. L. R. 599 | 949 953 |
| Allien v. Claybills 97 L. T. 709 | 987 |
| Allnutt Re 22 C D 275: 52 L J Ch 209 | 763 |
| v. McPaerson, 1 H. L. Cas. 201; 13 R. R. 30 v. Papworth, 1 Ves. Sen. 163 v. Walker, L. R. 5 Ex. 187; 39 L. J. Ex. 153 Allhusen v. Whittell, 4 Eq. 295; 36 L. J. Ch. 929 Alliance, &c., The, v. MacIvor & Co., 7 T. L. R. 599 Allison v. Clayhills, 97 L. T. 709 Allnutt, Re, 22 C. D. 275; 52 L. J. Ch. 299 Alsbury, Re, 45 C. D. 237; 60 L. J. Ch. 29; 63 L. T. 576; 39 | W B. 1000 |
| 198 | 0.70 |
| Alston, Exp., L. R. 4 Ch. 168; 17 W. R. 266 | 63, 64, 65 |
| Alton v . Medlicot, 2 Ves. Sen. 417 | . 836 |
| Ambler, Re, (1905) 1 Ch. 697; 74 L. J. Ch. 367; 92 L. T. 716 | |
| W. R. 584; 21 T. L. R. 376 | . 736 |
| Ames v. Comyns. 16 W. R. 74 | 209 |
| Amies. Re. W. N. (80) 16 | 692 |
| W. R. 584; 21 T. L. R. 376. Ames v. Comyns, 16 W. R. 74. Amies, Re, W. N. (80) 16. Amis v. Witt, 33 B. 619. Amos v. Chadwick, 9 C. D. 459; 47 L. J. Ch. 871. | 434, 436 |
| Amos v. Chadwick, 9 C. D. 459: 47 L. J. Ch. 871 | 792 |
| v. Horner, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 112. | 577. 587 |
| v. Smith, 1 H. & C. 234 | . 731 |
| Amphlett v. Parke, 2 Russ. & M. 221; 9 L. J. Ch. 161; 34 R. | R. 61 402, |
| | 409 |
| Amy's Case, 2 Ch. Ca. 128 | . 484 |
| Anandale v. A., 2 Ves. Sen. 384 Ancell v. Rolfe, W. N. (1896) 9; 40 Sol. Jo. 230 Anderson v. Abbott, 23 B. 457 | 387 |
| Ancell v. Rolfe, W. N. (1896) 9; 40 Sol. Jo. 230 | 228 |
| Anderson v . Abbott, 23 B. 457 | 456, 457 |
| v. Berkley, (1902) 1 Ch. 936; 71 L. J. Ch. 444; 86 | L. T. |
| 443; 50 W. R. 684 | 580 |
| v. Butler, &c. Co., 48 L. J. Ch. 828 | 138 |
| v. Butler, &c. Co., 48 L. J. Ch. 828 | . 904 |
| v. Radcliffe, 2 B. & E. 806; 28 L. J. Q. B. 32. | 161 |
| v. Radchtffe, 2 B. & E. 806; 28 L. J. Q. B. 32 . Anderton v. Cooke, 1 Bro. Ch. 456 Andrew v. A., 1 Coll. 690 | . 3, 17 |
| Andrew v. A., 1 Coll. 690 | 842 |
| | 457 |
| Andrewes v. Tyrrell, 29 Sol. Jo. 622 | 677 |
| Andrews, Re, L. R. 8 Q. B. 153 | 549 |
| Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 394; 71 L. J. Ch. 676; 87 L. T. 2 | |
| W. R. 569 | 28, 432, 434 |
| | |
| L. T. 726 v. Patriotic Ass. &c., 18 L. R. Ir. 355. | 475, 477 |
| v. Fatriotic Ass. &c., 18 L. R. 17, 355. v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. 636; 28 L. T. 686; 21 W. R. 431 | . 310, 311 |
| v. Batt, 11. 1t. 0 Oh. 000; 20 11. 1. 000; 21 W. R. 431 | |
| Anesley & Anesley's Case, Ridg. 149; 8 Mod. 214 | 543 511 |
| Angerstein v. Martin, T. & R. 241; 2 L. J. Ch. 88; 24 R. R. | 511 |
| Angier v. A., Pr. Ch. 496; Gilb. Eq. R. 152 | 14 619 610 |
| Angier c. m., 11. On. 100, Ono. 11q. 10. 102 | 14, 013, 019 |

| TO | VOLUM | 1E I. | | | | | xvii |
|---|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------|----------|---------|---|
| | | | | | | | |
| Anglesey, Re, (1903) 2 Ch. 727; | 79 T. J | Ch | 789. | 59 W | D 1 | | PAGE 135 |
| Anglo-Africa, &c. Co, Re., 32 C. | D. 350 : | 55 I | i. J. (| 0.2 W | · 11. 1. | 24 . | 00. |
| Angus v. A., West t. Hardwick | e, 23. | | | | | | 010 |
| v. Clifford, (1891) 2 Ch. | 449; 60 | L. J. | Ch. 4 | 43 | | | 477 |
| Ann Elliott, Re, L. R. 2 P. & D | 274 ; 4 | 0 L. J | F. P. d | čΜ. | | | 700 |
| Ann, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 549; 63 l Annandale, Ex p., Amb. 81 | | | | • | • | | |
| Annandale, Exp., Amb. 81 Anne Walker, Re, L. & G. t. Su Anon, Jac. 265 (n.) | od 299 | • | • | • | • | | $\frac{388}{680}$ |
| Anon, Jac. 265 (n.) | | · | | | | | 547 |
| Anon, Jac. 269 (n.) , 3 Jar. (N. S.) 839; 27 L. , 3 Atk, 726 , 2 Ves. Sen. 56. , 2.Ves. Sen. 374 , Jac. 264 (n.) , 2 Vern. 199 , 2 Sim. (N. S.) 54 , Jac. 264 , Gilb. 15 , 1 V. 462 , 1 C. D. 573; 45 L. J. Ch. Ansley v. Cotton, 16 L. J. Ch. 5 | J. Q. B. | 184 | | | | 675 | |
| , 3 Atk, 726 | | | • | | | | 171 |
| , 2 Ves. Sen. 56. | • | • | | • | • | | 545 |
| | • | • | • | • | | | 546 |
| , 2 Vern, 199 | • | | : | | | | 889 |
| , 2 Sim. (N. S.) 54 | | | | | | | 540 |
| ——-, Jac. 264 | | | | | | | 520 |
| | • | | | | | • | 458 |
| , 1. V. 462 | 17 | • | • | • | | • | $\frac{388}{159}$ |
| ——, Gilb. 15 | . ±1 . 5 | • | • | • | | • | 905 |
| Anson, Re. (1907) 2 Un. 424: 70 |) Li. +J. Ul | 1. b+1 | : 97 | 11. 1. | 4/2 . | : | 878 |
| Anstey v. Newman, 39 L. J. Ch. Anstruther v. Adair, 2 My. & K. Anthony, Re, (1892) 1 Ch. 450; | . 769 | | | | | | 59 |
| Anstruther v. Adair, 2 My. & K. | 513. | | | | | 676, | |
| Anthony, Re, (1892) 1 Ch. 450; | 61 L. J. | Ch. 4 | 1004 | | T //3 | 200. | 31 |
| Anthony v. A., (1893) 3 Ch. 501 41 W. R. 667. | ; 62 1 | . Cn. | 1004 | ; 69 | 14. 1. | 300 ; | 25 |
| Appleby, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 565; | 72 L.J. (| Oh. 33 | $\frac{1}{32}:8$ | 8 Т. | T. 219 | 9: 51 | ±0 |
| W. R. 455 | | | , . | | | 382, | 402 |
| W. R. 455 Applin's Trusts, Re, 13 W. R. 10 Apreece v. A., 1 V. & B. 364 Aquilar v. A. 5 Madd, 414 | 62 . | | | | | | |
| Apreece v. A., 1 V. & B. 364 | | | • | | | 836, | 886 |
| Aquilar v. A., 5 Madd. 414 | • | • | • | • | | .47 | 679 |
| Arbuthnot $E_{CR} = 3 \text{ C. D. } 477$ | • | • | • | | | .41 | 111 |
| Aprecee v. A., 1 V. & B. 364 . Aquilar v. A., 5 Madd. 414 . Arab, The, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 417 . Arbuthnot, Ex p., 3 C. D. 477 Norton, 5 Moore, | P. C. C. | $\frac{1}{219}$ | • | | · · | | 156 |
| Archer v. Hudson, 7 B. 560; 15 | L. J. Ch | . 211 | ; 64] | R. R. | 152 . | 255, 2 | 281, |
| | | | | | | 282, | 298 |
| v. Lavender, 9 Ir. R. Eq. | 220 | | • | • | | 015 | 744 |
| v. Layender, 9 Ir. R. Eq. v. Preston, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr | :. 135, pr | . о | • | • | | 815, | 691 |
| Arden v. A. 29 C. D. 703 · 54 L | э . . Л. Ch. (| 355 | | | . 12 | 1. 132. | 139 |
| Ardesoife v. Bennet, Dick. 465. | | | | | . 44 | 6, 464, | 466 |
| Ardglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. | 237. | | | | | 307, | 320 |
| Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. | īā . | | | | | 816, | 817 |
| Arkwright v. Huntley, cited Sug | gd. Prop. | 86 | • | • | • ; | •. | 200 504 |
| v. Rorke, 7 Ir. Eq. R. 476 Arden v. A., 29 C. D. 703; 54 L Ardesoife v. Bennet, Dick. 465. Ardglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. Arkwright v. Huntley, cited Sug Armit, Re, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 352 Armitage, Re, (1893) 3 Ch. 337; | 63 T. J | Ch 1 | 10 | 7 R. 9 | 290 | 91. | 878 |
| | | | | | | | 756 |
| Armstrong, Re, Ex p. Gilchrist, | 17 Q. B. | D. 52 | 1; 55 | L. J | . Q. B | . 578. | |
| | | | | | | 704, | 719 |
| | а. В. D. S | 264; | 57 L. | J. Q. | . В. 55 | 3 . ´ | 704, |
| Pa (1909) 1 O P 39 | | | | | | | $\begin{array}{c} 758 \\ 527 \end{array}$ |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | | • | | | | : | 280 |
| | 61 L. J. | P. & | D. 63 | | . 79 | 4, 796, | |
| v Burnet 20 B 424 | : 24 [4, 4] | r. Ch. | 473 | | . 873 | 3, 874, | |
| v. Lynn, 9 Ir. R. Eq | . 186 | | • | | | • | 461 |
| Arnold, Re. 37 U. D. 644; 57 L. | J. Oh. 68 | 200 | | • | | 887, | - 55 903 |
| v. A., 2 My. & K. 374; v. Dixon, 19 Eq. 113 | | 222 | | | | | 223 |
| | • | • | | | • | b | |
| w. & T.—VOL. I. | | | | | | Ų | |

| PAG1 | E. |
|--|--------|
| Arnold v. Ennis, 2 Ir. Ch. R. 601 | 2 |
| v. Woodhams, 16 Eq. 34; 42 L. J. Ch. 578 494, 752 | 2 |
| Arthur v. A., 11 Ir. Eq. R. 511 692 | |
| v. Mackinnon, 11 C. D. 385; 48 L. J. Ch. 534 860 | |
| Artistic Colour Printing Co., Re, 14 C. D. 502; 49 L. J. Ch. 526; 42 | |
| L. T. 803; 28 W. R. 943 | 1 |
| Arundel's Case, Earl of, Jenk. 6 Cent. Ca. 26, p. 243; 3 Dyer, 342 b 58- | |
| Arundell v. A., 1 My. & K. 316; 2 L. J. Ch. 77 | |
| | |
| Ashburton v. A., 6 V. 6; 5 R. R. 201 Ashby, Re, Exp. Wreford, (1892) 1 Q. B. 877; 66 L. T. 353; 40 W. R. | ., |
| | • |
| | |
| v. A., 1 Coll. Ch. R. 549; 14 L. J. Ch. 22; 66 R. R. 176 . 175 | 1 |
| v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 296; 15 R. R. 116 | 1 |
| ASHION V. A., Fr. Ch. 220 | i. |
| v. Dawson, Sel. Ca. 14 | 1 |
| v. Dawson, Sel. Ca. 14 | I |
| 048, 74 648, 74 | - |
| Ashurst v. Mill. 7 Ha. 502: 18 L. J. Ch. 129 | |
| | |
| Ashwell v. Dolli, D. R. 21. & D. 477 | 1 |
| Ashwell v. Lomi, L. R. 2 P. & D. 477 | 1 |
| Askew v. Rooth, 17 Eq. 426: 44 L. J. Ch. 200. | k O |
| | |
| v. Thompson, 4 K. & J. 620 | |
| | |
| Assam (Northern) Tea Co., Re, 10 Eq. 458, 463; 39 L. J. Ch. 829 146 Assignees of Dunne v. Hibernian, &c. Co., 2 Ir. R. Eq. 82 130 | |
| | |
| Asten v. A., (1894) 3 Ch. 260; 63 L. J. Ch. 838 | |
| Astley v. Earl of Essex, L. R. 6 Ch. 898 | |
| v. — 18 Eq. 290; 43 L. J. Ch. 817 | |
| Aston v. Exeter, 6 V. 293 | |
| v. Gregory, 6 V. 151 | |
| v. Meredith, 13 Eq. 492; 40 L. J. Ch. 241; 24 L. T. 128 | |
| v. Wood, 22 W. R. 893; 43 L. J. Ch. 715 457, 866 | |
| Atcheson v. A., 11 B. 485; 18 L. J. Ch. 230; 83 R. R. 230 | |
| v. Le Mann, 33 L. T. 302 | 4 |
| | - |
| 142, 144, 143 144, 144, 143 | |
| Athill v. A., 16 C. D. 211; 50 L. J. Ch. 123 | |
| | |
| v. Hatton, 2 Anst. 386 | Э |
| W. R. 7 | ` |
| Attorneys and Solicitors Act, Re, 1 C. D. 573; 45 L. J. Ch. 47. | |
| A _G a Allochum 14 O R D 001 · 19 A C 679 · 57 L I O R 92 | 1. |
| AG. v. Ailesbury, 14 Q. B. D. 901; 12 A. C. 672; 57 L. J. Q. B. 83 | 1 |
| 224, 369, 371, 387, 389, 39 | |
| v. Akers, W. N., (1872) p. 45 | ۲ |
| v. Ashbourne Recreation Co., (1903) 1 Ch. 101; 72 L. J. Ch. 67; 87 L. T. 561; 51 W. R. 125 | c |
| v. Bouwens, 4 M. & W. 171; 7 L. J. Ex. 297 | |
| | Ó |
| v. Brunning, 8 H. L. Cas. 243; 30 L. J. Ex. 379 . 369, 370, 371 | 1- |
| v. Chambers, 4 De G. & J. 58. | |
| v. Clements, 12 Eq. 32; 40 L. J. Ch. 678 | |
| v. Clements, 12 Eq. 32; 40 L. J. Ch. 678 | n. |
| v. Dodd, (1894) 2 Q. B. 150; 63 L. J. Q. B. 319 . 367, 369, 370 | , |
| 9. 2004, (1001) 2 Q. D. 100, 00 D. 0. Q. D. 010 . 001, 000, 010 | ., |
| v. Fletcher, 5 L. J. Ch. 75; 42 R. R. 291 | |
| v. Fullerton, 2 V. & B. 264; 13 R. R. 76. | |
| v. George, 8 Si. 138; 5 L. J. Ch. 330 | |
| | , |
| | |

TO VOLUME I.

| _ | |
|--|------|
| | AGE |
| AG. v. Grote, 2 Russ. & M. 690; 3 Mer. 316; 34 R. R. 183 | 881 |
| v. Hamilton, 1 Madd. 214; 16 R. R. 208 | 216 |
| | 917 |
| v 5 Madd, 321: 21 B. B. 299 | 360 |
| v, 5 Madd. 321; 21 R. R. 299 | |
| 0. Hollord, 1 11166, 420, 10 lb. lb. lb. lb. lb. | 370 |
| v. Hubbuck, 13 Q. B. D. 275; 53 L. J. Q. B. 146 | 371 |
| —— v. Hudson, 1 P. W. 675 | 886 |
| v. Jefferys, (1908) 1 Ch. 552; (1908) A. C. 411; 77 L. J. Ch. | |
| v. Jefferys, (1908) 1 Ch. 552; (1908) A. C. 411; 77 L. J. Ch. 685; 99 L. T. 737; 24 T. L. R. 793 | 412 |
| • v. Johnson, (1907) 2 K. B. 885; 76 L. J. K. B. 1150 . 369, | 372 |
| Tomas 2 Daisa 200 | 419 |
| | |
| — - v. Lepine, 2 Sw. 181; 19 R. R. 55 | 822 |
| v. Lomas, L. R. 9 Ex. 29; 43 L. J. Ch. 32; 29 L. T. 749. 370, | 404 |
| | |
| 74 L. J. K. B. 81; 53 W. R. 147; 21 T. L. R. 36 . 370, | 372 |
| | 532 |
| v. Manchester, &c. Ry., 1 Ry. Cas. 430; 55 R. R. 820 | 799 |
| 7. Manchester, &c. My, 1 My. Cas. 450; 55 M. R. 620 | |
| v. Montmorris, Dick. 379. | 55 |
| ——- v. Mullay, 4 Russ. 329; 7 B. 351 | 532 |
| v. Parkin, Amb. 566 | 832 |
| v. Parnther, 3 Bro. Ch. 441; 4 Bro. Ch. 409 | 732 |
| ——- v. Poulden, 3 Ha. 555; 64 R. R. 414 | 850 |
| | |
| - v. neau, 12 mq. 50 | 532 |
| v. Robins, 2 P. W. 25 | |
| v. Severne, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 313; 12 L. J. Ch. 298 | 532 |
| — - v. Stephens, 6 De G. M. & G. 133: 25 L. J. Ch. SSS 187, 188, | 189 |
| v, 1 K. & J. 724; 24 L. J. Ch. 694 | 189 |
| v. Sturge 19 B 597 · 23 L. J. Ch 495 | 822 |
| ——- v. Tomline, 7 C. D. 389; 47 L. J. Ch. 473 | 250 |
| Frandall 0 Edge 00 Arch C14 | |
| v. Tyndall, 2 Eden, 207; Amb. 614 | |
| v. Wax Chandlers Co., L. R. 6 H. L. 14; 42 L. J. Ch. 425 | 190 |
| v. Weymouth, Amb. 20 | 360 |
| ———— v. Wilkinson, 2 Eq. 816 | 716 |
| ——- v. Wilson, 70 L. J. Ch. 234; 83 L. T. 646 | 788 |
| | 54 |
| A44ma Pa (1007) 9 TZ D 909 , 07 T III 641 , 99 III T D 791 | |
| Attree, Re, (1907) 2 K. B. 868; 97 L. T. 641; 23 T. L. R. 734. | 340 |
| Attwood v. —, 1 Russ. 353 | 241 |
| Atwell v. A., 13 Eq. 23; 41 L. J. Ch. 23 | 368 |
| Auditor Curle's Case, 11 Co. 2 b | 509 |
| Austen v. Halsey, 2 S. & S. 123 (n.) | 529 |
| v 13 V 125 | 594 |
| v, 13 V. 125 | 691 |
| Austin v. A., 4 C. D. 233; 46 L. J. Ch. 42 | |
| Auther $v. A.$, 13 Si. 422 | 839 |
| Avelyn v. Ward, 1 Ves. Sen. 420 832, | |
| Averall v. Wade, L. & G. t. Sugden, 252; 46 R. R. 218 . 40, 58, 59, | 60, |
| | 62 |
| Averill, Re, (1898) 1 Ch. 525; 67 L. J. Ch. 233; 78 L. T. 320; 46 | |
| W. R. 460 | 901 |
| VV. IV. 100 | 900 |
| Awdley v. A., 2 Vern. 192. | 388 |
| Axford v. Reid, 22 Q. B. D. 553; 58 L. J. Q. B. 230. 737, 739, | 101 |
| Ayles v. Cox, 16 B. 23; 11 L. J. Ch. 408. | 363 |
| | 729 |
| | 324, |
| 332, 333, 334, 336, 342, | 343 |
| | 285 |
| Aylward v. Kearney, 2 Ball & B. 463 | |
| | 899 |
| Ayres, Re, 8 P. D. 168; 52 L. J. P. & D. 98 | 768 |
| | |

| В. | | | | | |
|---|-------------|--------------|------------------|-----------|-------------|
| | | | | . P. | AGE |
| BACKHOUSE v. Paddon, 14 W. R. 273 | | | | | 213 |
| Backwell v. Child, Amb. 260 | | | | | 870 |
| Bacon, Re, 62 L. J. Ch. 445 | | | | | 853 |
| ——— Re, (1907) 1 Ch. 475; 76 L. J. | Ch. 213 | ; 96 L. T | . 690 . | 659, | |
| | | C/4 A | a = 30 30 | | 705 |
| v. Cosby, 4 De G. & Sm. 261; | | | | | 457 |
| Bacon's Will, Re, 31 C. D. 460; 55 L. | . J. Ch. 3 | $68; 54 1_1$ | . T. 150 |); 34 | 111 |
| W. R. 319 | CII . 000 | | | .c | 411 |
| Badcock, Re, 4 My. & C. 440; 8 L. J. | Ch. 283 | ; 48 K. K | . 149 . | 388, | |
| Baden v. Pembroke, 2 Vern. 58. | (190e) | 1 /75 0=. | | r (1) | 359 |
| Badische, &c. v. Henry Johnson & Co | ., (1690) | 1 Cn. 25; | 69 H. 9 | . Cn. | 825 |
| Badrick v. Stevens, 3 Bro. Ch. 431 | • | • | | 941 | |
| Baerlein v . Chartered Mercantile Ban | 1- (1805) | 9 Ch. 49 | e · 65] | 841, | 900 |
| Ch. 54 | K, (1000) | 2 Cu. 10 | 0, 00 | 1.1. 0. | 787 |
| Baggett v. Meux, 1 Ph. 627; 1 Coll. 0 | 7h ir 13 | 8 13 L | J. Ch. | 998. | 101 |
| 65 R. R. 471 | 011. 10. 10 | | 716, 750 | | 761 |
| Baglioni v. Cavali, 83 L. T. 500; 49 V | V. R. 236 | | 110, 10 | o, 101, | 57 |
| Bagot v. Chapman, (1907) 2 Ch. 222; | | | 23 T. I | L. R. | 0. |
| 562 | | | | | 494 |
| Bagshaw v. Winter, 5 De G. & Sm. 40 | 38 . | | | | 672 |
| Bagster v. Fackerell, 26 B. 469. | | | | 404, | |
| Bague v. Dumergue, 10 Ha. 462 | | | | | 893 |
| Bahia, &c. Ry. Co., Re, L. R. 3 Q. B. | 584; 37] | L. J. Q. E | 3.176 . | 474, | |
| Bahin v. Hughes, 31 C. D. 390: 57 L. | . J. Ch. 4 | 172 . | | | 768 |
| Bailey, Re, 12 C. D. 268, 274; 48 L. | J. Ch. 628 | 8. | | | 14 |
| v. Hammond, 7 V. 590 | | | | | 890 |
| Baillie v. B., 5 Eq. 175; 37 L. J. Ch. | 225 . | | | | 796 |
| v. Butterfield, 1 Cox, 392 | | | | 915, | 918 |
| | L. J. Ch. | 295 . | | | 177 |
| Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18 C. D. 188; | 50 L. J. | Ch. 522 | . 28 | 3, 297, | |
| Baird v. Prescott, 6 T. L. R. 231 | | | | 794, | |
| Baker, Re, 44 C. D. 262; 50 L. J. Ch | . 661 | | | | 790 |
| v. B., 6 H. L. Cas. 616; 27 L. | J. Ch. 41 | | | 850, | |
| v. Bayldon, 8 Ha. 210 v. Bent, 1 Russ. & M. 224 . | • | • | | • | 667 |
| v. Bent, 1 Russ. & M. 224 | • | • | | • | 326 |
| v. Blaker, 55 L. T. 723 v. Bradley, 2 Sm. & Gif. 531; | - Do C | ir e.c. z | 07. 05 | т т | 253 |
| Ch. 7 | 1 De G. | | 282, 28 | | 759 |
| v. Farmer, L. R. 3 Ch. 537; 4 | Ea 389 | 26 T. T | 404, 40 Ch 81 | ±, 201, | |
| 6. Parmer, 11. 16. 5 Ch. 557, 4 | ±q. 90≥, | , 50 11. 0. | сп. 61 | • • | 883, 884 |
| v. Hall, 12 V. 497; 8 R. R. 36 | 6 | | | | 170 |
| | | | • | • | 716 |
| ——— v. Loader, 16 Eq. 49: 42 L. J. | Ch. 113 | | | | 299 |
| a Monk 33 B 410 · 4 Do G | T & S 39 | 88 . | | 296, | |
| v. Newton, 2 B. 112; 8 L. J. | Ch. 306 | | | | 695 |
| v. Taylor, 1 C. & P. 101 | | | | | 524 |
| v. Taylor, 1 C. & P. 101 v. White, 2 Vern. 215; 1 R. F | R. 453; 2 | T. R. 159 | ٠ | | 598 |
| Baldwin v. B., 5 De G. & Sm. 319 . | | | | | 667 |
| v. Belcher, 3 Dr. & War. 176 | ; . | | | 58 | , 62 |
| Baldwyn v. Smith, (1900) 1 Ch. 588; | 69 L. J. | Ch. 336 ; 8 | 32 L. T. | 616; | |
| 48 W. R. 346 | | | | | 387 |
| Balfour v. Carpenter, 1 Phill. Ec. R. | | | | | 523 |
| Balkis Consolidated Co. v. Tomkinson, | (1893) A. | C. 396; 6 | 3 L.J. | | |
| 134 | • | | | 474, | |
| Ball v. B., 2 Si. 35 | | | | | 542 |
| v. Coutts, 1 V. & B. 292 | 10 T T | Oh 200 | . 52 | 5, 527, | |
| v. Kemp-Welch, 14 C. D. 512; | ±э П. J. | он. 528; | 45 L. T | 116 | 228 |

| TO 11 AT 1 AT 10 AT 10 AT 10 AT | PAGE |
|--|-----------------------|
| Ball v. Montgomery, 2 V. 194; 2 R. R. 197 Balls, Re, (1909) 1 Ch. 791; 78 L. J. Ch. 341; 100 L. T. 780 Bamford v. B., 5 Ha. 205. | . 646, 679 |
| | / 1 1 4 1 1 1 |
| Bampfield v. Wyndham, Pr. Ch. 101. | 3. 16 |
| Bank of Africa, Ltd. v. Cohen, (1909) 2 Ch. 129; 78 L. J. C | ch. 767; |
| 100 L. T. 916; 25 T. L. R. 625 | 825 |
| Bank of England v. Cutler, (1908) 2 K. B. 208; 77 L. J. K. | B. 889; |
| 98 L. T. 336; 24 T. L. R. 518 v. Vagliano, (1891) A. C. 160; 60 L. J. Q. | B 145 490 |
| Bank of Ireland v. McCarthy, (1898) A. C. 181; 67 L. J. P. | Č. 13; |
| •77 L. T. 777 | 14 |
| Banks, Re, (1905) 1 Ch. 547; 74 L. J. Ch. 336; 92 L. T. 225 | |
| v. B. 17 B. 352 | 16, 20 |
| | 848 905 |
| v. Sutton, 2 P. W. 700 | . 355, 649 |
| Tr. 73, 10, (1002) 2 Cd. 000, (1111. 0. Ch. 100, 0) II. II. | 102,00 |
| W. R. 663 Bannatyne v. MacIver, (1906) 1 K. B. 103; 75 L. J. K. B. 1 | . 750, 763 |
| L T 150 · 54 W R 293 | 155 |
| Banner, Ex p., 17 C. D. 489; 51 L. J. Ch. 300. | |
| Bannerman's Estate, Re, 21 C. D. 105; 51 L. J. Ch. 449. | 906 |
| L. T. 150; 54 W. R. 293 Banner, Exp., 17 C. D. 489; 51 L. J. Ch. 300. Bannerman's Estate, Re, 21 C. D. 105; 51 L. J. Ch. 449. Barber, Re, 11 C. D. 442 v. B., 3 My. & C. 688; 7 L. J. Ch. 70; 45 R. R. 349 Barclay, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 674; 68 L. J. Ch. 383; 80 L. T. 70 | . 170, 678 |
| | 900 |
| | |
| 747; 93 L. T. 83; 54 W. R. 49 | 477 |
| 747; 93 L. T. 83; 54 W. R. 49 | 914, 916, 917 |
| Barden v. Meagher, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 250 Barham v. Clarendon, 10 Ha. 126; 22 L. J. Ch. 1087; 90 R. | . 846, 847 |
| Baring, Re, (1893) 1 Ch. 61; 62 L. J. Ch. 50; 67 L. T. 702; 4 | n. 505 25 |
| 97 | 0 = 4 |
| v. Ashburton, 54 L. T. 463 | . 459 |
| | . 209, 211 |
| | 387, 391, 392 907 |
| | . 667 |
| v. Rayner, 5 Madd. 208; 2 Russ. 122; 26 R. R. 18 | 867 |
| | 326 |
| Barksdale v. Gilliat, 1 Swans, 362; 18 K. R. 139 | |
| Barlow v. Grant. 1 Vern. 255 | 861 |
| Barnard v. Ford, L. R. 4 Ch. 247; 38 L. J. Ch. 671. | 679 |
| Barlow v. Grant, 1 Vern. 255 Barnard v. Ford, L. R. 4 Ch. 247; 38 L. J. Ch. 671 Barnard v. Ford, (1892) A. C. 328; 61 L. J. Q. B. 728 A. W. Wellyck, (1891) A. C. 328; 61 L. J. Q. B. 721 | . 548,551 |
| v. michigh, (1001) A. C. 000. Of D. O. W. D. (21 | 011.021.001 |
| Barnes v. Racster, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 401; 11 L. J. Ch. 228; 57 401. | R. K. . 40, 57, 60 |
| v. Robinson, 32 L. J. Ch. 143; 11 W. R. 276; 9 Jur. | (N. S.) |
| 245 | . 662, 664 |
| v. Robinson, 32 L. J. Ch. 143; 11 W. R. 276; 9 Jur. 245 | 548 |
| | . 851,853 9 T. W |
| | 29, 748, 752 |
| Barnewall v. Cawdor, 3 Madd. 453 | 32 |
| , | . 24 |
| Barny v. Beak, 2 Ch. Cas. 136 | 307, 324, 326 |
| Barrack v. McCulloch, 3 K. & J. 110, 119; 26 L. J. Ch. 105 | $690^{\circ}733$ |
| The second of th | 747 |
| Barrington, Re, 33 C. D. 523; 56 L. J. Ch. 175 | 88 |
| | 4 |

| | 70.107 |
|---|-----------------------|
| Parimeter a Thiotron 6 V 245, 5 D D 200 | PAGE 893 |
| Barrington v. Tristram, 6 V. 345; 5 R. R. 322. | · (1909) 4 C |
| Barron v. Willis, (1899) 2 Ch. 578; (1900) 2 Ch. 121 271; 68 L. J. Ch. 604; 48 W. R. 26; 81 L. T. 32 | 1 · 15 T L B |
| 468 | 257 284 296 |
| 468 | 173, 464, 466, 467 |
| | |
| v. Manning, W. N. (1878) 122 | 665, 669 679 |
| | |
| | 875 |
| — v. Peruvian Corporation, (1896) 1 Q. B. 209; | 65 L. J. Q. B. |
| 191; 73 L. T. 678; 44 W. R. 487 | 787 |
| Bartholomew v. May, 1 Atk. 487 | \sim |
| Bartlett, Ex p., 2 Coll. 661; 15 L. J. Ch. 418 | 520 |
| | 916 |
| | 878 |
| | 878 168, 177 |
| Barton v. B., 2 Vern. 308 | 575, 580, 586, 588 |
| v. Cooke, 5 V. 461 | 861 |
| v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 24 Q. B. D. 77; 57 L | J. Ch. 676 . 488 |
| Basan v. Brandon, 8 Si. 171; 42 R. R. 147 | |
| Baseley v. B., 4 Cl. & Fin. 378 (n.) | . 525, 528, 530 |
| Basnett v. Moxon, 20 Eq. 182; 44 L. J. Ch. 557 | |
| v. B. & N. W. Ry. Co., 24 Q. B. D. 17; 51 L. Basan v. Brandon, 8 Si. 171; 42 R. R. 147 | 169, 178 |
| Bate, Re, 43 C. D. 600; 59 L. J. Ch. 277 | 31 |
| | |
| Bateman v. Faber, (1898) 1 Ch. 144; 67 L. J. Ch. | 130; 77 L. T. |
| 576; 46 W. R. 215 | 493, 752, 764 |
| v. Hunt, (1904) 2 K. B. 530; 73 L. J. K. 1 | |
| 331; 52 W. R. 609; 20 T. L. R. 628 | 152 |
| v. Roden, 1 Jo. & Lat. 356; 7 Ir. R. Eq. | |
| 253 1 Dom 1925 . 14 D. D. | |
| | |
| Bates, Re, (1907) 1 Ch. 22; 76 L. J. Ch. 29; 95 | 623, 624, 636, 640 |
| T. L. R. 15 | |
| v. Kesterton, (1896) 1 Ch. 159; 65 L. J. Ch. | 78, 82, 83, 88 |
| | |
| v. Mackinley, 31 B. 280; 31 L. J. Ch. 389 | 718, 766 877 |
| Batey, Re, 14 C. D. 579 | 636 |
| Bath r. Bradford, 2 Ves. Sen. 590 | |
| Bathe v. The Bank of England, 4 K. & J. 564; 27 I | L. J. Ch 630 700 |
| Bathurst v. Murray, 8 V. 74: 6 B. R. 230 | 526 528 530 |
| Bathurst r. Murray, 8 V. 74; 6 R. R. 230 . Batt's S. E., Re, (1897) 2 Ch. 65; 66 L. J. Ch. 635 | 704 |
| Batten v. Earnley, 2 P. W. 163 | |
| Batten Pooll v. Kennedy, (1907) 1 Ch. 256; 76 L. J | . Ch. 162 478 |
| Battersea Park Acts, Re, Arnold, Re, 32 B. 591 | |
| Batteste v. Maunsell, 10 Ir. R. Eq. 97, 314 | 367, 391 |
| Batthyany v. Walford, 33 C. D. 624; 36 C. D. 269; | 56 L. J. Ch. 881 795, |
| | 817, 820 |
| Batty v . Lloyd, 1 Vern. 141 | 307, 313, 330 |
| Baudains v. Richardson, (1906) A. C. 169; 75 L. J. 1 | P. C. 57 ; 94 Ĺ. T. |
| 290; 22 T. L. R. 533 | 300 |
| Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils. 320 | 343 |
| Bawden, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 693; 63 L. J. Ch. 412 | 50, 51, 66, 844 |
| Bawtree v. Watson, 3 My. & K. 339 | . 323, 342, 343 |
| Baxter v. Knollys, 1 Ves. Sen. 494 | |
| Bayley v. Bishop, 9 V. 6; 7 R. R. 132 | |
| Baylie v. Quin, 2 Dr. & War. 116 . | . 919 |
| Baylis, Re, (1896) 2 Ch. 107; 65 L. J. Ch. 612; 7 | 4 L. T. 506; 44 |
| W. R. 533 | |
| | |

| | AGE |
|---|------------|
| | 244, |
| 255, | |
| Bellasis v. Ermine, 1 Ch. Cas. 22 | 010 |
| Bellerby v. Rowland & Marwood S S. S. Co., (1902) 2 Ch. 14; 71 | 197 |
| Polymone at D. 10 In. D. For 402 | 788 |
| Polton a Hodges 9 Ping 265, 2 T. T. C. P. 19 | 493 |
| Rely adone at Poshfort 5 Bro P (1900) | 99 |
| L. J. Ch. 541; 86 L. T. 671; 50 W. R. 566. Belmore v. B., 12 Ir. R. Eq. 493 Belton v. Hodges, 9 Bing. 365; 2 L. J. C. P. 19 Belvedere v. Rochfort, 5 Bro. P. C. 299 Benand, Re, 16 W. R. 538 Bence v. Shearman, (1898) 2 Ch. 582; 67 L. J. Ch. 513; 78 L. T. | 599 |
| Banco & Shoarman (1808) 2 Ch 582: 67 L J Ch 513: 78 L T | |
| 804 Bendyshe, Re, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 727 Benn v. Dixon, 10 Si. 636; 9 L. J. Ch. 259; 51 R. R. 328 Bennett, Re, 73 L. T. 17 | 141 - |
| Bendyshe Re 3 Jur (N. S.) 727 661. | 674 |
| Benn v Divon 10 Si 636: 9 L J Ch 259: 51 B. B. 328 | 79 |
| Bennett, Re, 73 L. T. 17 | 178 |
| | 24 |
| ——— v. Bury, 5 C. P. D. 339; 49 L. J. C. P. 411; 42 L. T. 480. | 792 |
| | 108 |
| | 449 |
| v. Lytton, 2 J. & H. 155 | 790 |
| | 247 |
| | 894 |
| Bent v. Cullen, L. R. 6 Ch. 235; 40 L. J. Ch. 250 | 847 |
| Bent v. Cullen, L. R. 6 Ch. 235; 40 L. J. Ch. 250 | 817 |
| Bentham, Re. 94 L. T. 307 | 81 |
| Bentinck v. Fenn. 12 A. C. 652 | 294 |
| v. London J. S. Bank. (1893) 2 Ch. 144: 9 T. L. R. 262 | 489 |
| Bentley, Re, 54 L. J. Ch. 782; 33 W. R. 610 | 718 |
| | 247 |
| Benwell Tower, The, 72 L. T. 670 | 343 |
| Benwell Tower, The, 72 L. T. 670 | 332 |
| v, 17 V. 34; 11 R. R. 12 | 917 |
| v. Fitch, 35 B. 570 | 343 |
| Berdoe v. Dawson, 34 B. 608 | 297 |
| Deresiord v. Armagn, 15 St. 645; 15 L. J. Ch. 255; 60 K. K. 428 | 731 |
| Bergmann v. Macmillan, 17 C. D. 423 | 108 |
| Bergmann v. Macmillan, 17 C. D. 423 | 158 |
| Bernal v. Donegal, 3 Dow. 133. | 332 |
| Bernal v. Donegal, 3 Dow. 133. Bernard, Exp., 6 Ir. Ch. R. 133 Berny v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 14; 2 Ch. R. 396. Bernington v. Evans, 3 T. & C. 384; 51 R. R. 395 | 159 |
| Berny v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 14; 2 Ch. R. 396 307, 312, 318, 3 | 324 |
| Berrington v. Evans, 3 T. & C. 384; 51 R. R. 395 | 20 |
| | 184 |
| Berry v. Gaukroger, (1903) 2 Ch. 116; 72 L. J. Ch. 435; 88 L. T. 521; 51 W. R. 449 | |
| 021; 01 W. R. 449 | 570 |
| v. Mullen, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 368 | 100 |
| 521; 51 W. R. 449 | :07 |
| Dertie v. Lord Falkland, 5 Ch. Ca. 129 | 181 |
| Besant v. Wood, 11 C. D. 519; 12 C. D. 622; 48 L. J. Ch. 497251, 5 | 19, |
| 540, 555, 624, 628, 629, 630, 632, 633, 7 Bestall v. Bunbury, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 318 | |
| Bethune v. Kennedy, 1 My. & C. 114; 43 R. R. 153 81, 86, 8 | 115 |
| Betty, Re, (1899), 1 Ch. 821; 68 L. J. Ch. 435; 80 L. T. 675. | 7-4 |
| D. H | |
| D 1 0 1 0:0 001 | 166 188 |
| TO 1 1 C 4 TO 400 | 511 |
| Beverly, Re, (1901) 1 Ch. 681; 70 L. J. Ch. 295; 84 L. T. 296; 49 | 111 |
| | 92 |
| Beyfus v. Lawley, (1903) A. C. 411; 72 L. J. Ch. 781; 89 L. T. 309; | • |
| 51 W. R. 150 | 32 |
| Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. 391 . 322, 324, 325, 332, 343, 344, 3 | 45 |
| Bibby v. Coulter, Ridg. Cas. t. H. 206 (n.) | |
| , | |

| Bickham r. Cruttwell, 3 My. & C. 763; 7 L. J. Ch. 198; 45 R. 380 | R. | AGE , 20 |
|--|---------|-------------------|
| Biddles v. Jackson, 26 B. 282; 3 De G. & J. 544; 28 L. J. Ch. 40 529, 530, |), 290 |) |
| Biddulph v. B., 12 V. 161. | | 355 |
| Bidweit's Sett., Re, 11 W. R. 161; 32 L. J. Ch. 11 | | 451 |
| | | 55 |
| Bigge, Re, (1907) 1 Ch. 714; 76 L. J. Ch. 413; 96 L. T. 903 . Biggs v. Andrews, 5 Si. 424 | | 851 359 |
| Biggs v. Andrews, 5 St. 424 v. Evans, (1894) 1 Q. B. 88 | • | 485 |
| • v. Feacock, 22 C. D. 284: 52 L. J. Ch. 1 | 368, | 380 |
| Bigland v. Huddleston, 3 Bro. Ch. 285 (n.) | | 457 |
| Bigland v. Huddleston, 3 Bro. Ch. 285 (n.) Bignold, Re, 45c. D. 496; 59 L. J. Ch. 736 | | 897 |
| Bill v. Kynaston, 2 Atk. 82 | | $\frac{847}{905}$ |
| - v The Sierra Nevada &c Co 1 De G E & J 177: 29 L | J | |
| Ch. 176 | | 799 |
| Bindley r. Mulloney, 7 Eq. 343 | 636, | 640 |
| Bingham v. B., 1 Ves. Sen. 126 | • | 243 |
| Binns v. Michols, 2 Eq. 200; 50 H. J. Ch. 650 | 591 | -01 597 |
| | | $\frac{27}{27}$ |
| ———— r. Baker, Mos. 373 | 866, | 868 |
| v. B., 8 P. D. 163; 52 L. J. P. & D. 88 | | 157 |
| —— v. Sherratt, L. R. 2 Ch. 644; 36 L. J. Ch. 925 8 | 349, | 850 |
| Bird Re (1892) 1 Ch 270 : 61 L. J. Ch 288 365 369 5 | | 201 386 |
| | | 91 |
| —— v. Hunsdon, 2 Swans. 342; 19 R. R. 82 | | 588 |
| Bindley r. Mulloney, 7 Eq. 343 Bingham r. B., 1 Ves. Sen. 126 Binns r. Nichols, 2 Eq. 256; 35 L. J. Ch. 635 Birch, Re, 17 B. 358 | . ' | 744 |
| v. Philpott, (1900) 1 Ch. 822; 69 L. J. Ch. 487; 82 L. T. 11 | () | 10 4 |
| Birkett v. B., 98 L. T. 540: 24 T. L. B. 284 | : . | $\frac{32}{747}$ |
| v. Hibbert, 3 M. & K. 227: 3 L. J. Ch. 158. | 525, a | 530 |
| Birmingham v. Kirwan, 2 Sch. & L. 444 | 45, | 455 |
| Birds v. Askey, 24 B. 618 | В. | |
| 28; 92 W. R. 84 | 42, | 101 793 |
| | : ; | 307 |
| Bishop v. B., (1897) P. 138; 66 L. J. P. 69; 76 L. T. 409; 45 W. | R. | |
| 567 | | |
| v. Wall, 3 C. D. 194; 45 L. J. Ch. 773. | | 715 839 |
| Bizzev v. Flight. 3 C. D. 269: 45 L. J. Ch. 852 | | 458 |
| Bishop of Peterboro v. Mortlock, 1 Bro. Ch. 565 Bizzey v. Flight, 3 C. D. 269; 45 L. J. Ch. 852 Blachford, Re, 27 C. D. 676; 54 L. J. Ch. 215. | . (| 909 |
| Black Point Syndicate, Ltd. v. Eastern Concessions, Ltd., 79 L. | T. | |
| 658; 15 T. L. R. 117 | 314, 8 | 816 |
| Blackburne v. Hope Edwardes, (1901) 1 Ch. 419; 70 L. J. Ch. 99 | . : | 285 |
| | ', : | 851 |
| | ŧ50, | |
| Blackie v. Clark, 15 B. 595; 22 L. J. Ch. 377 294, 2 | | |
| | . 69, (| 594 689 |
| | | 866 866 |
| TOLD TO THE POT OF A DOT TOT OF | | 459 |
| Blake, Re, 29 C. D. 913 | . 8 | 820 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | | 733 =00 |
| | | $\frac{520}{872}$ |
| v, 15 C. D. 487; 49 L. J. Ch. 393 870, 8 | ,,,, | نشدا د |

| PA Blake v. Bunbury, 4 Bro. Ch. 21; 1 V. 523; 1 R. R. 111 445, 446, 4- | |
|--|-----------------|
| 450, 4 | |
| Blakely Ordnance Co., Re, L. R. 3 Ch. 154; 37 L. J. Ch. 418 . 145, 1 | 146 |
| Blanchet v. Foster, 2 Ves. Sen. 264 | 549 - 20 |
| | 392 |
| .Diamuloid v. D., (1092) 1. 140, 01 11. 0. 1. 0. 17. 01 | 517 |
| Blann v. Bell, 5 De G. & Sm. 658; 2 De G. M. & G. 775; 21 L. J. Ch. | -ن |
| 311; 90 R. R. 191 | $\frac{3i}{20}$ |
| Blewitt v. Roberts, Cr. & Ph. 274; 4 L. J. Dig. 335 | 46 |
| Bligh v. Darnley, 2 P. W. 619 | |
| Blonmert v. Player 2 S & S 507 | 153 153 |
| | 211 |
| | 100 |
| 205; 45 W. R. 449 | :80 :68 |
| v. Burrow, 1 V. 546; 4 Bro. Ch. 71 | 134 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 175 |
| 205; 45 W. R. 449 | 550 555 |
| | 66 |
| Blunt v. Lack, 26 L. J. Ch. 148 | 6 65 |
| Boazman v. Johnston, 3 Si. 377; 30 R. R. 172. | 14 47 |
| Boddington, Re, 22 C. D. 597; 25 C. D. 685; 53 L. J. Ch. 475 | 30, |
| 9 | 921 |
| Boddy v. Dawes, 1 Keen, 362; 44 R. R. 91 | เบอ เอี0 |
| 851, 9 | |
| Bodicoate v. Steer, Dick. 69 | 15 |
| Bolitho v. Gidley, (1905) A. C. 98; 74 L. J. K. B. 430; 92 L. T. 369; | (59 |
| v. Hillyar, 34 B. 180 | 257 |
| Bolton, Re, W. N. (1888) 243 | 11 |
| | .09 .30 |
| 53 W. R. 498 | 00 |
| 15 W. R. 021 | 0.1 |
| Bond, Re, (1901) 1 Ch. 15, 70 L. J. Ch. 12; 82 L. T. 612; 49 W. R. | 209 |
| 126 | 355 |
| | 71 |
| Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 118 | 662 - 78 |
| Bonham v . Newcomb, 1 Vern. 232 | 10 |
| Donnard v. Dott, (1900) 1 Ch. 140, 10 11. 0. Ch. 440, 54 11. 1. 000, | |
| 22 T. L. R. 399 | |
| | |
| Booker, Re, W. N. (1886) 18 | 149 |
| Booth, Re, (1894) 2 Ch. 282; 63 L. J. Ch. 560. | 346 147 |
| v. Alington, 6 De G. M. & G. 613; 26 L. J. Ch. 138 | 883 |
| v. Coulton, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 207; 30 L. J. Ch. 378 | 85 |
| T 1 0 3 5 0 0 1 - 0 0 7 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | 51 96 |
| —— v. Meyer, 38 L. T. 125 | 591 |
| | |
| Booth's Set. T., Re, 1 W. R. 444 | 28 |

| Boothby v. B., 15 B. 212; 1 Mac. & G. 604; 1 H. & Ty | PAGE TO 914 + Q4 |
|---|--|
| R. R. 193 | 326, 331, 342 |
| R. R. 193 Bootle r. Blundell, 1 Mer. 193, 227; 15 R. R. 938, | |
| Bor v. B., 3 Bro. P. C. 167 | $21,22$ $446^{\circ}455$ 465 |
| Bor v. B., 3 Bro. P. C. 167 | L. T. 638; |
| 49 W. R. 212. Borton v. B., 16 Si. 552; 18 L. J. Ch. 219; 80 R. R. 145 Bosanquet v. Dashwood, Cas. t. Talbot, 40 | . 110 |
| Bosanguet v. Dashwood, Cas. t. Talbot, 40 | 174 |
| Bosvil v_{\bullet} Brander, 1 P. W. 459 | 660 |
| Bosanquet v. Dashwood, Cas. t. Talbot, 40 | 185 |
| Bothamiey v. Snerson, 20 Eq. 504; 44 L. J. Ch. 589 | 839, 855, 873 |
| Bouch v. Sproule, 12 A. C. 385; 56 L. J. Ch. 1037 | 91, 877, 878 |
| Boughton v. B., 1 H. L. Cas. 406; 73 R. R. 116 | . 13, 15, 19 |
| Boulcott r B 2 Drew 25: 23 L J Ch 57 | 460 920 |
| Boulton, Exp., 1 De G. & J. 163; 26 L. J. Bank. 45 . | . 130, 136 |
| Bourdillon v. Adair, 3 Bro. Ch. 237 | 674 |
| Bourne, Re. (1893) 1 Ch. 191: 62 L. J. Ch. 69: 67 L. T. 5 | $\frac{1}{1000}$ |
| v . B., 2 Ha. 35; 11 L. J. Ch. 416; 62 R. R. 7 | . 368, 373 |
| Bouch v. Sproule, 12 A. C. 385; 56 L. J. Ch. 1037. Boughton v. B., 1 H. L. Cas. 406; 73 R. R. 116 —————————————————————————————————— | 171 |
| | 434 |
| Bouverie v. Prentice, 1 Bro. Ch. 200 Bowden v. B., 17 Si. 65; 83 R. R. 286 Bowen, Re, (1892) 2 Ch. 291; 61 L. J. Ch. 432 Bowerman, Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 340; 77 L. J. Ch. 594; 99 L. | . 189, 191 |
| Bowden v. B., 17 Si. 65; 83 R. R. 286 | . 81, 84, 86 |
| Bowerman, Re. (1998) 2 Ch. 340; 77 L. J. Ch. 594; 99 L | T. 7 . 31 |
| Bowerman, Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 340; 77 L. J. Ch. 594; 99 L. Bowes r. Heaps, 3 V. & B. 117; 13 R. R. 162 | 342 |
| Powlby Pa (1904) 9 Ch 685 - 78 T. J. Ch 810 - 91 T. T. | 1. 579 • 59 |
| W. R. 270 | 9, 900, 902, 903 |
| Bowles v. Rump, 9 W. R. 370 | . 209, 212 |
| Bown, Re. 27 C. D. 411: 53 L. J. Ch. 881 | 693, 750, 751 |
| Bowra v. Rhodes, 31 L. J. Ch. 676 | 405 |
| | 216 |
| Box, Re, 1 Hem. & M. 552; 33 L. J. Ch. 42 | 875 |
| v. Barrett, 3 Eq. 244 | 447, 449, 450 |
| v. Jackson, 2 Con. & Law. 605; 1 Drury, 55 | . 669, 672 |
| Boyce v. Corbally, Ll. & G. 102 | 593 |
| Boyd v. Allen, 24 C. D. 622; 53 L. J. Ch. 701 | 209 |
| Bowyer v. Woodman, 3 Eq. 313 | 892 |
| Boyes, Re, 26 C. D. 531; 53 L. J. Ch. 654 | 302 |
| Boynton v. B., 1 Bro. Ch. 445 | 462 |
| | |
| Boys v. B., 28 B. 436 | . 81, 84 |
| v. Williams, 2 Russ. & M. 689; 34 R. R. 178 Boyse, Re, 15 C. D. 591; 49 L. J. Ch. 689 | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Cas. 2 | . 296, 300, 301 |
| Bradford v. Foley, 3 Bro. Ch. 351 (n.) | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| - Danking Oo. v Driggs, 12 M. C. 20, 00 M. C. | 134, 135, 144 |
| Bradlaugh v. Newdegate, 11 Q. B. D. 5; 52 L. J. Q. B. 4 | 154 . 158, 159 |
| Bradley v. B., 51 L. J. P. & M. 87 | 636 |

| | AGE |
|---|-------------------|
| Bradshaw, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 436; 71 L. J. Ch. 230; 86 L. T. 253 . | 462 |
| W. R. 142 | 697 |
| Brady v. Curran, 2 Ir. R. C. L. 14 | 250 |
| Braithwaite v. AG., (1909) 1 Ch. 510; 78 L. J. Ch. 314; 100 L. T. | |
| 599; 25 T. L. R. 333 | 412 |
| Brandon v. Woodthorpe, 10 B. 463 | 175 |
| Brandts v. Dunlop Rubber Co., (1905) A. C. 454; 74 L. J. K. B. | 1 (1 |
| 898; 93 L. T. 495; 21 T. L. R. 710 | 141 |
| Braunstein v. Lewis, 65 L. T. 449 | 726 |
| Braybrooke v. Meredith, 13 Si. 271; 12 L. J. Ch. 289; 60 R. R. 339 | 118 |
| Breadalbane, The Marquis of, v. The Marquis of Chandos, 2 My. & C. | |
| 711; 7 L. J. Ch. 28; 45 R. R. 172 | 794 |
| Brearcliff v. Dorrington, 4 De G. & Sm. 122; 6 L. J. Dig. 14; 87 | |
| R. R. 318 | 135 |
| Breed's Will, Re, 1 C. D. 226; 45 L. J. Ch. 191 Brenchley r. Higgins, 70 L. J. Ch. 788; 83 L. T. 751 | 882 |
| brenchies v. 111ggins, 10 11. 0. Cd. 100, 00 11. 1. 101 . 029, 029, | 336 |
| Brennan v. Moran, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 126 | |
| Breslauer v. Barwick, 24 W. R. 901 | 788 |
| Breslauer v. Barwick, 24 W. R. 901 Breton v. Mockett, 9 C. D. 95; 47 L. J. Ch. 754 Breton's Estate, Re, 17 C. D. 416; 50 L. J. Ch. 369 689, | |
| Bretou's Estate, Re, 17 C. D. 416; 50 L. J. Ch. 369 689, | 772 |
| Brett, Re, 29 L. J. Ch. 297 | |
| —— v. Greenwell, 3 Y. & C. Ex. C. 230 Brettle, Re, 2 De G. J. & S. 79; 33 L. J. Ch. 471 | $\frac{668}{752}$ |
| Briant, Re, 39 C. D. 478; 27 L. J. Ch. 953 . 178, 660, 662, 668, 6 | |
| 670, | |
| Brice v. Bannister, 3 Q. B. D. 569; 47 L. J. Q. B. 722 . 113, 118, | |
| 142, | |
| Bridge v. Beadon, 3 Eq. 664; 36 L. J. Ch. 351 | 128 |
| Bridgeman v. Dove, 3 Atk. 201 Bridger, Re, (1893) 1 Ch. 44; (1894) 1 Ch. 302; 63 L. J. Ch. 18656, | 13 |
| Bridges v. Hales, Mos. 108 | 535 535 |
| | 546 |
| Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sen. 627; Wilm. 58266, 268, 277, 294, | 297 |
| Bridle, Re, 4 C. P. D. 336 | 867 |
| Briggs, Re, 7 T. L. R. 572 | 790 |
| | 887 |
| | 114 |
| Bright v. Larcher, 3 De G. & J. 148; 28 L. J. Ch. 635, 50 K. R. 575 | 380 840 |
| Bright's Trust, Re. 21 B. 434: 25 L. J. Ch. 447 | 131 |
| Brinckman v. B., 3 Atk. 394 | 772 |
| Brine v. Ferrier, 7 Si. 549; 40 R. R. 188 | 919 |
| Briscoe v. B., 7 Ir. R. Eq. 123; 1 Jo. & Lat. 334 | 464 |
| Bristol & Aerated Co. v. Maggs, 44 C. D. 616; 59 L. J. Ch. 472 | 476 |
| Dristow v. D., 5 D. 289; 59 R. R. 501 872, 893, 917, | 920 140 |
| Bristow v. B., 5 B. 289; 59 R. R. 501 872, 893, 917, | $\frac{142}{447}$ |
| British, &c. v. Lamson, &c. Co., (1908) 1 K. B. 1006; 77 L. J. K. B. | **! |
| 649; 98 L. T. 875 | 160 |
| South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique, (1892) 2 | |
| Q. B. 358; (1893) A. C. 602; 63 L. J. Q. B. 70 | |
| | 792 675 |
| 70 1111 1 1 0 0 1 1 - 71 - 71 | 675 907 |
| Broadbent v. Barlow, 3 De G. F. & J. 570; 30 L. J. Ch. 569 . 63, 65, | |
| Broadwood, Re, 1 C. D. 438; 45 L. J. Ch. 168 | 383 |
| Broadwood's S., Re, (1908) 1 Ch. 115; 77 L. J. Ch. 18; 98 L. T. 217 | 90 |

| PAGE | |
|---|--|
| Brocklesby v. Temperance, &c. Socy., (1895) A. C. 173; 64 L. J. Ch. | |
| 433; 72 L. T. 477; 43 W. R. 606 | |
| Brodie v. Barry, 2 V. & B. 127; 13 R. R. 6, 37 | |
| Bromfield, Ex p., 1 V. 455; 3 Bro. Ch. 510; 2 R. R. 126387, 388, 389 | |
| Bromhall v. Wilbraham (at the Rolls, November, 1734) | |
| Bromley v. Brunton, 6 Eq. 275; 37 L. J. Ch. 902 | |
| | |
| | |
| Bronsdon v. Winter, Amb. 57 | |
| Brooks and Examin's Cont. Re (1898) 1 Ch. 647 : 67 L. J. Ch. 979 : | |
| Brooke and Fremlin's Cont., Re, (1898) 1 Ch. 647; 67 L. J. Ch. 272; 78 L. T. 416; 46 W. R. 442 | |
| v. B., 25 B. 342; 27 L. J. Ch. 639 | |
| v. Hickes, 12 W. R. 703 | |
| v. Mostyn, 2 De G. J. & S. 373; L. R. 4 H. L. 304; 34 L. J. | |
| Ch. 65 | |
| v Warwick 1 H & Tw 149: 9 De G & Sm 425: 18 | |
| L. J. Ch. 137; 79 R. R. 270 | |
| Brook v. Hertford, 2 P. W. 518 | |
| L. J. Ch. 137; 79 R. R. 270. 13, 21, 866 Brook v. Hertford, 2 P. W. 518 211, 216 Brooks, Re, 76 L. T. 771 . 892 | |
| v. Reynolds, 1 Bro. Ch. 183 | |
| | |
| Broughton v. Hutt, 3 De G. & J. 501; 28 L. J. Ch. 167 242 | |
| Broun v. Kennedy, 33 B. 133; 4 De G. J. & S. 217 288 | |
| Brown, Re, 13 Q. B. D. 614 | |
| | |
| W. R. 173 | |
| v. Bamford, 11 Si. 127; 12 Si. 616; 1 Pk. 626; 15 L. J. Ch. | |
| 361; 65 R. R. 467 | |
| v. Bateman, L. R. 2 C. P. 272; 36 L. J. C. P. 134 . 108, 112 | |
| v. Digg, 1 v. 200 | |
| v. Diffie, 1 12x, D. 5, 45 13, 6, 12xen, 12x | |
| v 2 Fg 481 456 457 465 | |
| v 7 Eq. 185: 38 L. J. Ch. 153 | |
| v 1 Keen 275: 44 B. R. 84 | |
| v. Bigg, 7 V. 280 | |
| | |
| | |
| v. Dimbleby, (1904) 1 K. B. 28; 73 L. J. K. B. 35; 89 L. T. | |
| | |
| v. Gellatly, L. R. 2 Ch. 751 79, 82, 87, 89 | |
| v. Harper, 68 L. T. 488 | |
| v. Like, 14 V. 302 | |
| v. Peck, 1 Eden, 140 | |
| v. Pocock, 2 My. & K. 189; 4 L. J. Ch. 15 | |
| v. Tanner, L. R. 3 Ch. 597; 37 L. J. Ch. 923; 18 L. T. 624; | |
| 16 W. R. 882 | |
| v. Temperley, 3 Russ. 263 | |
| | |
| & Co. v. Kough, 29 C. D. 848; 54 L. J. Ch. 1024 . 111, 112, | |
| | |
| Browne Re (1903) 1 Ch 188: 72 L L Ch 85 700 710 | |
| | |
| - 2 Groombridge 4 Madd 495 · 20 R R 326 19 865 | |
| Browne, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 188; 72 L. J. Ch. 85 | |
| Browne's Will, Re, 27 B. 324 | |
| Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 A. C. 953 | |
| | |

| P | AGE |
|--|--|
| Brown's Will, Re, 18 C. D. 61; 50 L. J. Ch. 724 | 97 |
| Brummel v. Prothero, 3 V. 111 | 16 |
| Brummell a McPherson 7 V 937 | 526. |
| Brunning Re (1909) 1 Ch 277 · 78 L J Ch 75 : 99 L T. 918 8 | 852 |
| Bryan, Re, 14 C. D. 519; 49 L. J. Ch. 504; 28 W. R. 761 Bryant v. Easterson, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 166; 7 W. R. 298 Brydges v. Phillips, 6 V. 567 Buchanan v. Angus, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 5 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 5 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 5 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 5 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 6 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 7 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 7 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 7 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 7 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374 Buchanan v. Angus, 7 Macq. M. Buchanan v. Buchanan v. Macq. M. Buchanan v. Buchanan | 680 |
| Bryant v. Easterson, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 166; 7 W. R. 298 | 843 |
| Buchenen a Angus 4 Maca H T. Cas 374 | 354 |
| | 105 |
| Buck v. Robson, 3 Q. B. D. 686; 48 L. J. Q. B. 250 | 118 |
| Buck v. Robson, 3 Q. B. D. 686; 48 L. J. Q. B. 250 Buckland v. B., (1900) 2 Ch. 534; 69 L. J. Ch. 648; 82 L. T. 759; | |
| 48 W. R. 637. Buckle, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 286; 63 L. J. Ch. 330 Buckley v. B., 19 L. R. Ir. 544 Buckley's Trusts, Re, 22 C. D. 583; 52 L. J. Ch. 439 Buckmaster v. B., 35 C. D. 22; 13 A. C. 61; 55 L. J. Ch. 826527, 35 | 759 |
| Buckle, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 286; 63 L. J. Ch. 330 | 906 50 |
| Buckley's Trusts. Re. 22 C. D. 583 : 52 L. J. Ch. 439 | 900 |
| Buckmaster v. B., 35 C. D. 22; 13 A. C. 61; 55 L. J. Ch. 826527, | 531 |
| | 631 |
| Buckner v. Royston, Pr. Ch. 285 | 101 |
| Bugden v. Bignold, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 377; 60 R. R. 202 | 57 |
| Building Estates, &c. Co. Re, Parbury's Case, (1896) 1 Ch. 100; 65 L. J. Ch. 104 | 197 |
| Bulkeley v. Stephens, (1896) 2 Ch. 241; 65 L. J. Ch. 597; 74 L. T. | xo i |
| 409; 44 W. R. 490 | 880 |
| Bulkley v. Wilford, 2 Cl. & Fin. 102; 37 R. R. 39 | 289 |
| Bull, Re, 49 L. T. 592 | 27 |
| Buller v. Plunkett, 1 John. & H. 441; 30 L. J. Ch. 641. | 131 |
| Bullock, Re, 60 L. J. Ch. 341; 39 W. R. 472; 64 L. T. 736 . 862, 8 | 564 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | от. Эво |
| Dunbury 0, D., 2 D. 110, 1 D. 000, 0 D. 0. CH. 201, 10 H. 10 Olo | |
| | |
| | 818 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 4 Bunting v. Marriott. 19 B. 163 | 818 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 | 818 431 17 538 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 5 | \$18 431 17 538 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 58 Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 58 Burges v. Booth (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223 386 390; 380 | \$18 431 17 538 373 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 58 Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | \$18 431 17 538 373 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 | \$18 431 17 538 373 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 | \$18 431 17 538 373 391 411 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 | \$18 431 17 538 373 391 411 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 | \$18 431 17 538 373 391 411 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 | \$18 431 17 538 373 391 411 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 5 Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | 818 431 17 538 373 391 411 485 124 486 325 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 5 Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | 818 431 17 538 373 391 411 485 124 486 325 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 5 Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | 818 431 17 538 373 391 411 485 124 486 325 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 331 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | 818 431 17 538 373 391 411 485 486 825 494 401 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 32 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | 818 431 17 538 373 391 411 485 459 460 124 825 694 401 151 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 5 Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | \$18 431 17 538 373 391 411 485 524 486 325 491 151 111, |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 32 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20 | 818 431 17 538 3373 391 411 485 485 481 485 481 485 481 481 485 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 32 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20 | 818 17 538 373 391 891 485 124 885 124 131 111, 20 67 225 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 9 | \$18 431 17 538 373 391 411 485 459 486 325 491 411, 20 667 70 668 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 . 5 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 | 818 17 538 373 391 891 485 124 885 124 131 111, 20 67 225 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 5 Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 5 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 32 2 v. Robinson, 3 Mer. 9 5 2 v. Robinson, 3 Mer. 9 7 2 v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177 7 355, 48 Burgis v. Constantine, (1908) 2 K. B. 484; 77 L. J. K. B. 1045; 99 L. T. 490; 24 T. L. R. 682 7 Burke v. Greene, 2 Ball & B. 521 7 355, 48 Burke v. Greene, 2 Ball & B. 521 7 357, 48 Burkinshaw v. Nicolls, 3 A. C. 204; 47 L. J. Ch. 415 7 Burkinshaw v. Nicolls, 3 A. C. 204; 47 L. J. Ch. 591 797, 88 Burleton v. Humphrey, Amb. 286 7 Burleton v. Humphrey, Amb. 286 7 Burley v. Evelyn, 16 Si. 290; 80 R. R. 74 Burlinson v. Hall, 12 Q. B. D. 347; 53 L. J. Q. B. 222 7 Burn v. Carvalho, 4 My. & C. 690; 9 L. J. Ch. 65; 48 R. R. 213 | 818 177 538 3373 391 485 491 485 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 8 8 v. Robinson, 3 Mer. 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 | \$18 17 538 373 391 411 485 494 401 451 451 467 468 432 460 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 | \$18 17 538 3391 411 485 486 4825 491 485 491 485 491 485 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 491 |
| Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231; 17 R. R. 497 426, 429, 48 Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163 Burbridge, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 426; 71 L. J. Ch. 271; 86 L. T. 331 8 Burgess v. Lamb, 16 V. 180; 10 R. R. 150 8 Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; 78 L. J. Ch. 32 223, 386,390, 38 | \$18 17 538 373 391 411 485 494 401 451 451 467 468 432 460 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 |

| TO VOLUME I. | | xxxi |
|---|---|--|
| | | PAGE |
| Burton v. Hodsoll, 2 Si. 24 | | . 359 |
| v. Knowlton, 3 V. 107; 3 R. R. 62 | • ' | . 15 |
| v. Mount, 2 De G. & Sm. 383; 79 R. R. 257 | • | 81, 84 |
| - v. Pierpoint, 2 P. W. 79 Burton's Will, Re, (1892) 2 Ch. 38; 61 L. J. Ch. 702 | • | . 53 . 901 |
| Bury v. Oppenheim, 26 B. 594 | • | . 282 |
| Busby v. Seymour, 1 Jo. & Lat. 527; 68 R. R. 331 | | . 48 |
| Busfield, Re, 32 C. D. 123; 55 L. J. Ch. 467 | | . 825 |
| Bushby v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297; 21 R. R. 294 | | . 794 |
| Butcher v ₂ B., 14 B. 222 Bute v. Cunynghame, 2 Russ. 275; 26 R. R. 72 | | . 763 |
| Bute v. Cunynghame, 2 Russ. 275; 26 R. R. 72 | | |
| | . 18 | อ เด 189 |
| R. R. 475 Butler, Re, (1894) 3 Ch. 250; 33 L. J. Ch. 362 . 17, 21, 23, | 31 32. | 33. 50 |
| Butler v. B., 14 Q. B. D. 831; 16 Q. B. D. 378; 55 L. J. | Q. B. 5 | 5 5 |
| 694 695 795 797 | -733 - 73 | 34 74() |
| v. Cumpston, 7 Eq. 16; 38 L. J. Ch. 35 | | . 747 |
| v. Freeman, Amb. 301 | 525, 52 | 26, 533 |
| | 150 1 | . 525 |
| Butler's T., Re, 3 L. R. Ir. 89 | 172, 1 | 10, 110 68 177 |
| Proteinles of Prodhumet 2 Res Ch. 90: 2 R. R. 100 | . 1 | 464 |
| Buttenshaw v. Martin John 89 | | . 762 |
| - Ryam a: Munton 1 Russ & M. 505 : 8 L. J. Un. 150 : 52 f | i. n. 20 | 0400 |
| | | . 851 |
| Byrne v. Carew, 13 Ir. R. Eq. 1 | . 6 | 36, 640 |
| —— v. Sutton, 19 B. 556 | • | . 534 |
| | | |
| | | |
| С. | | |
| | • | . 766 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556 | . 78, | . 766 84, 85 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556 | . 620. 6 | 19, 102 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556 | , 62ə, 6 , 430, 4: | 19, 102 33, 435 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C. 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 | 19, 152 33, 435 1579, |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C. 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 | 19, 152 33, 435 1579, |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C. 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312: 11 L. J. Ch. 414: 57 | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 | 19, 152 33, 435 1579, |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan Re 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 | , 625, 6 , 430, 4 R. R. 34 85, 87, | 19, 152 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 Callisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292. Callisher v. Bischoffsheim L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. 1 | , 625, 6 , 430, 4: R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 | 19, 152 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 131 547 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 L. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 85, 87, | 19, 102 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 131 547 242 669 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 L. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 85, 87, | 19, 102 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 131 547 242 669 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 L. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 85, 87, | 19, 102 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 131 547 242 669 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 L. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 85, 87, | 19, 102 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 131 547 242 669 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 L. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 85, 87, | 19, 102 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 131 547 242 669 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 L. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. | , 625, 6 , 430, 43 R. R. 34 85, 87, | 19, 102 33, 435 4579, 89, 91 131 547 242 669 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 I. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292. Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 Calmady v. C., 2 V. 568 Calvert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446 Cameron, Re, 26 C. D. 19; 53 L. J. Ch. 1139 Campbell, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 214; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 ——————————————————————————————————— | , 622, 6 , 430, 4; R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 | 18, 62 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 131 547 242 669 725 04, 206 55 407 27, 30 909 763 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 | , 622, 6 , 430, 4; R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 , 199, 2: | 18, 62 33, 435 5579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 242 . 669 . 725 04, 206 . 407 27, 30 . 763 . 763 . 763 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 d. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. 10 Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154 v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 Calmady v. C., 2 V. 568 Calvert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446 Cameron, Re, 26 C. D. 19; 53 L. J. Ch. 1139 Campbell, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 214; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 (1893) 3 Ch. 468; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 v. Bainbridge, 6 Eq. 269; 37 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40; 3 L. J. K. B. 136; 194 | , 622, 6 , 430, 4; R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 , 199, 2; | 18, 62 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 242 . 669 . 725 04, 206 . 407 27, 30 . 909 . 763 3. . 476 76, 680 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556 . Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 . Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 . Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. D. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154 | , 622, 6 , 430, 4: R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 , 199, 2: 53 R. F. | 18, 622 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 131 547 2442 669 725 04, 206 55 27, 30 27, 30 27, 36 680 3. 476 680 3. |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 d. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 . Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 Calmady v. C., 2 V. 568 . 197 Calwert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446 Cameron, Re, 26 C. D. 19; 53 L. J. Ch. 1139 . Campbell, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 214; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 (1893) 3 Ch. 468; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 v. Bainbridge, 6 Eq. 269; 37 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40; 3 L. J. K. B. 136; 194 v. French, 3 V. 323; 4 R. R. 5 v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; 9 L. J. Ch. 234; 244 | , 622, 6 , 430, 4: R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 , 199, 2: 53 R. F. | 18, 622 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 242 . 669 . 725 04, 206 . 55 . 407 27, 30 . 909 . 763 3. . 476 768 3. . 476 38, 872 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57; Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292. Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 Calmady v. C., 2 V. 568 Calvert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446 Cameron, Re, 26 C. D. 19; 53 L. J. Ch. 1139 Campbell, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 214; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 , (1893) 3 Ch. 468; 62 L. J. Ch. 878 v. Bainbridge, 6 Eq. 269; 37 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40; 3 L. J. K. B. 136; 194 v. French, 3 V. 323; 4 R. R. 5 v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; 9 L. J. Ch. 234; 244 v. Ingilby, 1 De G. & J. 393; 26 L. J. Ch. 654 | , 622, 6 , 430, 4: R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 . , 199, 2: 53 R. F 674, 6 32 R. F | 18, 622 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 242 . 669 . 725 04, 206 . 407 27, 309 . 763 3. . 476 680 3. 38, 872 . 456 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 | , 622, 6 , 430, 4: R. R. 34 85, 87, B. 181 . , 199, 2: 53 R. F 674, 6 32 R. F | 18, 622 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 242 . 649 . 725 04, 206 . 55 . 407 27, 30 . 763 3. . 476 76, 680 3. 3. 3. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292. Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154. v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 Calmady v. C., 2 V. 568 Calvert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446 Cameron, Re, 26 C. D. 19; 53 L. J. Ch. 1139 Campbell, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 214; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 (1893) 3 Ch. 468; 62 L. J. Ch. 878 v. Bainbridge, 6 Eq. 269; 37 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40; 3 L. J. K. B. 136; 194 v. French, 3 V. 323; 4 R. R. 5 v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; 9 L. J. Ch. 654 v. Mackay, 2 My. & C. 34; 45 R. R. 1 v. Mackay, 2 My. & C. 34; 45 R. R. 1 | 53 R. F 674, 6 674, 6 632 R. F 645, 5 | 18, 622 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 242 . 669 . 725 04, 206 . 407 27, 309 . 763 3. . 476 680 3. 38, 872 . 456 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 d. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154 v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 Calmady v. C., 2 V. 568 Calvert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446 Cameron, Re, 26 C. D. 19; 53 L. J. Ch. 1139 Campbell, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 214; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 (1893) 3 Ch. 468; 62 L. J. Ch. 878 v. Bainbridge, 6 Eq. 269; 37 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40; 3 L. J. K. B. 136; 194 v. French, 3 V. 323; 4 R. R. 5 v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; 9 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Ingilby, 1 De G. & J. 393; 26 L. J. Ch. 654 v. Mackay, 2 My. & C. 34; 45 R. R. 1 v. Netterville, 2 V. 530; 10 V. 243 Rampion v. Cotton, 17 V. 273 | 53 R. F 674, 6 32 R. F. 3 545, 5 | 18, 622 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 242 . 669 . 725 04, 206 . 55 . 407 27, 300 . 763 3. . 476 768 38, 872 . 456 46, 547 . 591 . 17, 918 . 771 |
| C.'s Sett., Re, 56 L. J. Ch. 556. Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; 71 R. R. 17 Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420 . 250, 251, 257, 379, 493, 624. Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; 65 L. J. Q. B. 587428 Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; 11 L. J. Ch. 414; 57 d. Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; 41 L. J. Ch. 56 Callaghan, Re, 28 C. D. 186; 54 L. J. Ch. 292 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. I. Callow v. C., 55 L. T. 154 v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 71 Calmady v. C., 2 V. 568 Calvert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446 Cameron, Re, 26 C. D. 19; 53 L. J. Ch. 1139 Campbell, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 214; 62 L. J. Ch. 594 (1893) 3 Ch. 468; 62 L. J. Ch. 878 v. Bainbridge, 6 Eq. 269; 37 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40; 3 L. J. K. B. 136; 194 v. French, 3 V. 323; 4 R. R. 5 v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; 9 L. J. Ch. 634 v. Ingilby, 1 De G. & J. 393; 26 L. J. Ch. 654 v. Mackay, 2 My. & C. 34; 45 R. R. 1 v. Netterville, 2 V. 530; 10 V. 243 Rampion v. Cotton, 17 V. 273 | 53 R. F 674, 6 32 R. F. 3 545, 5 | 18, 622 33, 435 1579, 89, 91 . 131 . 547 . 2442 . 669 . 725 04, 206 . 55 . 407 27, 30 . 763 3. . 476 76, 680 3. 38, 872 . 456 446, 547 . 591 17, 918 |

| G | PAGE |
|--|--|
| Cannon v. Johnson, 11 Eq. 90; 40 L. J. Ch. 46 | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| Canterbury v. Cooper, 99 L. T. 612; 100 L. T. 597. | 480 |
| Cant's Estate, Re, 4 De G. & J. 503; 1 Gif. 12; 28 L. | |
| Cape v. C., 2 Y. & C. Ex. C. 543; 47 R. R. 458 | 691 |
| Capron v. C., 17 Eq. 288; 43 L. J. Ch. 677 | |
| Carden, Ex p., 52 Sol. Jo. 209 | 340 |
| Carey, Re, 10 Q. B. D. 454; 52 L. J. Q. B. 442 | |
| | . • . • 646 |
| v. Leighton, 3 Mer. 671 | . 108 |
| Culturation C. Cocy J III C. Cocy , In C. | . 844, 849, 892 |
| Carnegie v. C., 22 W. R. 595 | |
| | |
| Carr v. Eastabrooke, 4 V. 146 | 379 |
| r. Ingleby, 1 De G. & Sm. 362 (n.) | 852 |
| v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 316; 44 L. | |
| M 1 10 W 77 0 D D 10 | 474, 485 |
| | . 169, 682 |
| Carringtons, Ltd. v. Smith, (1906) 1 K. B. 79; 75 L. | J. K. B. 49 |
| 93 L. T. 779 : 54 W. R. 424 ; 22 T. L. R. 109 | 338, 340 |
| Carritt, Goods of, Re, 66 L. T. 379 | 918 |
| Carron Co. v. Hunter, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 362 | 877 |
| Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. C. 416; 24 L. J. | |
| Carshalton, &c., Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 62; 77 L. J. Ch. 550; | 797, 798 |
| 24 T. L. R. 547 | |
| Carte v. C., 3 Atk. 174; Amb. 28 | 870 |
| Carter, Re, 41 W. R. 140 | 82 |
| Carter, Re, 41 W. R. 140 | 33 |
| v. Haswell, 26 L. J. Ch. 576 | |
| 239; 51 W. R. 520 | |
| v. Salt, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 97 | 850 |
| v. Silber, (1891) 3 Ch. 553; (1892) 2 Ch. 278; | (1893) A. C. |
| 360; 61 L. J. Ch. 401 | . 447, 467 |
| v. Taggart, 1 De G. M. & G. 286; 16 Si. 423; | 21 L. J. Ch. |
| 216; 90 R. R. 6 | 817 |
| - Cartwright 6, C., 5 De G. M. & G. 364, 24 D. 5. Ch. 5 | TI, OU M. M. |
| 498 | . 580, 640, 641 |
| 498 | 823 |
| Corresponding Property Property N. 2011, O. I. T. Ch. 10. | . 196, 210, 212 |
| Carver v. Bowles, 3 Russ. & M. 304; 9 L. J. Ch. 19; | 54 n. n. 102400, 462 |
| Casamajor r. Strode, 19 V. 391 (n.) | |
| | 208, 209 |
| Cass v. Wood, 30 L. T. 670 Cassidy v. Belfast B. Co., 22 L. R. Ir. 68 . Castell & Brown, Ltd., Re. (1898) 1 Ch. 315 : 67 L. J. | 435 |
| | Ch. 169; 78 |
| L. T. 109; 46 W. R. 248 | 110 153 |
| Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 386 | 856, 858, 859 |
| Castleton (Lord) v. Fanshaw (Lord), 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 29 | 8 831 |
| Castleton (Lord) v. Fanshaw (Lord), 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 29: Catherine Strong, Re, 26 L. J. Ch. 64 | |
| Cate v. Irving, 5 De G. & Sm. 210; 21 L. J. Ch. 675; | 90 R. R. 62138 |
| Caton v. Rideout, 1 Mac. & G. 599; 19 L. J. Ch. 408; | 54 R. R. 189730, 731, 732 |
| Cator v. Mason, 2 W. R. 667 | |
| | |



| | PAGE |
|--|-------------------|
| Catterina Chiazzare, The, 1 P. D. 368; 45 L. J. P. & D. 105 | 797 |
| Cattley v. Arnold, 4 K. & J. 595: 28 L. J. Ch. 352 | 210 |
| Catton v. Banks, (1893) 2 Ch. 224; 62 L. J. Ch. 600 | 7, 228 |
| Catt's Trust, Re, 2 Hem. & M. 52; 33 L. J. Un. 495 | 580 5, 448 |
| Cavan v. Pulteney, 2 V. 560; 3 R. R. 8; 3 V. 384 446 Cave v. C., 15 B. 227 | 529 |
| | 3, 145 |
| ———— v. C., L. R. 10 Ch. 319 | 226 |
| Cawley v. Poole, 1 Hem. & M. 50 | 257 |
| Cayley, Re. (1904) 2 Ch. 781; 74 L. J. Ch. 31; 53 W. R. 144. | 906 |
| • Cecil v. Juxon, 1 Atk. 278 | 746 |
| Cercle Restaurant, &c., Co. v. Lavery, 18 C. D. 555; 50 L. J. Ch. 837 | 785 |
| | 477 |
| Chadwin, Ex v., 3 Swans, 380: 19 R. R. 219 | 884 |
| Chaffers v. Goldsmid, (1894) 1 Q. B. 186; 63 L. J. Q. B. 59; 70 | |
| L. T. 24; 42 W. R. 239 | 791 |
| |), 381 |
| Chalmers v. Storil, 2 V. & B. 222 | $\frac{462}{383}$ |
| Chambers v. C., 15 Si. 183; 15 L. J. Ch. 318; 74 R. R. 56 | 79 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 640 |
| ———— v. Crabbe, 34 B, 457 | , 647 |
| | |
| Champion, Re, (1893) 1 Ch. 101; 62 L. J. Ch. 372 | 856 |
| Champney, Ex p., Dick. 350 | $545 \\ 3, 88$ |
| Chandler v. Pocock, 15 C. D. 491; 16 C. D. 648; 49 L. J. Ch. 442 | 355. |
| 358 | , 379 |
| Chantrell, Re, (1907) W. N. 213 | 24 |
| Chaplin v. Brammall, (1908) 1 K. B. 233; 77 L. J. K. B. 366; 97 | |
| L. T. 860 | ł, 297 |
| | 32 358 |
| Chapman, Re. 15 Eq. 75: 42 L. J. Bank, 38 | 797 |
| Chapman, Re, 15 Eq. 75; 42 L. J. Bank. 38 | 835 |
| v. Hart. 1 Ves. Sen. 271 | 866 |
| v. Michaelson, (1909) 1 Ch. 238; 78 L. J. Ch. 272; 100 L. T. 109; 25 T. L. R. 101. | |
| L. T. 109; 25 T. L. R. 101 | 341 |
| | 579 |
| Chappell v. Rees, 1 De G. M. & G. 393 | 2. 908 |
| Charlemont v. Spencer, 11 L. R. Ir. 347 | 715 |
| Charlesworth v. Holt, 9 Exch. 38 | 637 |
| Charlton v. Coombes, 32 L. J. Ch. 284; 11 W. R. 1038 | 586 |
| v. — 4 Gif. 382 Charriere, Re, (1896) 1 Ch. 912; 65 L. J. Ch. 460; 74 L. T. 650; 44 | 597 |
| W. R. 539 | 233 |
| Chartered Bank, &c. v. Henderson, L. R. 5 P. C. 501 | 146 |
| Chatteris v. Young, 2 Russ. 184; 26 R. R. 44 | 921 |
| Chauncy v. Graydon, 2 Atk. 616 | |
| Chave v. C., 2 John. & H. 713 (n.) | 451 |
| Chaworth v. Beech, 4 V. 555 | , 876 |
| Chaytor, Re, (1905) 1 Ch. 233; 74 L. J. Ch. 106; 92 L. T. 290; 53 W. R. 251 | 3. 88 |
| Cheadle, Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 620; 69:L. J. Ch. 753; 83 L. T. 297; 49 | ٥, ٥٠ |
| W. R. 88 | 860 |
| Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 V. 46; 6 R. R. 212 | 188 |
| Cherry v. Mott, 1 My. & C. 123; 5 L. J. Ch. 65; 43 R. R. 156 | 55 |
| Chesham, (Lord) Re, 31 C. D. 466; 55 L. J. Ch. 401 446 | , 448 |
| W. & T.—VOL. I, | |

| | GE |
|--|-------------------|
| Chessum & Sons v. Gordon, (1901) 1 K. B. 694; 70 L. J. K. B. 394; |)52 |
| 84 L. T. 137; 49 W. R. 309 | 196 |
| Onester v. Fainter, 21. W. 566. | 33 |
| v. Hrwick. 23 B. 402 | 337 |
| Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 126 | 599 |
| Chesterfield's T., Re, 24 C. D. 643; 52 L. J. Ch. 958 | 90 |
| Chesterfield's T., Re, 24 C. D. 643; 52 L. J. Ch. 958 Chetwynd v. Fleetwood, 4 Bro. P. C. 435. Chichester v. Bickerstaff, 2 Vern. 295 v. Quatrefages, (1895) P. 186; 64 L. J. P. & D. 75. Chidgev v. Whitby, 41 L. J. Ch. 699. | 157 |
| Chichester v. Bickerstaff, 2 Vern. 295 | 379 |
| v. Quatrefages, (1895) P. 186; 64 L. J. P. & D. 75. |)18 |
| Chidgey v. Whitby, 41 L. J. Ch. 699 | 398• |
| China Steamship Co., Re, 7 Eq. 240; 38 L. J. Ch. 199 | 145 |
| | 787 |
| (1881) 89 | 101 |
| 253 46 47 | 67 |
| 253 | 722 |
| Chisholm, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 82; 70 L. J. Ch. 533 Chitty v. Parker, 2 V. 271 Choat v. Yeates, 1 J. & W. 102; 20 R. R. 239 Cholmely v. C., 2 Vern. 82 | 104 |
| Choat v. Yeates, 1 J. & W. 102; 20 R. R. 239 | 21 |
| Cholmely v. C., 2 Vern. 82 | 71 |
| Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 4 Bli. 1; 22 R. R. 84 | 162 |
| Chown v. Parrott, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 74; 32 L. J. C. P. 197 | 249 |
| Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 4 Bli. 1; 22 R. R. 84 Chown v. Parrott, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 74; 32 L. J. C. P. 197 Chowne v. Baylis, 31 B. 351; 31 L. J. Ch. 757. Christianshyer, The 10 P. D. 141; 54 L. J. Ad. 81; 53 L. T. 612 | 114 |
| | |
| Christie v. Tauuton, (1893) 2 Ch. 175; 62 L. J. Ch. 385 |)93 [49 |
| v Stretch 9 Eq. 559: 39 L. J. Ch. 329 | 125 |
| Chubb v. Pettipher, W. N., (1872) 110 | 198 |
| | 162 |
| v. C., 5 Eq. 44; 37 L. J. Ch. 92 | 771 |
| | |
| Citizens Bank, &c. v. First National Bank, L. R. 6 H. L. 352; 43 L. J. Ch. 269 | 178 |
| Orty Bank, Exp., L. R. 3 Ch. 762 | i 4 6 |
| | 63 |
| L. J. Ch. 269 | 144 |
| Clarendon w Hornby 1 P W 446 |)15 |
| Clarges v. Albemarle 2 Vern. 247 | 771 |
| Clarges v. Albemarle, 2 Vern. 247 | $5\overline{4}$ |
| | |
| W. R. 678 | 735 |
| v. Browne, 2 Sm. & G. 524 | 867 |
| v. C., 10 P. D. 193; 54 L. J. P. & D. 57625, 626, 629, 631, 6 | |
| v, 4 Giff. 702 | 33 |
| | 200 200 |
| v. Girdwood, 7 C. D. 9; 47 L. J. Ch. 116 | 155 155 |
| v. Hall, 24 I. R. Ir. 316 | 180 |
| v. Malpas, 4 De G. F. & J. 401; 31 B. 80; 31 L. J. Ch. 696 . 2 | 96. |
| 325, 8 | |
| | 396 |
| Clarke, Re, 18 C. D. 162; 50 L. J. Ch. 733 | 880 |
| , Re, 21 C. D. 821; 51 L. J. Ch. 762 518, 519, 547, 8 | |
| TO OF OUT WAS | 119 |
| | 751 |
| v. Berkeley, 2 Vern. 720 | |
| v. Clayton, 2 Gif. 333 | 835 919 |
| v. Cobley, 2 Cox, 173; 2 R. R. 25. | $\frac{212}{192}$ |
| v. Franklin, 4 Kay & J. 257; 27 L. J. Ch. 557 . 359, 372, 3 | |
| | |

| C1 7 C1 2 TT 2 3 TT 4 T4 | | PAGE |
|--|---|---|
| Clarke v. Green, 2 Hem. & M. 474 | • | 180 |
| —— v. Ormonde, Jac. 108; 23 R. R. S, 143 . | | . 788, 821 |
| v. Parker, 19 V. 1; 12 R. R. 124 58 | 31, 591, | 592, 593, 594 |
| v. Pistor, 3 Bro. Ch. 568 | | 755 |
| u Woodward 25 R 455 | | 175 |
| v. Yonge, 5 B. 523. | | 188 |
| Clavering v. Ellison, 3 Drew. 451; 8 De G. M. & G. | $669 \cdot 7^{\circ}$ | H T. C. |
| 707. 90 T. I Ch 761 | 002, 1. | |
| 707; 29 L. J. Ch. 761. | 0017 | . 520, 580 |
| v. Yorke, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 363 (n.); 70 R. R. | 204 (n. | |
| Clayton v. Cookes, 2 Atk. 449 | | 187 |
| Cleaver v. Mutual, &c., (1892) 1 Q. B. 147; 61 L. J. | Q. B. 1 | 28 	 . 	 709 |
| Clement Parson's Case, 8 Co. 142 | | 779 |
| Clements, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 665; 63 L. J. Ch. 326 . | | 903 |
| v. Matthews, 11 Q. B. D. 808 : 52 L. J. Q. | B. 772 | 119 |
| Clementson v. Gandy, 1 Keen, 309; 5 L. J. Ch. 260 Cleveland, Re, (1895) 2 Ch. 542; 65 L. J. Ch. 29 | • | |
| Cleveland Re (1895) 2 Ch. 542 · 65 L. J. Ch. 29 | | ga |
| Cleveland's S. E., Re, (1893) 3 Ch. 244; 62 L. J. Ch. Cliff, Re, (1895) 2 Ch. 25; 61 L. J. Ch. 397 | 055 | 255 260 250 |
| Oliff Do (1905) 9 Ch 95 . 61 T. T. Ch. 207 | 900 . | 999, 908, 918 |
| Olim, ne, (1895) 2 Ch. 25; 01 11. 5. Ch. 39; | | 820 |
| Clifford v. Beaumont, 4 Russ. 323; 28 R. R. 111 | 911, | 581, 583, 596 |
| v. C., 9 P. D. 76; 53 L. J. P. & D. 68. | | 632, 637, 638 |
| Clifford v. Beaumont, 4 Russ. 325; 28 R. R. 111 v. C., 9 P. D. 76; 53 L. J. P. & D. 68. Clifton v. Cockburn, 3 M. & K. 76 Cline's Estate. Re. 18 Eq. 213 | | . 247, 254 |
| Cline's Estate, Re, 18 Eq. 213 | | 879 |
| Clinton v. Hooper, 1 V. 173; 3 Bro. Ch. 201; 1 R. E. Clive v. Carew, 1 John. & H. 199; 28 L. J. Ch. 685 v. C., Kay, 600; 23 L. J. Ch. 981 v, L. R. 7 Ch. 433; 41 L. J. Ch. 386; 26 L. | 102 | 734 |
| Clive v. Carew. 1 John. & H. 199: 28 L. J. Ch. 685 | | 727 |
| v C Kay 600: 23 L J Ch 981 | • | 975 903 |
| " — I. P. 7 Ch 433: 41 L. I. Ch 386: 26 L. | TT 400 | . 010,000 |
| Olahamman Taranan Prasm 95 | 1. 400 | 880 |
| Cloberry v. Lampen, Freem. 25 | • | 889 |
| Clothier v. Chapman, 14 East, 551 (n.); 12 R. R. 543 | | 189 |
| Clough v. U., 3 My. & K. 296 | • | 869 |
| Clothier v. Chapman, 14 East, 331 (n.); 12 R. R. 543 Clough v. C., 3 My. & K. 296 v. Lambert, 10 Si. 174; 51 R. R. 227 | 618, | 619, 622, 636 |
| Clowes, Re, (1893) 1 Ch. 214 | | 871 |
| —— v. C., 1 Curt. 145 | | . 615 |
| Clutterbuck v. C., 1 My. & K. 15; 2 L. J. Ch. 113. | | 20, 21 . 20, 872 |
| Coard v. Holderness, 22 B, 391. | | 20 872 |
| v. C., 1 Curt. 145 | • | . 453 |
| Cobbett v. Brock, 20 B. 524 | • | . 453 . 293 |
| Cobhain v. Dalton, L. R. 10 Ch. 655; 44 L. J. Ch. 709 | | D 005 500 |
| Coole v. C. 12 W. D. 100 | 2; 20 11 | |
| Cock v. C., 13 W. R. 188 | | 639 |
| v. Cooke, L. R. 1 P. & D. 241 | | . 426 |
| v. Richards, 10 V. 429; 8 R. R. 23 | | 599 |
| | | |
| Cockayne v. Harrison, 13 Eq. 432, 42 In. 3. Cm. 660 | | 843 |
| Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 460 | | 843 289 |
| Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 46 Cockcroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 | · · | 843 289 31, 361, 363 |
| Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 46 Cockcroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; 21 L. J. Ch. 545. | | 843 289 31, 361, 363 142, 160 |
| Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 46 Cockcroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; 21 L. J. Ch. 545 Cockerell, Exp., 4 C. P. D. 39 | | |
| Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 46 Cockcroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; 21 L. J. Ch. 545 Cockerell, Ex p., 4 C. P. D. 39 | | 31, 361, 363 . 142, 160 |
| Cockeroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 545 Cockerolt, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; 21 L. J. Ch. 545 Cockerell, Ex p., 4 C. P. D. 39 Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. Sen. 401 Cockerolt, Cockerolt, C. 14 Si 248 | | 31, 361, 363 . 142, 160 . 179 |
| Cockayne v. Harrison, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 660 Cockeroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; 21 L. J. Ch. 545 Cockerell, Ex p., 4 C. P. D. 39 Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. Sen. 401 Cockran v. C., 14 Si. 248 | | 31, 361, 363 142, 160 179 282 80, 838 |
| — v. Richards, 10 V. 429; 8 R. R. 23. Cockayne v. Harrison, 13 Eq. 432; 42 L. J. Ch. 660 Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 46 Cockeroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; 21 L. J. Ch. 545. Cockerell, Ex p., 4 C. P. D. 39. Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. Sen. 401 Cockran v. C., 14 Si. 248. Cocks v. Foley, 1 Vern. 359 | | |
| Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 660 Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449; 51 L. J. Ch. 46 Cockcroft, Re, 24 C. D. 94; 52 L. J. Ch. 811 Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; 21 L. J. Ch. 545 Cockerell, Ex p., 4 C. P. D. 39 Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. Sen. 401 Cockran v. C., 14 Si. 248 Cocks v. Foley, 1 Vern. 359 Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 Cocksedge v. C. C. Dig. 140 | | |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 . Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 | : 34 T. | Т 221 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 . Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648. | ; 34 L. ; 34 L. | T. 221; |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 . Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648 . 44 v. Lindsav, L. R. 8 Ch. 592 : L. R. 7 H. | ; 34 L. 17, 448, L. 854 | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 . Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648 . 44 v. Lindsav, L. R. 8 Ch. 592 : L. R. 7 H. | ; 34 L. 17, 448, L. 854 | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648 | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 . Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648 . v. Lindsay, L. R. 8 Ch. 592; L. R. 7 H. Coffin v. Cooper, 14 V. 205; 9 R. R. 274 Cogan v. Stevens, 1 B. 482 (n.): 5 L. J. Ch. 17: 42 R. | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 . 591 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648 | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, R. 258 | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 . 591 . 403, 405 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648 | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, R. 258 | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 . 591 . 403, 405 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, R. 258 Bank. 12 0, 319, | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 . Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648. 44 . | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, R. 258 Bank. 12 0, 319, | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 . 591 . 403, 405 6. 793 320, 323, 344 . 345, 600 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 . Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 24 W. R. 648. 44 . | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, R. 258 Bank. 12 0, 319, | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 . 591 . 403, 405 6. 793 320, 323, 344 . 345, 600 |
| Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; 5 L. J. Dig. 130 Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; 45 L. J. Ch. 660 | ; 34 L. 47, 448, L. 854; 447, R. 258 Bank. 12 0, 319, | T. 221; 455, 456, 462 42 L. J. 448, 456, 457 . 591 . 403, 405 6. 793 320, 323, 344 . 345, 600 |

| | | | , | DICE |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|----------|-------|
| Cala Maddle 10 He 186 . 99 T. T. Ch. | 101 | | | PAGE |
| Cole v. Muddle, 10 Ha. 186; 22 L. J. Ch. | . 401 | • | | 144 |
| v. Scott, 1 M. & G. 518; 19 L. J. Ch | 1. 00 . | • | | 856 |
| Cole's Will, 8 Eq. 271 | | | | 905 |
| Coleby v. C., 2 Eq. 803 | | D D 917 | | 24 |
| Colegrave v. Manby, 6 Madd. 84; 2 Russ. | . 258; 22 | n. n. 243 | 00 000 | 871 |
| Coleman Re, 39 C. D. 443; 58 L. J. Ch. 2 | 226 . | . 108, 1 | 09, 862 | |
| v. C., 2 V. 640 | · | | . 831, | , 838 |
| v. Overseers, &c., 6 Q. B. D. 615 | ; 50 14. 0. | M. C. 92 | | 710 |
| Coles v. Jones, 2 Vern. 692 | | | | 142 |
| Colledge v. Pike, 56 L. T. 124 | | | | 792 |
| Collen v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647; 27 L. J. | Q. B. 215 | ; 6 W. R. | 123 . | 490 |
| Colleton v. Garth, 6 Si. 19; 2 L. J. Ch. 75 | 5; 38 R. I | ₹. 70 . | | -866 |
| Collett v. C., 35 B. 312; 2 Eq. 203 | | | | -593 |
| —— v. Dickenson, 11 C. D. 687 | | | | 725 |
| Collingham v. Sloper, (1894) 3 Ch. 716; 6 | 84 L. J. Cl | ı. 149 | | 252 |
| Collingwood v. Row, 26 L. J. Ch. 649; 3 | Jur. (N. 8 | 8.) 785; 5 | W. R. | |
| 484 | | | 75, 376, | 378 |
| Collins, Ex p., 2 Ir. Ch. R. 618 | | | | 289 |
| Blantern 2 Wils 347 | | · · | | 599 |
| v. C., 2 My. & K. 703 | | | . 80, 81 | |
| v. Lewis, 8 Eq. 708 | | | | |
| v. Martin, 1 Bos. & P. 648; 4 R. I | 3. 752 | | | 146 |
| | 352 399 4 | 01 409 4 | 07 409 | 410 |
| Collinson v. C., 24 B. 269 | 302, 300, . | , ,, , | .,, | 872 |
| Collis v. Robins, 1 De G. & Sm. 131; 75 F | R 88 | 18 L. J. C | h 951 | 13 |
| Collis v. Hoblins, I Do G. & Sm. 101, 101 | | 10 11. 0. 0 | 16, 17, | |
| Collison v. Curling, 9 Cl. & Fin. 88 | | | 10, 11, | 882 |
| Collyer v. Fallon, Turn. & R. 459 | | | | 156 |
| | 1b 14 | | • | 137 |
| Colonial Bank v. Cady, 15 A. C. 267; 38 C | U D 300 | . 28 C T | | 194 |
| 60 L. J. Ch. 131. | C. D. 366 | | | 100 |
| v. Whinney, 11 A. C. 426; | set t | 15 | 17, 473, | 400 |
| v. willing, 11 A. C. 420; | эо д. э. (| .11. ±011 | 4, 100, | |
| Colonial Dawle of Assetsalasia w Manufa | .11 (1000) | 1 0 | | 151 |
| Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Marsha | | | | 100 |
| L. J. P. C. 76; 95 L. T. 310; 22 T. L. I | R. 140 | • • | | 490 |
| Colonial Trusts, &c., Re, 15 C. D. 472 Colston v. Morris, 6 Madd. 89; Jac. 227 (1 Colvile v. Middleton, 3 B. 570; 52 R. R. 2 | ` | | | 111 |
| Colston v. Morris, 6 Madd. 89; Jac. 221 (1 | n.); 22 K. | R. 246 | . a20, | 895 |
| Colvile v. Middleton, 3 B. 570; 52 K. K. 2 | 31 . | • , • | 13, 20, | 844 |
| Colwell v. Shadwell, 1 P. W. ±11 | • | • • | • | 382 |
| Colyer, Re, 55 L. T. 344 | | • | • • • | 843 |
| v. Finch, 5 H. L. Cas. 905; 26 L. | J. Ch. 65 | • • | • • | 61 |
| Comfort v. Betts, (1891) 1 Q. B. 737; 60 I | n. n. G. B. | 656. | • • • | 151 |
| Commercial Bank of India, Re, 6 Eq. 517 | | ••_ | <u>.</u> | 817 |
| Commissioners of Sewers v. Gellatly, 3 (| O. D. 610 | ; 45 L. | J. Ch. | |
| \sim 788 \sim \sim | | | | 792 |
| v. Glasse, L. R. | 7 Ch. 456; | ; 4 L. J. C | h. 409 | 189 |
| v. Glasse, L. R. v. Harby, 23 B. | $508~;~26~{ m L}$ | . J. Ch. 47 | 2 . | 130 |
| Compton v. Collinson, 2 Bro. Ch. 377 . | | | | 619 |
| Concessions Trust, Re, McKay's Case, (189 | 6) 2 Ch. 78 | 57; 65 L. | J. Ch. | |
| 909; 75 L. T. 298 | | | | 487 |
| Condon v. Vollum, 57 L. T. 154 | •: • | | | 555 |
| Conduitt v. Soane, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 502; 48 Conington v. Gilliat, 1 C. D. 694; 46 L. J | R. R. 248 | 3 . | | 905 |
| Conington v. Gilliat, 1 C. D. 694; 46 L. J | Ch. 61: | 25 W. R. | 69 . | 666 |
| Connelly v. C., 7 Moore P. C. C. 438; 83. | R. R. 70 | | | 579 |
| Connor, Re, 16 Ir. C. L. 112 | | | | 549 |
| Conquest's Case, 1 C. D. 334; 45 L. J. Ch | ı. 336 — . | | | 175 |
| Conron v. C., 7 H. L. Cas. 168 | | | | 14 |
| Consolidated, &c., Co. v. Musgrave, (1900) | 1 Ch. 37: | 69 L. J. C | h. 11: | |
| 81 L. T. 747; 48 | 8 W. R. 29 | 8 . | | 158 |
| v. Riley, 1 Gif. 371: | 29 L. J. | Ch. 123 | | 139 |

| PAGE |
|---|
| |
| Consort Deep Level Co., Re, W. N. (1897) 25; 66 L. J. Ch. 122; |
| |
| 76 L. T. 300; 45 W. R. 227 |
| Constantinidi v. C., (1905) P. 253; 74 L. J. P. 122; 54 W. R. 121; |
| 91 T L R 651 638 |
| |
| Conway v. Fenton, 40 C. D. 512; 58 L. J. Ch. 282 |
| Cook v. Addison 7 Fig. 466: 38 L. J. Ch. 322 |
| - 2 Black 1 Ha 390: 11 L J Ch 268: 58 B B 104 |
| 7. Field 15 O B 460: 19 L J Q B 441 160 162 |
| * Fryer 1 Ha 498: 11 L. J. Ch. 284: 58 B. B. 153 |
| - v Greeson 2 Dr 286: 25 L. J. Ch. 706 |
| v. Gregson, 2 Dr. 286; 25 L. J. Ch. 706 |
| v Wright 1 B & S 559 · 30 L J Q B 321 241 242 |
| - Cookin Montopore Re (1896) 1 Ch 993 : 65 L J Ch 654 : 74 L T |
| 652 · 44 W. B. 646 |
| Cooke v. Burtchaell. 2 Dr. & War. 165 |
| v. Clayworth, 18 V. 12: 11 R. R. 137 |
| v. Dealey, 22 B. 196 |
| v. Fuller, 26 B. 99 |
| |
| 652; 44 W. R. 646 |
| Cookes' Cont., Re. 4 C. D. 454 |
| Cookney v. Anderson, 31 B. 452: 32 L. J. Ch. 427 |
| Cookson v. C., 12 Cl. & Fin. 121; 69 R. R. 66355, 365, 366, 384, 385, 386 |
| v. Hancock, 1 Keen, 817; 2 My. & C. 606; 5 L. J. Ch. 245; |
| 45 R. R. 136 |
| 45 R. R. 136 |
| Cooper's T., Re. 4 De G. M. & G. 768; 23 L. J. Ch. 25 |
| Cooper v. C., 13 A. C. 88 |
| T. P. 7 H. L. 59 · 44 L. J. Ch. 6. 445 446 449 455 460 |
| |
| v, L. R. 6 Ch. 15; 40 L. J. Ch. 5 |
| — v. —, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 217 |
| v. Gostling, 4 Gif. 449 |
| |
| v. Jarman, 3 Eq. 98; 36 L. J. Ch. 85 |
| v. Macdonald, 7 C. D. 288; 44 L. J. Ch. 373694, 717, 743, 746, |
| |
| v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 170 |
| —— v. Reilly, 2 Si. 560 |
| —— v. Thornton, 3 Bro. Ch. 96 |
| —— v. Wormald, 27 B. 266 |
| Coore v. Todd, 7 De G. M. & G. 520; 23 B. 92 |
| Coote v. Boyd, 2 Bro. Ch. 529 |
| v. C., 3 Jo. & Lat. 175 |
| ——- v. Gordon, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 180 |
| v. Lowndes, 10 Eq. 376; 39 L. J. Ch. 887 |
| Copeman v . Gallant, 1 \bar{P} . W. 314 |
| Compile C. O.D. W. 000 |
| Coppin v. C., 2 P. W. 290 |
| Corbet v. C., 7 Ir. R. Eq. 45 |
| —— v. Davenant, 2 Bro-1Ch. 252 |
| Corbett v. Brock, 20 B. 524 |

| | | | P | AGE |
|--|------------|----------|--------|-------|
| Cornfield v. Wyndham, 2 Coll. 184; 14 L. J. Ch. 3 | 75 | | | 845 |
| Cormicks, Re, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 264 | | | | 539 |
| Cornick v. Pearce, 7 Ha. 477; 82 R. R. 194 . | • | • | - | 369 |
| Cornick v. 1 carce, 1 11a. 411, 62 1i. 1i. 154 | | | • | |
| v. Gest, 2 Cox, 27 | • | | | 212 |
| Cornwall, Re, 3 Dr. & War. 173; 61 R. R. 39. Cory v. C., 1 Ves. Sen. 19 | | | | 45 |
| Corv v. C., 1 Ves. Sen. 19 | | | 254, | 283 |
| Cosby v. Ashtown, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 219 | | - | 445, | |
| COSOY V. ASHLOWH, 10 II. CH. II. 210 | • | | 110, | |
| Costello v. O'Rorke, 3 Ir. R. Eq. 172 | • | | | 367 |
| Coster v. C., 9 Si. 597; 1 Keen, 199; 8 L. J. Ch. 2 | 30 | | 669, | 681 |
| Cotesworth v. Stephens, 4 Ha. 185 | | . •. | | 785 |
| Cotton, Re, 1 C. D. 232; 45 L. J. Ch. 201 . | | | | 901 |
| O.H 10. 10. 10. 10. 10. 11. 0. 01. 11. 1 | 11 | | • | |
| Cotton's Trustees, Re, 19 C. D. 624; 21 L. J. Ch. 5 | 1.4 | | | 379 |
| Cottrell Re, (1910) 1 Ch. 403 | | | 849, | 851 |
| | | | | 788 |
| | Θ T. | T 486 | . 99 | |
| Tr D aver | 3.1. | 1. 100 | , 55 | 6343 |
| W. R. 361 | • | | • | 88 |
| Court v. Buckland, 1 C. D. 610; 45 L. J. Ch. 214 | | | | 407 |
| ——- v. Foster, 1 John. & H. 30 | | | | 636 |
| Courtenay v. Gallagher, 5 Ir. Ch. R. 154. | | • | | 847 |
| | • | | | |
| Courtier, Re. 34 C. D. 136; 56 L. J. Ch. 350 . | | | 368, | |
| Courtois v. Vincent, Jac. 268 | | | | 545 |
| Courtoy v. Vincent, T. & R. 433; 24 R. R. 94 | | | | 905 |
| Cousins, Re, 30 C. D. 203 | - | | • | 378 |
| D 01 (1 T) 051 | • | | • | |
| | | | | 132 |
| Coutts v. Acworth, 8 Eq. 558; 38 L. J. Ch. 694 | | ٠ | | 280 |
| Coutts c. Acworth, 8 Eq. 558; 38 L. J. Ch. 694 v. —, 9 Eq. 519; 39 L. J. Ch. 649 Coventry v. C., 2 Dr. & Sm. 470 | | 449 | , 454, | 461 |
| Coventry a C 2 Dr. & Sm. 470 | • | | | |
| Ti -i 116 00 07 D D 700 | • | . 10, | 18, 21 | |
| v. Higgins, 14 Si. 30; 65 R. R. 536. | | | 591, | |
| Coward, &c, Re, 20 Eq. 179; 44 L. J. Ch. 384 Cowley v. Hartstonge, 1 Dow. 361; 14 R. R. 86 | | . 176 | , 669, | 698 |
| Cowley v. Hartstonge, 1 Dow, 361: 14 R. R. 86 | | | , 367, | |
| Componer Harmon 57 L. I. Ch. 60 | • | . 000 | ,, | 211 |
| Cowper v. Harmer, 57 L. J. Ch. 60 | • | | | |
| v. Mantell, 22 B. 231 | | | 864, | 840 |
| r. Mantell, 22 B. 231 | | | | 880 |
| Cox v. Bennett, 31 L. T. 83; 22 W. R. 819 | | | 527, | |
| " (1901) 1 Ch 622 · 60 T. T Ch 65 | - | | 0-1, | |
| | i | | • | 702 |
| | | | | 871 |
| v. C., 3 K. & J. 544 | | | | 228 |
| v. Dolman, 2 De G. M. & G. 592; 22 L. J. Cl | h. 427 | 7 | | 908 |
| " Mitchell 7 C B (N S) 55, 20 T T C D | 99 | • | | |
| v. Mitchell, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 55; 29 L. J. C. P. Coxhead v. Mullis, 3 C. P. D. 439; 47 L. J. C. P. | 700 700 | | • | 792 |
| Coxhead v. Mullis, 3 C. P. D. 439; 47 L. J. C. P. | 761 | | | 346 |
| Cox Moore v. Peruvian Corp., (1908) 1 Ch. 604; 7 | 7 14. | J. Ch. | 387; | |
| 98 L. T. 611 | | | | 110 |
| Coysegame, $Ex p., 1$ Atk. 192 | | | | 660 |
| Crobb a C 1 Mr & K 511 . 2 T. I Ch 101 . 90 | p p | 260 | • | |
| Crabb v. C., 1 My. & K. 511; 3 L. J. Ch. 181; 36 Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 687 | n. n | . 502 . | | 453 |
| Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 687 | 355, | 359, 367 | , 384, | 385 |
| Crackelt v. Bethune, 1 J. & W. 586: 21 R. R. 241 | | | | 903 |
| Craddock's T., Re. W. N. (1875) 187 | | | | 674 |
| Craddock's T., Re, W. N. (1875) 187 | • | | • | |
| Craudek v. 11per, 10 St. 301 | • | | | 47 |
| Craig v. Wheeler, 29 L. J. Ch. 374 | | | 79, 81 | l, 84 |
| Crane, Re, (1908) 1 Ch. 379; 77 L. J. Ch. 212; 98 | L. T | . 314 . | | |
| Cranley v. Dixon, 23 B. 512 | | | | 89 |
| Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 V. 170; 3 R. R. 80. | • | 701 01: | 015 | 000 |
| Chansiowii v. Comision, S. V. 170, S. D. D. D. T. Ci. | | 794, 815 | | |
| Craven v. Brady, L. R. 4 Ch. 296; 36 L. J. Ch. 29 | 70 | | | 586 |
| Crawford v. Forshaw, (1891) 2 Ch. 261; 60 L. J. Crawley v. C., 7 Si. 427; 40 R. R. 170 | Ch. 68 | 83 . | | 593 |
| Crawley v. C., 7 Si, 427; 40 R. R. 170 | | | • | 89 |
| Cray v. Mansfield, 1 Ves. Sen. 379 | • | | • | |
| Change Wilson O Very 770 | | | | 285 |
| Creagh v. Wilson, 2 Vern. 572. Creed v. C., 11 Cl. & Fin. 508; 65 R. R. 252. | | 575, 576 | | |
| Ureed v. U., 11 Ul. & Fin. 508; 65 R. R. 252. | | 836, 844 | 872. | 887 |
| Cresswell v. C., 6 Eq. 69; 37 L. J. Ch. 521 . | | | , , | 915 |
| v. Dewell, 4 Gif. 460 | • | • | 175 | |
| D. 200 HOLL, 1 O.L. 100 | • | • | 175, | 018 |
| | | | | |

| â | |
|---|--|
| | GE |
| Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Cox, 242; 2 R. R. 38; 2 Bro. Ch. 500 (n.)539, 3 | |
| Crickett v. Dolby, 3 V. 13 | 710 |
| Crickitt v. C., (1902) P. 177; 71 L. J. P. 65; 86 L. T. 635 | 712 836 |
| Crockat v. C., (1902) F. 177; 71 D. J. F. 65; 86 D. 1. 655 Crockat v. C., 2 P. W. 164 Croft v. Graham, 2 De G. J. & S. 155; 5 Giff. 1 | 343 |
| — v. Pike, 3 P. W. 180 | 103 |
| Croly v. Weld, 3 De G. M. & G. 995: 22 L. J. Ch. 916 8 | 885 |
| | 596 |
| Cronmire, Re, (1901) 1 K. B. 480; 70 L. J. K. B. 310; 84 L. T. 342 | 135 |
| Crook v. Co, W. N. (1890) 26 | |
| | $\begin{array}{c} 54 \\ 727 \end{array}$ |
| Crosby v. Church, 3 B. 485; 10 L. J. Ch. 212; 52 R. R. 196 Cross v. Addenbrook, 3 P. W. 222 (n.) | |
| 77 7 77 77 77 77 | 200 |
| Crossman v. Richards, W. N., (1888) 167. Crouch v. Crédit Foncier, &c., L. R. 8 Q. B. 374; 42 L. J. Q. B. 183 v. Martin, 2 Vern. 595. v. Waller, 4 De G. & J. 302. Croughton, Re, 8 C. D. 460; 47 L. J. Ch. 795. Crow v. Price, 22 Q. B. D. 429; 58 L. J. Q. B. 215 Crowder v. Clowes, 2 V. 449 Crowe v. Crisford, 17 B. 507 Crowle v. Russell, 4 C. P. D. 186; 48 L. J. C. P. 76 | 146 |
| | 109 |
| v. Waller, 4 De G. & J. 302 | 336 |
| Croughton, Re, 8 C. D. 460; 47 L. J. Ch. 795 | 751 |
| Crow v. Price, 22 Q. B. D. 429; 58 L. J. Q. B. 215 | 157 |
| Crowder v. Clowes, 2 V. 449 | 920 94 |
| Crowle v. Urisiora, 17 B. 507 | 04 785 |
| | 88 |
| Croxton v. May, 9 Eq. 408; 39 L. J. Ch. 155 | 670 |
| Crump, Re, 34 B. 576 | 676 |
| Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. W. 20 | 109 |
| Cuenod v. Leslie, (1909) 1 K. B. 880; 78 L. J. K. B. 695; 100 L. T. | |
| 675; 25 T. L. R. 374 | |
| Cuff v. Hall, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 972 | 366 |
| | $\frac{449}{49}$ |
| Carpepper v. Ashton, 2 Ch. Ca. 111. | 662 |
| v. Forrester, 2 J. & W. 345; 22 R. R. 157 | 449 |
| Cuuliffe v. Manchester, &c. Canal Co., 2 Russ. & M. 480 (n.) . | 799 |
| Cunnack v. Edwards, (1896) 2 Ch. 679; 65 L. J. Ch. 801; 75 L. T. | |
| 122; 45 W. R. 99 | 412 |
| 2,,,,,,,, - | 756 |
| Cunningham v. Antrobus, 16 Si. 436 | 177_{-000} |
| v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 174 | 382 865 |
| Cuno, Re, 43 C. D. 12; 62 L. T. 15 | |
| Curling v. May, 3 Atk. 255 | 364 |
| Cunningham v. Antrobus, 16 Si. 436 352, 354, 355, | |
| Curran v. Corbet, (1897) 1 Ir. R. 343 | 591 |
| Curre v. Bowyer, 5 B. 6 (n.); 59 R. R. 395 (n.) | 363 |
| Currey, Re, 32 C. D. 361; 55 L. J. Ch. 906; 56 L. T. 80 . 751, 7 | 62, |
| 763, 765, | |
| T) TT - 100 | 905 |
| | 917 |
| Currey v. File, 2 Bro. Ch. 225 | 718 |
| Curteis v. Kenrick, 3 M. & W. 461; 7 L. J. Ex. 169 v. Wormald, 10 C. D. 172 Curtis, Re, 28 L. J. Ch. 458 538, | 405 |
| v. Wormald, 10 C. D. 172 | 539 |
| . Arabon 1 1 & W 700 | 108 |
| v. C., 2 Bro. Ch. 620 | 233 |
| v 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1147 | 541 |
| Curwyn v. Milner, 3 P. W. 293 (n.) 307, 313, 318, 324, | |
| | $\frac{890}{478}$ |
| Cuthbertson v. Irving, 4 H. & N. 742; 28 L. J. Ex. 307 Cutler, Re, 14 B. 220; 20 L. J. Ch. 504 669, 670, 672, | |
| 000, 110, 11 10, 110, 110, 110, 110, 11 | - 1 1 |

| D. | |
|--|-------------------|
| | PAGE |
| ACRE v. Patrickson, 1 Dr. & Sm. 182; 29 L. J. Ch. 846 . 18, 19 | 9, 25 |
| Pagley v. Tolferry, 1 P. W. 285 | 889 |
|)'Aglie v. Fryer, 12 Si. 1; 13 L. J. Ch. 398 |), 81 |
|)aintry, Re, (1893) 2 Q. B. 116; 62 L. J. Q. B. 511; 9 T. L. R. 452 | 257 |
| bakins v. Berisford, 1 Ch. Ca. 194 | 694 |
|)albiac v. D., 16 V. 110 | 478 |
| Paley v. Desbouverie, 2 Atk. 273 | 592 |
|) allas, Re, (1904) 2 Ch. 385; 73 L. J. Ch. 365; 90 L. T. 177; 52 | 191 |
| W. R. 567 | 325 |
| Dally v. Wonham, 33 B. 154; 32 L. J. Ch. 790 Dalton, Re, 6 De G. M. & G. 201; 3 Sm. & G. 331; 25 L. J. Ch. | 020 |
| 751 | 525 |
|)aly, Re, 6 B. 393 (n.); 17 L. J. C. P. 1 | 547 |
| Daniel v. Freeman, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 233 | 139 |
| v. Warren, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 290 | 81 |
| Daniell v. Sinclair, 6 A. C. 181; 55 L. J. P. C. 50 | 242 |
| | 484 |
| Darbon v. Rickards, 14 Si. 537; 14 L. J. Ch. 344 849. | 850 |
| Darby, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 465; 76 L. J. Ch. 689 | 59 |
| Yarcy v. Blake, 2 Sch. & L. 390 | 233 |
| Darcy v. Croft, 9 Ir. Ch. R. 19 | 695 |
| Darkin v. D., 17 B. 578; 23 L. J. Ch. 890 | 733 |
| Darley v. D., 3 Atk. 399 | 691 |
| Darnley, Re, (1907) 1 Ch. 159; 76 L. J. Ch. 58; 95 L. T. 706; 23 | |
| T. L. R. 93 | 372 |
| Darrell v. Tibbitts, 5 Q. B. D. 563; 50 L. J. Q. B. 33; 42 L. T. 797. | 153 |
| Dartnall, Re, (1895) 1 Ch. 474; 64 L. J. Ch. 341; 72 L. T. 404; 43 | 105 |
| W. R. 644 Dashwood v. Bulkeley, 10 V. 230; 90 R. R. 834 . 575, 581, 592, | 127 |
| Dashwood v. Bulkeley, 10 V. 230; 90 R. R. 834 . 575, 581, 592, | |
| v. Peyton, 18 V. 49; 11 R. R. 145 | 886 |
| Davenport, Re, (1895) 1 Ch. 366; 64 L. J. Ch. 252 . 175, 678, 703, | |
| 716, 722, 758, | 759 |
| v. Coltman, 12 Si. 610; 11 L. J. Ex. 114; 56 R. R. 112. | 405 |
| | 219 |
| v.:Marshall, (1902) 1 Ch. 82; 71 L. J. Ch. 29; 85 L. T. | |
| 340: 50 W. R. 39 | 698 |
| Daveron, Re, (1893) 3 Ch. 421; 64 L. J. Ch. 54 | 402 |
| Davidson, Re, 11 C. D. 341 | 463 |
| | 710 |
| Davies, Re. (1892) 1 Ch. 90; 61 L. J. Ch. 650 | 710 |
| , Ré, (1898) 2 Ch. 142; 67 L. J. Ch. 507; 79 L. T. 344 | 536 |
| v. Ashford, 15 St. 42; 5 L. J. Dig. 400; 74 R. R. 1 . 17, | 384 |
| v. Bush, 1 Younge, 341; 4 Bl. (N. S.) 305 22, 886, | 887 |
| v. Cooper, 5 My. & C. 270; 48 R. R. 304 . 323, 325, 326, | 332 |
| v. D., 9 Eq. 468; 39 L. J. Ch. 343 173, 467, | |
| v. —, 38 C. D. 212; 57 L. J. Ch. 759 | $\frac{462}{282}$ |
| v. —, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1320 | 212 |
| v. Fowler, 16 Eq. 308; 43 L. J. Ch. 90. | 840 |
| v. Goodhew, 6 Si. 585; 38 R. R. 183 | 368 |
| v. Hodgson, 25 B. 186; 27 L. J. Ch. 449 | $\frac{366}{764}$ |
| v. Jenkins, 6 C. D. 728; 46 L. J. Ch. 761; 26 W. R. 260 | 725 |
| v. London, &c. Marine Insurance Co., 8 C. D. 475; 47 L. J. | . , |
| Ch. 511 | 296 |
| v. Morgan, 1 B. 405 | 837 |
| —— v. Stanford, 61 L. T. 234 | 727 |
| a Tonn 9 Bro Ch 950 | 90 |



| | PAGE |
|--|---|
| Davies v. Wattier, 1 S. & S. 463 . | 892 |
| Davis & Co., Re, 22 Q. B. D. 193 | 109, 112, 137 |
| | . 85 907 |
| v. Angel, 31 B. 223; 31 L. J. Ch. | 613 |
| ——- v. D., 13 C. D. 861; 49 L. J. Ch. 2 | 241 250 |
| v, (1876) W. N. 242; 24 W. R v. Freethy, 24 Q. B. D. 519; 59 L. | 962 |
| v. Freethy, 24 Q. D. D. 519; 59 H. | . J. Q. B. 318 . 161, 288, 289 |
| v. Ingram, (1897) 1 Ch. 477; 66 L. | . J. Off. 550; 45 W. K. 459. 216, |
| v. Marlborough, 1 Swans. 74; 2 S | wans. 108; 53 R. R. 32 . 157, |
| • 0. Marborough, 1 Swans. 14, 2 S | 325, 326 |
| Davis's Case, 1 P. W. 698 | . = no |
| Davis s Case, 11. W. 656. Dawes v. Creyke, 30 C. D. 500; 54 L. J. | Ch. 1096 698 |
| v. Scott, 5 Russ. 32 | |
| Dawkins v. Simonetti, 29 W. R. 228; 50 | L. J. P. & D. 30 |
| Dawley v. Ballfrey, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 103 | 889 |
| Dawson, Re, (1906) 2 Ch. 211; 75 L. J. | Ch. 604; 94 L. T. 817; 54 |
| W. R. 556 | 853 |
| v. Bourne, 16 B. 29 | 693 |
| v. G. N. & C. Ry., (1905) 1 K. B | 5. 260; 74 L. J. K. B. 190; |
| 92 L. T. 137; 21 T. L. R. 114 | 151, 152 |
| | |
| 295 | |
| | 546, 554 |
| | |
| | 45 L. J. Ch. 519 593, 594 |
| " Thompson 12 L. T. 178 | J. Ch. 169 748 |
| Day, Re, (1898) 2 Ch. 510; 67 L. J. Ch. | 619: 79 L. T. 437 |
| v. Croft, 4 B. 561 | |
| — v. D., 1 Drew. 569; 22 L. J. Ch. 87 | |
| — v. —, 1 Dr. & Sm. 261 | |
| — v. —, 78 L. T. 358 | 889 |
| D'Aguilar v. Drinkwater, 2 V. & B. 225 | 591, 592, 593 |
| D'Arey's, Re, 11 Ir. C. L. R. 298 | |
| De Beauvoir v. De B., 3 H. L. Cas. 524; | 6 L. J. Dig. 384; 88 R. R. |
| 191 | 365 |
| De Bernales v. N. Y. Herald, (1893) 2 Q. | B. 97 (n.); 62 L. J. Q. B. |
| 385. | |
| De Burgh Lawson, Re, 41 C. D. 568; 58 | |
| 39 . De Bussche v. Alt, 8 C. D. 314; 47 L. J. | |
| | |
| D'Epineuil, Re, 20 C. D. 758 De Gendre v. Kent, 4 Eq. 283 | |
| De Hoghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. 164 | |
| De la Garde v. Lempriere, 6 B. 344; 12 | L. J. Ch. 472; 63 R. R. 103 . 667, |
| Do in Guido v. Dempiloro, o D. 011, 12 | 678 |
| De Lancey, Re, L. R. 5 Ex. 102; 39 L. J | |
| v. Reg., L. R. 7 Ex. 140. | |
| De Lisle v. Hodges, 17 Eq. 440; 43 L. J | |
| De Manneville v. De M., 10 V. 52; 7 R. | R. 340 518, 541, 546 |
| De Mazar v. Pybus, 4 V. 644 | |
| D'Oechsner v. Scott, 24 B. 239 | |
| De Pereda v. De Mancha, 19 C. D. 451; | 51 L. J. Ch. 204 522 |
| De Pothonier v. De Mattos, El. B. & E. 4 | 467; 27 L. J. Q. B. 260 . 140 |
| De Rochfort v. Dawes, 12 Eq. 540; 40 L | . J. Ch. 62525, 26 |
| De Weever v. Rochport, 6 B. 391 . | |
| De Witte v. Addison, 80 L. T. 207 | 281, 282, 283, 299 |
| Dean v. Allen, 20 B. 1 | \cdot |
| Deane v. Test, 9 V. 146 | 841 |

| | | | | | | | * |
|--|----------|--------|----------|---------|------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| | | | | | |] | PAGE |
| Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1; 27 R. R. | 1 | | | | | | 122 |
| Dearmer, Re, 53 L. T. 505. | | | | | | | 696 |
| Debtor, Re, (1898) 2 Q. B. 576. 67 | тт | Ó F | 990 | . 70 | T. m | . 294 . | 000 |
| Deptor, he, (1996) 2 Q. D. 910. 01 | 11. 0. | Ø. 1 |). O±0 | , 10 | 14. 1. | O=1, | -00 |
| 46 W. R. 675 | · . | ÷- , | | • | · | | 703 |
| , Re, (1903) 1 K. B. 705; 72 | 11. J. | K. 1 | 3. 382 | ; 88 | L. T. | 401; | |
| 51 W. R. 370 | | | | | | | -339 |
| Deeth v. Hale 2 Moll 317 | | | | | | 350 | , 381 |
| Deeth v. Hale, 2 Moll. 317 . Deg v. D., 2 P. W. 412 | • | • | • | • | • | | 455 |
| Deg v. D., 21. W. 112 | no. 4 | · T | r n | in. | . 1 1 | | |
| Delta, The, 25 W. R. 46; 1 P. D. 3 | 999; 4 | 9 II. | J. F. 0 | cD. | 111 | | 797 |
| Delves v. Newington, 52 L. T. 512 | | | | | | | • 852 |
| Dempsey v. Lawson, 2 P. D. 98; 4 Deneker, Re, (1895) W. N. 28; 72 | 6 L. d | J. P. | & D. : | 23 | | | -918 |
| Deneker, Re. (1895) W. N. 28: 72 | L. T. | 220 | | | | | 889 |
| Dennis v. Badd, 1 Ch. Ca. 156, cited | 1 9 V | arn 1 | 103 | - | | | 389 |
| Dennis v. Dadd, 1 On. Ca. 150, Creek | or . | t OL | 105. | 40.7 | o D | | |
| Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & C. 277; | o .ii. e | , en | . 120; | 40 1 | a. n. 3 | ## . | 200, |
| | | | | | 280, 2 | 81, 282 | 293 |
| v. D., L. R. 1 P. & D. 366; 3 | 5 L. e | J. P. | & M. | 61 | | | -157 |
| Derbishire v. Home, 3 De G. M. & | G. 80 | : 90 | R. R. | 200 | | | 764 |
| Dowing w Wineholege 1 Cov 318: | 1 R | Ř 41 | | | | 37 38 | 1.58 |
| Dering v. Winchelsea, 1 Cox, 318; Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. 337; 58 L. | T (0 | . 002 | | • | · (~0 t | - 3 4 7 - | , 100 120 |
| Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. 551; 56 L. | J. CI | 1. 005 | t. | | 110, 4 | 14, 411 | , 410 |
| Despointed v , marris, v be v . In | αc. | せつひ | | | | | 141 |
| Desbrambes v. Tompkins, 4 Bro. Cl | h. 149 | (n.) | , 1 Co: | x, 13 | 3 | | -898 |
| Deschamps v. Miller, (1908) 1 Ch. 8 | 856: | 77 T. | J. Ch | . 410 | 3:98 | T. T. | |
| 564 (1000) 1 CII. C | ,, | | 0. 01. | | , | 91.1 | , 815 |
| 564 | · ir | | | | • | . 014 | |
| Dettmar v. Metropolitan, &c. Bk., | nen | 1. œ . | M. 041 | | | . 283 | 3,298 |
| Devonport Corp. v. Tozer, (1902) 2 | Ch. | 182; | 71 L. | J. (| Jh. 75 | 64;86 | |
| L. T. 612 | | | | | | | -786 |
| Deverges v. Sandeman, C. & Co., (1 | 19091 | 1 Cb | 579 | 71 T. | J. Ch | 398 . | |
| oc T T oco . 50 W D 404 | .00. | 1 011 | . 0.0, | 1 1 11 | . 0. 04 | • 0 | 111 |
| 86 L. T. 269; 50 W. R. 404 . | • | • | | • | • | • | 114 |
| Dewar v . Maitland, 2 Eq. 834 . | | | | | | . 458 | 1, 464 |
| Dewar v. Maitland, 2 Eq. 834 . Dews v. Brandt, Ch. Ca. 7 | | | | | | . 459 | -330 |
| Dibbs v. Goren, 11 B. 483; 83 R. I | 3.228 | | | | | | 142 |
| Dickin v. Edwards, 4 Ha. 276; 67 | B B | BB | - | - | ٠. | 20 826 | 845 |
| Dickin v. Dawards, Tital 270, 07 | . T 7 | . 00 | | • | • | _0, 000 | 100 |
| Dickinson v. Burrell, 35 B. 257; 36 |) LI. 0 | . On. | 911 | | • | | 100 |
| Dicks v. Batten, W. N., (1870) 173 | | | | | | | 220 |
| Dickson's Trusts, 1 Si. (N. S.) 37; | 20 L. | J. C | h. 33; | 89 | R. R. | 16 . | 580, |
| , , , | | | | | | | 586 |
| Dickson, Re, 28 C. D. 291; 29 C. D. | 1 221 | . 54 | T. T | Ob : | (10 | 200 | |
| | | | | | | | , 502 |
| v. Swansea, &c. Ry. Co., L | . R. 4 | : 4 | D. 44; | ં ૭૦ | L. J. | Q. D. | |
| 17 | | | | • | | | 145 |
| Digby v. Boycatt, 4 Ha. 444 | | | | | | | 895 |
| v. Legard, 3 P. W. 22 . | 1 | • | | | | | 349 |
| 1 Bro Ch 501 | • | • | • | • | • | 306 | 300 |
| Dillon, Re, 44 C. D. 82; 59 L. J. C | n. 40 | n : ec | i m | 61= | • | 405 | 100 |
| Dillon, Re, 44 C. D. 82; 59 L. J. C | n. 42 | υ; 62 | 2 II. I. | 610 | | 420, | 426, |
| | | 428, | 429, 4 | 432, • | 433, 4 | 34, 435 | , 437 |
| v. Coppin, 6 B. 217 (n.); 4 v. Harris, 4 Bligh, 321 v. Lady Mountcashell, 4 Br v. Parker, 1 Swans. 359; 18 | L. J. | Dig. | 200 | | | | -209 |
| v Harris 4 Blich 321 | | | | | | | 599 |
| " Lody Mountaghall 4 By | o D | C 36 | | • | • | 400 | 5.1.1 |
| v. Dady Mountcashen, 4 Dr | 0, 1. | 0. 50 | ο. | | 100 1 | . 498 | , 044 |
| v. Parker, 1 Swans. 359; 18 | S_K. 1 | x. 72. | 440, | 449, | 462, 4 | 63,464 | , 1 65 |
| Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195; 28 R. | R. 40 | ö. | | | : | . 8 | 7,92 |
| Dimsdale v. D., 3 Drew. 556; 25 I | i. J. (| 7h. 8 | 06 | | | | 255 |
| Dingwell v. Askew, 1 Cox, 427 | | | - | - | - | | 869 |
| Dinlock a Hommand O. Co. & C. | 111. | · . T | · 0 | ir e | . d 96 | | 000 |
| Diplock v. Hammond, 2 Sm. & G. | 141; | θL | ie Cr. | M. & | | | |
| L. J. Ch. 550 | <u>.</u> | • | | | . 1 | 13, 114 | , 118 |
| Directors, &c. of the Midland, &c. | . Ry. | Co. c | of Irel | land | v. Jol | mson. | |
| 6 H. L. Cas. 798 | | | | | | . , | 242 |
| Di Savini v. Lousada, 18 W. R. 42a | 5 | | - | • | • | • | 554 |
| Dichon at D 1 D W 904 | | • | . • | • | • | | |
| Disher v. D., 1 P. W. 204 | • | • | | • | • | | 356 |
| Disney, Re, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 206. | | • | • | | | | 669 |
| v. Crosse, 2 Eq. 593 . | | | | | | | 836 |
| Ditcham v. Worrall, 5 C. P. D. 410 | . 49 | T. J | . C. P. | 688 | | | 346 |

| 7)'14 V. 1 () T) 777, 17 T T D 1 07 | | | PAGE |
|---|----------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Ditton, Ex p., 1 C. D. 557; 45 L. J. Bank. 87 Dixie v. Wright, 32 B. 662 Dixon, Re, 42 C. D. 306 | • | | 786, 793 |
| Dixon Re 42 C D 306 | • | | 379, 393 680, 702 |
| (1000) 0 (% 501, 00) 1 (% 000) | O . T / | n 100. | 10 |
| W. R. 665 | | . 730 | , 731, 732 |
| Dixon's T., Re, 48 L. J. Ch. 592 | | | . 665 |
| Dixon v. Dawson, 2 S. & S. 327 | | | 404, 407 |
| v. D., 9 C. D. 587 | | | . 730 |
| | 120 | | . 890 |
| v. Evans, D. R. S. H. D. 600; 42 D. J. Ch. | 199 | | 242, 202 |
| W. R. 665 Dixon's T., Re, 48 L. J. Ch. 592 Dixon v. Dawson, 2 S. & S. 327 | h. 501 | . 82 T. | . Т. |
| 527 | | | . 487 |
| v. Olmius, 1 Cox, 414; 9 R. R. 286 (n.); | 20 R. I | 3. 235 (| n.)268, |
| | | | 691 |
| v. Steele, (1901) 2 Ch. 602; 70 L. J. Ch. 79 | 94; 85 | L. T. 4 | 04; |
| 50 W. R. 132 Dobson v. Waterman, 3 V. 308 (n.); 22 R. R. 105 | • | | . 64 |
| | | | . 841 . 225 |
| Dodson, Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 638; 77 L. J. Ch. 830; | 98 T. T | 395 | 993 |
| 250tb5ti, 250, (1505) 2 cm 050, 11 m 01 cm 050, | 00 44. 4 | 500 | 224, 386 |
| ———— v. Hay, 3 Bro. Ch. 404 | | | $\stackrel{.}{.} 354$ |
| v. Samuell, 1 Dr. & Sm. 575; 29 L. J. Cl | ı. 335 | | . 790 |
| Doe d. Goldin v. Lakeman, 2 B. & Ad. 30 | | | . 847 |
| d. Kenrick v. Beauclerk, 11 East, 657 | | | . 597 |
| | D D 7 | | . 453 . 597 |
| | | | . 820 |
| Doetch, Re, (1896) W. N. 82 | . 637 | | . 789 |
| Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. 486, 505 . | . 46, | 47, 58, 5 | 19. 60. 62 |
| Domvile v. Taylor, 32 B. 604 | | | 865, 866 |
| Donaldson, Re, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 310 | • | | 735 |
| v. D., Kay, 711; 23 L. J. Ch. 788. | • | | 112, 120 |
| Donally a Broughton (1891) A C 435: 60 L I | P C 4 | | . 380 301 |
| Donne. Re. 2 Moll. 490 | 1.0.3 | | 529 |
| Donnelly v. Foss, 7 L. R. Ir. 439 | | 169. | 170, 678 |
| Donne, Re, 2 Moll. 490 | ; 73 R | . R. 309 | . 897, |
| | | | 898 |
| Door v. Geary, 1 Ves. Sen. 255 | • | | . 841 |
| Door v. Geary, 1 Ves. Sen. 255 | • | | . 904 |
| Donolas v. Cooksey 2 Tr. R. Fo. 311 | • | | $\frac{366}{46,47}$ |
| v. D., 12 Eq. 617: 41 L. J. Ch. 74 | | | . 462 |
| | | | . 856 |
| v. Russel, 4 Si. 524; 33 R. R. 135 | | | . 108 |
| Douglas & Ps. Cont., Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 296; 71 L. | J. Ch. | 850 . | |
| Door v. Geary, 1 Ves. Sen. 255 Dornford v. D., 12 V. 127; 8 R. R. 316 Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. W. 320 Douglas v. Cooksey, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 311 | 77 T | 7 T O | 384 |
| | | J. I. O. | . 459 |
| 98 L. T. 509; 24 T. L. R. 344 | : | | 756 |
| Dowding, Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 441; 73 L. J. Ch. 194 | ; 90 L | . T. 82; | 52 |
| W. R. 293 | | | . 763 |
| Dowley v. Winfield, 14 Si. 277; 65 R. R. 590. | • | | . 890 |
| Dowling v. D., (1898) P. 228; 68 L. J. P. 8 | 11 | | . 633 |
| ——— v. Tyrell, 2 Russ. & My. 343; 34 R. R. 1 Downes v. Jennings, 32 B. 290; 32 L. J. Ch. 643 | TT | 647 | . 898 648, 649 |
| Downes v. Jennings, 32 B. 230, 32 E. 3. Ch. 643 Dowse v. Gorton, (1891) A. C. 190; 60 L. J. Ch. | 745 : 64 | | |
| 40 W. R. 17 | | | . 155 |
| Dowsett, Re, (1901) 1 Ch. 398; 70 L. J. Ch. 149; | 49 W. | $\mathbf{R.~268}$ | . 872 |
| | | | |

| PAG | |
|---|-----------|
| Doyley v. Tollferry, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 300 | |
| Drant v. Vause, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 580; 11 L. J. Ch. 170; 57 R. R. | |
| 459 | |
| Draper's Trusts, Re. 58 L. T. 942: 57 L. J. Ch. 942 | |
| Duezel v. Ellie (1905) 1 K B 574 : 74 L T K B 401 : 99 L T | |
| 816: 53 W. R. 353 | 7 |
| 816; 53 W. R. 353 | 7 |
| v. Josolyne, 18 Q. B. D. 590; 56 L. J. Q. B. 490 14 | 2 |
| Drewry v. Thacker, 3 Swans. 529; 19 R. R. 274 Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. Sen. 623 | 8 |
| |), |
| 221, 22 | 2 |
| Driver v. Broad, (1893) 1 Q. B. 744; 63 L. J. Q. B. 12; 69 L. T. | -0 |
| 169; 41 W. R. 483 | 0 |
| | 9 |
| | 3 |
| Druitt v. Willens, 23 L. R. Ir. 436 179, 66 | 7 |
| Drummond & Daire, Re, (1891) 1 Ch. 524; 60 L. J. Ch. 258704, 717, 71 | 8 |
| Drury v. D., 4 Bro. Ch. 506, note (a) | 9 4 |
| Drumwond & Darre, Re, (1881) 1 Ch. 324, 66 11. 3. Ch. 258 64, 717, 717, 717 Drury v. D., 4 Bro. Ch. 506, note (o) | $\hat{8}$ |
| Dublin & Rathcoole Ry. Co., Re, 12 Ir. R. 98 | 3 |
| Duckmanton v. D., 5 H. & N. 219; 29 L. J. Ex. 132 86 | 0 |
| Duckworth v. Lee, (1899) 1 Ir. R. 405 | <u>ə</u> |
| | |
| T. J. Ch. 618: 87 L. T. 22: 50 W. R. 551 816, 818, 821, 82 | ŏ |
| Dufaur v. The Professional L. A. Co., 25 B. 599; 27 L. J. Ch. 817120 |), |
| Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 543; 1 S. & S. 239; 30 R. R. 69421, 42: | |
| 426, 427, 432, 434, 43 | 6 |
| Duffy's T., Re, 28 B. 386 . . | 5 |
| Dugdale, Re, 38 C. D. 176; 57 L. J. Ch. 634 | 2 |
| Dugger at Kelly 10 Tr R Eq. 295, 473 | 1 |
| Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 1 B. 79; 19 B. 389; 4 My. & C. 525; 48 | |
| B. B. 165 | 0 |
| Duke of Bolton v. Williams, 4 Bro. Ch. 297, 430; 7 R. R. 285 . 84 ——————————————————————————————————— | ā a |
| | _ |
| R. 297 | 0 |
| R. 297 | 9 |
| Dumble, Re. 23 C. D. 360; 52 L. J. Ch. 631 90 | 1 |
| Dummer v. Pitcher, 2 My. & K. 262; 5 Si. 35; 39 R. R. 203453, 833 | |
| Duncan v. Campbell, 12 Si, 616: 56 R. R. 117 | 0 |
| v. Cannan, 18 B. 128; 7 De G. M. & G. 78; 23 L. J. Ch. 26517 | 7 |
| v. Dixon, 44 C. D. 211; 59 L. J. Ch. 437 | |
| | |
| | 8 |
| Duncombe v. Greenacre, 28 B. 472; 29 B. 578; 30 L. J. Ch. 413660 |), |
| -66 | s |
| Dundas v. Wolfe-Murray, 1 H. & M. 425; 32 L. J. Ch. 151 90 Dunk v. Fenner, 2 Russ. & M. 557 | 5 4 |
| Dunkley v. D., 2 De G. M. & G. 390 | |
| Dunlop, Re, 21 C. D. 583 | |

| | PAGE |
|---|---|
| Dunnage v. White, 1 Swans. 137; 18 R. R. 33 Dunne v. Boyd, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 609 Dunnill, Re, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 322 Dunster v. Glengall, 3 Ir. Ch. R. 47 Durand v. D., 1 Hag. Ec. 760; 2 Cox, 207 Durant v. Titley. 7 Price, 557; 21 R. R. 773 | 243, 249, 254 |
| Dunne v. Boyd, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 609 | 128, 429, 435 |
| Dungton a Clongell 2 In Ch P 47 | 100 |
| Durand v. D. 1 Hao Fe 760: 2 Cox 207 | 614 617 |
| Durant v. Titley, 7 Price, 557; 21 R. R. 773. | 617, 640 |
| Durham v. Crackles, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 1174; 11 W. R. 138; 3 | |
| 111 | . 663, 664, 665 |
| Durham Bros. v. Robertson, (1898) 1 Q. B. 765: 67 L. J. | Q. B. 484: |
| 78 L. T•438 | 13, 141, 151, 152 |
| Durour v. Motteux, 1 Ves. Sen. 320 349, 3 | 50, 396, 399, 409 |
| | |
| v. Friend, 5 De G. &. Sm. 343; 21 L. J. Ch. 353 | |
| 103 Dutton v. Thompson, 23 C. D. 278; 52 L. J. Ch. 651 Dye v. D., 13 Q. B. D. 147; 53 L. J. Q. B. 442 Dyer v. D., 34 B. 504; 34 L. J. Ch. 513 Dyer v. Paynter, 33 W. R. 806 Dyet, Re, 87 L. T. 744 Dyke v. Stephens, W. N., (1885) 177 Dysoe v. D., 1 P. W. 305 Dyson & Fowke Re (1896) 2 Ch. 720: 65 L. J. Ch. 791 | 864 |
| Due of D. 13 O. R. D. 147 · 53 L. J. O. R. 449. | 690 |
| Dver v. D. 34 R 504: 34 L. J. Ch. 513 | 389 390 |
| Dyer v. Paynter, 33 W. R. 806 | 218 |
| Dvet. Re. 87 L. T. 744 | 905 |
| Dyke v. Stephens, W. N., (1885) 177 | 786 |
| Dyose v. D., 1 P. W. 305 | 884 |
| 2 , 50 m & 10 " Mo, 110 00) 2 CM 120 , 00 H. 0. CM 101 | , |
| 759; 45 W. R. 28 | 380 |
| | |
| E. | |
| | 224 |
| EAGER, Re, 22 C. D. 86; 52 L. J. Ch. 56. | 825 |
| Earl v. Ferris, 19 B. 67; 24 L. J. Ch. 20 | 695 |
| Earl of Darlington v. Bowes, 1 Eden. 270 | 183 $ 523$ |
| EAGER, Re, 22 C. D. 86; 52 L. J. Ch. 56. Earl v. Ferris, 19 B. 67; 24 L. J. Ch. 20 Earl of Darlington v. Bowes, 1 Eden. 270 ——————————————————————————————————— | 325, 326 |
| Earl's Trust Re 4 Kay & J 673 | 856 |
| Earle v. Bellingham, 24 B. 445: 27 L. J. Ch. 545 | 850, 893, 894 |
| Earl's Trust, Re, 4 Kay & J. 673 | 7 . 160, 161 |
| v. Kingscote, (1900) 2 Ch. 585; 83 L. T. 377; 69 | L. J. Ch. |
| | |
| Earlom v. Saunders, Amb. 241 | 365 |
| Early v. Benbow, 2 Coll. 342; 15 L. J. Ch. 169; 70 R. R. | .250 . 919 |
| v. E., 16 C. D. 214 (n.); 49 L. J. Ch. 826 | 20 |
| That we Charle 9 Was San 20 | 919 |
| East v. Cook, 2 ves. Sen. 50 | 80 87 89 |
| Earlom v. Saunders, Amb. 241 Early v. Benbow, 2 Coll. 342; 15 L. J. Ch. 169; 70 R. R. v. E., 16 C. D. 214 (n.); 49 L. J. Ch. 826 v. Middleton, 14 B. 453 East v. Cook, 2 Ves. Sen. 30 Eaton, Re, 70 L. T. 761 Eavestaffe v. Austin, 19 B. 591 Eccles v. Mills, (1898) A. C. 360: 67 L. J. P. C. 25: 78 | 885 |
| Eccles v. Mills, (1898) A. C. 360; 67 L. J. P. C. 25; 78 | L. T. 206; |
| 46 W. R. 398 Economic Fire Office, Re, 12 T. L. R. 142 Eddel's Trusts, Re, 11 Eq. 559; 40 L. J. Ch. 616 | 873, 874, 875 |
| Economic Fire Office, Re, 12 T. L. R. 142 | 485 |
| Economic Fire Office, Re, 12 T. L. R. 142 Eddel's Trusts, Re, 11 Eq. 559; 40 L. J. Ch. 616 | 901 |
| Eddowes v . Argentine, &c., 63 L. T. 364 | 700 |
| Eddystone Marine, &c. Co., Re, (1893) 3 Ch. 13; 62 L. | J. Ch. 742475 |
| | 470, 480, 480 |
| Edelstein v. Schuler, (1902) 2 K. B. 144; 71 L. J. K. I | 146 490 |
| L. T. 204; 50 W. R. 493 Eden v. Naish, 7 C. D. 781; 47 L. J. Ch. 325 | 146, 489 |
| v. Ridsdales, &c. Co., 23 Q. B. D. 368; 58 L. J. Q. | |
| Edes v Brereton West Cas t Hardw 348 | |
| Edgcombe, Re, (1902) 2 K. B. 403; 71 L. J. K. B. 722 | ; 87 L. T. |
| 108: 50 W. R. 678 | 793 |
| Edmonds, Exp., 4 De G. F. & J. 488 | 155 |
| | 877 |

| | 51 | | | | P | AGE |
|---|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------|--------|------|
| Edwards a Townshord 1 Anst 93 | | | | | | 675 |
| Edmunds v. Townshend, 1 Anst. 93 | 070 00 | · | 4.3 1.0 | | • | |
| Edward Oliver, The, L. R. 1 Ad. & E. | 319; 30 | Ti. f. | Au. 15 | • | | 67 |
| Hidward a Chavna 13 A C 385 | | | | | | 731 |
| Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 1 | 100 393 | 327 | 329 | 331. | 332. | 344 |
| Edwards v. Diowne, 2 Con. Ch. H. | . 00 T | T (11- | 015 | 202, | 200 | 021 |
| v. Burt, 2 De G. M. & G. 55 | ; 22 L. | J. Un | 210 | 520, | 029, | 001, |
| | | | | | 332, | 342 |
| v. Carter, (1893) A. C. 360; | E. T. 28 | Cb 10 | 00 | 346. | 465 | 467 |
| v. Carter, (1000) A. C. 500, (| ου <u>μ</u> . υ. | Оп. х | | 0109 | . 100, | 000 |
| v. Hall, 11 Ha. 23; 90 R. R. | 552 | | • | • | | 836 |
| v. Jones, 14 W. R. 815 | | | | | | 691 |
| v1 My. & C., 233; 5 v. Martyn, 17 Q. B. 693; 21 | L. J. Ch | 194 | 43 B | В | 178 | 427 |
| v 1 My. & O., 255, 5 | Ť. ř. Ön | 1. 1 <i>0</i> 1 | TOIL | w | 110 | 700 |
| v. Martyn, 17 Q. B. 693; 21 | L. J. Q. | B. 86 | | • | • | 190 |
| v. Morgan, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 401 | | | | | | 463 |
| v. Tuck, 23 B. 268 | - | | | | 365, | 368 |
| v. 1uck, 20 D. 200 | 40 T T | | | • | 000, | |
| v. Warden, L. R. 9 Ch. 495; v. Warwick, 2 P. W. 171. | 43 L. J. | . Ch. 6 | 44 . | • | • | 825 |
| v. Warwick, 2 P. W. 171 v. West, 7 C. D. 858; 47 L. J | | . 35 | 5, 356, | 359, | , 366, | 383 |
| Wort 7 C D 959 . 47 T. T | Ob 469 | • | 961 | 369 | 375 | 377 |
| 0. West, 1 C. D. 500, 11 II. 0 | . Сп. тоо | | our, | , | . 010, | ~0~ |
| ——— v. Wise, Barn. C. 139 . | | | | | • | |
| Eedes v. E., 11 Si. 569; 10 L. J. Ch. 19 | 99 . | | | | | 680 |
| Egbert v. Short, (1907) 2 Ch. 205; 76 | T. T (2) | h 590 | . 97 T. | Tr. | 90 . | |
| | 11. 0. 0 | u. 020 | , 0111 | | , oo | ~0.1 |
| 23 T. L. R. 558 | | | | | • | 794 |
| Elborough v. Ayres, 10 Eq. 367; 39 L. | J. Ch. 6 | 301 . | | | | 160 |
| Elcom, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 303; 63 L. J. | Ch 309 | | | | | 178 |
| Епсош, ле, (1034) г Сп. 303, 03 гл. 3. | On. 552 | • | • | • | • | |
| Elder, Ex p., 2 Madd. 286 | | | | | • | 731 |
| v. Maclean, 5 W. R. 447 . | | | | | 130, | 134 |
| Elderton, Re, 25 C. D. 220; 53 L. J. C | 15 958 | | | | 540, | |
| Enderton, 11e, 25 O. D. 220; 55 11.5. O | ш. 200 . | | o - - | m ~ | 1.1 | 000 |
| Ellenborough, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 697; 72 | 2 д. Ј. О. | h. 218 | ; 81 L. | T. 1 | 14; | |
| 51 W. R. 315 | | | | | | 112 |
| Ellender v. Wood, 32 Sol. Jo. 628 . | - | | | | | 249 |
| Ellender v. Wood, 52 Bol. 50. 026 . | | • | • | • | | |
| Elliot v. Dearsley, 16 C. D. 322 | | | • | _: | 1-1 | , 29 |
| v. North, (1901) 1 Ch. 424; 70 | L. J. Ch | 1.217 | : 49 W | . R. | 247 | .424 |
| Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149; 21 R. | P 287 | | <i>'</i> | | | 665 |
| | 10. 201 | | • | • | 9:0 | |
| —— v. Fisher, 12 Si. 505 | | | • | • | 359, | |
| ——— v. Minto, 6 Madd. 16 | | | | | | 797 |
| v. Remington, 9 Si. 502 v. Richardson, L. R. 5 C. P. 74 | | | | | | 675 |
| v. Remington, 5 St. 502 | , 'ao T | T (3 | D 010 | • | • | |
| v. Richardson, L. R. 5 U. P. 74 | $\pm ; 39 T$ | . J. C. | P. 540 | • . | | 162 |
| Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; 41 L. | . J. Ch. (| 64 . | | 249, | , 286, | 295 |
| | | | | | , | 402 |
| v. Bartrum, 25 B. 110 | | | • | • | | |
| — v. E., 1 Sch. & L. 1 | | | • | • | 577, | |
| — v. Eden, 25 B. 482; 26 L. J. Ch. | 533 . | | | | 860, | 873 |
| — v. Walker, Amb. 310 | | | 830 | 836 | 837, | 872 |
| Till: 1 (B) 1 (B) 1 (B) 1 (C) 1 (C) T | · 🔐 | • | 000, | COO | 001, | |
| Ellis's Trusts, Re, 17 Eq. 409; 43 L. J | . Un. 44 | • | • | • | • | 751 |
| Ellison v. Elwin, 13 Si. 309 | | | | | | 174 |
| Elmore's Trust, Re, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1325 | | | | | _ | 84 |
| Til. William To T III on T T I | r Att oo | | • | • | | 250 |
| Elsas v. Williams, 52 L. T. 39; 54 L. J | . Un. 55 | ь. | • | • | • | |
| Elton v. E., 27 B. 633 | | | | | | 217 |
| v, 1 Wils. 159 | | | | | | 563 |
| | • | • | • | • | 000 | |
| Elwes v . Causton, 30 B. 554 | | • | • | • | 883, | |
| Elwin v. E., 8 V. 547; 7 R. R. 117 | | | | | | 364 |
| Elworthy v. Bird, 2 S. & S. 372; 3 L. 3 | J Ch 19 | ω. | | _ | | 629 |
| | 9. CH. 16 | • | • | • | • | 677 |
| v. Wickstead, 1 J. & W. 69 | | | | | | |
| Emblyn v. Freeman, Pr. Ch. 541 . | | | | 350, | . 396, | 299 |
| Emerson Exp 11 T L R 218 | | | | . ' | 521, | |
| Emerson, Ex p., 11 T. L. R. 218 . Emery v. Hill, 1 Russ. 112; 25 R. R. 1 | | • | • | • | , | 822 |
| Emery v. fill, 1 Kuss. 112; 25 R. R. 1 | | | • | • | • | |
| Emery's T., Re, 32 W. R. 357 | | | | | | 176 |
| Emily Sutton, Re, 2 Fost. & Fin. 267 | | | | | | 519 |
| Program & Craith O The C P. C 700 - | ு ப் | 040 | | 070 | 970 | |
| Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sm. 722; 7 | я к. к., | • 0£6 | 33, | 070, | . 010, | |
| Engelhardt v. E., 26 W. R. 852 . | | | | | | 847 |
| England, Re, 1 Russ. & M. 499; 32 R. | R. 959 | | | | _ | 539 |
| " Downs 9 D 500 OT T | Ob 212 | ξΛ.Đ | D 920 | 2 | - | 646 |
| v. Downs, 2 B. 522; 9 L. J. 0 | оп. ото ; | n ou m | . дъ. 400 | | • | |
| v. Lavers, 3 Eq. 63 | | | | | | 460. |

| PAGE |
|---|
| English, &c. Trust v. Brunton, (1892) 2 Q. B. p. 8, 706; 62 |
| L. J. Q. B. 136 |
| Eno v. Tatham, 3 De G. J. & S. 443; 4 Giff. 181; 32 L. J. Ch. 31127 |
| Enohin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. C. 1: 31 L. J. Ch. 402 |
| Enohin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. C. 1; 31 L. J. Ch. 402 818, 820 Erlanger v. New Sombrero, &c. Co., 3 A. C. 1230; 48 L. J. Ch. |
| 50 |
| Frskine's T., Re., 1 K. & J. 302; 24 L. J. Ch. 327 |
| Espey v. Lake, 10 Ha. 261; 22 L. J. Ch. 336; 90 R. R. 362 298 |
| Ethel Brown, Re. 13 Q. B. D. 614 |
| Ethel Brown, Re, 13 Q. B. D. 614 517, 548, 550 Etty •v. Bridges, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 494; 12 L. J. Ch. 474; 60 |
| *R. R. 240 |
| *R. R. 240 |
| European Bank, Re. L. R. 5 Ch. 358; 41 L. J. Ch. 217 |
| Evans. Re. 4 Cr. M. & R. 205: 4 L. J. Ex. 201 |
| Evans, Re, 4 Cr. M. & R. 205; 4 L. J. Ex. 201 |
| ——- v. Ball, 30 W. R. 899 |
| |
| |
| v. Cheshire, Belt's Supp. to V. 300 |
| |
| ——- v. Cockeram, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 428 |
| |
| |
| —————————————————————————————————————— |
| v. Llewellin, 2 Bro. Ch. 150; 1 Cox. 333; 1 R. R. 49 . 322, 327 |
| |
| — - v. Scott, 1 H. L. C. 57; 73 R. R. 4 |
| |
| ——- v. Walker, 3 C. D. 211; 25 W. R. 7 |
| |
| Evelyn, Re. (1894) 2 Q. B. 502: 65 H. J. Q. B. 658: 70 H. T. 692: |
| 42 W. R. 512 |
| v. E., 2 P. W. 659 8, 9 |
| Everett v. E., 7 C. D. 428; 47 L. J. Ch. 367 856, 867 |
| Everitt v. E., 10 Eq. 405; 39 L. J. Ch. 777 |
| Ewart v. Chubb, 20 Eq. 454; 45 L. J. Ch. 108 676 |
| 42 W. R. 512 |
| |
| L. J. Ch. 435 |
| Eyre v. M'Dowell, 9 H. L. Cas. 619 |
| v. Marsden, 2 Keen, 564; 7 L. J. Ch. 211; 48 R. R. 73 401 |
| |
| |
| F. |
| ${f F}$. |
| |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 519, 538 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 519, 538 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 519, 538 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 519, 538 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 519, 538 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 519, 538 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 519, 538 Fairclough v. Johnstone, 16 Ir. Ch. R. 442 457 Fairer v. Park, 3 C. D. 309; 45 L. J. Ch. 760 535 Falkland v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 333 507, 511 Falkner v. Grace, 9 Ha. 282; 89 R. R. 444 14 Fall v. Elkins, 9 W. R. 861 212 Fane v. F., 20 Eq. 698; 45 L. J. Ch. 200 248, 255, 284 Faquain v. Selwyn, Jac. 268 (n.) 520 Farington v. Parker, 4 Eq. 116 732 Farley v. Turner, 26 L. J. Ch. 710 114 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 Fairelough v. Johnstone, 16 Ir. Ch. R. 442 Fairer v. Park, 3 C. D. 309; 45 L. J. Ch. 760 S35 Falkland v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 333 507, 511 Falkner v. Grace, 9 Ha. 282; 89 R. R. 444 Fall v. Elkins, 9 W. R. 861 Fane v. F., 20 Eq. 698; 45 L. J. Ch. 200 Farington v. Selwyn, Jac. 268 (n.) Farly v. Turner, 26 L. J. Ch. 710 Farman, Re, 57 L. J. Ch. 637; 58 L. T. 12 Farmer v. Mills, 4 Russ. 86; 28 R. R. 14 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 |
| F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; 71 L. J. Ch. 415 |

| | | | | | I | AGE |
|---|--------|-------|----------|--------------|--------|-------------------|
| Farquharson v. King, (1902) A. C. 325; 71 I | . J. K | C. B. | 667; | 86 I | . T. | |
| 810; 51 W. R. 94 | • | | 473, | 474, | 475, | 485 |
| Farrar v. Winterton, 5 B. 1; 59 R. R. 392 | | | • | • | • | 359 |
| Farrell, Re, 10 1r. On. R. 304 | | | | • | | 110 |
| Farrer v. St. Catherine's Coll. Camb., 16 Eq Farrow v. Smith, W. N. (1877) 21 Faulkener v. Hollingsworth, 8 V. 558 . Fawkes v. Gray, 18 V. 131; 11 R. 168 Fearns v. Young, 10 V. 184; 9 V. 553 . Fearon, Re. (1896) W. N. 175; 45 W. R. 232 | (. 19; | 42 | ப. J. | Uh. | 809 | |
| Farrow v. Smith, W. N. (1877) 21 | • | • | ٠ | • | • | $692 \\ 364$ |
| Fawkes v. Grav. 18 V. 131 · 11 R. R. 168 | • | • | • | • | • | 895 |
| Fearns v. Young. 10 V. 184: 9 V. 553 | | • | : | Ċ | Ċ | |
| Fearns v. Young, 10 V. 184; 9 V. 553 . Fearon, Re, (1896) W. N. 175; 45 W. R. 232 Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q. B. D. 792; 54 L. | | | | | 698. | 751 |
| Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q. B. D. 792; 54 L. | J. 6 |). B. | . 33 | 628, | 631, | 634, |
| | | | | | 635, | 637 |
| Feistel v. King's College, 10 B. 491; 16 L. J | . Ch. | 339 | | | | 158 |
| Fellow v. Jermyn, W. N. (1877) 95. Feltham v. Clark, 1 De G. & Sm. 307; 75 R. Fenner v. Taylor, 2 Russ. & M. 190; 5 L. J. | D 1 | | • | | | 391 |
| Feltham v. Clark, 1 De G. & Sm. 307; 75 R. | K. I. | 18 | • | • | • | 139 |
| Fenner v. Taylor, 2 Kuss. & M. 190; 5 L. J. | Un. | 140 | • | • | • | $\frac{667}{3,7}$ |
| Fereges v. Robinson, Bunb. 301 Ferguson v. Douglas, 3 Pat. App. Cas. 503 | • | • | • | • | • | 819 |
| | | | | | • | 856 |
| Ferneley's T., Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 543; 71 L. J. | Ch. 4 | 22: | 86 L | . T. 4 | 13 : | 0.00 |
| 50 W R. 346 | 2.5 | | | | | 756 |
| Ferrand v. Prentice, Amb. 273; Dick. 568 Festing v. Allen, 5 Ha. 575; 71 R. R. 233 | | | | | | 891 |
| Festing v. Allen, 5 Ha. 575; 71 R. R. 233 | | | | 895, | 898, | 903 |
| v Toylor 3 B & S 217 · 31 L J () | - B 3 | 6 . | 32 1. | .) (.) | В | |
| 41 Fettiplace v. Gorges, 1 V. 46; 1 R. R. 79 Field v. Brown, 17 B. 146; 27 B. 90; 19 B. v. Evans, 15 Si. 375 | • | • | • | • | H1- | 906 |
| Field Drawn 17 P 146, 97 B 00, 10 B | 176 | • | 300 | 201 | 710, | 140 |
| Evens 15 Si 375 | 170 | • | o90, | <i>ээ</i> т, | 048, | 753 |
| - 2 Megaw L R 4 C P 660 | • | • | • | • | 111 | 118 |
| v. Moore. 7 De G. M. & G. 691: 25 L. | J. Cl | i. 66 | · } . | Ċ | | 530 |
| Field v. Brown, 17 B. 146; 27 B. 90; 19 B. v. Evans, 15 Si. 375 v. Megaw, L. R. 4 C. P. 660 v. Moore, 7 De G. M. & G. 691; 25 L. v. Peckett, 29 B. 568; 30 L. J. Ch. 818 Field's Marriage, 2 H. L. Cas. 48 Fielding v. Preston, 1 De G. & J. 438 Fieldwick, 26 (1900) 1 Ch. 1. 78 L. J. Ch. 1818 | 3. | | | | 407, | 842 |
| Field's Marriage, 2 H. L. Cas. 48 | | | | | | 531 |
| Fielding v. Preston, 1 De G. & J. 438 . | | | | 81 | , 835, | 888 |
| Fieldwick, Re, (1909) 1 Ch. 1; 78 L. J. Ch. 1 | 153; | 100 | L. T. | 106 | | 722 |
| Finch, Re, 23 U. D. 271 | • | • . | • | • | • | 690 |
| Findlater v. Lowe, (1904) 1 Ir. R. 519 . | D 1 | | • | • | ٠ | 881 |
| Figher v. Pulnam, 2 De G. & Sm. 99; 19 K. | IX. 1. | 99 | • | • | • | 280 |
| Colvert 97 W R 301 | • | • | • | • | • | 118 |
| v F 2 Keen 610: 7 L J Ch 176 | • | • | • | . 1 | 7 19 | 32 |
| Fitch v. Weber, 6 Ha, 145: 17 L. J. Ch. 361 | : 77 | R. I | 3.8 | | 401. | 402 |
| Fitzer v. F., 2 Atk. 512 | · . | | | 618, | 619, | 636 |
| Finch, Re, 23 C. D. 271 | | | | | | 56 |
| | | | | | | |
| W. R. 432; 20 T. L. R. 332 | | | • | • | 862, | 864 |
| v. Chapman, 1 C. D. 563; 45 L. J | . Uh. | 23 | • | • | 050 | 176 |
| W. R. 432; 20 T. L. R. 332 | 268 | • | • | • | 372, | 313 |
| Fitzgibbon v. Pike, 6 L. R. Ir. 487 | • | • | • | • | 746 | 747 |
| Fitzroy v. Cave, (1905) 2 K. B. 364; 74 L. 499; 54 W. R. 17; 21 T. L. R. 612 | I. K. | B. 8 | 329 : 9 | 93 T. | T. | 1 1 1 |
| 499; 54 W. R. 17; 21 T. L. R. 612 . | | | | | | 161 |
| Fitzsimons v. F., 28 B. 417 | | | | | | 451 |
| Fitzwilliams v. Kelly, 10 Ha. 266; 22 L. J. (| Ch. 10 | 16; | 90 R | . R. 3 | 67 | 835, |
| | | | | | 874, | |
| Flamank, Ex p., 1 Si. (N. S.) 260; 89 R. R. 8 | | | | | • | 393 |
| , Re, 40 C. D. 461; 58 L. J. Ch. 518 | • | | | | 730, | |
| Flanagan v. F., 1 Bro. Ch. 500 | • | • | 349, | 350, | 396, | |
| Flarty v Odlum, 3 T. R. 681; 1 R. R. 791 | • | • | • | • | • | 157 |
| Fleck, Re, 37 C. D. 677; 57 L. J. Ch. 943 | ó Þ | 0.5 | <u>.</u> | • | 1 7 1 | 30 |
| Fleet v. Perrins, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500; 38 L. J. | &. B | . 20 | 1 . | • | 171, | 609 |

xlix

| Fox v. Wright, 6 Madd. 111; 22 R. R. 251 | 2 |
|--|--------|
| Fox v. Wright, 6 Madd. 111; 22 A. H. 201 | i |
| Frampton v. F. 4 B. 287: 55 B. B. 79 | 5 |
| France v. Clark. 26 C. D. 257: 53 L. J. Ch. 588 | i |
| Francis v. Brooking, 19 B. 347 | 3 |
| Frank v. Basnett, 2 My. & K. 618 |) |
| v. F., 3 My. & C. 171 |) |
| v, 1 Ch. Cas. 84 |) |
| v. Standish, 1 Bro. Ch. 588 (n.) |) |
| Franks v. Bollans, L. R. 3 Ch. 717; 37 L. J. Ch. 148 |) |
| Frape, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 284; 62 L. J. Ch. 473 | ł |
| Fraser, Re, L. R. 2 P. & D. 40, 183; 39 L. J. P. 20; 18 W. R. 263; | |
| 21 L. T. 680 | |
| D_{c} (1004) 1 (1), $70e$, 70 T = T (1), 401 , 61 T = 70 , 40 , 50 | |
| W R 516 | |
| v. Byng. 1 Russ. & M. 90: 32 R. R. 154 | 3 |
| Fray v. Vowles, 1 Ell. & Ell. 389; 28 L. J. Q. B. 232 |) |
| Frayne v. Taylor, 33 L. J. Ch. 228 | 2 |
| Fream v. Dowling, 20 B. 624; 4 Eq. 145 (n.) |) |
| W. R. 516 | ; |
| Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654; 18 L. J. Ex. 114; 76 R. R. 711473, 473 v. Fairlie, 3 Mer. 24; 11 Jur. 447; 17 R. R. 7 66: v. Ellis, 1 Hem. & M. 758 32 v. Simpson, 6 Si. 75; 2 L. J. Ch. 141 898 Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. W. 429 120 Freen, Re, 22 C. D. 622; 52 L. J. Ch. 301 863 Freke v. Barrington, 3 Bro. Ch. 284 446 Freme v. Brade, 2 De G. & J. 582; 27 L. J. Ch. 697 324 French v. Chichester, 2 Vern. 568 16 Freshfields, T., Re, 11 C. D. 198 126 Fretwell v. Stacy, 2 Vern. 434 886 Frewen, Re, 60 L. T. 953 361, 393 - v. F., L. R. 10 Ch. 610 361, 393 |) |
| v. Fairlie, 3 Mer. 24; 11 Jur. 447; 17 R. R. 7 | } |
| v. Ellis, I Hem. & M. 758 | : |
| | , |
| From Re 22 C D 622 52 L I Ch 301 | , (|
| Freke v. Barrington, 3 Bro. Ch. 284 | ; |
| Freme v. Brade. 2 De G. & J. 582: 27 L. J. Ch. 697 | |
| French v. Chichester, 2 Vern. 568 | ; |
| Freshfields, T., Re, 11 C. D. 198 | ; |
| Fretwell v. Stacy, 2 Vern. 434 | ; |
| Frewen, Re, 60 L. T. 953 | |
| v. F., L. R. 10 Ch. 610. | i |
| | |
| L. T. 17; 44 W. R. 682 | |
| Frith, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 342; 71 L. J. Ch. 199; 86 L. T. 212 155—v. Forbes, 4 De G. F. & J. 409; 32 L. J. Ch. 10 | |
| Thurst Common 17 on 100 | |
| v. Lane, 40 C. D. 312; 58 L. J. Ch. 113 . 278, 296, 322, 324, 328, | |
| 333, 336, 342, 343, 344 | c |
| | |
| — v. Porter, 1 Ch. Ca. 138 | : |
| — v. Noble, 20 B. 598; 25 L. J. Ch. 144 | 1 |
| | , |
| Fulham v. Macarthy, I.H. L. Cas. 703 | : |
| Fullerton v. Provincial Bank of Ireland, (1903) A. C. 309; 72 L. J. | , |
| P. C. 79; 89 L. T. 79 | |
| Furley v. Hyder, 42 L. J. Ch. 626 | |
| Furnival v. Boole, 4 Russ, 142: 6 L. J. Ch. 91: 28 R. R. 34 250, 785 | 5 |
| Furzaker v. Robinson, Pr. Ch. 475 | ī |
| Fynn, Re, 2 De G. & Sm. 481; 79 R. R. 284 . 517, 520, 538, 539, 540 |) |
| Furzaker v. Robinson, Pr. Ch. 475 | í |
| | |
| and the second s | |
| $\mathbf{G}_{oldsymbol{\cdot}}$ | |
| G., Re. (1892) 1 Ch. 292: 61 L. J. Ch. 490 | ; |

| | | | 71.67 |
|--|----------------|----------------|--|
| Gadd v. Provincial Union Bank, (1909) 2 K. B. 353 | 2 . 78 | т. л к | PAGE |
| 815; 101 L. T. 219; 25 T. L. R. 591 | . 10 | | . 340 |
| Gaffee, Re, 1 Mac. & G. 541; 19 L. J. Ch. 179; 84 | Ř. R. | $\frac{1}{1}$ | . 761 |
| Gale v. G., 21 B, 349 | • | | 867,872 |
| v. Lindo, 1 Vern. 475 | | | 478,601 |
| | | | 24, 27 . 411 |
| Gall v. Fenwick, 43 L. J. Ch. 178 Gallard v. Hawkins, 27 C. D. 298; 53 L. J. Ch. 83 | 4. | | |
| Gallini v. Noble, 3 Mer. 691 | • | | $\begin{array}{c} . & 842 \\ 32, 33, 47 \end{array}$ |
| Galton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 437. | | | |
| Galvin v. Devereux, (1903) 1 Ir. R. 185 Game, Re. (1897) 1 Ch. 881; 66 L. J. Ch. 505; | 76 T. | m 450 | 449, 451 |
| W P 479 | 70 | 80 81 | 83, 84, 86 |
| W. R. 472 | T. T | 145 | . 756 |
| Games, Ex p., 12 C. D. 314 | | | . 108 |
| Gandy v. G., 7 P. D. 80, 168; 30 C. D. 57; 51 L. | J., P. | & D. 41 | . 625, |
| | | | , 637, 639 |
| Garbut v. Hilton, 1 Atk. 381 | | | . 563 |
| Garbutt v. Faweus, 1 C. D. 155; 45 L. J. Ch. 130 | | | 785,788 |
| Gardener v. Ennor, 35 B. 549 Gardiner, Re, 20 Q. B. D. 249; 57 L. J. Q. B. 149 | • | | . 287 |
| Gardiner, Re, 20 Q. B. D. 249; 57 L. J. Q. B. 149 | • | | . 703 |
| | | • | . 583 |
| | • | | 380, 381 . 537 |
| | 17 | • | . 108 |
| v. G., 1 Gif. 126: 28 L. J. Ch. 903 | | | 732, 733 |
| | | | . 790 |
| v. Garrett, 20 B. 469 | | | 837, 867 |
| | 229 . 4 | ס ס פו | 104 128 |
| ———— v. Marshall, 14 Si. 575; 65 R. R. 644. | | • | . 668 |
| | | . 426 | , 427, 434 |
| | | | . 678 |
| Carlorth v. Bradley, 2 ves. Sen. 575 | • | | . 678 |
| Garnett, Re , 31 C. D. 9 | • | | 437, 690 |
| | • | • | . 763 |
| | • | | . 362 |
| Garnett Orme and Hargreaves Contract, Re, 25 C. D. | 595: | 53 L. J. | |
| 196 | | | . 369 |
| Garret v. Pritty, 2 Vern. 293; 3 Mer. 120 (n.). | | | . 586 |
| Garrett v. Wilkinson, 2 De G. & Sm. 244; 79 R. I | t. 197 | | . 289 |
| Garth v. Meyrick, 1 Bro. Ch. 30 | | | . 919 |
| Garthshore v. Chalie, 10 V. 13; 7 R. R. 311 . | | | . 894 |
| Gaskell v. G., 6 Si. 643 | • | | . 211 |
| Gaskell's Trusts, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 780. | • | | . 764 |
| Gaskin v. Rogers, 2 Eq. 284 | • | | 54,845 725 |
| Gaston v. Frankum, 2 De G. & Sm. 561 Gathercole v. Smith, 17 C. D. 1; 50 L. J. Ch. 671 Gaŭdet Frères, Re, 12 C. D. 882; 48 L. J. Ch. 818 | • | | . 156 |
| Gaudet Frères, Re, 12 C. D. 882; 48 L. J. Ch. 818 | • | | . 253 |
| Gaunt v. Taylor, 3 Man. & G. 886; 3 Scott's N. R. | | | . •789 |
| Gaussen v. Whatman, 93 L. T. 101 | | | . 392 |
| Gawden v . Draper, 2 Vent. 217 | | | . 640 |
| Gawler v . Standerwick, 2 Cox, 15 | | | 890, 891 |
| Gaynor v. G., (1901) 1 Ir. R. 217 | | • | . 748 |
| Gayre v. G., 2 Vern. 538 | | • • • | . 854 |
| Geck, Re, (1893) W. N. 161 | · 01 | | . 822 |
| Gee v. Mahood, 11 C. D. 891; 9 C. D. 151; 48 L. | J. Uh. | 657 . | . 849 |
| General Company for the Promotion of Land Cr | eart, | L. K. 5 | |
| 363; 39 L. J. Ch. 737 | • | • | . 818 |
| | 8 10 | d D is | 145, 146 475 480 |
| I manco, wo. co. v. involator i ormanento. | ~., <u>1</u> 0 | O. D. 10. J | |

| | DACT |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| General Service, &c. Stores, Re, (1891) 1 Ch. 496; 60 L. | J. Ch. 586: |
| 64 L. T. 272 | 791 |
| Genery v. Fitzgerald, Jac. 468; 23 R. R. 121 | 901 |
| Genese, Re, 16 Q. B. D. 700; 55 L. J. Q. B. 118 . | 735 |
| Gent, Re, 40 C. D. 190; 58 L. J. Ch. 162 | 547 |
| —— v. Harris, 10 Ha. 383 George, Re, 5 C. D. 837; 47 L. J. Ch. 118 | 669, 670 . 898, 899, 901 |
| - v. G., L. R. 1 P. & D. 544; 38 L. J. P. & M. 34 | |
| Gerrard v. O'Reilly, 3 Dr. & Wa. 414; 61 R. R. 97. | 344 |
| Gertrude, The, 15 P. D. 109 | 788 |
| Gervis v. G., 14 Si. 654; 16 L. J. Ch. 422 | |
| Gethin v. Allen, 23 L. R. Ir. 236 | 410 |
| Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 8 Ch. 338 Gibbins v. Eyden, 7 Eq. 371; 38 L. J. Ch. 377 | 679 26, 33, 51 |
| Gibbon v. Chaytor, (1907) 1 Ir. R. 65 | 20, 35, 51 |
| Gibbons v. Hills, Dick. 324 | 836 |
| v. Kibbey, 10 W. R. 55 | 674, 676 |
| Gibbs v. Harding, L. R. 5 Ch. 338; 39 L. J. Ch. 374 | . 624, 627, 629 |
| v. Haydon, 30 W. R. 726 | 211 |
| v. Ongier, 12 V. 416; 8 R. R. 348 | 47 |
| Gibson, Re. 2 Eq. 669: 35 L. J. Ch. 596 | |
| Gibson, Re, 2 Eq. 669; 35 L. J. Ch. 596 | 857, 868 79, 89, 894, 904 599 |
| v. Dickie, 3 M. & S. 463; 16 R. R. 333 . | |
| t. Jeyes, U v. 200, J II. II. 200 | 287 280, 293 |
| v. Russell, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 104; 60 R. R. 60 v. Seagrim, 20 B. 614; 24 L. J. Ch. 782 | 280, 293 |
| Giddings v. G., 3 Russ. 241; 27 R. R. 78 | 56, 57 464 |
| Giffard v. Williams, L. R. 5 Ch. 546; 39 L. J. Ch. 735 | 209 |
| Gilbert v. Endean. 9 U. D. 259 | . 248, 254 |
| v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. & S. 38; 32 L. J. Ch. 347 v. Smith, 2 C. D. 686; 11 C. D. 82; 48 L. J. Ch. | . 691, 692, 694 |
| v. Smith, 2 C. D. 686; 11 C. D. 82; 48 L. J. Ch. | 352 . 222, 225 |
| Gilbertson v. G., 34 B. 354 | 15 |
| Gilchrist v. Cator, 1 De G. & Sm. 188 Gillaume v. Adderley, 15 V. 384 | . 664, 669, 681 . 837, 841, 872 |
| Gillespie v. Alexander, 2 S. & S. 145; 3 L. J. Ch. 52 | 917 |
| Gillespie v. Alexander, 2 S. & S. 145; 3 L. J. Ch. 52 v. Croker, 16 Ir. Ch. R. 182 | 426 |
| Gillet v . Wrav, I.P. W. 284 | 576, 583 |
| Gilliat v. G., 28 B. 481 | 536, 841 |
| Gilling Re 74 T. T. Ch. 385 - 92 T. T. 533 - 53 W. R. 49 | 27 641 |
| Gilling, Re, 74 L. J. Ch. 335; 92 L. T. 533; 53 W. R. 42 Gillins, Re, (1909) 1 Ch. 345; 78 L. J. Ch. 244; 100 L. T. 22 | 26839. 855. 857 |
| Gillman v. Carbutt, 61 L. T. 281 | 478 |
| Gipps v. Hume, 2 John. & H. 517; 31 L. J. Ch. 37 | 028 |
| Gist, Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 398; 73 L. J. Ch. 251; 90 L. T. 35 | ; 52 W. R. |
| 422 | . 387, 389 |
| Given v. Massey, 31 L. R. Ir. 126 | 20 |
| Gjers, Re, (1899) 2 Ch. 54; 68 L. J. Ch. 442; 47 W. R. 535; | 80 L. T. 689874 |
| Gladstone v. G., 1 P. D. 442: 45 L. J. P. & D. 82 | 638 |
| v. The Ottoman Bank, 1 H. & M. 505; 32 L. | J. Ch. 229826 |
| Glaister v. Hewer, 8 V. 207 | 673 |
| Glanvill, Re, 31 C. D. 532; 55 L. J. Ch. 325 | 764, 767 |
| Gleadow v. Leetham, 22 C. D. 269; 51 L. J. Ch. 102 | 901 |
| Gleaves v. Paine, 1 De G. J. & S. 87; 32 L. J. Ch. 182 | . 662, 671 |
| Glenie v. Bruce-Smith and Tucker, (1908) 1 K. B. 26; K. B. 193; 98 L. T. 515; 24 T. L. R. 177 | 3; 77 L. J. |
| K. B. 193; 98 L. T. 515; 24 T. L. R. 177 | 489 |
| Glover, Ex p., 4 Dowl. 291; 47 R. R. 818 | 519 |
| - o. man, to bi. 000; 10 h. J. Un. 300 | 691 |

| P | AGE |
|---|------------------|
| Glover v. Strothoff, 2 Bro. C. C. 34 | 820 |
| Glukman, Re, (1908) 1 Ch. 552; (1908) A. C. 411; 77 L. J. Ch. 685; | 110 |
| 99 L. T. 737; 24 T. L. R. 793 | 412 |
| | 187 |
| Goatley v. Jones, (1909) 1 Ch. 557; 78 L. J. Ch. 420; 100 L. T. 512 | 703 |
| Godbon a Lourio 10 Price 159 | 675 |
| | 297 |
| | 647 |
| Googlen, Re, (1895) 1 Ch. 292; 52 Lt. J. Ch. 409 | $\frac{90}{862}$ |
| Godfray v. G., 12 Jur. (N. S.) 397 | 820 |
| Godfrey, Re, 63 L. J. Ch. 854; 71 L. T. 568; 72 L. T. 8; 43 W. R. 244 | 712 |
| - v. Littel, 1 Russ. & M. 59; 2 Russ. & M. 630; 31 R. R. 79 | 187, |
| 189, | 190 |
| Godfrey's T., Re, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 531 | 677 |
| Colding Design Co. Pa. 12 C. D. 609 | 62 |
| Goldsmid at G. G. Coop. 225 | 1±1 509 |
| Goldsmith v. Bruning, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 89 | 600 |
| Goldsworthy, Re, 2 Q. B. D. 75; 46 L. J. Q. B. 187 . 517, 538, | 550 |
| Gooch v. G., (1893) P. 99; 62 L. J. P. & D. 73 632, 633, | 634 |
| Goodn E. R., (1893) F. 99; 62 L. J. P. & D. 73 | 34 |
| Goodacre v. G., W. N., (1888) 138 | 213 |
| Goodal v. Harris, 2 P. W. 562 | 523 |
| Gooda Re 1 Tr Ch R 256 | 010 544 |
| | 493 |
| Goodenough, Re. (1895) 2 Ch. 537; 65 L. J. Ch. 71 | 90 |
| Goode, Re, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 256 | 233 |
| v Tremamondo 2 B 512 · 50 R R 262 | 84 |
| Goodier v. Edmunds, (1893) 3 Ch. 455; 62 L. J. Ch. 649 | 402 |
| Goodnich a Morch W N (1979) 196 | 881 995 |
| Goodson v. Ellison 3 Russ 583 · 27 R. R. 127 | 220 140 |
| Goodlad v. Burnett, 1 K. & J. 341 | $\frac{110}{22}$ |
| v. Robarts, 1 A. C. 476; 45 L. J. Ex. 748 146, 147, | 489 |
| Goold v. Teague, 7 W. R. 84 | 378 |
| Gordon, Re, 6 C. D. 537; 45 L. J. Bank. 1 | 385 |
| | 589 - 610 |
| - v. Anderson, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1097 | 800 910 |
| | 839 |
| v. G., 3 Swans. 400; 19 R. R. 230 | 247 |
| v. Robarts, 1 A. C. 476; 45 L. J. Ex. 748 | |
| 389; 20 T. L. R. 272 | 767 |
| | |
| Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45; 2 L. J. K. B. 206; 27 R. R. 290 | 146 |
| Gorringe v. Irwell, 34 C. D. 134; 56 L. J. Ch. 85 . 106, 111, 112, 1 Gosden v. Dotterill, 1 My. & K. 56; 2 L. J. Ch. 15; 36 R. R. 244 | 205 |
| Goslin v. Clark, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 681; 31 L. J. C. P. 330 | 337 |
| Gosling v. G., John. 272 | 862 |
| Gosselin, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 120; 75 L. J. Ch. 88; 54 W. R. 193 | 355 |
| Gotch v. Foster, 5 Eq. 311 | 895 |
| Gough v. Bult, 16 Si. 45, 323; 17 L. J. Ch. 10; 80 R. R. 19 861, 9 | |
| Goulder v. Camm, 1 De G. F. & J. 146; 29 L. J. Ch. 135 . 693, 7 Governesses' Benevolent Institution v. Rusbridger, 18 B. 467 8 | 891 |
| Government Stock, &c. Co. v. Manila Ry. Co., (1897) A. C. 86; 66 | 101 |
| | .10 |
| | 377 |
| | |

| v. Otte, 1 S. & S. 250; 1 L. J. Ch. 87 | | AGE |
|---|--|------------|
| Goy & Co., Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 149; 69 L. J. Ch. 481; 83 L. T. 309; 48 W. R. 425 Gosman, Re, 15 C. D. 67 Graham, Re, 10 EG, 530; 39 L. J. Ch. 724 — v. Clinton, 81 L. T. 717 — v. Johnson, 8 Eq. 36; 38 L. J. Ch. 374 — v. Londonderry, 2 Atk. 78; 3 Atk. 369, 395 53, 689, 771, 772 — v. Maxwell, 1 Mac. & G. 71; 18 L. J. Ch. 225 — v. Maxwell, 1 Mac. & G. 71; 18 L. J. Ch. 225 Graham's T., Re, 20 W. R. 289 Graham's T., Re, 20 W. R. 289 Grandgr. Re, (1902) A. C. 1; 69 L. J. Ch. 789; 83 L. T. 209; 48 W. R. 673 Grand Junc., &c. v. Hampton U. C., (1898) 2 Ch. 331; 67 L. J. Ch. 603; 78 L. T. 673; 46 W. R. 644 Grange, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 20; 76 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, 373 — v. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, 373 — v. Pyber, 2 Down 93; 14 R. R. 118 — n. G., 34 B. 623; 13 W. R. 1057; 34 L. J. Ch. 641 Grant v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330 — v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 — v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 Gray, Re, 36 C. D. 205; 56 L. J. Ch. 975 Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 Grazebrook v. Percival, 14 Jur. 1103 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 Graves v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 581 Graves v. R., 23 C. D. p. 316; 50 L. J. Ch. 817 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 517 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 576 Greated v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 187 Greated v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 187 Greated v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 29 L. J. Ch. 167 — v. Bushout, 5 De G. & Sm. 290 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 187 Greated v. G., 26 R. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 477 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. Hydrolla, 14 D. J. Ch. 180 — v. Winderdorpe, 3 Green, 1 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 — v. Veloch, 1 R. & S. 250; 1 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 — v. Wellen, 1 Thus, & M. | Gowan, Re, 17 C. D. 778; 50 L. J. Ch. 248 | 670 |
| 48 W. R. 425 Gosman, Re, 15 C. D. 67 Gosman, Re, 15 C. D. 67 | Gowland v. De Faria, 17 V. 20; 11 R. R. 9324, 325, 331, 342, 343, | 344 |
| Gosman, Re, 15 C. D. 67 Graham, Re, 10 Eq. 530; 39 L. J. Ch. 724 —— v. Clinton, 81 L. T. 717 —— v. Johnson, 8 Eq. 36; 38 L. J. Ch. 374 —— v. Johnson, 8 Eq. 36; 38 L. J. Ch. 374 —— v. Londonderry, 2 Atk. 78; 3 Atk. 369, 395 53, 689, 771, 772 —— v. Maxwell, 1 Mac. & G. 71; 18 L. J. Ch. 225 Graham's T., Re, 20 W. R. 289 Grainger, Re, (1902) A. C. 1; 69 L. J. Ch. 789; 83 L. T. 209; 48 W. R. 673 Grand Junc., & c. v. Hampton U. C., (1898) 2 Ch. 331; 67 L. J. Ch. 603; 78 L. T. 673; 46 W. R. 644 Grange, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 20; 76 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, 373 — v. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 620 — st. T. 673; 41 W. R. 191 — Re, 52 L. J. Ch. 552 — v. Dyer, 2 Dow. 93; 14 R. R. 118 — v. Grant, Re, 182 — v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 Grattix v. Chambers, 2 Giff. 321 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 — v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 Gray, Re, 36 C. D. 205; 56 L. J. Ch. 975 — v. Minnethorpe, 3 V. 103 — v. Nall, 46 L. J. Ch. 819 — v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 Grazebrook v. Percival, 14 Jur. 1103 Graet Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 — v. Baull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 — v. Buithurn v. Charkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 Gravdon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 Grazebrook v. Re, 4 De G. J. & S. 63 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 — v. Buitten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Univalidation, 10 Ch. 157 Greaded v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 157 Greaded v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 167 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Carill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 167 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Carill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 167 — v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35 — v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35 — v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35 — v. Jackson, 67, 18 L. J. Ch. 165; 32 R. R. 232 — v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 — v. Stephens | Goy & Co., Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 149; 69 L. J. Ch. 481; 83 L. T. 309; | 112 |
| Graham, Re, 10 Eq. 530; 39 L. J. Ch. 724 ——————————————————————————————————— | | |
| | | |
| | a. Clinton 81 L. T. 717 | |
| | 2. Johnson S Ea 36: 38 L. J. Ch. 374 | |
| Graham's T., Re, 20 W. R. 289 Graham's T., Re, 20 W. R. 289 Grainger, Re, (1902) A. C. 1; 69 L. J. Ch. 789; 83 L. T. 209; 48 W. R. 673 Grand June., &c. v. Hampton U. C., (1898) 2 Ch. 331; 67 L. J. Ch. 603; 78 L. T. 673; 46 W. R. 644 786 Grange, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 20; 76 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, 373 v. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 620 231 Grant, Re, 14 W. R. 191 666 Re, 52 L. J. Ch. 552 852 v. Dyer, 2 Dow. 93; 14 R. R. 118 593 v. G., 34 B. 623; 13 W. R. 1057; 34 L. J. Ch. 641 630, 772 Grant v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330 v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 v. Thompson, 73 L. T. 264 v. Thompson, 74 L. T. 20 v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 474 436 v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 v. Rushout, 5 De G. & Sm. 290 v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 187 v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 157 v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 187 v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 v, 5 Ha. 400 (n.); 18 L. J. Ch. 465; 71 R. R. 151 v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 v. Synonds, 1 Broc. Ch. 129 (n.) v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 v. Synonds, 1 Broc. Ch. 129 (n.) v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 v. Synonds, 1 Broc. Ch. 129 (n.) v. | v. Londonderry, 2 Atk, 78: 3 Atk, 369, 395 53, 689, 771, | 772 |
| Graham's T., Re, 20 W. R. 289 Grainger, Re, (1902) A. C. 1; 69 L. J. Ch. 789; 83 L. T. 209; 48 W. R. 673 Grand June., &c. v. Hampton U. C., (1898) 2 Ch. 331; 67 L. J. Ch. 603; 78 L. T. 673; 46 W. R. 644 Grange, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 20; 76 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, 373 — v. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 620 Grant, Re, 14 W. R. 191 — 6666 — , Re, 52 L. J. Ch. 552 — v. Dyer, 2 Dow. 93; 14 R. R. 118 — v. G., 34 B. 623; 13 W. R. 1057; 34 L. J. Ch. 641 Gratrix v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330 — v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Giff, 321 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 — v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 — v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 — v. Faull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 — v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 Graybour v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 Graets V. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 517 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 517 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 517 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 57 Greates, Re, 23 C. D. p. 316; 50 L. J. Ch. 157 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 157 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 157 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 187 — v. G., 2 Mer. 88; 16 R. R. 147 — v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 — v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 — 355 — v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 — v. N. B. & Mercantile In | | 795 |
| Grainger, Re, (1902) A. C. 1; 69 L. J. Ch. 789; 83 L. T. 209; 48 W. R. 673 | Graham's T., Re, 20 W. R. 289 | 695 |
| W. R. 673 Grand June., &c. v. Hampton U. C., (1898) 2 Ch. 331; 67 L. J. Ch. 603; 78 L. T. 673; 46 W. R. 644 | Grainger, Re, (1902) A. C. 1; 69 L. J. Ch. 789; 83 L. T. 209; 48 | |
| 603; 78 L. T. 673; 46 W. R. 644 Grange, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 20; 76 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, 373 — v. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 620 Grant, Re, 14 W. R. 191 — Re, 52 L. J. Ch. 552 — v. Dyer, 2 Dow. 93; 14 R. R. 118 — v. G., 34 B. 623; 13 W. R. 1057; 34 L. J. Ch. 641 Grant v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330 — v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Giff. 321 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 — v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 — v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 — v. Faull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 — v. Ningers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 — v. Ningers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 Graet Ship Co., Re, 4 De G. J. & S. 63 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 817 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 157 Greated v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 477 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 477 — v. Finchen, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 12 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 477 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 — v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 — v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 — v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 — v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 — v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) Greenbill v. G., | W. R. 673 | 881 |
| Grange, Re. (1907) 2 Ch. 20; 76 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, 373 - v. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 620 - r. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 620 - r. Byte, 2 Dow. 93; 14 R. R. 118 - r. Grant, Re. 14 W. R. 191 - v. Dyer, 2 Dow. 93; 14 R. R. 118 - v. Dyer, 2 Dow. 93; 14 R. R. 118 - v. Grant v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330 - v. G., 34 B. 623; 13 W. R. 1057; 34 L. J. Ch. 641 Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Giff. 321 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 - v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Giff. 321 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 - v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 - v. Faull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 - v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 - v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 - v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 - v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 - v. Rushout, 5 De G. & Sm. 290 Grazebrook v. Percival, 14 Jur. 1103 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 Greated V. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 756 Greaves, Re, 23 C. D. p. 316; 50 L. J. Ch. 817 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175, 177, 660, 680 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 - v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 - v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 477 - v. D. Greatedn, 15 R. 8. 15 Ch. 157 - v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 - v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 477 - v, 2 Jo. & Lat. 529; 69 R. R. 364 - v, 5 Ha. 400 (n.); 18 L. J. Ch. 465; 71 R. R. 151 - v. Handley Ch. J. Ch. 103 - v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 - v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 - v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 - v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 - v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 - v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 - v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 - v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 - v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 - v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679; Pr. Ch. 320 - v. N. B. & Mercantile In. Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474; 62 L. J. Ch. 173, 464, 467 | | |
| Grant, Re, 14 W. R. 191 | 603; 78 L. T. 673; 46 W. R. 644 . | |
| $\begin{array}{c} \text{Grant, } Re, \ 14 \text{ W. R. } 191 \\$ | Grange, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 20; 76 L. J. Ch. 456; 96 L. T. 867365, | |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | v. White, 18 C. D. 612; 50 L. J. Ch. 620 | |
| | | |
| Grant v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330 | | |
| Grant v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330 84 - v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264 159 Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Giff. 321 852 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 253 - v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 474 Gray, Re, 36 C. D. 205; 56 L. J. Ch. 975 839, 859 - v. Minnethorpe, 3 V. 103 15, 19 - v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 251 - v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 79, 83 Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 91, 92 Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 593 Grazebrook v. Percival, 14 Jur. 1103 646 Great Ship Co., Re, 4 De G. J. & S. 63 791 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 243, 247 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 756 27 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 817 355 Greated v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 817 355 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 177, 660, 680 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 16, 80, 85, 835 - v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 - v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 54 L. J. Ch. 177 733 | 7. Dyer, 2 Dow. 95; 14 K. N. 116 | |
| Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Giff. 321 | Grant v. Mneeatt & W. R. 330 | |
| Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Giff. 321 852 Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 253 — v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313 474 Gray, Re, 36 C. D. 205; 56 L. J. Ch. 975 839, 859 — v. Minnethorpe, 3 V. 103 15, 19 — v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 251 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 79, 83 Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 91, 92 Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 593 Grazebrook v. Percival, 14 Jur. 1103 646 Great Ship Co., Re, 4 De G. J. & S. 63 791 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 243, 247 — v. Rushout, 5 De G. & Sm. 290 799 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 756 27 Greaves, Re, 23 C. D. p. 316; 50 L. J. Ch. 817 355 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175, 177, 660, 680 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 16, 80, 85, 835 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. G.; 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 457 — v. G.; 4 Macd. (n.) | v Thompson 72 L T 264 | |
| Graves v. G., 69 L. T. 420 | | |
| | | |
| Gray, Re, 36 C. D. 205; 56 H. J. Ch. 975 — v. Minnethorpe, 3 V. 103 — v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 Grazebrook v. Percival, 14 Jur. 1103 Great Ship Co., Re, 4 De G. J. & S. 63 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 — v. Rushout, 5 De G. & Sm. 290 Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 756 Greaves, Re, 23 C. D. p. 316; 50 L. J. Ch. 817 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175, 660, 680 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 477 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 — v. —, 5 Ha. 400 (n.); 18 L. J. Ch. 465; 71 R. R. 151 — v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 — v. Otte, 1 S. & S. 250; 1 L. J. Ch. 87 — v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 — v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 — v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 — v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; 20 R. R. 284 — v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679; Pr. Ch. 320 — v. N. B. & Mercantile In. Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474; 62 L. J. Ch. 918 — To., 173, 464, 467 | | |
| | Grav, Re. 36 C. D. 205; 56 L. J. Ch. 975 839, | |
| — v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 — | — v. Minnethorpe, 3 V. 103 | 19 |
| — v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74; 49 L. J. Ch. 819 | v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818 | 251 |
| Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 91, 92 Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 | v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74: 49 L. J. Ch. 819 | , 83 |
| Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 | Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; 37 L. J. Ch. 550 . 91, | * |
| Great Ship Co., Re, 4 De G. J. & S. 63 Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 243, 247 247 248, 247 249 249 249 240 241 241 243 247 247 248 247 248 248 249 258 267 267 278 278 278 278 279 279 289 290 291 292 293 294 294 295 296 297 298 298 299 298 299 299 299 | Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16 | |
| Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 | | |
| v. Rushout, 5 De G. & Sm. 290 | | |
| Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 L. J. Ch. 756 Greaves, Re, 23 C. D. p. 316; 50 L. J. Ch. 817 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175, 177, 660, 680 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 Greedy v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 477 v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 v, 2 Jo. & Lat. 529; 69 R. R. 364 v, 5 Ha. 400 (n.); 18 L. J. Ch. 465; 71 R. R. 151 748 v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35 v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; 20 R. R. 284 To. 16 Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679; Pr. Ch. 320 v. N. B. & Mercantile In. Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474; 62 L. J. Ch. 918 | Great Western Railway Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91 | 247 |
| Greaves, Re, 23 C. D. p. 316; 50 L. J. Ch. 817 Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175, 177, 660, 680 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 . 16, 80, 85, 835 — v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; 42 L. J. Ch. 18782, 83, 457, 692 — v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; 46 L. J. Ch. 477 . 733 — v. G., 2 Mer. 86; 16 R. R. 147 . 457 — v. —, 2 Jo. & Lat. 529; 69 R. R. 364 . 593 — v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35 . 409 — v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 . 692 — v. Otte, 1 S. & S. 250; 1 L. J. Ch. 87 . 890 — v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 . 891 — v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 . 862 — v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 . 355 — v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) . 842, 854, 866 Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; 20 R. R. 284 . 15, 16 Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679; Pr. Ch. 320 — v. N. B. & Mercantile In. Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474; 62 L. J. Ch. 918 | | |
| Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; 19 L. J. Ch. 494; 88 R. R. 426175, 177, 660, 680 Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 | Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; 28 J. J. Uh. 756 | |
| Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 | Creates, Re, 25 C. D. p. 510; 50 L. J. Ch. 517 | |
| Green, Re, 40 C. D. p. 613; 58 L. J. Ch. 157 | 177 aga | egn |
| | | |
| | v Britten 1 De G. J. & S. 649: 42 L. J. Ch. 187. 82. 83. 457 | 699 |
| | | |
| v. —, 2 Jo. & Lat. 529; 69 R. R. 364 v. —, 5 Ha. 400 (n.); 18 L. J. Ch. 465; 71 R. R. 151 v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35 v. Auguston, 5 Russ. 35 v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 v. Otte, 1 S. & S. 250; 1 L. J. Ch. 87 v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. 103 v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; 8 L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; 20 R. R. 284 Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679; Pr. Ch. 320 v. N. B. & Mercantile In. Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474; 62 L. J. Ch. 918 173, 464, 467 | v. G., 2 Mer. 86: 16 B. R. 147 | |
| v. Marsden, I Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 | v 2 Jo. & Lat. 529: 69 R. R. 364 | |
| v. Marsden, I Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 | v, 5 Ha. 400 (n.); 18 L. J. Ch. 465; 71 R. R. 151 | |
| v. Marsden, I Drew. 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 | v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35 | |
| | v. Marsden, I Drew, 646; 22 L. J. Ch. 1092 | 692 |
| | v. Otte, 1 S. & S. 250; 1 L. J. Ch. 87 | 890 |
| v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.) Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; 20 R. R. 284 Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679; Pr. Ch. 320 v. N. B. & Mercantile In. Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474; 62 L. J. Ch. 918 173, 464, 467 | | 891 |
| | v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; S L. J. Ch. 105; 32 R. R. 232 | 862 |
| Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; 20 R. R. 284 | —— v. Stephens, 17 V. 77 | |
| Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679; Pr. Ch. 320 | | |
| | | |
| Ch. 918 | Greenfill v. G., 2 Vern. 6/9; Pr. Ch. 320 | ฮอ์อ์ |
| | | |
| | Greenway r. G., 1 Giff, 131; 2 De G. F. & J. 128; 29 L. J. Ch. 601 | 101 201 |
| Greenwood Re (1903) 1 Ch 746 · 79 T. I Ch 981 · 88 T. T 910 · | Greenwood, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 746; 72 L. J. Ch. 281; 88 L. T. 212; | 909 |
| | | 597 |

| Greenwood v. G., 2 De G. J. & S. 28 - v. —, (1892) 2 Ch. 295; 61 L. J. Ch. 558 - v. —, 1 Bro. Ch. 31 (n) - v. Jemmett, 26 B. 479 - v. Percy, 26 B. 572 - v. Percy, 26 B. 572 - v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 187 - v. Percy, 26 B. 572 - v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 187 - de Gregory v. Lockyer, 6 Madd. 90; 22 R. R. 246 Gregory v. Lockyer, 6 Madd. 90; 22 R. R. 246 Grenfell v. The Dean, & c. of Windsor, 2 B. 550; 50 R. R. 279 157, 158 Gretfon v. Haward, 1 Swans. 433; 18 R. R. 95 - 446, 465, 466 Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 689 - 14, 51 - Re, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684519, 538, 542, 549, 551, 553, 556, 558, 559 Grierson v. Eyre, 9 V. 345 Grievson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 R. R. 305 Griffith, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 - 15 T. L. R. 78 - 15 T. L. R. 78 - 16 W. 189; 1 Ch. 507; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 - Re, 120 C. D. 655 - Re, 120 C. D. 655 - Re, 120 C. D. 655 - Re, 1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 - v. Hughes, (1892) 3 Ch. 105; 62 L. J. Ch. 135 - v. Tower, & C. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 Griffith, Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 507; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 - v. Ricketts, 7 Ha. 299; 19 L. J. Ch. 100; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 - v. Tower, & C. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 Griffith, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 739; 72 L. J. Ch. 30; 88 L. T. 547709, 710 - v. Fleming, (1909) 1 K. B. 805; 78 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 L. T. 765; 25 T. L. R. 377 - v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; 53 R. R. 34 - v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 - v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; 53 R. R. 34 - v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 - v. Robins, 6 K. 406 - v. Wright, 2 Kay & J. 347 - v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659 - r. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 - v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 - v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 - v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 - v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 - v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 - v. Staplee, 2 | | |
|---|---|---|
| , (1892) 2 Ch. 295; 61 L. J. Ch. 558, 1 Bro. Ch. 31 (n.) | | |
| | | |
| | v = 1 Bro. Ch. 31 (n) | |
| | | |
| | 446 459 | |
| or. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 187 48 Gregg v. Arrott, L. & G. t. Sugden, 246; 46 R. R. 214 62 Gregory v. Lockyer, 6 Madd. 90; 22 R. R. 246 744 Greefon v. Haward, 1 Swans. 433; 18 R. R. 95 446, 465, 466 Gretton v. Haward, 1 Swans. 433; 18 R. R. 95 446, 465, 466 Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 689 14, 51 Grey, Re, 34 C. D. 712; 56 L. J. Ch. 511 693, 751 Grey, Re, 34 C. D. 712; 56 L. J. Ch. 511 693, 751 Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314 383, 384, 385 Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314 383, 384, 385 Griesveson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 R. R. 305 Griffin, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 15 T. L. R. 78 112, 437 v. De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131 286 Griffith, Re, 49 L. T. 161 88 Re, 12 C. D. 655 Re, 1904 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 789 v. Hughes, (1892) 3 Ch. 105; 62 L. J. Ch. 135 767 v. Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 Griffiths, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 739; 72 L. J. Ch. 330; 88 L. T. 547 709, 710 v. Fleming, | | |
| Gregory v. Lockyer, 6 Madd. 90; 22 R. R. 246 Grenfell v. The Dean, &c. of Windsor, 2 B. 550; 50 R. R. 279 157, 158 Gretfon v. Haward, 1 Swans. 433; 18 R. R. 95 Grey, Re, 34 C. D. 712; 56 L. J. Ch. 511 — Re, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684519, 538, 542, 549, 551, 553, 556, 558, 559 Grierson v. Eyre, 9 V. 345 Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314 R. R. 305 Griesbach v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 R. R. 305 Griffin, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 - v. De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131 - v. De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131 - v. Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 100; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 - v. Hughes, (1892) 3 Ch. 105; 62 L. J. Ch. 135 - v. Ricketts, 7 Ha. 299; 19 L. J. Ch. 100; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 - v. Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 Griffiths, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 739; 72 L. J. Ch. 330; 88 L. T. 547709, 710 - v. Fleming, (1909) 1 K. B. 805; 78 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 - L. T. 765; 25 T. L. R. 377 - v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 Grissel v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 Grigss v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 Grissel v. Swindow, Re, 159 Grissel v. Swindow, Re, 1698 Grove v. Comp., 18 Eq. 387 Grove v. Comp., 19 Eq. 291 Grove v. Grove, 24 Eq. 291 Grove v. Comp., 18 Eq. 387 Grove v. Comp., 18 Eq. 387 Grove v. Comp., 18 Eq. 387 Grove v. Comp., 19 Eq. 291 Grove v. Grove, 24 Eq. 25 Grove v. Grove, 24 Eq. 25 Grove v. Comp., 19 Eq. 387 Grove v. G | v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 187 | , |
| Grenfell v . The Dean, &c. of Windsor, 2 B. 550; 50 R. R. 279 157, 158 Gretton v . Haward, 1 Swans. 433; 18 R. R. 95 446, 465, 466 Greville v . Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 689 144, 51 Grey, Re , 34 C. D. 712; 56 L. J. Ch. 511 693, 751 693, 755 Grierson v . Eyre, 9 V. 345 187 Griesbach v . Fremantle, 17 B. 314 383, 342, 549, 551, 553, 556, 558, 558 Grieveson v . Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 R. 305 384, 385 Grieveson v . Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 R. R. 305 365, 368 Griffin, Re , (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 112, 437 v . De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131 286 Griffith, Re , 49 L. T. 161 88 v . Re , 12 C. D. 655 879, 880 v . Re , 1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 789 v . Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 789 v . Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 100; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 v . Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 109 v . Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 v . Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 L. T. 766; 25 T. L. R. 377 710 v . Pruen, 11 Si. 202; 54 R. R. 345 408 v . R. 761; 1090) 1 K. B. 805; 78 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 L. T. 766; 25 T. L. R. 377 710 v . Pruen, 11 Si. 202; 54 R. R. 345 408 v . Robins, 3 Madd. 191; 53 R. R. 34 280 v . Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 895 Griggs v . Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 648 Grigbs v . Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. 517 284, 684 Grimstone, Exp , Amb. 708 388, 389 Grimthorpe (Lord), Exp , Amb. 708 388, 389 Grimsell v . Swinhe, 7 Eq. 291 446, 449 Grosvenor v . Durston, 25 B. 97 454, 354 472 886 Grimstone, Exp , Amb. 708 388, 389 Grimstoll v . Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291 446, 449 Grosvenor v . Durston, 25 B. 97 454, 545 486 Grimstone, Exp , Amb. 708 388, 389 Grimthorpe (Lord), Exp , Ex | | |
| Grettlon v. Haward, 1 Swans, 433; 18 R. R. 95 Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 689 Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 689 Grey, Re, 34 C. D. 712; 56 L. J. Ch. 511 — Re, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684519, 538, 542, 549, 551, 553, 556, 558, 559 Grierson v. Eyre, 9 V. 345 Grierson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 R. R. 305 Griffin, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 — v. De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131 — Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 — Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 — Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 105; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 — v. Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 Griffith-Boscawen v. Scott, 26 C. D. 358; 53 L. J. Ch. 571 — v. Fleming, (1909) 1 K. B. 805; 78 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 L. T. 765; 25 T. L. R. 377 — v. Fleming, (1909) 1 K. R. 805; 78 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 L. T. 765; 25 T. L. R. 377 — v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 Griggy v. Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. 517 Grimstone, Ex. p., Amb. 708 Grimthorpe (Lord), Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 675; 78 L. J. Ch. 20; 25 T. L. R. 15 Groven r. Durston, 25 B. 97 — v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659 Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 — v. Worthington, 34 R. R. 13 Grove v. Perkins, 6 Si. 576; 38 R. R. 11. 63 Groven v. Durston, 25 B. 97 — v. Worthington, 3 De G. & Sm. 289; 11. 1. 63 Groven v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 — v. Worthington, 3 De G. & Sm. 289; 283, 295 Grove's Trusts, Re, 1 Gif. 74; 28 L. J. Ch. 536 Gruedla, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 536 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 536 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guenella, Georgia and the second second second second second second second s | Gregory v. Lockyer, 6 Madd. 90; 22 R. R. 246 | |
| ————————————————————————————————————— | Grenfell v. The Dean, &c. of Windsor, 2 B. 550; 50 R. R. 279 157, 158 | , |
| ————————————————————————————————————— | Gravilla a Brown 7 H. L. Cos 680 | • |
| ————————————————————————————————————— | Grey Re 34 C D 712: 56 L J Ch 511 693 751 | |
| Grierson v . Eyre, 9 V. 345 Grierson v . Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 R. R. 305 Griffin, Re , (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 • v. De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131 • v. De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131 • Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 • Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 • v. Hughes, (1892) 3 Ch. 105; 62 L. J. Ch. 135 • v. Ricketts, 7 Ha. 299; 19 L. J. Ch. 100; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 • v. Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 • v. Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 • v. Fleming, (1909) 1 K. B. 805; 78 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 L. T. 765; 25 T. L. R. 377 • v. Pruen, 11 Si. 202; 54 R.R. 345 • v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; 53 R. R. 34 • v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; 53 R. R. 34 • v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 Grimstone, Exp , Amb. 708 Grimthorpe (Lord), Re , (1908) 2 Ch. 675; 78 L. J. Ch. 20; 25 T. L. R. 15 Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843 Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843 Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843 Grissell v. Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291 Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 • v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659 Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 • v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659 Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 • v. Worthington, 3 De G. & Sm. 217 Guardians of St. Mary Abbotts', 4 T. L. R. 63 Gruedla, Re , (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Gueralte v. Worthington, 3 De G. & Sm. 39; 18 L. J. Ch. 303; 84 R. R. 355 Guengratte v. Young, 4 De G. & Sm. 217 Guidot v. G., 3 Atk. 236 Guengratte v. Young, 4 De G. & Sm. 217 Guinel v. Gardianer, 4 Giff. 626; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1220 | |) |
| Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314 | Grierson v. Evre, 9 V. 345 | , |
| Griffith, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 | Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314 | , |
| Griffith, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 408; 68 L. J. Ch. 220; 79 L. T. 442; 15 T. L. R. 78 | Grieveson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; 6 L. J. Ch. 261; 44 | |
| $ \begin{array}{c} 15 \text{ T. L. R. 78} \\$ | R. R. 305 365, 368 | , |
| $\begin{array}{c}$ | | |
| Griffith, Re , 49 L. T. 161 | 10 T. L. R. 78 | |
| ————————————————————————————————————— | | |
| ——, Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 807; 73 L. J. Ch. 464; 90 L. T. 639 | | |
| — v. Hughes, (1892) 3 Ch. 105; 62 L. J. Ch. 135 | | |
| — v. Ricketts, 7 Ha. 299; 19 L. J. Ch. 100; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 — v. Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 | v. Hughes, (1892) 3 Ch. 105: 62 L. J. Ch. 135 | 7 |
| | v. Ricketts, 7 Ha. 299; 19 L. J. Ch. 100; 82 R. R. 111359, 372 | |
| Griffith-Boscawen v. Scott, 26 C. D. 358; 53 L. J. Ch. 571 . 449, 456 Griffiths, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 739; 72 L. J. Ch. 330; 88 L. T. 547709, 710 —— v. Fleming, (1909) 1 K. B. 805; 78 L. J. K. B. 567; 100 L. T. 765; 25 T. L. R. 377 . 710 —— v. Pruen, 11 Si. 202; 54 R.R. 345 . 408 —— v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; 53 R. R. 345 . 280 —— v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 . 895 Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 . 648 Grigby v. Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. 517 . 284, 684 Grimes, Re, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 465 . 540 Grimstone, Ex p., Amb. 708 . 388, 389 Grimthorpe (Lord), Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 675; 78 L. J. Ch. 20; 25 T. L. R. 15 . 359, 372, 383 Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843 . 224, 392 Grissell v. Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291 . 446, 449 Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton, (1894) 2 Q. B. 836; 63 L. J. Q. B. 661478 Grosvenor v. Durston, 25 B. 97 . 451, 453 —— v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659 . 283, 295 Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 . 226 Grove's Trusts, Re, 1 Gif. 74; 28 L. J. Ch. 536 . 848 Groves v. Perkins, 6 Si. 576; 38 R. R. 178 . 2248, 666 —— v. Wright, 2 Kay & J. 347 . 843 Guardians of St. Mary Abbotts', 4 T. L. R. 63 . 521 Gude v. Mumford, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 438; 47 R. R. 436 . 905 — v. Worthington, 3 De G. & Sm. 389; 18 L. J. Ch. 303; 84 R. R. R. 355 | v. Tower, &c. Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; 66 L. J. Ch. 12; 75 | |
| Griffiths, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 739; 72 L. J. Ch. 330; 88 L. T. 547709, 710 ——————————————————————————————————— | L. T. 330; 45 W. R. 73 | , |
| $\begin{array}{c} \text{L. T. 765} : 25 \text{ T. L. R. 377} & 710 \\v & \text{Pruen, 11 Si. } 202 : 54 \text{ R.R. } 345 & 408 \\v & \text{Robins, 3 Madd. } 191 : 53 \text{ R. R. } 34 & 280 \\v & \text{Smith, 1 V. 97} : 1 \text{ R. R. 87} & 895 \\ \text{Griggs } v & \text{Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. } 472 & 648 \\ \text{Grigby } v & \text{Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. } 517 & 284, 684 \\ \text{Grimes, } \textit{Re, 5 Ir. R. Eq. } 465 & 540 \\ \text{Grimstone, } \textit{Ex p., Amb. } 708 & 388, 389 \\ \text{Grimthorpe (Lord), } \textit{Re, (1908) 2 Ch. } 675 : 78 \text{ L. J. Ch. } 20 : 25 \\ \text{T. L. R. } 15 & 359, 372, 383 \\ \text{Grimwood } v & \text{Bartels, 25 W. R. 843} & 224, 392 \\ \text{Grissell } v & \text{Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291} & 446, 449 \\ \text{Grosvenor Hotel Co. } v & \text{Hamilton, (1894) 2 Q. B. 836} : 63 \text{ L. J. Q. B. } 661478 \\ \text{Groven } v & \text{Durston, 25 B. 97} & 451, 453 \\v & \text{Sherratt, 28 B. } 659 & 283, 295 \\ \text{Grove } v & \text{Comyn, 18 Eq. 387} & 226 \\ \text{Grove's Trusts, } \textit{Re, 1 Gif. 74} : 28 \text{ L. J. Ch. } 536 & 848 \\ \text{Groves } v & \text{Perkins, 6 Si. } 576 : 38 \text{ R. R. } 178 & 248, 666 \\$ | Griffith-Boscawen v. Scott, 26 C. D. 358; 53 L. J. Ch. 571 . 449, 456 | ; |
| $\begin{array}{c} \text{L. T. 765} : 25 \text{ T. L. R. 377} & 710 \\v & \text{Pruen, 11 Si. } 202 : 54 \text{ R.R. } 345 & 408 \\v & \text{Robins, 3 Madd. } 191 : 53 \text{ R. R. } 34 & 280 \\v & \text{Smith, 1 V. 97} : 1 \text{ R. R. 87} & 895 \\ \text{Griggs } v & \text{Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. } 472 & 648 \\ \text{Grigby } v & \text{Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. } 517 & 284, 684 \\ \text{Grimes, } \textit{Re, 5 Ir. R. Eq. } 465 & 540 \\ \text{Grimstone, } \textit{Ex p., Amb. } 708 & 388, 389 \\ \text{Grimthorpe (Lord), } \textit{Re, (1908) 2 Ch. } 675 : 78 \text{ L. J. Ch. } 20 : 25 \\ \text{T. L. R. } 15 & 359, 372, 383 \\ \text{Grimwood } v & \text{Bartels, 25 W. R. 843} & 224, 392 \\ \text{Grissell } v & \text{Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291} & 446, 449 \\ \text{Grosvenor Hotel Co. } v & \text{Hamilton, (1894) 2 Q. B. 836} : 63 \text{ L. J. Q. B. } 661478 \\ \text{Groven } v & \text{Durston, 25 B. 97} & 451, 453 \\v & \text{Sherratt, 28 B. } 659 & 283, 295 \\ \text{Grove } v & \text{Comyn, 18 Eq. 387} & 226 \\ \text{Grove's Trusts, } \textit{Re, 1 Gif. 74} : 28 \text{ L. J. Ch. } 536 & 848 \\ \text{Groves } v & \text{Perkins, 6 Si. } 576 : 38 \text{ R. R. } 178 & 248, 666 \\$ | Griffiths, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 739; 72 L. J. Ch. 330; 88 L. T. 547709, 710 |) |
| ———— v. Pruen, 11 Si. 202; 54 R.R. 345 ———— v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; 53 R. R. 34 ————— v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 ————— v. Smith, 1 V. 97; 1 R. R. 87 ———————————————————————————————————— | | |
| | | |
| Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 | D.Li. 9 M11 101 . 20 D. D. 04 | |
| Grimthorpe (Lord), Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 675; 78 L. J. Ch. 20; 25 T. L. R. 15 | v. Smith. 1 V. 97: 1 R. R. 87 | |
| Grimthorpe (Lord), Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 675; 78 L. J. Ch. 20; 25 T. L. R. 15 | Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm. 472 | ; |
| Grimthorpe (Lord), Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 675; 78 L. J. Ch. 20; 25 T. L. R. 15 | Grigby v. Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. 517 | : |
| Grimthorpe (Lord), Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 675; 78 L. J. Ch. 20; 25 T. L. R. 15 | Grimes, Re, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 465 | |
| T. L. R. 15 Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843 Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843 Grissell v. Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291 Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton, (1894) 2 Q. B. 836; 63 L. J. Q. B. 661478 Grosvenor v. Durston, 25 B. 97 —— v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659 Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 Grove's Trusts, Re, 1 Gif. 74; 28 L. J. Ch. 536 Grove's Trusts, Re, 1 Gif. 74; 28 L. J. Ch. 536 Grove v. Perkins, 6 Si. 576; 38 R. R. 178 Guardians of St. Mary Abbotts', 4 T. L. R. 63 Guardians of St. Mary Abbotts', 4 T. L. R. 63 —— v. Worthington, 3 De G. & Sm. 389; 18 L. J. Ch. 303; 84 R. R. 355 Guelella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L. J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guidot v. G., 3 Atk. 256 Gunn, Re, 9 P. D. 242; 53 L. J. P. & D. 107 Gurnell v. Gardner, 4 Giff. 626; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1220 | Grimstone, $Ex p.$, Amb. 708 |) |
| $\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$ | | |
| Grosvenor V. Durston, 25 B. 97 | T. L. R. 15 | |
| Grosvenor V. Durston, 25 B. 97 | Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 845 | |
| Grosvenor v. Durston, 25 B. 97 | Grosvenor Hotel Co. 2: Hamilton (1894) 20 R 836 : 63 L J O R 661 478 | 2 |
| | Grosvenor v. Durston, 25 B 97 | |
| Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387 | 9. Shownott 20 P 650 | |
| $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | Grove v. Comyn, 18 Éq. 387 | |
| | Grove's Trusts, Re, 1 Gif. 74; 28 L. J. Ch. 536 848 | |
| | Groves v. Perkins, 6 Si. 576; 38 R. R. 178 | ; |
| | v. Wright, 2 Kay & J. 347 | ; |
| | Guardians of St. Mary Abbotts, 4 T. L. R. 63 | |
| R. R. 355 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 Guidot v. Young, 4 De G. & Sm. 217 Guidot v. G., 3 Atk. 256 Gunn, Re, 9 P. D. 242; 53 L. J. P. & D. 107 Gurnell v. Gardner, 4 Giff. 626; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1220 | Worthington 3 Do G & Sm 389 18 L L Ch 303 81 | ١ |
| Guedella, Re, (1905) 2 Ch. 331; 75 L J. Ch. 52; 54 W. R. 77 . 720 Guepratte v. Young, 4 De G. & Sm. 217 | | |
| Guepratte v. Young, 4 De G. & Sm. 217 | Guedella Re (1905) 2 Ch 331 : 75 L J. Ch 52 : 54 W. R. 77 | |
| Guidot v. G., 3 Atk. 256 Gunn, Re, 9 P. D. 242; 53 L. J. P. & D. 107 Gurnell v. Gardner, 4 Giff. 626; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1220 | Guepratte v. Young, 4 De G. & Sm. 217 | |
| Gunn, Re, 9 P. D. 242; 53 L. J. P. & D. 107 | Guidot v. G., 3 Atk. 256 | , |
| Gurnell v. Gardner, 4 Giff. 626; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1220 | Gunn, Re, 9 P. D. 242; 53 L. J. P. & D. 107 | |
| Gurney v. Goggs, 25 B. 334 | Gurnell v. Gardner, 4 Giff. 626; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1220 | |
| | Gurney v. Goggs, 25 B. 334 | i |

| | PAGE |
|--|--|
| Guth v. G., 3 Bro. Ch. 614 | |
| Guthrie v. Walrond, 22 C. D. 573; 52 L. J. Ch. 165 . 457, 893, 899 | 161 |
| Guy v. Churchill, 40 C. D. 480; 58 L. J. Ch. 345 159 | 672 |
| | , 920 |
| | 253 |
| v. Walker, 8 T. L. R. 314 | 48, 61 |
| | 3,342 |
| -v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 8 | 820 |
| Gynn v. Gilbard, 1 Dr. & Sm. 356 | 2, 531 |
| | , 6 |
| H. | |
| H. v. W., 3 K. & J. 382 | , 641 |
| H's. Sett., Re, (1909) 2 Un. 260; 78 L. J. Un. 745 | 606 |
| Haddon v. Fladgate, 1 Sw. & Ir. 48; 27 L. J. F. & M. 21 | 638 |
| | |
| Hacking v. Whalley, 51 L. J. Ch. 944 | |
| T. L. R. 411 | 795 |
| Hakewill, Re, 12 C. B. 223; 22 L. J. Ch. 662 | 548 |
| Hale v . Cox, 3 Bro. Ch. 322 | 18 |
| T. L. R. 411 | :7, 59 |
| Haley v. Bannister, 23 B. 336 | 921 |
| Holford a Stoins 16 St 488 - 80 R R 126 | 401 |
| Hall Ex v. 10 C. D. 615: 48 L. J. Bank. 79 | 8. 137 |
| —, Re, 9 L. R. Ir. 180 | , 129 |
| —, Re, (1903) 2 Ch. 226; 72 L. J. Ch. 554; 88 L. T. 619; 51 | , |
| W. R. 529 | 891 |
| W. R. 529 | 132 |
| v. 11., o Ath. 121 | りせり |
| v. H., L. R. 8 Ch. 430; 42 L. J. Ch. 444; 28 L. T. 383; 21 W. R. | 280 |
| 373 | 161 |
| v. Hill, 1 Dr. & War, 109; 58 R. R. 223 | 920 |
| | 307 |
| v. Robertson, 4 De G. M. & G. 781; 23 L. J. Ch. 241 | 588 |
| v. Thynne, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 89; 3 P. W. 76; 3 Lev. 414. | 599 |
| Hall's Will, Re, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 974 | 2, 843 |
| Halliday Re 17 Typ 56 | 740 |
| Halliwell a Tanner 1 Russ & M 633 : 32 R R 306 | 7, 041 19 33 |
| Halliday, Re, 17 Jur. 56 | 789 |
| Hambro v. H., (1894) 2 Ch. 564; 63 L. J. Ch. 627 | 851 |
| Hambrooke v. Simmons, 4 Russ. 25 426 | 3, 429 |
| Hamil v. Stokes, 4 Pr. 161; 18 R. R. 730 | 142 |
| Hamilton v. Coningham, (1903) 2 Ir. R. 564 | 156 |
| | |
| | 5, 466 |
| | 7. 628 |
| | 703 |
| | |
| 71 L. T. 325; 43 W. R. 126; 10 T. L. R. 642 | 346 |
| Worley, 2 V. 65 | 33 |
| Hamilton's Windsor Ironworks, Re, 12 C. D. 707 | 110 |
| v. De Beil, 12 Cl. & Fin. 45; 69 R. R. 18 | $\begin{array}{c} 77 \\ 474 \end{array}$ |
| Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Si. 327 | 140 |
| | 0 |

| PAGE |
|--|
| Hanbury v. Hussey, 14 B. 152; 20 L. J. Ch. 557 |
| v. Roberts, Amb. 127 |
| Hance v. Harding, 20 Q. B. D. 732; 57 L. J. Q. B. 403 |
| Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 B, 496 |
| Hancock, Re, (1905) 1 Ch. 16; 74 L. J. Ch. 69; 91 L. T. 737; 53 |
| W. R. 89 |
| Hancox v. Abbey, 11 V. 179; 8 R. R. 124 |
| Handcock's Trusts, Re, 23 L. R. Ir. 34 |
| •Handford v. H., 63 L. T. 256 |
| W. R. 391; 80 L. T. 125; 15 T. L. R. 197 |
| Handley v. H. (1891) P. 194 · 63 L. T. 535 · 39 W. P. 97 591 |
| Hannah v. Hodgson, 30 B. 19 · 30 L. J. Ch. 738 |
| Transen v. Miner, 14 St. 22 |
| Hanson v. Graham, 6 V. 239; 5 R. R. 277 |
| Harbin v. Masterman, (1894) 2 Ch. 184; 64 L. J. Ch. 369; (1896) |
| 1 Ch. 351 |
| Harcourt v. Morgan, 2 Keen, 274; 44 R. R. 352 877 |
| v. Seymour, 2 Si. (N. S.) 12; 20 L. J. Ch. 606; 89 R R. |
| 196 |
| Harding, In the goods of, L. R. 2 P. & D. 394; 41 L. J. P. & M. 65172 |
| v. Countess of Suffolk, 1 Ch. R. 63 |
| |
| at Mot By Co L B 7 th 154 41 L J Ch 257 362 |
| |
| Hardey v. Green, 12 B. 182; 85 R. R. 62 |
| Hardy, Ex p., Kerry, Re, W. N. (1889) 3 |
| 50 B. 200 |
| v. Fothergill, 13 A. C. 351, 360; 58 L. J. Q. B. 44; 59 L. T. |
| 273; 37 W. R. 177 |
| —— v. Hawkshaw, 12 B. 552 |
| Harewood v. Child. Cas. t. Talbot 204 |
| Hargreaves v. Pennington, 34 L. J. Ch. 180; 10 L. T. 857; 12 W. R. |
| 1047 |
| Harkness & Allsopp's Cont., Re, (1896) 2 Ch. 358; 65 L. J. Ch. 726717, 768 Harle v. Jarman, (1895) 2 Ch. 414; 64 L. J. Ch. 779173, 380, 464, 467, |
| 468 |
| |
| Harley v. H., 10 Ha. 325 |
| Harman, Re, (1894) 3 Ch. 601; 63 L. J. Ch. 822 |
| Harmood v. Oglander, 8 V. 124 |
| Harning v. Castor, Mich., 3 Jac., cited in Earl of Oxford's Case 777 |
| Harper, Ex p., 4 T. L. R. 65 |
| |
| |
| v. Long, 2 My. & K. 590; 39 R. R. 304 160 |
| Harris, Re, 28 C. D. 171; 56 L. J. Ch. 754 |
| , Re, (1909) 2 Ch. 206; 78 L. J. Ch. 448; 100 L. T. 805449, 453, |
| 458, 459 v. Brisco, 17 Q. B. D. 504; 54 L. J. Q. B. 423 160 |
| v. Finch, McClel. 141 |
| |

| | | | | | | _ | |
|--|--------------|--------|-----------------|---------------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| II'- II 11 III D 00 | | | | | | £. | AGE |
| Harris v. H., 11 W. R. 62 | • | | • | • | | • | 233 |
| v. Lee, 1 P. W. 482 | | | • | • | | | 154 |
| v. Poyner, 1 Dr. 181; 21 L. J | . Uh. | 915 | | | . 80 | , 81, 84 | |
| v. Tremenheere, 15 V. 34; 10 | K. 1 | ń. o | | | | | 288 |
| Harrison, Re, 34 C. D. 214; 56 L. J. | Ch. 3 | 341; | $56~\mathrm{L}$ | . T. | 159 . | | 362 |
| v. Andrews, 13 Si. 595; 13 I v. Asher, 2 De G. & Sm. 43 | L. J. (| Ch. 2 | 43; (| 30 R. | R. 41- | Ł169, | 174 |
| v. Asher, 2 De G. & Sm. 43 | 6:1' | 7 L. | J. Ch | 452 | : 79 | R. R. | |
| 280 | -, - | | | | | | 865 |
| v. Goodall, Kay, 310 (n.) . | | | • | • | | • | 547 |
| v. Guest, 8 H. L. Cas. 481. | • | | • | • | | 322, | |
| v. Carron of P. W. 509. | 00.70 | D | 011 | • | . : | 705 | 001 |
| v. Gurney, 2 J. & W. 303; | 44.5 | r T | 211 Ob. / | | | , | |
| v. H., L. R. 8 Ch. 342, 348; v. H., D. D. 181; 58 L. | ; 42 J | u. J. | On. 4 | 190 | | | 459 |
| | J. P. | &D. | 28 | | • | 158, | |
| | . J. (| Jh. 6 | 47 . | | | • | 411 |
| v. Jackson, 7 C. D. 339; | 47 L. | . J. C | 'h. 14 | 28 | 37, 86 | 6, 867, | 868 |
| | 22 L. | J. C | h. 72 | 2 | | | 523 |
| Harrop, Re, 3 Drew. 726; 26 L. J. C | h. 51 | 6 . | | | | | 393 |
| v. Howard, 3 Ha. 624; 14 L | .J. (| 7h. 1 | 82 | | | | 754 |
| Hart v. Frontino, &c. Co., L. R. 5 E. | x. 11 | 1: 39 | T | I. Es | r. 93 . | | 487 |
| - v. H., 18 C. D. 670; 50 L. J. C. | h 69 | 7 | 9. | 13 9 | 58 69- | ł, 625, | |
| v. 11., 10 C. D. 010, 00 E. v. O. | 11. 00 | | | | | 1, 636, | |
| " This 10 D 140 | | | 1, 0 | <i>40</i> , 0 | 90, 00 | 1, 000, | |
| v. Tribe, 19 B. 149 | 30 T | т. | Cd ⊨ | • | | • | 547 |
| Hart's Trusts, Re, 3 De G. & J. 195; | 28 I | ય. હી. | On. 7 | _ | | • | 585 |
| Harter v. H., L. R. 3 P. & D. 20; 42 | 2 Б. Ј | . P. | & M. | 1 | | | 301 |
| Hartford v. Power, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 212 | | | | , | | | 692 |
| Hartley, $Ex p.$, 1 Deac. 288 | | | | | | | -63 |
| | . 113 | | | | | 15, | 694 |
| v. Ostler, 22 B. 449 | | | | | | . ' | 919 |
| v. Pendarves, (1901) 2 Ch. 4 | 98: | 70 T. | J. Ol | n. 74 | 5 : 85 | T. T. | |
| 64; 50 W. R. 56 | , | | | | , | | 391 |
| v. Rice, 10 East. 22; 10 R. | B 99 | 90 | • | • | • | • | 599 |
| | | | | • | | • | |
| | o II. | 11. 16 | 70 | • | | • | 159 |
| v. Smith, 10 W. R. 763 | | | • | • | | | 545 |
| Hartopp v. H., 21 B. 259; 25 L. J. C | Jn. 4 | ı I | | • | | 255, | |
| Harvey v. Aston, 1 Atk. 361 | : | | • . | | | | 584 |
| | J. Di | ig. 19 | 90 | | | -246, | 248 |
| v. Croydon, &c., 26 C. D. 249 | 9; 53 | L. J | ſ. Ch. | 707 | | | 250 |
| v. Farnie, 8 A. C. 52: 52 L. | J. P. | & D | . 33 | | | | 242 |
| v. H., 2 P. W. 21 | | | | | | | 898 |
| v, 5 B. 134; 59 R. R. 435 | . | | | | | | 81 |
| v Mount 8 B 439: 14 L J | Ch | 233 • | 68 R | R 1 | 46 9 | 80 294 | 299 |
| v. Mount, 8 B. 439; 14 L. J. v. Olliver, W. N. (1887) 149 | 57 | r. m | 930 | | 10 | JO, 201, | 996 |
| Hayrar's Estate Pa 12 (17) 216 . 4 | , 07. | T 7 | L 9 | • | | • | $\frac{220}{721}$ |
| Harvey's Estate, Re, 13 C. D. 216; 4 | 11. | J. C | п. э | • | | • | |
| S. E., Re, 21 C. D., 123 | 110 | | · + + | | | • | 223 |
| Harwood v. Fisher, 1 Y. & C. Ex. C. | 7110; | ; 4 L | . J. 1 | 5x. 1 | θ. | | 169 |
| v. Tooke, 2 Si. 192; 29 R. | R. 81 | | • | • | · · | | 331 |
| Haslam and Hier-Evans, Re, (1902) | 1 Ch | .765 | ; 71 | L | Г. Ch. | 374; | |
| 86 L. T. 663; 50 W. R. 444 | | | | | | 287, | -288 |
| Haslewood v. Green, 28 B. 1 | | | | | | . 883, | 885 |
| v. Pope. 3 P. W. 324 | | | | | | | , 50 |
| Hasluck v. Pedley, 19 Eq. 271; 44 L | . J. (| h. 1 | 43 | | | | 879 |
| Hastie v. H., 2 C. D. 304; 45 L. J. C | th 28 | 38 | | • | | 755, | ton. |
| Hastings, Re, 35 C. D. 94; 55 L. J. (| Ch 2 | 78 | • - | 10.5 | 20 50 | 1 791 | 795 |
| The manage of the Con 244 | Uш. <u>"</u> | 10 | | 10, 1 | 20, 12 | 1, 1-4, | 140 |
| v. Douglass, Cro. Car. 344 | | | • | • | • | • | 771 |
| v. Orde, 11 Si. 205 | | | • | | | | 174 |
| Haten v. H., 9 v. 292; 7 K. R. 195 | | · | | 263, | 266, 2 | 85,286 | |
| v. Searles, 2 Sm. & G., 147; 2 | 24 L. | J. C. | h. 22 | | | | 147 |
| Hatchell v. Eggleso, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 215 | ٠. | | | | | | 664 |
| Hatfield v. Pryme, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 204 | | | | | | | 404 |
| Hatton v. May, 3 C. D. 148 | | | | | | | 852 |

| Haughton v. H., 1 Moll. 611 | | | | PAGE . 579 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-----------|------------------------|
| Hawes v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. Ch. 156 | | • | | 280, 282 |
| Hawkes v. H., 63 L. T. 488 | | • | | . 228 |
| v. Hubback, 11 Eq. 5; 40 L. J. | Ch. 49 | • | | . 761 |
| Hawkesworth, Re, Ir. R. 1 Eq. 179. | | • | | . 212 |
| Hawkins, Ex p., 13 Si. 569; 60 R. R. 40 |)ə . 781 | • | | . 362 429, 430 |
| v. Blewitt, 2 Esp. 664; 5 R. Rv. H., 13 C. D. 470, | . 101 . | • | | . 874 |
| v Herbert 60 L 1 142: 37 W | R. 300 | 0 . | | 213, 225 |
| | | | | . 787 |
| Hawksworth, Re, W. N. (1887) 113. | · - : | | | . 768 |
| |) I., J. (| Jn. 534 | | 519, 553 |
| Hawley v. Cutts, Freem. 24 Hov. Ed. Hawthorn v. Shedden, 3 Sm. & G. 293 | | • | | . 877 . 834 |
| Hawthorne, Re, 23 C. D. 748; 52 L. J. | Ch. 750 | | | 817, 823 |
| Hayes v. H., 1 Keen, 97; 5 L. J. Ch. 24 | 3. | | | 838, 839 |
| Haycorth a Westing 19 Eq. 390: 40 I | I Ch | . 577 | | 323, 327 |
| Haynes v. Forshaw, 11 Ha. 93; 22 L. J. | Ch. 10 | 60; 90 £ | R. R. 59 | 1 . 61 |
| | 1 J. UI | 1. 302; 89 | t L. T. 1 | 139; |
| | Dr. & 8 | Sm. 426 : | 30 L. J. | 446, 448 Ch. |
| 578 | | -361.36 | 32 - 885 | 886 905 |
| Hayslep v. Gymer, 1 A. & E. 162; 3 L. | J. K. 3 | B. 149; 4 | 10 R. R. | 276 437 |
| Hayter v. Rod, 1 P. W. 364 | | • | | . 359 |
| Hayward v. Smith, 20 L. T. 70 | | • | • | . 223 |
| Hayward v. Smith, 20 L. T. 70. Head v. Godlee, John. 536; 29 L.J. Ch. v. H., 3 Atk. 547 | 000 . | • | 613 | 617 619 |
| Headen v. Rosher, M'Cle. & Yo. 89 | • • | • | . 010 | . 332 |
| Headen v. Rosher, M'Cle. & Yo. 89. Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 577; 7 L. J. | K. B. 2 | 83 . | | . 474 |
| Heap v. Marris, 2 Q. B. D. 630; 46 L. J. r. Tonge, 9 Ha. 90; 20 L. J. Ch. 6 | f. Q. B. | 761 | | . 599 |
| - v. Tonge, 9 Ha. 90; 20 L. J. Ch. (| 361;89 |) R. R. 33 | 9 . | 243, 245 |
| Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. W. 409 Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695; 1 Ves | Son | 298 | 458 | . 736 , 655, 899 |
| Heath, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 270; 76 L. J. C | h. 450: | 97 T. T | . 41 . | . 412 |
| | L. J. C | h. 455 | | 475, 480 |
| v. Crealock, L. R. 10 Ch. 22; 42 v. Dendy, 1 Russ. 543; 5 L. J. C v. Lewis, 3 De G. M. & G. 954; | h. 59; | 25 R. R. | 135 . | . 886 |
| v. Lewis, 3 De G. M. & G. 954; | 4 Giff. | 665; 13 | | 129 |
| 22 L. J. Ch. 721 | | • | | , 588, 667 |
| v. Nugent, 29 B. 227 | | • | . 832 | 852, 888 , 895, 900 |
| | | | . 366 | 368,381 |
| The North Stafferdshipe I | Ry. Co., | 2 M. & (| 1 100 | 700 |
| Heatley v. Thomas, 15 V. 596; 10 R. R. | 122 . | | . 719 | , 720, 725 |
| Heaton v. Dearden, 16 B. 147. | | • | | . 211 |
| Hedgely Re 34 C. D. 379 : 56 L. J. Ch. | 360 | • | | 737 |
| Heatley v. Thomas, 15 V. 596; 10 R. R. Heaton v. Dearden, 16 B. 147. Heazle v. Fitzmaurice, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 48: Hedgely, Re, 34 C. D. 379; 56 L. J. Ch Hedges v. Clark, 1 De G. & Sm. 354 | | | | . 677 |
| v. H., Pr. Ch. 269 v. Harpur, 3 De G. & J. 129; 2 | | | | 420, 427 |
| | 7 L. J. | Ch. 742 | ; 73 R | . R. |
| 408 | Ob 150 | • | | 847, 848 |
| Hedley v. Bates, 13 C. D. 498; 49 L. J. Hegarty v. King, 7 L. R. Ir. 18 | | | : | . 786 . 301 |
| Helsham v. Barnett, 21 W. R. 309 | | • | | 325, 335 |
| Helyar, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 391; 71 L. J. (| Ch. 209 | ; 85 L. | T. 627; | |
| W/ D 305 | | | | 599 597 |
| Heming v. Clutterbuck, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 49 | 1; 30 1 | к. К. 56 | • | 914, 919 |
| Hemingway v. Braithwaite, 61 L. T. 224 Hemming v. Gurrey, 2 S. & S. 311; 1 B | li (N S | 1 1 479 - 9 | 5 R P | . 757 209 917 |
| Hemmings v. Munkley, 1 Bro. Ch. 304 | ٠٠٠ /٢٠٠ ٢ | | | , 581, 582 |
| Henchman v. AG., 3 My. & K. 483; 4 | 1 R. R. | 102 | | . 355 |
| | | | | |

| | 10 | AGI |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| Hender v. Rose, 3 P. W. 124 (n.) | | 46 |
| Henderson v. H., 3 Ha. 100; 13 L. J. Q. B. 274; 64 R. R. 213 | 3 . | 798 |
| v. The Underwriting, &c. Asson., 65 L. T. 616 | | 253 |
| Hendrich v. Wood, 9 W. R. 588 | | 817 |
| Hengler's Ts., Re, (1893) 1 Ch. 586; 62 L. J. Ch. 383 | | 90 |
| Henry, Re, (1907) 1 Ch. 30; 76 L. J. Ch. 74; 95 L. T. 776 | | 853 |
| | 13, 451, | |
| Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; 37 L. J. Ch. 9726, 32, | 33. 51. | 843 |
| Hepworth v. Hill, 30 B. 476; 31 L. J. Ch. 569 | | 24 |
| Herbert's Case, 3 P. W. 116 | 06, 52 5 , | |
| Herbert v. Webster, 15 C. D. 610; 49 L. J. Ch. 620 | .70, 024, | 756 |
| Hercules Insurance Co., Re, 19 Eq. 302; 44 L. J. Ch. 450 | . 142, | |
| | 0;86 | |
| L. T. 48; 50 W. R. 300 | 0,00 | 489 |
| Hereford v. Ravenhill, 1 B. 481; 5 B. 51; 11 L. J. Ch. 173; 59 | R. R. | * 0.0 |
| | 65, 366, | 404 |
| Herman v. Charlesworth, (1905) 2 K. B. 123; 74 L. J. K. B. | | 101 |
| 93 L. T. 284; 54 W. R. 22; 21 T. L. R. 368 | o - 0, | 600 |
| Hernando, Re, 27 C. D. 284; 53 L. J. Ch. 865 | • | 715 |
| Heron v. H., 2 Atk. 160 | 56, 282, | |
| Hertford v. Lowther, 7 B. 107; 13 L. J. Ch. 41; 64 R. R. 24 | 879 | 915 |
| Hervey v. Aston, Cas. t. Talb. 212; 1 Atk. 361; Comyn's Rep | | |
| | 80, 581, | |
| Heseltine v. H., 3 Madd. 276 | 50, 001, | 865 |
| v. Siggers, 1 Exch. 856; 18 L. J. Ex. 166; 74 R. R. | 869 | 146 |
| Hetley, Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 866; 71 L. J. Ch. 769; 87 L. T. 265 | | 302 |
| TT W C TD C C C C C C TD TD 100 | . 21, | |
| v. Kaye, 6 Eq. 198; 37 L. J. Ch. 633 | | 432 |
| v. Morris, T. & R. 241; 24 R. R. 39 | • | 87 |
| Hewson, Re, 23 L. J. Ch. 256 | 466, | |
| Heygate v. Annesley, 3 Bro. Ch. 362 | . 400, | 171 |
| Heyman v. Dubois, 13 Eq. 158; 41 L. J. Ch. 224 | 63 | $\frac{1}{64}$ |
| Heysham v. H., 1 Cox, 179 | , | 544 |
| Hibblethwaite v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. 200; 8 L. J. Ex. 27 | | 011 |
| R. R. 578 | 1, 00 | 147 |
| Hickman v. Berens, (1895) 2 Ch. 638; 64 L. J. Ch. 785; 73 | T. T | 111 |
| 323 | | 250 |
| v. Upsall, 2 Gif. 124 | | 893 |
| Hicks v. Hastings, 3 K. & J. 701 | | 189 |
| v. Pendarvis, Freem. Ch. R. 41; 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 212 | , | $\frac{100}{576}$ |
| v. Powell, L. R. 4 Ch. 741 | | 824 |
| v. Ross, 14 Eq. 141; 41 L. J. Ch. 677; 26 L. T. 470 | | 847 |
| Hickson v. Aylward, 3 Mol. 1 | | $\frac{611}{484}$ |
| Hiddingh, The Heirs of, v. De Villiers, 12 A. C. 624; 56 L. J. P. | C 107 | 91 |
| Higgs v. Assam Tea Co., L. R. 4 Ex. 387; 38 L. J. Ex. 233 | | 145 |
| | | $\frac{1}{223}$ |
| Higgins v. Dawson, (1902) A. C. 1; 71 L. J. Ch. 132; 85 L. T. | 763 | |
| 50 W. R. 337 | | 881 |
| Hill, Re, 50 L. J. Ch. 551 | • | 89 |
| - v. Boyle 4 Eq. 260 | • | 160 |
| — v. Chapman, 2 Bro. Ch. 612 | | $\frac{135}{435}$ |
| — v. Boyle, 4 Eq. 260 | | $\frac{100}{400}$ |
| | 698, | |
| v. Edmonds, 5 De G. & Sm. 603; 90 R. R. 170 | | 664 |
| v. Fulbrook, Jac. 574 | 214, | |
| v. Gomme, 1 B. 540; 8 L. J. Ch. 350; 49 R. R. 438 | | 220 520 |
| v. Hickin, (1897) 2 Ch. 579; 66 L. J. Ch. 717; 77 L. T. | 197 | U±U |
| 46 W. R. 137 | | 214 |
| v. H., 3 V. & B. 183; 13 R. R. 175 | | $\frac{214}{897}$ |
| TT 14 T 3T 00 00 | | 001 |

Hogarth v. Latham, 3 Q. B. D. 643; 47 L. J. Q. B. 39 .

| | | | | P | AGE |
|--|---------|-------|---------|--------------|-------|
| Hoghton v. H., 15 B. 305; 21 L. J. Ch. 482 . | 245. | 255. | 257. | 282. | 299 |
| Holden v. Silkstone Co., 30 W. R. 98 | , | , | , | , | 792 |
| v. Thompson, (1907) 2 K. B. 489; 76 L. J | Г. К. | B. | 889: | 97 | |
| L. T. 138; 23 T. L. R. 529 | | | | | 160 |
| Hole v. Bradbury, 12 C. D. 886; 48 L. J. Ch. 673; | 41 7 | r, m | 153 : | 28 | 200 |
| W R 39 | | | | | 109 |
| W. R. 39 Holford, <i>Re</i> , (1894) 3 Ch. 30; 63 L. J. Ch. 637. | • | • | • | 900, | 901 |
| | • | • | • | 21, | 919 |
| Holgate v. Jennings, 24 B. 623; 34 B. 79; 34 L. J. | Ċħ | 120 | 81 | 89 86 | 91 |
| Holidar & Bowman 1 Bro Ch 145 | CH. | 1=0. | , | °-, 50 °3 | |
| Holday v. Bowman, 1 Bro. Ch. 145 | έc Τ. | rp. | 549 · | 50 | , 40 |
| W D 575 |)() 11. | 174 | 679 | 674 | 690 |
| W. R. 575 | • | тт, | 010, | U/T, | 719 |
| Hollawar Pa co T T 46 | • | | • | • | 200 |
| Holloway, Re, 60 L. T. 46 | • | • | • | | |
| | • | • | • | | 90T |
| v. York, 2 Ex. D. 555 | • | • | • | 00= | 101 |
| Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G. M. & G. 270 | • | • | • | 281, | 288 |
| Holmes' Estate, Re, 3 Chi. 337 | • | • | 101 | 101 | 281 |
| | • | ٠ | 121, | 154, | 100 |
| - v. Katchene, 25 h. 163, 26 h. 5 ch. 407 - v. York, 2 Ex. D. 333 Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G. M. & G. 270 . Holmes' Estate, Re, 3 Gif. 337 . - Re, 29 C. D. 786; 55 L. J. Ch. 33 - v. Brierly, 59 L. T. 70 . - v. Crispe, 18 L. J. Ch. 439; 83 R. R. 362 | • | • | • | • | 346 |
| v. Crispe, 18 L. J. Ch. 439; 83 R. R. 362 | • | • | • | | 899 |
| 2. 2201 (0), 20 11. 20 00 | • | | • | , | |
| | | • | • | | 583 |
| Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191; 33 L. J. C | h. I | 93 | | | 108 |
| Holsworthy U. C. v. Holsworthy R. C., (1907) 2 Ch | . 62; | 76 1 | ı. J. (| Uh. | |
| 389; 97 L. T. 634; 23 T. L. R. 452 | | | | | 242 |
| Holt, Re, (1897) 2 Ch. 525; 66 L. J. Ch. 734; 76 L. T. | 776; | 45 W | /. R. | 650 | 767 |
| — v. Dèwell, 4 Ha. 446; 15 L. J. Ch. 14; 67 R. — v. Jesse, 3 C. D. 177; 46 L. J. Ch. 254 | R. 13 | 31 | | 128, | 131 |
| —— v. Jesse, 3 C. D. 177; 46 L. J. Ch. 254 . | • | | | | 250 |
| Holtby v. Hodgson, 24 Q. B. D. 103: 59 L. J. Q. E | 3. 46 | | 726. | 728. | 729 - |
| Hone v. Mederaft, 1 Bro. Ch. 261 | | | • | 844, | 870 |
| Honner v. Morton, 3 Russ. 65; 27 R. R. 15 | | • | • | | 172 |
| Honywood v. Forster, 30 B. 14; 30 L. J. Ch. 930 | • | • | • | | 454 |
| | | | | | 524 |
| v. —, (1902) 1 Ch. 347; 71 L. J. Ch. 17 | 4;8 | 6 L. | T. 2 | 14. | 457 |
| 1100d v. Olapham, 19 D. 90; 24 H. J. Ch. 195 . | | • | 19,0 | 1, 00 | , 92 |
| ——- v. H., 26 L. J. Ch. 616 | • | . • | | • | |
| Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, (1894) 3 Ch. 376; 63 L. J. | Ch. | 719 | | | 712 |
| v (1895) 1 Q. B. 873 ; 64 L v (1894) 2 Q. B. 559 ; 63 L | J. Q. | B. 5 | 20 | | 712 |
| ———— v. ——————————————————————————————— | J. Q. | В. 6 | 02 | 7 | 126, |
| 729, 748, | 750, | 751, | 752, | 753, | 764 |
| v & Heriot, (1897) A. C. 177 | ; 66 | L. J | . Q. | | |
| 356; 76 L. T. 299; 45 W. R. 507 | • | • | | _• | 712 |
| 356; 76 L. T. 299; 45 W. R. 507 V. Heriot, (1896) A. C. 174; (1894) 2 Q Q. B. 352 | . В. а | 559; | ىلا 65 | . J. | |
| Q. B. 352 | 748, | | | | |
| Hooper v. Smart, 1 C. D. 90; 45 L. J. Ch. 99. | | • | • | | 144 |
| Hooper's T., Re, 6 W. R. 824 | | | | | 669 |
| Hope v. Carnegie, L. R. 1 Ch. 320 | | • | 795, | 798, 554, | 820 |
| v. H., 4 De G. M. & G. 328; 23 L. J. Ch. 685 | 2 | | 522, | 554, | 677 |
| v. H., 4 De G. M. & G. 328; 23 L. J. Ch. 68: v. —, 8 De G. M. & G. 731; 26 L. J. Ch. 417 | , | • | | υώυ, · | 041 |
| v (1892) 2 Ch. 342: 61 L. J. Ch. 441 | | | 702, | 744, | 746 |
| ——- Johnstone, Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 470; 73 L. J. Ch | . 32 | 1; 9 | 0 L. | Т. | |
| 253; 20 T. L. R. 282 | | • | 580, | 588, | |
| Hopkins, Ex p., 3 P. W. 152 | ٠ | | 518, | 549, | 551 |
| v. Hemsworth, (1898) 2 Ch. 347; 67 L. | J. (| Jh. d | 526; | | |
| L. T. 832; 47 W. R. 26 | | | | 127, | |
| v. H., Cas. t. Talbot, 44 | | • | ٠ | | 901 |
| Hopkins' Trusts, Re, 18 Eq. 697; 43 L. J. Ch. 722 | • | • | | | 878 |
| Hopkinson v. Forster, 19 Eq. 74 | | • | • | 115, | |
| v. Rolt, 9 H. L. Cas. 514; 34 L. J. Ch. | 458 | • | • | 134, | 144 |
| | | | | | |

-- v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G. 690; 87 R. R. 258

. 58, 60, 62, 908

| | DIGH |
|--|--|
| Huchae's Trust Re 2 Ham & M 89 | PAGE . 139 |
| Hughes's Trust, Re, 2 Hem. & M. 89 Hull v. Waterhouse, 13 W. R. 666 Humble v. H., 2 Jur. 696 | . 717 |
| Humble v. H. 2 Jur 696 | . 885 |
| Humble v . H., 2 Jur. 696 | . 836 |
| v. Richardson, 10 W. R. 528 | . 92 |
| Humphyer a Duller 1 Ath 450 | 744 |
| | 693 |
| Humphreys, Re, (1893) 3 Ch. 1; 62 L. J. Ch. 498 90 | 0. 903 |
| 2. Edwards 45 L. J. Ch. 112 · W. N. (1875) 208 | 787 |
| | 8. 884 |
| v. Polak (1901) 2 K. B. 385 · 70 L. J. K. B. 752 · 83 | ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, |
| L T 103 · 49 W R 612 | 1 551 |
| L. T. 103; 49 W. R. 612 | 4 489 |
| Hunt v. H., 31 L. J. Ch. 160: 32 L. J. Ch. 168 | 258 |
| Hunt v. H., 31 L. J. Ch. 160; 32 L. J. Ch. 168 | 630 |
| v 28 C. D. 606: 52 L. J. P. & D. 98 | 628 |
| | 631 |
| v Matthews 1 Vern 408 | 647 |
| v Scott. 1 De G. & Sm. 219 · 75 B. B. 92 | 84 |
| The Shrewshury &c. Co. 13 B. 1 | 799 |
| Hunt-Foulston v Furber 3 C D 285 | 852 |
| | 81 294 |
| " Daniel, 4 Ha, 420: 14 L. J. Ch, 194: 67 R. R. 114 | 159 |
| ## 12 ## 12 ## 14 ## | 545 |
| Huntington v H 2 Vern 437 | 34 735 |
| Huntley v. Griffith Moore, Q. B. 452 | 170 |
| Huntly v Gaskell (1905) 2 Ch 656: 75 L J Ch 66 | 712 |
| Hurst v Beach 5 Madd 358: 21 B R 304 | 7 920 |
| Huskisson v. Lefevre, 26 B. 157 | . 368 |
| Hussey v. Horne-Payne, 4 A. C. 311; 48 L. J. Ch. 846; 41 L. T. 1 | . 000 |
| 27 W R. 585 | 476 |
| 27 W. R. 585 | 72 894 |
| Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Bro. Ch. 128 405, 408, 409, 59 | 12, 001 |
| Hutchings to Burt, 59 L. T. 490 | 755 |
| Hutchinson v Heyworth 9 A & E 375 · 8 L J () B 17 | 31 141 |
| Hutchison v Skelton 2 Maca H L Cas 492 | 465 |
| Hutchings to Burt, 59 L. T. 490 Hutchinson v. Heyworth, 9 A. & E. 375; 8 L. J. Q. B. 17 Hutchison v. Skelton, 2 Macq. H. L. Cas. 492. Hutley v. H., L. R. 8 Q. B. 112; 42 L. J. Q. B. 52. Huxtable, Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 793; 71 L. J. Ch. 876; 87 L. T. 415 Hyde v. Hindly, 2 Cox. 408 | 160 |
| Huxtable Re (1902) 2 Ch 793: 71 L J Ch 876: 87 L T 415 | 302 |
| Hyde v. Hindly, 2 Cox. 408 | 214 |
| Hyde v. Hindly, 2 Cox, 408 | 22 764 |
| v. White, 5 Si, 524 | 331 |
| Hyett v. Mekin, 25 C. D. 735; 52 L. J. Ch. 241 223, 224, 365, 38 | 86 390 |
| Hylton v. H., 2 Ves. Sen. 547 | 85 286 |
| Hyman v. Helm, 24 C. D. 531; 49 L. T. 376; 32 W. R. 258 | 794 |
| 11/11/11/11/11/11/11/11/11/11/11/11/11/ | . 101 |
| | |
| I. | |
| | |
| IBBETSON, Ex p., 8 C. D. 519; 39 L. T. 1; 26 W. R. 843 . Ibbitson, Re, 7 Eq. 226; 21 L. T. 163 | 136 |
| Ibbitson, Re. 7 Eq. 226: 21 L. T. 163 | 64. 368 |
| Ibbotson v. Elam. 1 Eq. 188: 35 B. 594 | . 877 |
| v. Rhodes, 2 Vern. 554 | 484 |
| Hehester, Exp., 7 V. 367: 6 R. R. 138 . 535 5 | 44 545 |
| Imbert, Ex p., 1 De G. & J. 152: 26 L. J. Bank, 65 | . 114 |
| | |
| 72 L. J. P. C. 1: 87 L. T. 457: 51 W. R. 289 | . 490 |
| 72 L. J. P. C. 1; 87 L. T. 457; 51 W. R. 289 Inchiquin v. French, 1 Cox, 1 | . 12 13 |
| Includen v. Northcote, 3 Atk. 430 | . 53 |
| Incorporated, &c. Society, The v. Coles, 5 De G. M. & G. 331; 2 | 24 |
| | . 360 |
| | . 000 |

| ТО | VOL | UMF | E I. | | | | | | lxv |
|---|-------------------|------------|------------------|--------------|------|--------------|-----------------|--------|------|
| - | | | | | | | | I | AGE |
| Ingham v. Bickerdike, 6 Madd. | 275 | | | • | • | • | | • | 543 |
| Ingham v. Bickerdike, 6 Madd. Ingle, Re, 21 B. 275; 25 L. J. C. Inglefield v. Coghlan, 2 Coll. Ch. | Jh. 16 | 9 | | | • | | • | • | 287 |
| Ingle, Re, 21 B. 275; 25 L. J. C. Inglefield v. Coghlan, 2 Coll. Ch. Ingram v. I., 1 Ves. Sen. 259 | ı. R. : | 247; | 70 E | d. R. | . 19 | 7. | • | • | 692 |
| Ingram v. 1., 1 Ves. Sen. 259 . | '. | - ~1 | | • | • | • | • | • | 460 |
| Inman, Re, (1893) 3 Ch. 518; 6: | 2 Д. J | . Ch | . 940 |) | ٠ | • | • | • | 903 |
| v. 1., 15 Eq. 260; 21 W. | K. 43 | 33 | • | • | • | • | • | • | 492 |
| Ingram v. I., 1 Ves. Sen. 259 . Inman, Re, (1893) 3 Ch. 518; 65 —— v. I., 15 Eq. 260; 21 W. Innell v. Newman, 4 B. & A. 41 Innes v. Johnson, 4 V. 568 | 9. | | • | • | ٠ | • | • | 096 | 618 |
| | | | | | - | ~~ ~ | | 836, | |
| | ГЦ. Э | ±0; | о у. | 404 | , , | 24.1 24.5 | a. 000 | 887 | 222 |
| Insole Re 1 Eq. 470 : 35 L. J. (| 7h 15 | 77 | • | • | • | OTO | , 002 | 176 | 698 |
| International Fibre Synd v Da | wson. | 84 | т. т. | 803 | • | • | • | 110, | 109 |
| T ₁ A. Soc. Re. 2 C | D 4 | 76 | 47 T | . J. | С'n. | 88 | • | | 46 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 3 C. T |), 59 | $4:\bar{4}$ | 6 L. | J. | Ch. 6 | 325 . | | 797 |
| Inwood v. Twyne, 2 Eden, 148. | | | | | | | | 384. | 388 |
| Irby v. I., 25 B. 632 | | | | | | | | . ′ | 144 |
| Irby v. I., 25 B. 632 | | | | | | | | | 788 |
| Ireland v. Hart, (1902) 1 Ch. 529 | 2;71 | L. | J. Cl | ı. 27 | 6; | 86 I | ı. T. 3 | 385; | |
| 50 W. R. 315. | | | | | | | | | 133 |
| v. Trinbaith, 14 W. R. 2 | 75 . | | | | | | • | • | 674 |
| v. Wilson, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 6 | 523 . | | | | • | | | | 185 |
| Irvin v. Ironmonger, 2 Russ. & | M. 53 | 1; 3 | 4 R. | R. 1 | .56 | • | | | 904 |
| Irving, Re, 7 C. D. 419; 47 L. J | . Ban | k. 38 | 3 | • | ٠ | • | 108 | , 111, | 121 |
| Irwin v. I., 5 Ir. R. Eq. 373 . | + ÷ | CII. | | • | • | • | • | 05- | 679 |
| Isaacs, Re, (1894) 3 Uh. 506; 63 | 11. 0 | r∪n. | 819 | | | • | • | 375, | 376 |
| v. Wilson, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 6 Irvin v. Ironmonger, 2 Russ. & Irving, Re, 7 C. D. 419; 47 L. J Irwin v. I., 5 Ir. R. Eq. 373 . Isaacs, Re, (1894) 3 Ch. 506; 63 Isaacson, Re, (1895) 1 Q. B. 333 Israel v. Douglas, 1 H. Black. 2 | ; 64. | LI. J. | (d. 1 | 5. 18 | 1 | • | • | • | 140 |
| Israel v. Douglas, 1 H. Black. 23 Ivens v. Butler, 26 L. J. Q. B. 1 | 09 . 45 | | • | • | • | • | • | • | 726 |
| Ivens v. Buner, 20 H. J. Q. B. I | . 40 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 190 |
| | _ | | | | | | | | |
| | J. | | | | | | | | |
| Jackson, Re, 21 C. D. 786 v. Cator, 5 V. 618; 5 F v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 48 v. J., 2 Cox, 35 v. Lomas, 23 W. R. 74 v. Petrie, 10 V. 165; 7 Jacob v. J., 78 L. T. 451, 825; 8 Jacobs v. Amyatt, 1 Madd. 376 (Jacomb v. Turner, (1892) 1 Q. B Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. 436 | | | | | | | | | 388 |
| | R. R. | 144 | | | • | • | • | • | 476 |
| v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 48 | 37:16 | 3 R. | R. 20 | 00 | | | 750 | . 752. | 753 |
| v. J., 2 Cox, 35 | | | | | | | | , , | 918 |
| v. Lomas, 23 W. R. 74 | 4. | | | | | | | | 225 |
| v. Petrie, 10 V. 165; 7 | R. R | . 368 | 3 | | | | | 816, | 817 |
| Jacob v. J., 78 L. T. 451, 825; 8 | $2 L.$ $^{\circ}$ | Г. 27 | 0 | | | • | | | 458 |
| Jacobs v. Amyatt, 1 Madd. 376 (| n.) . | | | | | | | 664, | 694 |
| Jacomb v. Turner, (1892) 1 Q. B. Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. 436 | . 47. | ' | · ~ | • | ٠. | | | | 232 |
| Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. 436 | 5; 15 | ы. | J. Or | 1. 22 | ō; | 70 B | 6. K. | 280 | |
| Tolerman's III De 99 (1 T) 944. | # 0 | Υ 1 | r OIL | 96 | | 100 | 170 | 990 | 875 |
| Jakeman's T., Re, 23 C. D. 344; | 92 | LI. 0 | . On | . 30 | o | 156, | 178, | 380, | 117, |
| James v. Couchman, 29 C. D. p. | 017. | 54 - | г. т | Ch | 220 | 2 | | | 746 |
| Doen 11 V 383 S R | $\frac{211}{2}$ | QT. | ц. о. | CII. | 000 | | • | • | 286 |
| —— v. Holmes 31 T. J. Ch. 56 | 10. 11. 37 | | | • | • | • | • | • | 903 |
| v. Dean, 11 V. 383; 8 R. v. Holmes, 31 L. J. Ch. 56 Kerr, 40 C. D. 457; 58 L. | тċ | h. 38 | 55 1 | 59. i | 161 | 288 | 322 | 324 | 328 |
| 11011, 10 0. 15. 101, 00 11. | | 00 | , , , , , , | , | 101 | , =00, | 332 | , 333, | 342 |
| ——- v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111 . | | | | | | | | | 323 |
| Janson v. Driefontein Mines, (19 | 902) A | L. C. | 491 | ; 71 | L. | J. K | . в. 8 | 357; | |
| 87 L. T. 372; 51 W. R. 142 . | | | | | | | | | 156 |
| Jarratt v. Aldam, 9 Eq. 463; 39 | L. J. | Ch. | 342 | | | | | | 300 |
| Jarvis v. Duke, 1 Vern. 19 . | | | | • | | | | | 579 |
| v. J., 63 L. J. Ch. 10 . | | | | | | • | | | 109 |
| Jauncey v. AG., 3 Gif. 308 | | <u>.</u> | . | | | | | | 54 |
| Jay v. Robinson, 25 Q. B. D. 46 | 7,59 | ٠. يا | آ <u>.</u> (۵. ِ | B. 3 | 67. | 728 | $\frac{739}{2}$ | , 740, | 757 |
| Jebb v. Tugwell, 20 B. 84; 7 De | e Cr. I | 11. Č | G. 6 | 63; | 25 | ا، بل | . Uh. | 109 | |
| | | | | | | | | | 83 |

| | 70 | 1.0177 |
|--|---------|------------------|
| Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547; 2 L. J. K. B. 81; 26 R. R. 453 | 619, | AGE 637 |
| Jeffery, Re, (1895) 2 Ch. 577; 64 L. J. Ch. 830 | | 900 |
| Jeffery's T, Re, 2 Eq. 68; 35 L. J. Ch. 426 | 840, | |
| Jeffreys v. Conner, 28 B. 328 | 010, | 88 |
| | | 840 |
| Jeffrys v. Vanteswarstwarth, Barn. 144 | 502, | |
| Jenkins, Re, 5 Russ. 183 | | 170 |
| , (1903) 2 Ch. 362 : 72 L. J. Ch. 693 : 88 L. T. 628 | | 379 |
| | | 865 |
| Jenkinson, Re, 15 Q. B. D. 441; 54 L. J. Q. B. 601 | 114, | 135 |
| | | 2 3 |
| Jenner v. Finch, 5 P. D. 107; 49 L. J. P. & D. 25 | | 918 |
| v. J., 2 De G. F. & J. 359; 30 L. J. Ch. 201 . 255, | , 283, | 284 |
| ——— v. Morris, 1 De G. F. & J. 52 | | 154 |
| v. Turner, 16 C. D. 188; 50 L. J. Ch. 161 | 579, | 580 |
| Jenney v. Andrews, 6 Madd. 264; 23 R. R. 216 | 32, | |
| Jennings v. Foster, W. N. (1884) 200 | | 228 |
| v. J., (1898) 1 Ch. 378; 67 L. J. Ch. 190; 77 L. T. 7 | 86; | |
| 46 W. R. 344 | 244, | 249 |
| v. Rigby, 33 B. 198; 33 L. J. Ch. 149 | | 789 |
| | 81. | |
| Jernegan v. Baxter, 6 Madd. 32 | • | 675 |
| Jervoise v. Duke, 1 Vern. 19 | . H-1-1 | 576 |
| T | , 111, | 104 |
| Jessopp v. Watson, 1 My. & K. 665; 2 L. J. Ch. 197 . 379 | , 400, | 678 |
| Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 420 | 257, | 678 |
| Jodrell v. J., 9 B. 45; 15 L. J. Ch. 17; 73 R. R. 274 Johnes v. Lockhart, 3 Bro. Ch. 383 (n.) | 201, | 694 |
| Johnson, Re, 15 C. D. 548 | • | 155 |
| | • | 256 |
| | 429, | |
| v. Arnold, 1 Ves. Sen. 169 | 365, | |
| v. Child, 4 Ha. 87; 67 R. R. 19 | 33, | |
| v. De la Creuze, 1 Bro. Ch. 105 | | 891 |
| v. Gallagher, 3 De G. F. & J. 502; 30 L. J. Ch. | 298 | |
| 686, 695, 719, 720, 721, 723, | ,724, | 744 |
| v. Harrowby, John. 425 | - , | |
| | | 839 |
| | | |
| v. J., 1 J. & W. 472 | | 666 |
| v. J., 2 Coll. Ch. R. 441; 70 R. R. 288 | 79, 80 | , 85 |
| v. Lander, 7 Eq. 228; 38 L. J. Ch. 229 | 176, | |
| v. Mills, 1 V. 282 | | 891 |
| v. Moffat, W. N. (1876) 21 | | 787 |
| v. Routh, 27 L. J. Ch. 305 | | 78 |
| v. Smith, 1 Ves. Sen. 314 | 425, | 426 |
| v. Telfourd, 1 Russ. & M. 244; 8 L. J. Ch. 94; 32 R. R. | 207 | |
| v. Woods, 2 B. 409; 9 L. J. Ch. 244 | 000 | 54 |
| Johnston, Re, 26 C. D. 538; 53 L. J. Ch. 645. ————, Re, (1894) 3 Ch. 208; 63 L. J. Ch. 753. ———————————————————————————————————— | | |
| Foreign & Co. Po (1004) 2 Ch 924 . 72 T T Ch & | 861, | 862 |
| Foreign, &c. Co., Re, (1904) 2 Ch. 234; 73 L. J. Ch. 6 91 L. T. 124; 53 W. R. 189 | 11.7 ; | 154 |
| v. Moore, 27 L. J. Ch. 453 | | |
| v. O'Neill, 3 L. R. Ir. 476 | • | $\frac{82}{903}$ |
| Johnstone Re, 14 C. D. 162; 49 L. J. Ch. 596 | | 872 |
| | | 514 |
| R. R. 78 | | 215 |
| and the second s | 554 | |
| v. Cox, 16 C. D. 571; 19 C. D. 17; 50 L. J. Ch. 216 | | 132 |
| Jollands v. Burdett, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 349 | , | 752 |
| | • | |

| PAGE 7. 10 (1.7) 100 50 T. T. (2. 650) 946 401 | |
|--|---|
| Jones, Exp., 18 C. D. 109; 50 L. J. Ch. 673 | |
| —, Re, (1895) 2 Ch. 719; (1896) 1 Ch. 222; 65 L. J. Ch. 191 . 289 | |
| , Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 478; 62 L. J. Ch. 996 62, 214, 466, 467 , Re, (1897) 2 Ch. 190; 66 L. J. Ch. 439; 76 L. T. 454; 45 | |
| | |
| W. R. 598 | |
| 0. Druce, 11 Dr. 221 | |
| v. Davies, 8 C. D. 205; 47 L. J. Ch. 654 | |
| | |
| -v. Geddes, 1 Ph. 725; 15 L. J. Ch. 65 | |
| | |
| | |
| v. Harris, 9 V. 486; 7 R. R. 282 | |
| - v. Humphreys, (1902) 1 K. B. 10; 71 L. J. K. B. 23; 85 L. T. 488 151 | |
| v. J., 1 Q. B. D. 282; 45 L. J. Q. B. 166 . 583, 584, 585, 587. | |
| 589, 590 | ì |
| | |
| The state of the s | |
| | |
| — v. Mitchell, 1 S. & S. 294 | |
| O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |
| v. Powell. 9 B. 345: 73 B. B. 378 | |
| v. Ricketts, 31 B. 130; 31 L. J. Ch. 753 | |
| ——- v. Robinson, 3 De G. M. & G. 911 | 7 |
| |) |
| - v. Salby, Pr. Ch. 300 | ó |
| |) |
| | |
| ——- v. Suffolk, 1 Bro. Ch. 528 | ; |
| v. The Consolidated A. Co., 26 B. 256; 28 L. J. Ch. 66 148 | 3 |
| | L |
| Jope v. Morshead, 6 B. 213; 12 L. J. Ch. 190 209, 212 | |
| Jopson v. James, 77 L. J. Ch. 824 | r |
| Jopson v. James, 77 L. J. Ch. 824 | ; |
| v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185; 23 L. J. Ch. 865474, 476, 477, | , |
| 601 | |
| Jordon v. Holkham, Amb. 209 | ; |
| Joseph, Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 512; 77 L. J. Ch. 832; 99 L. T. 539; 24 | |
| T. L. R. 770 | |
| v. Lyons, 15 Q. B. D. 280; 54 L. J. Q. B. 364 660, 784 | |
| Jubber v. J., 9 Si. 503 | |
| Judd v. Pratt, 13 V. 168; 15 V. 390 | , |
| Judkin's Ts., Re, 25 C. D. 743; 53 L. J. Ch. 496; 50 L. T. 200; 32 | , |
| W. R. 407 | , |
| | • |
| 567 Jump, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 129; 72 L. J. Ch. 16; 87 L. T. 502; 51 W. R. | • |
| 266 | |
| v. J., 8 P. D. 159; 52 L. J. P. & D. 71 628, 638 | |
| Jupp, Re, 39 C. D. 151; 57 L. J. Ch. 774 | |
| Justice v. Wynne, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 289 | |
| | |
| K. | |
| KAMPF v. Jones, 2 Keen, 756; 7 L. J. Ch. 63 | ; |
| Kane v. K., 16 C. D. 207; 50 L. J. Ch. 72 | |
| Karunaratne v. Ferdinandus, (1902) A. C. 405; 71 L. J. P. C. 76; | |
| 86 L. T. 329 | |
| Kaufman v. Gerson, (1904) 1 K. B. 591; 73 L. J. K. B. 320; 90 L. T. | |
| 608; 52 W. R. 420; 20 T. L. R. 277 | |
| e~2 | |
| 6, <u>2</u> ⋅ | |

| | PAGE | |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| Kay v. Johnson, 21 B. 538 | 548 | |
| Kearsley v. Woodcock, 3 Ha. 185; 64 R. R. 255 | 863 | |
| Keat v. Allen, 2 Vern. 588; Pr. Ch. 267 | 600 | |
| Keavs v . Lane, 3 Ir. R. Eq. 1 | 715 | |
| Keeling v. Brown, 5 V. 359; 5 R. R. 70 Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 372; 29 L. J. C. P. 287 | 50 | |
| Keene v. Beard, S.C. B. (N. S.) 372; 29 L. J. C. P. 287 | 7 115 | |
| Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C. 205 | . 579, 580, 587 | |
| Keith v. Burrows, 1 C. P. D. 733; 2 A. C. 636; 46 L. J | J. C. P. 801 . 138 | |
| —- v. Gancia, (1904) 1 Ch. 774; 73 L. J. Ch. 411; 9 | 0 L. T. 395: | |
| 52 W. R. 530; 20 T. L. R. 330 | 480 | |
| Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De G. M. & G. 176; 21 L. J. | | |
| Kelcey, Re, (1899) 2 Ch. 530; 68 L. J. Ch. 742; 48 W | 7 D 50 · 91 | |
| L. T. 354 | 120 | |
| | | |
| Kelland v. Fulford, 6 C. D. 491; 47 L. J. Ch. 94 . | | |
| Kellet v. K., 3 Dow. 248; 15 R. R. 63 | 407, 408 | |
| Kelly, Re, 9 Ir. Ch. R. 103 | 850 | |
| v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54; 11 L. J. Ex. 10; 60 R. | R. 666 . 243 | |
| Kemp v. Baerselman, (1906) 2 K. B. 604; 75 L. J. K. B | | |
| v. Coleman, Salk. 156 | 600 | |
| v. Falk, 7 A. C. 581; 52 L. J. Ch. 167 | . 64, 146, 147 | |
| Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R. 10 Ch. 15; 44 L. J. Ch. 195 | . 298, 300, 344 | |
| Kempster, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 446; 75 L. J. Ch. 286; 94 I | L. T. 248; 54 | |
| W. R. 385 | . 12, 31, 50, 52 | |
| Kendall, Ex. p., 17 V. 520; 11 R. R. 122 | 45, 46 | |
| | 323, 344 | |
| | 741 | |
| | 892 | |
| Kenlis v. Hodgson, (1895) 2 Ch. 458: 64 L. Ch. 585 | 371 | |
| Kennedy v. Broun, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 677; 32 L. J. C. B | . 137 289 | |
| v. Cassillis, 2 Swans, 313 | 794, 798 | |
| v. Cassillis, 2 Swans. 313 | 860 | |
| v. K., (1907) P. 49; 76 L. J. P. 34; 96 L. | | |
| T. L. R. 139 | 630, 634 | |
| v. Trott, 6 Moo. P. C. 467 | 188 | |
| Kennel v. Abbot, 4 V. 802; 4 R. R. 351 | 409 | |
| Kenney v. Browne, 3 Ridg. P. C. 462 | 161 | |
| Kenniels of Mountatember 48 W D 141 | 214 | |
| Kenrick v. Mountstephen, 48 W. R. 141 | | |
| | 25 T. M. 577 | |
| Kensington, ne, (1902) 1 Ch. 205; 71 H. J. Ch. 170; 6 | 00 127 | |
| 50 W. R. 201 | $\frac{1}{26}$, $\frac{26}{604}$ | |
| v. Dollond, 2 My. & K. 184; 3 L. J. Ch. 2 Kenward, Re, 94 L. T. 277; 22 T. L. R. 239 | $\frac{209}{500}$ $\frac{694}{500}$ | |
| Kenward, Re, 94 L. T. 211; 22 T. L. R. 259 | 790 | |
| Kenyon v. Worthington, Dick. 668 | 788 | |
| Kenyon's Est., Re, 56 L. T. 626 | 868 | |
| Keogh v. M'Grath, 5 L. R. Ir. 478 | 160 | |
| Keon, Re, 3 L. R. Ir. 228 | 460 | 1 |
| Kepitigalla Co. v. National Bank, (1909) 2 K. B. 1010; | 78 L. J. K. B. | |
| 964; 100 L. T. 516; 25 T. L. R. 402 | 490 | ŀ |
| Ker v. K., 4 Ir. R. Eq., 15 | 59, 62 | ; |
| v. Wauchope, 1 Bli. 25; 20 R. R. 1 | | 1 |
| Kermode v. Macdonald, 1 Eq. 457; L. R. 3 Ch. 584; | 37 L. J. Ch. | |
| 879 | 838 872 | 1 |
| Kerr v. Middlesex Hospital, The, 2 De G. M. & G. 583 | ; 22 L. J. Ch. | |
| 355 | 847, 848 | ; |
| | 30 | |
| Kershaw, Re, 37 C. D. 674; 57 L. J. Ch. 599 Kerswill v. Bishop, 2 C. & J. 529; 1 L. J. Ex. 227; 37 | R. R. 816 . 138 | |
| Kettleby v. Atwood, 1 Vern. 298 | 356, 357 | |
| Key v. Bradshaw, 2 Vern. 102. | | |
| Kibble, Ex p., L. R. 10 Ch. 373; 44 L. J. Ch. 63 | 346 | |
| Kidd, Re, (1894) 3 Ch. 558; 63 L. J. Ch. 855 | | |
| ,, (| | |

| | PAGE |
|--|--|
| Kidd v. North, 14 Si. 463; 2 Ph. 91; 5 L. J. Dig. 810; 7 | |
| Kidman v. K., 40 L. J. Ch. 369 | 903 |
| Kidney v. Coussmaker, 1 V. 436; 2 V. 267; 12 V. 13 | |
| P. C. 573 · 2 R. R. 118 | 407, 455, 462 |
| P. C. 573; 2 R. R. 118 | 539 |
| Kildare (Earl of) v. Eustage, 1 Vern, 419 | . 816, 821 |
| Kilford v. Blanev. 31 C. D. 56: 55 L. J. Ch. 185 12. | 13, 15, 16, 18, 25 |
| Killick, Ex v., 3 Mont. D. & De G. 480: 13 L. J. Bank, C | 092 |
| Kilford v. Blaney, 31 C. D. 56; 55 L. J. Ch. 185 12, Killick, Ex p., 3 Mont. D. & De G. 480; 13 L. J. Bank. (Kilpatrick v. K., Macphers. 143 | 539 |
| Kilpatrick v. K., Macphers. 143 | 779 |
| Kimberley v. Tew, 4 Dr. & W. 139; 65 R. R. 680 . | 891 |
| Kincaid's T., Re, 16 Jur. 106; 1 Drew. 326; 22 L. J. C | Ch. 395 669, |
| | 670, 677 |
| King, Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 363; 73 L. J. Ch. 210; 90 L. | |
| W. R. 230; 20 T. L. R. 187 | 906 |
| 0. CODON, 2 I. W. OTT | |
| v. George, 4 C. D. 435; 5 C. D. 627; 46 L. J. Ch. 6 | 70 835 |
| v. Hamlet, 2 My. & K. 485; 3 Cl. & Fin. 218; 3 | |
| 258; 39 R. R. 24, 237 | . 326 |
| v. Harwood, 2 Lev. 32; 1 Vent. 178 | 526 |
| v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494; 67 K. K. 694. | $\frac{1}{100}$ |
| 2 Inn (N. S.) 600, 27 L. I. Ch. 20 | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| v. Turong 92 (1 T) 793 . 59 T. T (1) . 61 | |
| " Malcott 9 Ha 692 · 80 R R 631 | |
| | |
| v. Samson, 3 Adams, 277 | 630 |
| v. Savery, 1 Sm. & G. 271; 5 H. L. C. 627 323, 3 | 25, 327, 330, 345 |
| v. Tootel, 25 B. 23 | 920 |
| a. Victoria & Co. (1906) A C. 950 · 65 T. I. D. | C. 38; 74 |
| L. T. 206; 44 W. R. 592 | 151, 152, 153 |
| v. Wright, 14 Si. 400; 14 L. J. Ch. 214 | 842 |
| Kingham v. K., (1897) 1 Ir. R. 170 | . 	 . 	 874, 875 |
| Kingsley's T., Re, 26 B. 84; 28 L. J. Ch. 80 | 700, 890 |
| Kingsman v. K., 6 Q. B. D. 125; 50 L. J. Q. B. 81 | 648 |
| Kingston, Re, 5 L. R. Ir. 169 | 36, 838, 841, 854 |
| Andy 0. 100001, 1 v. 102, 110.10.012 | 00,000,011,001 |
| Kirk, Re, 21 C. D. 431 Kirke v. K., 4 Russ. 449; L. J. Dig. 318. | 19 |
| Kinkham a Smith 1 Vog San 252 | 19 |
| Milos 13 V 338 | 250 284 |
| Kirklay Re 25 T L R 592 | 427 429 |
| Kirkpatrick v Bedford 4 A C 96 | 894 920 |
| Kirkham v. Smith, 1 Ves. Sen. 258 v. Miles, 13 V. 338 Kirkley, Re, 25 T. L. R. 522 Kirkpatrick v. Bedford, 4 A. C. 96 Kirwan v. Cullen, 4 Ir. Ch. R. 322 Kitching K. 19 L. T. 674 | 292 |
| Kitchin v. K., 19 L. T. 674 | 631 |
| Kitts v. Moore, (1895) 1 Q. B. 253: 64 L. J. Ch. 152 | 786 |
| Knapman, Re. 18 C. D. 300: 50 L. J. Ch. 629. | 145 |
| Knapp v. Noyes, Amb. 662 | 594 |
| Knight v. Bowyer, 2 De G. & J. 421; 27 L. J. Ch. 520 | 160 |
| Kirwan v. Cullen, 4 Ir. Ch. R. 322 Kitchin v. K., 19 L. T. 674 Kitts v. Moore, (1895) 1 Q. B. 253; 64 L. J. Ch. 152 Knapman, Re, 18 C. D. 300; 50 L. J. Ch. 629 Knapp v. Noyes, Amb. 662 Knight v. Bowyer, 2 De G. & J. 421; 27 L. J. Ch. 520 v. Cameron, 14 V. 389 v. Davis, 3 My. & K. 361; 3 L. J. Ch. 81; 41 R. | . 577, 583, 594 |
| 0. Davis, 6 M., a M., 601, 6 M. 61, 11 M. | . 010 |
| v. K., 2 Si. & S. 490; 25 R. R. 253 | 894 |
| v. K., 18 Eq. 487; 43 L. J. Ch. 611 | 682 |
| Knights v. Atkins, 3 Vern. 20. | 356 |
| Knollys v. Shepherd, 1 J. & W. 499 | |
| Knott v. Cottee, 2 Ph. 192; 16 B. 77; 78 R. R. 67 | 535, 545, 903 |
| Koeber v. Sturgis, 22 B. 588 | . 664, 669 |
| Kuyper's Policy, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 38; 68 L. J. Ch. 10; | 47 W. R. |
| 239; 79 L. T. 486 | 3, 16 |
| arymonom of ari, a Dio. Om aoi | . 0, 10 |

| ${f L}.$ | |
|---|---------------------|
| La Banque Jacques-Cartier v. La Banque d'Épargne, &c., 13 A. C. | PAGE |
| 111; 57 L. J. P. C. 42 | 344 |
| La Constancia, 2 Wm. Rob. 404, 406 | 67 |
| La Grange v. McAndrew, 4 Q. B. D. 211; 48 L. J. Q. B. 315; 39 | |
| L. T. 500; 27 W. R. 413 | . 785 |
| | . 87 |
| La Terriere v. Bulmer, 2 Si. 18 La Touche v. L., 3 H. & C. 576; 34 L. J. Ex. 85 | 725 |
| Lacy, Re, (1899) 2 Ch. 149; 68 L. J. Ch. 488; 47 W. R. 664; 80 |) |
| L. T. 706 | 907 |
| Ladd v. Puleston, W. N. (1883) 72; 31 W. R. 539; 52 L. J. Ch. 816 | 787 |
| Lady Chester's Case, 1 Vent. 207 | . 536 |
| Laing v. Walker, 64 L. T. 527 | . 771 |
| Lake, Re, (1903) 1 K. B. 151; 72 L. J. K. B. 117; 87 L. T. 655; | |
| 51 W. R. 319 | . 125 |
| | 9, 465 |
| | 664 |
| Lambe v. Orton, 1 Dr. & Sm. 125; 29 L. J. Ch. 319 | . 116 |
| Lambert, Re, 36 Sol. Jo. 327 | . 82 3, 743, |
| 74. | 4, 746 |
| | 1, 888 |
| | . 898 |
| Lamlee v. Hanman, 2 Vern. 499 | . 601 |
| | 3, 104 |
| Lancaster v. L., (1896) P. 118; 65 L. J. P. & D. 34 | $.~^{^{\prime}}253$ |
| & Carlisle Ry. Co. v. North Western Ry. Co., 2 K. & J | |
| 293; 25 L. J. Ch. 223 | . 799 |
| Lance v . Aglionby, 27 B. 65 \cdot . \cdot . \cdot . \cdot . | 16, 19 |
| —— v. Norman, 2 Ch. R. 79 | . 649 |
| Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136; 44 L. J. Ch. 203. 26, | |
| | 51, 843 |
| Lancey v. Fairechild, 2 Vern. 101 | . 356 |
| | $\frac{4}{9}$, 866 |
| | 8, 869 |
| — v. Oakes, 22 W. R. 709 | . 701 6, 147 |
| Langdale v. Briggs, 8 De G. M. & G. 391; 26 L. J. Ch. 27. | . 856 |
| | . 835 |
| Langdale's Estate, Re, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 572 | $\frac{.}{220}$ |
| Langford v. Pitt, 2 P.W. 629 | . 362 |
| | 8, 659 |
| Langmead v. Cockerton, 25 W. R. 315 | . 220 |
| Langslow v. L., 21 B. 552; 25 L. J. Ch. 610 45 | 0, 461 |
| Langton v. Horton, 1 Ha. 549; 58 R. R. 185 108, 13 | 8, 139 |
| v. Waring, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 315 | . 114 |
| Lanoy v. Athol, 2 Atk. 446 | |
| Lansdowne v. L., Mods. 364; 2 J. & W. 205 | 3, 244 |
| Larivière v. Morgan, L. R. 7 Ch. 550; 41 L. J. Ch. 746 | . 826 |
| Larkin v. Marshall, 4 Exch. 806; 19 L. J. Ex. 161; 80 R. R. 787 | . 736 |
| Larking, Re, 37 C. D. 310; 57 L. J. Ch. 282 | . 865 |
| Larner v. L., 26 L. J. Ch. 668. v. —, (1905) 2 K. B. 539; 74 L. J. K. B. 797; 93 L. T. 537 | . 836 |
| | , 2, 749 |
| Lascelles v. Butt, 2 C. D. 593 | $\frac{2}{186}$ |
| Lashmar, Re, (1891) 1 Ch. 258; 60 L. J. Ch. 143 | . 411 |
| | 0,894 |
| Laurie v. Clutton, 15 B. 65; 21 L. J. Ch. 226. | . 883 |
| | 3, 755 |
| 1 1 C 4 D D 11 140 | |

| Tamphania Potata Do 11 To Ch D 940 | | | | P | AGE |
|---|--------|--------|-------|--------|--|
| Lawder's Estate, Re, 11 Ir. Ch. R. 346 Lawe v. Stoney, W. N., (1876) 141 | • | • | • | • | $\begin{array}{c} 58 \\ 226 \end{array}$ |
| Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox, 167; 1 R. R. 10 | 362, | 373. | 374. | 375. | 376 |
| Lawley v. Hooper, 3 Atk. 278 | | • • • | | 307, | 313 |
| Lawrence v. L., 26 C. D. 795: 53 L. J. Ch. 982 | | | | | 879 |
| Lawrenson, Re, (1891) W. N. 28 Lawson v. L., 1 P. W. 441 | | | | | 921 |
| Lawson v. L., 1 P. W. 441 | | | 420, | 427, | 433 |
| v. Stiten, 1 Atk. 507 | • | | | 832, | |
| Lawton v. Campion, 18 B. 87; 23 L. J. Ch. 505 | • | • | • | • | 246 |
| Layton v. L., 1 Sm. & G. 179 | · D 5 | 01. | ກດ T | m. | 669 |
| Lezarus v. Smith, (1908) 2 K. B. 266; 77 L. J. K 77; 24 T. L. R. 592 | . D. 1 | 91; | 99 TI | . т. | 339 |
| L'Estrange v. L'E., 13 B. 281; 20 L. J. Ch. 39; | 88 R | R. 4 | 91 | • | 114 |
| | | | | 837, | |
| Le Jeune v. Budd, 6 Si. 441 | • | · | | | 592 |
| Le Lievre v. Gould, (1893) 1 Q. B. 491; 62 L. J. | Q. B. | 353 | | | 477 |
| Le Vasseur v. Scratton, 14 Si. 116 | | | | | 173 |
| Leach v. Westall, 17 W. R. 313 | | | | | 227 |
| Leacroft v. Maynard, 3 Bro. Ch. 233; 1 V. 279 | . • | | | | 920 |
| Leak v. Driffield, 24 Q. B. D. 95; 58 L. J. Q. B. | 89 | | | 711, | |
| Lean v. L., 23 W. R. 484; 32 L. T. 305 | • | | | | 82 |
| Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. W. 222 | • | | | 357, | |
| | • | | • | 357, | |
| Lecke v. Kilmorey, T. & R. 207 | • | • | • | • | 861 |
| Ledger v. Hooker, 18 Jur. 481 | • | • | • | • | 916 874 |
| Lee v. Egremont, 5 De G. & Sm. 348 | • | • | • | 449, | |
| v. Haves 17 Tr. C. L. B. 394 | • | • | • | 110, | 602 |
| v. Howlett, 2 K. & J. 531 | • | • | • | • | 139 |
| v. Hutton, 14 Jur. 638 | | | | | 532 |
| —- v. L., 27 L. J. Ch. 824 | | | | 868, | 869 |
| v. Pain, 4 Ha. 201; 14 L. J. Ch. 346; 67 R. J | R. 41. | 915 | 916 | , 917, | 920 |
| v. Park, 1 Keen, 714; 6 L. J. Ch. 93; 44 R. | R. 15 | 4 | | | 789 |
| — v. Prieaux, 3 Bro. Ch. 383 | | | | ٠. | 691 |
| Leeds v. Corp. New Radnor, 2 Bro. Ch. 518 . | | • | ٠ | | 191 |
| v. Powell, 1 Ves. Sen. 171 | • | • | • | | 191 |
| v. Strafford, 4 V. 180; 4 R. R. 186. | • | • | • | | 187 |
| Leeke v. Bennett, 1 Atk. 471 | o oo | т. т | OI. | 010 | 905 |
| Leeming, Re, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 115; 3 De G. F. & J. 4 | 3; 30 | Li. J. | Cn. | 210 | 387 |
| Lees v. Courton, 20 Eq. 20; 44 H. J. Ch. 556 . | • | • | • | 440, | 105 |
| 1 Johnson 3 V 359 | • | • | 619 | 612 | 617 |
| Lech v. L. 15 Si. 135: 74 R. R. 44 | • | • | 01, | 010, | 61 |
| Lees v. Coulton, 20 Eq. 20; 44 L. J. Ch. 556 . Legard v. Hodges, 1 V. 478; 2 R. R. 146 . v. Johnson, 3 V. 359 Legh v. L., 15 Si. 135; 74 R. R. 44 . Leigh, Re, 40 C. D. 290; 58 L. J. Ch. 306 . | • | 522. | 524. | 525. | 528 |
| v. Dickeson, 15 Q. B. D. 61; 54 L. J. Q. | B. 18 | • | • | • | 214 |
| Lemon v. Simmons, 36 W. R. 350; 57 L. J. Q. H. | 3. 260 | | | | 749 |
| Lemprière v. Lange, 12 C. D. 675; 41 L. T. 378 | | | | | 492 |
| | | | | | 716 |
| Leng, Re, (1895) 1 Ch. 652; 64 L. J. Ch. 468; | 72 I | . T. | 407; | 43 | |
| W. R. 406 | | | • | • | 736 |
| Lenzberg's Policy, Re, 7 C. D. 650; 47 L. J. Ch. | 178 | . • | • | • | 316 |
| Leonard, Re, 29 W. R. 234 | • | • | 040 | 011 | 83 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | • | • | | , 244, | |
| Toping Pa (1999) 1 (th. 210, 61 T. T. Ch. 159 | • | • | • • | 25, 26 | 892 |
| Lepine, Re, (1892) 1 Ch. 210; 61 L. J. Ch. 153 Leslie, Re, 23 C. D. 552; 52 L. J. Ch. 762 | • | • | • | 214, | |
| v. Devonshire, 2 Bro. Ch. 187 | • | • | • | , | 403 |
| v. L., Ll. & G. 1; 46 R. R. 173 | | : | • | • | 898 |
| Lethem v. Hall, 7 Si, 141 | | | | | 547 |
| Lett v. Randall, 3 Sm. & G. 83; 2 De G. F. & J. 388; 3 | 30 L.J | .Ch. | 110. | 846. | 848 |
| | | | | , | |

| | | AGE |
|---|-----------|-------------------|
| Letts T., Re, 7 L. R. Ir. 132 | | 676 |
| Levene v. Brougham, 25 T. L. R. 265 | | 491 |
| Levene v. Greenwood, 20 T. L. R. 389 | | 339 |
| Levinge, Re, 6 B. 392 (n.) | | 547 |
| Lewer, Re, 5 C. D. 61; 46 L. J. Bank. 70 | | 130 |
| Lewes' Trusts, Re, 11 Eq. 236; L. R. 6 Ch. 356; 40 L. J. Ch. 6 | 502. | 890 |
| Lewin's T., Re, 20 B. 378 | . ' | 679 |
| Lewin v . L., 2 Ves. Sen. 415 \cdot · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | 885 |
| Lewis, Re, 30 C. D. 654; 55 L. J. Ch. 232 | | 384 |
| Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 176; 69 L. J. Ch. 406; 82 L. T. 291 | .; 48 | |
| W. R. 426 | . : | 906 |
| Re, (1904) 2 Ch. 656; 73 L. J. Ch. 748; 91 L. T. 242 | ; 53 | |
| W. R. 393 | 1, 482, 9 | |
| Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 296; 76 L. J. Ch. 539; 97 L. T. 636. | • | 90 |
| v. Allenby, 10 Eq. 668 | • | 55 |
| v. Boetefeur, 38 L. T. 93 | | 55 |
| v. Clay, 67 L. J. Q. B. 224; 77 L. T. 653; 46 W. R. 319 | <i>)</i> | 489 |
| v. King, 2 Bro. Ch. 600 | | 446 |
| v. L., 1 Cox, 162 | | 862 |
| | 24, 29, | |
| v, 45 C. D. 281; 59 L. J. Ch. 712 | | $\frac{249}{110}$ |
| v. Madocks, 8 V. 150; 7 R. R. 10; 17 V. 48 | | 119 |
| | 691, | |
| Bowles' Case, 11 Co. 79; 1 Roll. Rep. 177 | | 778 |
| Ley v. Cox, 14 B. 157 |) T) ; | 210 |
| Lichfield v. Baker, 2 B. 481; 9 L. J. Ch. 291; 13 B. 447; 88 I | 1. II. | 00 |
| 527 | 79, | |
| Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63; 6 East, 20; 1 R. R. 425 | | $\frac{147}{157}$ |
| Lidderdale v. Montrose, 4 T. R. 248; 2 R. R. 375 | | 157 |
| Life Association, &c. v. Siddal, 3 De G. F. & J. 271 | 2, 663, 6 | 200 |
| | 281, 2 | 287 |
| 44 W. R. 116 | 201, 2 | 52 |
| Lillwall's Sett., Re, 30 W. R. 343 | ٠, | 766 |
| Lindgren v. L., 9 B. 358; 15 L. J. Ch. 428; 73 R. R. 385 | | 881 |
| Lindo, Re, 59 L. T. 462 | | 901 |
| Lindsay v. Gibbs, 22 B. 522; 28 L. J. Ch. 692 | | 108 |
| | | 300 |
| | 5, 382, 3 | |
| Linton v. L., 15 Q. B. D. 239; 54 L. J. Q. B. 529 | | 336 |
| Lippiat v. Holley, 1 B. 423 | | 250 |
| Lipscombe v. L., 7 Eq. 501; 38 L. J. Ch. 90 | | 25 |
| Lismore, Re, 1 Hog. 177 | | 355 |
| Lister v. L., 3 Y. & C. Ex. C. 540 | | 208 |
| v. Tidd, 4 Eq. 462 | | 135 |
| Litchfield v. Dreyfus, (1906) 1 K. B. 590; 75 L. J. K. B. 447 | : 22 | |
| T. L. R. 385 | | 342 |
| | 765, 7 | |
| Liverpool Marine, &c. v. Hunter, L. R. 4 Eq. 62; 36 L. J. Ch. | | |
| L. R. 3 Ch. 479 | . 7 | 796 |
| Co. v. Wilson, L. R. 7 Ch. 507; 41 L. J. Ch | .7981 | 138 |
| Livesay v. Redfern, 2 Y. & C. Ex. C. 90; 6 L. J. Ex. 35 | | 344 |
| Livesey v. Harding, 23 B. 141 | . 1 | 135 |
| v. L., 3 Russ. 287 | . 2 | 242 |
| Llewellin v . Cobbold, 1 Sm. & G. 376 | | 349 |
| Llewellyn's T., Re, 29 B. 171 | 79, 89, | 92 |
| Llewellyn v. Mackworth, Barn. C. 445 | | 157 |
| Lloyd, Re, 9 P. D. 65; 53 L. J. P. & D. 48 224, 356 | , 370, 3 | 92 |
| v. Banks, L. R. 3 Ch. 488: 37 L. J. Ch. 881 | 125, 1 | 27 |
| v. Branton, 3 Mer. 108; 17 R. R. 33 577, 586 | , 587, 5 | 594 |

| Lloyd v. Clark, 6 B. 309; 63 R. R. 85 |
|--|
| 824; 20 W. R. 296 |
| —— v. Mason, 5 Ha. 149; 71 R. R. 53 |
| —— v. ———, 2 Atk. 108 |
| L. T. 314 |
| Lobley v. Stocks, 19 B. 392 |
| Lockwood v. Salter, 5 B. & Ad. 303; 2 L. J. R. B. 198 |
| Lodge v. National Unión, &c. Ltd., (1907) 1 Ch. 300; 76 L. J. Ch. 187; 96 L. T. 301; 23 T. L. R. 187 |
| 64 L. J. Q. B. 717 |
| K. B. 218; 94 L. T. 153; 54 W. R. 270; 22 T. L. R. 187794 v. Birkett, 1 My. & K. 220; 2 L. J. Ch. 52 629 v. Fairlee, Jac. 193; 23 R. R. 28 546 |
| Lomas v. Wright, 2 My. & K. 769; 3 L. J. Ch. 58; 39 R. R. 350 . 47 Lomax v. L., 12 B. 285; 19 L. J. Ch. 137; 85 R. R. 94 32 |
| Londesborough v. Somerville, 19 B. 295; 23 L. J. Ch. 646 895 London and Blackwall Ry. Co. v. Cross, 31 C. D. 354; 55 L. J. Ch. 313 |
| London, Bombay, &c. Bank, Re, 18 C. D. 581; 50 L. J. Ch. 557; 45 L. T. 166; 30 W. R. 118 |
| London Chartered Bank v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 572; 42 L. J. P. C. 49 |
| London and County Bank v. London River Plate Bank, 21 Q. B. D. 540; 57 L. J. Q. B. 601 |
| London J. S. Bank v. Simmons, (1892) A. C. 201; 61 L. J. Ch. 723146, 482, 489 London Land Co., Ltd. v. Harris, 13 Q. B. D. 540; 53 L. J. Q. B. 536 787 |
| London, &c. Bank v. Strutton, 18 W. R. 107 |
| 738, 739 London School Board v. Wood, 15 Q. B. D. 415; 54 L. J. M. C. 145559 London Suburban Bank, Re, 19 W. R. 950 |
| London and Yorkshire Bank v. White, 11 T. L. R. 570 |
| |
| — - v. L., 3 V. 286 (n.) |
| —— v. Short, 1 P. W. 403 |
| Longbottom v. Pearce, 3 De G. & J., 545 (n.) |
| Longmate v. Ledger, 4 De G. F. & G. 402; 2 Giff. 157 . 296, 323, 328 |

| ~ 11 (73 1) TO 1/11/(0 /) 0.77 0.7 107 | PAGE |
|---|-------------------|
| Lonsdale (Earl) v. Berchtoldt (Countess), 3 K. & J. 185 | . 861 |
| Loosemore v. Knapman, Kay, 123; 23 L. J. Ch. 174 | . 23 en ei |
| Lord v. Godfrey, 4 Madd. 455 | 80, 81 |
| v. Jeffkins, 35 B. 7 | 329, 344 |
| v. L., L. R. 2 Ch. 789; 36 L. J. Ch. 533 v. Sutcliffe, 2 Si. 273 | 894, 895 . 917 |
| v. Succinie, 2 51. 275 v. Wightwick, 1 Drew. 576; 4 De G. M. & G. 803; 23 L. J. | Ch. 317 |
| | 12, 368 |
| 235; 6 H. L. Cas. 217 | . 535 |
| Raymond's Case, Cas. t. Talb. 58 | 502, 523 |
| Lorimer, Re, 12 B. 521 | . 691 |
| | . 214 |
| Loscombe v. Wintringham, 12 B. 46. | . 883 |
| Louch v. Peters, 1 M. & K. 489; 3 L. J. Ch. 167; 36 R. R. 357 | . 905 |
| Lound v. Grimwade, 39 C. D. 605; 57 L. J. Ch. 725 | . 296 |
| Lovat (Lord) v. Leeds (Duchess), 2 Dr. & Sm. 62; 10 W. R. 39 | |
| Love v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 67; 2 Freem. 125 | . 794 |
| Lovell v. Knight, 3 Si. 275: 1 L. J. Ch. 47 | . 716 |
| v. Newton, 4 C. P. D. 7; 39 L. T. 609 | 689, 696 |
| Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 130; 2 L. J. Ch. 75; 27 R. R. 1 | . 125 |
| Lovesy v. Smith, 15 C. D. 655; 49 L. J. Ch. 809 | . 293 |
| Lovett v , L., John, 118 | . 667 |
| v. L., (1898) 1 Ch. 82; 67 L. J. Ch. 20; 77 L. T. 650; | 46 |
| W. R. 105 | 476,480 |
| 100, 100, (1001) 1 Cm. 101, 00 11. 0. Cm. 00 | . 795 |
| v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82; 60 L. J. Ch. 594127, 472, | 473, 474, |
| 475, 476, 478, 482 | |
| v. Peers, Wilmot's Cases, 369 | . 588 |
| Lowe v. Manners, 5 B. & Ald. 917; 24 R. R. 613 | . 597 |
| ——- v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225 Lowndes v. L., 15 V. 301 | . 599 |
| | 897, 898 |
| Lowry v. Patterson, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 372 | . 595 . 741 |
| T D- 45 O T) 450 - 60 T T CL 40 - 69 T M 590 - 90 W D | 00 110 |
| Lucas v. Brandreth, 28 B. 273 | 368 369 |
| Lucas v. Brandreth, 28 B. 273 | 933 |
| | . 157 |
| v. L., 1 Atk. 270 | . 772 |
| Luckeraft v. Pridham, 48 L. J. Ch. 636 | . 14 |
| Lucy's Case, 4 De G. M. & G. 356; 22 L. J. Ch. 732 | . 241 |
| Luddy's Trustee v. Peard, 33 C. D. 500; 55 L. J. Ch. 884 . | . 288 |
| Ludlam, Re, 63 L. T. 330 | . 893 |
| Ludlow, Ex p., 2 Atk. 407 | . 388 |
| Lumb v . Milnes, 5 V. 517 | . 694 |
| Lumley, Re, (1896) 2 Ch. 690; 65 L. J. Ch. 837 . 695, 750 | , 758, 760 |
| Lupton v. White, 15 V. 432; 10 R. R. 94 | . 188 |
| Lush's T., Re, L. R. 4 Ch. 591; 38 L. J. Ch. 650 . 493, 494 | , 679, 727 |
| Lutkins v. Leigh, Cas. t. Talbot, 53 | |
| Lyddon v. Moss, 4 De G. & J. 104 | . 344 |
| Lyde v. Mynn, 1 My. & K. 693; 36 R. R. 415 108 | , 119, 137 |
| Lynch's Estate, Re, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 396. Lynes, Re, (1893) 2 Q. B. 113; 62 L. J. Q. B. 372 | 62 |
| Lynes' Estate, Re, 8 Eq. 482 | . 703 |
| Lynn v. Ashton, I Russ. & M. 190 | . 884 |
| Lyon v. Colville, 1 Coll. 449; 66 R. R. 143 | . 732 . 915 |
| | $\frac{1}{280}$ |
| Lyons, Re, 22 L. T. 770 | 539, 546 |
| Lyons v. Blenkin, Jac. 245; 23 R. R. 38. | 520, 539 |
| Lys v. T., 7 Eq. 126 | . 219 |
| Lysaght, Re, (1898) 1 Ch. 115; 67 L. J. Ch. 65; 77 L. T. 637. | 880, 881 |

| 1 | ~ | 77 | τ |
|-----|---|----|---|
| - 3 | X | х | ١ |

| $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
|--|
| M. |
| $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| MacGrath, Re, (1893) 1 Ch. 143; 62 L. J. Ch. 208517, 518, 519, 522, 549, 552, 556, 557 |
| McGregor v. M., 21 Q. B. D. 430; 57 L. J. Q. B. 591624, 625, 626, 629, 637 |
| McHenry v. Davies, 10 Eq. 88; 39 L. J. Ch. 866 |
| 401 |

| | D. C.T. |
|--|-------------------|
| | PAGE |
| McMahon v. Burchell, 3 Ha. 99; 5 Ha. 325; 64 R. R. 211 169, 214 | |
| McManus v. Cooke, 35 C. D. 695; 56 L. J. Ch. 682 | 476 |
| McMyn, Re, 33 U. D. 575; 55 L. J. Un. 845 | 746 |
| Macnamara v. Jones, 1 Bro. Ch. 411 | 445 |
| Macpherson v . M., 16 Jur. 847 \cdot | 87 |
| Maddever, Re, 27 C. D. 526; 53 L. J. Ch. 998 | 256 |
| Maddison v. Alderson, 8 A. C. 473; $52 \text{ Li. J. Q. B. } 737$ 474 | , 478 |
| v. Chapman, 1 John. & H. 470 | , 454 |
| Maddock, Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 220; 71 L. J. Ch. 567; 86 L. T. 644; 50 | |
| W. R. 598 | |
| Magdalen College Case, 11 Co. 66, b | 774 |
| Magees, Re, 31 L. R. Ir. 513 | 556 |
| Maguire v. Dodd, 9 Ir. Ch. R. 452 | 429 |
| Maher v , M., 1 L, R, Ir, 22 \cdot , | 896 |
| Maidstone Palace, &c. Re, (1909) 2 Ch. 283; 78 L. J. Ch. 739; 101 | |
| L. T. 458 | 785 |
| Mainland v. Upjohn, 41 C. D. 126; 58 L. J. Ch. 361 | 343 |
| Mainwaring v. Baxter, 5 V. 458 | 890 |
| Maitland v Backhouse 16 Si 58 : 17 L. J. Ch. 121 \sim 283, 285 | . 298 |
| v. Irving, 15 Si. 437; 16 L. J. Ch. 95; 74 R. R. 115 | 297 |
| Makeham v. Hooper, 4 Bro. Ch. 153 | 54 |
| Makeown v . Ardagh, 10 Ir. R. Eq. 445 | 867 |
| Malam, Re, (1894) 3 Ch. 578; 63 L. J. Ch. 797 | |
| Malcolm v Charlesworth 1 Keen 63: 5 L J Ch 172: 44 R R 19 | 139 |
| | 583 |
| " Scott 3 Ha 30 · 3 Mag & G 20 · 87 R R 1 | , 116 |
| | 797 |
| Mallabar v. M., Cas. t. Talb. 79 | |
| THE RESERVE TO THE RE | |
| Mallory v. French, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 376 Mallott v. Wilson, (1903) 2 Ch. 494; 72 L. J. Ch. 664; 89 L. T. 52257 | 660 |
| Maniott V. Wilson, (1905) 2 On. 494; 72 In. J. On. 604; 69 In. 1. 52257 | , 000 |
| | $\frac{328}{362}$ |
| Manchester, &c. Ry. Co., Re, 19 B. 365 | 302 |
| Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coombs, (1901) 2 Ch. 608; 70 L. J. Ch. | 0-1 |
| | , 374 |
| Manchester, Sheffield, &c. Ry. v. North Central, &c. Co., 13 A. C | |
| 554; 58 L. J. Ch. 219; 37 W. R. 305; 59 L. T. 730 | 115 |
| Manders v. M., 7 T. L. R. 149; 63 L. T. 627 | , 557 |
| Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas. 702; 88 R. R. 296 | ., 140 |
| Manifold v. Johnston, (1902) 1 Ir. R. 7 | 243 |
| Mann v. Copland, 2 Madd. 223 | |
| v. Fuller, Kay, 624; 23 L. J. Ch. 543 | 921 |
| Mannheim, The, (1897) P. 13; 66 L. J. P. 6; 75 L. T. 424 | 797 |
| Manning v. Mullins, (1898) 2 Ir. R. 34 | 157 |
| v. Purcell, 2 Sm. & G. 284; 7 De G. M. & G. 55; 7 L. J. | |
| Dig. 418 | -836 |
| | 32 |
| v. Spooner, 3 V. 117; 3 R. R. 67. v. Thesiger, 3 My. & K. 29; 4 L. J. Ch. 285; 41 R. R. 4. | 919 |
| Mansergh v. Campbell, 25 B. 544; 3 De G. & J. 232; 28 L. J. Ch. | |
| 61 | |
| Manton v. Tabois, 30 C. D. 92; 24 L. J. Ch. 1008 | 867 |
| Mara v. Browne, (1895) 2 Ch. 89; 64 L. J. Ch. 594; (1896) 1 Ch. 199 | 92 |
| — v. Manning, 2 Jo. & Lat. 311 | , 727 |
| March, Re, 27 C. D. 166; 54 L. J. Q. B. 143 | , 702 |
| v. Fowke, Cas. t. Finch, 414 | 17 |
| Marchant v. Morton, (1901) 2 K. B. 829; 70 L. J. K. B. 820; 85 | · |
| L. T. 169 | 114 |
| Mare v. Sandford, 1 Gif. 288 | 316 |
| Margetson & Jones, Re, (1897) 2 Ch. 314; 66 L. J. Ch. 619; 76 | / |
| L. T. 805; 45 W. R. 645 | , 249 |
| Margetts v. Barringer 7 Si 482 | 801 |

lxxvii

lxxviii

| | AGE |
|--|---|
| Mawhood v. Milbanke, 15 B. 36 | $\begin{array}{c} 748 \\ 459 \end{array}$ |
| NE O ÎN. CO ÎNE & CO 705 , 99 T. T. Ch. 119 | 150 |
| | 27 |
| v. M., 2 De G. M. & G. 105; 22 H. 5. Ch. 415 v. — v. — L. R. 4 H. L. 506; 39 L. J. Ch. 698 | 897 |
| May, Re, 45 C. D. 499; 60 L. J. Ch. 34 | 736 |
| v. Bennett, 1 Russ. 370; 25 R. R. 72 849, | 892 |
| v. Lane, 64 L. J. Q. B. 236 109, 113, 116, 151, | 152 |
| | 380 - 580 |
| Mayfair Property Co. v. Johnston, (1894) 1 Ch. 513; 63 L. J. Ch. | 102 |
| 399 208 211 213 | 216 |
| | |
| L. T. 302; 46 W. R. 465 | 111 |
| Maynard v. Eaton, L. R. 9 Ch. 414; 43 L. J. Ch. 641 247 | 249 |
| v. Moseley, 3 Sw. 655 | 338 |
| Mayor of Basingstoke v. Bolton, I Drew. 289 | 191 |
| London v. Russell, Rep. t. Fillen, 290 915, 914, | 100 |
| Mood Re 15 C D 651 · 50 L J Ch 30 432 | 435 |
| v. Hide. 2 Vern. 120 | 13 |
| Meades, Re, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 98 | 540 |
| Maynard v. Eaton, D. R. 9 Ch. 414; 45 D. 5 Ch. 641 ——————————————————————————————————— | 284 |
| Meadows v. M., 16 B. 401 | 838 |
| Medley, Re, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 339 | 546 |
| | 754 |
| | $\frac{344}{903}$ |
| Medlock, Re, 55 L. J. Ch. 738 | . 386 |
| Meeke v. Kettlewell, 1 Ph. 347; 58 R. R. 137. | 108 |
| Meliorucchi v. Royal Exchange Ass. Co., 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 8 pl. 8 | 102 |
| Mellish v. De Costa, 2 Atk. 14 | 536 |
| v. Vallins, 2 John. & H., 194; 31 L. J. Ch. 592 | 27 |
| Mellor, Re, 6 C. D. 127; 7 C. D. 200; 47 L. J. Ch. 246 | 702 |
| v. Porter, 25 C. D. 161; 53 L. J. Ch. 178 | 223 |
| 574 · 53 W R 581 · 21 T L R 591 | 479 |
| 574; 53 W. R. 581; 21 T. L. R. 591 | 4300 |
| Meluish v. Milton, 3 C. D. 27; 45 L. J. Ch. 836 | 302 |
| Mendes v. M., 1 Ves. Sen. 91; 3 Atk. 619 521, 535 | , 536 |
| Melty, Re, 53 L. J. Ch. 248; 49 L. T. 429 Meluish v. Milton, 3 C. D. 27; 45 L. J. Ch. 836 Mendes v. M., 1 Ves. Sen. 91; 3 Att. 619 Mercantile Bank of Australia, Re, (1892) 2 Ch. 204; 61 L. J. Ch. 417 | 818 |
| London v. Evans, (1899) 2 Q. B. 613; 68 L. J. Ch. 921; 81 L. T. 376; 15 T. L. R. 535 | |
| Mercantile, &c. Trust Co., The, v. River Plate, &c. Co., (1892) 2 | 151 |
| Ch 303 818 | 894 |
| Mercer v Hall 4 Bro Ch 228 | 592 |
| v. Liverpool, &c. Ry., (1903) 1 K. B. 652; 72 L. J. K. B. 128; 88 L. T. 374; 51 W. R. 308 | |
| 128; 88 L. T. 374; 51 W. R. 308 | 361 |
| v. Vans Colma, (1900) 1 Q. B. 130 (n.); 67 L. J. Q. B. 424; | |
| 78 L. T. 21 . Mercier v. M., (1903) 2 Ch. 98; 72 L. J. Ch. 511; 88 L. T. 516; | 136 |
| Mercier v. M., (1903) 2 Ch. 98; 72 L. J. Ch. 511; 88 L. T. 516; 51 W. R. 611 | ±00 |
| 51 W. R. 611 | , 133 881 |
| v. Yick, 23 B. 559; 27 L. J. Ch. 162 | 383 |
| v. Watson, 17 Jur. 1063 | 437 |
| Merry v. Ryves, 1 Eden, 1 | 592 |
| Merryman's T., Re, 10 W. R. 334; 31 L. J. Ch. 367 | 668 |
| Merryweather v. Jones, 4 Gif. 499 | 640 |
| Mesgrett v. M., 2 Vern. 580 | 591 |
| Messeena v. Carr, 9 Eq. 260; 39 L. J. Ch. 216 | 853 |

| PAGE |
|---|
| Messenger v. Clarke, 5 Exch. 388; 19 L. J. Ex. 306 |
| Metcalfe, Re, (1903) 2 Ch. 424; 72 L. J. Ch. 786; 88 L. T. 727; |
| v. York, 1 My. & C. 547; 6 L. J. Ch. 65; 43 R. R. |
| 257 |
| Metcalfe's Trusts, Re, 2 De G. J. & S. 122; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 91; |
| 33 L. J. Ch. 308 |
| Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley, 10 A. C. 210; 54 L. J. Q. B. 449 . 161, 791 |
| Metropolitan Public, &c. Co., Re, Brown's Case, L. R. 9 Ch. 102; |
| 43 L. J. Ch. 153; 29 L. T. 562; 22 W. R. 171 |
| Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Woodhouse, 13 W. R. 516 |
| week v. Dell, 1 Ha. 15; 11 H. J. Oll. 11; 95 R. R. 41 . 120, 150 |
| |
| Mexborough (Earl of) n Savile, 88 L. T. 131 |
| Meyer v. Simonsen, 5 De G. & Sm. 723; 21 L. J. Ch. 678; 90 |
| R. R. 204 |
| Michael's Trusts, Re, 46 L. J. Ch. 651 |
| Michell, Re, (1892) 2 Ch. 99; 61 L. J. Ch. 326 |
| v. M., 5 Madd. 69; 21 R. R. 280 |
| |
| |
| Middlecome v. Marlow, 2 Atk. 519 673 |
| Middleton v. Brown, 47 L. J. Ch. 411 |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Midland Ry. Co. v. Oswin, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 80 393 Midland, &c. Ry. of Ireland v. Kinder, 6 W. R. 511 242 |
| Milan Tramways Co., Re, 25 C. D. 586; 53 L. J. Ch. 1008 |
| |
| v. Quicke, 6 C. D. 553; 20 Eq. 537; 46 L. J. Ch. 667 |
| 224, 225, 226, 228, 392 |
| Miles v. Harrison, L. R. 9 Ch. 316; 43 L. J. Ch. 85 55, 56 |
| |
| —— v. M., 1 Eq. 462; 35 L. J. Ch. 315 |
| 241, 242, 244, 252 |
| v. Williams, 1 P. W. 252 |
| Millar v. Woodside, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 546 |
| v. Williams, 1 P. W. 252 |
| Miller v. Campbell, W. N. (1871) 210 |
| v. Collins, (1896) 1 Ch. 573; 65 L. J. Ch. 353; 74 L. T. 122; |
| 44 W. R. 466 |
| v. Cook, 10 Eq. 041; 40 E. 3. Ch. 11 |
| v. Huddlestone, 6 Eq. 65; 17 Si. 71; 3 Mac. & G. 513; 87 |
| R. R. 171 850, 851, 883, 885, 886, 887 |
| R. R. 171 |
| ——— v. Marriott, 7 Eq. 1 |
| v. M., 3 P. W. 356 421, 427, 432, 434, 435 |
| v, 13 Eq. 263; 41 L. J. Ch. 291 82, 368, 373 |
| v. Race, 1 Burr. 452 |
| v. Thurgood, 33 B. 496; 33 L. J. Ch. 511 |
| Millet a Rowse 7 V 419 525 527 528 530 |
| Mills, Ex p., L. R. 6 Ch. 594; 40 L. J. Bk. 89; 24 L. T. 859; 19 |
| W. R. 912 |
| |

| 35'II. : D 01 D 1 | PAGE |
|--|---------------|
| | ., 835 |
| v. Drewitt, 20 B. 632 | 849 8, 494 |
| v. M., 7 Si. 508; 4 L. J. Ch. 266 | 86 |
| Milltown v. Trench, 4 Cl. & Fin. 276; 11 Bligh (N. S.) 1 | 898 |
| Milne v. M., L. R. 2 P. & D. 295; 40 L. J. P. & M. 13 | 699 |
| - v. Parker, 12 Jur. 171; 17 L. J. Ch. 194; 80 R. R. 180 . | 80 |
| Milner, Re, (1891) 3 Ch. 547; 61 L. J. Ch. 84 | 766 |
| v. Colmer, 2 P. W. 639 | 661 |
| v. Harewood, 18 V. 259 | 173 |
| v. Wilmer, 2 P. W. 641 | 678 |
| Milnes v. Slater. 8 V. 295: 7 R. R. 48 | 31, 32 |
| Milroy v. Lord, 4 De G. F. & J. 264; 31 L. J. Ch. 798 | 689 |
| Minchin v. Gabbett, (1896) 1 Ir. R. 1 | 1,452 |
| Miner v. Baldwin, 1 Sm. & G. 522 | |
| Mines Royal Societies v. Magnay, 10 Exch. 489; 24 L. J. Ex. 7 | 783 |
| Minet v. Hyde, 2 Bro. Ch. 663. v. Vulliamy, 1 Russ. 113 (n.) Minors v. Battison, 1 A. C. 428; 46 L. J. Ch. 2 Mirams, Re, (1891) 1 Q. B. 494; 60 L. J. Q. B. 397. Nicology Spaints 2 Mr. & C. 625. 7 L. J. Ch. 22. 45 R. B. 164 | 674 |
| Minors v. Battison, 1 A. C. 428; 46 L. J. Ch. 2 | 822 |
| Minama Re (1891) 1 O R 494 · 60 T. J. O R 397 | r, 054 156 |
| Mirehouse v. Scaife, 2 My. & C. 695; 7 L. J. Ch. 22; 45 R. R. 164. | |
| | 545 |
| Mitchel v. Manchester, Dick. 149 | 527 |
| v. Homfray, 8 Q. B. D. 592; 50 L. J. Q. B. 460 282, 293 | 3, 300 |
| Mitchelson v. Piper, 8 Si. 64; 5 L. J. Ch. 294; 42 R. R. 104 | 788 |
| Mitford v. M., 9 V. 87 | 5, 166 |
| Mizen v, Pick, 3 M. & W. 481; 7 L. J. Ex. 153; 49 R. R. 694 | 640 |
| Moffett v. Bates, 3 Sm. & G. 468; 26 L. J. Ch. 465 | 457 |
| Mogg v. Hodges, 2 Ves. Sen. 53 Moggridge v. Thackwell, 1 V. 464; 3 Bro. Ch. 517; 2 R. R. 14091 | 54 |
| Moggridge v. Thackwell, 1 V. 464; 3 Bro. Ch. 517; 2 R. R. 14091 | |
| Mole v. M., Dick. 310 | 898 |
| Molony v. Aennedy, 10 St. 204; 51 M. H. 256 | 3, 744 |
| | 700 |
| W. R. 371 Molyneux, Re, 5 Ir. Ch. R. 346; 6 Ir. R. Eq. 411 . 676, 691, 753 | 790 761 |
| 10 W. R. 512 | 211 |
| v. Fletcher, (1898) 1 Q. B. 648; 67 L. J. Q. B. 392; 78 | 211 |
| L. T. 111; 46 W. R. 576 | 767 |
| v. Scott, 3 Ir. Ch. R. 291 | 790 |
| Monarch, The, 12 P. D. 7; 56 L. J. P. & D. 114 | 242 |
| Monck v. M., 1 Ball & B. 300; 12 R. R. 33 | 864 |
| Money, Re, 2 Dr. & Sm. 94; 31 L. J. Ch. 496 | 88 |
| v. M., 3 Drew. 256; 24 L. J. Ch. 684 | 529 |
| Monsell, Re, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 254 | 257 |
| Montagu, Ex p., 1 C. D. 554 | , 114 |
| | |
| Montague v. M., 15 B. 565 Montefiore v. Behrens, 1 Eq. 171 | 864 |
| Montefiore v. Behrens, 1 Eq. 171 | 6 194 |
| 3.5 1.0 ' 3.5 1 3.7 Dl 0.00 | 2,478 |
| Montgomerie v. Woodley, 5 V. 522 | 900 |
| | 7, 898 |
| Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, 10 C. D. 681 | 7. 824 |
| v. Raisbeck, 12 Si. 139; 56 R. R. 31 | 871 |
| — v. Rycault, Pr. Ch. 22 | 673 |
| Moore, Re, 39 C. D. 116; 57 L. J. Ch. 936 . 587, 588, 590, 602 | 2, 640 |
| | 521 |
| v. Butler, 2 Sch. & L. 268 | 465 |
| v. Darton, 4 De G. & Sm. 517; 20 L. J. Ch. 626; 87 R. R. 464 | |
| 428, 429, 432 | 2, 437 |
| | |

| TO VOLUME I. | lxxxi |
|--|-----------------------|
| Moore v. Fisher, 7 Si. 384 | PAGE . 159 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | . 145 |
| | . 524 . 209 |
| v. Madden, Ir. R. 2 Eq. 511 | . 856 |
| ——- v. M., 29 B. 496; 27 L. J. Ch. 385 | . 868 |
| | . 854 . 754 |
| | . 734 |
| | . 635 |
| | 8, 432, 434 |
| | 8, 432, 434 . 761 |
| v. N. W. Bank, (1891) 2 Ch. 599; 60 L. J. Ch. 627; 64 I | |
| 456: 40 W. R. 93 | . 133 |
| v. Prance, 9 Ha. 299; 20 L. J. Ch. 468 | $\frac{.}{287}$ |
| Moore Bros. & Co., Ld., Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 627; 68 L. J. Ch. 302 W. R. 401: 80 L. T. 104: 15 T. L. R. 192 | 474, 488 |
| Moorehead v. M., Ir. R. 2 Eq. 492 | . 211 |
| W. R. 401; 80 L. T. 104; 15 T. L. R. 192 | . 712 |
| More's Trust 10 Ha 171: 90 R R 320 | . 921 |
| More v. M., 2 Atk. 157 | 525, 526 |
| Morel v. Westmoreland, (1904) A. C. 11; 73 L. J. K. B. 93; 89 | L. T. |
| 702; 52 W. R. 353; 20 T. L. R. 38 | 710, 712 6 847 848 |
| | . 393 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | . 544 |
| v. Hatchell, 19 B. 86; 24 L. J. Ch. 135 | . 536 |
| | . 115 |
| v. M., 14 B. 72; 20 L. J. Ch. 109 80, | 81, 85, 87 |
| · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | |
| v. Thomas, 6 C. D. 176; 46 L. J. Ch. 775 | . 868 . 462 |
| | |
| v. Bird, 3 V. 629; 4 R. R. 106 | 90 841, 876 |
| v. Loughnan, (1893) 1 Ch. 736; 62 L. J. Ch. 675279, 28 | 1, 291, 297 |
| v. Rennoldson, 2 Ha. 570; 12 L. J. Ch. 373; 62 R. R. 579, 580, 58 | 3. 585. 588 |
| Mornington v. Keane, 2 De G. & J. 292 | . 120 |
| Mornington v. Keane, 2 De G. & J. 292 | . 343 |
| Morrell v. Wooten, 16 B. 197 | . 116 |
| Morrice v. Aylmer, L. R. 7 H. L. 717; 44 L. J. Ch. 212; L. I | R. 10 |
| Ch. 148 | 856, 869 |
| | |
| Morris, Re, 2 Sw. & Tr. 360 | . 536 |
| v. Hodges, 27 B. 625 | . 88 |
| v. Livie, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 380; 11 L. J. Ch. 172; 57 1 | a. k. 144, 884 |
| v. Timmins, 1 B. 411 | . 228 |
| Morrisey v. M., (1905) P. 90; 74 L. J. P. 11; 92 L. T. 476 | . 637 |
| Morrow v. Bush, 1 Cox, 185 | 12, 13 |
| 355; 57 L. J. Q. B. 174 | . 147 |
| Mortimer v. M., 2 Hag. Con. 318 | 614, 630 |
| Morton, Re, 12 W. R. 320; 33 L. J. Ch. 87 | 53f 224, 677 |
| , W. N. (1874) 181 | 0 |
| W. & T.—VOL. I. | f |

| | | | | פד | AGE |
|---|---------------|------------|------------------|------------|-------------------|
| Moses, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 100; 71 L | . J. Ch. | 101:85 | L. T. 5 | 96: | LUL |
| and see Beddington v. Baumann, su | pra. | | | | 872 |
| Mosley v. Ward, 11 V. 581; 8 R. R. 2 | 49 . | | | | 903 |
| v. ——, 29 B. 407 | n . m | | T.O | σ. | 457 |
| Moss, Ex p., 14 Q. B. D. 310; sub nom. | nelowai | u & Co., i | H 11.0.0 | . D. | 142 |
| v. Dunlop, 8 W. R. 39; 29 L. J. | . Ch. 39 | | : : | | 675 |
| Mostyn v. The West Mostyn Coal & | Iron Co. | , Ld., 1 O | . P. D. 1 | 45; | |
| 45 L. J. Ch. 113 | • | | | • | 788 |
| Moth v. Atwood, 5 V. 845 | • | | | | 329 520 |
| Mountfort, Ex p., 15 V. 446 | • | | | 538, | 546 546 |
| Mower v. Orr, 7 Ha. 475; 82 R. R. 19 |)1 . | | | | 369 |
| Mowers' T., Re, 8 Eq. 110; 20 L. T. 83 | 38 . | | | 57, 58, | 59 |
| Moxon v. Berkeley Bldg. Socy., 69 L. | T. 250; | 59 L. J. | Ch. 524 | | 57 |
| w. Payne, L. R. 8 Ch. 887; 43 Muggeridge v. Stanton, 1 De G. F. & | L. J. Cr | 1. 240 | . 278, | 292, | 300 746 |
| Mullineux v. M., 6 W. R. 356; 27 L. | J. Ch. 1: | 9 | | | 699 |
| Mullins v. Howell, 11 C. D. 763; 48 I | J. J. Ch. | 679 . | : : | | 254 |
| - v. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 210 . Mundy v. M., 2 V. 125; 4 Bro. Ch. 29 | | 836, 838, | 841, 845 | | |
| Mundy v. M., 2 V. 125; 4 Bro. Ch. 29 | 94 . | | | 232, | |
| Munt v. Glynes, 20 W. R. 823; 41 L. Mure, Ex p., 2 Cox, 63 | J. Ch. 6 | 39 . | • . • | | $760 \\ 112$ |
| Murphy v. Broder, 9 Ir. R. C. L. 123 | • | | | | 597 |
| Murray, Re, 3 Dr. & War. 83 | • | | | 526, | 530 |
| | L. J. Ch | . 184; 41 | R. R. 52 | 2 . (| 387, |
| or Deleger O Sele & T 400 | | | | 723, | |
| | Ch 74 | 5 · 51 T | T 462: | 342, 33 | 040 |
| W. R. 173 | | | | | 110 |
| v. Sitwell, (1902) W. N. 119. | | | | | 251 |
| Murton v. Markby, 18 B. 196 | | | | | 369 |
| Musgrove v. Flood, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 1086 | 6 . D 5/11 | • • | | | $\frac{675}{108}$ |
| Muspratt v. Gordon, 1 Anst. 34; 3 R. Musters v. Wright, 2 De G. & Sm. 77 | 7 . | | | | 744 |
| Musters v. Wright, 2 De G. & Sm. 77 Mutlow v. Bigg, 1 C. D. 385; 45 L. J | . Ch. 28 | 2 . | . 380, | 384, | |
| Mutrie v. Binney, 35 C. D. 614. | | | | 794. | |
| Mutual Life Assurance Society v. Lan | igley, 26 | O. D. 680 | 5; 32 U. | D. | 10= |
| 460. Myers v. United Guarantee Co., 7 De | GN& | G 112 | 122, 130, | | 111 |
| v. Washbrook, (1901) 1 Q. B. 30 | 60; 70 L. | J. Q. B. 3 | 357; 83 L | | |
| 633 | | | | | 843 |
| Mytton v. M., 19 Eq. 30; 44 L. J. Ch | . 18. | | | • | 841 |
| NT | | | | | |
| N. | | | | | |
| Nagle v. O'Donnell, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 79 | | | | | 736 |
| Nail v. Punter, 5 Si. 599; 38 R. R. 18 | 8. | | | | 721 |
| Nanney v. Martin, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 68 ———————————————————————————————————— | • | • • | | | $\frac{171}{289}$ |
| Nash, Re, (1909) 2 Ch. 450; (1910) 1 (| Oh. 1 (C. | A.) . | | | $\frac{163}{162}$ |
| ——— v. N., 2 Madd. 133 | | | | | 169 |
| ——- v. The Worcester, &c. Comrs., 1 | Jur. (N. | S.) 973 | | | 362 |
| Natal Investment Co., Re, L. R. 3 Ch. | 355; 57 | L. J. Ch | . 362 . D 997 | | 143 |
| Naylor v. Winch, 1 S. & S. 565; 2 L. Neale v. N., 1 Keen, 672; 44 R. R. 12 | 8 . | υΔ, Δ± ΙΛ. | 10. 441 | .4T1, 2 | 244 |
| Nedby v. N., 5 De G. & Sm. 377; 21 L | J. Ch. 4 | 46; 90 R. | R. 105 | .284, | 296 |
| Needham, Re, 54 L. J. Ch. 75 | • | • | • • • • | 18, | 19 |
| Negus v. Jones, 1 C. & E. 52 | . • | • • | | 691, | |
| Neil, Re, 62 L. T. 649 | • | • | • . • | . 8 | 363 |

| | | | | 3 | PAGE |
|---|--|---------|------------|---------------|------------|
| | Neilan v. Farrell, 29 L. R. Ir. 12 | | | | 426 |
| | Nelson v. Booth, 5 W. R. 722 | | | | 747 |
| | v. Bridport, 8 B. 547: 68 R. R. 174 | | | | 820 |
| | —— v. Carter, 5 Si. 530 | | 837, | 838 | , 840 |
| | | R. R | . 317 | | 328 |
| | v. Page. 7 Eq. 25; 38 L. J. Ch. 138 | | | 28 | 3, 29 |
| | v. Stocker, 4 De G. & J. 458; 27 L. J. Ch. 760 | | 476, | 493. | 648 |
| | Nesbitt v. Berridge, 4 De G. J. & S. 45; 32 B. 282. | | | 326 | , 330 |
| | Nevill. Re. 59 L. J. Ch. 511 | | | 27 | 7, 30 |
| | v. Snelling, 15 C. D. 679; 49 L. J. Ch. 777. | | 324, | 327 | 343 |
| | Neville v. Fortescue, 16 Si. 333; 80 R. R. 86 | | . ′ | | 85 |
| | ——— v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Ch. 543 | | 477. | 482. | 601 |
| | Nevin, Re, (1891) 2 Ch. 299; 60 L. J. Ch. 542. | | | | 518 |
| | New Travellers Chambers, Ld. v. Cheese, 70 L. T. 271 | | | | 785 |
| | M1 D-11 00 D 900 | | | | 0.1 |
| | Newbegin v. Bell, 23 B. 386 | 12. | 20. | 841. | 844 |
| | Newen, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 812; 72 L. J. Ch. 356; 88 I | . T. | 264: | 51 | |
| | W. R. 297 | | | | 249 |
| | Newenham v. Pemberton, 1 De G. & Sm. 644; 17 L. | J. Ch | . 991 : | 75 | |
| | R. R. 234 | | | | 663 |
| | Newfoundland v. Newfoundland Ry. Co., 13 A. C. | 199: | 57 L. | J. | , 000 |
| | D O 95 | | | | 143 |
| | Newlands v. Paynter, 4 My. & C. 408; 48 R. R. 131 | · | • | 748 | 762 |
| | Newlove v. Shrewsbury, 21 Q. B. D. 41; 57 L. J. 6 |). B. | 476: | 36 | , |
| | W. R. 835 | ٠. ـــ. | 1.0, | • | |
| | Newman v. Bateson, 3 Swans. 689; 19 R. R. 286 | • | : | 897 | 898 |
| | | • | • | 450 | 462 |
| | v N 28 C D 674 · 54 L J Ch 598 | 107 | 121 | 130 | 150 |
| | 2. Payne 2 V 199 | 101 | , 121, | 100, | 287 |
| | v. Payne, 2 V. 199 v. Wilson, 31 B. 33 Newmarch, Re, 9 C. D. 17; 48 L. J. Ch. 28 Newport v. Kynaston, Rep. t. Finch, 294 v. Woore Dick 166 | • | • | 27 | 668 |
| | Newmarch Re 9 C D 17: 48 L J Ch 28 | • | ٠, | 5 98 | 2 20 |
| | Newport v Kynaston Rep t Finch 294 | • | 912 | 914 | 915 |
| | Woore Dick 166 | • | 014, | 011, | 546 |
| | Newsome at N. L. R. 2 P. & D. 306: 40 L. J. P. & M. | 71 | • | 633 | 634 |
| | | | • | 176, | 178 |
| | Newton, Re, (1896) 1 Ch. 740; 65 L. J. Ch. 641 | 518 | 519 8 | 170, 138 | 530 |
| | 541 | 542 | 551, 551, | 559 | 559 |
| | | | | | 000 |
| | | . 11. | | 109, | 111 |
| | 4. Hunt 5 Q; 511 | • | | 329, | |
| | w Marsdan 2 J & H 356: 31 L J Ch 690 | • | • | 580, | |
| | | • | • | 114, | |
| | | : | • | | |
| | v. Osborn, 2 P. W. 419 | • | | | 901 |
| | v. Parker, 14 East, 331 (n.); 12 R. R. 542. | • | • | | 400 |
| | Nichols v. Hawkes 10 Ha 342: 22 L. J. Ch 255: 90 | B.B | 384 | • | 247 |
| | Nichols v. Hawkes, 10 Ha. 342; 22 L. J. Ch. 255; 90 Nicholson, Re, (1909) 2 Ch. 111; 78 L. J. Ch. 516; 100 | 10. 10. | 001 077 | 75 | 0.41 |
| • | | 100 | 011 | 168, | 160 |
| | 0. Dialy, &c. Oo., 1 O. D. 40, 41 H. 0. On. | 102 | | 176, | , |
| | —————————————————————————————————————— | | | | |
| | Nickels, Re, (1898) 1 Ch. 630; 67 L. J. Ch. 406; 78 I | m | 370 . | 46 | 526 |
| • | | 4. 1. | 515, | 40 | 892 |
| | W. R. 422 Nickisson v. Cockill, 3 De G. J. & S. 622; 32 L. J. Ch | 759 | • | | |
| | | . 100 | • | 636, | 368 640 |
| : | Nicol v. N., 31 C. D. 529; 55 L. J. Ch. 437 | • | • | | |
| | Nisbett v. Murray, 5 V. 149; 5 R. R. 6 | • | • | | 854 788 |
| • | Noble v. Edwardes, 5 C. D. 393. | • | • | | 788 715 |
| - | v. Willock, L. R. 7 H. L. 580 | 660 | | 713, , 20, | |
| • | Noel v. Henley, 7 Price, 241; 12 Price, 213; 26 R. R. — v. N., 10 P. D. 179; 54 L. J. P. & D. 73. | 000 | • 10 | | |
| 7 | Nokes v. Gandy, 17 Eq. 297; 43 L. J. Ch. 276. | • | . • | | 638 780 |
| | 100000 v. Gandy, 11 114. 201, 40 11. 0. On. 210. | • | | • | 789 |
| | | | $f \Omega$ | | |

lxxxiv

| 37 11:1 TO 1 0 CI:00 040 | PAGI |
|--|-------|
| Nollidge v. Prince, 2 Giff. 246 | 279 |
| Norcott v. Gordon, 14 Si. 258; 65 R. R. 577 | 886 |
| Norman v. Morrell, 4 V. 769; 4 R. R. 347 | 52 |
| | 176 |
| Norreys v. Franks, 9 Ir. R. Eq. 18 | 865 |
| Norris v. Chambres, 29 B. 246; 3 De G. F. & J. 583; 30 L. J. Ch | |
| | , 823 |
| v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 32 | 190 |
| W 2 Coll 719: 15 L J Ch 420: 70 R R 368 | 865 |
| | |
| 7 No. 1. 11 5 Modd 455 . 59 D D 90 | 890 |
| | 142 |
| North, Re, 8 L. T. 309 | 518 |
| r. Guinan, Beat. 342 | 210 |
| v. Strafford, 3 P. W. 148 | 191 |
| | 127 |
| ——— British &c. I. Co. v. London, &c. I. Co., 5 C. D. 569 | 153 |
| Carolina Estate Co., Re, 5 T. L. R. 328 | 797 |
| of England Oilcake Co. v. Archangel, &c., L. R. 10 Q. B. 249; | |
| | , 150 |
| London Ry. Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 11 Q. B. D. 30; 52 | , 100 |
| L. J. Q. B. 380 | 700 |
| Cta fferming Dr. Co. Dr. 2 Cif 204. 20 T. T. Cl. 205 | 786 |
| | 383 |
| | 114 |
| Northage, Re, 60 L. J. Ch. 488 | 878 |
| Northcote v. Doughty, 4 C. P. D. 385 | 346 |
| Northern Assam Tea Co., Re, 10 Eq. 458; 39 L. J. Ch. 829 | 145 |
| Northey v , N., 2 Atk. 78 | 771 |
| Northumberland v , Avlesford, Amb. 540 | 464 |
| Norton. Ex p., 8 De G. M. & G. 258; 25 L. J. Bank. 43. | 660 |
| Norton, Ex p., 8 De G. M. & G. 258; 25 L. J. Bank. 43 | |
| W. R. 140 | 392 |
| W. R. 140 | 821 |
| | 909 |
| . Theory, 2 Edding, 200, 5 It. It. 202 (II.) . 204, 205, 275, | 705 |
| Norton's Sett., Re, (1908) 1 Ch. 471; 77 L. J. Ch. 312; 99 L. T. 257 | 120 |
| Norton's Bett., Re, (1906) 1 On. 471; 17 D. J. On. 512; 99 D. T. 257 | |
| T I T I T O I T D O O T D O O I T T OT T O | 794 |
| Norwich Provident Insurance Society, Re, 8 C.D. 334; 47 L.J. Ch. 601 | .252 |
| Nott v. Hill, 1 Vern. 167, 271 | 307 |
| Nottage, Re, (1895) 2 Ch. 657; 64 L. J. Ch. 695 840, | 842 |
| Nottidge v. Prince, 2 Gif. 246; 29 L. J. Ch. 857 | 292 |
| Nottingham, &c. Socy. v. Thurstan, (1903) A. C. 6; 72 L. J. Ch. 134; | |
| 87 L. T. 529: 51 W. R. 273 | 154 |
| Nourse, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 63; 68 L. J. Ch. 15; 79 L. T. 376; 47 | |
| W. R. 116 | 586 |
| N W N 0 V | 443 |
| Noys v. Moradunt, 2 vern. 361 Nugent v. Vetzera, 2 Eq. 704; 35 L. J. Ch. 777 Nunn & Co. v. Tyson. (1901) 2 K. R. 487 · 70 T. J. K. R. 854 · 85 | |
| Nunn & Co. v. Tyson, (1901) 2 K. B. 487; 70 L. J. K. B. 854; 85 | 554 |
| 1 101, 10 H. D. 101, 00 | |
| L. T. 123; 50 W. R. 16 | 767 |
| | |
| 0. | |
| O O. O. TT CCC O. D. D. C19 | 0.00 |
| Oakes v. O., 9 Ha. 666; 89 R. R. 613 | |
| v. Strachey, 13 Si. 414; 60 R. R. 374 | , 86 |
| Jatway, Ke, (1903) 2 Un. 336; 72 L. J. Ch. 575; 88 L. T. 622 | 188 |
| J'Brien v. Lewis, 4 Gif. 221; 32 L. J. Ch. 569 | 287 |
| \mathcal{L}' Callaghan v . Cooper, 5 V. 117 | 595 |
| Ockford v. Barelli, 20 W. R. 116 | 242 |
| Ocock, Re, 40 Sol. Jo. 210 | |
| O'Connor, Re, 13 L. R. Ir. 406 | 918 |
| " Folor (1005) 1 To D 1 | 000 |

| | 2102 |
|---|---------------------|
| O'Ferrall, Ex p., 1 G. & J. 347 | PAGE 9, 682 |
| Ogilvie v West Australian &c Corp. (1896) A. C. 257: 65 L. J. | |
| P. C. 46; 74 L. T. 201 | 9,401 |
| O'Hara v. Strange, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 262 | 185 |
| 3 120 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 13 | 6, 544 |
| Oldfield v. Cobbett, 5 B. 132; 6 B. 515; 85 R. R. 28 | . 790 7, 288 |
| Oldham v. Hand, 2 Ves. Sen. 259 | |
| O'Learv v. Douglas, 3 L. R. Ir. 323 | 918 |
| Olive, Re, 34 C. D. 70; 53 L. J. Ch. 525; 50 L. T. 355; 56 L. J. | 896 |
| Oliver, Re, (1908) 2 Ch. 74; 77 L. J. Ch. 547; 99 L. T. 241 | 372 |
| | 8, 840 |
| 21 T. L. R. 61 | 461 |
| 21 T. L. R. 61 O'Neal v. Mead, 1 P. W. 693 Onslow, Re, 39 C. D. 622; 57 L. J. Ch. 940 704, 722, 758, 75 | 33, 53 |
| Onslow, Re, 39 C. D. 622; 57 L. J. Ch. 940 . 704, 722, 758, 75 | 9, 763 480 |
| Onward Bldg. Soc. v. Smithson, (1893) 1 Ch. 1; 62 L. J. Ch. 138 Ooregum Gold, &c. Co. v. Roper, (1892) A. C. 133; 61 L. J. Ch. 337 | 486 |
| Oppenheimer, Re. (1907) 1 Ch. 399 · 76 L. J. Ch. 287 · 96 L. T. 63188 | 0.881 |
| Ord, Re, 12 C. D. 22; 9 C. D. 667 | 3, 856 |
| v. Blackett, 9 Mod. 116 | 534 149 |
| Orger v. Spark, 9 W. R. 180 | 3. 223 |
| Orme v. Smith, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 302; Glib. Rep. 82; 2 vern. 681 . | 831 |
| O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, L. R. 2 Ch. 833; 2 A. C. 814322, 323, 324 | , 327, |
| 330, 331, 333, 33 | |
| Osborn v. Brown, 5 V. 527 | $\frac{459}{594}$ |
| Orrell v. O., L. R. 6 Ch. 302; 40 L. J. Ch. 539 Osborn v. Brown, 5 V. 527 v. Lea, 9 Mod. 96 | 101 |
| v. Morgan, 9 Ha. 432 · 21 L. J. Ob. 318 · 89 R. R. 523. 660 | , 665, 7, 680 |
| | 7, 228 |
| Osborne v. Duke of Leeds, 5 V. 369; 5 R. R. 74 | |
| v. Goldham, 1 Phill. Ecc. R. 221 | 523 |
| Osnea v. Os., 15 P. D. 62; 59 L. J. P. & D. 47 | $\frac{547}{294}$ |
| Ostell v. Lepage, 5 De G. & Sm. 95; 2 De G. M. & G. 892; 90 R. R. 25 | 798 |
| Ottos Kopje, &c. Mines, Re, (1893) 1 Ch. 618; 62 L. J. Ch. 166; 68 | |
| L. T. 138; 41 W. R. 258 | 487 |
| Ouseley v. Austruther 10 R 453 · 76 R R 175 | 399 17 19 |
| Overena v. Gurney, / St. 128 | 921 |
| Ovey, Re, 20 C. D. 676; 31 C. D. 118; 8 A. C. 812; 51 L. J. Ch. | |
| 667 |), 835 |
| W. R. 55 | 907 |
| v. Homan, 4 H. L. Cas. 997; 20 L. J. Ch. 314; 88 R. R. 463 | 725 |
| Owens v. Dickenson, Cr. & Ph. 48; 54 R. R. 195 695, 723 | 3, 744 |
| Oxenden v. Compton, 2 V. 69; 2 R. R. 131; 4 Bro. Ch. 231 . 359 | , 387 |
| Р. | |
| PACKER v. P., 1 Coll. Ch. R. 92 | 675 |
| | 502 |
| Padbury v. Clark, 2 Mac. & G. 298; 19 L. J. Ch. 533; 86 R. R. 116. | |
| Paddock v. Forrester, 3 Man. & G. 903; 60 R. R. 634 | $\frac{1,463}{257}$ |
| | , 909 |
| | |

lxxxvi

| | | | | | | | 1 | AGE |
|---|---|----------|--------------|-------------|------------|--------|--------|-------|
| Page v. Horne, 11 B. 227; 17 L. J | r. Ch. | . 200: | 83 | R. R | . 146 | | 280, | 293 |
| - v. Leapingwell, 18 V. 463; 1 | 1 R. I | 3.234. | 40 | 9.84 | 1, 843 | 844 | . 883. | |
| v. Way, 3 B. 20; 52 R. R. 2 | | | | . , | <i>'</i> . | · . | ´ . ´ | 863 |
| v. Young, 19 Eq. 501 . | - | • | • | • | • | • | | 838 |
| | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 878 |
| Paget, Re, 9 T. L. R. 88 | r Oh | 571 | • | • | • | • | 100 | |
| v. Ede, 18 Eq. 118; 43 L. v. Haywood, 1 Atk. 378 | J. On | . 011 | • | • | • | • | 190, | |
| v. Haywood, 1 Atk. 378 | • • • • | · - | | | : | • | 577, | 987 |
| v. Huish, 1 Hem. & M. 663 | ; 32 | L. J | . Uh | . 468 | 19, | 20, | 836, | 844 |
| v. P., (1898) 1 Ch. 470; 67 | L. J. | Ch. 2 | ?66 ; | 78 . | L. T. | 306; | 46 | |
| W. R. 472 | | | | | -733 | , 734, | 755, | 765 |
| Paice v. The Archbishop of Canter | bury, | 14 V. | 364 | : ; 90 |) R. I | R. 845 | í. | 360 |
| Palliser v. Gurney, 19 Q. B. D. 521 | $\mathfrak{l}: \check{5}\acute{\epsilon}$ | L. J. | Q. | B. 44 | 16. | | 711. | 726 |
| Palmer, Re, 45 C. D. 291; 59 L. J | Ch | 575 | | | | • | , | 289 |
| | | | 3.5 | 93 R | R 5 | .35 | • | 156 |
| | ou. œ | ъ. От | 0, 2 | 10 II | | | 0.50 | |
| 0. Crattord, 5 Swans. 462 | ÷ + | · Ca. | 100 | • | • | 851, | | |
| | ل پيد | · Cn. | 195 | • | • | • | 861, | |
| ——— v. Locke, 18 C. D. 384; 5 | L L. | J. Ch. | 124 | • | • | • | • | 136 |
| v. Neave, 11 V. 165; 8 R. | R. 1 | 22 | • | • | | | | 601 |
| | 66 I | L. J. (| Jh. (| 39; ' | 75 L. | T. 48 | 84; | |
| 45 W. R. 205 . | | | | | | | 168, | 177 |
| v. Trevor, 1 Vern. 261. | | | | | | | | 890 |
| Panama, &c. Mail Co., Re, L. R. 5 | Ch. | 318: | 39 T | . J. | Ch. | 482: | 22 | |
| L. T. 424; 18 W. R. 441 . | C | 010, | - | J. V. | · · | , | | 109 |
| Panton v. P., 15 V. 440 | • | . • | • | • | • | • | • | 188 |
| Demonstrate Manager Office 200 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | |
| Papworth v. Moore, 2 Vern. 283 | • • • | | ÷ 7 | · | ٠. | ~ · T | rn. | 890 |
| Paquin v. Beauclerk, (1906) A. C. | 148; | 10 L. | J. E | B. | 395; | 94 T | . Т. | |
| 350; 22 T. L. R. 395 | • | • | | • | • | • | • | 712 |
| Pares, Re, 12 C. D. 333 | | | | | | 224, | 226, | 387 |
| Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D. | 462: | ; 41 I | ī. J. | P. | & M. | 68 | 281, | 284, |
| | | | | | | | 300, | |
| Paris Skating, &c. Co., Re, 5 C. D. | 959 | | | | | | , | 160 |
| Park Ro 14 Si 89 · 13 L J Ch 5 | ₹69 • | 65 R | \mathbf{R} | 550 | • | • | - | 535 |
| ——- Gate Wagon Works Co., Re, Parker v. Brooke, 9 V. 583; 7 R. | 17.0 | יוד סט | 34. | 11 T | · mr | 901 | • | 162 |
| Darley a Proche OV 502 . 7 D | D 90 |). 1). 4 | ют, | TI 1 | 4. 1 | 660 | 201 | |
| rarker v. brooke, 9 v. 505; 1 k | n. 29 | 9 | • | 100 | 000 | 000, | 691, | |
| —— v. Gerard, Amb. 236 . | • | • | • | 198 | , 202, | 208, | 211, | |
| v. Hodgson, 1 Dr. & Sm. 5 | 68 | • . | • | • | • | . • . | | 890 |
| v. Lechmere, 12 C. D. 256 | | • | | | | 169, | 170, | 689 |
| v. Ringham, 33 B. 535. | | | | | | | | 789 |
| v. Trigg, W. N. (1874) 27 | | | | | | | | 219 |
| v. Williams, 15 W. R. 1006 | | | | | | | | 384 |
| Parker's Policies, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. | | 75 T | .J. | Ch. 9 | 97. | 94 T. | T | |
| 477 · 54 W R 329 · 22 T T R | 259 | | | C14. 2 | , | | 709, | 710 |
| 477; 54 W. R. 329; 22 T. L. R. Parkes v. White, 11 V. 221 | 200 | • | • | • | • | 102, | | |
| District D. (1999) 9 Cl. 710 99 T | • - | OI | . • | • | • | F01 | 753, | 755 |
| Parkin, Re, (1892) 3 Ch. 510; 62 I | ı. J. | Cn. 55 | , , , , | | ~· . | 721, | 722, | |
| Parnell (Goods of), Re, L. R. 2 P. v. Lyon, 1 V. & B. 479; 1 | &D. | 379; | 41 1 | և. Մ. | P. & | M. 3 | 5. | 535 |
| v. Lyon, 1 V. & B. 479; 1 | 2 R. | . R. 27 | 4 | | | | 591, | 596 |
| Parrott v. Worsfold, 1 J. & W. 594 | : 21 | R. R. | -248 | | | | | 855 |
| Parry, Re, (1904) 1 K. B. 129; 73 | L. J. | K. B. | 83: | 89 J | L. T. | 612: | 52 | |
| W. R. 256; 20 T. L. R. 7 | 3 | | . , | | | , | - | 256 |
| v. Spencer, 34 C. D. 214; 5 | 6 T | J Ch | 34 | 1 : 5 | вŤ. | T 13 | 50 . | 200 |
| sub nom. Re Harrison, supra. | 0 | 0. CI | . 01 | 1,0 | U 11. | x | , | 362 |
| Parry & Hopkins, Re, (1900) 1 Ch. | 100. | en T | ٠, | cui. | 100 | 01.T | m | 004 |
| | 100; | 69 11 | . ป. | Cn. | 190; | | | 0 H = |
| 807; 48 W. R. 345 | cit. | • | • | • | • | | 874, | |
| Parsons, Re, 45 C. D. 51; 59 L. J. | Uh. | 566 | | | | | 108, | 705 |
| v. Middleton, 6 Ha. 261 | | | | | | | | 118 |
| | | | | | | | | 845 |
| Part v. Bond, 94 L. T. 390; 22 T. | L. R. | 253 | | | | 338. | 339, | |
| Partington v. AG., L. R. 4 H. L. | 109 · | 38 T | .T. (| 7h. 2 | 05 | | | 172 |
| Partridge v. Governor & Co. of the | Ran | k of T | in orl | and - | 9 0 | B 30 | 96 | |
| 15 L. J. Q. B. 295; 72 R. R. 311 | Dau. | ()1 1 | -1181 | wiiu, | J &. | عن. ن | ,υ, | 147 |
| U. W. I. AUU, 14 IV. Dr. 011 | | • | • | | • | | | 147 |

| Partridge v. P., Cas. t. Talbot, 226 | | | 220 P | PAGE 39, 868 |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | • | | 0.11 |
| Pascoe v. Swan, 27 B. 508; 29 L. J. Ch. 159 | • • | • | • | . 214 |
| Patching v. Barnett, 49 L. J. Ch. 665; 51 L | J. Ch. | 74:28 | W. F | . 211 |
| 886 | | , . | . 8- | 44, 879 |
| Paterson v. Scott, 1 De G. M. & G. 531; 21 I | J. J. Ch | . 346 | . 16. | 44. 52 |
| Patrick, Re, (1891) 1 Ch. 82; 60 L. J. Ch. 1 | 11; 63 | L. T. 7 | 752 ; 3 | 9 |
| W. R. 113` | | | | 12, 120 |
| ratherson, ne. 12 W. M. 941 | | | | . 437 |
| Pattison v. P., 1 My. & K. 12; 2 L. J. Ch. 15 | 5;36 R. | . R. 241 | 8 | 58, 868 |
| Pawlet's Case, Raym. 335 | | | . 8 | 31,832 |
| Pawlett v. P., 1 Vern. 204 | | | | . 584 47, 848 |
| Pawson v. P., 19 B. 146; 23 L. J. Ch. 954 | | • | . 8 | 47,848 |
| Paxton v. Douglas, 8 V. 520; 12 R. R. 175 | | • | • | . 788 |
| Payne v. Little, 26 B. 1 | • | • | F3. F | . 731 25, 729 |
| | | • | | |
| Peacock v. Evans, 16 V. 512; 10 R. R. 218 | | • | | 24, 342 |
| | 965 | • | | 84, 769 |
| Peacock's T., Re, 10 C. D. 490; 48 L. J. Ch. | 400 . 94 . 100 | T. m. 4 | | 91, 695 |
| Pearce, Re, (1909) 1 Ch. 819; 78 L. J. Ch. 49 T. L. R. 497 | 04, 100 | 11, 1, (| 999, 2 973 8 | 77, 893 |
| v. Crutchfield, 14 V. 206; 16 V. 48 | | | | 523, 525 |
| | • • | • | | . 366 |
| | | • | | 49, 581 |
| Peareth v. Marriott, 22 C. D. 183; 52 L. J. C. | h. 221 | • | . 5 | 24, 906 |
| Pearmain v. Twiss, 2 Gif. 130; 29 L. J. Ch. 8 | 302 . | | | 33, 51 |
| Pearse v. P., 22 W. R. 69 | | | | . 696 |
| Pearson v. Helliwell, 18 Eq. 411 | | | | . 851 |
| v. Lane, 17 V. 101 | | | 369, 3 | 73, 383 |
| v. P., 1 Sch. & L. 12; 9 R. R. 1. | | | | 94, 897 |
| Peckering v. Kimpton, Toth. (Ed. 1649), 39 | | | | 185 |
| Peckham v . P., 2 Cox, 46 | | | . 5 | 33, 534 |
| Pedder's Sett., Re, 5 De G. M. & G. 890; 24 | L. J. Ch | ı. 313 | . 35 | 59, 369, |
| | 0. | | 381, 3 | 83, 386 |
| Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 403; 43 L. J. | | • | | 77, 478 |
| Peek's Trusts, Re, 16 Eq. 221; 42 L. J. Ch. 4 | 22 . | • | • | . 898 |
| Peillon v. Brooking, 25 B. 218 | | . #40 | -11 - | 753 |
| Pelton v. Harrison, (1891) 2 Q. B. 422; 60 L. | J. Q. 1 | 5. 7 4 2 | . / 11, / | 26, 729 |
| Pemberton v. Barnes, L. R. 6 Ch. 685; 13 | Eq. 348 | 1; 40 L | 1. J. ∪! 910. 9 | H. 190 996 |
| v. McGill, 1 Dr. & Sm. 266; 23 L | . J. Ch. | 400 | 410, 4 | 20, 226 27, 752 |
| Pembroke v. Friend, 1 John. & H. 132 . | 1. 0. On. | 100 | • • | 24, 27 |
| Penfold v. Mould, 4 Eq. 565; 36 L. J. Ch. 98 | | • | • | . 675 |
| Penhall v. Elwin, 1 Sm. & G. 258 | | • | · | . 256 |
| Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 455 | | | | . 816 |
| Pennell v. Millar, 23 B. 172; 16 L. J. Ch. 69 | 9 . | | . 3 | 325, 343 |
| v. Roy, 3 De G. M. & G. 126; 22 L. | J. Ch. 4 | 109 . | | . 791 |
| Pennington v. Dalbiac, 18 W. R. 684 | | | . 2 | 22, 226 |
| Penticost v. Ley, 2 J. & W. 207; 22 R. R. 10 | 4 . | | | . 842 |
| Percival v. Dunn, 29 C. D. 128; 54 L. J. Ch. | . 570 . | | | . 113 |
| Percy v. P., 35 B. 295 | | | . 8 | 849, 850 |
| Perfect v. Lane, 3 De G. F. & J. 369; 31 L. J. | Ch. 489 |)329, | 330, 3 | 31, 332 |
| Perkins, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 596; 77 L. J. Ch. 1 | 6 | | | . 853 |
| v. Cooke, 2 John. & H. 393; 31 L. | J. Ch. 82 | 23. | . 8 | 49, 850 |
| Perks v. Mylrea, W. N. (1884) 64 | | • | • | . 729 |
| Perkyns v. Baynton, 1 Bro. Ch. 574 | • • | • | ٠ ـ | 903 |
| Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East, 170; 9 R. R. 520. | • • | • | . 5 | 79, 583 |
| Perry v. Phelips, 10 V. 34; 7 R. R. 331. | 16. 21 | p p o | ຸ ຄ | . 788 243, 255 |
| Persse v. P., 7 Cl. & Fin. 318; 4 L. J. Dig. 1. Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt, 23 C. D. 22 | TO, DI. | T (1h | a. 2 714 7 | |
| Lorustan Guano Co. v. Dockwolub, 25 C, D. 22 | 0,0414 | φ. Oπ. | 11,11,1 | 01, 100 |

| PAG | E |
|--|---|
| Peshawur, The, 8 P. D. 33; 52 L. J. P. & D. 30 | |
| Peters v. Cowie, 2 Q. B. D. 131; 46 L. J. M. C. 177 71 | 0 |
| Peterson v. P., 3 Eq. 111; 36 L. J. Ch. 101 | |
| Peto v. P., 16 Si. 590; 80 R. R. 154 | |
| Petre v. P., 14 B. 197 | |
| Pett v. Fellows, 1 Swans. 561 (n.) | |
| Pettiward v. P., Rep. t. Finch, 152 | |
| Peyton v. Bladwell, 1 Vern. 240 | 1 |
| Pfleger, Re, 6 Eq. 426 | |
| Phelps & Co. v. Comber, 29 C. D. 813; 54 L. J. Ch. 1017 | |
| Philanthropic Soc. v. Kemp, 4 B. 581; 11 L. J. Ch. 360; 55 R. R. 164. | |
| തരായ സ്വാധ വിധാരം വ | Э |
| Philips v. Paget, 2 Atk. 80 Phillips, Ex p., 19 V. 124; 12 R. R. 151 |) |
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| | , |
| Phinner Torrogram 16 Fe 20, 49 T. T. Ch. 109 120 120 120 140 | |
| Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Molleson, 1 A. C. 780 | |
| TO: | |
| v. Mitchell, 14 B. 103 | |
| Pickard, Re, 53 L. T. 293 | |
| Pickard, Re, 53 L. T. 293 | |
| Pickering v. Ilfracombe Ry. Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 235; 37 L. J. C. P. 118. 121 | |
| Pickard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 2/4 | |
| 104 | |
| Pickersgill v. Rodger, 5 U. D. 163 | |
| Pickett v. Loggon, 14 V. 215 | |
| 80, 85, 86 | |
| Pickwick v. Gibbes, 1 B. 271 | |
| Pierce v. Snaveling, 1 Ves. Sen. 425 832 | |
| Piercey, Re, (1907) 1 Ch. 289; 76 L. J. Ch. 116; 95 L. T. 868 878 | |
| Piercy, Re, (1895) 1 Ch. 83; 64 L. J. Ch. 249 | |
| v. Roberts, 1 My. & K. 4; 2 L. J. Ch. 17; 36 R. R. 239 . 862 | |
| Pierse v. Waring, 1 P. W. 121; 1 Ves. Sen. 380; 2 Ves. Sen. 548263, 285 | |
| Pierson v. Shore, 1 Atk. 480 | |
| Pieters v. Thompson, G. Coop. 94 | |
| Piggot, Re, 18 C. D. 146; 50 L. J. Ch. 678 | |
| Piggott v. Morriss, Sel. Ch. Cas. 26; 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 214 | |
| Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 14 C. D. 837; 17 C. D. 454; 50 L. J. Ch. 394702, | |
| 715, 721, 725 | |
| v. Hoare, 2 Eden, 182 | |
| Pimm, Re, (1904) 2 Ch. 350; 91 L. T. 190; 52 W. R. 648 | |
| Pine, Re, L. R. 1 P. & D. 388; 36 L. J. P. & M. 95 | |
| Pinney v. Hunt, 6 C. D. 98 | |
| Pinnock v. Bailey, 23 C. D. 497; 52 L. J. Ch. 880 | |
| | |

| D: D 4 T 1 0 T 64 OOT T 69 PH | PAGE |
|---|---|
| Piper v. P., 1 John. & H. 91; 29 L. J. Ch. 71 | 19 |
| Pitcairn, Re, (1896) 2 Ch. 199; 65 L. J. Ch. | |
| Pitt, Re, 53 L. T. 113 | |
| — v. Camelford, 3 Bro. Ch. 160 | 837 |
| — v. Jones, 5 A. C. 651; 49 L. J. Ch. 795 | . 218, 219, 220, 221 |
| v. Pidgeon, 1 Ch. Cas. 301 | |
| v. White, 57 L. T. 650 | $\frac{1}{241}$ $\frac{1}{241}$ $\frac{227}{241}$ |
| Playfair v. Cooper, 17 B. 187; 23 L. J. Ch. 3 | |
| Playford v. P., 4 Ha. 546 | |
| Discolar De 47 T W 202 | 6; 77 R. R. 297 15 |
| Plomley, Re, 47 L. T. 283 | 520, 537, 539 |
| Poolslar v. D. 1 Vany 27 | |
| Pockley v. P., 1 Vern. 37 | \cdot |
| Pole v. Somers, 6 V. 322 | 453 |
| Pollard, Ex p., Mont. & Ch. 239 | |
| | |
| 51 W. R. 483 Pollard's Sett., Re, (1896) 1 Ch. 901; (1896) 2 C | |
| Polley v. Seymour, 2 Y. & C. Ex. C. 708; 7 I | T Ex 19 264 269 |
| Pollock v. Croft, 1 Mer. 181 | |
| -v. P., 18 Eq. 329; 44 L. J. Ch. 168 | |
| Pomfret v. Lord Windsor, 2 Ves. Sen. 484 | · · · · · 879 · · · 507 |
| Poncione v. Higgins, 21 T. L. R. 11 | 338, 340 |
| Ponsonby v. P., 9 P. D. 58; 53 L. J. P. & D. | 112 638 |
| Pontifex v. Farnham, 62 L. J. Q. B. 344; 41 | W. R. 238 289 |
| Poole's Estate, Re, 6 C. D. 739; 46 L. J. Ch. | |
| Poole v. Bott, 11 Ha. 33; 22 L. J. Ch. 1042; | 90 R. R. 558 . 586, 590 |
| v. Odling, 10 W. R. 337, 591; 31 L. J. | Ch. 439 449 |
| v. P., W. N. (1885) 15 | 212, 215 |
| Pooley's Trustees v. Whetham, 33 C. D. 111; | 56 L. J. Ch. 41 . 289 |
| Pope v. Whitcomb, 3 Russ. 124; 27 R. R. 32 | 108 |
| Porcher v. Wilson, 10 L. T. 714; 14 W. R. 10 Portal & Lamb, Re, 30 C. D. 50; 54 L. J. Ch. | 011 $27, 34$ |
| Portal & Lamb, Re, 30 C. D. 50; 54 L. J. Ch. | 1012 857, 859 |
| Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104; 41 | R. R. 23 794, 796 |
| Porter v. Baddeley, 5 C. D. 542 | 78, 83, 84 |
| Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104; 41 Porter v. Baddeley, 5 C. D. 542 v. Fry, Vent. 199 v. Lopes, 7 C. D. 358; 37 L. T. 824 | |
| | . 214, 219, 220, 228 |
| v. Moore, (1904) 2 Ch. 367; 73 L. J. C | Ch. 729; 91 L. T. 484; |
| 52 W. B. 619 | 476 |
| v. P., 37 C. D. 420; 58 L. T. 688; 36 | W. R. 580 211, 232 |
| v. Smith, 16 Si. 251 | |
| | r. R. 148; 60 L. J. Ch. |
| 556; 64 L. T. 841; 39 W. R. 610. Portuguese, &c. Mines, Re, Ex p. Lord Inchic | 434, 435, 436 |
| Portuguese, &c. Mines, Re, Ex p. Lord Inchig | quin, (1891) 3 Ch. 28 . 488 |
| Pott v. Lomas, 6 H. & N. 529; 30 L. J. Ex. 2 | 210 118 |
| Potter, Re, 3 T. L. R. 420 | |
| ——, Re, 7 Eq. 484 ——— v. Baker, 13 B. 273; 15 B. 489; 21 L | · |
| v. baker, 15 b. 275; 15 b. 489; 21 b. | |
| | |
| | 384, 385 |
| v. Waller, 2 De G. & Sm. 410 | 584, 588 |
| Potts v. Curtis, You. 543 | 209 |
| - v. Norton, 2 P. W. 109 (n.) | |
| v. Smith, 8 Eq. 683; 39 L. J. Ch. 131 | · · · · |
| v. Surr, 34 B. 543 | |
| Poulton v. Adjustable, &c. Co., (1908) 2 Ch. 4: | 32 · 77 L. J. Ch. 780 |
| 24 T. L. R. 782 | • • • • • • • 477 |
| Powell v. Browne, 97 L. T. 854; 24 T. L. R. | $\frac{1}{71}$ |
| v. Cleaver, 2 Bro. Ch. 499 | 520, 539 |
| | , |

| Powell at Hankow O.D. W. 04 | | PAGE |
|--|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| Powell v. Hankey, 2 P. W. 84. | | . 770 |
| v. Hemcar, 27 B. 261; 28 L. J. Ch. 355 | | . 429 |
| v. Hellicar, 27 B. 261; 28 L. J. Ch. 355 v. Jewesbury, 9 C. D. 39; 39 L. T. 213; 27 | W. R. 142 | . 785 |
| 21 K nowler 2 Att 2006 | | . 160 |
| v, Oakley, 34 B, 575 | | . 525 |
| v. P., 12 1r. R. Eg. 501 | • • | . 790 |
| v L R 3 P & D 56 · 49 L T P & M | | |
| v. —, L. R. 10 Ch. 130; 44 L. J. Ch. 122 — v. —, (1900) 1 Ch. 243; 69 L. J. Ch. 164; 8 | · · · | . 632 |
| (1000) 1 (1) 042 CO T T (1) 104 | | 225, 226 |
| | 32 L. T. 84 | . 282 |
| | | . 16 |
| | | 243, 246 |
| v. Thomas, 6 Ha. 300; 77 R. R. 116 | | . 476 |
| rower v. mayne, 8 Eq. 262 | | 852,853 |
| v. P., 8 Ir. Ch. R. 840 | • | • |
| Poyser, Re, (1910) W. N. 189 | | . 28 |
| Pratt, Re, (1894) 1 Ch. 491; 63 L. J. Ch. 484 | | . 853 |
| a Boylen 4 Prog. 507 T. T. D. 100 of D. | | . 841 |
| -v. Barker, 4 Russ. 507; L. J. Dig. 182; 27 R. | R. 136 . | . 293 |
| Preece v. Searle, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 711 | | . 597 |
| Prees v. Coke, L. R. 6 Ch. 645 | | . 327 |
| Prendergast v. P., 3 H. L. Cas. 218; 71 R. R. 67 | | . 78 |
| Preston v. Melville, 15 Si. 35: 54 R. R. 1 | • | . 84 |
| Price, Re Goods of, 12 P. D. 137; 56 L. J. P. & D. | P 180 | |
| Price, Re Goods of, 12 P. D. 137 · 56 L. J. P. & D. | 79 | . 249 |
| | FOO HOO | 743 |
| Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 86; 17 R. R. 24 | . 102, 103 | , 713, 715 |
| 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 | . 142 | 2, 145, 157 |
| Pride v. Bubb, L. R. 7 Ch. 64; 41 L. J. Ch. 105 | | . 717 |
| Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 4 Gif. 159; 1 De G. J. & S. 4 | 33; 32 L. J. | Ch. |
| 917 | | , 647, 649 |
| Pridie v. Field, 19 B. 497 . | | 00- |
| Priestley v. Ellis, (1897) 1 Ch. 489; 66 L. J. Ch. 240 |)· 76 T. T. 1 | 87. |
| 45 W. R. 442 | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | |
| v. Lamb, 6 V. 420 | | . 255 |
| Priestman v. Thomas 9 P D 70 · 53 T. T. D. P. D. | 100 | 525, 528 |
| Prince v. Haworth, (1905) 2 K. B. 768; 75 L. J. K. | 109. | 248 |
| 772. 91 T. D. 409 | B. 92; 92 L | . T. |
| 773; 21 T. L. R. 402 | | . 158 |
| Printing, &c. Co., Re, 8 C. D. 535; 47 L. J. Ch. 580 | ; 38 L. T. 6 | 76; |
| 26 W. R. 627 | | 789 791 |
| , Re, Ex p. Cammell, (1894) 1 Ch. 52 | 28; 63 L. J. | Ch. |
| 536: 70 L. T. 705 | | 100 |
| v. Sampson, 19 Eq. 462 · 44 L. J. C. | h. 705 | 108, 156 |
| Triscina, The, Dush. I | | |
| Pritchard v. Ames, 1 T. & R. 222 | • • | . 67 |
| Probert v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 440; Amb. 6 | • • | . 691 |
| Procter v. Bennis, 36 C. D. 740; 57 L. J. Ch. 11 | | . 53 |
| v. Robinson, 14 W. R. 381 | • | . 484 |
| Professional Life Assurance Co. D. D. E. and and | | . 640 |
| Professional Life Assurance Co., Re, 3 Eq. 668; 36 I | | |
| Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220; 37 L. J. Ch. 246 | . 169, | 172, 176 |
| Proof v. Hines, Cas. t. Talb. 111 | | 265, 287 |
| Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 481; 41 R. R. 32 | 2 | 159, 160 |
| Froudley v. Fielder, 2 My, & K, 57 · 39 R R 135 | | 743, 744 |
| Frovost of Edinburgh v. Aubrev. Amb. 236 | . 112, | |
| Frowse v. Abinodon 1 Atla 489 | • | . 821 |
| Pryce, Re. 4 C. D. 685: 36 T. T 117 · 25 W P 429 | • | . 49 |
| Pryce, Re, 4 C. D. 685; 36 L. T. 117; 25 W. R. 432 Pryce v. Gribble, L. R. 10 Ch. 534; 44 L. J. Ch. 676 | | 114, 136 |
| Pugh, Ex p., 1 Dr. 202 | | 253 |
| - Re 17 B 236, 99 T T CT 400 | • | . 670 |
| —, Re, 17 B. 336; 23 L. J. Ch. 132 | | . 725 |
| -v. Heath, 7 A. C. 237; 51 L. J. Q. B. 367 | • | . 660 |
| Tullett v. Ready, 2 Atk. 587 | | 243, 245 |
| v. Smith, 5 V. 21 | | . 891 |
| Pulsford v. Hunter, 3 Bro. Ch. 416 | | . 836 |
| | | • 000 |

| Paternary v. Doubington 2) V. 544 v. 2 V. 384 | |
|--|--------|
| Pulteney v. Darlington, 2 V. 544; 3 V. 384 | 8, |
| | 30 |
| Purse v. Snaplin, 1 Atk. 414 | 32 |
| Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. Ch. 347 | 6 |
| | |
| Q. | |
| Queen's College v. Sutton, 12 Si. 521; 11 L. J. Ch. 198 839, 84 Quennell v. Turner, 13 B. 240; 20 L. J. Ch. 237; 88 R. R. 466 | |
| R. | |
| RABBIDGE, Ex p., 8 C. D. 370; 48 L. J. Bank. 15 | |
| Radburn v. Jervis, 3 B. 450; 52 R. R. 183 | 9 |
| Rae v. Joyce, 29 L. R. Ir. 500 | 6 |
| Railway Steel & Plant Co., Ex p., 8 C. D. 183; 47 L. J. Ch. 321 . 79 Rainford v. Keith, &c. Co., (1905) 2 Ch. 147; 74 L. J. Ch. 531; 92 | |
| L. T. 786; 21 T. L. R. 582 | 0 |
| Ramsbotham v. Senior, 8 Eq. 575; 17 W. R. 1075 | 8 |
| v. Dyson, L. R. 1 H. L. 129 | 9 |
| Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow, 149, 179; 19 R. R. 36 60, 446, 449, 451 | , |
| Randal v. Payne, 1 Bro. Ch. 55 576, 579, 59 | 6 |
| Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 195; 17 R. R. 56 | 6 |
| Ranken v. Alfaro, 5 C. D. 786; 46 L. J. Ch. 852 | 1 9 |
| Ranklin v. Weguelin, 27 B. 309; 29 L. J. Ch. 323 (n.) 434, 43 Raphael v. Boehm, 11 V. 92; 13 V. 590; 8 R. R. 95 | 5 4 |
| Raphael v. Boehm, 11 V. 92; 13 V. 590; 8 R. R. 95 Rashleigh v. Master, 1 V. 201; 3 Bro. Ch. 99 Ratcliff v. Winch, 16 B. 576; 22 L. J. Ch. 915 Ratcliffe's Case, 3 Co. 37 512, 51 | 5 |
| Ratcliffe's Case, 3 Co. 37 | 3 |
| Raven v. Waite, 1 Swans. 553 | |
| Rawlings, Ex p., 60 L. T. 156 | |
| Rawlinson v. R., 2 Cox, 425 | 0 |
| | 0 |
| Ray, $Ex p., 1 \text{ Madd. } 199 \dots \dots$ | 2 |
| Rayner v. Harford, 27 L. J. Ch. 708 | 4 |
| Read v. Crop, 1 Bro. Ch. 492 | 3 |
| Reddel v. Dobree, 10 Si. 244; 51 R. R. 233 | |

| PAGE | i |
|--|---|
| Redding, Re, (1897) 1 Ch. 876; 66 L. J. Ch. 460; 76 L. T. 339; 45 | |
| W. R. 457 | |
| Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 C. D. 12; 51 L. J. Ch. 113 477 | |
| Redington v. R., 1 Ball & B. 131; 12 R. R. 5 | |
| Redington v. R., 1 Ball & B. 131; 12 R. R. 5 . | |
| Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 437; 65 L. J. Ch. 656; 12 T. L. R. | |
| 412 159, 294, 296, 322, 324, 328, 331, 342, 344 | |
| v. Keith, 11 Si. 388; 10 L. J. Ch. 46 170 | |
| Reeve v. Conyngham, 2 C. & K. 444 | |
| —— v. Rocher, 1 De G. & S. 626; 17 L. J. Ch. 86 682 | |
| v. Whitmore, 4 De G. J. & S. 1; 33 L. J. Ch. 63 | |
| Reeves v. Herne, 5 Vin. Abr. 343 | |
| Reg. v. Barnardo, 23 Q. B. D. 310; 58 L. J. Q. B. 553 519, 520 | |
| v. ——, (1891) 1 Q. B. 194; (1891) A. C. 388; sub nom. | |
| | |
| Barnardo v. MacHugh, 61 L. J. Q. B. 721 548, 558 | |
| v. Daltan Ilrian 20 Sal. To 255 | |
| v. Bolton Union, 36 Sol. Jo. 255 | |
| v. Clarke, 7 El. & Bl. 186; sub nom. Re Race, 26 L. J. Q. B. 169521, 548 | |
| v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. 232; sub nom. Re Gyngall, 62 | |
| L. J. Q. B. 559 . 517, 518, 538, 548, 549, 550, 551, 558 | |
| v. Howes, 3 El. & E. 332 | |
| v. Isley, 5 A. & E. 441; 5 L. J. K. B. 253; 44 R. R. 462 549 | |
| | |
| 679; 39 W. R. 407; 7 T. L. R. 382 628 | |
| | |
| 57 L. J. Q. B. 136 | |
| v. Leggatt, 18 Q. B. 781; 88 R. R. 790 | |
| v. Leresche, (1891) 2 Q. B. 418; 60 L. J. M. C. 153 697 | |
| v. Lewis, 9 T. L. R. 226 | |
| v. Mayor of London, 16 Q. B. D. 772; 55 L. J. M. C. 118 . 749 | |
| — v. Nash, 10 Q. B. D. 454; 52 L. J. Q. B. 442 | |
| — v. Smith, 22 L. J. Q. B. 117 | |
| v. Streeter, (1900) 2 Q. B. 601; 69 L. J. Q. B. 915; 83 L. T. | |
| 288; 48 W. R. 702 | |
| Regent's Canal Co., v. Ware, 23 B. 575 | |
| Reid v. R., 25 B. 469 | |
| —— v. —, 31 C. D. 402; 55 L. J. Ch. 756 167, 659, 705 | |
| v, 33 C. D. 220; 55 L. J. Ch. 756; 55 L. T. 153; 34 W. R. | |
| 715 | |
| Reiner v. Salisbury, 2 C. D. 378 | |
| Reis, Re, (1904) 2 K. B. 769; 73 L. J. K. B. 929; 91 L. T. 592; 53 | |
| W. R. 122; 20 T. L. R. 547 | |
| Repington, Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 811; 73 L. J. Ch. 533; 90 L. T. 663; | |
| 52 W. R. 522 | |
| Reresby v. Farrer, 2 Vern. 414 | |
| Reuss (Princess of) v. Bos, L. R. 5 H. L. 176; 40 L. J. Ch. 665 . 818 | |
| Revett v. Harvey, 1 S. & S. 502; 24 R. R. 219 | |
| Rex v. Greenhill, 4 A. & E. 624 | |
| v. James, (1902) 1 K. B. 540; 71 L. J. K. B. 211; 86 L. T. 202; | |
| 50 W. R. 286 | |
| v. Mead, 1 Burr. 542 | |
| NI ON TO TO THE | |
| TIT:1 "M TO 01 0 TO TO #10 | |
| | |
| C 4 D 100 FF D D 0 | |
| | |
| Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Ha. 222; 1 De G. M. & G. 660; 21 L. J. Ch. | |
| 633; 91 R. R. 228 | |
| Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330 | |
| Reynolds, Exp., 15 Q. B. D. 169; 54 L. J. Q. B. 354 791, 793 | |
| | |

| PAG: | E |
|--|--------|
| Reynolds v. Godlee, Johns. 536; 29 L. J. Ch. 633 40 | 15 |
| v. Tenham, 9 Mod. 40 | 6 |
| | 1 |
| Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 258; 35 L. J. Ch. 267280, 281, 282, 294, 297, 29 | 8 |
| | |
| v. R., 7 A. C. 198; 51 L. J. P. C. 53 | |
| | |
| | |
| Riccard v. Prichard, 1 K. & J. 277 | |
| Rice v. Gordon, 11 B. 265; 83 R. R. 153 | |
| Rich v. Cockell, 9 V. 369; 7 R. R. 227 459, 689, 715, 73 | Z |
| t. Williamord, 2 Ed. 505, 17 W. 15. 501 500, 500, 50 | ,,, |
| Richards, Re, 45 C. D. 595; 59 L. J. Ch. 728 125, 127, 136, 13 | 9 |
| Richards, Re, 45 C. D. 595; 59 L. J. Ch. 128 | 8 |
| v. Baker, 2 Atk. 321 | 9 |
| v. Chambers, 10 V. 580; 8 R. R. 44 | _ |
| v. Chambers, 10 V. 580; 8 R. R. 44 | ñ |
| Richards & Co., Re. 11 C. D. 676: 48 L. J. Ch. 555 | |
| Richards & Co., Re, 11 C. D. 676; 48 L. J. Ch. 555. | T |
| Richardson, Re, 30 C. D. 396; 55 L. J. Ch. 741; 53 L. T. 746; 34 | _ |
| W. R. 286 | |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 2 |
| v. Du Bois, L. R. 5 Q. B. 51; 39 L. J. Q. B. 69; 21 L. T. | |
| | 0 |
| | 2 |
| 2 Marrifield 4 Do G & Sm 161 · 87 R R 331 533 | ā |
| 7. Monton 12 Fz 192. 41 T T Ch 2 | 5 |
| 7. Morton, 13 Eq. 123, 41 II. 9. On. 6 | 0 |
| Richardson & Cook, Re, 80 L. T. 090 | S |
| Richerson, Re. (1892) 1 Ch. 379; 62 L. J. Ch. 708 370, 404, 406 | o |
| | 1 |
| Rickard v. Barrett, 2 K. & J. 289 | 2 |
| Rickards v. Gledstanes, 3 Gif. 298; 31 L. J. Ch. 142; 52 L. T. 568. 132 | 2 |
| Rickets v. Ladley: 3 Riiss 418 · 27 R. R. 102 84 | 5 |
| Rickets v. Ladley, 3 Russ. 418; 27 R. R. 102 | 7 |
| Riddell v Errington 26 C D 220 · 54 L J Ch 293 704 718 | Ŕ |
| Rider v. Wager, 2 P. W. 329 | e |
| Didney Norther 2 Dr. & W 220 | 1 |
| Rider v. Wager, 2 P. W. 329 | Ţ |
| Ridges v. Morrison, 1 Bro. Ch. 388 914, 915, 916 | Ö |
| v. | |
| Ridley, Re, 11 C. D. 645; 48 L. J. Ch. 563 | |
| Ridout v. Lewis, 1 Atk. 269 | 9 |
| —— v. Payne, 1 Ves. Sen. 10 | 2 |
| v. Plymouth, 2 Atk. 104 | 1 |
| Rigden v. Vallier, 2 Ves. Sen. 258 425, 42 | 7 |
| Right v. Bucknell, 2 B. & Ad. 278; 8 L. J. K. B. 304; 36 R. R. 563475, 48 | 'n |
| Rimington v. Hartley, 14 C. D. 630; 43 L. T. 15; 29 W. R. 42 23: | |
| Birmon a Welster (1902) 2 Ch 163 · 71 T. I Ch 561 · 86 I W | |
| Rimmer v. Webster, (1902) 2 Ch. 163; 71 L. J. Ch. 561; 86 L. T. | |
| 491; 50 W. R. 517 | |
| Ripley v. Sawyer, 31 C. D. 494; 55 L. J. Ch. 407 | |
| Rippon v. Norton, 2 B. 63; 50 R. R. 96 | 3 |
| Rishton v. Cobb, 9 Si. 615; 5 My. & C. 145; 9 L. J. Ch. 110 . 579, 586 | 0 |
| Ritson, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 128; 68 L. J. Ch. 77; 79 L. T. 455; 47 W. R. 213; 15 T. L. R. 76 | |
| W. R. 213; 15 T. L. R. 76 | ō |
| Rivis v. Watson, 5 M. & W. 255; 9 L. J. Ex. 67; 52 R. R. 710 . 210 | |
| Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 158 521, 524, 537, 54 | |
| v. Trood, 3 C. D. 429; 34 L. T. 105; 24 W. R. 803 | |
| Roberts a Trater 16 0 R 560 20 T. T. O. R 270 . 82 D D 601 400 | |
| Robarts v. Tucker, 16 Q. B. 560; 20 L. J. Q. B. 270; 83 R. R. 601 . 490 | |
| Robbins, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 8; 75 L. J. Ch. 751 | |
| Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543 | |
| Robert's Trusts, Re, 38 L. J. Ch. 708 | 1 |
| Roberts, Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 834; 72 L. J. Ch. 38; 87 L. T. 523; 51 | |
| W. R. 89 | 2 |
| | |
| | |

| PAGE Roberts, Re, (1905) 1 Ch. 704; 74 L. J. Ch. 483; 93 L. T. 253243, 247, |
|--|
| 248, 256 |
| , In the goods of, (1898) P. 149; 67 L. J. P. 71; 78 L. T. 390172 |
| v. Collett. 1 Sm. & G. 138 |
| v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch. 335; 60 L. J. Ch. 377179, 666, 668, 669, |
| 672, 679 |
| v. Kuffin, 2 Atk. 112 |
| |
| v. Pocock, 4 V. 158 |
| v. R., 13 Si. 349 |
| v, 3 P. W. 65 |
| v. Security Co., (1897) 1 Q. B. 111; 66 L. J. Q. B. 119; 75 |
| L. T. 531; 45 W. R. 214; 13 T. L. R. 79 488 |
| |
| Robertson v. Broadbent, 8 A. C. 812; 53 L. J. Ch. 266 . 16, 17, 834, 835 |
| v. Macdonough, 6 L. R. Ir. 433 |
| v. R., 8 P. D. 94 |
| Robey, &c. Ironworks v. Ollier, L. R. 7 Ch. 695; 27 L. T. 362; 20 |
| W. R. 956 |
| Robinson, Re, 27 C. D. 160; 53 L. J. Ch. 986 |
| v. Addison, 2 B. 515: 9 L. J. Ch. 369: 50 R. R. 264 . 840 |
| v. Aston. 9 Jur. 224 |
| v. Cleator, 15 V. 526; 10 R. R. 118 |
| |
| v. London Hospital, 10 Ha. 19; 22 L. J. Ch. 754; 90 R. R. |
| 254 |
| 254 |
| 51 125115g511151 |
| Market D 2 C D 204 27 T C D 124 |
| v. Nesbitt, L. R. 3 C. P. 264; 37 L. J. C. P. 124 |
| v. Pett, 3 P. W. 249 |
| v. R., 19 B. 494 |
| |
| |
| |
| L. J. Ch. 385 |
| Robinson, King & Co. v. Lynes, (1894) 2 Q. B. 577; 63 L. J. Q. B. |
| 759 708 736 739 749 |
| Robinson's S. E., Re, 12 C. D. 188; 48 L. J. Ch. 507 672 |
| Roblev v. R., 2 B, 95: 50 R, R, 112 916, 917 |
| Roch v. Callen, 6 Ha. 531; 17 L. J. Ch. 144; 77 R. R. 224915, 917, 920 |
| Roche v. O'Brien, 1 Ball & B. 330 |
| 547, 588 |
| Rock v. Hardman, 4 Madd. 254 |
| Roddy, Re, 11 Ir. Ch. R. 369 |
| Roden v. Smith, Amb. 588 |
| Rodger v. Comptoir, &c., de Paris, L. R. 2 P. C. 405; 38 L. J. P. C. 30146 Rodhouse v. Mold. 35 L. J. Ch. 67 |
| Rodhouse v. Mold, 35 L. J. Ch. 67 |
| 117, 120 |
| Rodney v. Chambers, 2 East, 297 |
| Roe d. Parry v. Hodgson, 2 Wills. 129 |
| Roebuck v. Chadebet, 8 Éq. 127; 38 L. J. Ch. 488 |

| T TT 1 CT 45 0 T T C T | H-1 | | | F | AGE |
|--|---------------|-----------------|-----------|---------------|-------------------|
| Rogers, Re, L. R. 1 C. P. 47; 35 L. J. C. P | . 11 | • | | • | $\frac{179}{174}$ |
| v. Acaster, 14 B. 445 | • | • | | 170, | |
| v. Clarke, C. P. Coop. 376 | · | : | | 1,0, | 841 |
| —— v. Horn, 26 W. R. 432 | | | | | 250 |
| v. Ingham, 3 C. D. 351; 35 L. T. 66' | $7\;;\;25\;]$ | W. R. | 338 . | | 247 |
| —— v. Jones 3 C. D. 688 · 7 C. D. 345 | _ | | | 447. | 464 |
| v. Soutten, 2 Keen, 598; 7 L. J. Ch. | 118; | 44 R. | R. 289 | • | 897 |
| Rolfe v. Perry, 11 W. R. 674; 32 L. J. Ch. Rolls v. Pearce, 5 C. D. 730; 46 L. J. Ch. 7 | 149 | • | | 27 | , 28 |
| Rolls v. Pearce, 5 C. D. 730; 46 L. J. Ch. 7 | 91 | • | • • | •. | 432 |
| Rolt v. White, 31 B. 520 | T Ch | 720 | 149 - 149 | | 142 |
| Rook w Warth 1 Vos Sen 461 | о. Оп. | 120 | 112, 11 | 386 | 388 |
| Rook v. Warth, 1 Ves. Sen. 461 Rooper v. Harrison, 2 K. & J. 86 | · | : | : : | 000, | 139 |
| Roots v. Williamson, 38 C. D. 485; 57 L. J. | Ch. 99 | 9 5 : 58 | L.T. 8 | 302: | 230 |
| 36 W. R. 758 | | | | | 133 |
| Roper, Re, 39 C. D. 482; 58 L. J. Ch. 439 | 718, 7 | 719, 79 | 20, 721, | 722, | 724, |
| • | | | | 725, | 762 |
| v. R., 3 C. D. 714; 35 L. T. 155; 24 | | | | | |
| Rorke's Estate, Re, 15 Ir. Ch. R. 316 | • | • | • • | • | 58 |
| Rose v. Rolls, 1 B. 270; 49 R. R. 362 — v. R., 7 P. D. 225; 8 P. D. 98; 52 L. J | тъ. | in a | | 629 | 675 |
| v. R., 7 P. D. 225; 8 P. D. 98; 52 H. 5 v. Sharrod, 11 W. R. 356 | J. F. & | D. 20 | 5625, | 052, | 755 |
| Rose & Bartlett's Case, Cro. Car. 292 | • | • | | • | 443 |
| Roseingrave v. Burke, 7 Ir. R. Eq. 187 . | • | : | | • | 879 |
| Rosenberg v. Lindo, 48 L. T. 478 | | | | | 548 |
| Rosenthal's Sett., Re. 6 W. R. 139 | | | | | 744 |
| Ross, Re, (1900) 1 Ch. 163; 69 L. J. Ch. 19 | 92;81 | LL. I | C. 578; | 48 | |
| W. R. 264 | | | | | 852 |
| v. Borer, 2 J. & H. 469; 31 L. J. Ch. | 709 | • | | 847, | |
| v. Willoughby, 10 Price, 22 | Ob 20 | • | | • | 618 |
| Ross's Trust, Re, 1 Si. (N. S.) 196; 20 L. J. Rossiter, Re, 13 C. D. 355; 49 L. J. Ch. 36 | Cn. 29 | 9 | • • | • | 755 29 |
| D 1/ C'1 OCT MOD TX NT /10H | 7) 32 · 9 | 25 W | R 269 | 220 | 222 |
| Roundell v. Breary, 2 Vern. 482: 2 De G. & | J. 319 |) | | | 120 |
| Rous v. Barker, 4 Bro. P. C. 660 | | | | | 186 |
| Rouse v. Jones, 1 Ph. 462; 14 L. J. Ch. 4 | | | | | 788 |
| Rouse's Estate, Re, 9 Ha. 646; 89 R. R. 608 | | | | | 898 |
| Roughton v. Gloson, 36 L. T. 93; W. N. [187] Roundell v. Breary, 2 Vern. 482; 2 De G. & Rous v. Barker, 4 Bro. P. C. 660 Rouse v. Jones, 1 Ph. 462; 14 L. J. Ch. 4 Rouse's Estate, Re, 9 Ha. 646; 89 R. R. 608 Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. Sen. 331 Rowe, Re, 58 L. J. Ch. 203 ——v. Gray, 5 C. D. 263; 46 L. J. Ch. 279 | | | | | 111 |
| Rowe, Re, 58 L. J. Ch. 203 | . • | • | | | 907 |
| v. Gray, 5 C. D. 263; 46 L. J. Ch. 279 v. Jackson, Dick. 604 | | • | • • | | 220 |
| | | | | 655, 81 | 733 |
| Rowland v. M'Donnel, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 365. | , | . 0. | | | 174 |
| Rowley v. Ginnever, (1897) 2 Ch. 503; 66 L | . J. Ch | . 669 | ; 77 L | . т. | ~ . ~ |
| 302 | | | | | 214 |
| v. R., L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 63; 35 L. J. | P. & 1 | M. 110 | 0258, | 632, | 333, |
| | | | | | 634 |
| v. Unwin, 2 K. & J. 138 | | | | 731, | 878 |
| Rowlls v. Bebb, (1900) 2 Ch. 107; 69 L. J. (|)h. 562 | ; 82 , | L.∵T. 6 | 33; | 00 |
| 48 W. R. 562 Roxburgh v. Fuller, 11 L. T. 587; 13 W. R. | 30 | • | 11, 81, | 52, 89 015 | , 90 017 |
| Roxburghe v. Cox, 17 C. D. 520; 50 L. J. C. | h 772 | • | • • | 132, | 142 |
| Royle, Re. 43 C. D. 18: 59 L. J. Ch. 1 | _ | _ | • | | 462 |
| Ruben v. Gt. Fingall, &c., Ld., (1906) A. C. 4 | 39; 75 | L.J. | K. B. 8 | 43; | |
| 95 L. T. 214: 22 T. L. B. 712 | 4 | | | | 485 |
| Rudge v. Weldon, 11 B. 98; 4 De G. & J. 223 | 3;17I | J.J. C | h. 215 | | 700 |
| —— v. Winnall, 12 B. 357; 85 R. R. 119 | | | • • | • | 898 |
| Rudstone v. Anderson, 2 Ves. Sen. 418. | 000 | • | | 844, | |
| Ruffles v. Alstone, 19 Eq. 539; 44 L. J. Ch. | 5 08 | • | 636, | 640, | 000 |
| | | | | | |

| Rusden v. Pope, L. R. 3 Ex. 269; 37 L. J. Ex. 137 | 917 475 109 132 727 136 422 695 387 361 673 |
|---|---|
| S. | |
| Sagitary v. Hyde, 1 Vern. 455 | 132 , 67 343 649 825 622 186 892 518 526 , 52 409 345 480 , 65 851 678 531 530 340 |
| Saunder's Case, 5 Rep. 12 a | 893 157 |
| | |

| • | |
|--|--|
| Saunders, Re, (1898) 1 Ch. 17; 67 L. J. Ch. 55; W. R. 456; 46 W. R. 180 | 905 |
| v. Newbold, (1905) 1 Ch. 260; 74 L. J. 67; 53 W. R. 162; 21 T. L. R. 104 v. Vautier, Cr. & Ph. 240; 10 L. J. Ch. Saunders Davies, Re, 34 C. D. 482; 56 L. J. Ch. | 339, 340 354; 54 R. R. 286862 |
| | 888 |
| Savery v. Dyer, Amb. 139; Dick. 162 | 82 |
| Savill v. Langman, 14 T. L. R. 504; 79 L. T. 44 | 158 |
| ——- v. S., 2 Coll. Ch. R. 721; 70 R. R. 370 . Sawer v. Shute, 1 Anst. 63 | 457 |
| Sawrey v. Rumney, 5 De G. & Sm. 698; 90 R. R | R. 197 916 |
| Sawyer v. S., 28 C. D. 605; 54 L. J. Ch. 444 . Saxton v. Bartley, 48 L. J. Ch. 519 | 220 |
| | |
| v. Ś., 7 Ha. 382; 87 R. R. 217 v, 2 Verm. 688; Pr. Ch. 392 | |
| Scales v. Baker, 28 B. 91 | 733 |
| —— v. Collins, 9 Ha. 656 Scanlan, Re, 40 C. D. 200; 57 L. J. Ch. 718 Scarborough v. Borman, 4 My. & C. 378; 9 L. J | |
| Scarborough v. Borman, 4 My. & C. 378; 9 L. J | . Ch. 48 761 |
| Scarf v. Jardine, 7 A. C. 345; 51 L. J. Q. B. 613 Scarth, Re, 10 C. D. 499; 40 L. T. 184; 27 W. F | |
| Scawen v. Blunt, 7 V. 294 Scholefield v. Lockwood, 4 De G. J. & S. 27 . | 168 734, 735 |
| v. Templer, John. 155; 28 L. J. Ch. 4 | 152 297 |
| Scholfield v. Londesborough, (1895) 1 Q. B. 536 64 L. J. Q. B. 293 | . 146, 481, 489, 490 |
| ———— v. Spooner, 26 C. D. 94; 53 L. J. Ch. Schroder v. S., Kay, 584; 23 L. J. Ch. 916 | 777 763 445, 446, 458 |
| Schroeder v. Central Bank, 34 L. T. 735; 24 W. | R. 710 115 |
| Schweder's Estate, Re, (1891) 3 Ch. 44; 60 L. J. Scott, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 918; 71 L. J. Ch. 475; | Ch. 656 886 86 L. T. 348; 50 |
| W. R. 454 | 900, 902 |
| ——- v. Bentley, 1 K. & J., 281; 24 L. J. Ch. 2 | 44 544 |
| ——- v. Davis, 4 My. & C. 87; 48 R. R. 11 . ——- v. Dunbar, 1 Moll. 459 | |
| v. Forristall, 10 W. R. 37 v. Hanbury, (1891) 1 Ch. 298; 60 L. J. Ch | - 1 |
| v. mastings, 4 M. & J. 655 | 141 |
| ——- v. Morley, 20 Q. B. D. 120; 57 L. J. Q. H | 3. 43703, 726, 728, 729, 736 |
| v. Nesbitt, 14 V. 438; 9 R. R. 318. | 825 |
| v. Porcher, 3 Mer. 652; 17 R. R. 161 | |
| —— v. —, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 74 | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| ——- v. Spashett, 3 Mac. & G. 599; 21 L. J. Ch | . 349660, 665, 668, 681 |
| —— v. Tyler, 2 Bro. Ch. 431 Scottish, &c. L. A. S. v. Fuller, 2 Eq. 58. | |
| Scriven a Tenley 2 Eden 337 | 76 L. T. 363249, 203 |
| Scrutton v. Pattillo, 19 Eq. 369; 44 L. J. Ch. 24 | 9 168, 169 |
| Scully v. Dundonald, 8 C. D. 658; 39 L. T. 116 | ; 27 W. R. 249 . 253 |
| Seagrave v. S., 13 V. 443; 9 R. R. 203 | |
| w. ov. T Vol. I | . A |

| | | 70.4.077 |
|--|------------------|-----------------------------|
| Clarks Da 05 T ID 451 | | PAGE 921 |
| Sealy, Re, 85 L. T. 451 Seaman, Re, (1896) 1 Q. B. 412; 65 L. J. | O B 348 74 | . Т. Т. 151 |
| 44 W. R. 496 | Q. D. 010, 11 | 136 |
| v. Woods, 24 B. 372; 27 L. J. Ch | 538 | 453 |
| Searle, Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 829; 69 L. J. Ch | 712 · 83 T. 7 | F 364 · 49 |
| W. R. 44 | . 112, 00 22. | 372 |
| v. Choat, 25 C. D. 723; 53 L. J. C | h. 506: 32 W. | R. 397 . 791 |
| v. Cook, 43 C. D. 519; 59 L. J. Cl | 1. 259 | 186 |
| Seaton v. S., 13 A. C. 61; 57 L. J. Ch. 66 | 1 1 | 73, 176, 468, 524, |
| Seaton v. S., 15 11. C. G1, G. 21. C. G21. G | | 525, 528, 531 |
| Sedgwick v. Thomas, 48 L. T. 100 . | | 765 |
| Seear v. Lawson, 15 C. D. 426; 50 L. J. C. | Ch. 139 . | |
| Seeley v. Jago, 1 P. W. 389 | | 161 379, 381 613, 614 |
| Seeling v. Crawley, 2 Vern. 386 | | . 613, 614 |
| Segrave v. Kirwan, Beat. 157 | | |
| Sellon v. Watts, 20 B. 519; 9 W. R. 847 | | |
| Selly v. S., 1 Phill. E. R. 223 | | 523 |
| v, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 488 | | 534 |
| Selwood v. Mildmay, 3 V. 306 | | 881, 882 |
| Semphill v. Bayly, Pr. Ch. 562. | | 881, 882 . 563, 573, 577 |
| Senhouse v. Mawson, 52 L. T. 745 | | 790 |
| Senior v. Hereford, 4 C. D. 495 | | |
| Sercombe v. Sanders, 34 B. 382. | | |
| Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 413 | | 388 |
| Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. W. 386 | | . 3, 6, 22, 32 |
| Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. W. 386 | 5 L. J. Q. B. 3 | 75 . 727, 741 |
| Seton v. Smith, 11 Si. 59 | | 465 |
| Severs v. S., 1 Sm. & G. 400 | | 844 |
| Sewell, Re, 11 Eq. 80; 40 L. J. Ch. 135 | | 83, 88 |
| Seymore v. Tresilian, 3 Atk. 358 . | | 771 |
| Seymour v. Bennett, 2 Atk. 483 | | 210 |
| Seyton, Re, 34 C. D. 511; 56 L. J. Ch. 778 | 5. | 709, 710 |
| Seyton, Re, 34 C. D. 511; 56 L. J. Ch. 773 Shaftsbury v. Hannam, Cas. t. Finch, 323 | | 535, 546 |
| Shaftesbury v. Marlborough, 7 St. 237; 31 | L. J. Ch. 30; 40 | R. R. 129 . 920 |
| | | 510 |
| | | . 854, 865 |
| Shafto v. Adams, 4 Gif. 492; 33 l. J. Ch. v. Butler, 40 L. J. Ch. 308; 19 W. | 287 | 329 |
| v. Butler, 40 L. J. Ch. 308; 19 W. | R. 595 | . 760, 761 |
| Shakespear, Re, 30 C. D. 171; 55 L. J. Cl | n. 44 . | |
| Shalleross v. Wright, 12 B. 505 | | . 14, 17 |
| Shanahan, Re, 20 L. T. 183 | | 549 |
| Shand v. Du Buisson, 18 Eq. 283; 43 L. J | . Ch. 508 | . 114, 115 |
| Shanley v. Harvey, 2 Eden. 125 | | 434 |
| Sharland, Re, (1896) W. N. 62; 65 L. J. C. Sharp, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 793; 75 L. J. Ch. | h. 280; 74 L. 1 | 2. 664 . 860 |
| Sharp, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 793; 75 L. J. Ch | ı. 458; 95 L. l | ľ. 522; 22 |
| T. L. R. 368 | | 906 |
| ——- v. Leach, 31 B. 491; 10 W. R. 878. | | 280, 283, 294 |
| v. McHenry, 55 L. T. 747 v. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343; 41 | T T 01 *** | 793 |
| v. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343; 41 | L. J. Un. 576 . | . 360, 383 |
| Sharpe v. Foy, L. R. 4 Ch. 35; 19 L. T. 54 | H; 17 W. R. 6 | |
| v. Wilmot, 84 L. T. Jo. 297 | | 253 |
| Shattock v. S., 2 Eq. 182; 35 L. J. Ch. 509 | , | . 719, 724 |
| Shaw, Re, 94 L. T. 93 | | 734 |
| Shaw's Trusts, Re, 12 Eq. 125 Shaw's Trusts, Re, 12 Eq. 125 | · · · · · · · | 79 |
| Shaw v. S., Vern. & Scriv. 607. | D 100 | 509 |
| Shaw & Co. v. Moss Empires, Ltd., 25 T. I. | . ц. 190 | 109 |
| Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 V. 501 | • • • • • • • • | 872 |
| Sheffield v. Orrery, 3 Atk. 282 | . #AT TIZ | |
| Sheffield Corp. v. Barclay, (1905) A. C. 392 | ; 14 11. J. K. I | 0. 141; 93 |
| L. T. 83; 54 W. R. 49; 21 T. L. R. 642 | | . 490 |

| 61 17 7 | 000 70 ## #075 7 | F Cd - 2 | _ | | | | AGE |
|-------------------|--|------------------------------|--------------|----------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Sheldon, Re, | 39 C. D. 51; 58 L. J cland, 23 B. 10; 26 p., 17 Eq. 109; 43 I estbrooke, Jac. 266 (h, 3 Madd. 232; 18 Thurchill, 25 B. 21 oodhouse, 2 Atk. 53 exenford, 1 K. & J. d., 32 B. 194 . 4 De G. J. & S. 421 varris, John. 172 . | J. Ch. 2a | . 1/1 | • | . 78 | 8, 82, 83 | 5, 88 |
| Shelford v. A. | cland, 23 B. 10; 26 | ш. J. U. | 1. 141 | • | • | • | 110 |
| Shellard, Ex | p., 17 Eq. 109; 45 1 | n). Da | ик. о. То | 477 | • | | 110 240 |
| Shelley v. We | b 9 Modd 929, 19 | п.); 20 р р о | n. n. | 41 . | • | | 200 |
| Sherbard a C | n, o Madd. 202; 10 Throughill 95 B 91 | n. n. z. | 20 . | • | • | 916 | 009 |
| Shepheru v. C | oodhougo 9 Atly 53 | ٠. | | • | • | . 210 | 207 |
| Shappard at C | Occurrence, 2 Atk. 550 | 500 500 | | • | • | • | 212 |
| Sheppard v. C | 29 R 104 | 5 00 | • | • | • | 940 | 850 |
| Showard Re | 1, 02 D. 104 | • | • | • | • | . 010 | 211 |
| Showell w Dr | rarria John 172 | • | • | • | • | . 603 | 694 |
| Shillito v Bio | ggart, (1903) 1 K. B. | 683 - 7 | T. T | K B 2 | 94 - 88 | TT | , 001 |
| 426 · 51 W | R. 479 | 000, 1. | 0. | | | | 138 |
| Shipbrook (L | \widetilde{R} . R. 479 . \widetilde{R} . Ord) v . Hinchinbrook rrers, 11 V. 536 | z (Lord) | Dick | 547 | • | • | 524 |
| Shirley v. Fe | rrers, 11 V. 536 rrin, 3 P. W. 74 (n.) by, 16 V. 396; 10 R dyoler, Cro. Jac. 55 ge, 58 L. T. 546 v. Greaves, 4 My. & | _ (| ,, 22 2022 | | | | 601 |
| v. Ma | rtin, 3 P. W. 74 (n.) | | | | | | 345 |
| Shirt v. West | by. 16 V. 396: 10 R | . R. 210 | | | . 88 | 5, 896. | 897 |
| Shopland v. F | tvoler, Cro. Jac. 55 | | | | | | 497 |
| Shute v. Hog | ge, 58 L. T. 546 . | | | | | | 756 |
| Shuttleworth | v. Greaves, 4 My. & | t C. 38; | 8 L. | J. Ch. 7 | | . 453, | 838 |
| | | | | | | | |
| Sibeth, $Ex p$. | , 14 Q. B. D. 417 ; $\bar{\epsilon}$ | 64 L. J. | Q. B. | 322 . | | | 689 |
| Sibley v. Per: | , 14 Q. B. D. 417; 5 ry, 7 V. 523; 6 R. R . Watson, 11 Ha. 17 Re, (1902) 2 Ch. 389; | R. 183 | | | | . 839, | 845 |
| Sidebotham v | . Watson, 11 Ha. 17 | 0 | · · | • | · _ 2 | 0, 837, | 867 |
| Sidebottom, I | $\Re e,\ (1902)\ 2\ \mathrm{Ch.}\ 389\ ;$ | 71 L. | J. Ch. | 662;87 | L T. 5 | 7;50 | |
| W. R. 641 | | | | • | | | 361 |
| Sidney v . S., | | Ch. 15 | | | . 88 | i8, 864, | 867 |
| Sieveking v. | Behrens, 2 My. & C. | 581 | • | | • | · | 785 |
| | lo-American Telegra | | | | | | 405 |
| Q. D. 392 | Pitt, L. R. 8 Ch. 978 | . 49 T | . O. | 005 | • | • | 487 |
| Simmons v. I | 71tt, Ll. R. 8 Un. 978 | ; 45 L. | J. On. | 201. | • | • • | 401 |
| v. 1 | Rose, 6 De G. M. & C., 6 Ha. 352 7alance, 4 Bro. Ch. 3 909) 1 K. B. 201; 7 | 7. 411 | | • | • | | 680 |
| | ., 0 11a. 552 Valance 4 Bro Ch 3 | 4.5 | | • | • | 839 | 840 |
| Simon Re (1 | 909) 1 K B 201 · 7 | ST. J | кв. | 392 - 10 | o T. T | 133 · | 010 |
| 25 T. T. R. | 140 | 0 11. 0. | | 002, 10 | · | 100, | 703 |
| Simpson v . A | 140 | • | : : | • | | | 365 |
| a. 1). | onicon 10 Ho 51 | | | • | | | 700 |
| v. D | shworth, 6 B. 412 enison, 10 Ha. 51. enny, 10 C. D. 28 arles, 11 Jur. 921; 8 | | | | | | 212 |
| v. Ea | arles, 11 Jur. 921; 8 | 31 R. R. | 928 . | | | | 81 |
| v. La | amb, 7 El. & Bl. 84 | ; 26 L. | J. Q. I | B. 121 | | 161, | 288 |
| v. Le | ester, 4 Jur. (N. S.) | 1269; 3 | 33 L. T | 2.6. | | . 81, 83 | 3, 89 |
| v. R | itchie, 16 Eq. 103; 4 | 2 L. J. | Ch. 54 | £3. | | . 227, | 228 |
| Simson v . Jor | enny, 10 C. D. 28 arles, 11 Jur. 921; 8 amb, 7 El. & Bl. 84; ester, 4 Jur. (N. S.) titchie, 16 Eq. 103; 4 (1897) 1 Ch. 921; 6 | 55; 9 L | J. Ch | . 106 | | . 531, | 672 |
| Sinclair, Re, | (1001) 1 (11.021, 0 | 6 L. J. | Ch. 51 | 4; 76 I | . T. 45 | 4, 10 | |
| | W. R. 596 | | · - : | | | | |
| v. Ja | mes, (1894), 3 Ch. 5 | 54;63 | L. J. (| Ch. 873 | | | 212 |
| Sinclair's Set | t., <i>Re</i> , 56 L. T. 83. Hopkins, 4 W. R. 10 | _ ' | | | • | | 364 |
| Singleton v . I | dopkins, 4 W. R. 10 | 7; 251 | ມ. ປ . O | h. 50 | | . 211, | 228 |
| v. T | Comlinson, 3 A. C. 4 | 104; 38 | L. T. | 653; 26 | i W. E | | 410 |
| Sin Thomas 1 | Toomala Cone 1 Warm | 40= | | | | 408, | 410 |
| Sirdeh Gurdr | Ieere's Case, 1 Vern. | . 1 00 Ba (100 | | 0 670 | • | | 307 |
| Siggon a Gile | val Singh v. Rajah, 6 | 814 · 99 | T. T | Ch 606 | • | 991 | |
| Sitwell o Par | s, 3 De G. J. & S. 6 mard, 6 V. 520; 5 R | R 97 | .ப. ⊍. L | Сп. 000 | • . | | 385 891 |
| Skapholme | Hart, Cas. t. Finch, | 477 | | • | • | | .891 160 |
| Skeeps, Re. 2 | De G. J. & S. 533 | | • | • | • | | 382 |
| Skinner, Ex | o., 9 Moore, 278; 27 | R. R. | 710 | • | 51 | 19,520, | |
| v. W | Varner, Dick. 779 . | | | • | . 5. | , 040, | 540 |
| Skinner's Tru | ists, Re, 1 John. & H | I. 102: | 34 L | J. Bank | . 9 | | 861 |
| | , , | , | | | | ~ O | |
| | | | | | | | |

| PAGE |
|--|
| Skirving v. Williams, 24 B. 275 |
| Slade v. Barlow, 7 Eq. 296; 36 L. J. Ch. 369 |
| Slater, R _r , (1907) 1 Ch. 665; 76 L. J. Ch. 472; 97 L. T. 74 . 836, 839, |
| 864, 868, 869 |
| Slater's Trusts, Re, 11 C. D. 227; 48 L. J. Ch. 473 343 |
| Slatter v. Noton, 16 V. 197 |
| = at S 1 V & C 10x C 28 |
| Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. Sen. 562 |
| Sleeman v. Wilson, 13 Eq. 36; 25 L. T. 408; 20 W. R. 109 . 533, 536 |
| Slim v. Croucher, 1 De G. F. & J. 518; 29 L. J. Ch. 273 . 474, 478 Slingsby v. Grainger, 7 H. L. Cas. 273; 28 L. J. Ch. 616 841 |
| 61 61 13 670 61 717 |
| Shocombe v. Glubb, 2 Bro. Ch. 545 |
| Smallman's Estate, <i>Re</i> , 8 Ir. R. Eq. 249 |
| Smart v. S., (1892) A. C. 425; 61 L. J. P.C. 38518, 537, 538, 540, 541, |
| 549, 550, 551, 555, 557 |
| v. Tranter, 43 C. D. 587; 59 L. J. Ch. 363168, 172, 703, 743, 746 |
| Smith, Ex p., 22 W. R. 294 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— |
| 93 |
| , 44 C. D. 659; 59 L. J. Ch. 284 |
| 33 C. D. 195 · 55 T. J. Ch. 914 96 99 |
| 51 T. T 501 759 |
| , L. R. 10 Ch. 79 : 23 W. R. 297 |
| |
| 199 |
| W. R. 223 |
| |
| W. R. 104; 20 T. L. R. 66 593 |
| v. Baker, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 229 |
| v. Bate, Dick. 631 |
| v. Bruning, 2 Vern. 392 600 |
| |
| |
| v. Cowdery, 2 S. & S. 358; 3 L. J. Ch. 205; 25 R. R. 221595 |
| v. Everitt. 4 Bro. Ch. 64 |
| |
| v. Iliffe, 20 Eq. 666; 44 L. J. Ch. 755 |
| v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; 30 L. J. Ch. 45282, 283, 294, 295, 296, |
| 297, 325 |
| v. King, (1892) 2 Q. B. 543; 67 L. T. 420; 40 W. R. 542 . 346 v. Lucas, 18 C. D. 531; 45 L. T. 460; 30 W. R. 451448, 465, |
| 466, 467, 764 |
| |
| v. Matthews, 3 De G. F. & J. 139; 30 L. J. Ch. 445 . 662, 671 |
| v. Moreton, 37 L. J. Ch. 6 |
| v. Parkes, 16 B. 115 |
| v. Pincombe, 3 Mac. & G. 653; 87 R. R. 239 241, 248 |
| v. Prosser, (1907) 2 K. B. 735; 77 L. J. K. B. 71; 97 L. T. |
| 115; 23 T. L. R. 597 |
| v. Selwyn, 5 W. R. 682 |
| v. S., 2 Hag. Ec. (Supp.) 44 (n.) |
| v, 2 Cr. & M. 231; 3 L. J. $Ex. 42$; 39 R. R. 762 125 |
| v, J Abk, 304 |
| —— v. —, 2 Stra. 955 |

| | PAGE |
|---|-------------------|
| Smith v. S., 10 Ir. Ch. R. 461 | 27 |
| v, 3 Russ. 1; 6 L. J. K. B. 64 | $\frac{127}{600}$ |
| | 000 |
| | |
| Smyth, Ex p., 3 Mont. D. & De G. 687 | 136 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 372 |
| W. R. 104 | 253 |
| | 46 |
| Snellgrove v. Baily, 3 Atk. 214 | |
| | |
| Snelson v. Corbet, 3 Atk. 368 Snowdon v. Dales, 6 Si. 524; 3 L. J. Ch. 188; 38 R. R. 173 | 0.00 |
| Soames v. Martin, 10 Si. 287; 8 L. J. Ch. 367; 51 R. R. 249 | 846 |
| Société Générale de Paris v. Walker, 11 A. C. 20; 55 L. J. Q. B. 169. | .133 |
| Sockett v Wray 4 Bro Ch 483 | |
| Softlaw v. Welch, (1899) 2 Q. B. 419; 68 L. J. Q. B. 940; 47 W. R. | |
| 626; 81 L. T. 64; 15 T. L. R. 479 | .729 |
| Someux v. merosi, 2 Dos. & rui, 444 | 640 |
| Solicitor to Treasury v. Lewis, (1900) 2 Ch. 812; 69 L. J. Ch. 833; | |
| 83 L. T. 139: 48 W. R. 694 | 431 |
| Solicitors, &c., L. A. Socy. v. Lamb, 2 De G. J. & S. 251 | 63 |
| Solomon v S 12 W B 540 : 33 L J Ch 473 | 25 |
| Somers-Cocks, Re, (1895) 2 Ch. 449; 65 L J. Ch. 49 Somerset v. Cox, 33 B. 634; 33 L. J. Ch. 490 | 55 |
| Somerset v. Cox, 33 B. 634; 33 L. J. Ch. 490 | 132 |
| Sopwith v. Maugham, 30 B. 235 | |
| Soutar, Re, 26 C. D. 236; 54 L. J. Ch. 256 | 702 |
| South, Ex p., 3 Swans. 392; 19 R. R. 227 | 114 |
| v. Bloxham, 2 Hem. & M. 457; 34 L. J. Ch. 369 | $\frac{64}{247}$ |
| South American, &c. Co., Re, (1895) 1 Ch. p. 50; 64 L. J. Ch. 189. Southampton (Lord), Re, 16 C. D. 178; 50 L. J. Ch. 218; 43 L. T. | 4±1 |
| 687; 29 W. R. 231 | 121 |
| Spalding v. Ruding, 6 B. 376; 15 L. J. Ch. 374; 63 R. R. 120 | 64 |
| Sparkes v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 1; 6 L. J. K. B. 206 | $73\hat{6}$ |
| Sporks' Trusts Re (1904) 1 Ch 451 · (1904) 2 Ch 191 · 73 L. J. | |
| Ch. 576; 91 L. T. 237; 53 W. R. 41 | 636 |
| Sparrow v. Friend, Dick. 348 | 210 |
| v. Josselyn, 16 B. 135 837, 838, | 841 |
| Speer v. Crawter, 2 Mer. 416; 16 R. R. 191 185, | 187 |
| Spence, Re, 2 Ph. 247; 16 L. J. Ch. 309; 78 R. R. 82 . 517, 538, | 541 |
| Spencer, Re, 30 C. D. 183; 55 L. J. Ch. 80 | 751 |
| ————— v. Chesterfield, Amb. 146 | 545 |
| v. Clarke, 9 C. D. 137; 47 L. J. Ch. 692 121, | 150 |
| Spencer, Re, 30 C. D. 183; 55 L. J. Ch. 80 | 379 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 800 |
| v. S., 21 B. 548 | 408 |
| G. L. D. L. L. C. T. 100 | 675 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 369 |
| | |
| Spicer v. Dawson, 5 W. R. 431 v. Martin, 14 A. C. 23; 34 C. D. 1; 58 L. J. Ch. 309 v. S., 24 B. 365; 26 L. J. Ch. 704 Spike v. Harding, 7 C. D. 871; 42 L. J. Ch. 323 186, 187, | 479 |
| | 679 |
| Spike v. Harding, 7 C. D. 871; 42 L. J. Ch. 323 186, 187, | 190 |
| Spire v. Smith, 1 B. 419; 49 R. R. 396 | 871 |
| Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 522; L. R. 4 Ch. 404; 35 L. J. Ch. 755 | 668, |
| 669, 670, 678, | |
| Spong v. S., 3 Bli. 84; 1 Y. & J. 300; 32 R. R. 16 | , 50 |
| Spooner's Trust, Re, 2 Si. (N. S.) 129; 21 L. J. Ch. 151; 89 R. R. 243 | |
| Spoule v. Prior, 8 Si. 189; 6 L. J. Ch. 1 | 52 |
| Sprague, Ex p., 4 De G. M. & G. 866 | 136 |
| Sprange v. Lee, (1908) 1 Ch. 424; 77 L. J. Ch. 274; 98 L. T. 400. | 746 |

| | DAGE |
|---|---|
| Spratley v. Wilson, 1 Holt, 10 . | PAGE 429 |
| Spraney v. Wilson, 1 Hott, 10 | 428 |
| Spread v. Morgan, 11 H. L. Cas. 588 Spring v. Pride, 4 De G. J. & S. 395 | |
| Spring v. 11de, 4 De G. S. & S. 555 Storme v. Ponton 7 El & Pl 58 96 L | . J. Q. B. 64 |
| Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & Bl. 58; 26 L. Spurway v. Glynn, 9 V. 483; 7 R. R. | 279 |
| Spurway v. Grynn, 9 v. 400; 1 II. II. | 20, 010, 001 |
| Spyer v. S., Nels. 14 | |
| Squires v. Ashford, 23 B. 132 Stace v. Gage, 8 C. D. 451; 47 L. J. C | Ch. 608 |
| | |
| Stack v. Royse, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 246 . Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89; 3 | P P 50 505 500 576 577 570 |
| Stackpole r. Deattmont, 5 1. 55, 5 | |
| Stoffend - Duckler 9 Vos Sen 177 | 581, 582, 596, 679 |
| Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves. Sen. 177 | |
| Staffordshire, &c. Co. v. Hunt, (1907) | |
| Stahlschmidt v. Lett, 1 Sm. & G. 421 | |
| Stainton v. The Carron Co., 6 Jur. (N. Stamford, &c. Banking Co. v. Ball, 4 J | [. S.) 360 |
| | |
| Ch. 143 . Stamford (Earl), Re, 22 T. L. R. 632 | |
| Stammord (Barr), he, 22 1. D. R. 652 | |
| Stammers v. Halliley, 12 Si. 42; 56 R | R. R. 201 |
| | T. TP 501 |
| Standard Discount Co. v. Barton, 37 I Standering v. Hall, 11 C. D. 652; 48 | L. T. 581 |
| Steines a S 2 D D 49 47 L I D | & I) 10 958 |
| Staines v. S., 3 P. D. 42; 47 L. J. P. Stanger, Re, 60 L. J. Ch. 326. Staniland v. Willot, 3 Mac. & G. 674; Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox, 180; 2 R. R. | & D. 19 |
| Stanger, Re, 60 L. J. Ch. 326 Standard Willet 3 Mag. & G. 674: | · 97 R R 946 495 499 |
| Stepley a Potter 2 Cov 180 · 2 R | ? 26 |
| Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox, 180; 2 R. R. v. S., 7 C. D., 589; 47 L. J. O. | Ch. 256 |
| v. Wrigley, 3 Sm. & G. 18; 2 | 24 L. J. Ch. 176 |
| Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles, Camb | herwell 20 C D 196: 51 L J |
| Ch. 629. | |
| Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175; 9 | |
| Stapleton v. Colville, Cas. t. Talb. 202 | 2 |
| Starkey v. Bank of England, (1903) | A C 114 · 72 L J Ch 402 · |
| 88 L. T. 244; 51 W. R. 513 | 24 - 22 T. T. Ch. 220 |
| | 34 : 32 L. J. Ch. 300 46 |
| Stead v Newdigate 2 Mer 521 | 359 367 381 383 |
| Stedman, Re. 58 L. T. 709 | 213 225 227 |
| Steed v. Calley, 2 My, & K, 52 : 4 L. | J. Ch. 1 672 |
| State F. I. Co., Re, 1 De G. J. & S. 63 Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 521 Stedman, Re, 58 L. T. 709 Steed v. Calley, 2 My. & K. 52; 4 L. v. Preece, 18 Eq. 192; 43 L. | J. Ch. 687323, 350, 386, 387, 391 |
| Steedman v. Poole, 6 Ha. 193: 16 L. | J. Ch. 348: 77 R. R. 72 |
| Steedman v. Poole, 6 Ha. 193; 16 L. Steele v. North Metropolitan Ry., L. | R. 2 Ch. 237; 36 L. J. Ch. 540799 |
| Steinmetz v. Halthin, 1 G. & J. 64. | 667 |
| Stelfox v. Sugden, Johns. 234. | 849 |
| Stent v. Robinson, 12 V. 461 | 894, 898 |
| Stephens, Re. 43 C. D. 39: 59 L. J. C. | Ch. 109: 61 L. T. 609 |
| v. Green, (1895) 2 Ch. 148: | |
| v. James, 1 My. & K. 627; | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134 |
| 2.1 | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134 ; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134 ; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134 ; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| v. Ohve, 2 Bro. Ch. 90 v. S., 3 Drew. 697; 1 De G | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| stephenson, Ex p., De G. 389; 17 L. ——————————————————————————————————— | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| stephenson, Ex p., De G. 389; 17 L. ——————————————————————————————————— | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| Stepnenson, Exp., De G. 589; 17 L. v. Dowson, 3 B. 342; 10 v. Heathcote, 1 Eden, 38 Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 V. 139; 10 R. | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| Stepnenson, Exp., De G. 389; 17 L. v. Dowson, 3 B. 342; 10 v. Heathcote, 1 Eden, 38 Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 V. 139; 10 R. v. Sayage, 1 V. 154 | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 G. & J. 62 449, 452 |
| Stepnenson, Exp., De G. 389; 17 L. v. Dowson, 3 B. 342; 10 v. Heathcote, 1 Eden, 38 Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 V. 139; 10 R. v. Savage, 1 V. 154 v. Treyor-Garrick, (1893) 2 C | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 G. & J. 62 449, 452 141, 145 J. Bank. 5 66 D. L. J. Ch. 93; 52 R. R. 149839, 855 S |
| Stephenson, Exp., De G. 389; 17 L. | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| Stephenson, Exp., De G. 389; 17 L. | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| Stephenson, Exp., De G. 389; 17 L. | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |
| Stepnenson, Exp., De G. 389; 17 L. v. Dowson, 3 B. 342; 10 v. Heathcote, 1 Eden, 38 Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 V. 139; 10 R. v. Savage, 1 V. 154 v. Treyor-Garrick, (1893) 2 C | ; 64 L. J. Ch. 546 . 128, 131, 134; 36 R. R. 402 546 |

| Stewart, Re, 1 Sm. & G. 32; 22 L. J. Ch. 369 | PAGE |
|--|-------------------|
| 20 Denton 4 Dong 219 | 51, 595 55 873 |
| v. Rhodes, (1900) 1 Ch. 386; 69 L. J. Ch. 174; 82 L. T 337; 48 W. R. 354. | 1. |
| 337; 48 W. R. 354 | . 789 |
| | 10, 243, |
| 244, 245, 25 | |
| Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 My. & C. 37; 5 L. J. Ch. 138; 43 R. R. 1351' Stikeman v. Dawson, 1 De G. & Sm. 105; 16 L. J. Ch. 205; 7 | |
| R. R. 47 | . 491 |
| ALLEY AND ALLEY | . 518 |
| Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 480 | . 323 |
| Stirling's Case, 2 Fountainhall, 231. | . 914 |
| Stirling-Maxwell v. Cartwright, 11 C. D. 523; 48 L. J. Ch. 5628 | 19,820 |
| Stockley v. S., 1 V. & B. 31; 12 R. R. 189239, 243, 244, 245, 25 Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G. M. & G. 11; 22 L. J. Ch. 884; 90 R. R | iθ, Δ0π } |
| 000 101 107 16 | 00 110 |
| Stordon v. Lee. (1891) 1 Q. B. 661: 60 L. J. Q. B. 669 695, 726, 7 | 50, 761 |
| Stokes, Re, 62 L. T. 176; 38 W. R. 535 | . 371 |
| | 50, 52 |
| v. Cheek, 28 B. 620; 29 L. J. Ch. 922 | . 852 |
| Stone at Godfron 5 Do G M & G 78 · 93 L L Ch 706 9.19 9. | 11, 040 14 947 |
| | . 156 |
| | . 27 |
| | . 159 |
| Stone's Will Re W N (1893) 50 | . 136 |
| Stonehouse v. Evelyn, 3 P. W. 254 | . 897 |
| Stonor, Re, 24 C. D. 195; 52 L. J. Ch. 776 | 59, 763 |
| Stonehouse v. Evelyn, 3 P. W. 254 | . 904 |
| Storke v. S., 3 P. W. 51 | 15, 546 . 787 |
| Story v. Johnson 1 V & C 598 2 V & C Ex 586 | 13, 214 |
| Story v. Johnson, 1 Y. & C. 598; 2 Y. & C. Ex. 586 | . 175 |
| | . 552 |
| Stow v. Davenport, 5 B. & Ad. 359; 39 R. R. 503 | . 905 |
| Strachan v. Brandon, 1 Eden, 303 | 30, 287 |
| Strange v. Brennan, 15 Si. 346; 74 R. R. 94 | . 161 |
| | 91,592 |
| | 33, 464 . 848 |
| Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 V. 22; 1 R. R. 76 | 59, 303 |
| TT (1) - 67 0- T T 07 000 | . 861 |
| Stratton v Grymes 2 Vern 357 | . 586 |
| Strauss v. Francis, L. R. 1 Q. B. 379; 35 L. J. Q. B. 133; 14 L. T | |
| | 49, 250 |
| Streatfield v. S., 1 Swans. 447 | . 463 |
| Stribblehill v. Brett, 2 Vern. 445; Pr. Ch. 165 Strickland v. S., 10 Si. 374; 6 B. 77; 4 L. J. Dig. 273; 51 R. E | . 600 |
| 270 | |
| Stringer v. Harper, 26 B. 33 | . 26 |
| Strode v. Lady Falkland, 2 Vern, 621 | . 870 |
| Strong, Re, 26 L. J. Ch. 64; 5 W. R. 107 | 25, 526 |
| v. İngram, 6 Si. 197 9 | 16, 921 |
| Stronge v. Hawkes, 4 De G. & J. 632; 4 De G. M. & G. 18658, 60, | 62,484 |
| Strugnell v. S., 27 C. D. 259; 53 L. J. Ch. 1167 | . 223 |
| Struthers v. S., 5 W. R. 809 | . 871 |
| Stuart, Re, (1893) 2 Q. B. 201; 62 L. J. Q. B. 623 | . 289 46 554 |
| | 88, 789 |
| Stump v. Gaby, 2 De G. M. & G. 623; 22 L. J. Ch. 352. | 00, 344 |
| manually and managed and an analysis and and an analysis and and an analysis a | , - |

| T. C. | PAGE |
|--|-------------------|
| Sturge v. S., 12 B. 229; 19 L. J. Ch. 17; 85 R. R. 77 | 248 |
| Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 My. & C. 97; 4 L. J. Dig. 102; 48 R. R. | 004 |
| 245 | 755 |
| 243 | 380 |
| (Library 6. AC., (1881) A. C. 11, 00 L. S. Q. D. 21, 15 L. 1. | |
| 398; 45 W. R. 305 Snggitt's Trusts, Re, L. R. 3 Ch. 215; 37 L. J. Ch. 426 . 668, 669, | 372 |
| Suggitt's Trusts, Re, L. R. 3 Ch. 215; 37 L. J. Ch. 426 . 668, 669, | 672 |
| Suisse c. Lowther, 2 Ha. 432; 12 L. J. Ch. 315; 62 R. R. 170914, 927, | 0.00 |
| Sullivan v. Galbraith, 4 Ir. R. Eq. 582 846, | 848 |
| | 640 |
| | 691, |
| Surridge's T., Re, 17 Ir. Ch. R. 163 | 746 |
| Surridge's T., Re, 17 Ir. Ch. R. 163 | 011 1 59 |
| Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 498: 14 L. J. Ch. 71: 66 R. R. | |
| 162 | , 85 |
| Sutton v. Jewke, 2 Ch. R. 9 | 581 |
| Swaine v. Dephy 14 (1 D. 396 · 49 L. J. Ch. 734 | 909 |
| 162 | 203 |
| Swallow v. S., 1 B. 432 (n.) | 851 |
| Swan, Exp., 6 Eq. 344; 16 W. R. 560; 18 L. T. 230 | 147 |
| | 678 |
| v. M. B. Australasian Co., 2 H. & C. 175; 32 L. J. Ex. 273 | 147 |
| 474, 485. | 489 |
| —— v. S., 8 Price, 518; 22 R. R. 770 | 214 |
| Swannock v. Lyford, Co. Litt. 108 (n.) 1 | 649 |
| 635 | |
| Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536 | |
| Sweetman v. S., 2 Ir. R. Eq. 141 | 463 |
| Swift v. Nash, 2 Keen, 20; 6 L. J. Ch. 363 | 845 |
| | 520 |
| | $\frac{176}{249}$ |
| v. S., 27 L. J. Ch. 35 | 249 |
| Syer v. Gladstone, 30 C. D. 614; (1902) 1 Ch. 211 (n.) | 457 |
| Syke's T., Re, 2 John. & H. 415 Sykes v. Scholfield, 14 C. D. 629; 49 L. J. Ch. 833 | 750 |
| | $\frac{225}{368}$ |
| v. S., L. R. 2 P. & D. 163; 41 L. J. Ch. 25 | 699 |
| Symonds v. Hallett. 24 C. D. 346: 53 L. J. Ch. 60 | 748 |
| | 367 |
| | $\frac{454}{697}$ |
| · , (1001) 1. 011, 00 11. 1. 00 | 001 |
| | |
| Т. | |
| TABER'S Estate, Re, 51 L. J. Ch. 721; 46 L. T. 305; 30 W. R. 883. | 848 |
| Tadman v. Henman, (1893) 2 Q. B. 168 | 478 |
| Maille | 05, |
| Toit Way 13 For 211 , 41 T. T. Bowle 20 | |
| v. Lathbury, 1 Eq. 174 | $\frac{794}{369}$ |
| v. Northwick, 4 V. 816; 4 R. R. 358 | 15 |
| | $4\overline{57}$ |
| | |

| D. C. |
|--|
| Talbot v. Shrewsbury, 4 My. & C. 672; 4 L. J. Dig. 282 |
| |
| 197 |
| Tamplin v. James, 15 C. D. 217; 43 L. T. 520; 29 W. R. 311 |
| W. R. 510 |
| 459 |
| Tapley v. Eagleton, 12 C. D. 683; 28 W. R. 239 |
| Tarbottom v. Earle, 11 W. R. 680 |
| Tarsey's Trust, Re, 1 Eq. 561; 35 L. J. Ch. 452 692 |
| Tasker v. T., (1895) P. 4; 64 L. J. P. & D. 36 |
| — v. Hilbert, 2 V. 111; 2 R. R. 175 |
| v. Hyslop, 15 Q. B. D. 368; 54 L. J. Q. B. 592 132 |
| — v. Leithead, Kay, 656; 23 L. J. Ch. 736 |
| |
| Tatham v. Drummond, 2 Hem. & M. 262; 34 L. J. Ch. 1 840 Tatlock v. Jenkins, Kay, 654; 23 L. J. Ch. 767 |
| Tatlock v. Jenkins, Kay, 654; 23 L. J. Ch. 767 |
| Taylor, Re, 9 Ha. 596; 22 L. J. Ch. 142 |
| , Re, 4 C. D. 157; 46 L. J. Ch. 399 521, 555, Re, 53 L. J. Ch. 1161 849 |
| |
| —— v. Cartwright, 14 Eq. 167; 41 L. J. Ch. 529 |
| —— v. Clark, 1 Ha. 161; 11 L. J. Ch. 189 |
| —— v. Grange, 13 C. D. 226; 15 C. D. 168; 49 L. J. Ch. 794 . 208, |
| v. G. I. P. R. Co., 4 De G. & J. 559; 28 L. J. Ch. 285 |
| v. Haygarth, 14 Si. 8; 65 R. R. 530 411, 412 |
| |
| |
| 24 W. R. 691 |
| v. London, &c. Banking Co., (1901) 2 Ch. 231; 70 L. J. Ch. 477; 84 L. T. 397; 49 W. R. 451 |
| v. Martindale, 12 Si, 158; 10 L. J. Ch. 339; 56 R. R. 37 |
| ——— v. Meads, 4 De G. J. & S. 597; 34 L. J. Ch. 203 . 694, 716, 748 |
| v. Pugh, 1 Ha. 608; 12 L. J. Ch. 73; 58 R. R. 214 648 v. Stainton, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 634 694 |
| |
| v, 10 Ha, 475: 90 R, R, 440 |
| v, 3 De G. M. & G. 190; 22 L. J. Ch. 742 |
| |
| Taylor's S., Re, 9 Ha. 596 |
| |
| 53 W. R. 441 |
| Teague v. Richards, 11 St. 46; 9 L. J. Ch. 293 |
| Teasdale v. Braithwaite, 5 C. D. 630; 46 L. J. Ch. 725 |
| |
| |
| Telford v. Met. Board of Works, 13 Eq. 574; 20 W. R. 481; 41 L. J. Ch. 589. |
| |

| PAGI | |
|---|----|
| Tempest v. T., 7 De G. M. & G. 470; 26 L. J. Ch. 501 | |
| Tench v. Cheese, 6 De G. M. & G. 453; 24 L. J. Ch. 716 | |
| Tendril v. Smith, 2 Atk. 86 | |
| Tenham v. Lennard, 4 Bro. P. C. 302 | |
| Tennant v. Brail, Toth. 141 609 | |
| Tennent v. Tennents, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 6 | |
| v. Welch, 37 C. D. 622; 57 L. J. Ch. 481 179 | |
| Teresa, The, 71 L. T. 342 | 3 |
| Tetley v. Davies, 15 Vin. Abr. 447, fol. 20; 2 Y. & C. C. C. 399 (n.): 58 | |
| Teynham v. Lennard, 4 Bro. P. C. 302 | |
| Tharp, In the goods of, 3 P. D. 76; 38 L. T. 867; 26 W. R. 770 . 74 | |
| Thayer v. Lister, 30 L. J. Ch. 427 | |
| Thomas, Re, 22 L. J. Ch. 275 | |
| Thomas, Re, 22 L. J. Ch. 275 | |
| | |
| , Re, (1894) 1 Q. B. 747; 63 L. J. Q. B. 572; 70 L. T. 567 . 159 | Э. |
| , Re, (1900) 1 Ch. 319; 69 L. J. Ch. 198; 48 W. R. 409 . 876 | |
| v. Bennet, 2 P. W. 341 | |
| | |
| | |
| v Kelly, 13 A. C. 506; 58 L. J. Q. B. 66; 60 L. T. 114; 37 | • |
| W. R. 353 | 7 |
| | |
| | l |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 548, 549, 55 | |
| Thomond (Lord) v. Earl of Suffolk, 1 P. W. 461 829, 83 | Ĺ |
| Thompson, Re, (1894) 1 Q. B. 462; 63 L. J. Q. B. 187 | |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| Thomson v . Eastwood, 2 A. C. 215 | |
| Thornber v. Sheard, 12 B. 589; 85 R. R. 169 | į |
| Thornley v. T., (1893) 2 Ch. 229; 62 L. J. Ch. 370; 68 L. T. 199; | ` |
| 41 W. R. 541 | |
| Thornton v. Ellis, 15 B. 193; 21 L. J. Ch. 714 78, 86 | 7 |
| v. T., 11 1r. Ch. R. 4/4 | 3 |
| Thorold v. T., 1 Phillim. 1 | |
| Thorpe v. Owen, 2 W. R. 208; 23 L. J. Ch. 286 | 2 |
| Thruston v. Anstey, 27 B. 335 | |
| Thursby v. T., 19 Eq. 406; 44 L. J. Ch. 289 | |
| Thwaites v. Forman, 1 Coll. 409; 65 R. R. 124 | |
| Thynne v. St. Maur, 56 L. J. Ch. 733; 55 L. T. 753 | |
| Tibbitts v. T., 19 V. 663; Jac. 316; 23 R. R. 79 | |
| Tickner v. Old, 18 Eq. 426; 31 L. T. 29; 22 W. R. 871 | |

| mil. 7.1. 10.77 178 0.70 C | 3.F 0 0 | | 00 T T | CI 046 | PAGE |
|---|---------------------|-----------------|-----------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Tidd v. Lister, 10 Ha. 157; 3 De G. | M. & G | | | . Ch. 249 ., 665, 60 | |
| Tidswell, Re, 56 L. J. Q. B. 548 | | | | • | . 735 |
| Tighe v. Dolphin, (1906) 1 Ir. R. 30 | 5. | • | | • | 40, 60 |
| Tillett, R-, 60 L. T. 575 Tillott, Re, (1892) 1 Ch. 88; 61 L. J Tilt, Re, 74 L. T. 163 | . Ch 38 | • | | : : 12 | $\frac{136}{7,482}$ |
| Tilt. Re. 74 L. T. 163 | . 011. 55 | | | | . 112 |
| Tily v , Smith, 1 Col. 434 | | · · | | • | . 366 |
| Timewell v. Perkins, 2 Atk. 102 v. Stackhouse, 27 B. 434 | • | • | • | • | . 453 . 847 |
| Timmis, Re, (1902) 1 Ch. 176; 71 I | . J. Ch. | . 118: | 85 L. T. | 672; 50 | . o . 1 |
| W. R. 164 | | | | . 90 | 7, 909 |
| W. R. 164 | | D 100 | | 198 19 | . 787 |
| 11ngal, ne. 9 1, 11, B, 24 | | | | | . 878 |
| Tinkler's Estate, Re, 20 Eq. 456; 45 | L. J. C | h. 135 | | • | . 895 |
| Tinkley v. T., 24 T. L. R. 691. Tippett and Newbould's Cont., Re, | . n .e | 110. | 50 T. TT | 754 - 36 | $\frac{749}{3}$ |
| W. R. 597 | 31 U. D. | 440; | . 693 | 754, 36 | 51,766 |
| W. R. 597 | | | 33, 37, | 4 9, 5 3, € | 1, 771 |
| | | | | • | . 677 |
| —— v. Beilby, 27 B. 356 Toker v. T., 31 B. 629; 32 L. J. Ch. | . 222 . | • | | • | . 888 . 294 |
| Tolhurst v. Ass. Portland, &c., (1903) | 3) A. C. 4 | $\{14\ ;\ 75$ | 2 L. J. K | В. 834 | ; |
| 89 L. T. 196; 52 W. R. 143. | | • | | . 10 | 9, 151 |
| Toller v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 495. Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 497; | | | | | |
| | | | 45, 47, | 49, 50, 5 | 53, 888 |
| Tomkins v. Colthurst, 1 C. D. 626; | | | | | |
| Tomkyns v. Blane, 28 B. 422 . v. Ladbroke, 2 Ves. Sen. 5 | 193 | • | | • | . 459 . 465 |
| Tomlinson, Re, (1898) 1 Ch. 232; 6 | 7 L. J. (|)h. 97 ; | 78 L. T | 1. 12; 40 | 3 |
| W. R. 299 | | | | • | . 874 |
| Tomson v. Judge, 3 Drew. 306; 24 Toogood's Ts., Re, 61 L. T. 19. | L. J. OI | 1. 709 | | • | . 287 |
| Toole v. Hamilton, (1901) 1 Ir. R. 3 | 883 . | · | | . 86 | 7, 868 |
| Toombes v. Elers, Dick. 88 | | 1091 | | | . 524 |
| Tootal's Estate, Re, 2 C. D. 628; 2. Tooth v. Hallett, L. R. 4 Ch. 242; | 4 W. R. 38 L. J. | 1051 Ch. 396 | · · | | . 835 .3, 142 |
| Topham v. Burgoyne, 41 L. T. 670; | ; 49 L. J | l. Ch. 2 | 13 . | | . 224 |
| Torkington v. Magee, (1902) 2 K. B | .427;7 | 1 L. J | . Q. B. | 712; 8 | 7 |
| L. T. 304 | 24 L. J | . Ch. 7 | 57 . | 109, 1 | 904 |
| Torre v. Browne, 5 H. L. Cas. 555; Tottenham v. Emmet, 14 W. R. 3; ———————————————————————————————————— | 10 Jur. | (N. S.) | 1090 . | . 35 | 23, 325 |
| v. Green, 32 L. J. Ch. 2 | 01; 1 N | . R. 66 | 6. | 325, 33 | 26, 343 |
| Tower v. Bous, 18 V. 138: 11 R. R. | n. n. 19 169 . | • | | . 13. | 15.17 |
| Townley v. Bedwell, 14 V. 591; 9 | R. R. 352 | 2 . | . 365 | 2, 375, 3 | 76, 377 |
| Townsend, Re, 34 C. D. 357; 56 L. | J. Ch. 2 | 237 | | . 84 | . 901 |
| Townshend v. Mostyn, 26 B. 72 | 2 K. K. | 190 | | . 9 | 15, 916 |
| Tozier v. Hawkins, 15 Q. B. D. 680 |); 55 L. | J. Q. I | 3. 152 . | | . 825 |
| Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 440 | | • | | . 38 | 82, 386 |
| Transatlantic Co. v. Pietroni, John. Travis, Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 541; 69 L. | J. Ch. | 663: 8 | 3 I. T | . 241 : 4 | . 797 19 |
| W. R. 38 | | | | | . 862 |
| Tredwell, Re, (1891) 2 Ch. 640; 60 | L. J. Cl | a. 657 | | • | . 586 |
| Tremain's Case, 1 Stra. 173 . Trenchard, Re, (1905) 1 Ch. 82; 74 | L. J. Cl | ı. 135 : | 92 L. T | 1. 265 : <i>1</i> | 545 |
| W. R. 238 | | • | | , | . 19 |

| | PAGE |
|--|-------------------|
| Tress v. T., 12 P. D. 128; 56 L. J. P. & D. 93 | . 634 |
| Trestrail v. Mason, 7 C. D. 455; 47 L. J. Ch. 249 | . 25 |
| Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 A. C. 409; 57 L. J. Ch. 28 | . 486 |
| Tricker v. Kingsbury, 7 W. R. 652 | . 586 |
| Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 A. C. 409; 57 L. J. Ch. 28 Tricker v. Kingsbury, 7 W. R. 652 Trident, The, 1 Wm. Rob. 29, 35 | . 67 |
| Trigge v. Lavallee, 15 Moo. P. C. 271; 11 W. R. 404 | 240, 241 |
| Trimmer v. Bayne, 9 V. 209; 6 R. R. 173 | 52, 61 |
| Trinder v. Dayle, v v. 200, O II. II. 170 | 842, 856 |
| Trinder v. T., 1 Eq. 695; 14 W. R. 557 | |
| Triquet v. Thornton, 15 v. 349. | . 367 |
| | 16, 18, 31 |
| Troutbeck v. Boughey, 2 Eq. 534; 35 L. J. Ch. 840 | 693, 716 |
| Trower v. Knightley, 6 Madd. 134 | 350, 381 |
| Trumper v. T., L. R. 8 Ch. 870; 42 L. J. Ch. 641 | . 58 |
| Tubb's E., Re, 8 W. R. 270 | . 670 |
| Tucker, Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 323; 64 L. J. Ch. 513 | . 851 |
| Tucker, Ke, (1893) 2 Ch. 323; 64 L. J. Ch. 513 | 917, 918 |
| Tuckfield v. Buller, Dick. 240; Amb. 197 | 210, 216 |
| Tuer a Turner 20 B 560: 24 L J Ch 663 | . 380 |
| Tuer v. Turner, 20 B. 560; 24 L. J. Ch. 663 | . 744 |
| Tugnal v. (VDonoghue (1907) 1 Tu D 260 | $\frac{744}{731}$ |
| Tugnell v. O'Donoghue, (1897) 1 Ir. R. 360 | 207 200 |
| Tugwell, Re, 27 C. D. 309; 53 L. J. Ch. 1006 | 387, 395 |
| Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 B. 1; 4 My. & C. 377; 4 B. 323; 9 L. J. | . Ch. |
| 41; 49 R. R. 280 | 723, 760 |
| Tullit v. T., Amb. 370; Dick. 322 | . 389 |
| Tulloch v. Hartley, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 114; 57 R. R. 265 | . 190 |
| Tunno, Re, 45 C. D. 66; 59 L. J. Ch. 573 | 844, 883 |
| Tunstall v. Boothby, 10 Si. 542; 9 L. J. Ch. 294 | . 158 |
| Turcan, Re. 40 C. D. 5: 58 L. J. Ch. 101. 109, 119 | . 148. 150 |
| Turnbull, Re, (1897) 2 Ch. 415; 66 L. J. Ch. 719; 77 L. T. 47 | · 46 |
| | |
| W. R. 3 , (1900) 1 Ch. 180; 69 L. J. Ch. 187 | 102, 103 |
| (1005) 1 Ch. 796 · 74 T. T. Ch. 439 · 52 W. D. 440 | 906 |
| ———, (1905) 1 Ch. 726; 74 L. J. Ch. 438; 53 W. R. 440 ——— v. Duval, (1902) A. C. 429; 71 L. J. P. C. 84; 87 L | 7 . 800 |
| - v. Duvai, (1902) A. C. 429; 11 11. J. F. C. 84; 81 11 | . 1. |
| | , 294, 29 |
| Turner, Re, 41 L. J. Q. B. 142 | . 548 |
| ——, —, 66 L. T. 758 | 463,694 |
| ——, —, (1908) 1 Ir. R. 274 | . 836 |
| v. Buck, 18 Eq. 301; 43 L. J. Ch. 583 | . 897 |
| v. Caulfield, 7 L. R. Ir. 347 | . 739 |
| v. Collins, L. R. 7 Ch. 329; 40 L. J. Ch. 614 255, 282 | , 284, 344 |
| v. Green, (1895) 2 Ch. 205; 64 L. J. Ch. 539; 72 L. T. | 763 : |
| 43 W. R. 537 | 247, 252 |
| " Martin 7 De G M & G 429 · 26 L J Ch 216 | 886 |
| v. Morgan, 8 V. 143 | 208 214 |
| Mullingur 1 I & H 224 | 006 |
| v. Millimeux, 1 J. & H. 504 | . 900 |
| v. Newport, 5 Ph. 14; 18 R. R. 1 | . 90 |
| v. T., 4 St. 430 | . 899 |
| v, 2 Rep. Ch. 81 | . 243 |
| —— v. —, Amb. 782 | . 845 |
| | , 144, 600 |
| Tweedale v. T., 7 C. D. 633; 47 L. J. Ch. 530 | . 591 |
| Tweedale's Sett., Re. Johns. 109 | , 676, 680 |
| Tweedie, Re, and Miles, Re, 27 C. D. 315: 54 L. J. Ch. 331 | 367, 380 |
| Twigg, Re. (1892) 1 Ch. 579: 61 L. J. Ch. 444 | 412 |
| Twining v. Powell, 2 Coll. 262; 70 R. R. 210 | . 842 |
| Twisden v. Wise, 1 Vern. 161 | . 169 |
| Pring a Noblett 4 Tr. D. Fo. 64 | |
| Twiss v. Noblett, 4 Ir. R. Eq. 64 | 040 940 |
| Twycross v. Dreyfus, 5 C. D. 614; 46 L. J. Ch. 510 | , 542, 545 |
| Twycross v. Dreylus, 5 U. D. 614; 46 L. J. Ch. 510 | . 826 |
| Twyne's Case, 3 Rep. 80 | . 123 |

TO VOLUME I.

| | | | | | | | P | AGE |
|--|--|---|--|--------------------------------|--|--|---|---|
| Tyars v. Alsop, 59 L. T. 369; 61] | L. T. 8 | 3; 37 | W. : | R. 33 | 9. | 287, | 293, | 299 |
| Tyler, Re. (1891) 3 Ch. 252: 60 L. | J. Ch | . 686 | : 65 | L. T | . 367 | | | 839 |
| ——— v. Lake, 2 Russ. & M. 183; Tyler v. Yates, L. R. 6 Ch. 665; 1 | 34 R. | R. 53 | | | | | | 694 |
| Tyler v. Yates, L. R. 6 Ch. 665; 1 | 1 Eq. | 265; | 40] | J. J. | Ch. | 768 | 322, | 324, |
| | * | ĺ | | | | | 342, | |
| Tynt v. T., 2 P. W. 542 | | | , ' | | | | | 37 |
| Tynte v. Hodge, 2 Hem. & M. 287 | | | | | | | 325, | 332 |
| Tyrell v . T., $\overset{\smile}{4}$ $\overset{\smile}{V}$. 1 | | | | | | | | 895 |
| Tyrrell v. Hope, 2 Atk. 558 . | | | | | | | | 691 |
| v. Painton, (1894) P. 151; | 70 L. | T. 45 | 3:4 | 2 W. | R. 3 | 343 | | 301 |
| Tyson v. Jackson, 30 B. 384 . | | | | | | | | 161 |
| Tysson v. Benyon, 2 Bro. Ch. 5 | | | | | | | | 465 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | U. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| ULLEE, Re, 53 L. T. 711; 54 L. T. | 286 | | | | | | | 521 |
| Underwood, Re, 3 K. & J. 745. | | | | | | | | 373 |
| v. Morris, 2 Atk. 184 | | _ | | | | | 563, | - t- t- |
| Union, &c. Bank v. Mersey, &c. | Board | . (189 | 99) | 2 Q. | B. : | 205: | 68 | - • • |
| L. J. Q. B. 842; 81 L. T. 44. | | | .′ | | | | | 485 |
| Unsworth, Re, 2 Dr. & Sm. 337; 1 | 3 W. | R. 48 | 8 | | | | | 325 |
| Upton v. Brown, 26 C. D. 588; 54 | L. J. | Ch. 6 | 14 | | | | | 90 |
| v. Vanner, 1 Dr. & Sm. 594 | | | | | | | | 851 |
| Usborne, Ex p., 1 G. & J. 358 . | | | | | | | | 136 |
| Usticke v. Peters, 4 K. & J. 437 | | | | | | | 451, | |
| | | | | | | | , | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | V. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| VACHELL v. Roberts, 32 B. 140. | | | | | | | | 84 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I | R. 93 | : | • | | | • | | 84 216 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I | R. 93 86; 69 | Ĺ. J. | Q | B. 74 | · · | • | | |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 | 6; 69 | L. J. Ch. 6 | Q. 354; | B. 74 72 I | . J. (| Ch. 6' | 74 ; | 216 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 • | Ch. 6 | 55 4 ; | 72 I | ı. J. (| | | 216 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 • | Ch. 6 | 55 4 ; | 72 I | ı. J. (| | | $\frac{216}{346}$ |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 | 66; 69 903) 2 • | Ch. 6 | 55 4 ; | 72 I | ı. J. (| | | $\frac{216}{346}$ |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. | Ch. 6 Ch. 3 | 554; 01; | 72 I 94 L : | . J. (. T. . 364, | 472; $367,$ | 54 379, | 216 346 110 30 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. | Ch. 6 Ch. 3 | 554; 01; | 72 I 94 L : | . J. (. T. . 364, | 472; $367,$ | 54 379, | 216 346 110 30 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. | Ch. 6 Ch. 3 | 554; 01; | 72 I 94 L : | . J. (. T. . 364, | 472; $367,$ | 54 379, | 216 346 110 30 383 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. J. C ; (190 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 | 554; 01; | 72 I 94 L | . J. 6 . T. 364, 97 I | 472; 367, L. T. | 54 379, 69; | 216 346 110 30 383 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. J. C ; (190 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 | 554; 01; | 72 I 94 L | . J. 6 . T. 364, 97 I | 472 ; 367, L. T. | 54 379, 69; | 216 346 110 30 383 411 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. J. C ; (190 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 | 354; 01; | 72 I 94 L | . J. (. T. 364, 97 I Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; | 54 379, 69; 88 | 216 346 110 30 383 411 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. J. C ; (190 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 | 354; 01; | 72 I 94 L | . J. (. T. 364, 97 I Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; | 54 379, 69; 88 | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. O.; (190 Ch. | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 17) 2 I 434; | 354; 01; | 72 I 94 L | . J. (. T. 364, 97 I Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; | 54 379, 69; 88 | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. O.; (190 Ch. | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 17) 2 I 434; | 354; 01; | 72 I 94 L | . J. (. T. 364, 97 I Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; | 54 379, 69; 88 | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 17) 2 I 434; | 354; 01; | 72 I 94 L | . J. (. T. 364, 97 I Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; | 54 379, 69; 88 | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102 Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 K. & J. | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 17) 2 I 434; 70 L. | 554; 51; 72 I J. (| 72 I 94 L . 23; L. J. | . J. (. T. . 364, . 97 I . Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; 85 L. | 54 379, 69; 88 T. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102 Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 17) 2 I 434; 70 L. | 554; 51; 72 I J. (| 72 I 94 L . 23; L. J. | . J. (. T. . 364, . 97 I . Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; 85 L. | 54 379, 69; 88 T. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 My. & | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 1334; 50 C. 25 | i54; i. 01; i | 72 I 94 L . 23; L. J. | . J. (. T. . 364, . 97 I . Ch. | 472; 367, L. T. 260; 85 L. | 54 379, 69; 88 T. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 My. & 18; 9 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 1334; 70 L. C. 25 R. R | i54; i01; i. i. i. i. i. i. i. i. i. i. | 72 I 94 L | J. J. (6 364, 97 I Ch. 25; | 472; 367, L. T. 260; 85 L. | 54 379, 69; 88 T. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M 48 R. R. 286 Vane v. Dungannon, 2 Sch. & L. 1 Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 2 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 My. & 18; 9 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 1334; 70 L. C. 25 R. R | i54; i01; i. i. i. i. i. i. i. i. i. i. | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 7 L. 62; | J. (Ch. 227 L | 472; 367, L. T. 260; 85 L. Ch. 2 | 54 379, 69; 88 T. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102 Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M 48 R. R. 286 Vane v. Dungannon, 2 Sch. & L. 1 Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 2 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 Ay. & .18; 9 .49; 4 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 17) 2 H 434; 70 L. C. 22 R. R. | 554; 01; 72 I | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 7 L. 62; | J. (Ch. 225; L. 520, L | 472; 367, 3. T. 260; 85 L. Ch. 2 | 54 379, 69; 88 T. 71; Ch. 627. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 628 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102 Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 K. & J. Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M 48 R. R. 286 Vane v. Dungannon, 2 Sch. & L. 1 Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 2 289 Vardon's Trusts, Re, 31 C. D. 279 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 Ay. & .18; 9 .49; 4 | Ch. 6 Ch. 30 h. 1 17) 2 H 434; 70 L. C. 22 R. R. | 554; 01; 72 I | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 7 L. 62; | J. (Ch. 225; L. 520, L | 472; 367, 3. T. 260; 85 L. Ch. 2 | 54 379, 69; 88 T. 71; Ch. 627. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 628 763 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 My. & J. 204 18; 9 449; 4 ; 55 | Ch. 6 Ch. 3 Ch. 3 F. 1 F. 2 F. 3 F. 2 F. R. R. S. L. J. | 554; .01; | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 7 L. 62; | J. (Ch. 225; L. 520, L | 472; 367, 3. T. 260; 85 L. Ch. 2 | 54 379, 69; 88 T. 71; Ch. 627. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 628 763 795 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102 Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 K. & J. Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M. 48 R. R. 286 Vane v. Dungannon, 2 Sch. & L. 1 Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 2 289 Vardon's Trusts, Re, 31 C. D. 279 Vardopulo v. V., 25 T. L. R. 518 Varley v. Winn, 2 K. & J. 700; 2 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. C. ; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 My. & J. 204 18; 9 449; 4 ; 55 | Ch. 6 Ch. 3 Ch. 3 F. 1 F. 2 F. 3 F. 2 F. R. R. S. L. J. | 554; .01; | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 7 L. 62; | J. (Ch. 225; L. 520, L | 472; 367, 3. T. 260; 85 L. Ch. 2 | 54 379, 69; 88 T. 71; Ch. 627. | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 628 763 795 896 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I. Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I. W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I. Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K. Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M. 48 R. R. 286 Vane v. Dungaunon, 2 Sch. & L. I. Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 289 Vardon's Trusts, Re, 31 C. D. 279 Vardopulo v. V., 25 T. L. R. 518 Varley v. Winn, 2 K. & J. 700; 2 Vase, Re, 84 L. T. 761 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. J. C.; (190 Ch. 779; & J. 204 4y. & 18; 9 449; 4 ; 55] 5 L. J | Ch. 6. h. 1 77) 2 I 434; 70 L. C. 22 R. R. K. & L. J. . Ch. 4 | 554; .01; | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 7 L. 62; | J. (Ch. 225; L. 520, L | 472; 367, 3. T. 260; 85 L. Ch. 2 | 54 379, 69; 88 T. 71; Ch. 627, 466, | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 628 763 7795 896 228 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I. Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I. W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I. Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K. Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M. 48 R. R. 286 Vane v. Dungannon, 2 Sch. & L. 1. Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 289 Vardopulo v. V., 25 T. L. R. 518 Varley v. Winn, 2 K. & J. 700; 2 Vase, Re, 84 L. T. 761 Vaughan v. Buck. 1 Ph. 75; 65 R. | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. C.; (190 Ch | Ch. 6. h. 1 7) 2 I 434; 70 L. C. 22 R. R. K. & L. J. | 554; 01; 72 I | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 62; 62; | J. (1. 227 L 520, .445 | 472; 367, 1. T. 260; 85 L. 624, 448, | 54 379, 69; 88 T. 71; Ch. 627, 466, | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 628 763 795 896 228 , 86 |
| Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. I. Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 16 Valletort, &c. Laundry Co., Re, (1 89 L. T. 60 Valpy, Re, (1906) 1 Ch. 531; 75 I. W. R. 401 Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102. Van Hagan, Re, 16 C. D. 18; 50 I. Van Laun, Re, (1907) 1 K. B. 155 23 T. L. R. 384 Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1903) 1 L. T. 249; 51 W. R. 357 Van Straubenzee, Re, (1901) 2 Ch. 541 Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 K. Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82 Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 M. 48 R. R. 286 Vane v. Dungaunon, 2 Sch. & L. I. Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 289 Vardon's Trusts, Re, 31 C. D. 279 Vardopulo v. V., 25 T. L. R. 518 Varley v. Winn, 2 K. & J. 700; 2 Vase, Re, 84 L. T. 761 | 66; 69 903) 2 L. J. C.; (190 Ch | Ch. 6. h. 1 7) 2 I 434; 70 L. C. 22 R. R. K. & L. J. Ch. 4 | 554; 01; 72 I | 72 I 94 L 23; L J. 62; 62; | J. (1. 227 L 520, .445 | 472; 367, 1. T. 260; 85 L. 624, 448, | 54 379, 69; 88 T. 71; Ch. 627, 466, | 216 346 110 30 383 411 289 243 77 799 23 115 640 459 628 763 795 896 628 8, 86 664, |

| σ. | AGE |
|--|-------------------|
| Vaughan v. Vanderstegen, 2 Drew. 165, 363; 23 L. J. Ch. 793 | 493 |
| Voughton a Noble 20 P 20 | $\frac{721}{286}$ |
| Vaughton v. Noble, 30 B. 39 | 601 |
| Veal v. V., 27 B. 303; 29 L. J. Ch. 321 | |
| Veal v. V., 27 B. 303; 29 L. J. Ch. 321 | 677 |
| Venables v. Baring & Co., (1892) 3 Ch. 527; 61 L. J. Ch. 609 | 146 |
| Venning v. Loyd, 1 De G. F. & J. 193; 29 L. J. Ch. 152 794, | 797 |
| Vernon v. Thellusson, 1 Ph. 466; 14 L. J. Ch. 83 | 788 |
| —— & Vernon's Case, 1 V. 456 | |
| Verrall v. Cathcart, 27 W. R. 645 | 222 |
| Vertue v. East Angl. Rys. Co., 5 Exch. 280; 19 L. J. Ex. 235; | 10- |
| 82 R. R. 668 . Vickers v. Pound, 6 W. R. 580; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 543; 6 H. L. Cas. | 107 |
| 885 | 838 |
| Victoria Steamboats Co., Re, (1897) 1 Ch. 163; 66 L. J. Ch. 21; 75 | 000 |
| L. T. 374; 45 W. R. 135 | 110 |
| Victorian, &c. Synd. v. Dott, (1905) 2 Ch. 624; 74 L. J. Ch. 673; | |
| 93 L. T. 627; 21 T. L. R. 742 | 340 |
| Viditz v. O'Hagan, (1899) 2 Ch. 576; (1900) 2 Ch. 87; 69 L. J. Ch. | |
| 507; 82 L. T. 480; 48 W. R. 516 | 468 |
| Vidler v. Collyer, 47 L. T. 283 | 539 |
| Villareal v. Mellish, 2 Swans. 533 | 536 |
| Vincent v. Godson, 3 De G. & S. 717; 24 L. J. Ch. 121; 84 R. R. 411 | |
| | |
| | 883 |
| Vivian & Co., Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 654; 69 L. J. Ch. 659; 82 L. T. 674; | 000 |
| 48 W. R. 636 | 110 |
| Vizard's Ts., Re, L. R. 1 Ch. 588; 35 L. J. Ch. 804; 14 W. R. 1000 | 108 |
| | 797 |
| Voss, Re, 13 C. D. 505 | 701 |
| Vron Colliery Co., Re, 20 C. D. 442; 51 L. J. Ch. 389 | 791 |
| | |
| W. | |
| | |
| W. v. B., 11 B. 621; 83 R. R. 275 | 586 |
| | 298 |
| | 527 |
| v. Hopkinson, 19 B. 613. | 530 |
| | 901 |
| Waggetaff Re (1908) 1 Ch 162: 77 L. J. Ch 19: 98 L. T. 149: 24 | 907 |
| Wagstaff, Re, (1908) 1 Ch. 162; 77 L. J. Ch. 19; 98 L. T. 149; 24 T. L. R. 136 | 580 |
| | 856 |
| Wasstaffe v. Smith. $\hat{9}$ V. 520 | 755 |
| Wainford v. Heyl, 20 Eq. 321; 44 L. J. Ch. 567; 33 L. T. 155; 23 | |
| W. R. 848 | 727 |
| Wainwright v. Bendelowes, 2 Vern. 718 | 3 |
| | |
| | 580 |
| Waite v. Bingley, 21 C. D. 681; 51 L. J. Ch. 671 . 209, 210, 211, 9 | |
| v. Morland, 38 C. D. 135; 57 L. J. Ch. 655 . 698, 700, 718, 7 | 54 |
| | 181 |
| the state of the s | 783 |
| v. W., 3 Bro. Ch. 255; 1 V. 335 | |
| Wakeham v. Merrick, 37 L. J. Ch. 45 | 347 |
| | 362 |

TO VOLUME I.

| | PAGE 526 |
|--|---|
| Walker, Re, L. & G. t. Sugd. 299 | 020 |
| W. B. 171 | 908 |
| —————————————————————————————————————— | 363 |
| v. Bradford Bank, 12 Q. B. D. 511; 53 L. J. Q. B. 280 | 152 |
| | 54 891 |
| v. Denne, 2 V. 170; 2 R. R. 185 | |
| v Drury 17 B 482 · 23 L J Ch 712 | 672 |
| ——•- v. Jackson, 2 Atk. 624 | 11 |
| | 840 |
| v. Smith, 29 B. 394 | 301 |
| | $\frac{361}{257}$ |
| | |
| Wall v. Bushby, 1 Bro. Ch. 484 v. Colshead, 2 De G. & J. 683 | , 405 |
| — v. Rogers, 9 Eq. 58; 39 L. J. Ch. 381 | 251 |
| v. Tomlinson, 16 V. 413; 10 R. R. 212 170, | 673 |
| | 898 |
| Wallace v. Anderson, 16 B. 533 | 863 |
| 523 | 110 |
| v. Auldjo, 1 De G. J. & S. 643; 32 L. J. Ch. 748 | |
| | , 677 |
| Waller v. Dalt, 1 Ch. Cas. 276; Dick. 8 | 326 |
| | $\begin{array}{c} 135 \\ 458 \end{array}$ |
| Wallinger v. W., 9 Eq. 301; 22 L. T. 259; 18 W. R. 274 Wallis, Re, (1902) 1 K. B. 719; 71 L. J. K. B. 465; 86 L. T. 237; | 100 |
| 50 W. R. 430 | 137 |
| v. Portland, 3 V. 494; 4 R. R. 78 159, | |
| v. Portland, 3 V. 494; 4 R. R. 78 159, v. Woodyear, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 179 | 61 |
| Wallop v. Hewett, 2 Ch. R. 70 | |
| Walmesley v. Booth, 2 Atk. 25 | $\frac{287}{883}$ |
| | 445 |
| Walrond v. Rosslyn, 11 C. D. 640; 48 L. J. Ch. 602 . 357, 380, | 381 |
| v. W., John. 18; 28 L. J. Ch. 97 520, 627, 628, | 630 |
| W-1-1 D. F. T. D. T., 824 | 88 |
| waish, Re, 7 L. R. 17, 554 | 79 4 918 |
| v. Gladstone, 1 Ph. 294; 13 L. J. Ch. 52; 65 R. R. 387 . v. Studdart, 4 Dr. & War. 159; 65 R. R. 686 429, | |
| v. W., 4 Ir. B. Eq. 396 | 915 |
| - 1 Drew 64 | 889 |
| v. Wason, L. R. 8 Ch. 482; 42 L. J. Ch. 676 669, | 670 |
| 1, 21001 0. 110080, 2 10 11 21, 100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 269 |
| —— v. Maunde, 19 V. 424; 13 R. R. 230 | 368 90 5 |
| Warburton v. Hill. Kay. 470: 23 L. J. Ch. 633 | |
| Ward, Re, (1897) 1 Q. B. 266; 66 L. J. Q. B. 310; 76 L. T. 37; 45 | |
| W. R. 329 | 157 |
| ——- v. Arch, 15 Si. 389 | 372 |
| v. Baugh, 4 V. 627; 4 R. R. 307 | 190 |
| 124. 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 135, | 139 |
| | 845 |
| v. St. Paul, 2 Bro. Ch. 583 533, | 534 |
| v. The Society of Attornies, 1 Coll. 370 | 799 |
| v. Wallis, (1900) 1 Q. B. 675; 69 L. J. Q. B. 423; 82 L. T. | 244 |
| 261 | |
| 5. 11., 11 c. 25. 555, 15 21. 6. CH. 100 | , 550 |

| | | | | | | | P. | AGE |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------|---------|----------------|----------------|
| Ward, v. W., 4 Ir. Ch. R. 215, 220 | | | | | | | | 142 |
| | • | • | • | • | • | • | ٠ | |
| v, 18 W. R. 87 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 209 |
| | • | · _ | • | • | • | | • | 670 |
| Ward's Trusts, Re. L. R. 7 Ch. 727 | ; 42 | L. J. | Ch. 4 | £ | | | | 862 |
| Warde v. W., 2 Ph. 786; 78 R. R. 2 | 293 | | | | | 538. | 539, | 541 |
| Wardle v. Carter, 7 Si. 490; 5 L. J. | | คอง | • | • | • | , | 330, | |
| | | | • | • | • | • | 000, | |
| v. Claxton, 9 Si. 324; 8 L. | | | • | • | • | | | 691 |
| Ware v. Polhill, 11 V. 278; 8 R. R. | 144 | | | | | | 388, | 389 |
| v. The Grand Junction Wate | | | 2 R | mss. | & M | v. 4" | 70: | |
| 9 L. J. K. B. 169 | , | | , | | | | , | 799 |
| | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | |
| Waring v. Hotham, Dick. 550. | • | · . | • | • | • | • | • | 186 |
| v. Ward, 5 V. 675; 5 R. R. | 134 (| (n.) | | | | | | 18 |
| Warner, $Ex p.$, 4 Bro. Ch. 101. | | • | | | | 539. | 540, | 541 |
| v. Baynes, Amb. 589 . | | | | | | | 201, | |
| | . 10 | ir m | cor | • | • | 100, | | |
| Warren's Sett., Re, 52 L. J. Ch. 928 | | | | • | • | • | | 765 |
| v. Rudall, 1 J. & H. 1; 29 | Li. J | . Ch. | 543 | | | • | 457, | 458 |
| v. Wright, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 40 | 1 | | | | | | 847, | 848 |
| Warren's Trusts, Re, 26 C. D. 208; | 53 T | | lh 78 | 7 | | | | 461 |
| Warrender v. W., 2 Cl. & Fin. 527; | 97.1 | D D | 100 | • | • | • | | |
| | | | | • | • | • | 614, | |
| Warriner v. Rogers, 16 Eq. 340; 42 | ل .لل ا | I. Ch. | 581 | | | • | 429, | 431 |
| Warter v. Yorke, 19 V. 451 . | | | | | | ٠. | 523, | 526 |
| Warwick v. Hawkins, 5 De G. & | Sm. | 481 . | 21 T | . J. | Oh. 7 | 96: | 90 | |
| R. R. 124 | 10244 | , | | | | , | | 920 |
| | 4. 01 | 337 | nac | | • | • | • | |
| Warwicker v. Bretnall, 23 C. D. 199 | 4; 31 | L YV | K. 520 | , | | | | 392 |
| Wasdale, Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 163; 68 J | L. J. | Ch. 1 | 17; 4 | 7 W. | . R. 1 | 169; | 79 | |
| T. T. 520 · 15 T. T. R. 97 | | | | | | | 128, | 130 |
| Wassell v. Leggatt, (1896) 1 Ch. 55 | 4 . 63 | s T. J | Ch | 240 | | | 730, | |
| Waterhange w Stangfold O He 024 | 1, 10 | TT. | 324. | 01 T | · r / | | | 100 |
| Waterhouse v. Stansfield, 9 Ha. 234 | ; 10 | na. | | | | .11.0 | | 0.34 |
| 89 R. R. 411 | | | • | • | • | | 824, | 825 |
| Waters, Re, 42 C. D. 517; 58 L. J. | Ch. | 750 | | | | | | 897 |
| ———— v. Wood, 5 De G. & Sm. 7 | | | . J. C | h. 20 | 6:9 | 0 B. | R. | |
| 201 | , | | | | ٠, ٠ | | | 882 |
| | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | |
| Watkins, $Ex p.$, 2 Ves. Sen. 470 | ٠ | <u>.</u> . | <u>.</u> | • | • | • | • | 554 |
| v. W., (1896) P. 228; 65 I | L. J. | P. & | D. 75 | | | | | 760 |
| v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G. | 622: | 21 L | . J. C | h. 60 | 1:8 | 37 R. | \mathbf{R} . | |
| 228 | , | | | | -, - | | | 211 |
| | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | |
| Watson, Ex p., 21 Q. B. D. 309 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 278 |
| | | | | | | • | • | 211 |
| v. Brickwood, 9 V. 453 | | | | | | | 12 | , 17 |
| v. Dennis, 3 Russ. 90. | | | | | | | _ | 172 |
| v. Gass, 30 W. R. 286; 51 | т. т | (Th | 460 | • | • | • | • | 214 |
| 0. Uass, 50 W. IL. 200, 51 | , <u>T</u> . 0 | . OII. | 400 | • | •. | • | 050 | |
| v. Marshall, 17 B. 363; 22 | 4 Lt. 0 | J. Un. | 895 | | : . | | 672, | |
| v. Mid-Wales Ry. Co., L. 1 | R. 2 (| J. P. | 593; | $36~\mathrm{L}$ | . J. C |). P. : | 285 | 143 |
| v. Northumberland, 11 V. | 162 | | | | | | 208, | |
| v. Reed, 5 Si. 431; 35 R. I | R 179 | R | | | | | , | 916 |
| . Lood, o Di. 101, oo 11. 1 | LU. 11 | , | • | • | • | • | • | |
| v. Saul, 1 Gif. 188 | · | ÷ ~ | · | • | • | • | | 907 |
| Watt v. Assets Co., (1905) A. C. 317 | 7;74 | ال ديلا: | . P. C | .82 | | | 247, | 249 |
| — v. Leach, 26 W. R. 475 . | | | | | | | | 211 |
| Watts, Re, 29 C. D. 947; 58 L. J. | Ch 3 | 39 | | | | | 54, | 360 |
| " Cuscamell 9 Fa Co Abn | 515 | 02 | • | • | • | • | 471 | 401 |
| v. Cresswell, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. | 919 | · · | · | | | | 471, | 491 |
| v. Drescoll, (1901) 1 Ch. 294 | E; 70 | L. J. | . Ch. : | 157; | 84 1. | ι. Τ. S | 97; · | |
| 49 W. R. 146 . | | | | | | | | 142 |
| v. Porter, 3 El. & Bl. 743; | 23 T. | J. Q. | B. 34 | 15 | | _ | | 121 |
| ——— v. W., 17 Eq. 217; 43 L. J. | Ch. | 77 | | | • | _ | 362, | |
| Works III Do O Do O T and one | Oπ. | '' T - | 71 40 | • | • | • | 000, | |
| Way's T., Re, 2 De G. J. & S. 365; | 94 T | 1. 0. (| л. 49 | • | • | • . | • | 120 |
| Wearing v. W., 23 Beav. 99 . | • | . • | • | • | • | • | • | 84 |
| Weaver, Re, 29 C. D. 236; 54 L. J. | Ch. | 749 | | | | | | 790 |
| Webb v. Alexandria, &c. Co., 93 L. | T. 35 | 39 . 2 | 1 T T | , R | 579 | | | 146 |
| - v. Byng, 1 K. & J. 580 . | | , = | | <u>T</u> U. | J , 4 | • | • | and the second |
| D. D. T | 00.7 | | ni | | • | • | • | 857 |
| v. De Beauvoisin, 31 B. 573; | 32 1 | J. J. (| n. 21ي | .7 | • . | | • | 21 |
| v. Grace, 2 Ph. 701: 15 Si. 3 | 84:7 | 78 R. I | $\mathrm{K.}~252$ | | 576. | 584. | 588. | 589 |

TO VOLUME I.

| Webb v. Herne Bay Commrs., L. R. 5 Q. B. 642 | 17, 22 46, 47, 66, 111, 113, 118 R. R. R. 180 . 891 |
|---|--|
| Wedgwood v. Denton, 12 Eq. 290; 40 L. J. Ch. 52 Wedmore, Re, (1907) 2 Ch. 277; 76 L. J. Ch. 486; T. L. R. 547 | 16 |
| Welles v. Middleton, 1 Cox, 112; 4 Bro. P. C. 245 Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 19; 5 L. J. Ch. 85; | 748, 749 287 . 26 R. R. 1 . 517, 518, 523, 524, 539, 541, 543 |
| | 5 517, 533, 540 622, 629 120 547 |
| ——, Re, 43 C. D. 281; 59 L. J. Ch. 113; 61 L. 7 327 ——, Re, (1903) 1 Ch. 848; 72 L. J. Ch. 513; 8 W. R. 521 | F. 806; 38 W. R. 903 88 L. T. 355; 51 251 |
| v. Allott, (1904) 2 K. B. 842; 73 L. J. K. B. 694 | |
| Welton v. Saffery, (1897) A. C. 299; 66 L. J. Ch. 3 45 W. R. 508 | R. 721 486 |
| Wentworth v. W., (1900) A. C. 163; 69 L. J. P. C. West Devon Great Consols Mine, Re, 38 C. D. 51; —— & Hardy's Cont., Re, (1904) 1 Ch. 145; 73 I L. T. 579; 52 W. R. 188 | 13; 81 L. T. 682 89 57 L. J. Ch. 850 250 L. J. Ch. 91; 89 717, 768 . Q. B. 639 289 |
| v. Errissey, 2 P. W. 349; 1 Bro. P. C. 225 v. Jones, 1 Si. (N. S.) 208; 20 L. J. Ch. 362 v. Kerr, 6 Ir. Jur. 141 v. Kerr Waggon, &c. Co. v. West, (1892) 1 Ch. 27 244 v. Co. v. West, (1892) 1 Ch. 27 | 442 478 590, 595, 596 5; 61 L. J. Ch. 105, 109, 113, 115, 151 |
| W. & T.—VOL. I. | h |

| PAGE | |
|--|----------|
| Westby v. W., 2 Dr. & War. 503; 59 R. R. 795 | |
| Westmeath's Case, Re, Jac. 125; 1 Dow. & Cl. 547; 2 Hag. Ec. App. | |
| 115: 35 R. R. 54 |) |
| Weston, Re, (1900) 2 Ch. 164; 69 L. J. Ch. 555; 82 L. T. 591; 48 | |
| W. R. 467 | ŧ |
| | , |
| Westzinthus Re 5 R & Ad 817 . 3 L J K R 56 . 39 R R 665 63 65 | 5 |
| Wethered v. W., 2 Si. 183; 29 R. R. 77 | |
| Wethered v. W., 2 Si. 183; 29 R. R. 77 | 3 |
| Wharton, Re, 5 De G. M. & G. 33; 23 L. J. Ch. 522 | - |
| | 2 |
| | 3 |
| | 1 |
| v. Silkstone Coal Co., 29 C. D. 715; 54 L. J. Ch. 778; 52 | |
| L. T. 798; 33 W. R. 797 |) . |
| L. T. 172; 15 T. L. R. 545 | 4 |
| | • |
| W. R. 586 | 1 |
| | 7 |
| | o 4 |
| | î |
| wheldale v. Fartridge, 5 v. 396; 8 v. 221; 7 R. R. 37354, 358, 359 | ٠. |
| Whieldon v. Spode, 15 B. 537; 21 L. J. Ch. 913 12, 19 Whistler v. Webster, 2 V. 372; 2 R. R. 260 | 3 |
| Whistler v. Webster 2 V 372 · 2 R R 260 446 449 459 46 | 9 |
| Whitaker, Re, 34 C. D. 227; 56 L. J. Ch. 251 | 3 |
| , Re, (1901) 1 Ch. 9; (1904) 1 Ch. 299; 73 L. J. Ch. 166; | |
| 90 L. T. 277 | 6 |
| C. P. 140 | 3 |
| Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 C. D. 494; 59 L. J. Ch. 485 | |
| White, Re. 10 L. T. 349 | |
| | 8 |
| | 6 |
| | |
| v. Anderson, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 419 | .9 |
| v. British Empire Mutual L. A. Co., 7 Eq. 394; 38 L. J. Ch. | 20 |
| v. Herrick, L. R. 4 Ch. 345: 38 L. J. Ch. 679 530, 674, 67 | 33 77 |
| v. M'Dermott, 7 Ir. R. C. L. 4 | 3 |
| | 52 |
| | 13 |
| | 35 |
| Whitehead, Ex p., 14 Q. B. D. 419; 54 L. J. Q. B. 240; 52 L. T. | ,0 |
| 591; 55 W. R. 411 | |
| | 39 70 |
| Whitehouse v . Insole, 7 L. T. 400 \cdot | 19 86 |
| Whiteley v. Edwards, (1896) 2 Q. B. 48; 65 L. J. Q. B. 457 . 729, 73 | 52 |
| Whitfield v. Fausset, 1 Ves. Sen. 387 | 13 |
| whiting's Sett., Re, (1905) 1 Ch. 96; 74 L. J. Ch. 207; 91 L. T. | 41 |
| 821; 53 W. R. 293; 21 T. L. R. 83 | 86 |

| PAGE |
|--|
| Whitley v. W., 31 B. 173 |
| W. B. 787 |
| |
| 203; 39 W. R. 23 |
| v. W., 4 Bro. Ch. 31 |
| Whittem v. Sawyer, 1 B. 593 |
| Whittle v. Henning, 2 Ph. 731; 18 L. J. Ch. 51; 78 R. R. 264175, 677, |
| 678 |
| Whitty's T., Re, 9 Ir. R. Eq. 41 |
| Whitwell, Re, 19 L. R. Ir. 45 |
| Whitworth v. Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695; 9 L. J. K. B. 297; 36 R. R. 715 161 Whyte v. Meade, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 420 |
| Whyte v. Meade, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 420 |
| Widgery v. Tepper, 7 C. D. 423; 47 L. J. Ch. 550 171, 172, 678 |
| Wigg v. Nicholl, 14 Eq. 92; 26 L. T. 935; 20 W. R. 738 . 54, 55 Wightwick v. Lord, 6 H. L. Cas. 217; 26 L. J. Ch. 825 . 77, 78, 79 |
| Wightwick v. Lord, 6 H. L. Cas. 217; 26 L. J. Ch. 825 . 77, 78, 79 |
| Wigney v. W., 7 P. D. 177; 51 L. J. P. & D. 60 638 Wilberforce v. Hearfield, 5 C. D. 709; 46 L. J. Ch. 584 189 |
| Wilby v. Elgee, L. R. 10 C. P. 497; 44 L. J. C. P. 254 |
| Wilcox v. Drake, Dick. 631 |
| |
| Wild v. Wells, Dick. 3 |
| Wilday v. Barnett, 6 Eq. 193; 16 W. R. 961 |
| Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263; 52 L. J. Ch. 141173, 379, 448, 466, 467 |
| Wildes v. Davies, 1 Sm. & G. 475; 22 L. J. Ch. 495 401, 410 |
| Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch. 534; 66 L. J. Ch. 684; 77 L. T. |
| 57; 45 W. R. 675 |
| Wilkins Re 27 C D 703 : 54 L J Ch 188 |
| Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch. 534; 66 L. J. Ch. 684; 77 L. T. 57; 45 W. R. 675 |
| v. Sibley, 4 Gif. 442 |
| Wilkinson, Exp., 3 De G. & Sm. 633; 19 L. J. Ch. 257; 84 R. R. 393 |
| |
| |
| |
| v. Dent, L. R. 6 Ch. 339; 40 L. J. Ch. 253; 25 L. 1. |
| 142; 19 W. R. 611 |
| 77 78 89 90 |
| |
| v. Joberns, 16 Eq. 14; 42 L. J. Ch. 663 . 220, 222, 228 |
| v. Joughin, 41 L. J. Ch. 234 |
| |
| Willats v. Cay, 2 Atk. 67 |
| Willes v. Greenhill, 29 B. 376; 4 De G. F. & J. 150; 30 L. J. |
| Ch. 808 |
| William's Estate, Re, 15 Eq. 270; 42 L. J. Ch. 158 |
| v. Armstrong, 12 Ir. R. Eq. 356 |
| |
| v. Bayley, L. R. 1 H. L. 200; 35 L. J. Ch. 717 295 |
| v. Bolton, 2 V. 138; 4 R. R. 282 |
| |
| v. Hughes, 24 B. 474; 27 L. J. Ch. 218 20, 836, 844, 845, 872 |
| h 0 |

| | PAGE |
|--|---------------------------------|
| Williams v. Kershaw, 1 Keen, 276 (n.) | 54 |
| v. Llandaff, 1 Cox, 254 v. Protheroe, 5 Bing. 309; 3 Y. & J. 129 | 9: 30 B. B. 608 |
| , and a second s | 159, 160 |
| | |
| v. Thomas, 2 Dr. & Sm. 29; 31 L. J. Ch | 676 257 |
| | |
| | 941 945 954 |
| | 7; 81 L. T. 804;* |
| r. Wilson, a N. B. 267 | 32, 834 |
| Williamson v . Gihon, 2 S. & L. 357 | 600 |
| Willis v. Barron, (1902) A. C. 271; 71 L. J. Ch. 60 | |
| v. Kymer, 7 C. D. 181; 47 L. J. Ch. 90 | |
| v. Parkinson, 2 Mer. 507 | |
| - v. W., 38 W. R. 7; 61 L. T. 610 | . 211, 225, 227 |
| Willoughby, Re, 30 C. D. 324; 54 L. J. Ch. 1122 | 554 J. Ch 683 448 456 |
| e. madeloon, 2 oom. de 11. of 1. | 457 |
| Willox v. Rhodes, 2 Russ. 452 | 20, 844, 872 |
| Willox v. Rhodes, 2 Russ. 452. Wills v. Bourne, 16 Eq. 487; 43 L. J. Ch. 89. v. Sayers, 4 Madd. 409. | 694 |
| | |
| | |
| Willmott v. Barber, 15 C. D. 96; 17 C. D. 772; 4 | 9 L. J. Ch. 792475, |
| Wilmot v. Alton, (1897) 1 Q. B. 17; 66 L. J. Q. B. | 42; 75 L. T. 447; |
| 45 W. D 119 | 11/1 197 |
| -v. Pike, 5 Ha. 14; 5 L. J. Dig. 452; 71 R. Wilmott v. Jenkins, 1 B. 401 | R. 10 139 884, 885 |
| Willson v. Pack, Pr. Ch. 583 | |
| Wilson, Re, 26 W. R. 848 | |
| | 820 |
| 116, (1507) 1 Ch. 654, 70 H. 6. Ch. 210, 50 | 88 |
| —— Re, (1908) 1 Ch. 839; 77 L. J. Ch. 564; 98 | |
| v. Bàsil, (1903) P. 239; 71 L. J. P. 89. v. Beddard, 12 St. 32; 10 L. J. Ch. 305 | 301 |
| v. Brownsmith, 9 V. 180 | 839 |
| v. Coles, 28 B. 215; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1003 v. Ferrand, 13 Eq. 362; 26 L. T. 387 | 367, 404 |
| v. Ferrand, 13 Eq. 362; 26 L. T. 387 v. Fielding, 2 Vern. 763 | · · · · · 798 · · · · 47 |
| —— v. Gabriel, 4 B. & S. 243 | 143 |
| v. Maddison, 2 Y. & C. C. 372; 12 L. | |
| R. R. 198 | 846, 848, 897 - 250 : 37 R R |
| 542 | 618 622 636 |
| v. O'Leary, 12 Eq. 531; L. R. 7 Ch. 448 | s; 41 L. J. Ch. |
| 342 9 | 14, 915, 917, 919, 920 |
| v. Short, 6 Ha. 366; 17 L. J. Ch. 289; 77 v. Thornbury, L. R. 10 Ch. 248; 44 L. J. 0 | R. R. 139 160 |
| v. Thornbury, L. R. 10 Ch. 248; 44 L. J. (| Oh. 242 463 |
| v. Townshend, 2 V. 693; 3 R. R. 31 . v. West Hartlepool Ry. Co., 2 De G. J. & | 445, 466 S. 475 · 34 T. J. |
| Ch. 241 | 626 |
| v. W., 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1076 | |
| | |
| v, 1 11. Oas. 000, 10 10. 10. 100 | |

| PAGE |
|---|
| Wilton v. Hill, 25 L. J. Ch. 150; 4 W. R. 66 |
| |
| Wilts, &c. Rv. Co., Re, 2 Dr. & S. 552 |
| Willishire v. Maddits, 14 St. 70, 13 11. 5. Ch. 254, 65 16. 16. 545 |
| Winch v. James, 4 V. 386 |
| |
| Winchelsea's Policy Trusts, Re, 39 C. D. 168; 58 L. J. Ch. 20 |
| Winchester v. Paine, 11 V. 199; 8 R. R. 131 620 |
| Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P. W. 572 |
| Windham v. W., Rep. t. Finch. 267 |
| 783 (1904) 2 On. 665; 75 D. 5. Ch. 757; 51 D. 1. |
| Wingrove v. W., 11 P. D. 82; 55 L. J. P. & D. 7 |
| 783 |
| W. R. 120 |
| Winter v. Easum, 2 De G. J. & S. 272; 33 L. J. Un. 660 174 Wintle v. Compensor Pen + Finely 462 |
| Wintour v. Clifton, 21 B. 447; 8 De G. M. & G. 641; 26 L. J. Ch. |
| |
| $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |
| Witherby v. Rackham, 39 W. R. 363; 60 L. J. Ch. 511 178 |
| Witt v. Amis, I B. & S. 109; 30 L. J. Q. B. 318 |
| Witter v. W., (1891) 1. 105, 60 H. J. I. & D. 65 |
| Wollaston v. King, 8 Eq. 165; 38 L. J. Ch. 392 458, 461 |
| Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern. 121 |
| Wollen v. Tanner, 5 V. 218 |
| Wollen v. Tanner, 5 V. 218 |
| |
| |
| -, 15, (1000) 2 CM. 000, 00 M. 0. CM. 011, 10 M. 1. 20, 11 |
| W. R. 685 |
| v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417; 18 R. R. 264 |
| - v. Copper Milles Co., 17 C. B. 361; 23 H. 3. C. F. 100 |
| v. Gregory, 43 C. D. 82; 59 L. J. Ch. 232 |
| v. Griffith, 1 Swans. 56; 18 R. R. 18 140, 160 |
| v. Ordish, 3 Sm. & G. 125; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 584 31, 32 |
| v. Penoyre, 13 V. 333; 9 R. R. 185 |
| v. Sketton, 6 St. 170; 2 H. J. Ch. 105 |
| |
| Woodall v. Clifton, (1905) 2 Ch. 257: 74 L. J. Ch. 555: 93 L. T. |
| 251; 54 W. R. 1; 21 T. L. R. 581 |
| Woodburn v. Grant, 22 B. 483 |
| Woodgate, Ex p., 2 Mont. D. & De G. 394; 11 L. J. Bk. 25 136 Woodhouse v. Okill, 8 Si. 115; 5 L. J. Ch. 326 871 |
| Woodhouse v. Okill, 8 Si. 115; 5 L. J. Ch. 326 |
| Woodin, Re, (1895) 2 Ch. 316; 64 L. J. Ch. 501 893, 903 |
| Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197; 9 L. J. Ch. 257 . 760, 852 |
| Woodroffe v. Allen, 1 Hayes & J. 73 |
| Woods, Re, (1904) 2 Ch. 4; 73 L. J. Ch. 204; 90 L. T. 8 . 79, 89, 90 |
| v. Lyttleton, 25 T. L. R. 665 |
| Woodward v. Pratt, 16 Eq. 127; 42 L. J. Ch. 891 675 |
| |
| Wookey v. Pole, 4 B. & Ald. 13 |

| PAGE Woolf v. Pemberton, 6 C. D. 19; 37 L. T. 328; 25 W. R. 873518, 519 Woollands v. Crowcher, 12 V. 174 165, 166 Woolridge v. W., John. 63; 28 L. J. Ch. 689 460, 462 Woolsteneroft v. W., 2 De G. F. & J. 347; 30 L. J. Ch. 22 27 Worcester Bank v. Firbank, (1894) 1 Q. B. 786; 63 L. J. Q. B. 542 825 Wordsworth v. Dayrell, 4 W. R. 689 676 Wormald v. Muzeen, (1881) W. N. 83; 50 L. J. Ch. 776 850 Wormald v. Jacob, 3 Mer. 256 24 Wortham v. Pemberton, 1 De G. & Sm. 644; 75 R. R. 234 525, 663 Worthing Corp. v. Heather, (1906) 2 Ch. 532; 75 L. J. Ch. 761; 22 T. L. R. 750 373, 374 Worthington v. Evans, 1 S. & S. 165; 1 L. J. Ch. 126; 24 R. R. 160 S91, 593 — v. Wiginton, 20 B. 67; 24 L. J. Ch. 773 463, 465 |
|---|
| W_{100000} D_{2} O_{2} O_{3} O_{4} O_{4} |
| Wray c. Field, 6 Madd. 300; 2 Russ. 257; 26 R. R. 61 |
| Wray's T., Re, 16 Jur. 1126 673 |
| Wren v. Bradley, 2 De G. & Sm. 49; 17 L. J. Ch. 172; 79 R. R. 120 |
| 588, 602 Wrexham, &c. Co., Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 440; 68 L. J. Ch. 270; 47 W. R. |
| 464; 80 L. T. 130; 15 T. L. R. 122 |
| 464; 80 L. T. 130; 15 T. L. R. 122 |
| Wride r. Clarke, 2 Bro. Ch. 261 |
| Wright, Re, (1906) 2 Ch. 288; 94 L. T. 696; 75 L. J. Ch. 500; 54 |
| W. R. 515 461 |
| |
| \$51, \$52 |
| v. Carter, (1903) 1 Ch. 27; 72 L. J. Ch. 138; 87 L. T. 624; 51 W. R. 196 |
| 7. Chard, 4 Dr. 702; 1 De G. F. & J. 567; 29 L. J. Ch. |
| 415 |
| |
| v. Lambert, 6 C. D. 649; 26 W. R. 206 90 |
| v. Morley, 11 V. 12; 8 R. R. 69 165, 681 |
| v. Naylor, 5 Madd. 77 |
| v. Redgrave, 11 C. D. 24; 40 L. T. 206; 27 W. R. 562 . 785 |
| |
| v. Rutter, 2 V. 673; 3 R. R. 24 674, 675 |
| v. Tuckett. 1 J. & H. 266 |
| v. Vanderplank, 8 De G. M. & G. 136; 2 K. & J. 1; 25 |
| L. J. Ch. 753 |
| |
| v W 2 John & H 655 |
| |
| |
| n. R. 370 |
| Wroughton v. Colquhoun, 1 De G. & Sm. 357; 16 L. J. Ch. 70; 75 |
| R. R. 19, 136 |
| Wyatt, Re, (1892) 1 Ch. 188; 61 L. J. Ch. 178 |
| |
| Wycherly v. W., 2 Eden, 175 |
| Wynch v. W., 1 Cox, 433 |
| Wyndham v. Ennismore, 1 Keen, 467 |
| Wythe v. Henniker, 2 My. & K. 635; 3 L. J. Ch. 221 . 17, 22, 51, 52 |
| territoriale de la compatibilità de la compatibilità della compatibilità della compatibilità della compatibili |

| | | • | |
|---|---|---|---|
| c | X | 1 | Σ |

TO VOLUME I.

| PAGE X. |
|--|
| X., Re, (1899) 1 Ch. 526; 68 L. J. Ch. 265; 47 W. R. 345; 80 L. T. 311 |
| Y. |
| YARDLEY v. Holland, 20 Eq. 428; 33 L. T. 301 |
| Z. |

ZOACH v. Lloyd, 2 Vern. 192 .




TABLE OF STATUTES TO VOL. I.

| TO THE TOTAL OF THE STATE OF TH | | | | AGE |
|--|-----------|----------|------|------|
| 13 Edw. I. c. 35 (Ravishment of Ward) | | | 501, | 012 |
| 31 Hen. VIII. c. 1 (Partition) | | 195, | 208, | |
| 32 Hen. VIII. c. 9 (Maintenance and Champerty | 7) | • | . • | |
| c. 32 (Partition) | | | 208, | |
| s. 1 | | | 209, | 210 |
| c. 46 (Court of Wards) | | | | 507 |
| 33 Hen. VIII. c. 22 (Ward and Liveries) . | | | | 507 |
| 5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 16 (Against buying and selling | g of Offi | ces). | | 157 |
| 4 & 5 Phil. & M. c. 8 (Ravishment of Ward) . | Ŭ., | 509, | 513, | 518 |
| 13 Eliz. c. 5 (Fraudulent Conveyance) | | | | 256 |
| 3 Jac. c. 5 (Popish Recusants). | | | 534, | 673 |
| 12 Car. II. c. 24 (Abolition of Military Tenures) | ١ | | 514, | 534 |
| s. 3 | · | | . ′ | 507 |
| s. 8 | | | 532, | |
| s. 9 | • | • | | 532 |
| 14 & 15 Car. II. (Ir.) c. 19 | • • | • | · | 532 |
| 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 10 (Distributions) | • • | • | • | 640 |
| 25 Car. II. c. 2, s. 5 (Popish Recusants) | • | • | • | 534 |
| | | 11, 625, | 671 | |
| 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 4 (Statute of Frauds). | | 11, 020, | 074, | 690 |
| s. 7 | | • | • | 744 |
| s. 25 | | • | • | |
| 3 Will. & M. c. 14 (Fraudulent Devises). | | • | | 52 |
| 9 & 10 Will. III. c. 32 (Blasphemy and Profane | ness) . | • | • | 534 |
| 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9 (Promissory Notes) | | • | • | 107 |
| 4 Anne, c. 16. s. 20 (Amendment of Law) . | | • | • | 107 |
| 5 Anne, c. 3 (Marlborough Titles) | | • | • | 157 |
| 7 Anne, c. 16 (Gaming) | | • | • | 311 |
| c. 25 (Coinage) | | • | • | 107 |
| 7 Geo. II. c. 8 (Stock Jobbing) | | | | 311 |
| 9 Geo. II. c. 36 (Mortmain Act) | | | | 360 |
| 10 Geo. II. c. 8 (Stock Jobbing) | | | | 311 |
| 11 Geo. II. c. 19 (Distress for Rent Act, 1737) | | | | 107 |
| 26 Geo. II. c. 33 (Prevention of Clandestine Ma | arriages) | | | 574 |
| 36 Geo. III. c. 52, s. 19 (Legacy Duty) | | | | 371 |
| 5.02 | | | | 889 |
| 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 98 (Thellusson Act) | | | | 401 |
| 49 Geo. III. c. 126 (Prevention of sale and brol | kerage of | Offices) | | 157 |
| 51 Geo. III. c. 64, s. 4 (India). | | ´ | | 107 |
| 53 Geo. III. c. 160 (Popish Recusants) | | | | 534 |
| zz (lee III e 194 (Stemme) | | | 118 | -371 |
| 4 Geo. IV. c. 76 (Marriage Act, 1823) | | | | 522 |
| ss. 16, 17 | | | 522. | 523 |
| ss. 23, 24 | | | | 532 |
| s. 75 | • | | J_J, | 522 |
| 9 Geo. IV. c. 31 (Offences against the Person) | • | • | • | 507 |
| s. 1 | • | | • | 513 |
| c. 74, s. 125 (East Indies) | • | • | | 513 |
| 10 Goo IV a 7 (Roman Cutholica) | • | • | • | 534 |
| 10 Geo. IV. c. 7 (Roman Catholics) | | • | • | 994 |

| 11 Geo. IV. & Will. IV 1 Will. IV. c. 40 (Exe 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 80 (3 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s c. 74 s. s. | 7. c. 20 (| Wille | of 901 | J:\ | | | | PAGE |
|--|----------------------------|----------------|---|------------------------|--------------|--------|--------------|----------------------------|
| 1 Will. IV. c. 40 (Exe | cutors A | ct) | DT 1201 | diers | • | • | • | . 423 |
| 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 80 () | Ecclesias | tical L | ands) | • | • | • | • | 19, 411 |
| 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s | . 36 (Sta | tute of | Lim | itation | · (a) | • | 195 0 | 190 |
| s | . 42 ` . | | | | | • | 100, 2 | uo, 499 ane |
| c. 74 s. | 40 (Fin | es and | Recov | reries) | | : | . 1 | 76 379 |
| S. | $\frac{71}{2}$. | ٠. | | . ′ | | | 176. 3 | 79. 382 |
| s. | 01 | • | | | | | 176, 3 | 79, 493 |
| e 104 (| Dop+/ | • | • | | | | | . 662 |
| c. 104 (| Down. | 1 041 | • | • | | 36, - | €0, 47,• | 52,354 |
| s. 100 (| 12 | x Ct) | • | • | • | • | 232, 23 | 33, 355 |
| s. c. 104 (c. 105 (c. 105 (s. c. 106 (4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 92 (A | The Lav | z of In | harita | neo t | | | | 886 |
| 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 92 (A 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 85 (M | bolition | of Fin | es and | l Reco | шена | ment | () -1 15 | 00, 458 |
| 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 92 (A 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 85 (M 1 Viet. c. 26 (Wills Act) s. 2 s. 7 ss. 11, 12 s. 23 s. 24 ss. 25, 33 s. 27 s. 28 2 & 3 Viet. c. 54 (Talfou | [arriages | | | r Treco | verre | s, m | emma) | 179 |
| 1 Viet. c. 26 (Wills Act) | ١. ٽ | | | • | 388 | 390 | 1000 50 | 022 |
| s. 2 . | | | | | | | 300.00 | 1990 - 1991 1991 - 1991 |
| S. / | | | | | | | 38 | 8 525 |
| ss. 11, 12 | • | | | | | | | 493 |
| s. 20 . e 94 | • | | | | | | | 871 |
| SS 25 22 | | • | • | 33, 50 | , 85, | 855, | 857, 85 | 9.870 |
| s. 27 | | • | ٠ | • | | | | 410 |
| s. 28 | | • | • | • | • | | | 834 |
| 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54 (Talfou 3 & 4 Vict. c. 108, s. 22 | rd's Act | , | | ٠ . | | | | 847 |
| | | | | | | | | 550 |
| 4 & 5 Viet. c. 35, s. 85 ((| opyholo | ls) | Porum | оцѕ, т | reian | a) | • | 47 |
| 4 & 5 Viet. c. 35, s. 85 (67 & 8 Viet. c. 102 (Roma 8 & 9 Viet. c. 16, s. 18 (6 | in Catho | lies) | • | • | | • | • | 209 |
| 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 18 (C. 18 (Lands | ${ m Compani}$ | es Ćlav | ises A | et. 18- | £5) | • | • | 534 |
| c. 18 (Lands s. 69 | Clauses | Conso | lidatio | (n) | .0) | • | • | 488 |
| s. 69 | | • | | | | | | -380 -393 |
| S. 74 | • | | | | | | • | 88 |
| c. 19 (Tanda | 01 | · . | • | | | | | 393 |
| c. 76 (Legger | Clauses, | Scotla | $\mathbf{nd})$ | | | | | 107 |
| c. 106 (Real | Proporto | ٠. | • | | | | | 425 |
| c. 118 (Inclos | nre) |) • | • | | | | | 106 |
| ss. 90. | 91 | • | • | | • | | 191 | , 232 |
| 9 & 10 Vict. c. 70 (Com | non). | • | • | | • | | | 232 |
| 11 & 12 Vict. c. 99, ss. 13 | , 14 (Co. | mmon) | | • | • | | • | 191 |
| 12 & 13 Vict. c. 83, ss. 7, | 11 (Con | imon) | | • | • | • | • | 232 |
| 15 & 16 Viet - 70 | (Trustee | s) ´ | | • | | • | | 232 |
| 16 & 17 Viet o 45 (C | , 32 (Co | mmon) | | | • | • | | 222 |
| c. 18 (Lands s. 69 s. 74 s. 78 c. 19 (Lands c. 76 (Legacy c. 106 (Real) c. 118 (Inclos ss. 90, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 70 (Comm 11 & 12 Vict. c. 99, ss. 13 12 & 13 Vict. c. 83, ss. 7, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 30 15 & 16 Vict. c. 45 (Gove c. 51, s. 30 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90 (Usury c. 97, s. 5 | rnment. | Annuit | ies) . | | : | • | | $\frac{232}{149}$ |
| c. 51, s. 30 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90 (Usury c. 97, s. 5 c. 113 (Local ss. 1, c. 125 (Com | (Success | ion Du | $\mathrm{ty})$. | | | : | • | 371 |
| c. 97 s 5 | <i>()</i> | • | | | | | • | 306 |
| c. 113 (Tool | e Kina | · | ٠. | | | | | 232 |
| ss. 1. | 2 | s Act) | | | | | 51, 53, | 361 |
| c. 125 (Com s. 83 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43 (Infan | mon Ta | v Prog | | 10-4 | 23, 24 | , 25, | 27, 30, | 361 |
| | | | | , | | • | • | 121 |
| 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43 (Infan | ts Settle | ments) | • | • | • | | • | 100 |
| 88. 3. 4 | L | • | | • | • | 17 | 3, 524, | |
| c. 111 (Bill oc. 124, s. 33 | of Ladin | g Mer | chant | Shinn | ino) | • | | 524 |
| c. 124, s. 33 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, s. 19 | (Charita | ble Tr | $\operatorname{ust} \operatorname{A}_1$ | nendn | ⊶ຮ/ ient\ | • | • | 107 |
| 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, s. 19 | (LILUILIA | ge anu | Regis | tratio | a A m | end. | + | 191 |
| s. 21 | Act, 18. | 56) . | ٠. | | | | 10111 | 500 |
| c. 120 ss 22 | 91 95 6 | | | | | · | • | 523 523 |
| c. 120, ss. 23 | $_{\rm Estates}^{24,25,3}$ |)±, 36 (. \ | Leases | s and S | lales c | of Set | $_{ m tled}$ | |
| | ~~ caucs | | • | • | | | | 223 |
| | | | | | | | | |

cxxiii

cxxiv

TABLE OF STATUTES.


| 00 | ۵ | 00 | TT : 1 | | 10 | /77 | • | | D . 1 | | A . | .41 | | | 0.4 | | | PAGE |
|-----|------|-----|---------------|----|------|----------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|---------------|--------|--------------|------------|-------------------|
| 32 | œ | 33 | Vict. | | | | | | | | | 869) | • | • | . 04 | | 744, | 736 |
| | | | | c. | 71 | , s. | 22 | (B | an k | נוניני יונויני | itev | Act, 1 | 869) | • | • | • | • | 136 |
| | | | | ٠. | | | 66 | | | | | | | : | : | : | | 793 |
| | | | | | | | 11 | | · | | | | • | | | | | 107 |
| 33 | & | 34 | Vict. | c. | 14 | | | | lizat | ion | Act | , 1870 |)) | | | | | 676 |
| | | | | | | s. | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 360 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | s and | | | | • - | 161, | |
| | | | | c. | 35 | , ss | . 2 | , 5 /3.5 | (Ap | por | tion | ment | Act) | | 1 | 0-01 | | 880 |
| | | | | c. | 93 | , s. | | (MLE | arrıc 4, 5 | ea ' | vy om | en's l | rope | rty A | .ct, 1 | 010) | • | $\frac{700}{701}$ |
| | | | | | | | _ | , s, | τ, υ | , 0, | 4 | • | | • | • | • | • | 701 |
| | | | | | | | 10 | | : | | | • | : | : | : | • | 708, | 709 |
| | | | | | | | 12 | | | | | | | | | | • | 737 |
| | | | | c. | 10 | 2() | Na | tura | aliza | atio | n) | | | | | | 360, | -676 |
| 34 | £ | 35 | Vict. | c. | 44 | , s. | 10 | (Iı | acui | mbe | ents | Resign d For | nation | a Act |) | ٠ | | 156 |
| ۰ | 0 | 0.0 | TT | c. | 86 | , s. | 3 (| (Aŋ | xili | ary | Lan | d For Acts, | ces) | | | • | | 132 |
| 35 | ď. | 36 | Viet. | c. | 39 | (N | atı | ıral | ızai | 1011 | () 6 4 . | | 1050 | | • | :00 | 360, | 676 |
| 90 | œ | 01 | V 106. | e. | 12 | (0 | นะเ 1 | oay | OI | III | iants | Acts, | 1810 |) | • | 520, | , 040, | , 542 555 |
| | | | | Ċ. | بشا | | $\frac{1}{2}$ | | • | | • | : | • | • | • | 590 | , 555, | 897 |
| | | | | | | | $\tilde{3}$ | | • | | • | : | | • | : | | , | 555 |
| | | | | c. | 35 | | | | De | ben | ture | s) | | : | • | : | · | 107 |
| | | | | c. | 66 | J_1 | udi | cat | ure | Act | t, 187 | s) [3) | | | • | | | 660 |
| | | | | | | s. | 3 | • | | | | | | | | | | 783 |
| | | | | | | | 4 | | • | | • | • | | • | • | • | • | 783 |
| | | | | | | | 16 | | • | | • | • | • | • | 186, | 426, | 688, | |
| | | | | | | | $\frac{19}{24}$ | | • | | • | • | • | • | • | 100 | 090 | 783 |
| | | | | | | ъ. | 24 | | b-s. | 1 | • | • | • | • | • | 420, | 630, 67 | |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. | | : | : | : | • | • | 67 | 660, | 660 |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. | | : | | | : | : | | | 167 |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. | | | | · · | . 67, | 141, | 660, | 688, | 787 |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. | | | | | 252, | 630, | 784, | 786, | 788 |
| | | | | | | | ۸. | | b-s. | 7 | • | • | | • | | | | 209 |
| | | | | | | s. | 25 | | | 0 | • | • | • | | • | • | | 426 |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. | | • | •. | 107 | 141 | | | 536, | 907 |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. b-s. | | | • | 107, | 141, | 140, | 150, | 151, | 152 |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. | | | • | • | • | • | • | 214, 517, | 100 |
| | | | | | | | | | b-s. | | | : | : | | 67. | 660. | 688, | 784 |
| | | | | | | s. | 34 | | b-s. | | | | | | | • | 208, | 517 |
| 0. | ٥ | 00 | TT: . | | | s. | 36 | | | | | | | _ | | | | 786 |
| 37 | œ | 38 | Viet. | c. | 50, | s. | 1 (| Ma: | rrie | d V | Vome | n's A | ct, 18 | 370, <i>1</i> | 1mer | $_{ m idme}$ | $_{ m nt}$ | |
| | | | | | | | | | 187 | 74) | • | • | | • | • | | | 737 |
| | | | | | | | $\frac{2}{2}$ | , 4, | 5 | | • | • | • | • | • | • | | 737 |
| | | | | c. | 57 | 88 | 8 | 10 | /Re | · fee | Pron | erty I | imit | | 1 04) | | | 739 |
| | | | | c. | 62 | (In | faı | at F | Relie | ef) | r rop | • | 11111110 | иноп | Acti | • | 907, | 908 467 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | : | | | 345 |
| 0.0 | c | o - | ~~. | c. | 78 | (Ve | enc | lors | an | d P | urch | asers | Act. | 1874 |) | | : | 768 |
| 38 | Å | 39 | Vict. | c. | 77 | (1) | adi | cati | ure | Act | t, 18' | 75) | . ′ | • | | | | 786 |
| | | | | | | s. | 10 | | • | | • | • | | | | | 34 | , 48 |
| 30 | Ŗ, | 40 | Vict | | 1 17 | s. | 11 | :4: | ٠. | | | | | | | | | 786 |
| υŋ | oc · | ŧυ | Vict. | c. | 17 | | | 1110 | n) | | • | • | • | • | | | | 211 |
| | | | | | | s. s. | | • | • | | • | • | • | • | 212, | 225, | 229, | 230 |
| | | | | | | s. | | | • | | • | • | • | • | • | 212, | 230, | |
| | | | | | | s. | | • | · | | | : | | 218 | 224 | 231 | 232, | 231 |
| | | | | | | s. | | | | | | • | | | | <i>ω</i> υ1, | | $\frac{592}{232}$ |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | • | • | |



cxxv

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | P | AGE |
|----|------------------|------|--------|------|------|---------|-------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------|-------------|-------|---------|--------|--------|---|
| 45 | S. | 46 | Vict. | c. | 75. | s. 28 | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | 167 |
| 46 | s. | 47 | Vict. | c. | 52. | s. 4 | (Ba | nkı | rupt | tev. | Act | , 188 | 33) | | | | | 203 |
| 10 | | ٠, | 1 100. | ٠. | ٠, | s. 10 | 0 811 | b-9 | . 2 | | | , | . ′ | | | | | 792 |
| | | | | | | ss. 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | 636 |
| | | | | | | s. 4 | | | • | - | | | | | | | 158, | 161 |
| | | | | | | D. 1 | | ıh. | s. ii | ; | | | | | | _ | . ' | 135 |
| | | | | | | s. 5 | | | | | • | | • | • | • | | | 136 |
| | | | | | | s. 5 | - 1 | 10- | · 5. U | • | • | | | • | • | • | • | 158 |
| | | | | | | B. U | | h. | s. 2 | • | | | • | • | • | • | • | 156 |
| | | | | | | ~ 5 | | ID- | D. 4 | • | • | | • | • | • | • | ٠. | 157 |
| | | | | | | s. 5 | | | • | • | | | • | • | • | • | • | 161 |
| | | | | | | s. 5 | | | | ٠ | | • | • | • | • | • | • | 793 |
| | | | | | | s. 9 | | | • | • | | | • | • | • | • | een | 785 |
| | | | | | | s. 9 | | | | • | • | | • | • | • | • | 660, | 793 |
| | | | | | | s. 1 | | | | • | | | • | • | | 200 | -00 | |
| | | | *** 1 | | | s. 1 | | | | XX7 | • | 1. TO | | | | | 789, | |
| 47 | ď | 48 | Vict | . с. | 14, | s. 1 | (M | arr: | iea | VV OI | ner | 18.1 | $_{\circ}$ | rty | Act, 1 | 204) | • | 742 |
| | | | | c. | 61, | , S. 1 | 4 (J | ua: | icat | ure | AC | , 10 | 0# <i>]</i> | | • | • | • | 014 |
| | | | | c. | 68 | (Ma | un | ion | 181 | Cau | ses. | ACU | , 100 | 4) | 519 | • | • | 33.1 |
| | | | ~~. | c. | 71 | (Inte | esta | tes | Es | tate | s, 1 | 884) |) | | | - | | 411 |
| 49 | Œ | 50 | Vict | . с. | 27 | (Gu | ard | ıan | ship | 10 | 1n: | tants | Act | :)- | 519. | , 021, | 044, | 002 |
| | | | | | | 50 - 24 | • | | | ٠ | | | • | ٠ | • | .,, | 00.1 | .,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, |
| | | | | | | s. 3 | | | | | • | | • | • | • | • | 537, | |
| | | | | | | SS. | 4, 5 | | • _ | | | | 13 | • | • | • | 541, | |
| | | | | | | ss. | 6, 7 | , 8, | _9, | 10, | 11, | 12, | 13 | ٠. | | • | 543, | ððī |
| | | | | c. | 52 | | | | | | | | | | n Case | e of | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | • | 697 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | teve | nue | Act) | | | 371 |
| 51 | æ | 52 | Vict | | | , s. 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | 229 |
| | | | | c. | 59 | , s. 6 | | us | tee . | $\operatorname{Act},$ | , 18 | 88) . | | | | | • | 766 |
| | | | | | | s. 8 | | | | | | | | | | | 536, | 909 |
| 52 | & | 53 | Vict | . с. | 30 | (Bos | ard o | of. | $_{ m Agr}$ | icul | tur | e) | | | | | 191, | 232 |
| | | | | c. | 49 | , ss. | 13, 1 | 14 | (Ar) | bitra | atio | n) | | | | | | 190 |
| | | | | c. | 56 | (Poo | r L | aw | Act | t). | | | | | | | 519, | 559 |
| | | | | | | s. 6 | | | | • | | | | | | | | 519 |
| 53 | \mathbf{V}_{1} | ict. | c. 5, | | | (Lu | | у А | ct) | | | | | | | | | 211 |
| | | | | s. | 120 | (b) | | | | | | | | | | | | 232 |
| | | | | | 123 | | | | | | | | | | | | 386, | 865 |
| 53 | & | 54 | Vict | . с. | 23 | , s. 3 | (Cl | nan | cer | y of | La | ncas | ter) | | | | | 229 |
| | | | | c. | 29 | (Inte | esta | tes | Es | tate | s, 1 | .890 |) | | | -233, | 411, | 412 |
| | | | | e. | 39 | , ss. | 14, | 36, | 37 | (Par | rtne | ershi | p Ac | et, 1 | 890) | | | 481 |
| | | | | | | , s. 9 | | | | | | | | | · | | | 228 |
| | | | | c. | 63 | (Con | npa | $_{ m nie}$ | s W | ind | ing | up. | Act) | | | | | 818 |
| | | | | c. | 69 | , s. 1 | 5~(S | ett | led | Lar | $\operatorname{ad} I$ | Λcŧ, | 189Ó |) . | | | | 388 |
| | | | | c. | 71 | , s. 2 | 1 (E | Ban | kru | pter | y A | ct, 1 | 890) | ٠. | | | | 790 |
| 54 | V | ict. | c. 3 | (Cı | ısto | ody o | f Cl | hilo | iren | Ac | t. 1 | 891) | , | | | 519. | 521, | 549 |
| | | | | s. 1 | | | | | | | • | . ′ | | | | | . ' | 558 |
| | | | | ss. | 2, 3 | 3. | | | | | | | | | | | 558, | |
| | | | | s. 4 | F . | | | | | | | | | | | | 541, | |
| | | | | s. 5 | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 558 |
| 54 | E | 55 | Vict | . c. | 39 | (Star | mp. | Ac | t. 18 | 391) | | | | Ī | · | · | • | 118 |
| | | | | c. | 73 | The | Mo | orti | nair | n an | d C | hari | tabli | e II: | ses Ac | E) . | • | 360 |
| | | | | | | ss. 5 | | | _ | | | | | О О. | 200 210 | | 360, | |
| | | | | | | s. 9 | _ | | | Ċ | | • | • | • | • | 00, | , 500, | 56 |
| 55 | & | 56 | Vict | . c. | 23 | (For | eier | 1 M | Tarr | iaore | À | ·t.) | • | • | • | • | • | 523 |
| 56 | & | 57 | Vict | . c. | 53 | (Tru | stee | A | ct | 1899 | , <u>, , ,</u> (| -0) | • | • | • | • | • 70 | 523 1, 91 |
| | | | | | | s. 16 | | | | | 1. | | • | • | • | • | . 10 | 768 |
| | | | | | | s. 30 | | | | • | | | • | • | • | • | • | 211 |
| | | | | | | s. 31 | | | | ٠ | • | | • | • | • | ٠ | 216, | |
| | | | | | | s. 42 | | • | - | • | • | | • | • | • | • | | |
| | | | | | | s. 45 | | | • | • | | | • | • | • | • | 661, | |
| | | | | | | | • | | • | • | • | | • | • | | • | 727, | 100 |

| -0 0 FF TT' 1 | 00 /3 5 | | CT. | , 7 | | | | 0.01 | | | AGE |
|------------------|------------|--------|--------------|--------|--------|---------|------------------|------------------|-------|---------|------|
| 56 & 57 Viet. e. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | s. 1 | • | • | • | • | | 711, | 726, | 729, | 747, | |
| | s. 2 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | | <u></u> | 712 |
| | s. 3 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 113, | 715, | |
| | s. 4 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 713 |
| | s. 6 | | | | • | • | • | • | • | ٠ | 713 |
| C. | 71, s. 58 | (15a16 | 01 (| roods | Act) | • | • | • | • | • | 329 |
| 57 & 58 Vict. c. | 30, s. 1 (| Ema: | nce <i>I</i> | ict, 1 | 894) | • | • | • | • | • | 370 |
| • | S. 9 (| 1) | . , , , | | • | • | • | • | ٠ | 31, | 372 |
| c. | 46, s. 52 | (Cop | ynor | ar) | - | • | • | • | • | • | 191 |
| ro e ro 77° 4 | S. 81 | | ٠, . | ٠, ، | | ٠. | | •• | | | 209 |
| 58 & 59 Viet. c. | 39 (Sum | mary | Jun | saict: | ton (A | larrie | d Wo | men) |) 696 | ,697 | ,700 |
| 60 & 61 Viet. c. | 60, s. 1 | or n | · m | | : . | 1005 | • | • | ٠. | 370, | 468 |
| | | | . Tra | nster | Act, | 1897) | • | • | . 1 | 2, 49 | |
| 01 0 00 771 1 | s. 11 | | | • | | • | | • | • | • | 162 |
| 61 & 62 Viet. c. | 48, S. 1, | sub-s | 5. 2 (. | Bene: | nces) | | • | • | | | 215 |
| 63 & 64 Viet. c. | | | | | | | | | 326, | | |
| | | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | . 3 | 37 et | |
| | s. 2 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 340, | |
| | ss. 3, | 4, 5 | • | • | • | • | • | • | | ٠ | 341 |
| e 77.7 = 40. | s. 6 | ٠., | | ٠. | | ٠ | | | | ے را | 341 |
| 7 Edw. 7, c. 18, | | rried | Won | ien's | Prope | erty A | et, 19 | 1 07) | 713, | 717, | |
| | s. 2 | • | • | ٠ | • | • | • | • | • | · | 713 |
| | s. 3 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 714, | |
| 0777 = 0= | 8. 4 | **** | ٠, | | ٠, | : | | • | | • | 714 |
| 8 Edw. 7, c. 27 | | | | | | | 1908) | • | • | | 710 |
| | ss. 12–2 | | | | | | | • | | 539, | |
| c. 69 | (Compan | ies (C | onsc | lidat: | ion) A | Lct,:19 | 3 08) | • | • | • | 818 |
| | s. 27 | • | | | | • | • | • | • | | 133 |
| | s. 59 | | • | | | | | • | • | • | 111 |
| | s. 89 | • | | | | • | • | • | • | | 486 |
| | s. 105 | • | • | • | • | | • | • | • | • | 116 |
| | s. 128 | • | | • | | | • | • | ٠ | | 741 |
| | s. 140 | | • | | • | • | • | • | | • | 791 |
| | s. 151 | • | | • | • | • | • | | • | • | 162 |



ADMINISTRATION.

DUKE OF ANCASTER v. MAYER.

1783, 1784, 1785. 1 Bro. Ch. 453.

Primary Liability of Personal Estate to the Payment of Debts.— Exoneration.

Personal estate, not specifically bequeathed, is primarily liable to the payment of the debts of a testator, unless it be exempted by express words or necessary implication.

Notwithstanding a charge upon a term for payment of debts, a leasehold estate purchased by the testator subject to a mortgage shall bear the burden of that mortgage, it not being properly the debt of the testator.

Charles Bertie made his will, dated the 9th of November, 1759, and thereby devised as follows: "I give and devise to Thomas Noel and John Mayer, their executors, administrators, and assigns, all those my manors, lands, &c., in Lincolnshire, to have and to hold to them, from the time of my decease, for the term of ninety-nine years, upon the trusts hereinafter mentioned." He then gave the real estate, subject to the term, and in default of issue of his own body, to Montague Bertie, for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to the plaintiff for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, with remainders over, and afterwards declared as follows: "I do hereby declare, that the term and estate so as aforesaid limited to them the said Thomas Noel and John Mayer their executors, administrators, and assigns, for ninety-nine years. is upon the special trust and confidence, and to the intents and purposes following; that is to say, Upon trust and confidence that they the said Thomas Noel and John Mayer, their executors, &c., shall out of the rents and profits, or by mortgage, assignment, or demise of all or any part of my before-mentioned manors, &c., or any of them, for all or any part of the said term of ninety-nine years, or otherwise as to their discretion shall seem meet, levy and raise so much lawful money of Great Britain as will be sufficient to pay and satisfy all

the debts I shall owe at the time of my decease, my funeral charges, and all the legacies and sums of money given by me in and by this my will, and pay and apply the same accordingly. And my will and mind is, that after so much money shall be raised as shall answer the purposes aforesaid, together with all costs and charges in or about levying or raising thereof, the said term shall cease and determine." He then devised as follows: "I give and devise to my brother, Montague Bertie, his executors and administrators, all that the manor of East and West Deeping, holden by lease from the Crown, subject to the yearly rent and covenants reserved in the said lease, and also subject to the mortgage thereon to Mrs. Millicent Neate, of London, for 6500l.; but in case my said brother shall not be living at the time of my decease, then I give the said estate and premises, with the appurtenances, (subject as aforesaid,) to such person as shall be entitled to the freehold of my real estate at the time of my decease, by virtue of the aforesaid limitations in this my will." And towards the end of his will he devised as follows: "Item, I also give all my household goods, and all other my goods, chattels, effects, and personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever, unto my said brother, Montague Bertie, if he shall be living at the time of my death; but in case he shall be then dead, I give and devise the same to such person as shall be entitled to the freehold of my real estate, under and by virtue of the limitations in this my will: Provided always, and I do hereby declare my mind and will to be, that in case I shall, at the time of my death, leave issue of my own body, that then, and in such case as well all and every the before mentioned uses, devises, and limitations to my said brother, Montague Bertie, the Duke of Ancaster, and their respective heirs, and also the devise of the residue of my personal estate, shall be utterly void; and in such case I do hereby will, and my mind is, that all my real estate, subject to the said term of ninety-nine years, shall descend according to the rules of law, and that the residue of my personal estate shall go and be distributed in such manner, and to and among such persons, as if I had died intestate. And I do hereby nominate and appoint the said Thomas Noel and John Mayer executors of this my last will; and I do hereby will, order, direct, and appoint, that my said executors and the survivor of them shall and do pay, satisfy, and discharge my funeral charges, and all my debts and legacies, as soon as they shall

become due and payable, by such methods, ways, and means, and in such manner as he or they, or their counsel learned in the law, shall in that behalf advise and think meet; and it shall and may be lawful to my said executors, or either of them, to deduct and satisfy to him or themselves, out of my personal estate, or out of the monies to be raised out of the said term of ninety-nine years before to them devised, all such disbursements, expenses, and charges which they or either of them shall be put to in proving this my will, or by any other ways or means whatsoever in or about the execution of this my will."

Montague Bertie died in the lifetime of the testator, and the plaintiff became entitled, under the limitations in the will, to the real estate.

The leasehold estate had been, several years before, mortgaged by the testator's father for 6500l. to Mrs. Neate, and in 1765 the mortgage was assigned, by the desire of the testator, to Sir Thomas Palmer, who advanced the testator a further sum of 100l. on it, and the testator conveyed other estates as an additional security for the 6600l.

This cause was first heard before the late Lords Commissioners.

Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Madocks, and Mr. Kenyon, for the plaintiffs.— There are three questions in this case: first, whether the personal estate is exonerated of the debts (a); secondly, whether the mortgaged estate is liable to the mortgage (b); thirdly, what interest the duke takes in the personal estate.

Mr. Selwyn, Mr. Arden, and Mr. Ainge, for the defendants.—As to the last question, we contend the duke can take a limited interest for life only, there being no addition of executors or administrators in the will. Secondly, with respect to the second, that the mortgaged premises must bear their own burthen.

As to the first point, which is the principal question, it depends on the several clauses in the will (c).

- (a) Wainwright v. Bendelowes, 2 Vern. 718; Anderton v. Cooke, 1 Bro. Ch. 456; Stapleton v. Colville, Cas. t. Talbot, 202; Kynaston v. K., 1 Bro. Ch. 457; Holiday v. Bowman, 1 Bro. Ch. 145; Bampfield v. Wyndham, Pr. Ch. 101; as to which three last cases see infra, p. 16, n. (d).
- (b) Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. W. 386; Galton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 437.
- (v) Bromhall v. Wilbraham (at the Rolls, November, 1734); Inchiquin v. French, 1 Cox, 1; Fereges v. Robinson, Bunb. 301; Stephenson v. Heathcote, 1 Eden, 38.

Lords Commissioners Ashurst and Hotham held: (1) that the plaintiff was entitled to the personal estate exempt from payment of debts; (2) that the mortgage must be paid out of the devised estate; (3) that the plaintiff took an absolute interest in the personalty.

A petition was presented for a rehearing, which came on before Lord *Thurlow*, the 16th of June, 1784. The arguments used, and the cases cited, were a recapitulation of those before the Lords Commissioners.

LORD CHANCELLOR THURLOW.—It would be highly advantageous to property if there were a settled rule where the personalty shall be applied to the payment of debts, and where it shall be exempted from them. One step has been taken toward such a rule, by its being laid down, that charging the estate in any way is not of itself an exemption of the personal estate; that the personal estate being the fund first liable, where it is to be aided by either a legal or an equitable fund, it must be itself in the first place applied.

The question that next arises is, whether, a real estate being charged, and the personal given away, a presumption arises that this shall be exempted from the debts. I never heard, till the arguments in this case, that such a rule had been extracted from the authorities on the subject; on the contrary, I have always understood that, in order to exempt the personal estate, the testator must express an intention so to do, although no particular form of words was necessary for the purpose. I therefore take the rule in primis to be, that neither the charge of the debts upon the real estate, or the gift of the personal is sufficient of itself to exempt it. But it is indubitably true, that express words are not necessary to exempt the personal estate: the question therefore is, whether a presumption can be drawn of the testator's intention to exonerate the personal estate. It is impossible to express in definition what circumstances shall be sufficient to raise this presumption. It must arise from the context of the will; but, with great deference to the opinion which has been given, I think there is not sufficient in this will.

After devising his real estate, the testator takes up the term; he places it before any of his other estates, and before his issue, so that he meant it to be a subsisting term for the payment of his debts.

He gives his leasehold estate to Montague Bertie, but without any predilection; for he gives it to whoever should be entitled to the possession of his freehold estate. He then proceeds to declare the trusts of the term which are to raise money to pay his debts and legacies; and after raising them, the term is to cease. He then disposes of the rest of his personal estate. He afterwards determines what shall be done with the personal estates in case he should have issue. In the provision which he superadds, he takes notice of the devise of the personalty, and calls it a residue; by which he means the devise of the personal estate after the specific bequest. He provides then, that if he should die leaving issue, the dispositions he had made should fail: this was not essentially necessary, though apparently so. He then makes a general provision for the discharge of the executors, who are also trustees; so that it is given them in the character of executors. It is also material to observe, that, in the special and general disposition of the personal estate to the same person who shall be entitled to the possession of the real, the personal is made to accrue to the real, which is settled with the utmost strictness. The question, then, is whether any inference is to be drawn, that he meant it should go with the burthen the law throws upon it, or it is to be presumed that it should be exonerated, for the purpose of throwing that burthen upon the freehold estate, which he has given in the strictest manner. The inference rather seems to me to be, that he meant to protect the real estate, and therefore that the personal should bear its natural burthen. By chance he has gone further: for, where he has given directions for the indemnity of his executors, he has directed the expenses to be taken out of either the personal or real estate. He has, in that clause, arranged the estates as the law would arrange them; which affords an inference that he meant the real estate only to be in aid of the personal. I should therefore think, if the rule were, that the gift of the personal estate to a stranger was sufficient to raise a presumption that it was to be exempt from the debts, he had sufficiently here expressed his intention that it should not be so; but I take the general rule to be the other way.

I should have no doubt on the intention of the testator in this respect, if there were not another point, which I think ought to undergo a further inquiry—I mean the mortgage of the leasehold

estate. The case of Serle v. St. Eloy (a) went upon the idea of the charge upon the real estate being the debt of the testator. If that case were recent, and had not been followed, I should have thought, upon the face of it, it was very open to argument. The difference between the cases is, that if it had been real estate mortgaged by the father, it would have been liable only as a charge; but, in the present case, the debt of the father falls upon the estate in two ways—partly as being a charge, and partly as a debt, upon the personal estate. It must be referred to the Master to consider the circumstances of the debt of 6000l., and the estate on which it was secured; and, as that point must stand over, I shall think it no impediment to the justice of the Court, to defer the decree upon the other point also.

The Master having made his report that the 6000l. was a charge upon the leasehold estate prior to the testator's having any interest in it, and that he had only covenanted for the payment of the money upon the transfer of the mortgage from Mrs. Neate to Sir Thomas Palmer (b), the cause was again set down for argument on the 4th July, 1785, and then stood for judgment till the next day, when the Lord Chancellor pronounced his decree.

LORD CHANCELLOR THURLOW.—Whether the personal estate should be liable, in the first instance, in exoneration of the real estate, to the payment of debts in wills of this kind, upon looking into the cases I find to be a point so slender and fine that I cannot collect any certainty upon the question; but so much uncertainty abounds, that, could the will of a testator be referred to a number of lawyers, they would probably entertain a diversity of opinions upon it.

The point ought to be fixed; and, in order to make it so, I take it, the rules have been these, and should be adhered to. In the first place, that the personal estate is liable in the first instance to the payment of the debts; but (in exception to this) it is agreed that the testator may, if he pleases, give his personal estate, as against his heir or any other representative, clear of the payment of his debts; and then it becomes a question, what is the mode of expression to

⁽a) 2 P. W. 386. seems, advanced to the testator. Vide

⁽b) A further sum of 100l. was, it ante, p. 3.

give the personal estate exempt from such payment, when the rule of law is, that such estate is first liable. Perhaps it might have been not unwise to have adopted the rule laid down in Fereges v. Robinson (a)—that the testator must use express words for that purpose; but it is impossible to abide by the opinion given in that case, consistently with the rules in other cases. The second rule is, that where there is a declaration plain; that shall stand in lieu of express words. This rule has been laid down so long, and acted upon so constantly, that if other judges were to put the construction of wills upon other grounds, how wise soever it might have been originally to have done so, it would be very unwise to make the administration of justice take a course contrary to former rules. Therefore if there be a declaration plain, or manifestation clear, so that it is apparent, upon the face of the will, that there is such a plain intention, the rule then is, not to disappoint, but to carry such intent into execution. But should not such intention manifestly appear, there is not a single case which does not take it for granted that the personal estate is, by law, the first fund for the payment of debts.

In regard, then, to the general intention of the will of Charles Bertie, the testator was seised of a real estate, which he had in his contemplation (exclusive of the idea of his own children), and wished to leave it to other lines of the family of Bertie; and consequently devised it to Montague Bertie, with remainder over to Peregrine Bertie for life, &c.: so far, in respect of the real estate his intention was to fix it in the name and blood of the family.

The next object he had in view was a leasehold estate, which he held under the Crown; that estate was a chattel interest, and with regard to that, he does not shew such a wish to fix and continue that estate in the line of Bertie: his apparent wish was not so strong as in respect to the disposal of his real estate; for had it been so though he could not have created an entail of this leasehold estate with limitations over, yet he might have prevented the first taker of it from alienating it. Had the testator been asked the question, whether he meant that this part of his estate should be subject to the mortgage, or to give it entire to the first taker of the real estate, or to charge the term of ninety-nine years in exoneration of the other estate, this might have been a very doubtful question, and merely

conjectural, though, perhaps, he might have answered, that that estate should pay the debts; but whatever his intention was, he has positively given it subject to the payment of the debt: therefore, if another estate had been appropriated to payment of his debts, and this had been his debt upon the estate, I should have concurred with the Lords Commissioners (a): but in following them in that course, in which they considered it as being the clear intention in the mind of the testator, that the real estate should be so appropriated, I rather think otherwise; for it appears to me as if the testator wished it should not, and that he chose that the leasehold estate should be so appropriated rather than to have burthened the real estate. For the mode of limiting the estate to Montague Bertie for life implies the intention of giving him a personal bounty; but, in case of failure of issue, he gives it to the next heir who should come into possession, &c. Had the real estate been expressly charged with payment of the debts, or the testator shewn an anxious intention to have sacrificed his real estate in preference to the leasehold or his other estate, for that purpose, by the mode of disposing of his estates, such a circumstance might have been sufficient to have turned the rule of law; and it must have been appropriated to the payment of debts, let him have charged it in any manner he pleased.

When the testator purchased this leasehold estate he purchased the equity of redemption; and the mortgage was to be considered merely as a real incumbrance upon the estate itself, and not a personal debt, as against the purchaser, according to the rules of this Court and cases decided. For if a man purchases an equity of redemption, subject to an incumbrance, that shall be a real incumbrance following the land, and not a personal one. The question is, whether by purchasing this estate, and assigning the mortgage from Mrs. Neate to Hoare (b), and covenanting for payment of debts, he did not make it his own debt. Had Evelyn v. E. (c) never been decided, a fair argument might have arisen upon that head; because, where a man transfers a mortgage, and covenants for the payment of the debt according to the rule of law, he makes it his own debt, and makes himself liable to be sued upon that covenant; and such a debt

⁽a) See Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. (b) Qu. Palmer. 227; Bickham v. Cruttwell, 3 My. & (c) 2 P. W. 659. C. 763.

has priority before other simple contract debts. Now, I do not know in what Court, or by what rule, the debt would have followed the purchaser personally; but Evelyn v. E. (a) has decided, that though he might be at law liable, yet while there are real assets sufficient for the payment of the incumbrance, they shall be applied for that purpose; and it is to be understood with respect to such transaction, that the party did it by way of accommodating the charge, and not of making the debt his own. The difference between the estate descended and purchased is nothing, unless the circumstance of purchasing creates the difference; but that affords no argument.

The next question is, whether, when he mortgages an estate of his own as an ulterior security, that circumstance would create a difference; as if, in Evelyn v. E. (a), an additional real fund had been secured for making the debt good, that would have turned the judgment: it would not; for nothing makes it his debt so effectually as the covenant to pay; for it does not create the debt, but only operates as collateral to the debt. A man mortgages his estate without covenant, yet, because the money was borrowed, the mortgagee becomes a simple contract creditor, and in that case the mortgage is a collateral security; and if there is a bond or a covenant, then there is a collateral security of a higher species, but no higher by means of the mortgage merely: therefore, having such security amounts to nothing: and I have no doubt but that if the case had been stated to the Lords Commissioners, namely, that this incumbrance was not one of the testator's debts, and did not fall upon the personal estate, that they would have considered it as inherent to the leasehold estate. The argument of its not falling upon the testator answers his real intention better. But as to the real intention, I should have agreed with the Lords Commissioners, could that intention have been made clear; but the intention does not amount to a declaration plain, in any sense in which these words have been properly applied.

For the purpose of securing property and the due administration of justice in a free country, judges ought to abide constantly by real principles, and by such beneficial rules as may afford some reasonable judgment, without applying to a superior tribunal. It is a fixed rule, that the personal estate must be first liable, unless

another fund is provided; the testator must express his intention to discharge that estate from the payment of debts.

With regard to the intention apparent upon this will, it is said such intention is most anxiously limited to the raising of the term of ninety-nine years. Whether the expression be more or less, it is but subjecting the estate to the payment of debts; and it cannot extend so far as to suppose he burthened his real estate in exoneration of the personal estate. If there had been in the gift of the personal estate words of a sufficient force, according to my notion of a declaration plain, I should not have changed the force of those words; but the intent of these words, as they stand, naturally leans to subject the personal estate to the debts. With respect to the second clause, had that stood alone, I confess that would have been liable to a degree of inference; but constructions thus picked up, and collected from more circumstances than are necessary for the purpose, are not good ways of finding out the intention of the testator; and it is better to rest upon settled rules, unless you can collect more favourable and forcible observations. With regard to the next clause, that carries more weight, because the trustees are directed to pay, not only the expense of the probate of the will, which is expressly mentioned, but to pay all the charges and expenses that should arise by proving the will, or by any other means, &c. How are these to be paid? Out of the personal estate, or the means to be raised out of the term of ninety-nine years? They have authority to pay the whole out of the personal estate an optional clause, and empowering the executors to pay out of this fund before the other fund is ready for the purpose. He has precisely arranged the estates in the same order that the law would have done; he has made his personal estate first liable, and then the term. The true ground upon which I proceed is not upon any of these criticisms, but simply upon the rule of law, the testator not having declared by express words, or any other declaration, which would tend in law to the purpose of preserving the personal estate for any given purpose whatever. As to Adams v. Meyrick (a), that depended on the circumstance of the personal estate being a provision for the wife; and, therefore, the Court forced a construction upon the will, and it is, as Lord Hardwicke termed it, in Walker v.

(a) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 271.

Jackson (a), a weak case: in the latter case, the republication of the will was an argument much relied upon. As to the cases determined upon the words "rest and residue," I could have wished his Lordship had decided upon them all, so as to have left a particular note upon each of them; for such determinations as those cases afford have occasioned great perplexity upon the rule of law. As to Stapleton v. Colville (b), in that case the wife was executrix, and, exclusive of the context of the will, with regard to the option given to her to charge either fund, there never was a stronger case against charging the real estate; for he gives the whole real estate to the wife, and to be charged with debts; he wishes the continuance in his name and family, and yet charges it with the payment of the debts. Lord Talbot observed, much might arise from the examination as to the quantum of the debts and the amount of the personal Lord Talbot took it as clear, that such an examination could be gone into. In Stephenson v. Heathcote (c), it is said expressly, no examination can be had. In that case, Lord Keeper Henley relied much upon the wife being executrix. The case was this: that the testator gave all his real estate to R. and his wife for ever, with a charge thereon for payment of debts; and, after disposing of other property, he gives a silver tobacco-box to his uncle, and all the residue he gives to his wife for ever, whom he appointed sole executrix. The Lord Keeper's observation upon this case was, that the intent of the testator was to be collected from the words of the will, and from no circumstances out of it; and, upon general principles and rules established in the cases, that the Court could not go into the testator's circumstances, as it would establish a rule not to be adhered to. The testator intended to charge his personal estate with payment of his debts, and only made his real estate an auxiliary fund: according to the rule of law, where the intent of the testator is plain, or words tantamount to express words, that is sufficient to take it out of the rule, and that it could not be the intention; for the last clause, of giving the silver tobacco-box, and then the residue to his wife, is not sufficient to shew his intention to give the residue free from debts, but that the primary fund should be liable.

In the present case, I am obliged to differ from the Lords Commissioners, and consider the whole personal estate as liable to the

⁽a) 2 Atk. 624.

⁽b) Cas. t. Talbot, 202.

⁽c) 1 Eden, 38, 44.

payment of the debts; and, with respect to the leasehold estate, that the charge under which it came to the testator was prior to his purchasing it, and inherent in the estate, and the estate itself left liable to answer it, and that neither the personal estate nor real estate ought to be charged with that debt.

The judgment, ex relatione.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Cases illustrating the principle of exoneration.
- Exoneration of mortgaged estates not within Real Estate Charges Acts, p. 22.
- 4. Exoneration of mortgaged estates under Real Estate Charges Acts, p. 23.
- 5. Order of Application of Assets, (1) generally: (2) where mortgaged estate is exonerated, p. 31.

1. Generally.

The rule laid down in the principal case, viz., that the general personal estate of a testator is the primary fund for the payment of his debts, unless it be exempted by express words or manifest intent, has been fully recognised. But the difficulty of gathering the intent, where the exoneration of the personal estate does not depend upon express words, is very great. Certain circumstances may have more or less weight with the Court deciding the question, but such circumstances may be explained or rebutted by other parts of the will. For the intention of the testator, which is the thing to be got at, is to be collected from the whole will (a). Extrinsic evidence is not admissible (b), and the burden of proof lies on those who contend for exemption (c). The Land Transfer Act, 1897, has not affected this principle: see s. 2, sub-s. 3, of that Act, nor has it rendered express trusts for the payment of debts out of realty or charges upon it for that purpose futile (d).

2. Cases illustrating the Principle of Exoneration:

Express Words. See cases (e).—It is not essential to the validity of a direction exempting a fund of personalty from payment of debts,

- (a) Jarman (1893), p. 1462; Watson v. Brickwood, 9 V. 453; Kilford v. Blaney, 31 C. D. 56; In re Banks, (1905) 1 Ch. 547; Aldridge v. Wallscourt, 1 B. & B. 312.
- (b) Inchiquin v. French, 1 Cox, 1; Stephenson v. Heathcote, 1 Eden, 38.
- (c) Whieldon v. Spode, 15 B. 537;
- Lord v. Wightwick, 1 Drew. 576; Kilford v. Blaney, 31 C. D. 56.
- (d) Re Kempster, (1906) 1 Ch. 446; Re Balls, (1909) 1 Ch. 791; cf. Re Stephens, 43 C. D. 39.
- (e) Morrow v. Bush, 1 Cox, 185; Young v. Y., 26 B. 522; Dawes v. Scott, 5 Russ. 32; Forrest v. Prescott, 10 Eq. 545.

that the fund should be specifically bequeathed, for the direction is equally good, though the fund not being disposed of falls into the residue (a). Where personalty is expressly exempted from payment of debts, and they are thrown upon certain real estate which proves insufficient, they cannot come upon the personalty until every other fund, even real estate settled by the will of the testator, has been exhausted (b). When, however, certain land is given for payment of debts in exoneration of the personalty, but without express exemption of the personalty, generally, if that land is insufficient for that purpose, the primary liability of the personalty remains for the purpose of making good the deficiency (c). If, moreover, the land and the residue are both given exempt from the payment of debts, on failure of other funds, the residue is primarily liable (d).

Exemption by Plain Intention.— Such an intention is not shown merely by a charge upon land, or a trust to sell, or the creation of a term for payment of the debts (e); although the charge be by deed (f). Nor *semble*, by a devise of real estate, upon the condition of the devisee paying the testator's debts (g).

A gift of the real and personal estate together will not be sufficient. So where real and personal estate was given to trustees, upon trust to receive the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and to pay certain legacies and annuities and to invest and accumulate the surplus of the whole of the property in trust for the same persons, the income arising from the personal estate was held to remain primarily liable (h). But if the realty is devised upon trust for sale, and the proceeds are blended with the personalty upon trust for payment

- (a) Coventry v. C., 2 Dr. & Sm. 470.
- (b) Morrow v. Bush, 1 Cox, 185; Young v. Y., 26 B. 522.
 - (c) Colvile v. Middleton, 3 B. 570.
- (d) Brooke v. Warwick, 1 H. & Tw. 142.
- (e) Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. 193; Tower v. Rous, 18 V. 132; Brydges v. Phillipps, 6 V. 567; White v. W., 2 Vern. 43; Inchiquin v. French, 1 Cox, 1; Tait v. Northwick, 4 V. 816; Hancox v. Abbey, 11 V. 186; Rhodes v. Rudge, 1 Si. 79; Collis v. Robins,
- 1 De G. & Sm. 131; Ouseley v. Anstruther, 10 B. 453; Kilford v. Blaney, supra; and see McCleland v. Shaw, 2 Sch. & L. 538, at p. 545; Re Banks, (1905) 1 Ch. 547, at p. 550.
- (f) Trott v. Buchanan, 28 C. D. 446.
- (g) Bridgeman v. Dove, 3 Atk. 201;
 Mead v. Hide, 2 Vern. 120; Henry v.
 H., 6 Ir. R. Eq. 286.
- (h) Boughton v. B., 1 H. L. Cas. 406;Tench v. Cheese, 6 De G. M. & G. 453.

of debts, the realty and personalty are liable rateably for that object (a).

So where a testator had empowered his trustees to sell his real and personal estate in case and as often as they should think fit, and had directed them to pay certain legacies out of the residue of his real and personal estate, and the moneys arising from the sale thereof, it was held by the C. A. that the legacies were payable, pro ratâ out of the real and personal estate (b). And the result is the same where real estate is directed to be converted, and to become part of the personal estate (c).

The rule, however, of rateable payment does not extend beyond the things which the testator has expressly directed to be paid out of the blended fund. Thus although, according to a well known rule, where there is a gift by a testator of the "residue" of his property, real and personal, and, either prior or subsequently thereto, there is a gift of legacies, the legacies by implication and by force of the word "residue" are charged on the residuary real as well as the residuary personal estate (d), the primary liability of the personal estate will not be thereby disturbed, the real estate being only thereby charged with the legacies in aid of the personalty (e). A charge of legacies upon the real estate of the testator will not make specifically devised real estate liable for the payment of legacies (f).

But the rule of rateable payment will apply where a payment is directed to be made out of the rents and profits of an aliquot share of real and personal estate (g); for as there are no burdens regularly incident to a share of personalty, there is no primá facie liability to be negatived, and the devisees take subject to the burthen imposed by the will, irrespective of any legal presumption: Jarm. (1893), p. 1439.

- (a) Roberts v. Walker, 1 Russ. & M. 752; Dunk v. Fenner, 2 Russ. & M. 557; Simmons v. Rose, 6 De G. M. & G. 411; Bedford v. B., 35 B. 584; Tatlock v. Jenkins, Kay, 654; Ashworth v. Munn, 34 C. D. 391. Re Spencer Cooper, (1908) 1 Ch. 130; Re Balls, (1909) 1 Ch. 791.
- (b) Allan v. Gott, L. R. 7 Ch. 439; Re Boards, (1895) 1 Ch. 499; Re Spencer Cooper, supra.
- (c) Bright v. Larchner, 3 De G. & J. 148; Simmons v. Rose, 6 De G. M. & G. 411; Shallcross v. Wright, 12 B.

- 505.
- (d) Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas.689; Re Bailey, 12 C. D. 268, 274;Re Smith, (1899) 1 Ch. 365.
- (e) Elliott v. Dearsley, 16 C. D. 322; Re Grainger, (1900) 2 Ch. 756, at p. 767; (1902) A. C. 1; Luckeraft v. Pridham, 48 L. J. Ch. 636; Wells v. Row, 48 L. J. Ch. 476; Re Boards, supra.
- (f) Conron v. C., 7 H. L. Cas. 168;
 Spong v. S., 3 Bli. 84; and see Bank of Ireland v. McCarthy, (1898) A. C. 181.
 - (g) Falkner v. Grace, 9 Ha. 282.

And so also where the surplus of a fund made up of the rents and profits of the testator's real estate (unconverted) and the income of his residuary personal estate, was after payment of annuities thereout, given to persons other than those becoming entitled subject to the trusts for payment to the real estate, the real and personal estates were held liable rateably to payment of the annuities (a).

Charging Funeral and Testamentary Expenses, &c., on Land.—A mere charge of funeral or testamentary expenses, or of both, in addition to debts upon real estate, although a strong circumstance (b), will not exempt the personalty, unless there are other words in the will which exhibit beyond reasonable doubt the intention of the testator to exonerate it (c). But where a testator throws upon his real estate all those burthens which naturally fall upon the personal estate as a primary fund, such as funeral and testamentary expenses, debts, and legacies, a strong, though not absolutely conclusive, argument arises, that the testator intended to give his personalty as a specific legacy, free from those charges, and that, consequently, the realty is the primary fund for their payment (d).

Personal Estate bequeathed Specifically, not as a Residue.—The distinction between a mere residuary bequest, and a gift of all the personal estate, has been considered important (e). And where the personalty has been bequeathed, not as a residue, but as a whole, and the debts and funeral and testamentary expenses have been made payable out of the real estate devised in trust for sale, the real estate has been held the primary fund for their payment (f). The same principle applies to legacies, where the funeral and testamentary charges and also legacies are in the same way thrown upon

- (a) Howard v. Dryland, 38 L. T.,(N. S.) 24, distinguishing Boughton v.B. 1 H. L. C. 406.
- (b) Burton v. Knowlton, 3 V. 107; Re Banks, (1905) 1 Ch. 547.
- (c) Kilford v. Blaney, 31 C. D. 56; Brydges v. Phillipps, 6 V. 567; Stephenson v. Heathcote, 1 Eden, 38; Aldridge v. Wallscourt, 1 Ball & B. 312; Tait v. Northwick, 4 V. 816; Gray v. Minnethorpe, 3 V. 103; Hartley v. Hurle, 5 V. 540; Rhodes v. Rudge, 1 Si. 79; M'Cleland v. Shaw, 2 Sch. & L. 538; Coote v. C.,
- 3 Jo. & Lat. 175; Bootle v. Blundell,1 Mer. 193.
- (d) Tower v. Rous, 18 V. 138; Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. 193; Plenty v. West, 16 B. 173.
- (e) Tower v. Rous, 18 V. 138; Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. 228.
- (f) Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; Michell v. M., 5 Madd. 69; Driver v. Ferrand, 1 Russ. & M. 681; Blount v. Hipkins, 7 Si. 43; Kilford v. Blaney, 31 C. D. 56; Plenty v. West, 16 B. 173; Gilbertson v. G., 34 B. 354; see Re Banks, (1905) 1 Ch. at p. 550.

the real estate, for then it will be the primary fund for their payment (a).

So where the personal estate has been specifically bequeathed, and the debts, general and testamentary expenses, have been thrown upon a particular real estate, devised upon trust for their payment, such particular estate will be the primary fund for their payment; and it has been held that if such particular estate is insufficient, and if other real estate has been specifically devised, not charged with debts, such real estate and the personal estate must contribute rateably towards the payment of the debts (b). The principle does not apply where a testator subjects his personal as well as his real estate to the payment of his debts, funeral and testamentary expenses (c).

A bequest of all the personal estate (with or without an enumeration of particulars), as distinguished from a mere general residuary bequest, will not, at any rate where the legatee is also appointed executor, exonerate the personalty passing under such bequest, although lands are devised in trust to pay all the testator's debts (d).

The inference against the exoneration of the personal estate, when the legatee is also the executor, arises upon the assumption that he takes the personal estate in that character, with all the burthens attached to it, in a regular course of administration. But it has also been decided that the personalty will not in similar cases be exonerated where the legatee is not executor (e).

And when it is a matter of doubt, whether the whole personal estate is meant to be given specifically or only as a residue, the omission to charge the funeral and testamentary expenses on the real estate, as well as the debts, is an argument which may be

- (a) Jones v. Bruce, 11 Si. 221; Coote v. C., 3 Jo. & Lat. 175; Lance v. Aglionby, 27 B. 65; Re Banks, supra; Robertson v. Broadbent, 8 A. C. 812.
- (b) Powell v. Riley, 12 Eq. 175; dissented from in Re Ovey, 51 L. J. Ch. 667, 20 C. D. 676; and see Re Green, 40 C. D., p. 613.
- (c) Patterson v. Scott, 1 De G. M. & G. 531.
- (d) French v. Chichester, 2 Vern. 568; Harewood v. Child, Cas. t. Talbot, 204; Haslewood v. Pope, 3 P. W. 324; Brummel v. Prothero, 3 V. 111;
- Trott v. Buchanan, 28 C. D. 446; Aldridge v. Wallscourt, 1 Ball and B. 312. The cases, therefore, of Kynaston v. K., 1 Bro. Ch. 457; Holiday v. Bowman, 1 Bro. Ch. 145; Bampfield v. Wyndham, Pr. Ch. 101, cited in the principal case, may be considered as overruled.
- (e) Collis v. Robins, 1 De G. & Sm. 131; Ouseley v. Anstruther, 10 B. 453; cf. Greene v. G., 4 Madd. 148; Kilford v. Blaney, 31 C. D. 56; see Re Banks, (1905) 1 Ch. 547.

relied upon against the exemption of the personalty from its primary liability (a).

Personal Estate expressly Charged.—An express charge of some particular debts, as simple contract debts, or legacies on the personalty for the payment of which, without such charge, it would be primarily liable, will not raise a presumption, founded on the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," that it is only to be the auxiliary fund for payment of other charges not expressly charged upon it, but which are charged upon the land (b).

Certain Expressions amounting to Exoneration.—In Webb v. Jones (c) the testator devised his real estate to be sold, and the money to arise by the sale to be applied to pay mortgages and all other debts, the residue to be added to his personal estate; Kenyon, M. R., held the personal estate to be exonerated, upon the ground, it is presumed, that the testator clearly showed that he did not contemplate the possibility of the whole personalty being applied before the realty, which it might have been if it was to be applied in its natural order (d).

So there is exoneration where a testator declares that he has charged his lands with the payment of his debts in order that the personalty may come clear to the legatee (e), or where he has directed the proceeds of his real estate to be applied "in part payment" of certain legacies (f).

In Dawes v. Scott (g) a testator devised an estate at C., and bequeathed certain specific chattels, upon trust to sell, and in the first place to pay all his just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and legacies, and after giving some pecuniary legacies, declared that the moneys to arise by such sale as aforesaid, should

- (a) Collis v. Robins, supra; Ouseley
 v. Anstruther, supra; Tower v. Rous,
 18 V. 138; Bootle v. Blundell, 1
 Mer. 193; Robertson v. Broadbent,
 8 A. C. 812.
- (b) Watson v. Brickwood, 9 V. 453, and see Lord Eldon's comment on this case in Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. at p. 230; see also Howe v. Dartmouth, infra, Brydges v. Phillipps, 6 V. 567; Davies v. Ashford, 15 Si. 42; but see Anderton v. Cooke, 1 Bro. Ch. 456;
- Williams v. Llandaff, 1 Cox, 254; Dawes v. Scott, 5 Russ. 32; Re Butler (1894) 3 Ch. 250.
 - (c) 2 Bro. Ch. 60; 1 R. R. 29.
- (d) And see Shallcross v. Wright, 12 B. 505; Fisher v. F., 2 Keen, 610; but see Wythe v. Henniker, 2 My. & K. 635.
- (e) March v. Fowke, Cas. t. Finch, 414.
 - (f) Bunting v. Marriott, 19 B. 163.(g) 5 Russ. 32.

be "the fund primarily applicable to the discharge of his said debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and legacies." And in case it should be insufficient, by a codicil charged his H. estate "with the payment of so much money as should be requisite to make good the deficiency;" it was held by Leach, M. R., that the personal estate was only liable after the two estates had been exhausted; "for the C. estate and the articles to be sold therewith, are expressed to be the primary fund, and the plain intention of the testator is, that the H. estate should be the secondary fund" (a).

In Forrest v. Prescott (b) a testatrix gave her real estate in trust for her two daughters, M. and S., for life, and afterwards each moiety was to go to the sons of each of her daughters and their families; and after giving various legacies she left the residue of her estate to her granddaughters. By a codicil the testatrix directed that certain debts incurred by her, for her son-in-law, J. M., should be exclusively, and in the first instance, borne by and paid out of the M. moiety of her real estate, exempting the S. moiety from payment of such debts. It was held that the codicil amounted to an express exoneration of the personal estate; and that the moiety of her real estate devised to the M. family was primarily liable to the debts (c).

Lapse.—Where the testator has exempted personalty which he has bequeathed from its primary liability to debts, the exemption will not be extended for the benefit of next of kin who take the personalty in consequence of a lapse. In Waring v. Ward (d), Arden, M. R., puts this case. "If an estate be given to A. and the personal estate to B. exempt from debts, that exemption is to be considered as intended only for the benefit of B., that he shall not pay those debts to which he would be liable if no such provision had been made; and is not a general exemption of the personal estate." It follows, therefore, that on the death of B., the next of kin who took the personal estate would take it subject to the payment of the debts (e).

In Kilford v. Blaney (f) a testatrix devised her real estates in

⁽a) And see Bateman v. Roden, 1 Jo. & Lat. 356; Evans v. E., 17 Si. 102; Kilford v. Blaney, 31 C. D. 56; Re Needham, 54 L. J. Ch. 75; Trott v. Buchanan, supra, p. 13.

⁽b) 10 Eq. 545.

⁽c) See also Bootle v. Blundell,

¹ Mer. 193.

⁽d) 5 V. at p. 675.

⁽e) Hale v. Cox, 3 Bro. Ch. 322; Noel v. Henley, 7 Price, 241; Dacre v. Patrickson, 1 Dr. & Sm. 182; Coventry v. C., 2 Dr. & Sm. 470.

⁽f) 31 C. D. 56.

trust to pay funeral and testamentary expenses, debts, and legacies, and she directed the proceeds of sale of her leaseholds should be an auxiliary fund for such payments; and all her personal estate she bequeathed to her trustees in trust for sale, the proceeds to be for certain charities. It was held there was a sufficient intention to exonerate, but part of the bequest to charities failing, and going to the Crown in default of next of kin, it was held the right to exoneration failed as to such bequest (a). But if the personalty exempted has not been bequeathed to any one, it is exempted for all purposes, and, therefore, for the benefit of the next of kin (b).

No Bequest of Personalty.—Appointment of Executor.—No inference of an intention to exonerate the personalty arose from the appointment of an executor, who, there being no bequest of the personalty, was entitled to it by such nomination (c), although the debts and funeral expenses are thrown upon the land (d); or arises now though he is a trustee of it for the next of kin(e), upon the principle, that there is no specific disposition of the residuary personal estate. But it is clear that the executor may take the personal estate, either beneficially or as trustee for the next of kin, exonerated from the payment of debts and legacies, if another fund is provided for their payment, and the personalty has, by express words, been exempted (f).

Charge of, or Trust to pay Legacies.—Where there is a simple gift of an annuity or legacy, followed by a charge thereof upon the real estate, the personal estate in such case is primarily liable, and the real estate is only charged in aid of the personal estate (g). So where there is a general charge of legacies upon land, or a devise in trust to pay legacies generally, the personal estate will be the primary fund for their payment (h). But the will may show an intention to make legacies primarily payable out of another fund (i).

- (a) Browne v. Groombridge, 4 Madd. 495, not being followed.
- (b) Milnes v. Slater, 8 V. 295; Fisher v. F., 2 Keen, 610; Dacre v. Patrickson, 1 Dr. & Sm. 186; cf. Re Kirk, 21 C. D. 431.
 - (c) Prior to the Executors Act, 1830.
 - (d) Gray v. Minnethorpe, 3 V. 103.
- (e) M'Cleland v. Shaw, 2 Sch. & L. 538.
 - (f) Milnes v. Slater, supra.
 - (y) Paget v. Huish, 1 Hem. & M. 663;

- and see Re Trenchard, (1905) 1 Ch. 82; Re Spencer Cooper, (1908) 1 Ch. 130.
- (h) Kirke v. K., 4 Russ. 449;
 Roberts v. R., 13 Si. 349; Ouseley v.
 Anstruther, 10 B. 453; Re Ovey, 31
 C. D., p. 118.
- (i) Boughton v. B., 1 H. L. Cas. 406; Whieldon v. Spode, 15 B. 537; Lance v. Aglionby, 27 B. 65; Re Needham, 54 L. J. Ch. 75; Thynne v. St. Maur, 55 L. T. 753.

Trust to Pay Certain Legacies.—But where there is a trust to sell and pay particular sums out of the proceeds of real estate, as if A. devise real estate to B. upon trust to sell and to pay 1000l. to C., such sum is considered as part of the real estate, and the personal estate will not be liable to the payment, even upon a deficiency of the real estate (a). Nor will it even though there be a direction at the end of the will, that the personal estate should be applied in payment of legacies in exoneration of the real estate (b).

And should the testator sell the estate out of which a sum is to be paid, the legacy will be adeemed (c). Where, however, the legacy appears to be a demonstrative legacy, there the fund pointed out for its payment, whether real or personal, is primarily liable, but upon its failure the demonstrative legacy will be payable out of the general assets (d).

Trust to Pay Certain Debts.—But it appears that a devise of real estate, upon trust to raise a certain sum for payment of debts (e), or to pay a particular debt to which the personal estate is already liable, will render the real estate the primary fund for the payment of such sums (f). But in Noel v. Henley (y), Richards, C. B., observed, "That he could not make any distinction between a direction that real estate should be chargeable with a particular debt of 20,000l., and a devise of real estate subject to all the testator's debts; for the 20,000l. was only part of those debts." See the remarks on this case in Jarman (1893) p. 1486. And it would seem from some cases that the charge of a debt on real estate, not being already a charge thereon, will not affect the primary liability of the personal estate (h), unless where the testator has

- (a) Hancox v. Abbey, 11 V. 179; Gittins v. Steele, 1 Sw. 24; Dickin v. Edwards, 4 Ha. 273; Bateman v. Roden, 7 Ir. Eq. R. 240; but see Jones v. Bruce, 11 Si. 221; Evans v. E., 17 Si. 102.
 - (b) Spurway v. Glynn, 4 V. 483.
- (c) Newbold v. Roadnight, 1 Russ. & M. 677.
- (d) Mann v. Copland, 2 Madd. 232; Fowler v. Willoughby, 2 S. & S. 354; Willox v. Rhodes, 2 Russ. 452; Sidebotham v. Watson, 11 Ha. 170; Colvile v. Middleton, 3 B. 570; Fream v. Dowling, 20 B. 624; 4 Eq. 145 (n.);
- Williams v. Hughes, 24 B. 474; Paget v. Huish, 1 Hem. & M. 663; Coard v. Holderness, 22 B. 391; Gordon v. Duff, 28 B. 519; and note to Ashburner v. Macguire, post.
 - (e) Clutterbuck v. C., 1 My. & K. 15. (f) Hancox v. Abbey, 11 V. 179;
- Welby v. Rockcliffe, 1 Russ. & M. 571; Evans v. Cockeram, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 428; Bateman v. Roden, 1 Jo. & Lat. 356; Coote v. C., 3 Jo. & Lat. 175.
 - (g) 7 Price, 241; Dan. 211.
- (h) Quennell v. Turner, 13 B. 240; Bickham v. Cruttwell, 3 My. & C. 763; cf. Re Banks, supra.

likewise imposed the payment of the debt as a personal obligation on the devisee (a).

Charge of Debts on Specific Fund.—Where a specific personal fund is subjected to charges which otherwise would fall upon the general personal estate, as debts, legacies, funeral and testamentary expenses, such specific fund will not be the auxiliary fund for their payment as in the case of land, see supra, but the primary fund (b). If, however, the residue is undisposed of it will be primarily liable (c).

Although the payment of debts is thrown by a testator upon a particular fund, and he devises or bequeaths other property discharged from such debts, if the particular fund should prove insufficient for payment of debts, the other property will be applicable for that purpose in the usual order. In Brooke v. Warwick (d) the testator devised an estate which he had mortgaged, and bequeathed specific personal property, and his residuary personal estate, to different persons, freed and discharged from his debts, &c., and he devised other real estate to trustees, upon trust to sell and pay his debts. The estate devised for payment of debts was insufficient for that purpose. It was held by Cottenham, C. (e), that the residue was primarily liable, and that the devisees of the mortgaged estates were entitled to exoneration thereout. "The only way," said his Lordship, "in which this case was attempted to be argued was this; that the gift of the residue was a specific gift. This is founded on the supposition that the testator has disposed of it as a particular fund. There may be many cases where residuary clauses must be considered, not as general dispositions of the residue, but as dispositions of the residue of a particular fund; and such gifts would be equally specific with gifts of other parts of the fund. In an ordinary gift of the residue, part to A. and part to B., and the residue to C., C. is as much a specific legatee as either of the former legatees A. or B. But this is a general gift of the residuary estate.

- (a) Welby v. Rockcliffe, 1 Russ. & M. 571; Clutterbuck v. C., 1 My. & K. 15.
- (b) Choate v. Yeates, 1 J. & W. 102; Phillips v. Eastwood, 1 L. & G. t. Sugden, 294; Evans v. E., 17 Si. 102; Webb v. De Beauvoisin, 31 B. 573; Coventry v. C., 2 Dr. & Sm. 470; Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. 193; Re
- Butler, (1894) 3 Ch. 250.
- (c) Hewett v. Snare, 1 De G. & Sm. 333; Holford v. Wood, 4 V. 76; Newbegin v. Bell, 23 B. 386; Corbett v. C., 8 Ir. R. Eq. 407; Re Hastings, 55 L. J. Ch. 278.
- (d) (1849) 1 H. & Tw. 142; affirming 2 De G. & Sm. 425.
- (e) 1 H. & Tw. at p. 148.

What, then, is a residuary estate? That which remains after payment of the debts. The testator gives it discharged from his debts; but he cannot do that, unless he provides for the payment of them by other means. Therefore, if he has expressed an intention of doing what he is incapable of effecting, it must fail."

Trust affecting Legatee.—In re Maddock (a) a testatrix devised her real estate and the residue of her personalty to X, and by a memorandum not attested as a will imposed a binding trust upon X as to a specified portion of her residuary personal estate in favour of certain persons, it was held by the Court of Appeal that for the purposes of administration the specified portion of the residue must be treated as specifically bequeathed, and that after exhaustion of the balance of the residue the debts must be borne rateably by the real estate and the specified portion (a).

3Exoneration in respect of Mortgaged Estates in cases not within the Real Estate Charges Acts.

The law previous to these Acts is fully stated in Jarman (1893), pp. 1442, et seq., and in the editions of this work prior to the last. The following is a short statement of it: where the secure debt was the debt of the deceased himself (b) the principle of the primary liability of the personal estate was fully applied, and was not excluded either by a devise of the mortgaged land subject to the mortgage (c) or by a devise of land upon trust to sell and pay mortgages (d). The same principles were applied in the case of a vendor's lien (e).

But in the following cases the mortgaged estate was held primarily liable:

- (1) Where the mortgaged debt was not the personal debt of the devisor or ancestor, and had not been adopted by him (f).
- (a) (1902) 2 Ch. 220.
- (b) Davies v. Bush. 4 Bli. (N. S.) 305; Bartholomew v. May, 1 Atk. 487; Pockley v. P., 1 Vern. 37; Belvedere v. Rochfort, 5 Bro. P. C. 299. For the previous law as to the exoneration of mortgaged estates, see Jarman (1893), p. 1442; Seton (1901), p. 1537; and the 1886 edition of this work, p. 754.
 - (c) Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. W. 386;
- Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. 193; Goodwin v. Lee, 1 K. & J. 377; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 948.
- (d) Wythe v. Henniker, 2 My. & K.635; but see Webb v. Jones, supra,p. 17.
 - (e) Yonge v. Furse, 20 B. 380.
- (f) Scott v. Beecher, 5 Madd. 96 Swainson v. S., 6 De G. M. & G. 648, and the principal case, p. 1.

- (2) Where there had been no benefit from the charge to the personalty of the person creating it (a).
- (3) Or where there had been a benefit to the personal estate but the inference from the circumstances was that the land was to be primarily liable (b).

4. The Exoneration of Mortgaged Estates under the Real Estate Charges Acts, 1854, 1867, and 1877.

By these statutes the order of liability as between real and lease-hold property, subject to mortgages, charges, or vendor's lien on the one hand, and the general personal estate upon the other has been reversed. Property within the Acts which is subject to mortgage, charge, or vendor's lien is made primarily liable for the debt thereby secured, and nothing short of the expression of an intent to exclude the operation of the Acts will render the personalty primarily liable to discharge the debt so secured (c). The Acts do not however, apply to personalty other than leaseholds, and accordingly a specific legatee is entitled to have his legacy redeemed at the expense of the personalty from charges created by the testator (d).

17 & 18 Vict. c. 113. (Locke King's Act. 11th August, 1854.)

- S. 1. "When any person shall after the 31st of December, 1854, die seised of or entitled to any estate, or interest in any land or other hereditaments which shall at the time of his death be charged with the payment of any sum or sums of money by way of mortgage, and such person shall not, by his will, deed, or other document, have signified any contrary or other intention, the heir or devisee to whom such land or hereditaments shall descend or be devised, shall not be entitled to have the mortgage debt discharged or satisfied out of the personal estate, or any other real estate of such person, but the land or hereditaments so charged shall, as between the different persons claiming through or under the deceased person, be primarily liable to the payment of all mortgage debts with which the same shall be charged, every part thereof, according to its value, bearing a proportionate part of the mortgage debts charged on the whole thereof: Provided always that nothing herein contained shall affect
- (a) Coventry v. C., 2 Dr. & Sm. 470; Lanoy v. Athol, 2 Atk. 444; Loosemore v. Knapman, Kay, 123.
- (b) Jenkinson v. Harcourt, Kay, 688; Vandeleur v. V., 3 Cl. & Fin. 82; Barham v. Clarendon, 10 Ha. 126; but
- see Redington v. R., 1 Ball & B. 131.
- (c) Re Fraser, (1904) 1 Ch. 726 C. A. (d) Bothamley v. Sherson, 20 Eq. 304; Re Bourne, (1893) 1 Ch. at p. 191; and see Re Butler, (1894) 3 Ch. at p. 258.

or diminish any right of the mortgagee on such lands or hereditaments to obtain full payment or satisfaction of his mortgage debt either out of the personal estate of the person so dying as aforesaid, or otherwise: provided also, that nothing herein contained shall affect the rights of any person claiming under or by virtue of any will, deed, or document already made or to be made before the first day of January one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five."

S. 2. "This Act shall not extend to Scotland."

"Any Estate or Interest in Lands," &c .- This Act only comprehends "any estate or interest in any land or other hereditaments;" the law, therefore, under that Act, remained unaltered as to the primary liability of the general personal estate, to satisfy charges on property not coming within those terms. Copyholds as well as freeholds are within the Act (a), but leaseholds for years are, by the language of the Act, which speaks of "the heir or devisee to whom such lands or hereditaments shall descend or be devised," excluded from its operation (b). But, by 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34, p. 30, infra, the Act is extended to lands and hereditaments of all tenures. Land devised upon trusts for conversion, and taken in its converted state, is (semble) not an interest in lands within the meaning of the Act: and a person to whom the proceeds of land have been bequeathed by a testator who had mortgaged it, can demand the payment of the mortgage out of the general personal estate (c). The Acts do not apply to charges on real estate abroad (d).

"Charged by way of Mortgage."—The meaning of mortgage is extended by 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34, infra, p. 30. This Act only applies where there is a defined and specified charge on a specified estate (e). It applies to an equitable mortgage of freeholds, by deposit of deeds with a memorandum (f), or without a memorandum (g); and though the memorandum stated that the deposit was made "as a collateral security" for money lent on a promissory note (h). A vendor's lien for unpaid purchase-money, however, is not within this Act (i).

- (a) Piper v. P., 1 John. & H. 91.
- (b) Solomon v. S., 12 W. R. 540; Gall v. Fenwick, 43 L. J. Ch. 178; Re Wormsley's Estate, 4 C. D. 665.
- (c) Lewis v. L., 13 Eq. 225; but see In Re Bennett, (1899) 1 Ch. 316.
 - (d) Re Chantrell, (1907) W. N. 213.
 - (e) Hepworth v. Hill, 30 B. 476.
 - (f) Pembroke v. Friend, 1 John. &

H. 132.

- (g) Davis v. D., 24 W. R. 962; W. N. (76) 242.
 - (h) Coleby v. C., 2 Eq. 803.
- (i) Hood v. H., 26 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 616; Barnwell v. Iremonger, 1 Dr. & Sm. 255. But see the amending Act, infra, p. 30.

Heir or Devisee.—A person exercising an option of purchase given him by the will is not a devisee within the Act(a).

"Or any other real estate of such person."—This means "other real estate not descended or devised to such heir or devisee" (b).

"As between the different persons," &c.—The Act operates only between the persons taking through the deceased debtor his real and personal estate (c). The Act accordingly was held not to apply where a partner had created a charge on his separate real estate to secure a partnership debt and at the time of his death the partnership assets were sufficient to answer all the debts of the partnership (d). Where, however, the Crown takes the personal estate in default of next of kin, the Crown takes the estate free from the mortgage debts (e).

"Be charged every part according to its value," &c.—This provision, with the other provisions of the Act, is subject to a contrary intention appearing by the will or other document of the person creating the charge. Subject to this, if freeholds mortgaged together to secure one sum, on the mortgagor's death, went to different devisees, in the absence of any intention to the contrary on his part, the devisees would have to contribute rateably to pay the mortgage debt. So if freeholds, leaseholds, or other personal estate, such as policies of assurance, were mortgaged together, on the death of the mortgagor intestate, in the absence of any contrary intention, the heir-at-law, as to the freehold and administrator, as to leaseholds must, under the Act, bear the burthen rateably (f).

Where, moreover, there is a further security given at a subsequent time, for the original and an additional debt, without anything more, such further security will not be considered as secondary as between different persons claiming the two properties from the mortgagor, and they will all contribute rateably towards payment of the amount due (q). The mortgagor, however, may not only by express terms,

- (a) Re Wilson, (1908) 1 Ch. 839, following Given v. Massey, (1892) 31 L. R. Ir. 126.
 - (b) Re Newmarch, 9 C. D. 17.

- (c) Anthony v. A., (1893) 3 Ch. 501.
 - (d) Re Ritson, (1899) 1 Ch. 128.
- (e) Dacre v. Patrickson, 1 Dr. &
 Sm. 186; cf. Kilford v. Blaney, 31
 C. D. 56.
- (f) Evans v. Wyatt, 31 B. 217; Trestrail v. Mason, 7 C. D. 455; Re Newmarch, supra; Leonino v. L., 10 C. D. 460.
- (g) Leonino v. L., supra; doubting Lipscomb v. L., 7 Eq. 501; De Rochfort v. Dawes, 12 Eq. 540; Athill v. A., 16 C. D. 211; Re Pimm 91 L. T. 190, reported on other points, (1904) 2 Ch. 350.

but also by implication in the mortgage deed, or by the will, declare his intention as between the two estates how the debt is to be primarily borne (a). The mere statement, however, in a second mortgage of other property, that it is a "collateral security," is not sufficient to show that it was intended that property comprised in a former mortgage should be primarily liable (b), although where that word was used, it was held, as the result of the whole transaction, that one property was not to be called upon to provide for payment of part of the debt until the other was exhausted (c). It is now established that where property is subject to a mortgage, and part is devised to specific, and part to residuary devisees (both devises being now considered specific), each part of the estates must contribute rateably (d).

A party seeking contribution must show not only that there is a charge on both properties, but also that they are equally liable inter se(e). Where there is a clear aggregate devise of different properties, some incumbered, and others not incumbered to one devisee, he is not entitled in the event of the incumbered properties being insufficient to satisfy the incumbrances thereon, to require that the unincumbered properties shall be exonerated at the expense of the personal estate (f).

Under Locke King's Act, unless by the signification of a contrary intention the primary liability of the land in mortgage to bear the mortgage debt be thrown upon other real or personal property of the party dying seised of or entitled to such land, the devisee or heir-at-law cannot claim a right to have land in mortgage exonerated by the application for that purpose of any of the real or personal estate of the testator or ancestor. As far as they are concerned, the land in mortgage must solely bear its burden. But where a contrary intention has been shown under the Act, by the substitution of another fund for the exoneration of the property in mortgage, it has been held by the greater weight of authority that if the fund be



⁽a) Leonino v. I., supra; De Rochfort v. Dawes, supra; Stringer v. Harper, 26 B. 33.

⁽b) Athill v. A., supra; Early v. E.,16 C. D. 214 (n.); Leonino v. L.,supra.

⁽c) Bute v. Cunynghame, 2 Russ. 275.

⁽d) Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch.

^{420;} Gibbins v. Eyden, 7 Eq. 371; Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136; Sackville v. Smyth, 17 Eq. 153, dissenting from Brownson v. Lawrance, 6 Eq. 1; Re Smith, Hannington v. True, 33 C. D. 195.

⁽e) Re Dunlop, 21 C. D. 583.

⁽f) Re Lord Kensington, (1902) 1 Ch. 203.

insufficient to pay off the mortgage, the deficiency must be borne by the mortgaged estate (a); effect is to be given to the contrary intention as shown by the will and no further (b).

"A Contrary or Other Intention."—See as to persons dying after 1867 or 31st December, 1877, note to 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, and 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34, infra. Judges, as might be expected, have differed much as to the meaning and application of these words (c).

The intention is to be gathered from the will of the testator, or some document executed by or binding upon him, and, semble, a will executed before the mortgage would suffice (d).

It was decided that a mere direction by the testator that the debts "shall be paid as soon as may be" (e), even although the real estate in mortgage be devised in strict settlement (f), or that debts should be paid "out of his estate" (g), or by his "executors out of his estate" (h), the source from which the payment is to be made not being mentioned, would not show a "contrary or other intention" sufficient to exonerate the mortgaged estate from its primary liability under this Act, but see as to persons dying after 1867, note to 30 & 31 Vict. e. 69, infra.

Where, however, the residue of the real and personal estate (i), or of the *personal estate*, was bequeathed upon trust to pay (k) or subject to the payment of debts (l), without express reference to mortgage debts, these words have been held sufficient to show a contrary intention within the meaning of the Act(m). In *Maxwell* v. M.(n), it was held that a Scotch heritable bond, given by a

- (a) Rodhouse v. Mold, 35 L. J. Ch. 67; Gall v. Fenwick, 43 L. J. Ch. 178; but cf. Smith v. Moreton, contra, 37 L. J. Ch. 6; Allen v. A., 30 B. 403; Greated v. G., 26 B. 621.
 - (b) Re Birch, (1909), 1 Ch. 787.
- (c) See observations of Westbury, C., in Rolfe v. Perry, 11 W. R. 674; see also Woolstencroft v. W., 2 De G. F. & J. 347; Eno v. Tatham, 3 De G. J. & S. 443; Mellish v. Vallins, 2 John. & H. 194.
 - (1) Re Campbell, (1893), 2 Ch. p. 214.
- (e) Pembroke v. Friend, 1 John. & H. 132.
 - (f) Coote v. Lowndes, 10 Eq. 376.
 - (g) Brownson v. Lawrance, 6 Eq. 1.

- (h) Woolstencroft v. W., supra.
- (i) Allen v. A., 30 B. 395; Greated v. G., 26 B. 621; Stone v. Parker, 1 Dr. & Sm. 212; Newman v. Wilson, 31 B. 33; Re Nevill, 59 L. J. Ch. 511; and see Thompson v. Bell, (1903) 1 Ir. 489.
 - (k) Moore v. M., 1 De G. J. & S. 602.
- (l) Eno v. Tatham, supra; Mellishv. Vallins, supra.
- (m) Also Smith v. S., 3 Gif. 263; and see Re Smith, (1899) 1 Ch. 365, in which Smith v. S., 10 Ir. Ch. R. 461 was not followed; Buckley v. B., 19 L. R. Ir. 544; Porcher v. Wilson, 14 W. R. 1011; Greated v. G., supra; Re Bull, 49 L. T. 592.
 - (n) L. R. 4 H. L. 506,

domiciled Englishman, was payable in exoneration of the estate upon which the bond was charged out of his residuary personal estate, bequeathed for payment of his "just debts."

"Provided also," &c.—With regard to the operation of this last proviso, an heir taking by descent after the passing of the Act will not come within such proviso, and consequently was held not entitled to exoneration, although the mortgage deed by which the equity of redemption was reserved to his ancestor and his heirs was executed (a), or the will by which the personalty is bequeathed was made (b) before the 1st of January, 1855. Again, an heir-at-law, or customary heir of a testator, taking by descent an estate which has been the subject of a lapsed devise, in a will made before the 1st day of January, 1855, was held not to come within the proviso (c). A will executed before 1855 was held "a will already made" within the proviso, though republished after January 1st, 1855 (d).

30 & 31 Vict. c. 69. (25th July, 1867.)

S. 1. "In the construction of the will of any person who may die after the 31st day of December, 1867, a general direction that the debts, or that all the debts of the testator, shall be paid out of his personal estate, shall not be deemed to be a declaration of an intention contrary to or other than the rule established by the said Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 113), unless such contrary or other intention shall be further declared by words expressly or by necessary implication referring to all or some of the testator's debts or debt charged by way of mortgage on any part of his real estate."

With regard to this Act, it has been observed that as it was a construing and explaining Act, it did not profess to amend the former Act, but to set aside the interpretation that had been put upon it—it was, in fact, a polite way of overruling the decisions of the Court of Chancery: per Jessel, M. R. (e).

"Contrary Intention." (See supra, p. 27.)—If a testator now wishes to give a direction which shall be deemed under this Act, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, a declaration of an intention contrary to the



⁽a) Piper v. P., 1 John. & H., 91.

⁽b) Power v. P., 8 Ir. Ch. Rep. 840.

⁽c) Nelson v. Page, 7 Eq. 25.

⁽d) Rolfe v. Perry, supra.

⁽e) Re Newmarch, 9 C. D. 17; and see Re Fraser, (1904) 1 Ch. 726.

rule laid down in Locke King's Act, it must be a direction applying to his mortgage debts in such terms as unmistakably refer to or describe them (a).

Act not excluded.—In the following cases, therefore, the Act will not be excluded. Where there is a mere direction to executors to pay all just debts (a), or to pay all my just debts out of my personal estate in exoneration of my real estate (b). Where a testator, after specifically devising certain real estates to his wife during widowhood, gave the residue of his real and personal estate to trustees upon trust to convert and pay thereout his debts, including the debts due on mortgage of the property, given to his wife, it was held by the C. A. that the will did not indicate any such contrary intention as to exclude the mortgages on the residuary real estate from the operation of Locke King's Act, and that they must be paid out of the proceeds of the mortgaged estate; "The reasonable view of the testator's intention," said James, L. J., "is that he considered the mortgages on the estates which were to be immediately sold would be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of those estates, and that the net proceeds only would go into the mixed fund out of which the estates that were not to be sold at once would be exonerated. The will does not show any intention to exclude the operation of the Act as to the mortgage debts, with reference to which nothing is said" (c). Where the whole of the testator's real estate was in mortgage and there was a charge of debts on part of the real estates devised in exoneration of the other real estate devised, without specially referring to his mortgage debts, although the charge was expressed to be in aid of the personal estate, the Act was not excluded (d). So also where the personal estate is bequeathed subject to debts, a specific devise of part of the mortgaged estate, while the rest is comprehended in a residuary devise, charged with debts in aid of the personal estate, will not exonerate the specifically devised land (e).

Act excluded.—F. directed his private debts to be paid out of the proceeds of certain policies, and bequeathed his residue subject to payment of his trade debts. After date of will F. deposited title deeds of real estate with his bankers, to secure overdrawn account Held he had made a particular specific provision which excluded the

⁽a) Nelson v. Page, 7 Eq. 25.

⁽b) Re Rossiter, 13 C. D. 355; Leonino v. L., 10 C. D. 460.

⁽c) Elliot v. Dearsley, 16 C. D. 322.

⁽d) Re Newmarch, 9 C. D. 17.

⁽e) Sackville v. Smyth, 17 Eq. 153; Buckley v. B., 19 L. R. Ir. 544; Lewis v. L., 13 Eq. 218; Re Smith, 33 C. D. 195.

- Act (a). A direction to pay debts "except mortgage debts if any on Blackacre" out of residue, implies that other mortgage debts are to be paid out of residue (b).
- S. 2. "In the construction of the said Act, and of this Act, the word 'mortgage' shall be deemed to extend to any lien for unpaid purchase-money upon any lands or hereditaments purchased by a testator."
- "Mortgage." (See note, "Mortgage or other," &c., infra.)—This section applies only to lands or hereditaments purchased by a "testator," the heir-at-law of an *intestate*, therefore was held under this Act to be entitled to have the lien for unpaid purchase-money, upon an estate purchased by the intestate, discharged out of his personal estate (c).

40 & 41 Vict. c. 34. (2nd August, 1877.)

S. 1. "The Acts mentioned in the schedule hereto shall, as to any testator or intestate dying after the 31st of December, 1877, be held to extend to any testator or intestate dying seised or possessed of or entitled to any land other hereditaments of whatever tenure which shall at the time of his death be charged with the payment of any sum or sums of money by way of mortgage, or any other equitable charge, including any lien for unpaid purchase-money, and the devisee or legatee or heir shall not be entitled to have such sum or sums discharged or satisfied out of any other estate of the testator or intestate, unless (in case of a testator) he shall, within the meaning of the said Acts, have signified a contrary intention; and such contrary intention shall not be deemed to be signified by a charge of, or direction for payment of debts upon or out of residuary real and personal estate or residuary real estate."

"In the Schedule."—The Acts in the schedule are 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113 and 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69.

"Land or Other Hereditaments."—By virtue of this section 17 & 18 Vict. c. 113, is extended to leaseholds (d).

(a) Re Fleck, 37 C. D. 677; Re
Nevill, 59 L. J. Ch. 511; Re Campbell, (1893) 2 Ch. 206; Thompson v.
Bell, (1903) 1 Ir. R. 489.

(b) Re Valpy, (1906) 1 Ch. 531.

(c) Harding r. H., 13 Ir. R. Eq. 493; see 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34, infra.

(d) Re Kershaw, 37 C. D. 674.

"Mortgage or other," &c., "including," &c.—The charge created by s. 9, sub-sec. 1 of the Finance Act, 1894, is an equitable charge within the Act (a). Land delivered in execution under an elegit is included in them (b). This Act applies the rule as to vendor's lien to the administration of the estate of an intestate, but, observed Kay, J., in Re Cockcroft (c), it seems to limit the exception of the expression of a contrary intention to the case of a testator, the draftsman apparently forgetting that it might be by deed or other document as well as by will.

Legatee.—The next of kin are not named, but the burden imposed on the legatee is imposed upon them (d).

5. Order of Application of Assets (1) Generally: (2) Where Mortgaged Estate is Exonerated.

Generally.—The order in which assets of a deceased person are applied in payment of debts is as follows:—

- (1) The general personal estate, or residuary personalty, not specifically bequeathed or exonerated (e).
- (2) Real estate devised in trust for payment of debts (f).
- (3) Real estate descended (g), whether possessed by the testator at the date of his will or acquired after (h).
- (4) Real or personal property charged with payment of debts and devised, or specifically bequeathed subject to such charge, rateably inter se(i). Where part of the property charged lapses, the lapsed share contributes rateably (k), and is not liable until after descended estate.
- (5) General pecuniary legacies pro ratâ and demonstrative legacies in so far as there is a deficiency in the designated fund (l).
- (a) Re Bowerman, (1908) 2 Ch. 340.

- (b) Re Anthony, (1892) 1 Ch. 450.
- (c) 24 C. D. 94; Re Kidd, (1894) 3 Ch. 558.
 - (d) Re Fraser, (1904) 1 Ch. 726.
- (e) See the principal case, and cf. Re Bate; Sellon v. Watts, infra; Re Ovey, 8 A. C. 812; 31 C. D. 113; Trott v. Buchanan, supra, p. 13.
- (f) Harmood v. Oglander, 8 V. 124; Phillips v. Parry, 22 B. 279.
 - (g) Harmood v. Oglander, supra.
 - (h) Milnes v. Slater, 8 V. 304.

- (i) Wride v. Clarke, 2 Bro. Ch. 261; Harmood v. Oglander; Re Salt, supra; and see Re Butler, (1894) 3 Ch. 250.
 - (k) Wood v. Ordish, 3 Sm. & G. 125.
- (7) Tomkins v. Colthurst, 1 C. D. 626; Farquharson v. Fzoyer, 3 C. D. 109; Sellon v. Watts, 20 B. 519; Seton (1901), p. 1673; Re Stokes, 67 L. T. 223; Re Salt, (1895) 2 Ch. 203; Re Roberts, (1902) 2 Ch. 834; Re Kempster, (1906) 1 Ch. 446; Re Bate, 43 Ch. D. 600 must be considered overruled.

- (6) Specific and residuary devises, and specific bequests, not charged with debts, rateably inter se(a). But when a specific bequest is made which has been charged with a debt in the lifetime of the testator, then, although the real estate is charged with the payment of debts, the property so specifically bequeathed must first be applied in payment of the particular debt charged upon it (b).
- (7) Real and personal estate appointed by will under a general power of appointment (c). Where, however, a power of appointment is exercised by a general bequest the property subject to the power passes as forming a part of the bequest, and not as on an express exercise of the power, and is therefore not necessarily postponed to other assets of the testator (d).
- (8) Widows' paraphernalia, if now capable of existing (e).

Where a Mortgaged Estate is entitled to be Exonerated from the Debt.

Where a devisee of a mortgaged estate is entitled to have the estate exonerated from the mortgage debt, the assets of the testator will be applicable for the payment of such debt in the following order:

1st. The general personal estate not specifically bequeathed or exonerated (f).

2nd. Lands expressly devised for payment of debts (g).

3rd. Lands descended to the heir (h), whether acquired before or after the date of the will (i). As to a lapsed share (k).

4th. Lands devised charged with debts (l). And in this case all the devisees, including the devisee of the mortgaged estate, if so

- (a) Manning v. Spooner, 3 V. 117; Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136; Re Maddock, (1902) 2 Ch. 220.
- (b) Re Butler, (1894) 3 Ch. 250; and cf. O'Neal v. Mead, 1 P. W. 693; Halliwell v. Tanner, 1 Russ. & M. 633.
- (c) Jenney v. Andrews, 6 Madd. 264; Fleming v. Buchanan, 3 De G. M. & G. 976; Beyfus v. Lawley, (1903) A. C. 411.
- (d) Williams v. W., (1900) 1 Ch. 152.
- (e) Masson-Templier v. De Fries (C. A.) 25 T. L. R. 784; and see note

- to Aldrich v. Cooper, infra.
 - (f) Phillips v. P., 3 Bro. Ch. 723.
- (g) Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. W. 386; Phillips v. Parry, 22 B. 279; Freeman v. Ellis, 1 Hem. & M. 758.
- (h) Galton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 424 and 430; Chaplin v. C., 3 P. W. 368; Barnewall v. Cawdor, 3 Madd. 453; Lomax v. L., 12 B. 285.
- (i) Milnes v. Slater, 8 V. 295; 7 R. R. 48.
- (k) Fisher v. F., 2 Keen, 610; Wood
 v. Ordish, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 584, 3 Sm. & G.
 125.
 - (1) Davies v. Topp, 2 Bro. Ch. 259.

charged, must contribute pro ratâ towards payment of the mortgaged debt(a).

Where the property subject to the mortgage is devised in part to specific and in part to residuary devisees, each part of the estate must contribute rateably (b).

But a devisee is not entitled to have the estate exonerated as against specific devisees of real estate (c), amongst whom are included, notwithstanding 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 24, residuary devisees (d). Nor is he entitled to be exonerated as against specific legatees (e); nor as against pecuniary legatees (f);—nor as against a widow's paraphernalia (g); and the specific legatee of encumbered property cannot, where the general personal estate is insufficient, call upon other specific legatees or devisees to contribute, although there is a general charge of debt (h).

In Hamilton v. Worley (i), Loughborough, C., observed: "The equity the Court affords to a person entitled to real estate by devise, to have the incumbrances upon it discharged as a debt out of the personal estate, can go no farther than this:—as between the heir or devisee of the estate and residuary legatee, it cannot interfere with the disposition of other parts, as specific or general legacies, much less with the interests of creditors."

The *heir*, where an estate descends subject to a mortgage, is entitled to exoneration, in cases not within the Real Estate Charges Act, first out of the general personal estate; and, lastly, out of real estate expressly devised for payment of debts (k).

Marshalling of Assets.—If the above-mentioned order has been disturbed by any creditor, equity will marshal the assets (l). The

- (a) Carter v. Barnadiston, 1 P. W.
 505; Middleton v. M., 15 B. 450;
 Harper v. Munday, 7 De G. M. & G.
 369
- (b) Gibbins v. Eyden, 7 Eq. 371; Sackville v. Smyth, 17 Eq. 153.
- (c) Galton v. Hancock, supra; Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sm. 722.
- (d) Pearmain v. Twiss, 2 Gif. 130; Emuss v. Smith, supra; Clark v. C., 4 Giff. 702; Rodhouse v. Mold, 35 L. J. Ch. 67; Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; in which case *Chelmsford*, C., decided that a residuary devise was specific; and this decision was approved
- of by Cairns, C., in Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136.
- (e) O'Neal v. Mead, 1 P. W. 693; Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sm. 722.
- (f) Lutkins v. Leigh, Cas. t. Talbot, 53; Johnson v. Child, 4 Ha. 87; Re Smith, (1899) 1 Ch. 365.
 - (g) Tipping v. T., 1 P. W. 730.
- (h) O'Neal v. Mead, supra; Halliwell v. Tanner, 1 Russ. & M. 633; Re Butler, (1894) 3 Ch. 250.
 - (i) 2 V. 65.
- (k) Hill v. London, 1 Atk. 621; Chester v. Powell, 7 Jur. 389.
 - (l) See Aldrich v. Cooper, p. 35.

right of the mortgagee to obtain full payment or satisfaction of his mortgage debts out of all the assets of the mortgagor, in case the mortgage estate should be insufficient, is not affected by Locke King's Act, and it is presumed, that after having resorted to the funds already indicated, he will be entitled to payment out of the assets of the testator in the ordinary course of administration.

The election of the mortgage to come upon the personalty for payment of the mortgage debt will not determine what fund shall be ultimately charged with it; for, under the ordinary rule of marshalling the simple contract creditors, the widow or legatees would have a right to stand in his place for so much of the real estate as he should take out of the personal. They will not, therefore, be prejudiced, nor will the devisee be benefited, by the election of the mortgagee to proceed, as he undoubtedly may, against the personal estate in the first instance (a).

Under Hinde Palmer's Act, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46, a mortgagee, being (as he ordinarily is by reason of the covenant in the mortgage deed) a specialty creditor, is only entitled to be paid pari passu with simple contract creditors.

And under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, s. 10, in the administration of the assets of any person who may die after the 1st of November, 1875, and whose estate may prove insufficient for the payment in full of his debts and liabilities, and in the winding-up of companies, a mortgagee, if he proves for his whole debt, must give up his security, or, if his security be realised or valued, he can prove only for the balance (b).

And under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 125, the estate of a person dying insolvent may be administered in bankruptcy upon the petition of a creditor of a deceased debtor whose debt would have been sufficient to support a bankruptcy petition against such debtor had he been alive (c).

⁽a) Porcher v. Wilson, 14 W. R. 1011; Buckley v. B., 19 L. R. Ir. 544. Re Smith, (1899) 1 Ch. 365.

⁽b) See Ex. p. Good, 14 C. D. 82.

⁽c) And see Judicature Act, 1875,

s. 10.

ALDRICH v. COOPER.

DURHAM v. LANKESTER.

DURHAM v. ARMSTRONG.

1803. 8 V. 381: 7 R. R. 86.

Marshalling.

Mortgagee of freehold and copyhold estates, also a specialty creditor, having exhausted the personal assets, simple contract creditors are entitled to stand in his place pro tanto against both the freehold and copyhold estates.

Mortgage of freehold estate, with a covenant for better securing the payment, to procure admission and to surrender a copyhold estate, and in the meantime to stand seised in trust for the mortgagee. A primary mortgage of both estates; and the freehold not first applicable.

In these causes the usual decree was made for an account of what was due to the plaintiff Aldrich, a simple contract creditor of the intestate John Cooper, and all other the creditors; and, in case the creditors by specialty should exhaust any part of the personal estate, it was declared, that the simple contract creditors were entitled to stand in their place, &c.

The Master's report stated, that the intestate died seised of freehold estates of inheritance, subject to a mortgage made by him, by indentures dated the 6th of October, 1791, for 1300l.; by which indentures also, for better securing the payment, he covenanted with the mortgagee to procure himself to be admitted to copyhold estates, and that he would surrender them to the mortgagee; and that until such surrender, he would stand seised of the premises in trust for the mortgagee.

The intestate died in June, 1792, not having been admitted to the copyhold estates, leaving five sisters his coheiresses-at-law, who, in September, 1792, were admitted to the copyhold estates as coheiresses of the intestate, and immediately afterwards surrendered to the mortgagee for securing what was due upon the mortgage and two bonds by the intestate to the mortgagee. The widow of the intestate took

out administration, and paid out of the personal estate 767l. in part of the mortgage and bonds. The personal estate being exhausted, when the cause came on for further directions, a question arose, whether the creditors by simple contract were entitled to stand in the place of the specialty creditors in respect of what they had drawn from the personal estate, against the copyhold as well as the freehold estates.

Mr. Romilly, for the plaintiff, said, that, if the question as against the copyhold estate could be considered open, the principle is, that where a creditor, who has two funds, chooses to resort to the only fund upon which other creditors can go, they shall stand in his place for so much, against the fund to which they otherwise could not have access; but he admitted this case could not be distinguished from Robinson v. Tonge (a).

Mr. Piggott, for the coheiresses, relied upon the circumstance, that the only act as to the copyhold estate was the covenant for farther security to be admitted, and to surrender to the mortgagee, and in the meantime to stand seised in trust for him; shewing the intention, that the freehold estate should be first applied, as the primary fund—the copyhold being only a subsidiary security.

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—The words, "for better securing the payment," are not thrown in for the purpose of making the freehold estate applicable first; but the common form of a mortgage of freehold and copyhold estates is to make the freehold liable, with a covenant to surrender the copyhold, in order to save the fine.

It is necessary to look into the case that has been cited. Freehold estates are not assets for simple contract debts (b); and I should have thought the same reasoning that governs that case, would have applied to this.

Dec. 7, 8, 1802.

Mr. Romilly and Mr. Stratford for the plaintiffs, commented upon Robinson v. Tonge (c); which they admitted could not be

⁽a) Stated in Mr. Cox's note, 1 P. W. 104; Carson, Real Property Statutes, 680, edit. 5. p. 398.

⁽b) But see now 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. (c) See the judgment, p. 40.

distinguished from this case, and cited Lanoy v. Athol (a); Tipping v. T. (b); Lutkins v. Leigh (c); Forrester v. Leigh (d).

Mr. Piggott and Mr. Fonblanque for the defendants, insisted upon Robinson v. Tonge.

Mr. Romilly, in reply * * It is objected, that marshalling is merely a distribution of the different assets by such an arrangement as will satisfy all the creditors, and that copyhold estate is not assets. But that which is called marshalling, is merely that rule with respect to the two funds, stated by Lord Hardwicke in Lanoy v. Athol, and is called marshalling assets merely as being generally applied to a case of assets. But the doctrine is applied to other cases; where the parties are living; as the case, mentioned in *Lanoy v. Athol, of the two mortgages. So, where the Crown, by an extent, has taken a mortgaged estate, and deprived the mortgagee of his security, the Court of Exchequer has marshalled in his favour by letting him stand in the place of the Crown upon other funds not comprised in his mortgage. Another instance is the case of a surety, who is put in the place of the creditor against the other securities, though he has no charge against them. That is the common equity: Tynt v. T. (e), and Dering v. Winchelsea (f); in which each surety had given a distinct security. The same principle is applied in all these cases

Lord Chancellor Eldon.—I cannot yet find this case (g) among Lord Hardwicke's notes. I feel it to be my duty to understand the principle of the case, before I confirm it; or to decide against it upon a principle stated from this place, so clear, that there can be no doubt upon it. I was surprised at the case, when it was stated. Suppose there was no freehold estate, but there was a copyhold estate; which the owner had subjected to a mortgage; and died. It is clear, the mortgagee, having two funds, might, if he pleased, resort to the copyhold estate. But would this Court compel him to resort to it? If so, the Court marshals by the necessary consequence of its act. If the Court would not compel him, is it not

⁽a) 2 Atk. 446.

⁽b) 1 P. W. 729.

⁽c) Cas. t. Talbot, 54.

⁽d) Amb. 171.

⁽e) 2 P. W. 542.

⁽f) 1 Cox, 318.

⁽g) Robinson v. Tonge, see p. 36, supra, n. (a).

clear that it is purely matter of his will, whether the simple contract creditors shall be paid, or not? That, at least, contradicts all the authorities, that if a party has two funds (not applying now to assets particularly), a person having an interest in one only has a right in equity to compel the former to resort to the other; if that is necessary for the satisfaction of both. I never understood, that if A. has two mortgages, and B. has one, the right of B. to throw A. upon the security, which B. cannot touch, depends upon the circumstance whether it is a freehold or a copyhold mortgage. It does not depend upon assets only: a species of marshalling being applied in other cases, though technically we do not apply that term except to assets. So, where in bankruptcy the Crown, by extent, laying hold of all the property, even against creditors, the Crown has been confined to such property as would leave the securities of incumbrancers effectual (a). So, in the case of the surety (b), it is not by force of the contract; but that equity, upon which it is considered against conscience that the holder of the securities should use them to the prejudice of the surety; and therefore there is nothing hard in the act of the Court, placing the surety exactly in the situation of the creditor. So, a surety may have the benefit of a mortgage of a copyhold estate exactly as of freehold. It is very difficult to reconcile this with the principle of all those cases between living persons.

So, also, in a case which this Court calls a just distribution of the effects of a deceased person, a simple contract creditor has no manner of hold upon the freehold estate. How, then, is he allowed in this Court effectually to apply it for his satisfaction? Not upon the ground that it is assets, either by will, or by contract inter vivos; but upon the ground, that the specialty or mortgage creditor, having two funds, shall not, by his will, resort to that, by going to which he will disappoint as just a creditor, who cannot resort to any other. The principle in some degree is, that it shall not depend upon the will of one creditor to disappoint another. Then, what is the distinction as to the copyhold estate? The question is, whether the debtor has not subjected the copyhold estate to the extent of the mortgage imposed upon it; whether he has not decided that his

⁽a) And see Sagitary v. Hyde, 1 (b) See Dering v. Winchelsea, post. Vol. II.

property, to that extent, shall be liable to some debt? And the Court will extract this farther principle, that a creditor who can make it liable to that extent, shall not, by his will, defeat another; the former having two funds, the latter only one. The principle is farther demonstrated by the cases of contracts by specialty that do not affect the real estate; as a bond, not mentioning heirs: there, according to Lord Hardwicke, there is no marshalling, as there are not two funds, and therefore no one is disappointed by the option of another; the act of the creditor's will necessarily originating out of the security he has. Robinson v. Tonge, to a certain degree, relieves simple contract creditors. The estate is charged expressly with the payment of that debt: and therefore, if the freehold and copyhold estates go to different heirs, that charge is the foundation for this Court's applying the principle of contribution; not because it is assets, but because it is charged, not being assets. The effect of that, as to simple contract creditors, is, that resort may be given to them upon the unexhausted part of the freehold estate, as the specialty creditors are, to a certain degree, thrown upon the copyhold.

Dec. 10.

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—I have looked into every book, and can find nothing material upon this point either in print or manuscript. No book notices that there was any such point in Robinson v. Tonge; but it is clear, from the Registrar's book, by the arrangement of the decree, that the point must have occurred. specialty creditors insisted that they had a right to have the whole copyhold estate applied to the mortgage, in order to leave the freehold estate as assets for debts. Upon that case, if that decision had not been made, I should have thought they would have had that right. I cannot conceive the principle upon which that decision stands. Mr. Cox had it from a book of Lord Redesdale's, a notebook of Sir Thomas Sewell, who, I have no doubt, took the note himself, and preserved it as a special case. No case, therefore, can be entitled to more respect. The difficulty is this: -Suppose the personal estate to be 1500l. and simple contract debts to that value, and a mortgage of that amount upon freehold and copyhold estates; the mortgagee, if he pleases, may call for payment out of the estate

It is clear, if no third persons are concerned (a), the Court would arrange between the two estates, if they went to different persons. In that case, if no third persons were concerned, and the estates were of equal value, that sum would be divided between them, and the simple contract creditors would receive the whole personal estate. If the mortgagee chose to exhaust the whole personal estate, the consequence, if that doctrine is right, is, that the simple contract creditors would stand in his place against the freehold estate at least, for the proportion of the mortgage that estate ought to bear. Why? That is not the act of the testator, nor of the law. There is no more a lien for them upon the freehold estate than upon the copyhold. But the Court has said, and the principle is repeated very distinctly in The Attorney-General v. Tundall (b), that if a creditor has two funds the interest of the debtor shall not be regarded, but the creditor having two funds, shall take to that which, paying him, will leave another fund for another creditor. If that is so as to simple contract creditors, having no connection with the freehold estate, except that principle of equity, why is not the same principle to apply to copyhold estate? Copyhold estate is not charged by law with debts; neither is freehold estate charged by law with simple contract debts (c): but this copyhold estate is expressly charged with a debt: and if freehold estate is applied to simple contract debts, because charged with another debt, why is not copyhold estate?

April 26, 1803.

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—This instrument, as far as it respects the copyhold estate, is certainly an inaccurate security: for the mortgagor, covenanting to procure himself to be admitted and to surrender, and in the meantime to stand seised to the use of the mortgagee, not being himself admitted, could not with propriety be said in the meantime to stand seised, as, after admission, in a sense, he might. The effect of the deed is an agreement in equity, pledging the copyhold

⁽a) As to third parties being concerned, see Averall v. Wade, L. & G. t. Sugden, 252; Barnes v. Racster; 1 Y. & C. C. C. 401; Tighe v Dolphin, (1906) 1 Ir. R. 305.

⁽b) Amb. 614.

⁽c) But see now 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, rendering freeholds and copyholds liable to all debts.

estate for the payment of that sum together with the freehold estate; and I state it in these terms, as I do not understand it to be an instrument of mortgage of the freehold estate, with no more than a covenant that, if the freehold estate should be deficient, the copyhold should be a security in aid; but I look upon it as giving the mortgagee a legal estate in the freehold and an equitable estate in the copyhold; thereby giving him recourse to two funds for the payment of his debt.

The question is, whether, for the sake, if it is necessary, of discharging the debts, and particularly the simple contract debts of the mortgagor, the Court will go farther than it appears to have done in a case which I found, I confess very much to my surprise, in Mr. Cox's note. I never had heard of it before. I do not find, either in print or manuscript, that it has found its way to the notice of the public, except through the channel from which Mr. Cox derived his information. There is no other note of it. Yet there is no doubt of the authenticity of that note; for Mr. Cox has, in this, as in all other cases (which makes his work of so much value in the library of a lawyer), examined the Registrar's book, which corresponds with the note. At the same time, no notice is taken of that case, or any other of that date, in Lord Hardwicke's notes. In fact, however, the records of the Court prove that there was such a case. I understand, by the note, that there being no fund but the freehold and copyhold estates, and the mortgage creditor having both those estates in his mortgage, it was desired that equity, in order to satisfy the specialty creditors, would require him to take his satisfaction out of the copyhold estate alone. The principle stated by the Court, in answer, that copyhold estates are not liable, either in law or equity, to the testator's debts, farther than he subjected them thereto, is undeniably true. But the question is, how it is to be applied, when the testator has, by contract, subjected his copyhold estate to the whole of the debt; though at the same time subjecting an estate of another species also to the whole debt. I understand the opinion of the Court to have been, considering it a due application of the principle stated by Mr. Cox, that none of the rules subject any fund to a claim to which it was not before subject; but they only take care that the election of one claimant shall not prejudice the claims of others; that there were a freehold and copyhold estate both liable

to the whole mortgage by the contract and act of the testator in his life; that though the specialty creditors could not be wholly paid, unless the mortgage was thrown upon the copyhold estate, to the intent that the freehold might be open to the specialty creditors, yet the copyhold should only bear its proportion; that is, that a value should be set upon each estate; and if that distribution of the two funds left any specialty creditor unpaid, they must abide by the loss. It is quite clear this case is by no means a due application of that principle stated by Mr. Cox. Both the copyhold and the freehold estates were before subject to the claim; and the converse of that proposition seems in some degree to follow from making the election of the mortgagee determine how far the specialty creditors shall or shall not be paid.

I have had an opportunity of communicating with Lord Redesdale upon this case, and have his Lordship's authority to say, that he can reconcile it with no principle; that it was as great a surprise upon him as it was upon me; and he considers it as a case standing altogether by itself, and not reconcilable to the principles which govern the Court in a great variety of other instances. I have also the full concurrence of Lord Redesdale's opinion, that he would not determine according to that authority. In the consideration of this subject, the word "assets" has been very frequently used. But when you come to look at the case of marshalling, though the term so frequently occurs, the operation is upon the principle, that the party has a double fund. It is said copyhold estate is not assets. Clearly it is not assets for specialty debts, not even for the debts of the Crown. But is freehold estate assets for simple contract debts? It is not, either in law nor equity (a). Upon what ground, then, does the Court say, in given cases, simple contract debts shall be paid out of the real estate? Not upon the ground of assets; but upon this, that, not every creditor has a pledge of land, but a specialty creditor has a double fund to resort to. There may be a mortgage, for instance, where the instrument in none of its parts or obligations would affect the heir. Though he has a pledge of the land, it is not as assets, or as a specialty creditor. But if he has a bond or covenant in the deed, he is a specialty creditor, whose demand after

⁽a) Both freehold and copyhold of all debts. See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. estates are now assets for the payment 104.

the death of the mortgagor would affect the heir. In that case, then, the Court says, as that specialty creditor, by his specialty contract, can affect the land, he has two funds: the freehold and the personal estate: and he shall not by his election disappoint the natural and moral equity of the creditor by simple contract to be paid out of the single fund, which his debt affects. The simple contract creditor, therefore, has no more in law any claim against the freehold estate than the specialty creditor in Robinson v. Tonge had upon the copyhold estate. But, in the former case, the Court has said, the caprice or election of a bond creditor shall not operate to the prejudice of the simple contract creditor; and how can a due application of that principle be made, if it is not applied where the specialty creditor has a claim against the freehold estate, but not against copyhold estate as any creditor of any sort, but both estates being pledged and made a double fund by the act and deed and contract of the mortgagor?

Suppose another case: two estates mortgaged to A., and one of them mortgaged to B. He has no claim under the deed upon the other estate. It may be so constructed that he could not affect that estate after the death of the mortgagor. But it is the ordinary case to say, a person having two funds shall not, by his election, disappoint the party having only one fund; and equity, to satisfy both, will throw him, who has two funds upon that which can be affected by him only, to the intent that the only fund to which the other has access, may remain clear to him. This has been carried to a great extent in bankruptcy; for a mortgagee, whose interest in the estate was affected by an extent of the Crown, has found his way, even in a question with the general creditors, to this relief; that he was held entitled to stand in the place of the Crown as to those securities, which he could not affect per directum, because the Crown affected those in pledge to him (a). Another case may be put: that a man died, having no fund but a freehold and a copyhold estate; that they were both comprehended in a mortgage to A., and the freehold estate only was mortgaged to B.; and that B. was not only a mortgagee of the freehold estate, but also a specialty creditor by a covenant or a bond. In that case, as well as in this, it might be said the mortgagee of both estates might, if he thought proper,

(a) And see Sagitary v. Hyde, 1 Vern. 455.

apply to the freehold estate, and exhaust the whole value of it. The other would then stand as a naked specialty creditor, the fund being taken out of his reach; and there is no doubt that, being both a specialty creditor and a mortgagee of the freehold estate, but not having any claim as mortgagee upon the copyhold estate, the same arrangement would take place, that he in equity should throw the prior incumbrancer upon the estate to which the other has no resort (a).

The cases with respect to creditors and other classes of claimants go exactly the same length. In the cases of legatees against assets descended, a legatee has not so strong a claim to this species of equity as a creditor. But the mere bounty of the testator enables the legatee to call for this species of marshalling: that, if those creditors, having a right to go to the real estate descended, will go to the personal estate, the choice of the creditors shall not determine whether the legatees shall be paid or not. That in some measure is upon the doctrine of assets; but with relation to the fact of a double fund. Both are in law liable to the creditors, and therefore by making the option to go against the one, they shall not disappoint another person, who the testator intended should be satisfied. That is not so strong as where it is not bounty, but the party has, by his own act in his life, made liable to the whole debt a copyhold estate, not in law liable, and who, having also a freehold estate, must be understood to mean, that the freehold estate shall be liable according to law to his specialty debts.

The case is exactly the same with reference to the distinction taken, that where lands are specifically devised, the legatees shall not stand in the place of the creditors against the devisees, for that is upon the supposition that there is in the will as strong an inclination of the testator in favour of a specific devisee as a pecuniary legatee, and therefore there shall be no marshalling. But if, though specifically devised, the land is made subject to all debts, that distinguishes the case; for there is a double fund; and as, by that denotation of intention, the creditor has a double fund,—the land devised, and the personal estate,—he shall not disappoint the legatee (b). The case is also the same, where, instead of the case of

⁽a) See Gwynne v. Edwards, 2 Russ. (b) See Paterson v. Scott, 1 De G. M. 289 (n.). & G. 531.

a mere specialty creditor, the land specifically devised is subject to a mortgage by the testator; as in Lutkins v. Leigh (a): there he shall not disappoint the legatee. So the case of paraphernalia is very strong for this proposition, that, wherever there is a double fund, though this Court will not restrain the party, yet he shall not so operate his payment as to disappoint another claim, whether arising by the law or by the act of the testator.

The conclusion is, that the case of Robinson v. Tonge is not reconcilable with the general classes of cases; and therefore, it is necessary for the payment of the creditors, that the mortgagee should be compelled to take his satisfaction out of the copyhold estate, if he takes it out of the freehold, those who are thereby disappointed must stand in his place as to the copyhold estate.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Marshalling in Administration of Assets, p. 47.
- 3. Marshalling Securities, p. 56.

1. Generally.

Where one claimant A. has the right to satisfy his claim out of two funds X and Y, and another claimant B. has, subject to the prior right of A., the right to satisfy his claim out of the X fund only, it is obvious that A. by exercising his legal right and proceeding in the first instance against the X fund may either totally or partially defeat B.'s claim. Where certain conditions are fulfilled, however, equity will intervene so that an exercise of A.'s legal right shall not disappoint B.'s claim (b). The principle of marshalling "in some degree is that it shall not depend upon the will of one creditor to disappoint another," per Lord Eldon in the principal case supra p. 38.

In applying the principle the Court does not affect the legal right of the creditor. The principle has never been applied to affect the interest of the creditor or to diminish his rights; it is applied only

(a) Cas. t. Talbot, 54.

(b) Story, Eq., (1892) p. 367; Lanoy v. Athol, 2 Atk. 444; Re Cornwall, 3 Dr. & War. 173; A.-G. v. Tyndall,

Amb. 614; Hanby v. Roberts, Amb. 127; Ex p. Kendall, 17 V. 514; Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 499; Tidd v. Lister, 10 Ha. 157.

against the owners of the property charged (a). The principle is carried into effect by giving the claimant who has been or may be disappointed by the action of the other claimant the right to satisfy his claim out of the fund against which he had originally no right (b).

The doctrine of marshalling has been applied in a great variety of cases—in the administration of assets both as between creditors prior to the statutory changes hereafter noted and as between beneficiaries—in the working out of equities subsisting between successive incumbrancers and in adjusting the rights and liabilities arising from the relation of principal and surety, principal and agent, &c.

The following conditions must be fulfilled in order that the doctrine may be applied:

- (1) The two claimants must be creditors of the same person, claiming against the same estate, or having demands against funds the property of the same person, or forming part of the same estate. "It was never said," observed Lord Eldon, "that if I have a demand against A. and B., a creditor of B. shall compel me to go against A. without more; as if B. himself could insist that A. ought to pay in the first instance, as in the ordinary case of drawer and acceptor, or principal and surety, to the intent that all the obligations arising out of these complicated relations may be satisfied; but if I have a demand against both, the creditors of B. have no right to compel me to seek payment from A., if not founded on some equity giving B. the right, for his own sake, to compel me to seek payment from A." (c).
- (2) There must be two funds already in existence before the question of marshalling is raised (d), and the prior creditor or claimant must have equal rights against each fund (e). "It is in effect no more than this, that where one person has a clear right to resort to two funds, and another person has a right to resort to one only of two funds, the latter may say that as between himself and the double creditor, that double creditor shall be first to exhaust the
- (a) Mason v. Bogg, 2 My. & Cr. 443; Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. Cas. 486, at pp. 500—501; Douglas v. Cooksey, Ir. R. 2 Eq. 311; The Chioggia, (1898) P. 1; but cf. Webb v. Smith, 30 C. D. 202—203.
 - (b) Ex. p. Kendall, 17 V. 520.
 - (c) Ex. p. Kendall, 17 ∇ . 520;

Beane v. Cox, 6 B. 84; Sneed v. Culpepper, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 255, 260.

- (d) Re Professional L. A. Co. L. R. 3
 Eq. 668; Re State F. I. Co., 1 De G. J.
 & S. 634; Re International L. A. Soc.,
 2 C. D. 476.
 - (e) Webb v. Smith, 30 C. D. 192.



security upon which the single creditor (if I may so call him) has no claim "(a).

- (3) The doctrine will not be applied to the prejudice of third parties. It is enforceable against the debtor and volunteers claiming under him (b).
- (4) The doctrine does not apply as between mere volunteers (c). The Court, however, will not interfere actively against volunteers under a settlement by marshalling in favour of a creditor of the settlor (d).

A case for marshalling need not be made by the pleadings (e).

2. Marshalling in Administration of Assets.

Between Creditors.—The Act of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, which makes freeholds and copyholds liable to simple contract debts, and the Act 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46, which places the simple contract debt of persons dying on or after January 1, 1870, on an equal footing with their specialty debt, have made the doctrine of marshalling inapplicable as between creditors. The rule acted upon was that as creditors by simple contract had no claim upon real assets, unless charged with, or devised for, the payment of debts, a Court of Equity would compel specialty creditors who could resort, in the first instance, to the personal estate, in priority of simple contract creditors, and to the real assets, in exclusion of them, to recover satisfaction, in the first place out of the real assets as far as they went; or, if the specialty creditors had already exhausted the personal assets in payment of their claims, the simple contract creditors would be put to stand in their place against the real assets, whether devised or descended, as far as the specialty creditors might have exhausted the personal assets (f). And a specialty creditor, to whose debt copyholds, previous to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, were not

- (a) Per Lord Westbury, Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. 486, 505.
- (b) Douglas v. Cooksey, Ir. R. 2 Eq. 311; Flint v. Howard, (1893) 2 Ch. 54; The Arab, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 417, The Chioggia, (1898) P. 1, and cf. Webb v. Smith. 30 C. D. 192.
- (c) Boazman v. Johnston, 3 Si. 377; but see Lomas v. Wright, 2 My. & K. 769.
- (d) Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. 486, 502; and see further as to

volunteers, Hales v. Cox, 32 B. 118; infra, p. 59.

- (e) Gibbs v. Ougier, 12 Ves. 416; 8R. R. 348, and see Jud. Act, 1873, s. 24 (4).
- (f) Sagitary v. Hyde, 1 Vern. 455; Wilson v. Fielding, 2 Vern, 763; Galton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 436; Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 499; Lomas v. Wright, 2 My. & K. 769; Cradock v. Piper, 15 Si. 301.

liable, might stand in the place of a mortgagee of the copyholds who was paid out of the personal estate (a). As to the effect of the Statutes of Limitation upon the rights of simple contract creditors to marshal (b).

Mortgagees.—The principle upon which the Courts act in cases of marshalling was departed from in the case of a mortgagee, in the administration of the assets of a deceased mortgagor in Chancery. There, it might have been supposed, that a mortgagee having two funds, viz., the mortgaged estate and the general assets, would as against the general creditors only have been allowed to prove against the latter fund for so much of the debt as the mortgaged estate was deficient to pay; and this was so decided by Leach, M. R., in Greenwood v. Taylor (c), following the rule of bankruptev in such cases, Cottenham, C., however, in Mason v. Bogg (d), overruling the case of Greenwood v. Taylor, held that in an administration suit a mortgagee might prove his whole debt and afterwards realise his security for the deficiency, and the same rule was followed in the winding-up of a company under the Companies Act, 1862, a creditor holding security being held entitled to prove for the whole amount that was due to him, and not merely, as in bankruptcy, for the balance remaining due, after realising or valuing his security.

This has, however, been changed by statute both in the administration of the estate of a deceased person whose estate is insolvent, and in the winding-up of companies, and now the rule of bankruptcy followed in *Greenwood* v. *Taylor* is applied (e).

Between Legatees.—Where a testator has charged one or more legacies upon the real estate, and other legacies are not so charged; if the personal estate prove insufficient to pay them all, the legacies charged on the real estate shall be paid thereout; or if they have been paid out of the personal estate, the other legacies, as to so much, shall stand in their place as a charge upon the land (f).

But where the charge of a legacy upon real estate fails to affect it,

- (a) Gwynne v. Edwards, 2 Russ. 289 (n.).
- (b) See Fordham v. Wallis, 10 Ha.217, 229; Busby v. Seymour, 1 Jo. &Lat. 527.
 - (c) 1 Russ. & M. 185.
 - (d) 2 My. & Cr. 448.
- (e) See the Judicature Act, 1875, . 10; Re Whitaker, (1904) 1 Ch. 299.
- (f) Hanby v. Roberts, Amb. 127; Masters v. M., 1 P. W. 422; Bligh v. Darnley, 2 P. W. 620; Bonner v. B., 13 V. 379; Hanby v. Fisher, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 515; Re Stokes, 67 L. T. 223; Re Salt, (1895) 2 Ch. 203; Scales v. Collins, 9 Ha. 656; Sellon v. Watts, 28 B. 519; Seton (1901), p. 1670.

in consequence of an event happening subsequent to the death of the testator, as the death of the legatee before the time of payment, the Court will not marshal assets so as to turn such legacy upon the personal estate, in which case it might be vested and transmissible, whereas, as against the real estate, it would sink by the death of the legatee (a). In Pearce v. Loman (b), a legacy charged upon real estate and payable at a future day, was held by Lord Rosslyn to sink as to the real estate by the death of the legatee, before the time of payment; and that the assets could not be marshalled. "There is a singularity," observes his Lordship, "in the doctrine, as it now stands, that, as far as it affects one fund it is good; as far as it affects the other, bad; but it would be still more singular if it shall sink in one case, and not in the other, but the land, making good the personal estate, shall be charged * * * * The assets cannot be marshalled. It would be directly against Prowse v. Abingdon; the contingency is the same; and I cannot charge the real estate indirectly "(c).

Where the legal order of the assets has been deranged.—The Land Transfer Act, 1897, leaves unaffected the order in which real and personal assets are applicable in the payment of debts, s. 2, sub-s. 3. If a creditor resorts to the assets for payment out of the order prescribed by law (see p. 31, supra), his election is not allowed to prejudice the beneficiaries. "One rule of marshalling assets," observes Lord Hardwicke, "is clear, if there are debts by specialty and legacies, and no devise of the real estate, but it descends; if the creditors exhaust the personal estate, the legatees may stand in their place, and come upon the real estate; this is against the heir-at-law" (d). And as Lord Eldon observed in the principal case, "in the case of legatees against assets descended, a legatee has not so strong a claim to this species of equity as a creditor, the mere bounty of the testator enables the legatee to call for this species of marshalling: that, if those creditors having a right to go to the real estate descended, will go to the personal estate, the choice of the creditors shall not determine whether the legatees shall be paid or not (e)."

The doctrine of marshalling in favour of legatees against heirs is

⁽a) Prowse v. Abingdon, 1 Atk. 482.

⁽b) 3 V. 135.

⁽c) Jarman (1893), vol. 1, p. 792, and vol. 2, p. 1499; Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 504.

⁽d) Hanby v. Roberts, Amb. 128.

⁽e) Supra, p. 44; and see Culpepper
v. Ashton, 2 Ch. Ca. 117; Tipping v.
T., 1 P. W. 730; Lutkins v. Leigh,
Cas. t. Talbot, 54.

part of the lex loci, and does not apply when the lands are situated in Scotland (a).

"If one devises real estate, and gives general pecuniary legacies not charged on that real estate, and the creditors exhaust the personal estate, the legatees shall not stand in their place and come on the realty, because it was the intention of the testator that the devisee should have the real estate, as well as the legatees be paid "(b). But otherwise if the debts are charged upon the real estate (c).

A specific legatee is not allowed to stand in the place of specialty creditors as against real estate devised (d); even where since 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 3, the heir is the devisee (e). It is now settled that a devisee and a specific legatee shall contribute pro rata to satisfy the debts of the testator which his general personal estate is insufficient to pay (f). Where a testatrix devised her real estate and bequeathed her residuary personal estate to A, one of the executors of her will, and by a memorandum not attested as a will imposed a trust as to a specified portion of the residue in favour of third persons, it was held that for purposes of administration the portion held in trust must be treated as a specific legacy. The residue unaffected by the trust was first to be exhausted and the balance of the debts borne rateably by the specified portion of the residue and the real estate (g).

Before the Wills Act, a pecuniary legatee was not entitled to stand in the place of a creditor who had exhausted the personal assets as against a residuary devisee, upon the ground that every residuary devise was in reality specific, as it only comprehended property of which the testator was seised at the time of making his will (h). A residuary devise of real estate remains specific, notwithstanding the 24th section of the Wills Act; and a pecuniary legatee has consequently no right to marshal assets as against

- (a) Harrison v. H., L. R. 8 Ch. 342, 348.
- (b) Hanby v. Roberts, Amb. 128; Scott v. S., Amb. 383; Mirehouse v. Scaife, 2 My. & C. 695; Keeling v. Brown, 5 V. 359; Tomkins v. Colthurst, 1 C. D. 620; Dugdale v. Dugdale, 14 Eq. 234.
- (c) Surtees v. Parkin, 19 B. 406; Rickard v. Barrett, 2 K. & J. 289; Re Salt, (1895) 2 Ch. 203; Re Roberts, (1902) 2 Ch. 834; Re Stokes, 67 L. T.
- 223; Re Kempster, (1906) 1 Ch. 446.
- (d) Haslewood v. Pope, 3 P. W. 324, 5th Resolution.
- (e) Strickland v. S., 10 Si. 374.
- (f) Long v. Short, 1 P. W. 403; Re Saunders-Davies, 34 C. D. 482; Re Bawden, (1894) 1 Ch. 693; Re Butler, (1894) 3 Ch. 250; Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 490.
 - (g) In re Maddock, (1902) 2 Ch. 220.
- (h) Spong v. S., 1 Y. & J. 300, 311; Mirehouse v. Scaife, 2 My. & C. 695.

residuary devisees where the land is not charged with debts (a), or with legacies (b).

In Hensman v. Fryer (c), Chelmsford, C., although he rightly decided that a residuary devise is none the less specific since the passing of the Wills Act, and that consequently pecuniary legatees had no more right to marshal as against residuary devisees than they had before the Act, nevertheless, apparently by some mistake, held that residuary devisees were bound to contribute rateably with the pecuniary legatees to pay such debts as the general personal estate was insufficient to satisfy. But in Collins v. Lewis (d), Stuart, V.-C., stating it to be the settled law of the Court that personal estate not specifically bequeathed must be first applied in payment of debts before the real estate which passes under a residuary devise can be resorted to, declined to follow Hensman v. Fryer (e) on this point.

Although, as we have before observed, a legatee is not entitled to stand in the place of a specialty creditor, as against real assets devised, nevertheless in cases not coming within the Real Estate Charges Acts (supra, p. 23), where a mortgagee either of a devised, or of a descended estate, has exhausted the personal assets by resorting to them in the first instance, a legatee, whether specific or pecuniary, may stand in his place, and be satisfied out of the mortgaged premises, to the extent of the personalty applied in their exoneration; for the application of the personal assets in exoneration of the real estate mortgaged, does not take place so as to defeat any legacy (f).

Notwithstanding the doubt expressed in Mackreth v. Symmons, by Eldon, C. (see post), and in other cases as to whether, on the death of a purchaser without having paid his purchase money, the Court would marshal his assets in favour of third parties, it was settled before 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34 (which see p. 30, supra), that where a purchaser of real estate died intestate as to such estate, but

- (a) Pearmain v. Twiss, 2 Gif. 130; Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; Gibbins v. Eyden, 7 Eq. 371; Collins v. Lewis, 8 Eq. 708; Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136.
- (b) Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas.
 689; Raikes v. Boulton, 29 B. 41; cf.
 Re Saunders-Davies, 34 C. D. 482; Re
 Bawden, (1894) 1 Ch. 693.
 - (c) L. R. 3 Ch. 420.

- (d) 8 Eq. 708; and see Dugdale v. D., 14 Eq. 234.
- (e) See also Farquharson v. Floyer, 3 C. D. 109.
- (f) See(e) supra; Forrester v. Leigh, Amb. 171; Lutkins v. Leigh, Cas. t. Talbot, 53; Middleton v. M., 15 B. 450; Wythe v. Henniker, 2 My. & K. 635, 644; Johnson v. Child, 4 Ha. 87; Ite Smith, (1899) 1 Ch. 365.

having bequeathed legacies by his will, as the vendor had two funds to resort to, viz., his lien upon the land descended and the general personal estate, the pecuniary legatees might stand in his place upon the descended land if the vendor resorted to the personalty in the first instance (a). And it was settled, notwithstanding Wythe v. Henniker (b), that pecuniary legatees had the same right to stand in the place of the vendor with respect to his lien for unpaid purchase money on estates devised by the purchaser, in case the vendor resorted in the first instance to the personal estate. In Birds v. Askey (c) a trustee advanced to A.B., one of his cestuis que trustent, a part of the trust funds, to enable him to purchase a real estate. A. B. died without having repaid the money, having devised the estate, and his personal estate was insufficient to pay his debts and legacies. Romilly, M. R., held, first, that there was a lien on the estate for the trust funds; and, secondly, that the pecuniary legatees had, as against the devisees, a right of marshalling so as to have the lien satisfied primarily out of the purchased estate (d).

Lands devised in trust to pay debts being applicable before pecuniary or specific legacies (e) will be marshalled in favour of legatees or annuitants (f).

Lands devised *charged* with debts are marshalled in favour of legacies (y); and the Land Transfer Act, 1897, does not affect this rule (h).

As to lands descended. As simple contract creditors have now, under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, a right to demand payment of their debts out of the real estate of the deceased debtor, and have therefore a double fund out of which they may receive satisfaction, it follows on principle, that if they exhaust the personal assets, the legatees may stand in their place as to the real estate descended. In a case, however, before *Knight Bruce*, V.-C., it was argued that the stats. 3 Will. & M. c. 14, and 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, were intended for the relief of creditors, and not of legatees, but his Honor was

⁽a) Trimmer v. Bayne, 9 V. 209; Spoule v. Prior, 8 Si. 189.

⁽b) 2 My. & K. 635.

⁽c) 24 B. 618.

⁽d) See also Lilford v. Powys-Keck,
1 Eq. 347. But see now 30 & 31 Vict.
c. 69, s. 2, and 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34, pp. 28 and 30, supra.

⁽e) p. 31, supra.

⁽f) Bradford v. Foley, 3 Bro. Ch.

^{351 (}n.); Webster v. Alsop, 3 Bro. Ch. 352 (n.); Norman v. Morrell, 4 V. 769; Surtees v. Parkin, 19 B. 406; Hanby v. Fisher, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 515; Buckley v. B., 19 L. R. Ir. 544; Paterson v. Scott, 1 De G. M. & G. 531; Seton (1901), p. 1663.

⁽g) Rickard v. Barrett, 3 K. & J. 289; Re Stokes; Re Salt; Re Roberts.

⁽h) Re Kempster; supra, p. 50.

clearly in favour of marshalling for the legatees in such a case. "The equity of marshalling," he observes, "arises from a creditor's power to resort not from the mode in which he acquired the power of rescrting to each or either of two funds belonging to the debtor, whose rights, subject to the debt, have become divided. * * * * I have dwelt the more upon this argument, grounded on the nature and effect of statutory liability to debts, because, if it is well founded, it seems in substance not to stop short of asserting that, inasmuch as it is by statute that copyholds are assets for creditors, and free-holds for simple contract creditors, therefore there cannot be marshalling for legatees against descended copyholds, or in respect of simple contract debts against descended freeholds; it will surprise me exceedingly to hear of such a doctrine having met, or meeting, with support, or acceptance" (a).

Widow's paraphernalia (b).—Although, with the exception of necessary wearing apparel a widow's paraphernalia are liable to her deceased husband's debts, she will be preferred to a general legatee, and be entitled, therefore, to marshal assets in all those cases in which a general legatee would be entitled to do so; for instance, as against real assets descended (c); or real assets devised, if subjected by will to the payment of debts (d); and if a devised estate be subject to a mortgage or other specific incumbrance, she will, in cases not coming within the Real Estate Charges Acts (supra, p. 23), be entitled to marshal the assets as against the devisee, by throwing the charge upon the estate, as the legatee would have that right (e); but it seems to have been thought that she could not marshal against an estate devised if it were neither subjected by will to payment of debts, nor subject to a mortgage or specific incumbrance (f). But it seems now that the same claims on the part of the widow would prevail against specific devisees (g) as well as specific legatees (h).

- (a) Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 499.
- (b) Queere whether paraphernalia can now exist legally, see Masson-Templier v. De Fries (C. A.) 25 T. L. R. 784; and as to paraphernalia generally, see Hulme v. Tenant, post.
- (c) Tipping v. T., 1 P. W. 730, cited p. 61, infra; and cf. Snelson v. Corbet, 3 Atk. 368; Tynt v. T., P. W. 543; Probert v. Clifford, Amb. 6.
 - (d) Incledon v. Northcote, 3 Atk.

- 438; Boynton v. Parkhurst, 1 Bro. Ch. 576.
- (e) O'Neal v. Mead, 1 P. W. 693; Lutkins v. Leigh, Cas. t. Talbot, 53.
- (f) Ridout v. Plymouth, 2 Atk. 104; Probert v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 440; Forrester v. Leigh, Amb. 171.
- (g) Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 490; Gervis v. G., 14 Si. 654.
- (h) Graham v. Londonderry, 2 Atk. 78; 3 Atk. 395, 369, but see Burton v. Pierpoint, 2 P. W. 79

Charity.—Until the passing of the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891, by which property of any kind may be given to charity by will, the general rule was that assets were never marshalled in favour of legacies given to charities. The ground stated by Lord Hardwicke, in Mogg v. Hodges (a) was that the Courts were not warranted in setting up a rule of equity merely to support a bequest which was contrary to law. Thus, if a testator gave his real estate and personal estate, consisting of personalty savouring of realty, as leaseholds and mortgage securities, and also pure personalty, to trustees, upon trust to sell, and pay his debts and legacies, and bequeathed the residue to a charity, equity would not marshal the assets by throwing the debts and ordinary legacies upon the proceeds of the real estate, and the personalty savouring of the realty, in order to leave the pure personalty for the charity (b). that equity would not marshal in favour of charities is now of little practical importance, for in the case of a testator dving after August 5th, 1891, the principle of marshalling will be applied to the charitable as well as to other valid legacies.

The following is a short statement of the law before the passing of the Act above mentioned.

If a simple pecuniary legacy was given to a charity out of two sorts of personalty, there was an abatement in the proportion of the mixed to the pure personalty (c). "The rule of the Court adopted in all such cases is, to appropriate the fund as if no legal objection existed as to applying any part of it to the charity legacies; then holding so much of the charity legacies to fail as would, in that way, be to be paid out of the prohibited fund (d). This apportionment should

- (a) 2 Ves. Sen. 53.
- (b) Mogg v. Hodges, supra; A.-G. v. Tyndall, 2 Eden, 207; Foster v. Bladgen, Amb. 704; Middleton v. Spicer, 1 Bro. Ch. 201; A.-G. v. Winchelsea, 3 Bro. Ch. 374; Makeham v. Hooper, 4 Bro. Ch. 153; Crosbie v. Mayor of Liverpool, 1 Russ. & M. 761 (n.); Fourdrin v. Gowdey, 3 My. & K. 397; Johnson v. Woods, 2 B. 409; Gaskin v. Rogers, 2 Eq. 284; Wigg v. Nicholl, 14 Eq. 92; Brook v. Badley, L. R. 3 Ch. 675; Re Watts, 29 C. D. 947.
- (c) Ridges v. Morrison, 1 Cox, 180; Walker v. Childs, Amb. 524; A.-G.

- v. Tyndall, 2 Eden. 207; Foster v. Bladgen, Amb. 704; Makeham v. Hooper, 4 Bro. Ch. 153; Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Keen, 273.
- (d) Per Cottenham, C., in Williams v. Kershaw, 1 Keen, 277 (n.), followed Ashworth v. Munn, 34 C. D. 391; see also Waite v. Webb, 6 Madd. 71; Johnson v. Harrowby, John. 425; Jauncey v. A.-G., 3 Gif. 308; Scott v. Forristall, 10 W. R. 37; Philanthropic Soc. v. Kemp, 4 B. 581; Re Hill's T., 16 C. D. 173; Re Clark, 33 W. R. 516; Seton (1901), pp. 1335 & 1349, F. 15.

be made according to the respective values of the pure and impure personalty at the testator's death (a). In a singular case, where executors were directed to purchase a presentation to Christ's Hospital, the result of the rule against marshalling assets for a charity was, that the bequest failed altogether, there not being sufficient money from the pure personalty alone to effect the purchase (b).

But although the Courts would not marshal assets for charitable legacies, a testator might in effect himself marshal or arrange his assets, by directing his charitable legacies to be paid exclusively out of his pure personalty, and the Courts would, as it was not illegal, give effect to his intention (c); and a bequest of a residue of personal estate which included impure personalty to trustees upon trust to divide the same among such charities in England as they should think proper, was held equivalent to a direction to the trustees in effect to marshal the residue (d).

Where a testator charged his real estate with payment of his debts, and directed his charity legacies to be paid out of his pure personalty, the charity legatees would have a right to stand in the place of creditors who may have exhausted the pure personalty, inasmuch as not the Court, but the testator in such case marshalled the assets (e).

Although the testator might have directed his charitable legacies to be paid out of his pure personalty in priority of other legacies, if he had given no direction as to the funds out of which his debts and funeral and testamentary expenses were to be paid, the pure personal estate contributed with the other personal estate to their payment before it could be applied in satisfaction of the charitable legacies (f).

But the testator might exonerate his pure personalty from debts,

(a) Calvert v. Armitage, 1 Hem. & M. 446, overruling on this point Robinson v. Governors of London Hospital, 10 Ha. 19.

- (b) Cherry v. Mott, 1 My. & Cr. 123.
- (c) Robinson v. Geldard, 3 Mac. & G. 735; Nickisson v. Cockill, 3 De G. J. & S. 622; Wigg v. Nicholl, 14 Eq. 92; Miles v. Harrison, L. R. 9 Ch. 316; Wills v. Bourne, 16 Eq. 487; Re Arnold, 37 C. D. 637; Re Pitt,
- 53 L. T. 113; Seton (1901), p. 1335, F. 16.
- (d) Lewis v. Allenby, 10 Eq. 668; and see Re Ovey, 31 C. D. 113; cf. Re Somers-Cocks, (1895) 2 Ch. 449.
- (e) A.-G. v. Montmorris, Dick. 379; Re Ovey, supra; Biggar v. Eastwood, 19 L. R. Ir. 49.
- (f) Tempest v. T., 7 De G. M. & G.
 470; Beaumont v. Oliveira, L. R. 4 Ch.
 309; Lewis v. Boetefeur, 38 L. T.
 (N. S.) 93.

and throw them either expressly or by implication upon some other fund as the realty, or impure personalty in default of realty (a), and although the testator may exonerate the pure personalty from debts it must bear its share of the costs of administration unless they are otherwise provided for by the testator (b).

The rule not allowing marshalling in favour of legacies given to charities was a local English rule, not applicable in the administration of the estate of a person domiciled in Scotland (c).

Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891.—This Act provides that land assured by will for a charitable purpose shall be sold within one year from the testator's death, s. 5, and that personal estate directed by will to be laid out in land shall not be so laid out, but shall go to the charity as if there had been no such direction, s. 7.

The Act which passed 5th Aug., 1891, is only to apply to the will of a testator dying after that date, s. 9; but it applies to the will of a testator dying after the passing of the Act although made before. So where a testator by his will, dated June, 1891, gave real and pure and impure personalty upon trust for his wife for life, and on her death the residuary estate which might by law be given to charitable purposes, to a hospital, the entire residue was held to pass to the hospital (d). Since this Act the necessity of inserting in wills containing charitable gifts any direction for the marshalling of testator's property is done away with (c).

3. Marshalling Securities.

Mortgages.—If a person who has two real estates, mortgages both to one person, and afterwards only one estate to a second mortgagee, with or without notice of the first, then the Court, as against the mortgagor, his representatives and volunteers claiming through him, throws the burden of the first mortgagee's mortgage primarily on the estate which is not in mortgage to the second mortgagee, even though the estates descended to two different persons; see the judgment of *Hardwicke*, C. in *Lanoy* v. *Athol* (f).

"The right of a subsequent mortgagee of one of the estates mortgaged to marshal, that is to throw the prior charge which exists on both estates, upon that which is not mortgaged to him—is an equity

⁽a) Wills v. Bourne, 16 Eq. 487; Miles v. Harrison, L. R. 9 Ch. 316.

⁽b) Re Fitzgerald, 26 W. R. 53.

⁽c) Macdonald v. M., 14 Eq. 60.

⁽d) Re Bridger, (1893) 1 Ch. 44.

⁽e) See Tudor Charities, 4th edit., 159.

⁽f) 2 Atk. 446; Tidd v. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 857, 872; Gibson v. Seagrim, 20 B. 614.

which is not enforced against third parties, that is against any one except the mortgagor and his legal representatives claiming as volunteers under him. It is not enforced against a mortgagee or purchaser of the other estate. If both estates are subject to separate second mortgages the Court, in working out the equities of successive incumbrancers, apportions the first mortgage between the estates ": per Kay, L. J., in Flint v. Howard (a).

Thus the Court will not (apart from an agreement creating a special equity) (b) marshal in favour of a second against a third mortgagee. In other words, if Blackacre and Whiteacre are mortgaged first to A., and then Blackacre to B., and then both to C., there will be no marshalling between B. and C., but A. will be paid rateably out of both, so that B. may be paid out of Blackacre, leaving what remains of both for C. In Barnes v. Racster (c), R. being seised of Foxhall Coppice, and a piece of land marked in a plan of the estate No. 32, mortgaged, in 1792, Foxhall to B.; in 1795, Foxhall to H.; in 1800, Foxhall and No. 32 to B., and in 1804, Foxhall and No. 32 to W.: the subsequent incumbrancers took with notice. It was held, by Knight-Bruce, V.-C., that the Court ought not, as against W., to marshal the securities. His Honour said, that, circumstanced as the case was, H. and W. stood, with regard to the matter in dispute, on an equal footing; that B. ought to be paid out of the respective proceeds of No. 32, and Foxhall, pari passu and rateably, according to their amounts; that the residue of the proceeds of Foxhall ought to be applied towards paying H., and that the residue of the produce of No. 32 ought to be applied towards paying W. In Bugden v. Bignold (d), C., second mortgagee of X., claimed, on the ground that he had no notice of the first mortgage of X. and Y. to A., to throw the whole of it upon Y. mortgaged to B. It was held that although he had no notice he could not do this, but because he had no notice B. could not insist on a similar right against him, and A.'s mortgage was apportioned rateably.

In Flint v. Howard (e), P. in 1876, mortgaged a paper mill, and a reversion to H. to secure 6000l. In 1882 he mortgaged the same properties to F. to secure 5000l. In 1884 he mortgaged the paper mill only to F. to secure 2500l. In 1885, by a deed between F., P.

⁽a) (1893) 2 Ch. 54, at p. 73.

⁽b) See infra, Re Mower's Trusts; Aldridge v. Forbes, p. 59.

⁽c) 1 Y. & C. C. C. 401; see Lord St. Leonards, V. & P. 747, 14th edit.,

and see Baglioni v. Cavali, 83 L. T. 500.

⁽d) 2 Y. & C. C. C. 377; and see Gibson v. Seagrim, 20 B. 614; Moxon v. Berkeley Bldg. Socy., 59 L. J. Ch. 524.

⁽e) (1893) 2 Ch. 54.

and H. the mortgage to F. on the paper mill for 2500l. was transferred to H., and the paper mill was released from the mortgage of 5000l. to F. Therefore, in 1885, H. was first and second mortgagee of the paper mill, and first mortgagee of the reversion, and F. was second mortgagee of the reversion. P. made subsequent mortgages of both properties. F. foreclosed all mortgages on the reversion subsequent to his own, and then brought an action claiming to redeem H.'s mortgage on payment of 6000l. (a), an absolute transfer of the reversion, and a transfer of the mortgage on the paper mill. Held that the 6000l. must be apportioned between the paper mill and the reversion according to their respective values, and that F. was entitled to a conveyance of the reversion absolutely, and of the paper mill as a security for such part of the 6000l. as should be apportioned to that property. H. therefore as second mortgagee of the paper mill would have a right to redeem F. on payment of the sum so apportioned (b). Sed qu.? as to the rights inter se of F. and H. if F. had not foreclosed so as to become entitled to the reversion, subject to H.'s 6000l., but had redeemed H.'s mortgage. Could be tack the 5000l. to the 6000l. and insist on being paid both sums by H. if he, as second mortgagee of the paper mills, sought in turn to redeem F. ? (c) and quære as to whether the equitable right to apportionment is affected by notice or absence of notice of the first mortgage (d).

But if a third mortgagee, by his mortgage, takes expressly, subject to and after payment of the first two mortgages, the second mortgagee will be entitled to marshal as against the third. Thus in Re Mower's T. (e), a mortgagor being entitled in reversion to funds A. and B., made three mortgages. The first mortgage included A. and B., the second mortgage included B. only, and the third mortgage included A. and B., but was made subject to, and after payment of the two former mortgages. Fund A. was absorbed in payment of the first mortgage. It was held by Romilly, M. R., that the second

⁽a) See Mutual L. S. v. Langley,32 C. D. 460.

⁽b) See further Stronge v. Hawkes, 4 De G. & J. 632; Averall v. Wade, L. & G. t. Sugden, 252; Baldwin v. Belcher, 3 Dr. & War. 176; Hughes v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G. 690; Baldwin v. Belcher, 3 Dr. & War. 173; Re Fox, 5 Ir. Ch. R. 541; Re Lawder's Estate, 11 Ir. Ch. R. 346; Re Rorke's Estate, 15 Ir. Ch. R. 316; Dolphin v. Aylward,

L. R. 4 H. L. 486; Trumper v. T., L. R. 8 Ch. 870.

⁽c) See per Lindley, L. J., (1893) 2 Ch. at p. 68, and cf. Tetley v. Davies, 15 Vin. Abr. 447, fol. 20, and 2 Y. & C. C. C. 399 (n.) and see Ashburner on Equity, p. 286 et seq., where the question is discussed.

⁽d) See per Kay, L. J., (1893) 2 Ch. at p. 73.

⁽e) 8 Eq. 110.

mortgagee was entitled to marshal as against the third by standing in the place of the first mortgagee as against fund B. (a).

The doctrine of marshalling will not be applied to the prejudice of volunteers where one of the estates has been conveyed away by a voluntary settlement (b). But estates comprised in one mortgage will be marshalled as against the mortgagor in favour of a voluntary settlement, so as to throw the debt on the unsettled estates. in Hales v. Cox (c), A. B. executed a voluntary settlement of real estates to uses in favour of his four children, and covenanted that the estate should remain to those uses and for quiet enjoyment. A. B. afterwards mortgaged the settled estate with his own unsettled estates, and died. It was held by Romilly, M. R., that the children were entitled to throw the mortgages on the unsettled estate, and as against the legatees to prove under the covenants against the settlor's assets for the damage they had sustained by the mortgage. "It is clear," said his Honour, "that the persons who take under the voluntary settlement would, as regards the subsequent mortgages, not only take the property subject to those mortgages, but the mortgages ought, by marshalling, to be thrown as much as possible on the unsettled property, so as to liberate the settled property from the mortgage. If, by these means, the settled property will not be altogether freed from the mortgages, then I think that the persons who are entitled to the benefit of the covenants for quiet enjoyment contained in the settlement have a right to prove against the assets of the settlor for the amount to which they have been damaged by reason of his subsequently mortgaging the settled property; that is, after providing for the testator's debts, they are entitled to priority over the legatees "(d).

Marshalling in favour of a second incumbrancer whose charge is voluntary, as against a third incumbrancer, was given where the third incumbrancer expressly agreed that his incumbrance should not affect the rights of those claiming under the second (e).

Where the owner of two estates charged with debts, mortgages one

(a) See also Re Roddy, 11 Ir. Ch. R. 369.

- (b) Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. 502.
- (c) 32 B. 118, Mallot v. Wilson, (1903) 2 Ch. 494; and see Anstey v. Newman, 39 L. J. Ch. 769, cf. Averall v. Wade, infra.
 - (d) See Seton (1901), p. 2088, and

the remarks on this case by *Christian*, I. J., in Ker v. K., 4 Ir. R. Eq. 15; and see this case discussed in *Re Darby*, (1907) 2 Ch. 465, and cf. *Re* Repington, (1904) 1 Ch. 811.

(e) Aldridge v. Forbes, 4 Jur. 20; Lysaght's Estate, (1903) 1 Ir. R. 235, and cf. Re Mower's Trusts (supra).

of them, and ecites in the mortgage deed by mistake, that the debts are paid, and covenants against incumbrances, he will be bound to indemnify the mortgaged estate out of the other estate; in other words, there will be marshalling against the mortgagor and volunteers claiming through him (a). And the result has been the same when a mortgagor settling part of mortgaged estates covenants to exonerate them from incumbrances; the tenant in tail under the settlement has been held entitled under these circumstances to throw the mortgage upon the unsettled estates, not only as against the settlor and against the assignee in bankruptey, but also as against subsequent judgment creditors (b), but not, it seems, against a subsequent incumbrancer being an assignee for value without notice (c).

Where, however, two estates both charged with debts and legacies under a will are successively mortgaged under a power of appointment contained in the will, the former incumbrancer, though his mortgage contains a covenant against incumbrances, cannot marshal against the latter incumbrancer any more than he could have done against persons taking in default of appointment (d).

Nor will the doctrine of marshalling be applied in favour of a subsequent mortgagee as against intermediate volunteers, in favour of whom one of the estates subject to a mortgage has been conveyed. Suppose, for instance, A. mortgaged Blackacre and Whiteacre to B., and then made a voluntary settlement of Whiteacre, and afterwards mortgaged Blackacre to C., the doctrine of marshalling would not be applied in favour of C., by compelling B. to have recourse to Whiteacre alone so as to leave Blackacre free (e).

If one of two estates in mortgage is subject to a portion, the person entitled to the portion may, if it be necessary, compel the mortgage to resort to the other estate, so that the payment of the portion as well as the mortgage may be worked out (f).

So where a jointure is a charge upon two estates, and a portion upon one of them only, the portioner can compel the jointress to resort to the other estate. In Lanoy v. Athol (g), Lanoy created, by marriage settlement, a charge of 500l. a year upon real estate as a

- (a) Stronge v. Hawkes, 4 De G. & J. 632, 651.
- (b) Hughes v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G.683; Chappell v. Rees, 1 De G. M. & G. 393.
- (c) Barnes v. Racster; Stronge v. Hawkes, supra, but see Tighe v. Dolphin, (1906) 1 Ir. R. 505, following

Averall v. Wade, infra, p. 62.

- (d) Stronge v. Hawkes, supra.
- (e) Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. 486, 501.
- (f) Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow, 216; cf. Re Saunders-Davies, 34 C. D. 482.
 - (g) 2 Atk. 444.

jointure for his wife, afterwards Duchess of Athol, and there was a covenant for the payment thereof. Under a post-nuptial settlement by Lanoy of his real estate, there was a term of 200 years created to raise a portion of 6000l. for daughters. The plaintiff, being an only daughter, was entitled to 6000l., which the real estate was sufficient to pay. It was held that the Duchess of Athol having two funds, viz. the real estate under the settlement and copyholds and personal estate to which she could have recourse under the covenant, for the payment of her jointure, while the plaintiff had only one fund, viz., the real estate in settlement, she was entitled to turn the Duchess upon the copyhold and personal estates (a).

If a mortgagee chooses to take the paraphernalia (b) of a widow in satisfaction of his debt by bond or covenant, Equity will ascertain the value, and make her a creditor for that upon the mortgaged estate (c).

Where an estate is subject to debts, legacies, or other charges, and the owner mortgages a part of such estate, the mortgagee will, as against the mortgagor, or a purchaser from him of the part mortgaged, have a right to throw such charges upon that part of the estate which is not comprised within his security (d).

In applying the doctrine of marshalling to mortgagees and creditors, the Court will not interfere with the first mortgagee's right to take his debt out of that part of his security which becomes first available upon the ground that other funds are comprised in his security (e), nor will a mortgagee who is executor and legatee of the mortgager be compelled to satisfy the mortgage debt out of the first sufficient sum of personal assets that comes to his hands (f); but if the mortgagee having a double fund has exercised his option in such a way as to disappoint a creditor by taking the only fund to which he could resort (g); or even if such only fund had been applied for convenience by the order of the Court (h); such exercise of option or order will not have the effect of disappointing the creditor with one fund only, who will therefore be entitled to stand pro tanto in the place of the former (i).

The doctrine, however, of marshalling is not applicable where no

- (a) See also Legh v. L., 15 Si. 135.
- (b) Quære whether paraphernalia can now exist, see infra, under Hulme v. Tenant.
 - (c) Tipping v. T., 1 P. W. 729.

- (d) Haynes v. Forshaw, 11 Ha. 93; Colyer v. Finch. 5 H. L. Cas. 905.
 - (e) Wallis v. Woodyear, 2 Jur. (N. S.)
- 179.
 - (f) Binns v. Nichols, 2 Eq. 256.
- (g) Aldrich v. Cooper, p. 44, supra; cf. Lysaght's Estate, (1903) 1 Ir. R. 235.
- (h) Gwynne v. Edwards, 2 Russ. 289 (n.).
 - (i) Trimmer v. Bayne, 9 V. 209.

question can be raised as to the insufficiency of the single fund. Thus a second mortgagee having the security of estates A. and B. and offering to redeem a prior mortgagee having the security of estate A. only, cannot be compelled by the prior mortgagee to resort to estate B. in the first instance (a).

Judgment Debts.-Where there are judgments affecting estates, and some of the estates are settled for valuable consideration, and there has been either a mere concealment of the judgment, and, a fortioni, if there is a declaration or covenant in the settlement that the estate is free from incumbrances, the trustees entitled to the settled estates will be entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of marshalling, by having the judgments thrown upon the unsettled estates, not only as against the settlor himself but also as against the judgment creditors of the settlor subsequent to the settlement, who do not stand in any better position than the settlor himself. In Averall v. Wade (b) a person being seised of several estates, and indebted by judgments, settled one of the estates for valuable consideration, with a covenant against incumbrances. He subsequently acknowledged other judgments, and it was contended, by subsequent judgment creditors, that, as their judgment debts only affected the unsettled estates, they on the principle in Aldrich v. Cooper, having only one fund, had a right to compel the prior judgment creditors, who had two funds,—the settled and unsettled estates,—to resort to the settled estates; or, at any rate, that the settled estates ought to contribute to the payment of the prior judgments. Sugden, C., however, held that the subsequent judgment creditors had no equity to compel the prior judgment creditors to resort to the settled estates: on the contrary, that the prior judgments should be thrown altogether on the unsettled estates, and that the subsequent judgment creditors had no right to make the settled estates contribute (c).

Bankruptcy.—A trustee in bankruptcy takes the bankrupt's estate subject to all equities and therefore subject to the equity to marshal (d). So where A taking under a will two estates charged

- (a) Gregg v. Arrott, L. & G. t. Sugden, 246.
- (b) (1835) L. & G. t. Sugden, 252; see Re Jones, (1893) 2 Ch. 470; M'Carthy v. M'Cartie, (1904) 1 Ir. R. 100, and see Stronge v. Hawkes, supra; see A. v. W. discussed in Ker v. Ker, (1869) Ir. R. 4 Eq. 15; Lysaght's Estate, supra; Flint v. Howard, supra; Re
- (c) See also Going v. Farrell, Beat. 472; Hughes v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G. 683; Chappell v. Rees, 1 De G. M. & G. 393; Re Lynch's Estate, 1 Ir. Eq. 396.

Jones, (1893) 2 Ch. 461, supra.

(d) Baldwin v. Belcher, 3 Dr. & W. 173, cf. Dolphin v. Aylward, L. R. 4 H. L. 486.

with legacies, mortgaged each estate separately, the proceeds of one estate proving insufficient to pay the legacies and mortgage money, the mortgagee of that estate was held entitled as against the mortgager or his assignees in bankruptcy, to call upon the legatees to take so much of their legacies out of the other mortgaged estate, which was amply sufficient to answer for the legacies and the mortgage thereon, as would leave a sufficiency to pay his mortgage (a).

Insurance Policies.—An Insurance office, where a policy is forfeitable on the suicide of the assured, except as to a beneficial interest vested in an assignee, cannot upon the suicide of the assured, compel the assignee to resort to other securities held by him for the debt, or to have it rateably paid out of all the securities (b). The result is the same when the policy has been assigned with other securities to the Company for upon the death of the assured by suicide, the Company must repay themselves their debt out of the sum assured, and re-assign the securities to the parties entitled to them (c).

Surety.—Where the creditor has two funds to which he can resort the surety is entitled to marshal not only as against the principal debtor, but also as against all persons claiming under him. In Re Westzinthus (d), W. shipped oil to L. & Co., who, on its arrival, endorsed the bill of lading and deposited it with H. & Co., brokers, who advanced money on it. H. & Co. had previously advanced money upon other goods the property of L. & Co. deposited with them by way of security. L. & Co. having become bankrupt, the oil not having been paid for, the agents of W. claimed the oil from the master, who, however, delivered it to H. & Co. It was held first that the transfer of the goods to H. & Co. would in equity be treated as a pledge or mortgage only, and that W., therefore, by his attempted stoppage in transitu, acquired a right to such goods in equity against the assignees of L. & Co., subject to the lien of H. & Co. for the sum they had advanced upon them. Secondly, that W., by means of his goods, had become surety to H. & Co. for L. & Co.'s debt, and had a clear equity to oblige H. & Co. to pay their debt

(a) Ex. p. Hartley, 1 Deac. 288;
explained in M'Carthy v. M'Cartie,
(1904) 1 Ir. 100; Broadbent v. Barlow,
3 De G. F. & J. 570; Ex. p. Alston,
L. R. 4 Ch. 168; Heyman v. Dubois,
13 Eq. 158; Ex. p. Salting, 25 C. D.
148; Wace, Bankruptcy, 361.

- (b) Solicitors &c., L. A. Soc. v. Lamb, (1864) 2 De G. J. & S. 251; City Bank v. Sovereign L. A. Co., (1884) 50 L. T. 565.
- (c) White v. British Empire, &c.,L. A. Co., (1868) 7 Eq. 394.
 - (d) 5 B. & Ad. 817.

out of L. & Co.'s own goods deposited with them in ease of his surety, and, all the goods of W. and L. & Co. having been sold, W. might insist on the proceeds of L. & Co.'s goods being appropriated to the payment of the debt, and therefore that W. was entitled to have all the proceeds of the oil paid over to him (a). A surety, moreover, can compel the principal creditor, a mortgagee, to avail himself of his equitable right to consolidate securities, so that marshalling may be carried out in favour of the surety. Heyman v. Dubois (b), A., by policy 9322, assured his life for 2000l.—which he mortgaged to the office for 1000l. A. subsequently effected a policy 9695 for 1000l. in the same office, and then mortgaged it to the office to secure 500l. A. afterwards effected a policy 10,688 for 1000l. in the same office, and mortgaged this policy together with policy 9322 to the office to secure 1500l., for the repayment of which the plaintiff was security. A. became bankrupt, and the plaintiff being sued by the Company, paid them 975l. 16s. 10d. in part discharge of the judgment and costs. Policy 10,688 was forfeited for non-payment of the premium. Upon A.'s death it was held by Bacon, V.-C., that as against A.'s assignee in bankruptcy the plaintiff was entitled to have the securities marshalled, so as to be paid out of the policy monies the sum which he had been compelled to pay under the judgment, including the costs of the action (c).

The right, however, of a subsequent mortgagee B. of one fund to compel a former mortgagee A. of the same fund and another to resort, in the first instance, to that fund which will leave his own either wholly or partially free, cannot be interfered with by a surety for the debt due on the first mortgage who on the exhaustion of the fund not mortgaged to B. has paid the balance of the debt due to A. and has taken an assignment of A.'s security on the other fund (d).

Agents.—If an agent, as for instance a factor or consignee, pledge the goods of his principal and also goods of his own to secure a debt, the pledgee may be compelled by the principal to resort first to the agent's goods. In $Ex\ p$. $Alston\ (e)$, a firm in Ceylon employed a firm in England as their agents and factors, and the

⁽a) Approved Kemp c. Falk, 7 A. C. 573. See also Spalding v. Ruding, 6 B. 376; Ex. p. Alston, L. R. 4 Ch. 168; and cases cited under note "Bankruptcy," supra, p. 62.

⁽b) 13 Eq. 158.

⁽c) Seton, (1901) 2088.

⁽d) South v. Bloxam, 2 Hem. & M. 457; explained in Dixon v. Steel, (1901) 2 Ch. 602; and see Re Toogood's Legacy Trusts, 61 L. T. 19.

⁽e) L. R. 4 Ch. 168.

course of the business was that the Ceylon firm consigned cargoes of coffee to the English firm for sale on their account, and drew bills on the English firm against the consignments. Consignments of coffee having been made in this manner, and bills accepted by the English firm against them, the English firm pledged the coffee which belonged to the Cevlon firm, together with certain securities of their own, with T., their broker, to secure a large debt due from them to him. The English firm became insolvent, and executed a creditors' deed under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861; and then T. sold the coffee, which produced more than sufficient to cover the bills drawn against it, and enough of the other securities to satisfy his debt, and still held securities of the English firm in his hands. was held by the Court of Appeal in Chancery that the Ceylon firm were entitled, as against the creditors of the English firm, to have the securities marshalled, so as to have a lien on the securities of the English firm remaining in the hands of T., for the balance due to them in respect of the consignments of coffee. A guarantee by one partner for the debt of the firm, which gives the creditor a right of proof against the separate estate of the partner in addition to his right of proof against the joint estate of the partnership, is also a security to which the principle of marshalling is applicable (a).

Husband and Wife.—Married Woman.—Where husband and wife mortgaged all the estates of the wife, and subsequently one of the estates to another person, the latter was held entitled to marshal against the wife surviving (b).

In Re Loder (c), C., a widow, was entitled to one-third of the income of a fund restrained from anticipation, and to the other two-thirds free from restraint. She mortgaged all her interest in the fund to F. She then married, and charged her interest in favour of P. The income was sufficient to pay the interest on F.'s mortgage, and also the premiums of certain policies which formed part of his security. It was held that as between F. and P., F. should take his interest and the premiums first out of the one-third restrained, so as to leave the remaining two-thirds free for P.

Landlord and Mortgagee.—The principle of marshalling has been applied to cases between a landlord and a mortgagee of chattels of

⁽a) Ex p. Salting, 25 C. D. 148; Ex p. Alston, L. R. 4 Ch. 168; Re West-zinthus; Broadbent v. Barlow, supra.

⁽b) Tidd v. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 857.

⁽c) 35 W. R. 58.

a tenant, where the landlord has distrained not only the chattelscomprised in the security, but also other chattels of the tenant. Thus in Ex p. Stephenson (a) a tenant mortgaged some personal chattels, and being in possession of them and also of other personal chattels, the landlord distrained for rent upon both sets of chattels. The person in possession under the distress was requested by the mortgagee, and consented, to hold possession of the goods, or at least of the mortgaged goods, for him as well as the landlord, without prejudice to the landlord's rights. The tenant then became bankrupt, and after the bankruptcy the landlord's demand was satisfied by means of a sale of goods, some, if not all, of which were subjected to the mortgagee's security, whilst some or all of the goods to which the security did not extend remained unsold. It was held by Knight-Bruce, V.-C., that the mortgagee was entitled to stand in the place of the landlord, and to be paid the amount of his mortgage debt out of the proceeds of the goods taken under the distress which were not comprised in his security (b).

Portions.—A testator devised his real estate subject to a trust to raise portions. His general personal estate was insufficient for the payment of debts, and the real estate and the specifically bequeathed personal estate had to contribute rateably. Held that, as between the portioners and the persons entitled to the real estate, the former were not bound to contribute (c).

Two Funds, one subject to Lien.—The defendants, S. and Co., auctioneers, sold a brewery for X., and had in hand the sale-money, subject to their charges. They also sold for X. some furniture, and held the proceeds. X. assigned the proceeds of the brewery to the plaintiff W., who gave notice to S. and Co. S. and Co. paid X. the proceeds of the furniture money, and paid themselves out of the brewery money assigned to W. Held by C. A. that, as S. and Co. had not equal claims or charges upon both funds, but a lien only on the brewery money, and a mere right of set-off as to the furniture money, they were right in so satisfying their lien, and that the principle of marshalling had no application (d).

- (a) De G. 586.
- (b) See also Broadbent v. Barlow, De G. F. & J. 570.
- (c) Re Saunders-Davies, 34 C. D. 482; following Raikes v. Boulton, 21
- B. 41, and explaining Long v. Short,P. W. 403. Cf. Re Bawden, (1894)1 Ch. 692.
- (d) Webb v. Smith, 30 C. D. 192; and cf. Re Dunlop, 21 C. D. 583.

The Crown.—Marshalling takes place where the Crown has two funds to which it can resort under an extent, viz., an estate comprised within a mortgage—and other property of the mortgagor; "for" in such a case, as observed by Eldon, C., in the principal case, "a mortgagee whose interest in the estate was affected by an extent of the Crown, has found his way, even in a question with the general creditors, to this relief, that he was held entitled to stand in the place of the Crown, as to those securities which he could not affect per directum, because the Crown affected those in pledge to him" (a). So when creditors were not entitled to be paid out of real estate, "there being a debt owing to the king, it was ordered that the king's debt should be satisfied out of the real estate, that the other creditors might be let in to have satisfaction of their debts out of the personal assets" (b).

Admiralty Cases.—The same doctrine was applied in the Admiralty Court, as for instance where there were several bonds, and one was secured on the ship and freight, and another upon the ship, freight, and cargo, the bond-holders who had a charge on the cargo were not allowed to disappoint the other bond-holders who had none thereon, but were compelled to resort to the security against their ship and freight (c). So where bottomry bond-holders had two funds out of which they might be satisfied, the first being ship and freight, and the second the cargo, and the master could only resort to the first fund for payment of his claim for wages and disbursements, the funds would be marshalled by the Court so as to allow the master to be paid out of the proceeds of the ship and freight (d). And since the Judicature Act the equity, it would seem, is to be recognised and acted upon by every Division of the High Court of Justice (c).

(a) Supra, p. 43.

(b) Sagitary v. Hyde, 1 Vern. 455.

(c) The Trident, 1 Wm. Rob. 29, 35; La Constancia, 2 Wm. Rob. 404, 406; The Arab, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 417.

(d) The Edward Oliver, L. R. 1 Ad.

& Ecc. 379; The Chioggia, (1898) P. 1; and see The Eugenie, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ecc. 123; The Priscilla, Lush. 1.

(e) Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, s.-s. 1 to 4, and s. 25, s.-s. 11.

HOWE v. EARL OF DARTMOUTH. HOWE v. COUNTESS OF AYLESBURY.

May 22, 1802. 7 V. 137, 6 R. R. 96.

Conversion as between Tenant for Life and Remainderman.

General rule, that where personal property is bequeathed for life, with remainders over, and not specifically, it is to be converted into the Three per Cents., subject, in the case of a real security to an inquiry, whether it will be for the benefit of all parties; and the tenant for life is entitled only upon that principle.

Bequest of personal estate not held specific merely from being combined with a devise of land.

The Court will protect an executor in doing what it would order.

WILLIAM EARL OF STRAFFORD, by his will, dated the 25th of October, 1774, gave to his wife Anne, Countess of Strafford, all his personal estate whatsoever (except the furniture of Wentworth Castle) for her life, subject to the following outpayments and legacies. He also left to her all his houses, gardens, parks, and woods, and all his landed estates for her life; and afterwards all his personal and landed estates to his eldest sister Lady Anne Conolly for her life: and then to the eldest son of George Byng, Esq.; and afterwards to his second, third, or any later sons he may have by the testator's niece Mrs. Byng; and then to the eldest son and other sons successively of the Earl of Buckingham by his niece Caroline, but all of them to be subject to the following outpayments and legacies. He left his wife the sum of 15,000l. to dispose of for ever as she pleases, and the value of 500l. in furniture in Wentworth Castle of whatever sort she chooses, else the whole furniture to be her's if she meets with any difficulty in this disposition. He gave several legacies and annuities, and declared he would have all his debts paid, and gave all his servants a year's wages.

The testator died on the 10th of March, 1791. Anne Countess of Strafford died in his life, on the 9th of February, 1785. Lady Anne Conolly filed a Bill for an account of the personal estate, &c. By a

decree made at the Rolls on the 17th of May, 1793, the usual accounts were directed; and it was declared that the plaintiff would be entitled to the interest of the clear residue of the testator's personal estate during her life; and an inquiry was directed, who were the next of kin of the testator at the time of his death.

The Master's report, dated the 7th of March, 1796, stated the account of the personal estate, part of which consisted of the following stocks and annuities, standing in the testator's name at his death:—

4,3201. Bank Stock;

9,572l. per annum Long Annuities;

750l. per annum Short Annuities.

Under orders made in the cause, the sum of 15,000l. and 4,000l. had been paid in by the executors, and laid out in 3l. per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annuities.

By a decretal order, made on the 7th of May, 1796, the balance of the personal estate in the hands of the executors, and of the interest, &c., was ordered to be paid into the Bank; and that the executors should transfer the 4,320l. Bank Stock, the 9,572l. per annum Long Annuities, and 750l. per annum Short Annuities, to the Accountant-General, in trust in the cause; and that the said funds, when so transferred, should be sold with his privity; and that the money to arise by such sale should be laid out in the purchase of 3l. per Cent. Annuities, in trust in the cause, subject to a further order; and that the Master should appropriate a sufficient part of the said Bank Annuities, when purchased, to answer the growing payments of the several annuities; and that, as any of the annuitants should die, the funds appropriated respectively should fall into the general residue, with liberty to apply; and it was ordered, that the interest of the residue of the said Bank Annuities after such appropriation, and also the interest and dividends of the said 4,320l. Bank Stock, should be paid to the plaintiff Lady Anne Conolly for her life, and on her death any person or persons entitled thereto were to be at liberty to apply: and after providing for the costs out of the balance of the personal estate, and for the arrears of the annuities out of the sum of 2,067l. 6s. 1d., the balance of the interest and dividends received by the executors and ordered to be paid into the Bank, it was ordered

that the remainder should be paid to Lady Anne Conolly; and also that 1,846l. 9s. 7d., cash in the Bank, which had arisen from interest of the funds in which part of the testator's personal estate had been invested, should be also paid to her; and that the dividends of 24,619l. 4s. 10d., 3l. per Cent. Bank Annuities, in which the sums received by the executors from the personal estate had been invested, should from time to time be paid to her during her life, and on her death any persons claiming to be entitled were to be at liberty to apply; and it was ordered, that the executors should get in the outstanding personal estate, and that so much thereof as should consist of interest should be paid to Lady Anne Conolly, and so much as consisted of principal, should be paid into the Bank, subject to further order.

The Master's further report, dated the 10th of December, 1796, stated that the Bank Stock and the Long and Short Annuities had been sold, and the produce laid out in 3l. per Cent. Annuities.

Upon the death of the plaintiff Lady Anne Conolly, the suit was revived by her executors; and the cause coming on before Lord Alvanley, then Master of the Rolls, for further directions on the subsequent report, it was insisted, on the part of Mr. Byng, that Lady Anne Conolly had received, for interest and dividends accrued on the Bank Stock and the Long and Short Annuities, and the produce thereof laid out in Bank 3l. per Cent. Annuities, large sums more than she was entitled to, if those funds had been sold, as they ought to have been immediately after the testator's decease, and the produce invested in a permanent fund, viz., the 3l. per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annuities. The Master of the Rolls directed inquiries with reference to that question between the executors of Lady Anne Conolly and Mr. Byng, and the other parties interested in the residue of the personal estate; with liberty to present a petition to re-hear the order of 1796, as to the payments thereby directed to be made to Lady Anne Conolly.

The re-hearing was argued before Lord Rosslyn, but no judgment was given.

Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Lloyd, Mr. W. Agar, Mr. Wingfield, Mr. Serjeant Palmer, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Richards, for different parties, in support of the petition of re-hearing.

The tenant for life of such funds as Bank Annuities, carrying a higher interest, and Long and Short Annuities, wearing out rapidly, are not entitled to the enjoyment of them in specie; but there is a standing rule of the Court, for the benefit of all parties interested, that those funds shall be laid out in the more equal fund, the 3l. per Cents. No party ought to suffer by the circumstance, that what ought to have been done, and what the Court would have directed to be done, immediately on the testator's death, was not The state of this question is, that the late Lord Chancellor went out of office without having delivered any opinion upon the point; and Lord Alvanley thought he could not decide against the order of the Lord Chancellor; supposing his Lordship to have been of opinion, that there was something particular in this will, upon the distinction between the gift of a general residue for life, with remainder over, and a specific bequest of this sort of property; in which case it could not be sold, and the dividends follow, of course, from the death of the testator; even the rule, that takes place in general legacies postponing the payment of interest to the end of a year from the death, not attaching upon it. But there is nothing specific in this will. This is a mere gift of the residue of the personal estate for life, subject to the payment of debts, legacies, and annuities. Under every such will, the Court has always sold this sort of property, if there was any wearing out fund, not specifically given, or any fund as to which the tenant for life had an advantage over those in remainder *

Mr. Romilly, and Mr. Trower, for the executors of Lady Anne Conolly, in support of the decree.

The first question is, whether Lady Anne Conolly was entitled to the annual produce of the personal estate at the death of the testator; if not, the next consideration is, whether the executors having paid it to her, and particularly the dividends of the Bank Stock, those payments ought to be called back.

The personal estate is given to her for life specifically. As this disposition is expressed, it is the same as if the testator had enumerated the particular articles, of which the personal estate consisted. He has not given his personal estate to his executors, in trust to sell, &c., and that what remains shall be given to those

persons: but he has given the personal estate to them specifically as he has given the land. The Lord Chancellor considered, that there was nothing in the will, which made it necessary for the executor to convert this property into any other fund. For many purposes a bequest of all the personal estate is considered specific; for instance, upon the question of exoneration, where there is a charge of debts. There is no doubt of the general rule: but this question does not depend upon it * * * *

The second question is of considerable novelty, as to what is to be done with the dividends received, particularly upon the Bank Stock. With reference to the Bank Stock, as distinguished from the Annuities, no case has established that the executor had done wrong by paying to the tenant for life the interest of some permanent fund, though producing more than if the property was invested in the 3l. per Cents.; and to make this party account for what she has received, that proposition must be made out * * * *

The Lord Chancellor [Eldon] desired the counsel in reply not to trouble himself upon the point whether the bequest was specific, and to advert to the Bank Stock.

Mr. Mansfield, in reply.—In this respect there is no difference between the Bank Stock and the Annuities. The price is perfectly accidental, and is never considered. The Court says, first, Bank Stock is the stock of a trading company, not a Government fund, secured by the Legislature. The former also produces a high dividend, and is therefore more liable to fluctuation and uncertainty. For these reasons, this Court never suffers those funds to remain which are considered hazardous, and, to a certain extent, wasteful. The tenant for life cannot have any more right to advantage in the shape of that large dividend, than of Long and Short Annuities. The Court goes further, ordering the conversion of 4l. per Cents., a Government fund, probably on the principle that they are liable to be redeemed, and not so permanent a fund. With respect to refunding, these are trustees. Their conduct cannot affect the rights; and it happens that there are dividends now due to Lady Anne Conolly in Court, which, if the decision is against her, the executors have no objection to apply to the refunding, if it is to take place * * *

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—No question arises upon this will except whether this is a specific bequest of such personal estate as was the testator's at the time of his death. Lord Rosslyn is represented to have had considerable doubt whether it was not specific; and if it is, I agree, not only Lady Anne Conolly, up to the date of the decree, but afterwards, and Mr. Byng and the other persons in remainder, must take the specific produce of what is specifically given. But if it is so to be considered, the decree is not correct, considering the bequest specific to the date of that decree, and no longer. It is wrong, therefore, in any way.

Upon the question, whether this is specific, it must be either upon the words describing the personal estate, or upon the construction of those words, coupled with the devise of all his landed estates.

With respect to the latter, every devise of land, whether in particular or general terms, must of necessity be specific, from this circumstance, that a man can devise only what he has at the time of devising. Upon that ground, in the case at the Cockpit, it was held, that a residuary devisee of land is as much a specific devisee as a particular devisee is.

But it is quite different as to personal estate. The question must be, did he mean to dispose of what he had at the date of the will, or of that which he should have at his death? If he meant the former, then every part of that identical personal estate, which is disposed of between the date of the will and the death, is a legacy adeemed: pro tanto it is gone. If the question is, whether those subjects, to be acquired between the date of his will and his death, should pass, I cannot say he did mean that. If not it can only be specific thus: that the persons to take the personal estate he should have at his death in different interests should enjoy it as he left it.

Not one word of this will goes to that. It is given as "all his personal estate;" and the mode in which he says it is to be enjoyed, is to one for life, and to the others afterwards. Then, the Court says, it is to be construed as to the perishable part, so that one shall take for life, and the others afterwards; and unless the testator directs the mode, so that it is to continue as it was, the Court understands that it shall be put in such a state, that the others may enjoy it after the decease of the first; and the thing is quite equal: for it might consist of a vast number of particulars; for instance, a

personal annuity, not to commence in enjoyment till the expiration of twenty years from the death of the testator, payable upon a contingency, perhaps. If, in this case, it is equitable that Long or Short Annuities should be sold, to give every one an equal chance, the Court acts equally in the other case; for those future interests are, for the sake of the tenant for life, to be converted into a present interest, being sold immediately in order to yield an immediate interest to the tenant for life. As in the one case, that in which the tenant for life has too great an interest, is melted for the benefit of the rest; in the other, that, of which, if it remained in specie, he might never receive anything, is brought in, and he has immediately the interest of its present worth.

As to the annuities charged upon this estate, the tenant for life, if entitled to the whole, would be properly paying out of the aggregate property the annuities. But it would be great injustice to those in remainder, if these capital sums were paid out of that part of the bulk of the property which does not consist of perishable interests, and were not to be thrown in proportion upon the perishable part. The ordinary rule of apportioning requires, that, in some degree, a provision should be made out of those (the Short Annuities), if they remain, and not out of the 3l. per Cents. only.

The cases alluded to, where personal estate has been taken to be specifically given, do not apply. First where a residuary legatee takes it [the residue] as a specific gift, not subject to debts, the inference, that he is to take that personal estate, is not made, in general cases, upon the bequest of all the testator's personal estate, but upon the effect of that, connected with what arises out of other parts of the will, with regard to the intention to fix upon other funds charges that would primarily fall upon that fund; and that must be made out, not by conjectures, but by declaration plain, or manifest intention (a). That is the principle upon which it is agreed these cases are to be construed; and the intention has never been considered manifest merely from a disposition of the personal estate in the same clause with land; which must be taken to be specifically given. But those cases do not go the length, that, if the enjoyment is portioned out in life interests, with remainders over, it is specific. I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that this is not a case in which

⁽a) See Ancaster v. Mayer, supra, p. 1.

the personal estate is in this sense specifically given, with a direction that it shall remain specifically such as it was at the testator's death; and the purposes for which it is given are those for which it is admitted there is a general rule, that these perishable funds are to be converted in such a way as to produce capital bearing interest.

I was astonished when that was doubted. From general recollection, I had considered the practice to be, that the first moment the observation of the Court was drawn to the fact, the Court would not permit property to be laid out, or to remain upon such funds, under a direction to lay it out in Government securities, but would immediately order it to be converted into that which the Court deems, for the execution of trust, a Government security.

I pass over what has been said as to real securities; for there is a great difference between real securities, or Bank Stock, for instance, and Government securities. Bank Stock is as safe, I trust and believe, as any Government security; but it is not Government security; and therefore this Court does not lay out, or leave, the property in Bank Stock; and what the Court will decree, it expects from trustees and executors; I will not state what the Court would do, where executors had not made these conversions. That depends upon many circumstances. But I abide by Lord Kenyon's rule in the case of Mr. Champion, an executor, before which time it was doubted whether an executor could lay out the property in 3l. per Cents. (a). Lord Kenyon, who was a repository of valuable knowledge, produced a dictum of Lord Northington, that the Court would protect an executor in doing what it would order him to do. The Court in this case would order him to do that.

It is not so in the case of a mortgage. The Court would not permit a real security to be called in without an inquiry, whether it would be for the benefit of every person; and it is accident that some part of the assets will produce more interest than a genuine trust security. In some instances, there is little doubt, it may be not only for the benefit of the tenant for life, but for the substantial interest of the remainderman, that the property should not be shifted from a good real security.

The question then is, whether the Court will change the fund, not as between the remainderman and the executor, but in a question

⁽a) See Order 22, r. 17; R. S. C. Nov. 1888; and Trustee Act, 1893.

between the tenant for life and the remainderman; and the question vith the executor cannot well arise, so as to be acted upon, till a ailure by the tenant for life, or those who represent him; for the ustice of the case, if the tenant for life has received so much, would e, that he should bring it back in ease of the executor, who paid im. If the rule is, that the fund shall not remain, it is impossible o say, the date of the decree shall decide. I do not like to put it pon the possibility of collusion; but that is not to be totally eglected, for it may happen, that the executor himself may be the enant for life, and then he has an interest in delay. Of necessity here must be great delay, before there can be a final decree in a ause of great property, and it may be very much protracted where here is an interest. However, I do not put it upon that. But if ne principle is, that the Court, when its observation is thrown upon , will order the conversion, it ought to be considered, to all practicble purposes as converted, when it could be first converted. That the genuine inference from the other principle. If the Court has ver attended to the difficulties often thrown before it, with regard to erishable property of other kinds, as leasehold estate, &c., it never as as to stock. You can learn the price at which it might be inverted on any day, and the moment the Court was ordered by ie Legislature to lay out its funds in stock, it necessarily held, that r this purpose stock must always be considered of the same value. is for the benefit of the creditor that it should be thrown into a sting fund; and it is equal to all the parties interested. As to ank Stock, the Court has ordered 4l. per Cents. and 5l. per Cents. be sold and converted into 3l. per Cents. upon this ground, that, owever likely, or not, that they may be redeemed, the Court looks them as a fund that is not permanent, though it may remain for er; and considers, that from that quality, there is an advantage the present holder, who gets more interest, because they are liable be redeemed. I do not know whether the reasoning is as just in actice as it is in theory. Property cannot be laid out by this ourt in Bank Stock in the execution of a trust to lay it out in overnment securities, for it is not a Government security. Conrting that, therefore, the executors would have done what this ourt would have ordered, and that falls under the same consideraon, and the advantage, if any, ought not to accrue to the tenant for

The account, therefore, must go as to that, as well as the Long and Short Annuities, from the time at which it would have been converted, if the observation of the Court had been drawn to the fact that the executors were possessed of those funds.

This petition of re-hearing is therefore well founded.

NOTES.

1. Generally.

- 2. Intention to give enjoyment in specie, p. 80.
- 3. Income of residue as between legatee for life and successors, p. 87.
- 4. Duties and liabilities of trustees as to conversion, p. 91.

1. Generally.

When there is a residuary bequest of property to persons in succession, and no trust for conversion, and such property is not invested upon securities which would be authorised by the Court, then, unless there is an express or implied expression of intention by the testator that such property is to be enjoyed in specie, the general rule of the Court is, that it is to be converted and invested in Consols or other authorised securities (a).

The rule only applies to a disposition by will of residuary personal estate given as one fund to be enjoyed by several persons in succession, and does not apply to a settlement by deed (b). Though it cannot perhaps be said that the rule in the principal case never applies in the case of an absolute gift of a residue with an executory limitation over, yet the rule is not generally applicable in such a case (c).

The rule is applicable to property of a wasting or perishable kind e.g. terminable annuities, leaseholds (d) and, in favour of the tenant for life, to reversionary property (e), and to all other existing investments not of the recognised character, and which are consequently

- (a) Tickner v. Old, 18 Eq. 422; Thursby v. T., 19 Eq. 406; Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101; Roberts v. Morgan, 23 L. R. Ir. 118; Re Pitcairn, (1896) 2 Ch. 199; Seton (1901), p. 1686; Jarman (1893), p. 576; Theobald, 7th edit., p. 555 et seq.
- (b) Re Van Straubenzee, (1901) 2 Ch. 779.
 - (c) Re Bland, (1899) 2 Ch. 336, and

- cf. Re Hammersley, 81 L. T. 150.
- (d) Fryer v. Buttar, 8 Si. 442; Wightwick v. Lord, 6 H. L. C. 217; and see Gover on Capital and Income, 97 et seq.
- (e) Wilkinson v. Duncan, 23 B. 469; Johnson v. Routh, 27 L. J. Ch. 305; Harrington v. Atherton, 2 De G. J. & S. 352; Rowlls v. Bebb, (1900) 2 Ch.

deemed to be more or less hazardous (a). A distinction has, however, been drawn between "wasting" and "hazardous but permanent" securities, and where trustees are by the will empowered to retain securities of the latter character the rule has no application (b); but the validity of this distinction has been denied, and the power to retain has been held to give the life tenant the income of wasting securities (c).

For where personal estate is given in terms amounting to a general residuary bequest, to be enjoyed by persons in succession, the interpretation the Court, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, puts upon the bequest is, that the persons indicated are to enjoy the same thing in succession; and in order to effectuate that intention, the Court, as a general rule, converts into permanent investments so much of the personalty as is not so invested, and also reversionary interests (d). The rule did not originally ascribe to testators the intention to effect such conversions, except in so far as a testator may be supposed to intend that which the law will do; but the Court, finding the intention of the testator to be, that the objects of his bounty shall take successive interests in one and the same thing, converts the property, as the only means of giving effect to that intention (e).

It follows from what is laid down in the principal case that all property, of whatever kind, included in a residuary bequest, whether wasting, perishable, or even permanent in its character, if it be not invested in authorised securities (f), or real securities, would, in the absence of any directions to invest, be converted and invested by order of the Court, in $2\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent. Consols (g); and it will be a breach of trust on the part of the trustees not to act in the same manner (h), having regard, however, it is presumed, to the Trustee Act and Rules of Court referred to in note (f). Where, however, wasting

- (a) Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101; Prendergast v. P., 3 H. L. Cas. 218; Wightwick v. Lord, 6 H. L. Cas. 217; Johnson v. Routh, 27 L. J. Ch. 305; Harrington v. Atherton, 2 De G. J. & S. 352; Wilkinson v. Duncan, 23 B. 469; and the observations of Cottenham, C., in Pickering v. P., 4 My. & C., 289; Porter v. Baddeley, 5 C. D. 542.
- (b) Re Sheldon, 39 C. D. 50; Re Bates, (1907) 1 Ch. 22; Re Wilson, (1907) 1 Ch. 394; and cf. Re Chaytor, (1905) 1 Ch. 233,

- (c) Re Nicholson, (1909) 2 Ch. 111; and see infra, p. 83.
- (d) Macdonald v. Irvine, supra. Re Pitcairn, (1896) 2 Ch. 199.
- (e) Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 35; but see Pickering v. P., 4 My. & C. 289.
- (f) As to which see R. S. C., Order 22, r. 17: Annual Practice, Part. II.; and The Trustee Act, 1893.
- (g) Vaizey, Investment, 1890, p. 27; Roberts v. Morgan, 23 L. R. Ir. 118; Thornton v. Ellis, 15 B. 193.
- (h) Bate v. Hooper, 5 De G. M. & G. 338.

securities are retained under a power to postpone conversion or where the property is so laid out as to be secure, and to produce a large annual income, but is not capable of immediate conversion without loss or damage to the estate; the rule is not to convert the property but to set a value upon it and to give the tenant for life equitable interest thereon (a). The rule appears to be settled that the rate of interest now given will be 3 per cent. (b).

"It is quite clear that the rule must be applied unless upon the fair construction of the will you find a sufficient indication of intention that it is not to be applied; the burden in every case being upon the person who says the rule of the Court ought not to be applied," per James, L. J., in Macdonald v. Irvine (c).

For instances of the application of the rule laid down in the principal case, see the cases cited in note (d).

Annuities.—The rule applies in favour of one having a life annuity charged on a residue (e). So, likewise, if it be charged on a wasting fund, as in Fryer v. Buttar (f), where the testator gave to M. W. an annuity of 40l. for life payable out of his Long Annuities, and directed that at M. W.'s death the principal out of which the annuity arose should go to his next of kin then living; and he further directed, that the annuity should be secured on his stock of Long Annuities. The testator died possessed of 509l. Long Annuities; Shadwell, V.-C., held, that a fund for payment of the annuity ought to be provided in the Three per Cents., and that the money required for that purpose ought to be raised by the sale of part of the Long Annuities, and that the remainder of the Long Annuities formed part of the testator's residuary estate.

(a) Meyer v. Simonsen, 5 De G. & Sm. 723; following Gibson v. Bott, 7 V. 89; Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. 312, and see Re Llewellyn's Trust, 29 B. 171; Brown v. Gellatly, L. R. 2 Ch. 751; cf. Gray v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74.

- (b) Re Woods, (1904) 2 Ch. 4.
- (c) 8 C. D. p. 124; see also Re Game, (1897) 1 Ch. 881.
- (d) Lichfield v. Baker, 2 B. 481; Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 498; Pickup v. Atkinson, 4 Ha. 624; Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; Johnson v. J., 2 Coll. Ch. R. 441; Benn
- v. Dixon, 10 Si. 636; Chambers v. C., 15 Si. 183; Lichfield v. Baker, 13 B. 447; Oakes v. Strachey, 13 Si. 414; Hood v. Clapham, 19 B. 90; Jebb v. Tugwell, 20 B. 84; 7 De G. M. & G. 663; Blann v. Bell, 5 De G. & Sm. 658; 2 De G. M. & G. 775; Howard v. Kay, 27 L. J. Ch. 448; Craig v. Wheeler, 29 L. J. Ch. 374; Re Game, (1897) 1 Ch. 881; Re Shaw's Trusts, 12 Eq. 124.
- (e) Wightwick v. Lord, 6 H. L. Cas. 217.
 - (f) 8 Si. 442.

2. Intention to give Enjoyment in Specie.

This intention may be expressed (a), or may be inferred from the terms of the whole will, and the authorities show an inclination to allow small indications of intention to exclude the rule (b). Where the interests of successive takers of a residue are not conflicting, as where a residue is given to a widow for life for the maintenance of herself and children, and to be equally divided at her death among her children, the case for conversion is weaker than where the interests of the tenant for life and remainderman are antagonistic (c).

Where wasting or reversionary property is given to persons in succession *specifically*, in the strict sense of that term, then there can be no reason for converting it (d).

But the mere absence of a direction to convert the property has never been construed to mean that it should be enjoyed in specie by legatees in succession (e).

If, however, an intention can be collected from the will, that property shall be enjoyed in specie, as it existed at the death of the testator, although the property be not, in a technical sense, specifically bequeathed (f), where, for instance, in the gift there is a partial enumeration of articles (which does not render the residuary gift specific (g)), it ought not to be converted (h), even although the trustees have given to them a discretionary power to do so (i); if such power is given to the trustees, with a view to the security of the property, and not with a view to vary or affect the relative right of the legatees (k). And where a residuary devise and bequest

- (a) Pickering v. P., 4 My. & C. 289; Collins v. C., 2 My. & K. 703.
- (b) Morgan v. M., 14 B. 72; Hinves v. H., 3 Ha. 611; Re Bland, (1899) 2 Ch. 336; but cf. citation from Macdonald v. Irvine, p. 79, supra.
- (c) Marshall v. Bremner, 2 Sm. & G. 237; Re Eaton, 70 L. T. 761.
- (d) Vincent v. Newcombe, You. 599; Cockran v. C., 14 Si. 248.
- (e) Johnson v. J., 2 Coll. Ch. R. 441; Morgan v. M., 14 B. 72, 83.
- (f) As to which see Bothamley v. Sherson, 20 Eq. 304; Re Ovey, 20 C. D. 676; 8 A. C. 812.
 - (g) As to which see Sutherland v.

- Cooke, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 498; Re Green, 40 C. D., p. 618.
- (h) Hinves v. H., 3 Ha. 611; Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101; Pickup v. Atkinson, 4 Ha. 624; Pickering v. P., 4 My. & C., 289; Hubbard v. Young, 10 B. 203; Harris v. Poyner, 1 Dr. 181; followed in Re Game, (1897) 1 Ch. 881; Collins v. C., 2 My. & K., 703.
 - (i) Lord v. Godfrey, 4 Madd. 455.
- (k) Milne v. Parker, 12 Jur. 171;
 D'Aglie v. Fryer, 12 Si. 1; Marshall v.
 Bremner, 2 Sm. & G. 237; Hubbard v. Young, 10 B. 203; Harris v.
 Poyner, 1 Dr. 181; Morgan v. M., 14

contains certain property the gift of which is specific, such as lands, freeholds, &c., there is a ground for inferring that other property included in the residue, such as Long Annuities, were also intended to be given specifically (a).

The argument in favour of specific enjoyment of things partially enumerated is, perhaps, weaker when they are given through the intervention of a trust (b).

A direction for conversion may be so expressed as to indicate an intention that there should be no conversion by the Court. Thus, a trust to convert at a particular time, e.g. the death of the tenant for life, will entitle the tenant for life to specific enjoyment (c).

So also a discretionary power of sale given to the trustees or to the tenant for life is inconsistent with and negatives any presumed intention of the testator that there should be conversion by the Court (d).

A power to vary securities is important, as showing that the testator did not intend his residue to remain on perishable securities (e). But it is said by Leach, V.-C., in Lord v. Godfrey(f), that such power is given to trustees with a view to the security of the property, and not with the view to vary or affect the relative rights of the legatees.

And where the property is given over specifically at the death of the tenant for life (g), or where the conversion of a part is expressly postponed for a certain time, the tenant for life will be entitled to

- B. 72; Mills v. Brown, 21 B. 1; Fielding v. Preston, 1 De G. & J. 438; Boys v. B., 28 B. 436; Thursby v. T., 19 Eq. 406; but see cases cited p. 89, infra, notes (d) (e).
- (a) Bethune v. Kennedy, 1 My. & C. 114; Simpson v. Earles, 11 Jur. 921; 81 R. R. 928; House v. Way, 18 L. J. Ch. 22; 83 R. R. 345; Burton v. Mount, 2 De G. & Sm. 383; Holgate v. Jennings, 24 B. 623; but cf. Blann v. Bell, 5 De G. & Sm. 658.
- (b) Craig v. Wheeler, 29 L. J. Ch. 374; 8 W. R. 172; followed in Re Game, supra; Vincent v. Newcombe, You. 599; Vaughan v. Buck. 1 Ph. 75; Blann v. Bell, 2 De G. M. & G. 775; Bowden v. B., 17 Si. 65; Hood v. Clapham, 19 B. 90; Boys v. B., 28

- B. 436; Thursby v. T., 19 Eq. 395.
- (c) Alcock v. Sloper, 2 My. & K., 699; Simpson v. Lester, 33 L. T. 6; Daniel v. Warren, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 290; Harvey v. H., 5 B. 134; Rowe v. R., 29 B. 276.
- (d) Re Pitcairn, (1896) 2 Ch. 199; Re Bentham, 94 L. T. 307; and see Burton v. Mount, 2 De G. & Sm. 383; Bowden v. B., 17 Si. 65; Skirving v. Williams, 24 B. 275; but cf. Rowlls v. Bebb, (1900) 2 Ch. 107.
 - (e) Morgan v. M., 14 B. 72, 85.
 - (f) 4 Madd. 459.
- (g) House v. Way, 18 L. J. Ch. 22;
 Harris v. Poyner, 1 Dr. 174; D'Aglie
 v. Fryer, 12 Si. 1; Collins v. C., 2 My.
 & K. 703.

specific enjoyment during that period (a), so where there is a power to sell or renew leaseholds with his consent (b).

Where a tenant for life is entitled to enjoy in specie, the rule is that investments may remain, but debts must be realised (c). But a power given in a will by a testator to trustees, after a direction to sell and convert his real and personal estate, "to continue invested any of his Government stocks and real securities," was held to be confined to such Government stocks as were of a permanent character, and therefore not to include Long Annuities (d).

A direction that certain property—shipping—comprised in a residuary bequest should not be converted during a certain term of years is tantamount to a direction that it should remain in specie during that term, and the tenant for life will be entitled to the income of it while it so remains in specie (e), or until it is sold. under a discretionary power vested in trustees. Where there is a trust for conversion and investment with a discretionary power to postpone conversion, and a provision that the income until conversion is to be paid to the tenant for life, he will be entitled to the actual income produced till conversion and the rule in the principal case does not apply either for or against the tenant for life. Accordingly, if the trustees in a proper exercise of their discretion retain unproductive property or do not realise reversionary interests, the tenant for life has no claim as against the remaindermen (f). There must, however, be an actual valid exercise of their discretion by the trustees in order to exclude the rule. In Rowlls v. Bebb (g), the testator directed conversion, giving the trustees a discretionary power to postpone, and directed that the produce of his outstanding personal estate should be treated as annual income. The estate comprised a reversionary interest in a sum of Consols subject to the life interest therein of the tenant for life under the will, but included no wasting assets.

- (a) Green v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; but see Re Carter, 41 W. R. 140, and Re Chaytor, (1905) 1 Ch. 233.
- (b) Hinves v. H., 3 Ha. 609; Crowe v. Crisford, 17 B. 507; Hind v. Selby, 22 B. 373; Skirving v. Williams, 24 B. 275.
- (c) Holgate v. Jennings, 24 B. 623; Crowe v. Crisford, 17 B. 507.
 - (d) Tickner v. Old, 18 Eq. 422; but

- cf. Re Sheldon; Re Bates; Re Wilson, supra.
- (e) Green v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 655; followed Re Lambert, 36 Sol. Jo. 327; cf. Brown v. Gellatly, infra, p. 89
- (f) Mackie v. M., 5 Ha. 70; Wrey
 v. Smith, 14 Si. 202; Johnston v.
 Moore, 27 L. J. Ch. 453; Lean v. L.,
 23 W. R. 484; Miller v. M., 13 Eq.
 263; Re Hubbuck, (1896) 1 Ch. 754.
 - (g) (1900) 2 Ch. 107.

trustees did not convert the reversionary interest. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence showed that the whole question as to whether the reversionary interest should or should not be converted was never considered by the trustees, and that, therefore, there had been no exercise of their discretion. It also appears that in the opinion of the Court, the fact that there were no wasting assets, the retention of which might counterbalance the non-conversion of the reversionary interest, rendered that non-conversion improper.

An express power to sell realty does not afford any indication of intention that the wasting securities should be specifically enjoyed (a); and it has been held that a mere power to retain investments will not entitle a tenant for life to specific enjoyment of wasting securities (b).

But a discretion in trustees to retain or sell any part of the trust estate (c), may amount to an expression of intention that the tenant for life should enjoy it (though wasting) in specie. In Re Thomas (d) where there was an absolute trust for conversion followed by an absolute discretion to retain, with a distinct gift of the income of investments retained, the Court held that the income of certain unauthorised investments retained by the trustees was to be enjoyed by the tenant for life. A power to postpone the sale of a business involves a power to continue it, and the tenant for life takes the income (e).

A direction to discharge incumbrances on (f), to renew or keep in repair (g), or a power to demise, leaseholds (h), is an indication of intention that the tenant for life should enjoy them in specie.

An exception from a general direction to convert may show an intention that the exempted property is to be enjoyed in specie as in Wilday v. Sandys (i), where a testator gave his residuary estate to trustees in trust to convert into money such parts thereof as should not at his decease consist in money, or be invested in any of the public funds or Government securities, and to invest the

- (a) Jebb v. Tugwell, 20 B. 84.
- (b) Porter v. Baddeley, 5 C. D. 542; not followed in *Re Nicholson*, (1909) 2 Ch. 111, where the cases are discussed.
- (c) Gray v. Siggers, 15 C. D. 74, followed in Re Nicholson, supra; Simpson v. Lester, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1269; Re Leonard, 29 W. R. 234; Green v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; Re Chan cellor, 26 C. D. 42; Re Sheldon, 39 C. D. 51.
- (d) (1891) 3 Ch. 482. Cf. Re Chaytor; Re Bates; Re Wilson, supra, p. 78.
 - (e) Re Crowther, (1895) 2 Ch. p. 60.
 - (f) Re Sewell, 11 Eq. 80.
- (g) Crowe v. Crisford, 17 B. 507. See Re Game, infra.
- (h) Hind v. Selby, 22 B. 373 Thursby v. T., 19 Eq. 395.
 - (i) 7 Eq. 455.

same in such public funds or Government securities as to them should seem most advantageous, *Romilly*, M. R., held that the Long Annuities, of which the testator died possessed, were within the exception from the trust for conversion (a).

Where the residuary estate includes properties producing rents, the question has frequently arisen whether in such case a direction to the trustees to pay the rents to persons entitled for life will exclude the rule requiring the conversion of leaseholds. The question is discussed at length, and the earlier decisions reviewed by Stirling, J., in Re Game (b). In that case the residuary estate included both freeholds and leaseholds, and the testator directed his trustees to pay the rents and profits of his residuary real and personal estate to his wife for life, and after her death gave his residuary estate to certain persons in succession charged after his wife's death with certain annuities. Each annuitant was given a power of distress for the recovery of his annuity. It was held, that as the residue included both freeholds and leaseholds the mere use of the word "rents" was not an indication of intention that the property was to be enjoyed in specie. The word "rents" could be satisfied by applying it to the freeholds, and the powers of distress were not by necessary implication to be over the leaseholds. The result would be otherwise if there were no freeholds or if other indications of intention that the leaseholds were to be enjoyed specifically were contained in the will (c). Similarly in Alcock v. Sloper (d), where there was a general residuary bequest, upon trust to permit the testator's widow to receive the rents, profits, dividends, and proceeds thereof, for life, Leach, V.-C., held, that the word "dividends" had reference to Long Annuities, of which part of the testator's estate consisted, and that the use of the word "dividends" was equivalent to a direction that the widow should enjoy the Long Annuities in specie.

- (a) Howard v. Kay, 27 L. J. Ch. 448; Grant v. Mussett, 8 W. R. 330. Cf. Porter v. Baddeley, supra; Preston v. Melville, 15 Si. 35.
- (b) (1897) 1 Ch. 881; Craig v. Wheeler, (1860) 29 L. J. Ch. 374 followed; Crowe v. Crisford, (1853) 17 B. 507; Wearing v. W., (1856) 23 B. 99; Vachell v. Roberts, (1863) 32 B. 140, commented on.
- (c) Goodenough v. Tremamondo, 2 B. 512; Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 36, and

see Hunt v. Scott, 1 De G. & Sm. 219; Howe v. H., 14 Jur. 359; Burton v. Mount, 2 De G. & Sm. 383; Blann v. Bell, 5 De G. & Sm. 658; 2 De G. M. & G. 775; Harris v. Poyner, 1 Dr. 174; Hind v. Selby, 22 B. 373; Bowden v. B., 17 Si. 65; Boys v. B., 28 B. 436; Re Elmore's T., 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1325; Thursby v. T., 19 Eq. 395.

(d) 2 My. & K, 699.

In Pickup v. Atkinson (a), where the testator died possessed of leaseholds, Long Annuities, and 3l. 5s. per Cent. Annuities, and ready money, it was held, that a bequest of the rents and profits, dividends, and interest of a residue, comprising that property, did not indicate an intention that it was to be enjoyed in specie; Wigram, V.-C., thought that the correct reasoning upon those words, considered alone, must be analogous to that which is applied to the residue itself. The mere enumeration of particulars in the latter case does not give a specific character to the bequest, because the whole clause is, in effect, a mere residuary bequest (b). He thought the same observation applied to a case like that; the enumeration of the particulars of income being nothing more than a gift of the income of the residue, which means income only. . conclusion appeared to his Honour to be put beyond dispute when it was considered that the words "rents, profits, dividends, and interest," in that case meant rents, profits, dividends, and interest, not of the property the testator then had, but of such property, real, personal, or mixed, as he might happen to have at the time of his death (c). The same conclusion arose from the words of the gift over, namely, "the whole of such residue of my said property" (d).

A direction that powers of attorney should be given to cestuis que trustent entitled to receive in succession the income of property, may show the testator's intention that they were to enjoy it in specie (e).

No implication arises that the general residue is not to be converted from the fact that there is a direction to convert certain specific parts of the personal estate (f). Nor do express directions that the residue of personal estate shall be sold from time to time by executors for payment of debts and legacies, raise an implication that it is to be sold for no other purpose, so as to prevent the operation of the general rule (g).

A direction to divide the property after the death of the tenant for life, has been held to indicate an intention that the tenant for

- (a) 4 Ha. 625.
- (b) See as to this Re Green, 40 C.D. 610 at p. 618.
 - (c) See Wills Act, s. 24.
- (d) And see Booth v. Coulton, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 207.
 - (e) Neville v. Fortescue, 16 Si. 333.
- (f) Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 34; Morgan v. M., 14 B. 85, 86; Hood v. Clapham,
- v. M., 14 B. 85, 86; 11000 v. Ciapila. 19 B. 90.
- (g) Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C.
 312; Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Coll. Ch.
 R. 498; Johnson v. J., 2 Coll. Ch.

life should enjoy the property in specie (a). But see the observations of Wigram, V.-C., in Pickup v. Atkinson (b).

Any expression from which it can be inferred that the testator intended the remainderman to take the same property as the tenant for life, will show that it was his intention that the tenant for life should enjoy the property in specie. Thus in Harris v. Poyner (c), the testator devised and bequeathed all the residue of his real and personal estate, "and all his estate term and interest therein" to trustees in trust for his wife for life, and after her death, he devised "the same and all his estate term and interest therein" to his son. Kindersley, V.-C., held, founding his decision on the word "term," that the testator intended the son to take the identical property, and, therefore, that during the life of the widow no conversion was to take place (d).

In Thursby v. T. (e), a testator seised of real estate, and possessed of leasehold collieries which he was working, by his will devised all his real estate and also all his leasehold estates and all his goods, chattels and credits, and other personal estate to trustees for persons in succession, it was held that a power given to the trustees (amongst other things) in case they should deem it beneficial so to do, to continue the collieries and either to increase or abridge the business thereof, and to procure any lease of the collieries to be renewed, and to continue the business after such renewal, was a sufficient indication of intention on the part of the testator, that the tenants for life should enjoy the collieries in specie, especially as the tenant for life of one moiety—an unmarried daughter—had power to appoint any part not exceeding one half of the rents, issues and profits, interest, dividends and annual income of her moiety during the lifetime of any husband for his use.

A mere direction postponing the payment of legacies or the distribution of estate until after the death of the tenant for life, will not be a sufficient indication of intention that he is to enjoy the residue in specie, inasmuch as such a direction may be taken to refer, not to

⁽a) Collins v. C., 2 My. & K. 703; and see Bethune v. Kennedy, 1 My. & C. 114; Pickering v. P., 2 B. 31; 4 My. & C. 289; Vaughan v. Buck, 1 Ph. 75; Oakes v. Strachey, 13 Si. 414; House v. Way, 12 Jur. 958; Holgate v. Jennings, 24 B. 623.

⁽b) 4 Ha. 630; and see Mills v. M.,

⁷ Si. 508.

⁽c) 1 Dr. 174; followed in Re Game, supra.

⁽d) But see Lichfield v. Baker, 2 B. 481; 13 B. 447; Thornton v. Ellis, 15 B. 193; Bowden v. B., 17 Si. 65.

⁽e) 19 Eq. 395.

the management of the property or the securities in which it should be invested, but simply to the postponement as regards the time of the coming into being of the interests respectively created by the will after the death of the tenant for life (a). Nor will the fact that many of the bequests in the will are specific, and require that the subject matter of them should be left in specie during the existence of the life estate, lead fairly to any inference that the residuary estate is also to be left in specie during the existence of such life estate (b).

A gift to the tenant for life of the income of the testator's "entire estate," will not, it seems, afford an indication of the testator's intention that his property should remain in specie until after the death of the tenant for life; at any rate, where the context shows that those words do not mean "to be kept intact," but are used in their ordinary or popular signification of "all" or "the whole" estate as distinguished from a part of the estate (c).

3. Income of Residue as between Legatee for Life and Successors.

Where a residue (d) is bequeathed with directions to convert and invest for the benefit of persons in succession and the income before conversion is not expressly or impliedly appropriated, the legatee for life takes the income from the testator's death of such part of the residue as consists of securities authorised by the Court or by the will (e). But as to such part of the residue as ought to be converted, the legatee for life will be entitled, from the death of the testator, to the dividend on so much Consols as could have been purchased with the proceeds of such part of the residue had it been converted at the end of a year from testator's death (f).

Where there is no direction for conversion, and there is an express or implied intention in the instrument that the legatee for life is to take in specie, such legatee will take the whole income (g).

- (a) Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D.101, 123; see also Blann v. Bell, 2De G. M. & G. 775.
- (b) Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101, 123, 124.
- (c) Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101, 123.
- (d) As to what is "residue," Allhusen v. Whittell, infra; Marshall v. Crowther, 2 C. D. 199, p. 91, infra.
- (e) Angerstein v. Martin, T. & R.232; Hewitt v. Morris, T. & R. 241;
- La Terriere v. Bulmer, 2 Si. 18; Allhusen v. Whittell, 4 Eq. 295; Macpherson v. M., 16 Jur. 847; Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; Jarman, (1893) p. 570; Lewin, 11th ed., p. 333.
- (f) Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195; Taylor v. Clark, 1 Ha. 161; Morgan v. M., 14 B. 72; Allhusen v. Whittell, 4 Eq. 295; Brown v. Gellatly, L. R. 2 Ch. 751.
- (g) See the principal case, and Alcock v. Sloper, 2 My. & K., 699; cf. Re Eaton, 70 L. T. 761; Re Pitcairn, supra.

And so likewise where there is a direction to convert, but the will shows an intention that until conversion the legatee for life is to take the actual income until conversion (a).

Where conversion is directed, and the income in the meantime is to be accumulated, and added to the capital, the accumulation is confined to one year from the testator's death, and from and after that period the tenant for life is entitled to the interest or rent directed to be accumulated (b).

Leaseholds.—Where a tenant for life is entitled to the enjoyment of leaseholds in specie, and they are taken by a public company, and the purchase-money is paid into Court, he is entitled to the same benefit thereout as he would have had from the lease (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, s. 74), and as leasehold property is of a wearing-out character, it is evident that the mere interest of the purchase-money cannot be considered an adequate compensation to the tenant for life. Thus, in Jeffreys v. Conner (c), leaseholds bequeathed to one for life, with remainder over, were taken by a railway company, and the purchase-money was invested in Consols. The tenant for life only received the dividends. It was held that her estate was entitled, out of the Consols, to the difference between the dividends received and the aggregate amount of the rental which would have accrued during her life, if the leaseholds had not been taken (d).

Where the tenant for life outlives the term for which he is entitled as tenant for life, he will become absolutely entitled to the whole fund (e). In Askew v. Woodhead (f), a case of a settlement, the C. A. held the legatee for life was entitled to receive an annuity of such an amount that the payment of it would exhaust the fund in the number of years which the leasehold had to run (g).

When conversion cannot be effected without loss.—Where property given to persons in succession is found by the trustees to be secure,

- (a) Mackie v. M., 5 Ha. 70; Wrey v. Smith, 14 Si. 202; Re Sewell, 11 Eq. 80: Re Chancellor, 26 C. D. 42; Re Crowther, (1895) 2 Ch. 56; Re Thomas, (1891) 3 Ch. 482; Re Sheldon, 39 C. D. 50; Re Bates, (1907) 1 Ch. 22; Re Wilson, (1907) 1 Ch. 394; and cf. Re Chaytor, (1905) 1 Ch. 233.
- (b) Sitwell v. Bernard, 6 V. 520; Jarman (1893), p. 572; Lewin, p. 332.
 - (c) 28 B. 328.
 - (d) See also Re Pfleger, 6 Eq. 426;

- Morris v. Hodges, 27 B. 625; and Re Money, 2 Dr. & Sm. 94, 31 L. J. Ch. 496.
- (e) Re Beaufoy, 1 Sm. & G. 20; and see Phillips v. Sargent, 7 Ha. 33.
 - (f) 14 C. D. 27.
- (g) See also Re Barrington, 33 C. D. 523; Re Walsh, 7 L. R. Ir. 554; Re Wood, 10 Eq. 572; Re Griffith, 49 L. T. 161; the Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 34; and Re Cottrell, 28 C. D. 628.

and to produce a large annual income, but is not capable of immediate conversion without loss and damage to the estate; there the rule is not to convert the property, but to set a value upon it, as at testator's death, and to give the legatee for life 3l., formerly 4l. per cent. (a) from the testator's death on such value, and the residue of the income must then be invested, and the income of the investment paid to the tenant for life, but the corpus must be secured for the remainderman (b). In Brown v. Gellatly (c), the testator, after giving his property to trustees, with full power to realise the same when and in such manner as they might see fit, empowered them to sail his ships for the benefit of his estate, until they could be satisfactorily sold. The ships gained considerable earnings after the testator's death. "With regard to the ships," said Cairns, L. J., "the testator has put them simply in the position of property, which was to be converted cautiously, and in proper time, and as to which there was no breach of trust in the executors delaying to convert it, but which was, when converted, and when invested, to be enjoyed as the residue of his estate. In that state of things, it seems to me that this case falls exactly within the third division pointed out by Parker, V.-C., in the case of Meyer v. Simonsen (d), and that a value must be set upon the ships, as at the death of the testator, and the tenant for life must have 4 per cent. on such value, and the residue of the profits must of course be invested, and become a part of the estate "(e).

Income of Legacies.—The tenant for life of a residue is, as a matter of convenience, entitled to the income of a fund set aside for contingent legacies (f); but if it is set apart for vested legacies not yet payable, the income on the fund must be invested and treated as capital belonging to the remaindermen, the tenant for life receiving only the income thereon (g).

Where the residue includes a reversionary interest vested or

- (a) Wentworth v. W., (1900) A. C.
 163; Rowlls v. Bebb, (1900) 2 Ch.
 107; Re Woods, (1904) 2 Ch. 4.
- (b) See Gibson v. Bott, 7 V. 89; Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312; Meyer v. Simonsen, 5 De G. & Sm. 723; Arnold v. Ennis, 2 Ir. Ch. R. 601; Furley v. Hyder, 42 L. J. Ch. 626; Re Llewellyn's T., 29 B. 171; Jarman, p. 575; Lewin, p. 324; Theobald, p. 447.
 - (c) L. R. 2 Ch. 751.
 - (d) 5 De G. & Sm. 723.
- (e) L. R. 2 Ch. 758. See also Wilkinson v. Duncan, 23 B. 469; Yates v. Y., 28 B. 637; Re Llewellyn's T., 29 B. 171; Simpson v. Lester, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1269; Arnold v. Ennis, 2 Ir. Ch. R. 601; Re Eaton, 70 L. T. 761; Re Hill, 50 L. J. Ch. 551.
- (f) Cranley v. Dixon, 23 B. 512; Allhusen v. Whittell, 4 Eq. 295.
- (g) Crawley v. C., 7 Si. 427; Re Whitehead, (1894) 1 Ch. 678; cf. Re Thomas, (1891) 3 Ch. 482.

contingent retained unconverted, under a power to postpone conversion, and there is no direction in the will to the effect that the tenant for life shall be entitled only to the income of property actually producing income, then on the reversion falling in, the sum produced by its realisation is apportioned between the tenant for life and the remaindermen on the principle laid down in Re Chesterfield's Trusts (a). The sum is ascertained which, put out at interest at 3 per cent. per annum on the day of the testator's death, and accumulating at compound interest calculated at that rate, with yearly rests and deducting income tax, would, with the accumulations of interest, have produced the amount actually received; and the sum so ascertained is corpus and the balance is income (b). The rule applies where trustees fail to exercise their discretion as to the conversion of reversionary interests (c).

Where the tenant for life is under the will entitled to the income of property actually producing income and part of an asset is recovered, then the amount so recovered will be treated as representing capital and income, and will be apportioned between the tenant for life and the remaindermen on the rule in $Re\ Chesterfield$'s Trusts, supra (d). If the whole amount of a mortgage debt and interest thereon is recovered, the tenant for life or his estate will be entitled to the interest (e). If a less amount is recovered, then it must be apportioned between the tenant for life and the remaindermen in the proportion that the interest due from the date of the mortgage bears to the capital sum thereby secured (f).

The rule in Re Chesterfield's Trusts, supra, applies where there is a loss to be borne. So where the residue included a leasehold on which the business of the testator was carried on, it being for the advantage of all persons interested that it should be retained and managed by the trustees, the Court ordered an apportionment of loss and gain on the principle above stated (g).

- (a) 24 C. D. 643; as to present rate of interest, see *Re* Woods, supra. For the earlier rule see Wilkinson v. Duncan, 23 B. 469; Wright v. Lambert, 6 C. D. 649.
- (b) Re Hobson, 55 L. J. Ch. 422; Re Goodenough, (1895) 2 Ch. 537; Re Morley, (1895) 2 Ch. 738.
 - (c) Rowlls v. Bebb, (1900) 2 Ch. 107.
- (d) Re Godden, (1893) 1 Ch. 292; cf. Turner v. Newport, 2 Ph. 14; Duke

- of Cleveland's Estate, (1895) 2 Ch. 542.
- (e) Re Lewis, (1907) 2 Ch. 296; cf. Re Broadwood's Settlements, (1908) 1 Ch. 115.
 - (f) Re Hubbuck, (1896) 1 Ch. 754.
- (g) See Re Hengler's Trusts, (1893) 1 Ch. 586, where the form of order is given, and cf. Upton v. Brown, 26 C. D. 588. And see Re Atkinson, (1904) 2 Ch. 160, as to apportionment of loss on authorised investments, and

Residue.—The legatee for life must keep down the interest on debts, and as between the legatee for life of a residue and the remainderman, there is no residue until debts and legacies are paid, and as between them the rule is that debts and legacies must be taken to have been paid out of such portion of the capital as together with the income of that portion, for one year from the testator's death, is sufficient to make such payment (a).

Shares in Companies.—Where a company has power to distribute its profits as dividends, or convert them into capital, all persons claiming under the settlor are bound by its exercise (b).

Inquiries.—Inquiries may be directed as to continuing or calling in securities; as to how much of the funds has arisen from interest and how much from capital; as to the value of leaseholds and other property not invested in Consols at testator's death, &c. (c). And before a mortgage security is called in there must be an inquiry whether it is for the benefit of all parties interested that it should be so (d).

4. Duties and Liabilities of Trustees as to Conversion.

Where there is a duty to convert, the rule $prim\hat{a}$ facie is that the conversion should take place within the year from testator's death (e). As to the investments of trustees and executors authorised by law, see Trustee Act, 1893, Part I.

Executors or trustees neglecting to convert wasting or improper securities bequeathed in succession, and permitting the legatee for life to receive more than he would have done if conversion had been duly effected, will be guilty of breach of trust (f), and will be entitled in passing their accounts to an allowance only of the dividends which the legatee for life would have been entitled to if the securities had been converted within a year from the testator's

Re Bird, (1901) 1 Ch. 916, as to loss arising from change from authorised to unauthorised investment.

- (a) Seton (1901), 1690; Holgate v. Jennings, 24 B. 623; Allhusen v. Whittell, 4 Eq. 295; Marshall v. Crowther, 2 C. D. 199.
- (b) Re Malam, (1894) 3 Ch. 578; Bouch v. Sproule, 12 A. C. 385; Re Armitage, (1893) 3 Ch. 337, and see
- Re Taylor's Trusts, (1905) 1 Ch. 734.
- (c) Seton (1901), p. 1078, et seq.; Caldecott v. C., 1 Y. & C. C. C. 312.
- (d) p. 75, supra; Beavan v. B., 24 C. D. 649 (n.).
- (e) Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; cf. The Heirs of Hiddingh v. De Villiers, &c., 12 A. C. 624.
- (f) Bate v. Hooper, 5 De G. M. & G. 338.

death. If the security, when realised, produces more than it would have produced if sold at the end of the year, they will not be entitled to set off this gain (a). But by an inquiry in the same suit they may recoup themselves against the legatee for life the amount overpaid to him (b).

(a) Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195.

(b) Hood v. Clapham, 19 B. 90; and see Tickner v. Old, 18 Eq. 426; Grayburn v. Clarkson, L. R. 3 Ch. 605; Re Llewellyn's, T. 29 B. 171; Arnold v.

Ennis, 2 Ir. Ch. R. 601; Hume v. Richardson, 10 W. R. 528; Trustee Act, 1893, s. 45; cf. Mara v. Browne, (1895) 2 Ch., p. 89; reversed on evidence, (1896) 1 Ch. 199.

ASSIGNMENT.

WARMSTREY v. TANFIELD.

4 Car. 1. 1 Ch. R. 29.

Possibility Assignable in Equity.

A grant of a future possibility not good in law, yet a possibility of a trust may be assigned in equity.

The plaintiff's title appeared to be, that one William Freeman, being possessed of the third part of the parsonage for the whole term to come, granted all his interest therein to one Alborough, in trust for the use of the said William Freeman and Alice his wife, during their lives, and after to the use of such issue male of their two bodies as the said William should by will appoint; and after, the said William appointed the premises after the death of the said Alice unto Richard Freeman, son of the said William and Alice; and that the said interest in law of the said Alborough came by mesne conveyance unto John and Robert Palmer; and that the said Richard Freeman, during the life of the said Alice, who not long after died, assigned the premises unto the plaintiff, and also released to the plaintiff, and the said Palmers assured their interest in law in the said premises to the plaintiff.

The defendant insists, for title, that the said Richard Freeman, about two years after his assignment aforesaid to the plaintiff, made a lease of the premises to Walter Thomas and John Makerith, who passed their estate to one Evans, and Hawkins, in trust for the defendant the Lady Tanfield, and had possession given her.

This Court (a), with the Judges, taking consideration of the said assignments, grants, and release, were of opinion, and declared, that howbeit a grant of a future possibility is not good in law (b), yet

⁽a) Lord Coventry was Lord Keeper. (b) See Lampet's case, 10 Co. 47a, 48b.

Warmstrey v. Tanfield.

a possibility of a trust in equity might be assigned, and the said Richard Freeman's assignment of his said trust unto the plaintiff is also confirmed by the assignment of the said Palmer, who had the interest in law, and the said plaintiff's assignment is also precedent to the deed made to the said Thomas, by which the said defendant, the Lady Tanfield, claimeth the said lease.

ROW v. DAWSON.

1749. 1 Ves. Sen. 331 (a).

Chose in Action Assignable in Equity.

A. borrows money of B., and gives him a draft upon a fund due to him (A.) out of the Exchequer, which was deposited with the officer from whom the fund was payable. A. afterwards becomes bankrupt; this is an assignment thereof to B. for valuable consideration, which shall prevail against the general assignees under the commission of bankruptcy.

A chose in action, though not assignable at law, is assignable in equity, and no particular form of words is necessary.

Tonson and Conway lent money to Gibson, who made a draft on Swinburn, the deputy of Horace Walpole, viz., "Out of the money due to me from Horace Walpole out of the Exchequer, and what will be due at Michaelmas, pay to Tonson and Conway, value received.

Gibson became bankrupt; and the question was whether the defendants Tonson, and the executors of Conway, were first entitled by a specific lien upon this sum due to the estate of Gibson; or whether the plaintiffs, the assignees under the commission, are entitled to have the whole sum paid to them; it being insisted for them, that this draft was in the nature of a bill of exchange, and that the property was not divested out of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy, in law or equity.

LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.—At first I little doubted about my own jurisdiction, and whether the plaintiffs ought not to have gone into the Exchequer, as being a Court of revenue; for this is not a personal credit given to, or demand upon the officer, but to be

⁽a) Reg. Lib. 1749, B., fol. 89.

Row v. Dawson.

paid out of that money issued out of the Exchequer to the officer; and this is on warrant, to be paid out of the revenue of the Crown for public services. But there is something in the present case delivering it from that: the officer admits he has received a sum of money applicable to this demand, which brings it to the old case of a liberate (a), which a person has under the Great Seal for the payment of money; upon admission that the officer had money in his hands applicable to the payment, and proof thereof, that would give Courts of law a jurisdiction, so that an action of debt might be maintained on the liberate.

This demand, and the instrument under which the defendants claim, is not a bill of exchange, but a draft, not to pay generally, but out of this particular fund, which creates no personal demand; therefore, not a draft on personal credit, to go in the common course of negotiation, which is necessary to bills of exchange, by draft on the general credit of the person drawing, the drawee, and the indorser, without reference to any particular fund. The first case of which kind, I remember to have been determined in B. R. not to be a bill of exchange, was a draft by an officer on the agent of his regiment, to be paid out of his growing subsistence. Then what is it, for it must amount to something? It is an agreement, for valuable consideration beforehand, to lend money on the faith of being satisfied out of this fund; which makes it a very strong case. If this is not a bill of exchange, nor a proceeding on the personal credit of Swinburn or Gibson, it is a credit on this fund, and must amount to an assignment of so much of the debt: and, though the law does not admit an assignment of a chose in action, this Court does; and any words will do, no particular words being necessary thereto.

In the case of a bond, it may be assigned in equity for valuable consideration, and good, although no special form used. Suppose an obligee receives the money on the bond, and there is wrote on the back of it, "Whereas I have received the principal and interest from such a one, do you the obligor pay the money to him." This is just that case; only it is not a debt arising from specialty:

and addressed to the Treasurer and Chamberlains of the Exchequer.

⁽a) A writ that lay for the payment of a yearly pension or other sum of money, granted under the Great Seal,

Row v. Dawson.

therefore, like an assignment of rent, by direction to a tenant or steward to pay so much of a year's rent to a third person.

The case of Ryall v. Rowles (a), now under the consideration of the Court, occurred to me. There the assignment of debts, of which no possession, came in question; but those are debts depending on partnership, and mentioned there how far the assignment of a bond should be supported against the assignees under the commission; and it is clear that they have been supported where the bond has been delivered over; but if not, some doubt has been, whether it should be supported on the foot of the clause (10 & 11) in the statute, 21 Jac. 1, c. 19.

But this is clear of that doubt, because this was a debt due to Gibson without any specialty. This draft, which amounts to an assignment, is deposited with the officer Swinburn, and therefore it attached immediately upon it; so that Swinburn could not have paid this money to Gibson, supposing he had not been bankrupt, without making himself liable to the defendants; because he would have paid it with full notice of this assignment, for valuable consideration.

(a) 1 Ves. Sen. 348. See next page.

RYALL v. ROWLES.

1747-1750. 1 Ves. Sen. 348.

Assignment of Debts without Notice to Debtor, Invalid against Assignees in Bankruptcy.

Assignee by way of mortgage of goods and chattels, or choses in action, allowing the assignor to continue in the possession or in the order and disposition of them, will, upon the construction of 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, ss. 10, 11 (α), have no specific lien on them against his assignees in bankruptcy.

WILLIAM HARVEST, a trader within the several statutes concerning bankrupts, in June, 1732, borrowed from Benjamin and Joseph Tomkins 1,500l., and, as a security, conveyed and assigned his dwelling-house and brew-house at Kingston, and all the coppers and utensils in trade belonging thereto, by way of mortgage, subject to redemption.

He afterwards took Jonathan Stephens into partnership with him, and in less than a month after the partnership, December 22, 1736, made a second mortgage to Potter, in trust for Jonathan Stephens, of his moiety of not only the utensils, but the stock in trade, debts, profits, &c., for securing a sum of money then lent to him by Jonathan Stephens, and any future sums that should be lent.

December 10, 1737, he made a third mortgage of the seventh part of his undivided moiety of all the stock in trade, utensils, debts due or to grow due, to Sir James Reynel.

April 24, 1738, he made a fourth mortgage of the seventh part of his undivided moiety, with the same description, to Skip.

September 7, 1738, he made a fifth mortgage to Jonathan Stephens, for securing to him 2,000*l*., which Stephens had paid to one Baugh, who had the original mortgage on the freehold estate;

⁽a) Repealed, but, with some modifications, re-enacted. See note, post, and 46 & 47 Vict, c. 52, s. 44; Yate-

the real premises, which were conveyed by way of lease to Tomkins having been mortgaged to Philip Stone in 1725, and assigned to Baugh, who assigned to Stephens upon being paid the 2,000l.

He afterwards made a sixth mortgage to George Harvest, his son, of the seventh part of his undivided moiety of the partnership, stock in trade, debts, utensils, and profits, in consideration of a sum of money lent.

Notwithstanding these several mortgages, he continued in possession of the utensils and stock in trade as before, altered, disposed, and mortgaged them as his own, and received the debts in partnership with Stephens, without any control from any of the mortgagees till 1740, when he failed and became bankrupt.

Then the assignees and mortgagees insisted on the right to the several goods, stock, &c., comprised in their several assignments, in opposition to the general creditors claiming under the commission.

The cause was heard before Lord Chancellor *Hardwicke*, the Seal after Michaelmas, 1747, and it being a new case, his Lordship ordered it to be argued by two counsel on each side, assisted by the Judges (a).

Solicitor-General (the Hon. William Murray (b)), and Mr. Noel, for the assignees under the commission.

Attorney-General (Sir Dudley Rider) and Mr. Wilbraham for all the mortgagees.

[The judgments of Burnett, J., Parker, C. B., and Lee, C. J., are omitted.]

LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.—I am obliged to the Judges for their assistance and endeavours to give light in so intricate a case, which intricacy arises in respect of the want of a number of authorities as to the construction of this Act of Parliament, though made so long ago. But a greater intricacy occurs in respect of the conduct of William Harvest, in making these securities. All the authorities giving light to this have been exhausted by the Judges, and it would be mis-spending of time to repeat what has been said. It is sufficient, therefore, to say, I concur in the opinion delivered;

⁽a) Feb. 24, 1747-8.

⁽b) Afterwards Lord Mansfield.

but as this is a case of great expectation and consequence, I will reduce the grounds to some general principle. * * *

Choses in action are properly within the description of goods and chattels within this clause (a); and I will only add one argument, for the sake of which I mention it, which is, that this construction is strongly warranted by the next preceding clause, relating to bankrupts who by fraud make themselves accountant to the king, to defeat their private creditors, which plainly shews that the words goods and chattels, as used in this Act, take in all kind of personal property of the bankrupt, whether in possession or action only; which strongly supports the construction made by the Judges, and is agreeable to Ford and Sheldon's Case, 12 Co. 1, where it is held, that, in an Act of Parliament, goods and chattels take in choses in action. The reason of the other opinion in the books arises from hence, that this question has arisen on a grant or assignment, or bargain and sale, not being such goods and chattels as would pass by that assignment or conveyance; but in an Act of Parliament, which can pass anything, they are always included.

I go on four general principles in the construction of this Act.

First, the aim and intent of the legislature was, that an equal proportion of the effects of the bankrupt among his creditors should be attained as far as possible.

Secondly, that, to attain that end, these Acts of Parliament should be construed beneficially for the general creditors under the commission; and therefore it is, in an unusual manner, different from most Acts of Parliament, enacted, that all these statutes and laws shall be largely and beneficially construed for the creditors in general under the commission.

Thirdly, it appears, the general view and intent of the provision now under consideration was, to prevent traders from gaining a delusive credit, by a false appearance of substance to mislead those who should deal with them.

Fourthly, the legislature judged they might do this by subjecting all the goods of the bankrupt, though conveyed to others, to the general creditors under the commission, because, where the vendee or assignee leaves such goods in possession of the bankrupt as owner, he confides as much in the general credit of the bankrupt as

that creditor who has only taken his bond or note. It is, in such case, put in the power of the bankrupt to sell the goods the next day; the former assignee could only have a personal remedy against the bankrupt.

All these grounds go to the substance of the case, and not upon niceties, and hold in case of a mortgage as well as an absolute sale; otherwise it would be contrary to the resolution of Stephens v. Sole, and the opinion of Lord Cowper in Buckner v. Royston (a), and to his implied opinion in Copeman v. Gallant (b), and would overturn this part of the statute, and restrain it to absolute sales. Traders, instead of absolute sales, would then make such mortgages, and there would be a greater opportunity; for traders might mortgage over and over again, as this case is a pregnant instance.

As to the most material and operative expression, the legislature has explained their own sense, by putting the words true owner in opposition to reputed, not special owner; and then these last words can only mean a person, who, by specious acts of possession, order and disposition, gives himself an appearance of property he has not really, (which is the present bankrupt's case,) till the mortgage money is paid.

Then it follows that the mortgages to Reynel, Skip, and George Harvest, and so much of the assignment to Stephens as relates to the utensils not fixed to the freehold, which are made a further security to him, must be void within this clause, so far as they are claimed to be specific liens.

The distinction endeavoured has been answered; and the distinction most laboured, that a share of a partner in a partnership stock is only a sort of proportion arising on the balance of the partnership account, and incapable of being delivered, would let in that false, delusive credit (intended to be prevented) in all trades in partnership, and would extend to particular goods in partnership.

As to choses in action comprised in these securities, where it is admitted none could pass but in equity, equity ought to follow the law in this case, if in any. Where property is established by Act of Parliament, equity follows it in like manner as where established by common law; for if not, it would cause great confusion; and it is always so taken on Acts of Parliament made concerning real and

personal estate, regulating that kind of property; for which there is a strong instance in the statutes relating to Papists; for, though subject to penal laws, equity regulates in the same way, by the same rule, as the statutes lay down concerning legal property.

The third and last point is in the construction of Potter's mortgage, which is said to be directly as if made to Stephens; and, I think, upon the whole, it would be so; though, perhaps, if it was nicely scrutinized, some difference might be taken; but whatever legal interest, that vested in Potter. And the law would not have taken notice of the trust if the question was at law; and, therefore, if this Act of Parliament has made it void at law, this Court would never set it up contrary to law for the sake of Stephens, because he was a partner, but would let the law take place for the benefit of the general creditors. As to any of these goods in that mortgage, which equity only could pass, equity will follow the law; for as to the profits arising from trade and choses in action, there could not be an equity upon an equity: equity would vest them in Stephens, and it would undoubtedly be considered as if the assignment had been directly to Stephens. And here the principal objection arises; it being said, it vested in Stephens as to these particulars, and that Stephens was partner then, and if he had not taken this mortgage, he would be entitled to have an allowance out of what would be coming to Harvest's moiety, and would have a specific lien on that moiety; and therefore Stephens, taking a mortgage of the other share, would not be put in a worse condition than without it. This was the most plausible thing urged for the defendant, and would be right if the foundation was right; but I dispute their foundation, which must be that the party so lending gains a special lien on the partner borrowing, and should be allowed a preference to his separate creditors; but for this there is no authority or precedent after a bankruptcy; it is a different consideration, what a Court of equity might do between the parties themselves, while both remained capable of transacting for themselves. But I might carry it further; for it is so after the death of a partner, where his effects come to be distributable as assets. In the case of Meliorucchi v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company (a), the points determined are not material to the present; but there the attempt made was to subject

(a) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 8, pl. 8.

stock after a bankruptcy to a debt contracted to the Company by a loan of money, and arguments were drawn from rules concerning partnership; but it was not contended for, that in case of a partnership, that could be carried further. And the case cited, of Croft v. Pike (a), is as strong as any negative authority can be; for there it was not attempted to give the surviving partner a right of retainer, or bringing into the partnership account a bond debt, so as to be preferred to others, but only as executor; and therefore the money taken by a deceased partner out of the partnership stock, was allowed to be brought into the partnership account, but the bond debt was not, because a separate loan and transaction. If, then, by a new determination now, it should be admitted, and that one partner, by lending money to another in a separate capacity, not relative to the partnership, should gain a specific lien on the effects of the partner so borrowing, it would open a door to fraud, and so defeat this statute; for then a person might be taken in as a partner into a moiety of a great stock and flourishing trade, and he may have a separate credit on that confidence, and yet may not have any in reality of the property in that stock, but the whole may belong to others; which tends plainly to great fraud and imposition on traders and great mischief. It has been said, that great mischief might arise to trade and credit from such a determination as this, as tending to prevent making use of that credit persons have to support themselves in trade, as they cannot make a security without exposing their circumstances to the world; and on the other hand it is contended, that the other construction would in fact repeal the Act of Parliament, and let in a mischief. Some inconvenience might perhaps arise from a determination of this case on either side; but I agree with Chief Justice Lee, that, as this is a law, we must adhere to it, and while it is a law, be bound by it, and if any inconvenience results from it, that is for the consideration of the legislature. But this I will say, that, as some inconvenience may be to particular persons on one hand, great inconvenience may be on the other, by creating that appearance, as having the substance of which they remain in possession, though they have not at all the real property; and that this was the intent of the legislature, I am clear; and I may go so far as to say, that the simplicity of those times did not let

in these large and airy notions of credit, as of late, which from the number of bankruptcies we have had of late years, is rather an evidence that the departing from the rule this law has laid down, and giving way to these notions, has been rather a mischief.

I agree, then, that these mortgages cannot prevail as specific liens and securities; therefore, as to the mortgages of lands and fixtures, they are not affected by the Act of Parliament: but what is affected by the direction therein is the assignment to Stephens (for Potter must be considered as a trustee for him) relating to any utensils not fixed to the freehold. So also are all the four mortgages of seventh part, by reason of the bankruptcy of William Harvest, made void by the statute, and can create no specific lien on the bankrupt's share of partnership stock, debts, and effects; but they must be considered only as general creditors.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Rights and Interests Assignable in Equity though not at Law, Expectant Interests, p. 108.
- 3. What amounts to an Equitable Assignment, p. 111.
- 4. Notice, Distringas, Stop Orders, &c., p. 120.
- 5. Rights and Remedies of Assignee under an Equitable Assignment, p. 140.
- 6. The Assignment of a Chose in Action is "subject to all Equities," p. 142.
 - (a) Set-off and analogous defences, p. 142.
 - (b) Defects in title, p. 144.
- 7. Choses in Action how far made assignable by statute, p. 148.
- 8. Subrogation, p. 152.
- 9. Assignments contrary to Public Policy, Champerty and Maintenance, p. 156.

1. Generally.

"The great wisdom and policy of the sages and founders of our law," says Coke, "have provided, that no possibility, right, title, nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for that would be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits, of great oppression of the people, and chiefly of terre-tenants, and the subversion of the due and equal execution of justice" (a). The common law principle above stated prevented the assignment and transfer inter vivos of (1) contractual rights, (2) of possibilities, under which head were included at the common law, not only bare possibilities mere expectations of beneficial rights and interests not based

(a) Lampet's Case, 10 Rep. 48a.

on any existing instrument, such as the expectation of benefits under the will of a living person, but also possibilities coupled with an interest, contingent remainders, and executory interests (a). Into the origin of this principle it is unnecessary here to go, the matter is discussed in the authorities referred to in the note (b).

By way of exception to the above principle the King could either grant or receive a possibility or chose in action by assignment (c) and by the Law Merchant bills of exchange were negotiable.

In equity, however, both the possibility and the chose in action became assignable. The validity of an assignment of a chose in action was recognised early in the seventeenth century and from the same period effect was given to assignments and contracts for the assignment of possibilities (d). The assignment both of the chose in action and the possibility was regarded as in the nature of a contract to which full effect was given by applying equitable principles. In Lord Macnaghten's words (e) "an assignment of future property for value operates in equity by way of agreement, binding the conscience of the assignor, and so binding the property from the moment when the contract becomes capable of being performed, on the principle that equity considers that done which ought to be done and in accordance with the maxim which Lord Thurlow said he took to be universal, "that wherever persons agree concerning any particular subject, that, in a Court of equity, as against the party himself, and any claiming under him voluntarily or with notice raises a trust: Legard v. Hodges(f)." In so effectuating an assignment the Court acted independently of the doctrine of specific performance, for an assignment could be enforced even though specific performance was impossible (q). Considerations applicable to cases of specific performance, properly so called, when the consideration is executory are not to be applied to every case of equitable assignment dealing with future property. "Cases of equitable assignment or specific lien, where the consideration has passed, depend on the real meaning of the agreement between the parties. The difficulty generally speaking is to ascertain the true scope and effect of the

- (a) Challis Real Property, 2nd Edit., p. 66.
- (b) Pollock on Contracts, 7th Edit. 217 and Appendix F.; Spence, Equitable Jur. &c., Vol. II. 850.
- (c) Co. Litt. 232 b. (n.) 1; Miles v. Williams, 1 P. W. 252; Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves. Sen. 177, 181.
- (d) See cases collected in Ashburner on Equity in notes pp. 321 and 334.
- (e) Tailby v. Official Receiver, 13 A. C. 523, at p. 546.
 - (f) 1 V. 478.
- (g) Metcalfe v. Abp. of York, 1 My. & Cr. 547; Western Waggon, &c., Co. v. West, (1892) 1 Ch. at p. 275.

agreement. When that is ascertained you have only to apply the principle that equity considers that done which ought to be done if that principle is applicable under the circumstances of the case "(a).

Where an equitable assignment was made of property recoverable in Courts of equity, hence called choses in equity, such as the beneficial interest in personalty under a will or intestacy, stock standing in the names of trustees, or in the Court, money in Court, judgments enforceable in equity, the beneficial interest in a legal debt assigned to trustees, &c., the assignee could sue in his own name in equity for such property; but where there was an equitable assignment made of things only recoverable at law—commonly called choses in action—the assignee could not sue in his own name, but he was obliged to do so in the name of the assignor, whom a Court of equity would compel to allow his name to be used for that purpose (b).

The equitable rules as to notice are hereinafter dealt with in detail; here it is only necessary to note that (1) as between assignor and assignee, though notice to the person indebted is not necessary to complete the title of the assignee (d), it is obviously desirable in order to prevent the person indebted paying the assignor or a subsequent assignee for value who had given notice, and by such payment obtaining a valid discharge (2), as between successive assignees priority is determined by the order in time of the notices of assignment. The history and basis of this rule is exhaustively discussed by Lord Macnaghten in Ward v. Duncombe (e).

By statute the common law principle enunciated by Coke has been greatly changed.

Firstly, as to the transfer of possibilities.—By the Real Property Act, 1845, s. 6, it was enacted "that after the 1st day of October, 1845, a contingent, an executory, and a future interest, and a possibility coupled with an interest in any tenements or hereditaments of any tenure, whether the object of the gift, or limitation of such interest, or possibility, be or be not ascertained; also a right of entry, whether immediate or future and whether vested or contingent, into or upon any tenements or hereditaments in England, of any tenure, may be disposed of by deed; but that no such disposition shall, by force only of this Act, defeat or enlarge an estate tail."

⁽a) Tailby v. Official Receiver, supra, at p. 547.

⁽b) See per Chitty, L. J., in Durham Bros. v. Robertson, (1898) 1 Q. B. at

p. 769.(d) Gorringe v. Irwell, &c., 34 C. D.

^{.28.}

⁽e) (1893) A. C. 383 et seq.

This Act, it will be observed, does not render assignments of contingent interests, or possibilities in chattels, or mere naked possibilities not coupled with an interest, valid at law; the exclusive jurisdiction, therefore, of the old Courts of equity as to such assignments was untouched by the Act.

Secondly, as to the assignment of choses in action.—In process of time, in addition to bills of exchange assignable by custom, other choses in action became assignable at law, by statute, as promissory notes, 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, 7 Anne, c. 25; bail and replevin bonds by 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 20, 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, respectively; railway, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 19, administration, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, ss. 81, 83, and exchequer (a) bonds; bills of lading if endorsed, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111; East India Bonds, 51 Geo. 3, c. 64, s. 4; mortgage debentures issued by the Land Companies under the Mortgage Debenture Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 20; things in actions of companies, Companies Act, 1862, ss. 95, 157; transferable debentures under the County Debenture Acts, 1873; policies of life assurance, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144 (b); and policies of marine insurance (c); the choses in action of bankrupts (d); and in all these cases the assignee might sue at law in his own name.

And now by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, s.-s. 6, any debt or other legal chose in action express notice in writing of the assignment of which shall have been given to the debtor, trustee, or other persons mentioned, is made assignable at law by an absolute assignment in writing, under the hand of the assignor, not purporting to be by way of charge only (e).

The equitable assignment of choses in action, whether legal or equitable, is unaffected by the provisions of the Judicature Act, and since the rules governing the equitable assignment of legal choses in action are less stringent than the rules governing legal assignment of choses in action, the topic of equitable assignment of choses in action remains of the greatest importance (f). Further, subject to the statutory modifications above noted, the common law rules preventing the legal transfer of possibilities, including thereunder

- (a) Vertue v. East Angl. Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 280.
- (b) Scottish, &c., L. A. S. v. Fuller, 2 Eq. 58; Newman v. N., 28 C. D. 674
- (c) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 86; see Lloyd v. Fleming, L. R. 7 Q. B. 299; North
- of England, &c., Co. v. Archangel, &c. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 249.
 - (d) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 111.
 - (e) See post (n.) 6.
- (f) See per Lord Macnaghten in Brandts, &c. v. Dunlop, &c., (1905) A. C. p. 461.

rights in property to be acquired in the future and non-existing property, remain unchanged.

2. Rights and Interests Assignable in Equity though not at Law. Expectant Interests.

The following interests are assignable in equity for valuable consideration:—

Possibilities. Contingent interests (a), or expectancies, as that of an heir-at-law to the estate of his ancestor (b); the interest which a person may take under the will of another then living (c); or under marriage articles (d); or the share to which such person may become entitled under an appointment (e); or an interest in money which may come to a person under a discretionary power in trustees to allow him maintenance (f); or in personal estate, as presumptive next of kin of a person then living (g); and in each case when any such interest falls into possession, the assignment will be enforced.

Non-existing Property (cf. (n.) p. 118).—Non-existing property, to be acquired at a future time, though not assignable at law (h) is clearly so in equity; the assignment, for instance, of future freight (i), of future patent rights (h), of profits arising from the working of a patent by licensees (l), of future dividends upon proof in bankruptcy (m), of the future cargo of a ship (n), of building materials to be brought on premises (o), or machinery at a future time to be added to or substituted for existing machinery (p), of goods and chattels now being, or which shall hereafter be, in or about a messuage or house (q) is valid in equity. An assignment by bill of sale of "all

- (a) Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P. W. 572, at p. 574.
- (b) Hobson v. Trevor, 2 P. W. 191; Wethered v. W., 2 Si. 183, 192; Smith v. Baker, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 223; but see Carleton v. Leighton, 3 Mer. 677; Re Vizard's Trusts, L. R. 1 Ch. 588.
- (c) Beckley v. Newland, 2 P. W. 182; Lyde v. Mynn, 1 My. & K. 693; but see Pope v. Whitcomb, 3 Russ. 124.
 - (d) Bennett v. Cooper, 9 B. 252.
 - (e) Musprat v. Gordon, 1 Anst. 34.
 - (f) Re Coleman, 39 C. D. 443.
- (g) Hinde v. Blake, 3 B. 235; Meeke v. Kettlewell, 1 Ph. 347; Re Parsons, 45 C. D. 51.
- (h) Robinson v. Macdonald, 5 Mau. & Selw. 228.

- (i) Brown v. Tanner, L. R. 3 Ch. 597; Wilson v. W., 14 Eq. 32.
- (k) Printing, &c., Co., v. Sampson, 19 Eq. 462.
- (l) Bergmann v. Macmillan, 17 C. D. 423.
- (m) Re Irving, 7 C. D. 419.
- (n) Curtis v. Auber, 1 J. & W. 526;
 Douglas v. Russel, 4 Si. 524; Langton v. Horton, 1 Ha. 549; Lindsay v. Gibbs, 22 B. 522; Gardner v. Cazenove, 1 H. & N. 423.
- (o) Brown v. Bateman, L. R. 2 C. P. 272.
- (p) Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191.
 - (q) Ex p. Games, 12 C. D. 314.

the book debts due and owing, or which may during the continuance of this security become due and owing, to the said mortgagor," is a good assignment, and passes the equitable interest in book debts incurred after the assignment, whether in the business then carried on by the mortgagor or in any other business (a). A company acting within its powers can mortgage its future or uncalled capital (b).

Choses in action are not personal chattels within the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, and the Amendment Act, 1882; see s. 4 of the Act of 1878 (c).

It may be here noted that rights under agreements of a personal nature are not assignable either at law or in equity. The right of assignment is confined to those cases where it can make no difference to the person on whom the obligation lies to which of two persons he is to perform it (d). Thus agreements between authors and publishers, even though the publisher be a limited liability company, are not assignable (e). But a salary to become due under a contract of personal service is assignable (f). For a discussion of the limits of this principle, see the judgment of Collins, M. R., in Tolhurst v. Assoc. Portland Cement, &c. <math>(g).

The chose in action must be distinguished from a mere right to sue for damages for breach of a contract; the latter right is unassignable (h). If the contract does not create a debt it cannot be assigned (i). So, too, a personal licence, e.g., a licence to enter a house and seize goods cannot be assigned (h).

Floating charge.—In connection with the subject of equitable assignment mention may be made of floating charges which are equitable charges created by companies over their undertakings (1).

- (a) Tailby v. Official Receiver, (1888)
 13 A. C. 523; Re Turcan, (1888)
 40 C. D. 5; and see Re Coleman, 39 C. D.
 443.
- (b) Re Pyle Works, (1890) 44 C. D.
 534; Newton v. Anglo-Austr., &c.,
 (1895) A. C. 244; Re Mayfair Property
 Co., (1898) 2 Ch. 28.
- (c) Re Isaacson, (1895) 1 Q. B. 333; but cf. Jarvis v. J., 63 L. J. Ch. 10.
- (d) Tolhurst v. Assoc. Portland, &c., (1902) 2 K. B. at p. 668; Kemp v. Baerselman, (1906) 2 K. B. 604.
- (e) Hole v. Bradbury, 12 C. D. 886; Griffith v. Tower Publishing Co., &c., (1897) 1 Q. B. 21; cf. International

- Fibre Syndicate v. Dawson, 84 L. T. 803.
- (f) Crouch v. Martin, 2 Vern. 595; Shaw & Co. v. Moss Empires, &c., 25 T. L. R. 190; Russell & Co. v. Austin Fryers, 25 T. L. R. 414.
 - (g) (1902) 2 K. B. at p. 668.
- (h) May v. Lane, 64 L. J. Q. B. 236; cf. Torkington v. Magee, (1902) 2 K. B. 427.
- (i) Western Waggon Co. v. West, (1892) 1 Ch. 275; but note Companies Act, 1908, s. 105.
 - (k) Re Davis & Co., 22 Q. B. D. 193.
- (l) Panama, &c., Mail Co. (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. 318.

"A floating security is an equitable charge on the assets for the time being of a going concern. It attaches to the subject charged in the varying conditions in which it happens to be from time to time. It is of the essence of such a charge that it remains dormant until the undertaking charged ceases to be a going concern, or until the person in whose favour the charge is created intervenes. His right to intervene may be suspended by agreement. But if there is no agreement for suspension, he may exercise his right whenever he pleases after default" (a).

The charge is a subsisting one though not immediately effective until some prescribed event happens to call it into activity (b). It gives an immediate equitable charge on the assets subject to the right of the company in the ordinary course and for the purpose of the business of the company, but not otherwise, to dispuse of the assets of the company as though the charge had not been created (c). In determining what matters are in the ordinary course of business, regard must be had to the objects of the company as defined in its memorandum of association (d). The company may sell any of its assets comprised in the security free from the charge (e), and may create specific mortgages, legal or equitable, ranking in priority to the floating charge (f), even where there is notice of the floating charge (g). A provision in the instrument creating the charge prohibiting the company from creating charges ranking in priority to the floating charge does not affect the priority of specific mortgagees without notice of the prohibition (h). Upon maturity, or prior to maturity if the security is in jeopardy (i), a receiver of the property comprised in the floating charge will be appointed. The holder of a floating security may issue his writ to enforce his security though the security has not matured and is not in jeopardy (k).

- (a) Per Lord Macnaghten; Government Stock, &c., Co., v. Manila Ry. Co., (1897) A. C. at pp. 86 and 87.
- (b) Victoria Steamboats Co., (1897) 1 Ch. at p. 163.
- (c) Wallace v. Evershed, (1899) 1 Ch. 891.
- (d) See Borax Co., (1901) 1 Ch. 326; H. H. Vivian & Co., (1900) 2 Ch. 654.
- (e) Florence Land, &c., Co., (1878) 10 C. D. 530; and see Driver v. Broad, (1893) 1 Q. B. 744.
- (f) Wheatley v. Silkstone Coal Co., (1885) 29 C. D. 715; Cox Moore v.

Peruvian Corporation, (1908) 1 Ch. 604; cf. Murray v. Scott, 9 A. C. 519.

- (y) Hamilton's Windsor Iron Works, (1879) 12 C. D. 707.
- (h) English, &c., Investment Co. v. Brunton, (1892) 2 Q. B. 706; Re Castell and Brown, Ltd., (1898) 1 Ch. 315; Re Valletort Steam Laundry Co., (1903) 2 Ch. 654.
- (i) Victoria Steamboats Co., ubi supra.
- (k) Re Carshalton &c., (1908) 2 Ch. 62, distinguishing Bonham v. Newcomb, 1 Vern. 232.

Upon the appointment of a receiver or the liquidation of the company the charge loses its floating character and attaches to the property comprised in the charge (a).

Mortgage by company of uncalled capital.—Where power to mortgage future or unpaid-up capital is given by the memorandum or articles of association a mortgage by a company of its future or uncalled capital is valid (b). A company has, however, no power to create any charge on that portion of its capital which can under s. 59 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, only be called up in the event of and for the purposes of the company being wound up (c).

3. What amounts to an Equitable Assignment.

An equitable assignment may take the form of an ordinary assignment—it may purport to be the transfer of a right, or it may take the form of an agreement to transfer a right existing or future. Effect is given to the transfer or the agreement in equity on the principles above stated. No rule can be laid down as to the form requisite. No writing is necessary (d), unless the agreement to be proved is within the Statute of Frauds (e), and any words which show an intention of transferring or appropriating the chose in action to or for the use of the assignee are sufficient (f), and give a good charge on the chose in action (g). "The mode or form of assignment is absolutely immaterial provided the intention of the parties is clear" (h). Whether consideration is requisite for the validity of an equitable assignment cannot be said to be settled (i). The cases shew that where the other requisites of a valid equitable assignment

- (a) Re Colonial Trusts, &c., 15 C. D. at p. 472.
- (b) Re Pyle Works, (1890) 44 C. D. 535; Newton v. Anglo-Australian, &c., (1895) A. C. 244.
- (c) Re Mayfair Property Co., (1898) 2 Ch. 28.
- (d) Gurnell v. Gardner, 4 Giff. 626; Riccard v. Prichard, 1 Kay & J. 277, 279; cf. Field v. Megaw, L. R. 4 C. P. 660.
- (e) Ex p. Hall, 10 C. D. 640, and cf. Re Richardson, 30 C. D. 396.
 - (f) Row v. Dawson, p. 95, supra.
 - (g) Gorringe v. Irwell, 34 C. D. 134.
- (h) Per Lord Macnaghten, Tailby v. Official Receiver, (1888) 13 A. C. 543; and see Brandts, &c., v. Dunlop
- & Co., (1905) A. C. at p. 461, et seq., Thompson v. Spiers, 13 Si. 469; Burn v. Carvalho, 4 My. & C. 690; Cook v. Black, 1 Ha. 390; M'Fadden v. Jenkyns, 1 Ha. 458; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Mac. & G. 29; Myers v. The United, &c., Co., 7 De G. M. & G. 112; Chowne v. Baylis, 31 B. 351; Frith v. Forbes, 4 De G. F. & J. 409; see remarks on this case in Brown & Co. v. Kough, 29 C. D. 848, and Ex p. Arbuthnot, 3 C. D. 477; Ex p. Montagu, 1 C. D. 554; Ranken v. Alfaro, 5 C. D. 786; Re Irving, 7 C. D. 419; Webb v. Smith, 30 C. D. 192.
- (i) It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the authorities as to consideration in relation to equitable

are present consideration is not necessary for the equitable assignment of an existing but reversionary equitable chose in action (a), and semble so also in the case of any existing chose in action (b). It has, however, been recently held on the ground that a "possibility" is not "property" that a possibility or expectancy is incapable of voluntary assignment even to trustees (c).

Although a mere contract as to after-acquired property may amount to an equitable assignment thereof, it must purport to confer an interest in the future chattels immediately by its own force, and without the necessity of any further act on the part of the assignee upon the future chattels coming into existence, and therefore an assignment of existing chattels, coupled with words which amount to a mere licence to seize after-acquired property, will not be construed as an equitable assignment of the latter (d). No notice to the debtor of the assignment is necessary (e). Assignments of debts are not governed by the same rules as bills of exchange and promissory notes, so as to make it obligatory upon the assignee of a debt to give notice to the assignor of non-payment by the debtor (f). But the assignee of a debt in such a case is chargeable for wilful default, as every mortgagee must be (g).

Some Cases of Equitable Assignment.—An agreement between a debtor and a creditor that the debt owing shall be paid out of a specific fund coming to the debtor (h), or an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a third person, having funds of the debtor, to pay the creditor out of such funds, will create a binding equitable assignment, and the consent of the party to whom the order is given is not necessary (i).

assignment. See Articles in L. Q. Review, 1900 & 1901, by Mr. Jenks and Sir W. Anson.

- (a) Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 M. & K. 36; Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De G. M. & G. 176.
- (b) Donaldson v. D., Kay, 711; Roberts v. Lloyd, 2 B. 376; Re Griffin, (1899) 1 Ch. 408; Re Patrick, (1891) 1 Ch. 82; Re Lucan, 45 C. D. 470; and see below under Ward v. Turner.
- (c) Re Ellenborough, (1903) 1 Ch. 697, distinguishing Kekewich v. Manning, supra; and see Re Tilt, 74 L. T. 163.
- (d) Reeve v. Whitmore, 4 De G. J. & S. 1; Brown v. Bateman, L. R. 2 C. P. 272, 283, 284; and see Re Davis & Co., 22 Q. B. D. 193, and (n.) "Covenants &c.," p. 118.
- (e) Gorringe v. Irwell, 34 C. D. 128.
 (f) See Glyn v. Hood, 1 De G. F. & J. 334.
- (g) Per Turner, L. J., Glyn v. Hood, 1 De G. F. & J. 349; see $Ex\ p$. Mure, 2 Cox. 63.
- (h) Rodick v. Gandell, 1 De G. M. & G. 763.
- (i) Burn v. Carvalho, supra; Brown & Co. v. Kough, 29 C. D. 848.

In Brice v. Bannister (a), G. agreed to build a vessel for defendant B., for a price payable in instalments: G. being indebted to the plaintiff Brice, ordered and requested the defendant to pay 100l. to Brice out of moneys due or to become due to him, G. The plaintiff gave the defendant notice of this. At the time the order to pay was given all the instalments due had been paid to G. The defendant refused to be bound by the notice, and afterwards paid the accruing balance to G. Held, a good equitable assignment (b).

In Percival v. Dunn (c), it was held that a similar order not specifying the fund or debt out of which payment was to come was bad. D., the defendant, owed A., a builder, money, payable by instalments. A. gave the plaintiff P., to whom he owed money, an order on D., "Please pay P. the amount of his account, 47l.," &c. At the time the order was given to defendant D., he was in debt to A. Held, it did not, for the above reason, operate as an equitable assignment (d).

In Brandts, &c. v. Dunlop, &c. (e), K. & Co., a firm of merchants, were financed by the plaintiffs under an arrangement whereby on a purchase of goods by K. & Co. approved of by the plaintiffs the latter provided funds to complete the purchase and took a delivery order of the goods to themselves. On K. & Co. finding a purchaser so approved of, the plaintiffs released the goods and gave a delivery order to K. & Co., relying for repayment of their advance upon a written undertaking by K. & Co. in such case that the price should be paid direct to the plaintiffs, and that in the meantime K. & Co. would hold the goods and their proceeds in trust for them, and would grant them "the sole and absolute lien on the said goods and their proceeds" until they obtained full payment of their advance. Under this arrangement a parcel of goods was bought by K. & Co. and sold and delivered to the defendants. plaintiffs sent a written notice to the defendants that K & Co. had made over to the plaintiffs the right to receive the purchase-money

⁽a) 3 Q. B. D. 569; and see Durhamv. Robertson, (1898) 1 Q. B. at p. 773.

⁽b) Supra, distinguishing Tooth v. Hallett, L. R. 4 Ch. 242, which was followed in Ex p. Hall, 10 C. D. 615; distinguished in Western Waggon, &c., Co. v. West, (1892) 1 Ch. 271, p. 115, infra; not applied in May v. Lane, (1894) 64 L. J. Q. B. 236.

⁽c) 29 C. D. 128; and see Yeates v. Groves, 1 V. 281.

⁽d) And see Diplock v. Hammond, 5 De G. M. & G. 320; Re Farrell, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 304; Harding v. H., 17 Q. B. D. 442; but see the letter, Webb v. Smith, 30 C. D. p. 194, in which no specific fund was referred to.

⁽e) (1905) A. C. 454.

and requesting the defendants to sign an undertaking to remit the purchase-money to the plaintiffs. It was held by the House of Lords that the transactions between K. & Co. and the plaintiffs amounted to a valid, equitable assignment with notice of the debt due from the defendants to K. & Co.

In Exp. Alderson(a), R., being pressed to discharge a debt on the 5th of August, 1813, gave to two creditors a draft on the executor of a debtor of hers, which draft the executor promised to discharge on receiving assets. A commission of bankrupt issued against R. on 17th of November, 1814. Upon a petition being presented by the two creditors, it was held, that they were entitled to the sum for which the draft was given, as against the assignees. And Lord Eldon on the appeal said, that the debtor would be bound by the order being shown to him, and that a contract on his part to pay was, in equity, not necessary (b).

A mere indorsement in blank of a debenture of a joint stock company has been held a good equitable assignment (c); as to equitable mortgages of shares (d).

In London & Yorkshire Bank v. White (e), F., in conversation with the bank manager, agreed on the 7th of December to assign to the bank, as security for an overdraft, his interest in certain goods then deposited with G. for sale. On the 9th December, F. sent a notice to G. that he had assigned his interest in the goods to the bank, and requesting G. to pay the bank the proceeds of sales from time to time, &c. Held, that there was, by the oral agreement of the 7th December, a complete equitable assignment to the bank, that

- (a) 1 Madd. 53, affir. 3 Swans. 392.
- (b) Ex p. South, (1818) 3 Swans. 392; Re Briggs & Co., (1906) 2 K. B. 209; Marchant v. Morton, (1901) 2 K. B. 829.
- (c) Re Pryce, 4 C. D. 685; Re Jenkinson, 15 Q. B. D. 441.
- (d) See Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 11 A. C. 426; Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs, 12 A. C. 29; Deverges v. Sandeman, Clarke & Co., (1902) 1 Ch. 579.
- (e) 11 T. L. R. 570. See also the following cases: Burn v. Carvallho, 4 My. & C. 690; Shand v. Du Buisson, 18 Eq. 283; Ex p. Montagu, 1 C. D. 555; Smith v. Everett, 4 Bro. Ch. 64;

Ex p. Steward, 3 Mont. D. & De G. 265;Diplock v. Hammond, 2 Sm. & G. 141; 5 De G. M. & G. 320; L'Estrange v. L'E., 13 B. 281; Riccard v. Prichard, 1 Kay & J. 277; Jones v. Farrell, 1 De G. & J. 208; Ex p. Imbert, 1 De G. & J. 152; Farley v. Turner, 26 L. J. Ch. 710; Rayner v. Harford, 27 L. J. Ch. 708; Chowne v. Baylis, 31 B. 351; Langton v. Waring, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 315; Ex p. North Western Bank, 15 Eq. 69; Addison v. Cox, L. R. 8 Ch. 82; Ex p. Nicholls, Re Jones, 22 C. D. 782; Brown & Co. v. Kough, 29 C. D. 848; Wilmot v. Alton, (1897) 1 Q. B. 17.

the notice to G. on the 9th was not necessary to complete the title, and that the notice of the 9th was not a bill of sale. The test as to whether a document is a bill of sale or not is, is it necessary to put the document in evidence to prove the transfer of or title to the goods (a).

Where no Equitable Assignment is Created.—The intention, however, to assign or to create a charge must be shown. Thus, a mere letter of instruction to a banker not written with any intent to create a charge on a fund in his hands, will not amount to an equitable assignment (b). Nor will the opening of a credit for a particular sum constitute an equitable assignment or specific appropriation of that sum, but it is merely an authority to the person in whose favour the credit is opened to draw to the extent of the specified amount (c).

Where a person has a fund belonging to another in his hands, a bill of exchange drawn by the latter on the former, although for the exact amount, is not an equitable assignment thereof (d); for a bill of exchange differs essentially both in origin and operation from an assignment of a debt. "An equitable assignment is not a negotiable instrument, and need not at all be free from the equities between the original parties to the transaction." The same instrument could hardly operate both as a bill of exchange and as an equitable assignment (e). Nor is a cheque an equitable assignment of the drawer's balance at the bankers upon whom it is drawn (f).

Where the property purporting to be assigned is not in the assignor at the time of the assignment, and by some act intervening, such as bankruptcy, never becomes his, there is no equitable assignment. So also where the benefit of a contract is assigned which creates no debt present or future. Thus in Western Waggon, &c., Co. v. West (g), P. assigned to the plaintiffs his right under a mortgage with defendant West to further advances which formed part of the

- (a) Manchester, Sheffield, &c., Ry. v.
 N. Central, &c., Co., 13 A. C. 554;
 Newlove v. Shrewsbury, 21 Q. B. D.
 41.
- (b) Hopkinson v. Forster, 19 Eq. 74; Schroeder v. Central Bank, &c., 34 L. T. 735.
- (c) See Morgan v. Larivière, L. R. 7 H. L. 423; but of. Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 K. & J. 204.
- (d) Shand v. Du Buisson, 18 Eq. 283.
- (e) See judgment of Fry, L.J., in Brown, Shipley & Co. v. Kough, 29 C. D. 875.
- (f) Hopkinson v. Forster, 19 Eq. 74, commenting on Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B. (N. S. 372.
 - (g) (1892) 1 Ch. 271.

consideration for such mortgage. The plaintiffs gave defendant notice of the assignment, but they, in forgetfulness, made a further advance of 500l. to P. Held, that as the contract in the mortgage deed was not a contract to lend out of a particular fund, no money or fund was bound by it, and that no debt was created by it, and that the 500l. was therefore never bound in the hands of the defendant W., although it would be in the hands of P. Also, that the plaintiffs could only sue for damages in right of P., and that P. had sustained none (a).

A mere mandate from a principal to his agent, not communicated to a third person, will give the third person no right or interest in the subject of the mandate. It may be revoked at any time before it is executed, or at least before any engagement is entered into with a third person to execute it for his benefit. And it will be revoked by any disposition of the property inconsistent with the execution of Where, for instance, an order is given by a man to his bankers to pay over a sum to a third person to whom the order is not communicated, and the banker does not make the payment, and the order is afterwards countermanded, the third party cannot insist on the banker paying to him the money (c). So if a landlord write a letter to his tenant requesting him to pay future rent when due to the landlord's bankers, the letter amounts only to a revocable authority, which will be revoked by the landlord's bankruptcy (d). In Re Russell (e), A., entitled to the balance of an unpaid legacy in the hands of executors, wrote a letter at the request of B. to his own solicitor, directing him to pay the balance to B. The letter was sent to the executors, and they paid the balance to B. four days after A.'s death. B. afterwards returned the money to the executors. Held that the letter was merely a direction, and not an equitable assignment, and that it was revoked by A.'s death (f). And as to references to cargo on the face of a bill of exchange and letters of advice accompanying it, see judgment of Chitty, J., in Brown, Shipley & Co. v. Kough(g). When, however, the agent communicates the mandate to the third person, and agrees to exercise it for his benefit, he converts

- (a) See also May v. Lane, 64 L. J. Q. B. 236, supra (b) p. 113, and note Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, s. 105.
- '(b) Scott v. Porcher, 3 Mer. 652, 664; but cf. Alexander v. Steinhardt, (1903) 2 K. B. 208.
 - (c) Morrell v. Wooten, 16 B. 197.
- (d) Exp. Hall, 10 C. D. 615.
- (e) 37 Sol. Jo. 212; cf. Lambe v. Orton, 1 Dr. & Sm. 125.
- (f) And see Lambe v. Orton, supra.
- (g) 29 C. D. 858; and see Malcolm
 r. Scott, 3 Ha. 39; Robey, &c., Ironworks
 v. Ollier, L. R. 7 Ch. 695; Phelps
 & Co. v. Comber, 29 C. D. 813.

himself into an agent for, and debtor to, the persons in whose favour the mandate was given. Thus, in Fitzgerald v. Stewart (a), consignments had been made from abroad to answer an annuity which the owner of the property consigned was liable to pay, and the consignee in this country gave notice of the arrangement to the annuitant, and made payments in pursuance of it, it was held by Brougham, C., that the consignee was not afterwards at liberty to discontinue such payments, so long as he had any proceeds of the consignments in his hands.

A mere power of attorney or authority to a person to receive money not addressed to the debtor, and directing such person to pay it to a creditor of the party granting the power or authority. will not amount to an equitable assignment. Thus, in Rodick v. Gandell (b), a railway company was indebted to the defendant, their engineer, who was greatly indebted to his bankers. The bankers having pressed for payment or security, the defendant, by letter to the solicitors of the company, authorised them to receive the money due to him from the company, and requested them to pay it to the bankers. The solicitors, by letter, promised the bankers to pay them such money on receiving it. It was held by Truro, C., affirming the decision of Lord Langdale, M.R., that this did not amount to an equitable assignment of the debt. "If," said his Lordship, "an assignment of the debts had been intended, it would have been quite as easy to have directed the order to the railway company as to the solicitors. It rather seems to have been intended that the bank should have no title or interest in the debts until the amount of the debts should have been adjusted, and some definite portion been adjusted and realized" (c).

A mere representation, by the drawer, that bills of exchange will be met by the drawee, inasmuch as the drawee has larger funds in his hands belonging to the drawer, will not amount to an equitable assignment or specific appropriation of such funds (d).

A promise to pay money when the debtor receives a debt due to him from a third person does not constitute an equitable

Ir. R. Eq. 294.

⁽a) 2 Russ. & M. 457.

⁽b) 1 De G. M. & G. 763 at p. 778; 12 B. 325.

<sup>c) See also Bell v. The L. & N. W.
Ry. Co., 15 B. 548; Thayer v. Lister,
30 L. J. Ch. 427; Flint v. Walker,
5 Moo. P. C. C. 179; Re Foster,</sup>

⁽d) See Thomson v. Simpson, L. R. 5 Ch. 659; Citizen's Bank, &c. v. First National Bank, &c., L. R. 6 H. L. 352; Brown, Shipley & Co. v. Kough, 29 C. D. 848.

assignment, so as to charge the debt in the hands of such third person (a).

Where an instrument was construed, not as a mere equitable assignment, but as an order for payment of a sum of money out of a particular fund, unless it were stamped as required by 55 Geo. III. c. 184, Sched. Part 1, tit. "Inland Bill," it could not be enforced in equity (b): but where an instrument, though in form an order for the payment of money, operated as an equitable assignment, if properly stamped as an assignment, and the penalty paid, it would be received by the Court (c).

An order operating as an equitable assignment is liable either to 10s, stamp as a "conveyance not hereinbefore described" or to ad valorem duty if the assignment is on sale or within s. 51 of the Stamp Act, 1891(d).

Covenants as to after-acquired Property.

As before stated in considering whether a covenant of this nature operates as an equitable assignment of or charge upon the property comprised within the covenant, the question whether specific performance of the covenant would be granted is irrelevant. question is whether definite ascertained property comprised within the words of the covenant has become legally vested in the covenantor; if it has, and if the covenant is no longer executory but executed in the sense that the consideration for the covenant has been furnished by the covenantee, the equitable assignment or charge is complete (e). Where the property comprised in the covenant is defined by reference to its character or the mode of acquisition by the covenantor in such manner that it can be easily identified, little difficulty has arisen in applying the principle. Thus where an incumbent charged his then benefice with an annuity and covenanted that if he were preferred to another benefice he would fully charge the same, and that in the meantime the same should be charged,

- (a) Field v. Megaw, L. R. 4 C. P. 660; Jones v. Starkey, 16 Jur. 510.
- (b) Braybrooke v. Meredith, 13 Si. 271; Parsons v. Middleton, 6 Ha. 261; and see Pott v. Lomas, 6 H. & N. 529.
- (c) Diplock v. Hammond, 5 De G.
 M. & G. 320; M'Gowan v. Smith, 26
 L. J. Ch. 8; Brice v. Bannister,
 3 Q. B. D. 569; Ex p. Hall, 10
 C. D. 615; and Buck v. Robson, 3
- Q. B. D. 686, and the observations
- therein, disapproving of Ex p. Shellard, 17 Eq. 109; Adams v. Morgan, 14 L. R. Ir. 140; Fisher v. Calvert, 27 W. R. 301; Webb v. Smith, 30 C. D. 192.
- (d) See Alpe, Stamp Duties, 1907, p. 74.
- (e) Metcalfe v. Abp. of York, 1 My.
 & C. 547; Tailby v. Official Receiver,
 13 A. C. 523, per Lord Macnaghten, at
 p. 547, et seq.

and was subsequently preferred, it was held that there was a good equitable charge upon the new benefice so soon as it was acquired (a). Again, a covenant by the grantor of an annuity to charge it upon all such property as in the event of his surviving his wife he might become possessed of by virtue of his wife's will or otherwise was held to create a valid charge upon an annuity to which the grantor became entitled under the will of his wife (b).

Where, however, a person in terms assigns or covenants to settle or charge all after-acquired property the law cannot be said to be free from doubt. The validity of such a covenant by a woman on her marriage for the settlement of her future property does not seem to have been questioned; it is apparently assumed by conveyancers that such a covenant is free from objection (c). In Re Reis (d), following and applying Lord Eldon's judgment in Lewis v. Madocks (e), the Court of Appeal held that a covenant by the settlor in his marriage settlement to transfer all his after-acquired property (except business assets) to the trustees of the settlement was not too vague and general to be enforced by the Court. regard to assignments by way of charge and covenants to charge purporting to bind all after-acquired property, the question has been many times discussed but no clear authority exists (f). Where the assignment was divisible, referring both to property capable of definite ascertainment and all after-acquired property, the assignment, or so far as property of the former nature is concerned, has been enforced while the Court has left open the effect of the latter Thus in $Re\ Clarke\ (g)$, where a mortpart of the assignment. gagor had assigned certain existing property and all moneys to which he might during the security become entitled under any settlement, will, or other document, and also all real and personal estate to which he should become entitled, the Court held that an interest to which the mortgagor subsequently became entitled under a will was included in the security, leaving open the effect of the last words in the assignment (h). In Re D'Epineuil (i) a written

(a) Metcalfe v. Abp. of York, supra. Such a covenant, unlawful when the action was brought, was lawful at the date of the covenant and the subsequent preferment.

(b) Lyde v. Mynn, 1 My. & K. 693.

(c) 2 Key & Elphinstone, 8th ed. 511.

(d) (1904) 2 K. B. 769.

(e) 8 V. 150; 7 R. R. 10; Hardey v. Green, 12 B. 182; see also Lyster v.

Burroughs, 1 Dr. & Wa. 149; White v. Anderson, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 419; Stack v Royse, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 246.

(f) Cf. Re Turcan, 40 C. D. 5.

(g) 36 C. D. 348.

(h) See Cotton L. J.'s comments,
 36 C. D. at p. 354, on Clements v.
 Matthews, 11 Q. B. D. 808.

(i) 20 C. D. 758.

instrument by a debtor charging all his present and future personalty to secure the payment of present and future debts to the assignee was held operative to charge all the personal property belonging to the debtor at the date of the instrument, but inoperative as to future acquired property. In so far as this decision is based upon the ground that future acquired property cannot be effectively charged it is overruled (a), but whether such an instrument can create a lien of any kind is, however, doubtful (b). In Re Kelcey (c) the validity of a memorandum of general charge for value upon all the existing property of the mortgagor was recognised and declared not to be against public policy.

Closely connected with the cases last discussed are those where a person who has covenanted to settle lands of a certain value or to secure an annuity of a certain amount by a charge on lands subsequently acquires lands. Is the covenantee entitled merely to sue for damages on a breach of the covenant or for specific performance, or is he further entitled to a lien or charge upon the lands so acquired? It would seem that such a covenant of itself creates no lien on lands subsequently acquired, whether the covenant is one which is capable of being specifically enforced or not, and the fact that the covenant is to be performed by a particular time is unimportant (d).

4. Notice, Distringas, Stop-Orders, &c.

Notice of an assignment is not necessary to render it perfect as between the assignor and assignee, whether it be for valuable consideration (e), or only voluntary (f). It does not render the title perfect, for it was not even a step in the title before Foster v. Cockerell (g), and a written notice does not require registration as a bill of sale (h).

- (a) Tailby v. Official Receiver, supra.
- (b) Per Lord Macnaghten, Tailby v. Official Receiver, supra, at p. 544.
 - (c) (1899) 2 Ch. 530.
- (d) Mornington v. Keane, 2 De G. & J. 292, where Roundell v. Breary, 2 Vern. 482 is explained, and Wellesley v. W., 17 Si. 59 questioned; Tailby v. Official Receiver, supra, at p. 548; and see Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. W. 429; Berrington v. Evans, 3 T. & C. 384.
- (e) Burn v. Carvalho, 4 My. & C. 702; Dufaur v. Professional L. A. Co.,

- supra; Rodick v. Gandell, 1 De G. M. & G. 780; Gorringe v. Irwell, 34 C. D.
- (f) Donaldson v. D., Kay, 711; Roberts v. Lloyd, 2 B. 376; Re Way's T., 2 De G. J. & S. 365; Re Patrick, (1891) 1 Ch. 82.
- (g) 3 Cl. & Fin. 456. See judgment of Lord *Macnaghten*, Ward v. Duncombe, (1893) A. C. p. 392.
- (h) London, &c., Bank v. White, 11 T. L. R. 520.

Nor is notice necessary as against third parties who stand in the same position as the assignor, as, for instance, persons claiming under a subsequent assignment as volunteers (a), a creditor under a judgment who has obtained a charging order (b), or as against a judgment creditor who has got a receiver appointed (c), or under a garnishee order under the C. L. P. Acts, 1854 and 1860 (d), or the trustee in bankruptcy of the assignor who is only a statutory assignee of the bankrupt (e).

The neglect, however, to give notice, or to obtain what is equivalent thereto, a distringas, or a stop-order, may have the effect, 1st, of rendering subsequent payments to the assignor valid; 2nd, of enabling a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer to gain priority by giving notice; 3rd, of bringing the subject-matter assigned within the operation of the reputed ownership clause of the Bankruptcy Act.

Neglect by assignee to give notice renders subsequent payment to assignor valid.—Where the assignee does not give notice of the assignment to the debtor, trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, he will be obliged to allow the payments which such debtor, trustee, or person subsequently makes to the assignor (f).

Priority, when gained by a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer giving notice.—If the assignee of a chose in action, or a trust estate of personalty, does not perfect his title by giving notice of the assignment to the debtor or trustees, a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer without notice, express or implied (at the date of his purchase or advance) of the former assignment (g) even though subsequently and before giving notice he is made aware of the

- (a) Justice v. Wynne, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 289.
- (b) Eyre v. M'Dowell, 9 H. L. Cas.
 619, 642; Scott v. Hastings, 4 Kay & J. 633; Brearcliffe v. Dorrington, 4 De G. & Sm. 122.
 - (c) Arden v. A., 29 C. D. 703.
- (d) Pickering v. The Ilfracombe Ry. Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 235; Robinson v. Nesbitt, Ibid., 264; overruling Watts v. Porter, 3 El. & Bl. 743; R. S. C., O. 45.
 - (e) Re Wallis, (1902) 1 K. B. 719;

- Re Irving, 7 C. D. 419.
- (f) Norrish v. Marshall, 5 Madd.
 475; Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G. M. &
 G. 11; see Re Lord Southampton,
 16 C. D. 178; Bence v. Shearman,
 (1898) 2 Ch. 582.
- (g) Re Holmes, 29 C. D. 786; and see Warburton v. Hill, Kay 470; Spencer v. Clarke, 9 C. D. 137; Newman v. N., 28 C. D. 674; English, &c., Investment Co. v. Brunton (1892), 2 Q. B. 700, and see supra under "Floating Charge,"

previous assignment or incumbrance (a) giving notice of his assignment will thereby acquire priority; and it is of no importance, in the question of priority, whether the interest of the assignor be vested or contingent, present or reversionary. The leading case upon this subject is Dearle v. Hall (b), in which case Brown, being entitled for life to the yearly sum of 93l., being the dividend arising from the moiety of a sum of money invested in the names of the executors of his father's will, by an indenture, dated the 19th of December, 1808, assigned it to Dearle, to secure an annuity granted in consideration of 204l.; and by another indenture, dated the 26th of September, 1809, he assigned the same yearly sum to Sherring, to secure an annuity granted in consideration of 150l. No notice of the assignments was given by either Dearle or Sherring to the executors. By an indenture, dated the 20th of March, 1812, Brown, in consideration of 711l. 3s. 6d., assigned the same annual sum absolutely to Hall, who, previous to making the purchase, called for every information respecting the fund and the title from the acting executor, and on the 25th of April, 1812, served the executors with a written notice to pay him, as assignee of Brown, a moiety of the dividends of the fund during Brown's life, and they accordingly paid him a sum of money on account thereof. On the 17th of October following, the executors for the first time, received notice of the assignments to Dearle and Sherring, and refused to make any more payments until the rights of the different parties should be ascertained. Plumer, M.R., after an elaborate consideration of the authorities, dismissed the bills filed by Dearle and Sherring, holding, that Hall had a better equity to the fund, and that the assignment to him, though posterior in date, was entitled in priority, in consequence of his having given, and of Dearle and Sherring having neglected to give, notice to the trustees. "The question," said his Honor, "here is, not which assignment is first in date, but whether there is not, on the part of Hall, a better title to call for the legal estate than Dearle or Sherring can set up; or rather the question is, shall these plaintiffs now have equitable relief, to the injury of Hall? What title have they shown to call on a Court of justice to interpose on their behalf, in order to obviate the consequences of their own misconduct? All that has happened is owing to their negligence, a negligence not accounted for, in forbearing to

lent article on this case in Law Quarterly Review, Oct., 1895.

⁽a) See e.g. Mutual Life A. S. v. Langley, 32 C. D. at p. 468.

⁽b) (1823) 3 Russ. 1. See an excel-

do what they ought to have done, what would have been attended with no difficulty, and what would have effectually prevented all the mischief which has followed. Is a plaintiff to be heard in a Court of equity, who asks its interposition in his behoof, to indemnify him against the effects of his own negligence, at the expense of another who has used all due diligence, and who, if he is to suffer loss, will suffer it by reason of the negligence of the very person who prays relief against him? The question here is, not as in Evans v. Bicknell (a), whether a Court of equity is to deprive the plaintiffs of any right, -whether it is to take from them, for instance, a legal estate, or to impose any charge upon them: it is simply, whether they are entitled to relief against their own negligence. They did not perfect their securities: a third party has innocently advanced his money, and has perfected his security, as far as the nature of the subject permitted him. Is this Court to interfere to postpone him to them? They say, that they were not bound to give notice to the trustees, for that notice does not form part of the necessary conveyance of an equitable interest. I admit, that, if you mean to rely on contract with the individual, you do not need to give notice; from the moment of the contract, he with whom you are dealing is personally bound. But if you mean to go further, and to make your right attach upon the thing which is the subject of the contract, it is necessary to give notice; and unless notice is given, you do not do that which is essential in all cases of transfer of personal property. The law of England has always been, that personal property passes by delivery of possession; and it is possession which determines the apparent ownership. If, therefore, an individual, who, in the way of purchase or mortgage, contracts with another for the transfer of his interest, does not divest the vendor or mortgagor of possession, but permits him to remain the ostensible owner as before, he must take the consequences which may ensue from such a mode of dealing. That doctrine was explained in Ryall v. Rowles . . . If you, having the right of possession, do not exercise that right, but leave another in actual possession, you enable that person to gain a false and delusive credit, and put it in his power to obtain money from innocent parties, on the hypothesis of his being the owner of that which in fact belongs to you. The principle has been long recognised even in Courts of law. In Twyne's Case (b), one of the badges of fraud was, that the possession had remained in the vendor. Possession

must follow right; and if you, who have the right, do not take possession, you do not follow up the title, and are responsible for the consequences. . . . It is true that a chose in action does not admit of tangible actual possession, and that neither Brown nor any person claiming under him were entitled to possess themselves of the fund which yielded the 93l. a-year. But, in Ryall v. Rowles, the Judges held, that, in the case of a chose in action, you must do everything towards having possession which the subject admits; you must do that which is tantamount to obtaining possession, by placing every person who has an equitable or legal interest in the matter under an obligation to treat it as your property. For this purpose, you must give notice to the legal holder of the fund; in the case of a debt, for instance, notice to the debtor is, for many purposes, tantamount to possession. If you omit to give that notice, you are guilty of the same degree and species of neglect (a) as he who leaves a personal chattel, to which he has acquired a title, in the actual possession and under the absolute control of another person.

"Is there the least doubt, that, if Brown had been a trader, all that was done by Dearle and Sherring would not have been in the least effectual against his assignees; but that, according to the doctrine of Ryall v. Rowles, his assignees would have taken the fund, because there was no notice to those in whom the legal interest was vested? In that case, it was the opinion of all the Judges, that he who contracts for a chose in action, and does not follow up his title by notice, gives personal credit to the individual with whom he deals. Notice, then, is necessary to perfect the title,—to give a complete right in rem (b), and not merely a right as against him who conveys his interest. If you are willing to trust the personal credit of the man, and are satisfied that he will make no improper use of the possession in which you will allow him to remain, notice is not necessary; for, against him, the title is perfect without notice. But if he, availing himself of the possession as a means of obtaining credit, induces third persons to purchase from him as the actual owner, and they part with their money before your pocket-conveyance is notified to them, you must be postponed. In being postponed. your security is not invalidated; you had priority, but that priority has not been followed up; and you have permitted another to acquire

⁽a) Cf. English, &c., Trust v. Brunton, (1892) 2 Q. B. 1. Lord Macnaghten, Ward v. Duncombe, infra.

⁽b) But see as to this judgment of

a better title to the legal possession. What was done by Dearle and Sherring did not exhaust the thing (to borrow the principle of the civil law), but left it still open to traffic. These are the principles on which I think it to be very old law, that possession, or what is tantamount to possession, is the criterion of perfect title to personal chattels, and that he who does not obtain such possession, must take his chance (a)." The cases of Dearle v. Hall, and Loveridge v. Cooper, were afterwards affirmed by Lyndhurst, C. upon appeal, who observed (b) that where personal property is assigned, delivery is necessary to complete the transaction, not as between the vendor and vendee, but as to third persons in order that they may not be deceived by apparent possession. * * * That in cases like the present, the act of giving the trustee notice was, in a certain degree, taking possession of the fund; that it was going as far towards equitable possession as it was possible to go; for, after notice given, the trustee of the fund becomes a trustee for the assignee who has given him notice.

In Foster v. Cockerell (c), M. conveyed estates to trustees, on trust to sell and pay creditors of B., and subject thereto on trust for M. for life, remainder to B. in fee. M. died and B. granted annuities charged on the estate, and then mortgaged the estate without notice of them. The trustees sold the estate, and the mortgagees, who had not made any inquiries of the trustees, gave notice to them of the mortgage five years after it was created, and it was held that they had priority over the annuitants by reason of such notice. "This case unquestionably lays down that the rule in Dearle v. Hall is independent of any consideration of the conduct of the competing assignees, where the assignee second in date, has no notice of the earlier assignment. Priority in such cases depends simply and solely on priority of notice (d)." And a second assignee giving first notice of his assignment will be equally entitled to priority

- (b) 3 Russ. 48.
- (c) 3 Cl. & Fin. 456.

Bridges, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 486; Warburton v. Hill, Kay, 470; Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G. M. & G. 11; Lloyd v. Banks, L. R. 3 Ch. 488; Dunster v. Glengall, 3 Ir. Ch. R. 47; Re Wasdale, (1899) 1 Ch. 163; Re Lake, (1903) 1 K. B. 151; Re Dallas, (1904) 2 Ch. 385. See also Re Richards, supra; English, &c., Trust v. Brunton, (1892) 2 Q. B. p. 8.

⁽a) See also Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 130; Re Richards, 45 C. D. p. 595.

⁽d) Per Lord Macnaghten, Ward v. Duncombe, (1893) A. C. p. 390; and see Smith v. S., 2 Cr. & M. 231; Timson v. Ramsbottom, 2 Keen, 49; Meux v. Bell, 1 Ha. 73; Etty v.

when he has taken such assignment from the legal personal representative of the *ccstui que trust* who made the assignment to a first assignee (a).

In Ward v. Duncombe (b), M. W. was entitled in remainder under a will to a share of a fund in the hands of S. and E. as trustees thereof. M. W. married H. D. and settled her share, reserving a life interest. S. had notice of this settlement, E., the other trustee, had not. M. D. and her husband proposed to mortgage her share as unencumbered. The intending mortgagees applied for information to the trustees S. and E. S. gave an evasive answer, but was not pressed further; E. stated, with truth, that he had not received notice of any incumbrance. The mortgage being completed, formal notice was sent to both trustees. E. acknowledged the notice, S. did not. Then S. died, without having informed E. of the settlement. E. therefore, the sole trustee of the will, had notice of the mortgage, but not of the settlement. Then one Evitt was appointed trustee of the will in place of S. deceased, and together with E. Held, affirming Stirling, J. and the C. A. (c), that the trustees of the settlement were entitled in priority to the mortgagees, for the death of S. could not deprive the trustees of the settlement of the priority which they had already acquired during his life. In Ward v. Duncombe all the principal cases relating to the effect of notice on the equitable assignment of a chose in action were thoroughly examined, and the foundation and scope of the doctrine laid down in Dearle v. Hall considered. The result seems to be that if one of the trustees of a fund has knowledge of an incumbrance affecting it, such knowledge amounts to express notice, and will enure for the benefit of such incumbrancer, and a subsequent incumbrance made whilst one of the trustees has such knowledge, cannot gain priority over it by the fact that the subsequent incumbrancer has given notice to any or all of the trustees. But if such trustee died or resigned, and then a further incumbrance was made and notice given to the existing trustees, none of whom had knowledge of any prior incumbrance, then, quare(d).

The rule in *Dearle* v. *Hall* applies to all equitable interests in personal estate and choses in action, but it has nothing to do with the

 ⁽a) Re Freshfield's T., 11 C. D. 198.
 Followed in Montefiore v. Guedella,
 (1903) 2 Ch. 26.

⁽b) (1893) A. C. 369.

⁽c) See Re Wyatt, (1892) 1 Ch. 188.

⁽d) See per Lord Macnaghten in Ward v. Duncombe, supra, at pp. 394, 395, doubting Timson v. Ramsbottom, 2 Keen, 35, and see infra, p. 129.

assignment of equitable interests in real estate or in leaseholds (a), and the principle of it is not to be extended, Ward v. Duncombe, supra.

Trustees of a fund are not under any legal obligation to answer inquiries put to them by intending incumbrancers as to existing incumbrances (b), and if they decline to do so the intending incumbrancer proceeds at his own risk (c).

How and to whom Notice should be given.

How Notice should be given.—The principle is best stated in Lord Cairns words (d). "If it can be shewn that in any way the trustee has got knowledge of that kind—knowledge which would operate upon the mind of any rational man, or man of business, and make him act with reference to the knowledge he has so acquired—then I think the end is attained, and that there has been fixed upon the conscience of the trustee, and through that upon the trust fund, a security against its being parted with in any way that would be inconsistent with the incumbrance which has been created."

It is not necessary that a notice to a trustee or debtor should be a notice formally given in writing; a verbal informal notice is sufficient, provided the fact of the assignment is distinctly and clearly brought to the mind and attention of the trustee (e). But a statement made in a mere casual conversation is not sufficient (f).

Although notices should be given either by the assignee himself, or some agent for him, it is sufficient if the trustee or debtor has received aliunde such notice as a reasonable man in the ordinary course of business would act upon (g).

To whom Notice should be given.—Notice of an assignment or charge upon a fund must be given to the trustees for the assignor or incumbrancer—to those whose duty it then is or will become to account for the fund to the assignor (h). Accordingly, when funds assigned are affected by successive trusts, notice of an assignment,

- (α) See Hopkins v. Hemsworth, (1898)
 2 Ch. 347; and Re Richards, 45 C. D.
 p. 596, as to mortgage debts. See (n.)
 "Interests in land," p. 139.
- (b) Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82, at p. 99. See as to obligation to the cestui que trust Re Tillott, (1892) 1 Ch. p. 88; and Re Dartnall, (1895) 1 Ch. 474.
- (c) Per *Herschell*, C., Ward v. Duncombe, (1893) A. C. p. 383.

- (d) Lloyd v Banks, L. R. 3 Ch. at p. 491.
- (e) Browne v. Savage, 4 Dr. 640;
 North British I. Co. v. Hallett, 7 Jur.
 (N. S.) 1263; Lloyd v. Banks, L. R.
 3 Ch. 488; Smith v. S., 3 Russ. 1.
- (f) Re Tichener, 35 B. 317; Re
 Brown's T., 5 Eq. 88; Saffron Walden
 B. B. So. v. Rayner, 14 C. D. 406, 410.
 - (y) Lloyd v. Banks, L. R. 3 Ch. 488.
 - (h) Re Dallas, (1904) 2 Ch. 385.

in order to be effectual, should be given to the trustees for the assignor, i.e., to the immediate trustees of the cestui que trust assigning, and not to the trustees of the original settlement, although the latter may have the actual control of the funds. In Stephens v. Green (a), a fund was in Court representing certain legacies bequeathed by testator A., whose estate was being administered in an action S. v. G. A.'s son was entitled to a reversionary interest in this fund, and his estate was also being administered in a second action, G. v. K. The daughter of A.'s son was entitled to a share in the fund under her father's will, and by post-nuptial settlement had agreed to assign her share to the trustees of the settlement. She then mortgaged her share to a company without notice of that settlement. In November, 1883, the company obtained a stop order in the first action. In December, 1883, the trustees obtained a like order in the same action. In January, 1884, the trustees gave notice of the settlement to the legal personal representatives of the son. The trustees were held entitled to priority.

If at the date of the assignment of a fund there is no person then in existence in whom the legal dominion of the fund is vested, no effective notice securing priority can possibly be given. A., an expectant legatee under the will of his father then living, charged his expectancy, firstly, in favour of B. and then of C., and on the death of his father, and being named executor in his father's will, renounced probate. D. then took out administration, and C. immediately gave notice of his charge to D., B. subsequently becoming aware of the grant of administration to D., also gave notice to him. It was held that C. had priority (b).

Notice to one of several co-trustees is sufficient to give priority as against a subsequent incumbrancer or assignee who gives notice to all the trustees(c).

It is advisable that notice be given to all the trustees of the fund in existence at the date of the assignment or incumbrance. If such notice is given the priority thus acquired is unaffected by the fact that on a complete change of trustees following, a subsequent incumbrancer gives notice of his charge to the new trustees, who had no notice of the prior assignment or charge (d).

- (a) (1895) 2 Ch. 148; Holt v. Dewell,
 4 Ha. 446; Bridge v. Beadon, 3 Eq.
 664, observed upon; Re Booth's Set. T.,
 1 W. R. 444, overruled.
 - (b) Re Dallas, (1904) 2 Ch. 385.
- (c) Ward v. Duncombe, supra.
- (d) Re Wasdale, (1899) 1 Ch. 1 63; distinguishing Timson v. Ramsbottom, 2 Keen 35; Re Hall, 9 L. R. Ir. 180.

Where, however, notice is not given to all the trustees it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the authorities with any principle. Notice to one of several trustees is, it is said. notice to all, and is sufficient to give priority whilst the trusteeship remains unchanged as against a subsequent incumbrancer giving notice to all (a). Priority so acquired by notice to one only of two trustees was held in Ward v. Duncombe (a) to be retained, despite the death of the trustee having notice as against a subsequent incumbrancer who had made an advance and given notice of his incumbrance to both trustees during the life of the trustees having notice. But in Timson v. Ramsbottom (b), it was held that such priority was not retained as against an incumbrancer making his advance and giving notice of his incumbrance after the death of the trustee having In view, however, of Lord Macnaghten's judgment in notice (c). Ward v. Duncombe this is at least doubtful.

Further, new trustees of a settlement are not affected with notice of an assignment of the funds comprised in the settlement given to their predecessors, nor are they bound to inquire from them whether they have received notice of any incumbrance, and it has never been the practice of the Court of Chancery on appointing new trustees of funds to make such an inquiry (d). Hence if notice be given to all the trustees who afterwards die or retire, and new trustees are appointed, such trustees will not incur any liability if they distribute the trust funds before receiving any notice.

It follows, therefore, that assignees are not perfectly secure even when they give notice to all the trustees though they are against subsequent incumbrancers; but if they wish to be so they should repeat their notice when new trustees are appointed, or have notice of their assignment endorsed on the original deed (e).

Although as a general rule notice to one of several trustees is, with the limitations before mentioned, sufficient, yet where such one of the trustees is also a beneficiary, and assigns his beneficial interest in the trust fund to a stranger, the notice acquired by such trustee as assignor will not constitute notice to the trustees so as to prevail over a subsequent incumbrancer who gives notice to all the

⁽a) Ward v. Duncombe, supra.

⁽b) 2 Keen, 35; followed in Re Phillips, (1903) 1 Ch. 183.

⁽c) See also Re Hall, 9 L. R. Ir. 180; and see Lord Herschell's discussion of Timson v. Ramsbottom in Ward

v. Duncombe, supra, at pp. 381 and 382.

⁽d) Phipps v. Lovegrove, 16 Eq. 80.

⁽e) P. 134; Phipps v. Lovegrove, supra; London Chartered Bank, &c. v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 572.

trustees, it being the interest of such trustee as assignor to conceal the assignment from subsequent intending incumbrancers (a). But where one trustee assigns his beneficial interest to another of his co-trustees, the notice which that co-trustee acquires as assignee constitutes during his life notice to the trustees, it not being his interest as assignee to conceal the assignment, and therefore it will prevail over subsequent incumbrancers with notice (b).

If the trustee himself advances money to a beneficiary and takes an equitable assignment he will have priority over a prior incumbrance of which he had no notice when he made his advance (c), and will also be entitled to priority over a subsequent incumbrancer giving notice (d).

A trustee who receives notice of an assignment of the trust fund made by the *cestui que trust*, is not, in the absence of inquiry, bound to inform the person giving him the notice, that he himself has a prior assignment, and by omitting to give that information the trustee will not lose his priority (e). Secus, if he had held out any inducement to such person to advance his money (f).

Although notice should be given as early as possible, it is sufficient if it be given before another notice (g). A purchaser, moreover, from an assignee of a reversionary fund who has given no notice cannot object to the title, unless he can show some intermediate incumbrance, but the vendor ought to point out to him who have been the trustees from time to time, in order to enable the purchaser to ascertain whether there have or have not been any intermediate incumbrances (h). If, however, evidence as to the persons who have been trustees is not produced, the title will be bad (i); but time may be given to produce sufficient evidence, if the vendor thinks he can procure it (k).

- (a) Browne v. Savage, 4 Drew. 635; Lloyds Bank v. Pearson, (1901) 1 Ch. 865; cf. Re Dallas, (1904) 2 Ch. 385.
- (b) Browne v. Savage, supra; Willes v. Greenhill, (No. 1.) 29 B. 376, 391; Re Dallas, (1904) 2 Ch. 385. But see Ex p. Stewart, 4 De G. & Sm. 543; 34 L. J. Bk. 6; Ex p. Smyth,

Mont. D. & De G. 687; Ex p. Boulton, 1 De G. & J. 163.

(c) Phipps v Lovegrove, supra; but cf. Re Wasdale, supra; Newman v. N, 28 C. D. 678; and see The Com-

missioners, &c., v. Harby, 23 B. 508.

- (d) Elder v. Maclean, 5 W. R. 447;
 see Mutual Life A. S. v. Langley, 32
 C. D. 460; Assignees of Dunne v.
 Hibernian, &c., Co., 2 Ir. Eq. R. 82.
 - (e) Re Lewer, 5 C. D. 61.
 - (f) Ib.
- (g) Meux v. Bell, 1 Ha. 86; Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G. M. & G. 17; Browne v. Savage, supra.
 - (h) Hobson v. Bell, 2 B. 17.
 - (i) Ib. p. 24.
 - (k) Ib. p. 25.

A general notice of a charge without specifying the amount will be sufficient (a), and a mere mistake in the description of the fund, if there is no doubt as to its being intended, will not render the notice void as against a subsequent purchaser. But the Court will not allow a former assignment to stand as a security against a subsequent purchaser beyond the sum mentioned in the notice (b); and if two charges on a chose in action are contained in one deed, and a notice is given to the trustees which specifies one only; the trustees not having constructive notice of the contents of the deed, notice of both the charges is not to be imputed to them (c).

Where stock standing in the names of trustees has been given as a specific legacy, and no assent has been given to it by the executor, notice to one of the trustees, not being an executor, is not sufficient to vest in the parties claiming by assignment from the legatee, that equitable possession of the fund which is required in order to postpone a subsequent incumbrancer, who has taken the precaution of giving such notice to the executor (d).

Where notices of assignments are simultaneous, the assignments will take priority according to their dates (e).

Notice by a subsequent incumbrancer to a person who may possibly become a trustee, before he was actually one, will be ineffectual to displace the priority of a former incumbrancer, and it appears that notice by an incumbrancer to an executor who afterwards renounces without having in any way acted as an executor is invalid (f). Thus, in Buller v. Plunkett (g), an officer in the army covenanted to assign to the trustees of a settlement any moneys which he might receive from the sale of his commission, and subsequently executed a second covenant to assign the same proceeds to another person who had no notice of the settlement. The second assignee gave the first notice to the army agent of the regiment, but the trustees also gave notice, both notices being given before the fund reached the army agent's hands. It was held by Page Wood, V.-C., that the trustees of the settlement had priority (h).

- (a) Re Bright's T., 21 B. 430, at p. 434; Hutchinson v. Heyworth, 9 A. & E. 375.
- (b) Woodburn v. Grant, 22 B. 483; and see Re Bright's T., 21 B. 430.
 - (c) Re Bright's T., supra.
- (d) Holt v. Dewell, 4 Ha. 447, followed in Stephens v. Green, supra,
- p. 128.
- (e) Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; Johnstone v. Cox, 16 C. D. 571.
 - (f) Re Dallas, supra.
 - (g) 1 John. & H. 441.
- (h) See also Webster v. W., 31 B. 393; Yates v. Cox, 17 W. R. 20.

And where an equitable assignee gives notice before the fund comes into possession of a trustee, as, for instance, an army agent, he will be postponed to a subsequent assignee, who has given notice after Where, moreover, an the fund has come into possession (a). officer retired from Her Majesty's service, the amount in respect of his commission to which he was entitled under 34 & 35 Vict. c. 86, s. 3, "upon his retirement," though it had been previously lodged by the Commissioners with the army agents, and by them entered in their books under the officer's name, was not money of the officer so as to be capable of being affected by notice from an incumbrancer to the army agents until the retirement was gazetted (b). These cases arising out of sales of commissions, when they come to be examined, turn upon the fact that the notice was given to a mere possible agent before he was an actual agent before the time at which he was in any sense liable to make payment, neither being himself a debtor, nor at that time charged with the duty of paying the money in question (c); and so the assignee first giving notice after the army agents had become the stakeholders of the agreed and appropriated fund for the assignor's pavment had priority.

Notice to Solicitors.—Notice of an assignment to the solicitors of trustees (d) will be sufficient only if they are actually, either expressly or impliedly, authorised as agents to receive such notices (e).

There are cases in bankruptcy in which it was held that notice to a person acting as solicitor was sufficient to take a chose in action out of the order and disposition of the assignor, and the Courts have always shown a great inclination to prevent a man losing his property through the fiction that somebody else has been giving credit to the bankrupt on the supposition that it was his, which is not the fact in one case out of a hundred (f).

- (a) Somerset v. Cox, 33 B. 634.
- (b) Johnstone v. Cox, 19 C. D. 17, and see Roxburghe v. Cox, 17 C. D. 520.
- (c) See Addison v. Cox, L. R. 8 Ch. 79.
- (d) Rickards v. Gledstanes, 3 Gif. 298; 52 L. T. 568; Willes v. Greenhill, 29 B. 392.
 - (e) Saffron Walden, &c., Building

Society v. Rayner, 14 C. D. 406, 410; and see Re Russell's Policy T., 15 Eq. 26; Arden v. A., 29 C. D. 702; Re Cousin's T., 31 C. D. 671; Re Hall & Co., 37 C. D. 712; Tate v. Hyslop, 15 Q. B. D. 368; Re Frewen, 60 L. T. 953.

(f) Per James, L. J. in Saffron Walden, &c., B. S. v. Rayner, supra.

Notice to Companies, &c.—Section 27 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (re-enacting s. 30 of the Companies Act, 1862), provides that no notice of any trust, express, implied, or constructive, shall be entered in the register of companies registered in England or Ireland. Under this section persons claiming equitable interests in shares held by a registered holder cannot by giving the company notice of their claims impose the obligations of a trustee upon the company, nor affect the priority of their claims (a).

Nevertheless on the registration of a transfer of shares being claimed, notice to the company of competing equitable claims does affect its legal position. Where all conditions giving a transferee "a present absolute unconditional right to have the transfer registered" (b) have been performed, the company is not bound to refuse to register the transfer on the ground that it has notice of prior equitable claims of a third person (c). If, however, the claim of a transferee to registration is incomplete, e.g., through some defect in the instrument of transfer, or the absence of the share certificate, and the company have notice of a prior adverse equitable claim, the company will be entitled (d), and may possibly (e) be bound, to refuse registration. Where the company refuses registration to an applicant having no legal right to demand it, no priority is gained through his application or notice, and the priority of conflicting equitable claims will be determined by the order of time in which they arose (f).

The section has no application where a conflict exists between the company and a third person, each claiming interests in shares of the company then legally vested in a registered shareholder of that company. The equitable doctrine of notice with all its consequences will then be applied against the company. So a company having under its articles a lien upon shares for all debts due from the holder thereof, cannot claim that under its lien it has priority over an equitable mortgagee of shares for debts incurred to it by

⁽a) See cases cited under (d), infra.

⁽b) See per Lord Selborne, Société Générale, &c. v. Walker, 11 A. C. 20, at p. 29.

⁽c) See cases cited under (d), infra.

⁽d) Société Générale, &c. v. Walker, supra; Roots v. Williamson, 38 C. D. 485; Moore v. N. W. Bank, (1891) 2 Ch. 599; Ireland v. Hart, (1902)

¹ Ch. 522.

⁽e) See per Lord Selborne, 11 A. C., at p. 29. Ireland v. Hart, (1902) 1 Ch. 522, in which the question arose, was decided on the ground that the defendant had no legal right to require registration.

⁽f) See cases cited under (d), supra.

the holder of those shares after notice of the mortgage (a). So, again, where on a transfer of shares the consideration therefor was received by the company in repayment of a loan previously made by the company to the transferor (the registered holder), it was held that as the company at the time it received the price had notice that the shares had been charged by the holder in favour of a third person, it was bound to ex aequo et bono to account to him for the amount of the consideration (b).

Distringas.—Where, by reason of the death of the person in whose name stock was standing, without legal representatives, there was no trustee to whom notice could be given, it was held, by *Knight-Bruce*, V.-C., that a second incumbrancer, without notice of the first, by serving a notice of distringas on the Bank of England, thereby obtained priority (c).

Under the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order XLVI., rule 2, "No writ of distringas shall be hereafter issued under the Act," 5 Vict. c. 5, s. 5.

And service of an affidavit and of the duplicate of the filed notice, as required by the rules of 1883, upon the Bank of England or any public company, whether incorporated or not, is to have the same effect as a writ of distringas formerly had (d).

Stop Orders.—Where a fund is not in the hands of trustees but in Court, then a person taking an assignment of it should obtain a stop order, otherwise a subsequent assignee who, at the time of his advance, had no notice of a first incumbrance (secus, if he then had notice) (e), will gain priority by obtaining the first stop order, although the person taking the first assignment be a trustee of the fund (f); or, although another assignee, after payment of the fund into Court, has given notice to the trustees prior, in point of date, to the stop order (g).

- (a) Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs & Co., 12 A. C. 29, applying Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. Cas. 514.
- (b) Rainford v. Keith, &c., Co., (1905) 2 Ch. 147.
- (c) Etty v. Bridges, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 486.
- (d) See the Annual Practice, O. 46, rr. 2—11.
 - (e) Mutual L. A. S. v. Langley, 32
- C. D. 460; cf. Warburton v. Hill,
 Kay, 470; Re Holmes, 29 C. D. 786;
 Stephens v. Green, p. 128, supra;
 Montefiore v. Guedella, (1903) 2 Ch. 26.
- (f) Elder v. Maclean, 5 W. R. 447, observed upon in Mutual L. A. S. v. Langley, supra; Thompson v. Tomkins, 2 Dr. & Sm. 8.
- (g) Pinnock v. Bailey, 23 C. D. 497, 498.

When an assignment is made of an interest in a trust fund, part of which is in Court and part in the hands of the trustees, the assignee, in order to complete his title, must, as regards the fund in Court, obtain a stop order, and as regards the fund in the hands of the trustees, give notice to the trustees. Notice to the trustees will be ineffectual as regards the fund in Court, and as to that fund the priorities of different assignees will be determined by the dates at which they have obtained stop orders. An assignee who has obtained a stop order is entitled (as regards the fund in Court) to priority over a prior assignee (of whose assignment he had no notice at the date of his advance), who had given notice to the trustees after the payment into Court but before the date of the stop order, but who had not himself obtained any stop order (a).

If a receivership order is obtained by way of equitable execution by a judgment creditor over a fund partly in Court and partly in the hands of an executor having notice of the order, then, even though it may be impossible to take the fund in execution, still a subsequent incumbrancer cannot get priority by a stop order (b).

An incumbrancer who has given notice to the trustees before payment into Court will not be postponed to a subsequent incumbrancer who first obtains a stop order (c). The order should be left at the Paymaster-General's office (d).

Bankruptcy.—(1) Reputed Ownership. When Dearle v. Hall (supra, p. 122), was decided, the law relating to reputed ownership in bankruptcy extended to all choses in action. It does not now apply to any choses in action (e), except "to debts due or growing due to the bankrupt in the course of his trade or business (f). In order, therefore, to divest the bankrupt of his reputed ownership of debts due to him, the person to whom he has assigned them, must have done everything that is equivalent to a delivery of chattels personal—that is, he must obtain an assignment and delivery of the security, if

⁽a) Mutual L. A. S. v. Langley, 26C. D. 686; 32 C. D. 460; cf. Lister v. Tidd, 4 Eq. 462.

⁽b) Re Anglesey, (1903) 2 Ch. 727.

⁽c) Livesey v. Harding, 23 B. 141; Brearcliffe v. Dorrington, 4 Dr. & Sm. 122.

⁽d) Waller v. Wildridge, 3 Ir. Ch. R. 155.

⁽e) Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 11 A. C. 426.

⁽f) Bankruptey A. 1883, s. 44, s.s. iii. Ward v. Duncombe, (1893) A. C. p 393; Re Jenkinson, 15 Q. B. D. 441.

any, and give notice to the debtor of the assignment (a) before the commencement of the bankruptcy. The only person to whom notice of the assignment need be given is the party from whom the assignor is to receive the payment of his money, and not the original debtor (b).

And notice to the debtors is equally necessary, where debts are assigned by a retiring partner to a partner continuing in the trade (c). A mere notice, however, in the name of the dissolved firm, to pay debts to one of the partners will not take the debts out of the order and disposition of the firm of which he was a member as it is consistent with the agency (d).

And now under sect. 50 (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, "where any part of the property of the bankrupt consists of things in action, such things shall be deemed to have been duly assigned to the trustees" (e). But to insure priority he must give notice (f).

The trustee, however, takes, subject to existing equities (see supra, p. 131), and an assignee subsequent to but without notice of the bankruptcy obtains priority over the trustee by priority of notice of assignment (g).

Shares in a railway company transferable only by deed (h), debentures of a joint stock company (i), and policies of life assurance (k), are all "things in action" within s. 44 of the Act, and are exempt from the doctrine of reputed ownership.

- (2) Effect of the Bankruptcy of the Assignor or Covenantor as to future Property. The effect of the subsequent bankruptcy of an assignor of future property, or of a covenantor who has agreed to settle after-acquired property, or to charge the same, may here be
- (a) Ryall v. Rowles p. 98, supra, and see Ex p. Stewart; Ex p. Smyth; Ex p. Boulton, supra, p. 130; Jones v. Gibbons, 9 V. 409; Re Richards, 45 C. D. p. 596; Ex p. Rawlings, 60 L. T. 156; Re Tillett, 60 L. T. 575; Rutter v. Everett, (1895) 2 Ch. 872; Re Seaman, (1896) 1 Q. B. 412.
- (b) Gardner v. Lachlan, 4 My. & C. 129.
- (c) See Ex p. Burton, 1 G. & J. 207; Ex p. Usborne, 1 G. & J. 358.
- (d) Ex p. Sprague, 4 De G. M. & G. 866; cf. Ex p. Woodgate, 2 Mont. D. & De G. 394.
- (e) See as to the corresponding clause under B. A. 1849, s. 141, Re Coombe's T., 1 Gif. 91; under the B. A. 1869, s. 22, Palmer v. Locke, 18 C. D. 384; Re Jakeman's T., 23 C. D., p. 372; Wace Bankruptcy, p. 261.
 - (f) Re Stone's Will, W. N. (93) 50.
- (g) Re Stone's Will, W. N. (93) 50;
 Mercer v. Vans Colina, (1900) 1 Q. B.
 130 (n.); Re Beale, (1899) 1 Q. B. 688.
- (h) Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 11 A. C. 426.
 - (i) Re Pryce, 4 C. D. 685.
 - (k) Ex p. Ibbetson, 8 C. D. 519.

considered. As to the assignment of future property, it is clear that if the future property comes into existence prior to the bankruptcy the equitable assignment is complete and the trustee in bankruptcy will take the property subject to the existing equities (a). So likewise if the property comes into existence subsequently to the bankruptcy and before the discharge of the bankrupt assignor or covenantor the trustee will take the legal interest subject to the equity attached thereto. Here, however, it must be noted that the assignee can have no greater right than the assignor in the absence of bankruptcy would have had. Accordingly, if there is an assignment of rights to arise under a contract existing at the date of the assignment, e.g., the right to future instalments to become due under the contract, the assignment will be valid against the trustee if the right of the assignor to recover that which is claimed by the assignee had become complete prior to the bankruptcy (b). however, the continued performance of the contract after the assignor's bankruptcy is necessary for the acquisition of the right claimed then, since the contract must be continued, if at all, by the trustee in bankruptcy, the assignee will have no title against him (c). Where, however, the future property only comes into existence after the discharge of the bankrupt assignor or covenantor difficulties Discharge operates as a release from liabilities provable in the bankruptcy, and as an assignment of future property can only operate contractually until the property comes into existence, the question arises whether the liability under the assignment is not one provable in bankruptcy and terminated by the discharge. Where the assignment was by way of security for debt, it was held that the debt being released by the discharge the security went with it and no charge could thereafter arise (d).

The written assignment of future chattels by way of charge is now impossible (e), but the rule recognised in the cases before cited (d) (see especially Collyer v. Isaacs) applies to all forms of future property and therefore remains of importance (f). The ratio decidendi

⁽a) See e.g. Re Wallis, (1902) 1 K. B. 719.

⁽b) Re Davis & Co., 22 Q. B. D. 193; cf. Ex p. Hall, 10 C. D. 615.

⁽c) Ex p. Nicholls, 22 C. D. 782; Wilmot v. Alton, (1897) 1 Q. B. 17.

⁽d) Thompson v. Cohen, L. R. 7 Q. B. 527; Cole v. Kernot, L. R. 7

Q. B. 534 (n.); Collyer v. Isaacs, 19C. D. 343.

⁽e) Thomas v. Kelly, 13 A. C. 506.

⁽f) Query whether Lyde v. Mynn, 1 My. & K. 693, can be reconciled with Collyer v. Isaacs, supra; and see Robinson v. Ommanney, 23 C. D. 285.

in those cases has no application to assignments and covenants other than those by way of security, and leaves unaffected covenants for the settlement of after-acquired property in marriage settlements. In Re Reis (a) a general covenant of that nature was held to be unaffected by the subsequent discharge in bankruptcy of the settlor. The principle apparently relied on being that where specific performance is the appropriate remedy for a contract discharge in bankruptcy does not affect the rights arising under that contract. That an equitable assignment, in form an assignment, is not affected by discharge from bankruptcy save where by way of security does not appear to have been questioned.

Freight.—A mortgagee of a ship, being under the mortgage entitled to the freight as a chose in action (b), is, by taking possession, or doing an act equivalent to taking possession, before the freight becomes payable (c), entitled to receive it as against the mortgagor or his assignees in bankruptcy (d), a judgment creditor (e), or assignees for value. In the case of Liverpool Marine, &c., Co. v. Wilson (f), it was held that the first registered mortgagee of a ship, by taking possession of her before the freight was completely earned, obtained a legal right to receive the freight, and to retain thereout not only what was due on his first mortgage, but also the amount of any subsequent charge which he might have acquired on the freight, in priority of every equitable charge of which he had no notice; and that it was immaterial that a subsequent incumbrancer was the first to give notice to the charterers of his charge on the freight. So a mortgagee of ship and general freight taking possession of the ship before any freight has become payable from the charterers to the owners, has been held to be entitled to freight in priority of a subsequent particular assignee of freight, although he may have given notice of his assignment to the charterers before the mortgagee took possession of the ship (q).

⁽a) (1904) 2 K. B. 769; cf. Hardy v. Fothergill, 13 A. C. 351, at p. 360.

⁽b) Kerswill v. Bishop, 2 C. & **J**. 529

⁽c) Shillito v. Biggart, (1903) 1 K. B. 683.

⁽d) Rusden v. Pope, L. R. 3 Ex.

^{269;} Wilson v. W., 14 Eq. 32.

⁽e) Langton v. Horton, 1 Ha. 549.

⁽f) L. R. 7 Ch. 507.

⁽g) Brown v. Tanner, L. R. 3 Ch. 597; Cato v. Irving, 5 De G. & Sm. 210; Wilson v. W., 14 Eq. 32; Keith v. Burrows, 2 A. C. 636; Anderson v. Butler's, &c., Co., 48 L. J. Ch. 828.

Where an assignee of a ship and cargo has done all in his power towards taking possession, he will not lose his priority (a).

Interests in Land.—The rule in Dearle v. Hall, supra, applicable in determining the priority of purchasers, or incumbrancers of choses in action, does not apply to conveyances of or incumbrances upon equitable estates or interests in land, whether freehold or leasehold (b). In Wiltshire v. Rabbits (c) a testator bequeathed a leasehold estate to trustees, upon trust, as therein mentioned; and first, he charged the estate with the payment of an annuity to his daughter during all his interest in the estate. The daughter afterwards mortgaged her annuity, first to A., and afterwards to B., but B. gave the trustees notice of his mortgage before A. did. It was held, by Shadwell, V.-C., that the annuity was not a chose in action, but a chattel interest, and that B. had not gained any priority over A. (d).

The rule does, however, apply to interests in real estate which can only reach the hands of the beneficiary or assignor in the shape of money. Thus, where a person is equitably entitled to moneys secured on (e), or to arise from the sale of (f), real estate, or to a portion to be raised by trustees out of real estate by sale, mortgage, or otherwise (g), such person is not considered to have an interest in land, and the assignees of such moneys, in order to retain priority over subsequent assignees for value, must give notice to the trustees. The registration of an assignment of a legacy charged upon land in a register county is unnecessary, and will not postpone a prior unregistered assignment of the same legacy (h).

- (a) Feltham v. Clark, 1 De G. & Sm. 307; Langton v. Horton, 1 Ha. 549
- (b) Ward v. Duncombe, (1893) A. C.
 p. 390; See Jones v. J., 8 Si. 633;
 Wilmot v. Pike, 5 Ha. 14; Lee v.
 Howlett, 2 Kay & J., 531; Phipps v.
 Lovegrove, 16 Eq. 80; Ex p. Rabbidge,
 8 C. D. 370; Rooper v. Harrison, 2
 Kay & J. 86.
 - (c) 14 Si. 76.
- (d) See Ward v. Duncombe, (1893) A. C. p. 390; and see as to mortgage debts, Re Richards, (1890) 45 C. D. pp. 595, 598; Hopkins v. Hemsworth,

- (1898) 2 Ch. 347; Taylor v. L. & C. Bank, (1901) 2 Ch. 231; Jones v. Gibbons, 9 V. 407; 7 R. R. 247; Arden v. A., infra.
- (e) Daniel v. Freeman, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 233.
- (f) Lee v. Howlett, 2 Kay & J. 531; Foster v. Cockerell, 3 Cl. & Fin. 456; The Consolidated, &c., Co. v. Riley, 1 Gif. 371; Lloyds Bank v. Pearson, (1901) 1 Ch. 865.
 - (g) Re Hughes' T., 2 Hem. & M. 89.
- (h) Malcolm v. Charlesworth, 1 Keen, 63; Arden v. A., 29 C. D. 702.

5. Rights and Remedies of Assignee under an Equitable Assignment.

Where the assignment is of a chose in action in equity the assignee could sue for it in his own name in the Court of Chancery (a).

Where the assignment was of a legal chose in action, the Courts of Law for a long time allowed the assignee to sue in the name of the assignor (b). If the debtor assented to the transfer of a debt, an action might be brought at law against him by the assignee, on the implied promise to pay (c); but if he did not, it could only be brought in the name of the assignor. If the assignment of a personal contract is defective in form, and the person liable upon it promise to pay the demand or satisfy the claim in consideration of time being given him, that will be a new contract, upon which the assignee may sue in his own name.

Equity, however, would interfere with its assistance if the assignor, being properly indemnified against all costs and charges, refused to allow the assignee to use his name or obstructed him when doing so (d).

"An ordinary debt or chose in action before the Judicature Act was not assignable so as to pass the right of action at law, but it was assignable so as to pass the right to sue in equity. In his suit in equity the assignee of a debt, even where the assignment was absolute on the face of it, had to make his assignor, the original creditor, party in order primarily to bind him and prevent his suing at law, and also to allow him to dispute the assignment if he thought fit. This was, a fortiori, the case where the assignment was by way of security, or by way of charge only, because the assignor had a right to redeem. Further, the assignee could not give a valid discharge for the debt to the original debtor unless expressly empowered so to do. The original debtor, whether he admitted the debt or not, was not concerned with the state of the accounts between the assignor and the assignee where the debt was assigned by way of security; and the rule was that where he did not dispute the debt he should have his

⁽a) Goodson v. Ellison, 3 Russ. 583; Jones v. Farrell, 1 De G. & J. 208.

⁽b) Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 619; De Pothonier v. De Mattos, El. B. & E. 467; Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 340.

⁽c) Israel v. Douglas, 1 H. Black. 239; Baron v. Husband, 4 B. & Ad. 611.

⁽d) Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Si. 327—332; and the judgment of *Eldon*, C., in Wood v. Griffith, 1 Swan. 56.

costs of the suit out of the debt: he was regarded in the light of a stakeholder. It is unnecessary to cite authorities in support of any of the above propositions. Now it was to afford some remedy for this state of things that s.s. 6 (Jud. Act, 1873, s. 25) was passed "(a).

By the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, s.s. 4, all the Courts are to recognise and take notice of all equitable estates, titles, and rights, and by s. 25, s.s. 11, if there is any conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law, the rules of equity are to prevail, so that the assignee of an equitable chose in action can now sue in all the Divisions of the High Court in his own name, but if the subject-matter of the suit be a legal chose in action, then in order to entitle the assignee to sue in his own name (b), the provisions of s. 25, s.s. 6, of the Judicature Act, 1873 (see infra, p. 150), must have been complied with.

When a debtor had received notice of an equitable assignment of the debt, he was bound to pay the debt to the assignee, although the assignor might have commenced proceedings against him at law to recover it, and although the equitable assignee refused to indemnify him on receiving payment (c). And where a debtor makes an assignment of a debt due or to become due and notice thereof is given to the creditor, if the creditor afterwards voluntarily pays the debt to the assignor, he will be liable to repay it to the assignee (d). So where a trustee or executor has notice that a legacy is charged he must withhold all further payments to the legatee, unless by consent of the assignee (e), but he is not bound to pay over the whole amount to a first incumbrancer (f). Notice to a debtor who has given a negotiable instrument for his debt that the debt has been assigned by the creditor can be disregarded by the debtor (g). Under certain circumstances interpleader by a debtor is allowed (h), and as to the circumstances under which trustees are entitled to call upon assignees to take proceedings to establish their claims see the cases cited in (f).

See further, "Distringas" and "Stop Orders," pp. 133, 134.

569.

⁽a) Per Chitty, L. J., Durham, &c., v. Robertson, (1898) 1 Q. B. 765, 769.

⁽b) See e.g. Brandts v. Dunlop, (1905) A. C. 454, supra.

⁽c) Jones v. Farrell, 1 De G. & J., 208; Hutchinson v. Heyworth, 9 A. & E. 375.

⁽d) Brice v. Bannister, 3 Q. B. D.

⁽e) Stephens v. Venables, 30 B. 625.

⁽f) Re Bell, (1896) 1 Ch. 1; Hockey v. Western, (1898) 1 Ch. 350.

⁽g) Bence v. Shearman, (1898) 2 Ch. 582.

⁽h) Desborough v. Harris, 5 De G. M. & G. 439.

6. The Assignment of a Chose in Action is "subject to all Equities."

The assignee, whether of a chose in action or a trust fund, can acquire no greater rights under the assignment than those enforceable by the assignor, and he therefore takes subject to all defences existing in respect of the right assigned which would be available against the assignor seeking to enforce the right assigned; provided that the matters on which such defences are based occurred before notice of the assignment was given to the person liable. This principle is shortly expressed by the statement that the assignee takes subject to all equities. The assignee therefore takes subject to rights of set-off and all defects in the title of the assignor (a).

(a) Set-off and analogous defences.—An assignee of money to arise under a contract will only be entitled to it subject to the conditions of the contract (b).

The assignee of a debt is bound by the state of the accounts between the assignor and the debtor at the date of the assignment. And if a creditor assigns over a debt which has been partially satisfied, the assignee, although without notice, will take subject to the state of accounts at the date of the assignment (c), and further, will be obliged to allow the payments which the debtor subsequently makes to the creditor before notice of the assignment (d), and the debtor may set off as against the assignee a debt accruing due before

(a) Turton v. Benson, 1 P. W. 496; Coles v. Jones, 2 Vern. 692; Hamil v. Stokes, 4 Pr. 161; 18 R. R. 730; Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 86; 17 R. R. 24; Dibbs v. Goren, 11 B. 483; Houlditch v. Wallace, 5 Cl. & Fin. 629; Ward v. W., 4 Ir. Ch. R. 215, 220; Cockell v. Taylor, 15 B. 103; Smith v. Parkes, 16 B. 115; Rolt v. White, 31 B. 520; Athenaeum L. A. Society v. Pooley, 3 De G. & J. 294; Graham v. Johnson, 8 Eq. 36; see the remarks on this case in Pollock, Contracts, 7th ed., p. 227; Re Hercules, &c., Co., 19 Eq. 302; Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas. 702; Phipps v. Lovegrove, 16 Eq. 80; Roxburghe v. Cox, 17 C. D. 520; Re Romford, &c., Co., 24 C. D. 85; Watts v. Drescoll, (1901) 1 Ch. 294; and as to legal assignment, Judicature Act; see note thereon, infra, p. 150.

(b) Newfoundland v. N. Ry. Co., 13 A. C. 199, supra; Tooth v. Hallett, L. R. 4 Ch. 242. See Bristow v. Whitmore, 9 H. L. Cas. 391; Young v. Kitchin, 3 Ex. D. 127, 130; Brice v. Bannister, 3 Q. B. D. 577; Ex p. Moss, 14 Q. B. D. 310; Drew v. Josolyne, 18 Q. B. D. 590.

(c) Ord v. White, 3 B. 357; Smith v. Parkes, 16 B. 115; Rolt v. White, 31 B. 520.

(d) Norrish v. Marshall, 5 Madd. 475; Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G. M. & G. 11.

notice of the assignment (a). The law is well illustrated in Christie v. Taunton (b), T., who held shares and debentures in a company, deposited in March, 1890, debentures with the plaintiff bank to secure a debt. The debentures were not payable until 31st December, 1890, unless a winding-up took place. On 3rd November, 1890, a call was made, and became on that date a debt due from T. to the On 6th November, the plaintiff bank gave notice of the company. assignment to the company. On the 12th November, the plaintiffs commenced a debenture-holder's action. On the 19th the company went into liquidation, and further calls were made on T. Held, that the company could set off in respect of the calls made before the winding-up, but not in respect of those made after. After notice of an equitable assignment the debtor cannot set off as against the assignee a debt which accrues due subsequently to the date of the notice, although that debt may arise out of a previous liability. The assignee will only take subject to equities arising out of the same transaction as the debt assigned. So where the creditors of a company proved their debts in the liquidation and assigned them to H., and H. assigned them to T., and the official liquidator subsequently recovered 2,000l. against H., T. was held entitled to the dividend on his debts, and a claim by the official liquidator to set off the 2,000l. against such dividend was dismissed (c), for the two demands were of a totally different origin, and equity will not allow, against the equitable chose in action, a set-off of a debt arising between the original parties subsequently to the notice of assignment, out of matters not connected with the debt claimed, nor in any way referring to it (d).

Where by the articles of association of a company, it is provided

(b) (1893) 2 Ch. 175.

to set-off, Cavendish v. Greaves, 24 B. 163; Burroughs v. Moss, 10 B. & C. 558; Re Dublin & Rathcoole Ry. Co., 12 Ir. R. 98; Young v. Kitchin, 3 Ex. D. 127; Re China Steamship Co., 7 Eq. 240; Re Natal Investment Co., L. R. 3 Ch. 355; Re Romford Canal Co., 24 C. D. 85; Newfoundland v. N. Ry. Co., supra; R. S. C., O. 19, r. 3 (n), Annual Practice, and as to debentures, see cases in note (f), p. 145.

⁽a) Watson v. Mid-Wales R. C.,
L. R. 2 C. P. 593; Wilson v. Gabriel,
4 B. & S. 243; cf. Re Goy, (1900) 2
Ch. 149

⁽c) Re Milan Tramways Co., 25 C. D. 586; Re Goy & Co., (1900) 2 Ch. 149; Re Brown & Gregory, Ltd., (1904) 1 Ch. 627; (1904) 2 Ch. 743; and see Newfoundland v. N. Ry. Co., 13 A. C. 199.

⁽d) Watson v. Mid-Wales Ry. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 593. And see further as

that the company should have a first and permanent lien and charge available at law and equity, on every share, for all debts due from the shareholders to the company, the rule in *Hopkinson* v. *Rolt* (a) applies, and the company cannot under its lien claim priority over subsequent incumbrances on shares in respect of moneys which become due to the company from the shareholder after the company has received notice thereof (b).

(b) Defects in title.—Where though the assignor purports to assign a right no right is in fact vested in him at the date of the alleged assignment, manifestly the assignee can obtain no title though he gives value and has no notice of the invalidity of the right assigned. Thus if a satisfied bond or a bond void at law or in equity be assigned, the assignee can neither enforce the bond nor rely upon it as a defence (c). Further if the transaction out of which the right assigned arises is liable to be set aside as against the assignor by reason of fraud, misrepresentation, or other ground of relief, the assignee acquires only a defeasible title and the relief which could be obtained against the assignor can be obtained against him (d).

Assignees for value of a residuary estate in Court in a suit in which it has been certified that all debts have been paid, will take subject to the claims of other creditors coming in and establishing their right to prove (e). So, if a trustee or executor assign a beneficial interest he may have taken under the will or trust, the assignee takes it subject to the equities which attached to the assignor; and therefore, if the latter, whether previously or subsequently to the assignment, commits a breach of trust whereby a debt becomes due to the estate, the assignee cannot claim the beneficial interest till he has satisfied the debt(f). The result is otherwise where the assignor became executor or trustee after the assignment took place, for in such case no equity arises in respect of a debt subsequently incurred (g).

- (a) 9 H. L. Cas. 114.
- (b) Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs,12 A. C. 29.
 - (c) Turton v. Benson, 1 P. W. 496.
- (d) Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas. 702; Athenæum L. A. v. Pooley, 3 De G. & J. 294, but see as to this case infra, p. 145; Graham v. Johnson, 8 Eq.
- 36; see above, note (a), p. 142; but see Re Romford Canal Co., 24 C. D. 85.
 - (e) Hooper v. Smart, 1 C. D. 90.
- (f) Morris v. Livie, 1 Y. & C. C. C.
 380; Clack v. Holland, 19 B. 262;
 Wilkins v. Sibley, 4 Gif. 442; Cole v.
 Muddle, 10 Ha. 186.
 - (g) Irby v. I., 25 B. 632.

Where a cestui que trust is indebted to the estate by reason of his having profited by a breach of trust, an assignee for value of his beneficial interest will take it, subject to the equity of making good the breach of trust by which the assignor has profited (a), and an executor was held entitled to set off against the assignee the costs of an action brought by the legatee against the executor (b).

But after an assignee has given notice of the assignment the trustee or obligee can, as against the assignee, create no new charge or right of set-off (c). And s. 25, sub-s. 6, of the Judicature Act, 1873 (infra, p. 150), in making debts assignable at law, preserves all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if that Act had not passed.

Exceptions to Rule.—Although the rule generally holds good, that whoever takes an assignment of a chose in action takes it subject to all its equities, it has been held that the rule must yield where a contrary intention appears from the nature or in the terms of the contract (d). "There is nothing to prevent a debtor from contracting with his creditor that he will not avail himself against a transferee of any rights which he may possess against the creditor or any assignee of his" (e). Moreover, any person may release those equities who is entitled to the benefit of them, and he may do so, either positively by words, in writing, or by the whole course of his conduct (f). And parties entitled to equities may lose their right to enforce them against the assignee, by neglecting to give him timely

- (a) Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 86; Willes v. Greenhill (No. 1), 29 B. 376; Stephens v. Venables (No. 1), 30 B. 625.
- (b) Re Knapman, 18 C. D. 300. Cf. Re Jones, (1897) 2 Ch. 190.
- (c) Stephens v. Venables, 30 B. 625, 627; Willes v. Greenhill, 29 B. 376; Cavendish v. Greaves, 24 B. 163, 173; Moore v. Jervis, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 60.
- (d) Re Agra, &c., Bank, L. R. 2 Ch.391; Re Blakely Ordnance Co., L. R.3 Ch. 154.
 - (e) Per Stirling, J., in Re Goy &

Co., (1900) 2 Ch. at p. 154; and see Dickson v. Swansea Vale, &c., L. R. 4 Q. B. 44.

(f) Re Assam Tea Co., 10 Eq. 458, 463; Re Agra, &c., Bank, L. R. 2 Ch. 391; Higgs v. Assam Tea Co., L. R. 4 Ex. 387; Re General Estates Co., L. R. 3 Ch. 758; Re Blakely Ordnance Co, L. R. 3 Ch. 154; Re Hercules Insurance Co., 19 Eq. 302; Webb v. Herne Bay Commissioners, L. R. 5 Q. B. 642; cf. Re Romford Canal Co., 24 C. D. 85; query how far Athenæum L. A. S. v. Pooley, supra, can be reconciled with these cases.

notice of any fact to which they have been accessory, tending to mislead him as to the real interest of the assignor (a).

Negotiable Instruments.—Where an instrument is transferable like cash by delivery, or by indorsement and delivery, and is also capable of being sued upon by the person holding it pro tempore, then it is entitled to the name of a negotiable instrument (b). Such instruments are, in the hands of bona fide holders, free from all equities. And in the hands of such a holder it is immaterial whether the person who delivered them either sold them or pledged them; in either case he would pass the property absolute or qualified to such holder (c), and mere negligence, on the part of a transferee of a negotiable instrument, to avail himself of means at his disposal to detect the bad title of the transferor, cannot be pleaded as a defence to an action on the instrument by the transferee (d). The following are negotiable instruments:—Bank notes (e), Bills of exchange, Promissory notes, Cheques on banker (f), Exchequer bills (g), Endorsed bills of lading (h), Foreign scrip (i), Foreign bonds (k), Foreign scrip issued by agent in England (l), American railway bond with collateral mortgage (m).

In the Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank, Limited (n), it was held, on proof of usage treating debentures payable to bearer issued by an English company in England as negotiable instruments transferable by delivery, that such debentures

- (a) Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas 702; Ex p. City Bank, L. R. 3 Ch. p. 762.
- (b) See Crouch v. Crédit Foncier, L. R. 8 Q. B. p. 381; London J. S. Bank v. Simmons, (1892) A. C. p. 215; Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank, (1898) 2 Q. B. 658; Chalmers, Bills of Exchange (1909), p. 345.
- (c) Wookey v. Pole, 4 B. & Ald. p. 13; Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. & P. 648; London, &c., Bank v. London River Plate Bank, 21 Q. B. D. p. 540; London J. S. Bank v. Simmons, (1892) A. C. 201.
- (d) Venables v. Baring & Co., (1892) 3 Ch. 527; and see Scholfield v. Londesborough, (1896) A. C. 514.
 - (e) Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452.
 - (f) See Bills of Exchange Act, 1882,

- ss. 8, 38, 73 and 89.
 - (g) Wookey v. Pole, 4 B. & Ald. 1.
- (h) Rodger v. Comptoir, &c., de Paris, L. R. 2 P. C. p. 405; Chartered Bank, &c. v. Henderson, L. R. 5 P. C. 501; Kemp v. Falk, 7 A. C. p. 581.
 - (i) Goodwin v. Robarts, 1 A. C. 476.
- (k) Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45; A.-G. v. Bouwens, 4 M. & W. 171; Heseltine v. Siggers, L. R. 1 Ex. 856.
- (l) Goodwin v. Robarts, 1 A. C. 476; Lang v. Smyth, 7 Bing. 284.
- (m) Venables v. Baring & Co., (1892) 3 Ch. 527.
- (n) (1898) 2 Q. B. 658; Edelstein v. Schuler, (1902) 2 K. B. 144; Webb v. Alexandra W. Co., 93 L. T. 339; and see Re Blakely Ordnance Co., L. R. 3 Ch. 154; Re General Estates Co., ibid.

were negotiable, and it has been since held that evidence of usage is not necessary, the Court taking notice of the fact that they were negotiable.

If the instrument on the face of it shows it was only intended to pass under a separate instrument of transfer it will not be a negotiable instrument (a). But if it contains a representation on the face of it that all the rights it represents will pass to the holder on delivery, then, whether it be a negotiable instrument or not, the person legally entitled may be estopped, on the principle of *Pickard* v. Sears (b), from disputing the title of the holder (c).

Dividend warrants of the Bank of England being in the form of cheques payable to a particular person without any words to make them transferable are not negotiable (d), nor, it seems, are coupons detached from foreign bonds passing by delivery (e).

The indorsee of an overdue bill of exchange or note takes it subject to all defects of title affecting it at maturity (f).

A person who without inquiry takes from another an instrument signed in blank by a third party, and fills up the blanks, cannot, even in the case of a negotiable instrument, claim the benefit of being a purchaser for value without notice, so as to acquire a greater right than the person from whom he himself received the instrument (g). A fortiori will this be the result in the case of an instrument not negotiable (h).

Stoppage in transitu.—The right of an unpaid vendor to stop the goods while in transitu cannot be defeated by a resale to a third person, even when the price has been paid, unless that third person takes delivery of the bill of lading, duly indorsed, without notice of the original purchaser's insolvency (i).

- (a) Cf. Yeo v. Dawe, 33 W. R. 739; cf. Mortgage I. C. v. Commissioner, &c., 21 Q. B. D. p. 355.
 - (b) 6 A. & E. p. 474.
- (c) Goodwin v. Robarts, 1 A. C. p. 490; Colonial Bank v. Cady, 15 A. C. 267.
- (d) Partridge v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England, 9 Q. B. 396.
 - (e) Lang v. Smyth, 7 Bing. 284.
- (f) See Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 36, s.s. 2; Chalmers, Bills of Exchange (1909), pp. 128, 131. See Re European Bank, L. R. 5 Ch. 358; Ex p. Swan, 6 Eq. p. 359.
- (g) France v. Clark, 26 C. D. 257; Hogarth v. Latham, 3 Q. B. D. 643; Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & G. 147; Taylor v. G. I. P. R. Co., 4 De G. & J. 559; Colonial Bank v. Cady, 15 A. C. 267.
- (h) France v. Clark, supra; Hibble-thwaite v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. 200; Swan v. N. B. A. Co., 2 H. & C. 175.
- (i) Ex p. Golding Davis & Co., 13
 C. D. 628; Kemp v. Falk, 7 A. C. 573;
 Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63;
 Smith's Leading Cases (1903), i. 693;
 Addison, Contracts (1903), p. 570.

7. Choses in Action how far made Assignable by Statute.

Policies of Life Assurance.—Before the Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144, a policy could not be assigned at law, but all the benefit of the policy moneys could be given to another person by the policyholder by the execution of a declaration of trust (a). Where a life policy which was to become void, if the assured should commit suicide, unless the policy should have been "legally assigned," had been deposited to secure a sum of money, it was held to be a sufficient assignment to come within the exception, and that notice of it to the office was unnecessary (b). In Re Turcan (c), T. on his marriage covenanted to settle his estate or interest in any property or estate to which he should become possessed or entitled during the marriage by devise, bequest, purchase or otherwise. He effected some policies, one of which was subject to a condition that it should not be assignable in any way whatever. Held that the covenant was divisible, that T. had become possessed of "property" by purchase, within the covenant, that the condition in the policy was intended only to prevent T. from assigning the policy at law, and that the moneys passed to the trustees.

By the Policies Assurance Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144, it is enacted that—

- 1. "Any person or corporation now being or hereafter becoming entitled, by assignment or other derivative title, to a policy of life assurance, and possessing at the time of action brought the right in equity to receive and the right to give an effectual discharge to the assurance company liable under such policy for moneys thereby assured or secured, shall be at liberty to sue at law in the name of such person or corporation to recover such moneys."
- 3. "No assignment made after the passing of this Act of a policy of life assurance shall confer on the assignee therein named, his executors, administrators, or assigns, any right to sue for the amount of such policy, or the moneys assured or secured thereby, until a written notice of the date and purport of such assignment shall have been given to the assurance company liable under such

⁽a) See Re Turcan, 40 C. D. p. 10, I and infra.

⁽b) Dufaur v. The Professional

L. A. O., 25 B. 599; and see Jones v.The Consolidated A. Co., 26 B. 256.

⁽c) (1888) 40 C. D. 5.

policy at their principal place of business for the time being, or in case they have two or more principal places of business, then at some one of such principal places of business, either in England, Scotland, or Ireland, and the date on which such notice shall be received shall regulate the priority of all claims under any assignment; and a payment bonâ fide made in respect of any policy by any assurance company before the date on which such notice shall have been received shall be as valid against the assignee giving such notice as if this Act had not been passed."

- 4. "Every assurance company shall on every policy issued by them after the 30th of September, 1867, specify their principal place or principal places of business at which notices of assignment may be given in pursuance of this Act."
- 6. "Every assurance company to whom notice shall have been duly given of the assignment of any policy under which they are liable shall, upon the request in writing of any person by whom any such notice was given or signed, or of his executors or administrators, and upon payment in each case of a fee not exceeding five shillings, deliver an acknowledgment in writing under the hand of the manager, secretary, treasurer, or other principal officer of the assurance company of their receipt of such notice; and every such written acknowledgment, if signed by a person being de jure or de facto the manager, secretary, treasurer, or other principal officer of the assurance company whose acknowledgment the same purports to be, shall be conclusive evidence as against such assurance company of their having duly received the notice to which such acknowledgment relates."

And it is provided by s. 8—" that this Act shall not apply to any policy of assurance granted or to be granted or to any contract for a payment on death entered into or to be entered into in pursuance of the provisions of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 45, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 43, or either of those Acts (a), or to any engagement for payment on death by any friendly society" (b).

Section 1 does not increase the power of assignment previously existing, but facilitates recovery of the policy moneys by enabling the assignee to sue in his own name.

An agreement in writing to execute on request an effectual mortgage of a policy of assurance deposited with another, at the time of

⁽a) These statutes are repealed, in (b) See The Scottish, &c., L. A. part, by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 51. Society v. Fuller, 2 Eq. 53.

the agreement, as security for a loan, is not an assignment of such policy within the meaning of the Policies of Assurance Act, 1867. Accordingly notice to the assurance company of such an agreement does not under that Act give any priority over a prior equitable mortgagee who has given no notice to the company, but has possession of the policy (a). The Act was passed for the convenience and protection of insurance offices and regulates the rights between the insurance office and the persons interested in the policy, but does not affect the rights of those persons inter se. Accordingly, where a first incumbrancer on a policy has not given such notice as is prescribed by the Act, and a second incumbrancer with notice of the prior charge had given the statutory notice, North, J., held, that the second incumbrancer did not thereby gain priority (b). A condition that a policy is not to be assigned in any case whatever, and a proviso that the company are not to be bound to recognise any equitable dealings with the policy, does not prevent a policy-holder dealing with the beneficial interest (c).

By the Policies of Marine Assurance Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 86, it is enacted that "whenever a policy of assurance on any ship, or on any goods in any ship, or on any freight, has been assigned, so as to pass the beneficial interest in such policy to any person entitled to the property thereby insured, the assignee of such policy shall be entitled to sue thereon in his own name"... (sect. 1).

It has been decided that under this Act a policy of marine assurance can be assigned, after loss, so as to entitle the assignee to sue upon it in his own name (d). But not after the interest of the assignor has ceased by a delivery of the cargo to the purchaser (e), unless there had been an agreement to assign the policy before such interest ceased (f).

Legal Assignment under the Judicature Act.—By the Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, sub-s. 6, it is enacted that "Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal chose in action, of which express notice in writing shall have been given to

⁽a) Spencer v. Clarke, 9 C. D. 137.

⁽b) Newman v. N., 28 C. D. 674; Re Holmes, 29 C. D. 786.

⁽c) Re Turcan, 40 C. D. 5.

⁽d) Lloyd v. Fleming, L. R. 7 Q. B.

^{299.}

⁽e) North of England, &c., Co. v. Archangel I. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 249,

⁽f) Ib. 254, per Lush, J.

the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, shall be and be deemed to have been effectual in law (subject to all equities, which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if this Act had not passed) to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action from the date of such notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the assignor."

In order to constitute a legal assignment under this sub-section: Firstly there must be an absolute assignment not purporting to be by way of charge only (a). The assignment may be absolute although the instrument of assignment be a mortgage containing a proviso for redemption and reassignment (b), and an assignment absolute in terms, though only by way of security, since equity would imply a right to reassignment, falls within the sub-section. A conditional assignment, owing to the uncertainty in which it would place the debtor, is excluded (c). Secondly, the subject-matter of the assignment must be a debt or other legal chose in action (d). It appears to be questionable whether an assignment of part of an entire debt is within the sub-section, for if it were, the original creditor could split up the single legal cause of action into as many legal causes of action as he might think fit (e). The assignment must be of a definite and ascertained amount (f). Contracts to lend money or make further advances are not assignable debts (g). In the Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coombs (h), Farwell, J., held that the benefit of a covenant contained in a lease of an hotel to purchase all beer from the lessor was an assignable chose in action. It would seem that the term chose in action "includes all rights the assignment of which a Court of law or equity would before the Act have considered

- (a) Burlinson v. Hall, 12 Q. B. D. 347; Comfort v. Betts, (1891) 1 Q. B. 737; Mercantile Bank of London v. Evans, (1899) 2 Q. B. 613; Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co., (1902) 2 K. B. 190.
- (b) Tancred v. Delagoa Bay, &c.,Co., 23 Q. B. D. 239; Durham Bros.v. Robertson, (1898) 1 Q. B. 765.
- (c) Durham Bros. v. Robertson, supra.
- (d) Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 11 A. C. 420; King v. Victoria, &c., Co., (1896) A. C. 250; Torkington v.

- Magee, (1902) 2 K. B. 427; Tolhurst v. Assoc., &c., (1903) A. C. 414; Dawson v. G. N. & C. Ry., (1905) 1 K. B. 260.
- (e) See judgment of *Chitty*, L. J., in Durham Bros. v. Robertson, supra, at p. 774; and see Jones v. Humphreys, infra.
- (f) Jones v. Humphreys, (1902) 1 K. B. 10.
- (g) Western Waggon Co. v. West,
 (1892) 1 Ch. 271; May v. Lane, 64
 L. J. Q. B. 236, but note Companies
 Act, 1908, s. 105.
 - (h) (1901) 2 Ch. 608,

lawful" (a). An assignment of a future debt is within the subsection (b). An assignment of a mere right of litigation, as for example a claim to damages for a wrongful act, is bad (c). The benefit of a personal contract is unassignable under the statute (d), as in equity (see above at p. 109). Thirdly, express notice in writing of the assignment must have been given. The Act, however, contains no provision as to when or by whom the notice is to be given. Apparently notice by either the assignor or assignce is valid (e), and notice may be given after the death of the assignor (f). The assignment need not be for consideration (g).

8. Subrogation.

Subrogation involves a transfer of rights, and therein resembles equitable assignment. Its distinguishing feature is that it arises not by agreement between parties but by operation of law. It consists in the substitution of a new creditor for an old creditor as against a debtor in relation to some particular subject matter. In subrogation strictly so called there is a transfer of all the rights of the old creditor to the new creditor; there are, however, cases in which the idea of subrogation is involved and the term employed although the substitution is incomplete.

It is difficult to deduce from the authorities any principle which will at the same time account for all the cases in which subrogation has been granted and explain its denial in other cases. A. It has been applied to cases where the transaction between the old creditor and debtor was one of indemnity. B. In certain cases where the debtor has been benefited by the discharge of the old creditor's claim out of moneys provided by the new creditor, the latter is permitted to stand in the former's place. C. Another case which does not appear to fall under either of the two former heads is that in which

⁽a) King v. Victoria Insurance Co., supra; and see May v. Lane and Torkington v. Magee, supra.

⁽b) Walker v. Bradford Old Bank, 12 Q. B. D. 511; and cf. Brice v. Banister, 3 Q. B. D. 569, apparently a case of equitable assignment; see Durham Bros. v. Robertson, supra.

⁽c) Dawson v. G. N. & C. Ry., supra.

⁽d) Kemp v. Baerselman, (1906) 2

K. B. 604.

⁽e) Bateman v. Hunt, (1904) 2 K. B. at p. 538.

⁽f) Walker v. Bradford Old Bank, 12 Q. B. D. 517; Bateman v. Hunt, (1904) 2 K. B. 530.

 ⁽g) Harding v. H., 17 Q. B. D. 442;
 Walker v. Bradford Old Bank, 12
 Q. B. D. 511.

an executor empowered to carry on a business with the whole or some part of the assets of the testator incurs debts and the creditors of the business are allowed to claim in respect of such debts payment directly from the testator's estate to the extent to which the executor is entitled to be indemnified out of the assets.

A. Under this head come contracts of marine and fire insurance and the contract of suretyship (a). With regard to the former "the contract of insurance contained in a marine or fire policy is a contract of indemnity, and of indemnity only, and that this contract means that the assured, in case of a loss against which the policy has been made, shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemnified" (b). This doctrine of subrogation must be carried to the extent that as between the underwriter and the assured the underwriter is entitled to the advantage "of every right of the assured whether such right consists in contract fulfilled or unfulfilled or in remedy for tort capable of being insisted on or already insisted on or in any other right, whether by way of condition or otherwise, legal or equitable, which can be or has been exercised or has accrued, and whether such right could or could not be enforced by the insurer in the name of the assured by the exercise or acquiring of which right or condition the loss against which the assured is insured can be, or has been diminished" (c). The insurer under a fire policy of a person who has a remedy against someone else to compel him ultimately to make good the loss stands in the position of a surety. "When a surety pays a debt he has the right to be put in the place of the creditor as against the principal debtor and to use all the remedies which the creditor could have used as against the principal debtor in order that the surety may recover back the sum which he has paid and which the creditor has a right to demand from him "(d). The principle underlying subrogation in the case of insurance and suretyship appears to be identical, but subrogation by act of law does not give an insurer the right to sue in a Court of law in his own name (e).

- B. The earliest examples of cases falling under the second head
- (a) For subrogation in suretyship, see infra, Vol. II., under Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea.
- (b) Castellain v. Preston, (1883) 11Q. B. D., per Brett, L. J., at p. 386.
 - (c) Ibid. at p. 388.
 - (d) Darrell v. Tibbitts, (1880) 5
- Q. B. D. at p. 563, per *Cotton*, L. J.; and see North British, &c., Insurance Co. v. London, &c., Insurance Co., (1877) 5 C. D. 569.
- (e) King v. Victoria Insurance Co., (1896) A. C. 250.

are perhaps those in which a person who has lent money to a deserted wife or husband for the purchase of or payment of debts incurred for necessaries is allowed to stand in the place of the person who has been paid (a). These cases have been explained upon the basis of an assignment (b) between the old and the new creditor.

Another example of this class of subrogation arises where the new creditor advances to the debtor the whole or part of the purchase money for land which the debtor is under contract to buy and becomes entitled to the lien which the vendor would have had for unpaid purchase money (c), and this lien will be supported against the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor (d). These cases appear to be true examples of subrogation although the ground upon which the decision in the case of Meux v. Smith (d) is based is, that the transaction was, by a contemporaneous contract which may be inferred, pro tanto for the benefit of the lender (e).

The term subrogation has also been applied to cases in which a company has borrowed money in excess of its borrowing powers although it may be doubted whether the rights conferred on the lender really arise by subrogation. It is clear that the lender is entitled to rank or claim as a creditor against the company to the extent that moneys advanced by him have been used in discharging antecedent liabilities contracted under its borrowing powers. There is, however, no transfer or assignment of any of the rights of the old creditor to the new creditor, and the new creditor's rights against the company are governed by his contractual relation with the company irrespective of the relation between the old creditor and the company. In certain of the cases the rights of the lender against the company have been based upon a fictional assignment of the debt in the nature of a subrogation (f). In the later case of Re Wrexham, Mold and Connah's Quay Railway Co. (g), where the main question

⁽a) Harris v. Lee, 1 P. W. 482; Marlow v. Pitfeild, 1 P. W. 558.

⁽b) Jenner v. Morris, 3 De G. F. & J. at p. 52.

⁽c) Brocklesby v. Temperance Permanent Building Society, (1895) A. C. 173; Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Thurstan, (1903) A. C. 6.

⁽d) Bird v. Philpott, (1900) 1 Ch.

^{822,} following Meux v. Smith, 11 Si. 410.

⁽e) 11 Si. 432.

⁽f) See e.g. Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co., 19 Q. B. D. 155, at p. 165.

⁽g) (1899) 1 Ch. 440; cf. Re Johnston Foreign, &c., Co., (1904) 2 Ch. 234.

was whether the lender enjoyed the securities or priorities of the creditor whose debt had been discharged, the Court of Appeal refused to base the lender's rights on any fictional assignment, and Rigby, L. J., referring to the cases before mentioned, stated that "the great preponderance of authority shows that the doctrine of subrogation has very little, if anything at all, to do with the equity really enforced in the cases." The test in these cases is whether as the result of the two transactions the liabilities of the company have been increased, and the new creditor's rights against the company are held good in so far as there has been no such increase.

The doctrine which has been applied in the case of a company exceeding its borrowing powers is not limited to the cases of companies, but is also applied in the case of an agent borrowing in excess of the authority conferred by his principal. Where money is borrowed on behalf of a principal by an agent, the lender believing that the agent has authority though it turns out that his act has not been authorised or ratified or adopted by the principal, there, although the principal cannot be sued at law, yet in equity to the extent to which the money borrowed has in fact been applied in paying legal debts and obligations of the principal, the lender is entitled to stand in the same position as if the money had originally been borrowed by the principal (a).

C. When a trustee or an executor is authorised to carry on a business with a specified portion of the testator's assets, a creditor who trusts the executor or trustee has a right to the benefit of the indemnity or lien which the executor or trustee has against the assets devoted to the purposes of the trade (b).

The right of the creditors is the right to put themselves in the place of a trustee who is entitled to an indemnity, and if the trustee is not entitled except on the terms of making good a loss to the trust estate the creditors have no better right (c). But where the business is so carried on by several trustees one of whom is a defaulter, the creditor does not lose the benefit of subrogation (d).

⁽a) Bannatyne v. MacIver, (1906)1 K. B. (C. A.) 103.

⁽b) Re Johnson, 15 C. D. 548; and see Ex p. Garland, 10 V. 110; Re Blundell, 44 C. D. 1; Dowse v. Gorton,

⁽¹⁸⁹¹⁾ A. C. 190.

⁽c) Ex p. Edmonds, 4 De G. F. & J. 488.

⁽d) Re Frith, (1902) 1 Ch. 342.

9. Assignments contrary to Public Policy; Champerty and Maintenance.

General Principle.—"You are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing which, more than another, public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting" (a).

Pensions and Salaries.—The Courts, upon the ground of public policy, will not give effect to agreements to assign or assignments of pensions and salaries of public officers, payable to them for the purpose of keeping up the dignity of their office, or to assure a due discharge of its duties. But the office must be a public one in the strictest sense, and the pay must come out of national, and not local funds (b). The following interests have been held not assignable: The full or half-pay of an officer in the army (c); The salary of an assistant parliamentary counsel for the Treasury (d); And of a clerk of the peace(e); The pension allowed to a retired clerk under the Incumbents' Resignation Act, 1871, c. 44, s. 10 (f). A clergyman having the cure of souls is (semble) not a public officer, and the salary of the chaplain to a workhouse payable out of the poor-rate is assignable (g). The salary of a judge, given to him for the support of the dignity of his office, is not assignable, seems to have been taken for granted in Arbuthnot v. Norton (h), which case, however, was There Sir John Norton, a held not to fall within the principles. puisne judge of the Supreme Court at Madras, assigned a sum "equal to the amount of six months' salary,"directed by 6 Geo. 4, c. 85, to be paid to the "legal personal representatives" of such judge, in case he

- (a) Per Jessel, M. R., Printing, &c., Co. v. Sampson, 19 Eq. p. 465; and see Re Mirams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 494; and see per Lord Halsbury, C., in Janson v. Driefontein Mines, (1902) A. C. at p. 491.
- (b) Re Mirams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 594, 596.
- (c) Stone v. Lidderdale, 2 Anst. 533; M'Carthy v. Goold, 1 Ball & B. 389; Collyer v. Fallon, Turn. & R. 459, 474. As to the limits of this doctrine see

Hamilton v. Coningham, (1903) 2 I. R. 564.

- (d) Cooper v. Reilly, 2 Si. 560.
- (e) Palmer v. Bate, 6 Moor. 28; cf. Hill v. Paul, 8 Cl. & Fin. 295.
- (f) Gathercole v. Smith, 17 C. D. 1; but see Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 52, s.s. 2; Williams, Bankruptcy (1908), pp. 282—3.
 - (g) Re Mirams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 594.
- (h) 5 Moore, P. C. 219; see per Dr. Lushington, at p. 230.

shall die in and after six months' possession of office. It was held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that the assignment was valid, not being within the 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, and 49 Geo. 3, c. 126.

A distinction has been drawn between half-pay and a retiring pension; the first is inalienable even at common law and therefore not seizable (a), but a retiring pension, unless made inalienable by statute, is alienable, and seizable (b), e.g., the pension of a County Court judge (c), or of a person who held an appointment in the legal department in the Government (d). And the pension of a retired judge of a crown colony, granted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and voted annually by the legislature of the colony, vests in the creditor's trustee on his bankruptcy (e). But in Birch v. B.(f) the pension was inalienable by virtue of the Army Act, 1881, s. 141, and therefore could not be taken in execution (g).

A pension given as a perpetual memorial of national gratitude for public services is inalienable. See Davis v. Marlborough (h), where it was held by Eldon, C., that the pension granted by 5 Ann. c. 4, "for the more honourable support of the dignities" of the Duke of Marlborough and his posterity, payable out of the revenues of the post-office, was inalienable (i).

Where no particular services are to be rendered to the public, an assignment of an interest or pension, though derived from the Crown or the public, will be valid. In the principal case of Row v. Dawson (p. 95, supra), Hardwicke, C., entertained jurisdiction on the ground that the officer admitted the money to be in his house for the use of the person under whom the litigating parties made their claim (k). Prize-money is assignable in equity before any interest vests by

- (a) Flarty v. Odlum, 3 T. R. 681; Lidderdale v. Montrose, 4 T. R. 248; cf. Wells v. Foster, 8 M. & W. 149.
 - (b) Dent v. D., L. R. 1 P. & D. 366.
- (c) Willcock v. Terrell, 3 Ex. D. 323; cf. Manning v. Mullins, (1898) 2 I. R. 34.
- (d) Sansom v. S., 4 P. D. 69; Wells v. Foster, 8 M. & W. 149; and McCreery v. Bennett, (1904) 2 I. R. 69.
- (e) Ex p. Huggins, 21 C. D. 85; see Bankruptey Act, 1883, ss. 44, 52, 53.
 - (f) 8 P. D. 163.
 - (g) See per Lindley, L. J., in Lucas
- v. Harris, 18 Q. B. D. pp. 135, 136; and see Crow v. Price, 22 Q. B. D. 429. The Army Act, 1881, s. 141, and the Indian Pensions Act, 1871, ss. 11 and 12, make all pensions, to which those Acts refer, inalienable; but see Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 53, s.s. 2, and Re Saunders, (1895) 2 Q. B. 424; Re Ward, (1897) 1 Q. B. 266.
 - (h) 1 Swans. 74.
- (i) Cf. Grenfell v. The Dean, &c., of Windsor, 2 B. at p. 550.
 - (k) Cf. Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 103.

grant from the Crown (a). A pension, granted by Government in compensation for the loss of a place in the Customs, is assignable (b). So an assignment of the emoluments of a fellow of a college in the university was held valid by Langdale, M. R. (c), but Shadwell, V.-C., seems to have come to a different conclusion in Berkeley v. King's College (d).

In Grenfell v. The Dean, &c., of Windsor (e), a canon of Windsor granted the canonry emoluments to secure a sum of money. There was no cure of souls, and the only duties were residence within the Castle, and attendance in the chapel, twenty-one days in the year. Langdale, M. R., held that the security was valid.

Bankruptcy.—The effect of bankruptcy on the pay and pensions of military, naval, or civil servants, is governed by the Bankruptcy Acts(f).

Alimony.—Alimony granted to a wife by the Divorce Court is not assignable, inasmuch as it is a mere allowance which, having regard to the means of the husband and wife, the Court thinks ought to be paid from time to time for her maintenance, and the Court may alter it or take it away when it pleases (g).

Agreements affecting the Administration of Justice.—An assignment of property, in consideration of stifling a prosecution (even abroad), is void (h), and so is an assignment of shares as indemnity for bail (i).

Maintenance and Champerty.—Maintenance is "where any man gives or delivers to another, that is plaintiff or defendant in any action, any sum of money or other thing to maintain his plea, or takes great pains for him, when he has nothing therewith to do "(k).

The rules are founded on considerations of public policy "that parties shall not by their countenance aid the prosecution of suits

- (a) Alexander v. Wellington, 2 Russ. & M. 35.
 - (b) Tunstall v. Boothby, 10 Si. 542.
- (c) Feistel v. King's College, 10 B. 491.
 - (d) Cited 10 B. 499.
 - (e) 2 B. 544.
- (f) See Bankruptcy Act, 1883, ss. 44, 52, 53, and Williams, Bankruptcy (1908), pp. 195, 221, 282—285.
- (g) Re Robinson, 27 C. D. 160, 164; but see Harrison v. H., 13 P. D. 180.

- (h) Kaufman v. Gerson, (1904) 1 K. B. 591.
- (i) Consolidated, &c., Finance Co. v. Musgrave, (1900) 1 Ch. 37; cf. Prince v. Howarth, (1905) 2 K. B. 768; Savill v. Langman, 14 T. L. R. 504.
- (k) Termes de la Ley, cited in E. B. & E. at p. 825; see Bradlaugh v. Newdegate, 11 Q. B. D. at p. 5. For the old cases, see Vin. Abr. tit. "Maintenance."

of any kind, which every person must bring upon his own bottom and at his own expense "(a); "no encouragement should be given to litigation by the introduction of parties to enforce those rights which others are not disposed to enforce" (b).

Three consequences flow from maintenance: a criminal prosecution (c); a civil action for damages (d); and the nullity of every agreement or assignment tainted with it. Improperly assisting in a criminal prosecution is not maintenance (e).

Of the three kinds of maintenance, viz., Maintenance in its limited sense (where only assistance is given), Embracery, and Champerty (f), only the last-named is dealt with in this note.

Champerty is "the unlawful maintenance of a suit in consideration of a bargain either for part of the thing or some profit out of it" (g). It is said to be derived from campi partitio (h). If the interference does not amount to maintenance, then there is no champerty, although the party rendering assistance is to derive benefit therefrom (i). It is not essential that there shall be a hostile action to recover the property or any action at all (k).

An agreement merely to communicate information in return for a share of the property recovered (if successful) is not champertous, but if the person to give the information agrees himself to recover the property or actively assist in its recovery, then the agreement is champertous and void (l). But agreements merely collateral are not tainted (m). Many of the defences available in an action of maintenance will not support a champertous assignment, e.g., common interest (n), interest arising from consanguinity or affinity (o),

- (a) Per Loughborough, L. C., in Wallis v. Portland, 3 V. at p. 502; 4 R. R. 78.
- (b) Per Abinger, L. C. B., in Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Ex. at p. 497.
- (c) Hawk., P. C., ed. (1795), vol. ii., p. 393 et seq.
- (d) See e.g. Bradlaugh v. Newde-gate, supra.
- (e) Grant v. Thompson, 72 L. T. 264.
- (f) See per Kay, J., in James v. Kerr, 40 C. D. at p. 456.
- (g) Per Grant, M. R., in Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 V. at p. 156.
- (h) See Radcliffe v. Anderson, E. B. & E. at p. 825; Guy v. Churchill, 40

- C. D. 481; Anon., 1 C. D. 573.
- (i) Williams v. Protheroe, 3 Y. & J. 129; Addison, Contracts (1903), pp. 74, 75; Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 342.
- (k) Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 437.
- (l) Rees v. De Bernardy, supra; Hartley v. Russell, 2 Si. & Stu. 244.
 - (m) Re Thomas, (1894) 1 Q. B. 747.
- (n) As to which see Alabaster v. Harness, (1895) 1 Q. B. 339; Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Ha. 420; Stone v. Yea, Jac. 426.
- (o) Burke v. Greene, 2 Ball & B. 521; Moore v. Fisher, 7 Si. 384.

or interest arising between master and servant (a), or charity (b), or the legitimate defence of trade interests (c), for, however they may excuse mere assistance, they are rebutted by the fact that the consideration is a share of the proceeds or some profit from it (d).

An assignment of a share of prize-money, the subject of a suit then depending in the Admiralty Court, to navy agents in consideration of an indemnity against all costs on account of any suit has been held void on the ground of champerty (e). The purchase of an estate for the purpose of setting aside a previous agreement affecting the property on the ground of fraud partakes of the nature of champerty and will not be enforced in equity (f). So, too, the assignment of a bare right to file a bill in equity for a fraud on the assignor (g); or of a right to sue a trustee for the recovery from him of interest on or profits of part of the trust funds which were for a certain period in his hands (h); or by a creditor of a company, who has presented a petition to wind it up, of his debt and the right to proceed with the petition (i), is void. The mere purchase (k), or mortgage (l) of the subject-matter of a suit, pendente lite, is not void; but a purchase in order to maintain a suit relating to the property is (m). The rule is that "the sale of an interest to which a right to sue is incident is good, but the sale of a mere right to sue is bad" (n). So that where a legatee, too poor to sue, assigned the legacy for less than it was worth to the plaintiff, who bought it

- (a) Wallis v. Portland, 3 V. at p. 503; Elborough v. Ayres, L. R. 10 Eq. 371, 375.
- (b) See Harris v. Brisco, 17 Q. B. D.504; Holden v. Thompson, (1907) 2K. B. 489.
- (c) British, &c. v. Lamson, &c., Co., (1908) 1 K. B. 1006.
- (d) See e.g. Hutley v. H., L. R. 8 Q. B. 112.
- (e) Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 V. 139; and see also Skapholme v. Hart Cas. t. Finch, 477; Strachan v. Brandon, 1 Eden, 303; Wood v. Downes, 18 V. 120, 123; Bayly v. Tyrrell, 2 Ball & B. at p. 362; Earle v. Hopwood, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 566.
- (f) De Hoghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. 164.
 - (g) Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C.

- Ex. 481. See also Powell v. Knowler, 2 Atk. 226; Twiss v. Noblett, 4 Ir. R. Eq. 64; Keogh v. McGrath, 5 L. R. Ir. 478.
- (h) Hill v. Boyle, L. R. 4 Eq. 260, 263.
- (i) Re Paris Skating, &c., Co., 5 C. D. 959.
- (k) Williams v. Protheroe, 5 Bing. 309; Wood v. Griffith, 1 Swans. 56; Knight v. Bowyer, 2 De G. & J. 421.
 - (1) Cockell v. Taylor, 15 Beav. 103.
- (m) De Hoghton v. Money, L. R.
 2 Ch. 164; Prosser v. Edmonds, 1
 Y. & C. Ex. 481; Harrington v.
 Long, 2 My. & K. 590.
- (n) See Pollock on Contracts (1902),
 p. 341; Wilson v. Short, 6 Ha. 366;
 Dickinson v. Burrell, 35 Beav. 257;
 Cook v. Field, 15 Q. B. 460.

Ryall v. Rowles.

with the intention of enforcing payment by suit, the transaction was The fact that the purchase of debts was done with an ulterior motive does not affect its validity (b). Where, however, the interest is purchased pendente lite by the assignor's solicitor the assignment is invalid (c). But where a solicitor purchased a judgment, and subsequently, on a new trial being ordered, acted as the solicitor to the assignor in the new trial, the transaction stood (d). Where a claimant borrowed money from a solicitor in order to conduct his defence in an action, and, as security, mortgaged the subject-matter of the action and covenanted to employ a particular solicitor, if successful, and to pay a bonus, he was held entitled to redeem (on the action resulting in his favour) on payment of the sums actually advanced (e). The rule, however, does not apply to an assignment by way of security, e.g., for costs (f), nor to an assignment to the solicitor after a judge's order for payment, for the order puts an end to the litigation (g). The rule, too, will not deprive the assignor of his right of action, since his title to sue is anterior to and independent of the champertous agreement, though the person deriving title under the agreement will of course be unable to sue (h).

The statutory provisions (i) which regulate agreements between solicitors and clients as to their remuneration do not affect the law relating to champerty (k). On bankruptcy the rights of a person injuriously affected by maintenance or champerty pass to his trustee, and consequently the bankrupt cannot sue unless the adjudication is set aside (l). The assignment by a trustee in bankruptcy of the subject-matter of an action he has commenced is outside the rules of maintenance and champerty (m).

432.

under.

Q. B. D. 524.

- (a) Tyson v. Jackson, 30 Beav. 384.
- (b) Fitzroy v. Cave, (1905) 2 K. B.
- (c) Wood v. Downes, 18 V. 120; Kenney v. Browne, 3 Ridg. P. C. 462, 498, 501; Simpson v. Lamb, 7 E. & B. 84; Hall v. Hallett, 1 Cox, 134; Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Ha. 222; Sprye v. Porter, 7 E. & B. 58; Strange v. Brennan, 15 Si. 346; Earle v. Hopwood, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 566.
- (d) Davis v. Freethy, 24 Q. B. D. 519.
 - (e) James v. Kerr, 40 C. D. 449.
- (f) Anderson v. Radcliffe, 28 L. J. Q. B. 32.

- (l) Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley, 10 A. C. 210; Whitworth v. Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695.

(g) Smith v. Selwyn, 5 W. R. 682.

(h) Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq.

(i) Attorneys Act, 1870, ss. 4 and

11; Solicitors' Remuneration Act,

1881, s. 8, and the Orders made there-

(k) Re Attorneys Act, 1870, 1

C. D. 573; Davis v. Freethy, 24

(m) Bankruptcy Act, 1883, ss. 44, 56; Seear v. Lawson, 15 C. D. 426; Guy v. Churchill, 40 C. D. 481.

Ryall v. Rowles.

An agreement for a pecuniary consideration by a shareholder in a company, in compulsory liquidation, that he would endeavour to postpone the making of a call or would support the claim of a creditor, is void, both as infringing the policy of the Winding-up Acts and also as constituting maintenance (a). A general assignment of all assets by the liquidator of a company passes claims for misfeasance against directors under s. 151 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, as choses in action, even though the facts constituting the claims were unknown at the time of the assignment (b), in spite of the transaction being an assignment of a mere right of action.

An agreement by an heir-at-law and devisee, both out of possession, where it is doubtful in which of them the right is vested, that they shall jointly recover the estate from the person in possession and divide it between them is void as contrary to the policy of the law (c), each alone being competent to make a composition with the person in possession, but not with any one else (d). This decision was based on the common law as well as the statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 9, and it is doubtful how far it is affected by the repeal of that statute (e). An heir-at-law may lawfully maintain the title of the person in possession (f), and the sale of a mere contingent right or expectancy, not being an adverse claim, is valid (g).

- (a) Elliott v. Richardson, L. R. 5 C. P. 744.
- (b) Re Park Gate Co., 17 C. D. 234; Wood v. Woodhouse and Rawson United, (1896) W. N. 4.
- (c) Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 4 Bli. 1; Sugd. Prop. 74.
- (d) See per Lord Redesdale at p. 123.
- (e) Land Transfer Act, 1897, s. 11.
- (f) See per Rigby, L. J., in Alabaster
 v. Harness, (1895) 1 Q. B. at p. 346.
- (g) Cook v. Field, 15 Q. B. 460; Pollock on Contracts (1902), p. 344.

HORNSBY v. LEE.

1816. 2 Madd. 16.

Assignment of Wife's Choses in Action.—Reduction into Possession.

Husband and wife assign a reversionary interest of the wife in certain trust stock, as security for the payment of an annuity granted by the husband, the husband afterwards takes the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors Act, and a general assignment is made of his property. The person on whose death the wife was to take dies, and then the husband dies without having done any other act to reduce the stock into possession. Held, that the wife was entitled by survivorship to the stock against both the particular and the general assignee.

By indenture, 1st January, 1774, between Deacon and Collier, assignees of Baptist Darwin, a bankrupt (the father of the plaintiff), of the first part; the said Baptist Darwin and S. Darwin, his wife (the mother of the plaintiff), of the second part; and Mary Petty, R. Petty, J. Elliott, and G. Hooper, of the third part, Deacon and Collier granted, &c., unto the said M. Petty, R. Petty, J. Elliott, and G. Hooper, 422l. 6s. 3d. Four per cents., together with the dividends, to hold the same upon trust, to apply the dividends for the separate use of S. Darwin during her life, and after her death, to apply the principal and dividends among all and every such child and children of the said B. Darwin by the said S. Darwin, as should be then living, in equal shares, payable at twenty-one; but if either of the children should die before his or their shares should become payable, the shares of him, her, or them so dying, to be paid to the survivors: and if only one child who should live to attain twenty-one, then the principal sum and the dividends to be paid to such only child. By the same indenture, Deacon and Collier granted, &c., to the said M. Petty, R. Petty, J. Elliott, and G. Hooper, certain shares in a messuage, and all the assignee's right, title, and interest in, and to the real estate late of Richard Petty (the father of the said S. Darwin), and the moiety, or half part of the share and proportion of them, the said assignees, of, in, and to a certain sum of 2,762l. 11s. 3d.

upon the same trusts as were declared respecting the 422l. 6s. 3d. Four per cents.

The plaintiff and Anne Mary Darwin were the only issue of Baptist and Sarah Darwin. Baptist Darwin died in 1782. In 1787, the plaintiff married Nathaniel Hornsby, without a settlement, and in February, 1799, the plaintiff and her husband assigned over a moiety of their interest in the said trust funds, upon the contingency of the plaintiff surviving her mother, unto the defendant John Parker, as a collateral security for the due payment of an annuity of 30l. granted by the plaintiff's husband, Hornsby, to Parker during his life, in consideration of 200l. paid to Hornsby.

In 1790, Anne Mary Darwin married John Patten.

In 1801, Thomas Rolph and the defendant George Lee were appointed trustees, and the trust moneys, which then consisted of 1,453l. 15s. 6d. 3l. per cents., were transferred to them.

Anne Mary Patten died in 1807, and Sarah Darwin (the mother) died early in February, 1814 (a).

The plaintiff's husband, Hornsby, was confined in the King's Bench Prison for debt, and in January, 1814, was discharged under the Insolvent Act, and his estate and effects vested in a clerk of the peace, and the same were by him assigned to the defendant John Seton.

Hornsby afterwards, 16th February, 1814, died without having instituted any proceedings, or done any act to reduce the trust fund into possession, in the short interval—a few days only—between the widow's death and his own.

Thomas Rolph died 24th March, 1814.

The bill stating these facts prayed, that the trust funds, with the dividends, might be transferred to the plaintiff; or if the Court should be of opinion that the defendants Parker and Seton, or either of them, were entitled to them, then that the plaintiff might be decreed to have a settlement out of the same.

The defendant Parker, by his answer, insisted that the dividends and interest of the moiety of the trust moneys assigned to him ought to be applied pursuant to the trusts declared as to the same, in and by the indenture of the 26th February, 1799, and stated,

⁽a) The particular day of her death does not appear on the pleadings.

that 314l. 3s. 6d. was due to him for ten years and a half arrears of the annuity, and claimed to be paid the same out of the trust moneys.

The defendant Seton, by his answer, submitted, that the trust funds ought to be transferred to him as the assignee of the estate and effects of Hornsby, for the benefit of himself and the rest of the creditors.

The defendant Lee, the trustee, submitted to act as the Court should direct.

Mr. Cooke and Mr. Richards, for the plaintiff.—The plaintiff claims the whole of this property, as having survived to her. being a reversionary interest, the husband could not reduce it into possession, or part with it before the death of Sarah Darwin, the mother; and after her death, a few days before his own, he did no act to reduce the property into possession. Neither the particular assignment to Parker, nor the general assignment under the Insolvent Act to Seton, operated as a reduction into possession. In Mitford v. M. (a) it was determined, that the general assignment in bankruptcy had not the effect of reducing into possession a legacy of stock left in trust for the benefit of the bankrupt's wife, and her right by survivorship was established against the assignees. same principle must apply to all assignments, whether under the Insolvent Debtors Act or to a particular assignee. They cited also Wildman v. W. (b), and Woollands v. Crowcher (c).

The plaintiff, by joining in the assignment to Parker, has not affected her claim; for being a married woman, the deed was inoperative as to her.

Mr. Leach and Mr. Dowdeswell, for the defendant Parker.—The assignment to Parker of this reversionary interest, as a security for the payment of the annuity granted to him, was valid. In Wright v. Morley (d) an assignment by the husband of his interest, in right of his wife, was held good, subject to the wife's equity to a settlement. That, it is true, was a present interest; but whether the interest to which the husband is entitled in right of his wife be

⁽a) 9 V. 87.

⁽c) 12 V. 174.

⁽b) 9 V. 174; 7 R. R. 153.

⁽d) 11 V. 12; 8 R. R 69.

present or reversionary, makes no difference. In both cases his assignment is effectual, subject to the wife's equity to a settlement.

Mr. Trower, for the defendant Seton.—After the determination in Mitford v. M. (a), I cannot contend that this interest passed by the assignment under the Insolvent Debtors Act; but this defendant, not having asserted any right to this property, and being made a party against his desire, ought to have his costs.

Mr. Shadwell, for the trustee, asked for his costs.

SIR THOMAS PLUMER, V.-C., E.—[After stating the facts of the case.] Independently of authority, let us consider, upon principle, whether the husband's assignment of his wife's contingent interest is good. The husband has a right to his wife's choses in action, provided he reduces them into possession. Is a deed assigning a reversionary interest a reduction into possession? It is impossible actually to reduce a reversionary interest into possession. Is it then a constructive reduction into possession? The assignment puts the assignee of the husband in the same situation as the husband, and if the husband survives the wife, the assignee is entitled to the property; but here the husband died before the wife, and the assignee therefore is not entitled to the property. This is the manner in which the case strikes me upon principle.

According to Mitford v. M. (a), it is clear, that the general assignment in bankruptcy does not pass a reversionary interest in the wife, she surviving her husband. It must be the same as to the assignment under the Insolvent Debtors Act. Nor do I see what answer can be given to the observation of Mr. Cooke, that a particular assignee cannot be in a better situation than an assignee under the general assignment in bankruptcy. The case cited of Woollands v. Crowcher (b) is strong to shew the insufficiency of the assignment to bar the wife's claim in case she survives her husband. On principle and authority the plaintiff is entitled to this money.

The decree was as follows: Declare the plaintiff is entitled to 1,453l. 15s. 6d., 3l. per cent. Reduced annuities, in the pleadings

mentioned, standing in the names of Thomas Rolph, in the pleadings named, and the defendant George Lee, in the books of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England. And it is ordered that the defendant George Lee do transfer the said 1,453l. 15s. 6d., 3l. per cent. Reduced annuities, unto the plaintiff, with the interest and dividends which have accrued due thereon. And it is ordered that the plaintiff do pay unto the defendants George Lee and John Seton their costs of this suit, to be taxed by Mr. Campbell, one of the masters of this Court, as between solicitor and client; and as between the plaintiff and defendant John Parker, no costs on either side; and any of the parties are to be at liberty to apply to this Court, as they shall be advised.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Reduction into possession, p. 168.
- 3. Chose in action of a married woman—How far assignable, p. 172.

1. Generally.

The rule of law stated in the principal cases is now of steadily diminishing importance. Where the marriage took place after January 1st, 1883, choses in action, whether belonging to the wife at the date of her marriage or acquired by her thereafter, are separate estate under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. Where the date of marriage was prior to that Act choses in action accruing to her in possession or reversion after the commencement of that Act are also separate estate thereunder (a). By the construction put upon the Act in Reid v. R. (b) choses in action the title to which accrued in reversion prior to January 1st, 1883, are not separate estate within the Act, though the title in possession accrues thereafter. To such choses in action the rule laid down in the principal case is still applicable.

The Old Law as to the wife's choses in action before 1883.—Marriage operated as a qualified gift to the husband of choses in action present and reversionary which did not belong to the wife for her separate use—the husband acquired them on the condition that he reduced them into possession during the continuance of the marriage (c);

⁽a) Married Women's Property Act, 1882, ss. 2, 5, 25.

⁽b) 31 C. D. 402.

⁽c) Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1.

if not so reduced they belonged to the wife if she survived her husband (a).

Marriage by operation of law divested the property in chattels personal out of the wife. In the case of a chose in action, marriage did not divest the property out of the wife, and all that the husband acquired by the marriage was a right to reduce the chose in action into possession (b). But at any time before the husband had actually reduced the equitable interest into possession, the wife might, if the chose in action were a present interest, assert her equity to a settlement (c).

If the husband survived his wife (d) on taking out administration (e) he was entitled to her choses in action, not reduced into possession, and this right where she dies intestate is unaffected by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (f).

2. Reduction into Possession.

What does not amount to.—In order to reduce a wife's choses in action into possession, acts must be done which will have the effect of changing the property therein, and divesting the wife's right. For nothing amounts to a reduction into possession which does not give the husband, for some moment of time, absolute dominion over the property without any concurrence of the wife (g).

In the following cases it was held that there had not been reduction into possession: the mere intention of an executor to pay the proceeds of a chose in action to which the wife was entitled to the husband, or an appropriation of a particular fund for that purpose (h), or the husband's receipt of the interest thereof (i), or a receipt of

- (a) Co. Litt. 351a; Scawen v. Blunt,
 7 V. 294; Langham v. Nenny, 3 V.
 467; Re Butler's Trusts, (1888) 38
 C. D. 286; Palmer v. Rich, (1897) 1
 Ch. 134.
- (b) See judgment of *Bowen*, L. J., *Re* Butler's T., 38 C. D. p. 294; and see *Re* Barton's Will, 10 Ha. 12.
- (c) As to which, see Elibank v. Montolieu, post.
- (d) See as to proof of survivorship Scrutton v. Pattillo, 19 Eq. 369.
 - (e) See (n.) "Administration by

- husband," p. 171; and Williams on Executors, 10th ed., p. 320.
- (f) Re Lambert's Estate, 39 C. D. 626; cf. Smart v. Trauter, 43 C. D. 587; Surman v. Wharton, (1891) 1 Q. B. 491.
- (g) Nicholson v. Drury, &c., 7 C. D. p. 55. See Aitchison v. Dixon, 10 Eq. p. 589; Williams' Executors (1905), p. 645 et seq.
 - (h) Blount v. Bestland, 5 V. 515.
- (i) Howman v. Corie, 2 Vern. 190; Blount v. Bestland, 5 V. 515.

part of the fund by the husband, except pro tanto (a). A transfer of stock by trustees or executors into the name of the married woman (b). A transfer of money in Court to the joint account of the husband and wife (c). A transfer of shares into the joint names of husband A transfer of money into names of husband and wife (e). Where trustees of a fund belonging to the wife simply retained it in their own hands (f), or invested or paid it into the names of trustees for her (g). The payment by executors of a legacy bequeathed to a wife, by means of a cheque drawn to the order of the husband and wife, indorsed by them, and handed by the wife to the manager of a bank, directing him, with the assent of the husband, to place it to an account in her sole name, which was done, and treated by the wife as her separate property (h). Where the wife was entitled to a legacy expectant on death of B., and she joined with her husband in assigning it to X., and the husband died before the tenant for life, it was held that the wife was entitled free from the claims of X. (i).

A mere agreement moreover to sell a fund (k), or a set-off of a debt of the husband's due to a testator against a legacy he has left to the wife, will not bar the wife's right to the legacy in case she survives her husband (l). It has been laid down, however, that where a debt to the estate of the testator may be set off by the executors against a legacy bequeathed by the testator to the debtor, such debt may also be set off against a legacy bequeathed by the testator to the wife of the debtor, subject to her equity (if any) to a settlement (m).

What does amount to.—The receipt, however, by the husband of his wife's chose in action, as, for instance, of a sum due to her on a

- (a) Nash v. N., 2 Madd. 133, 139; Scrutton v. Pattillo, 19 Eq. 369, 373; Parker v. Lechmere, 12 C. D. 256.
- (b) Wildman v. W., 9 V. 174, 7 R. R. 153; see Ryland v. Smith, p. 170, infra.
- (c) Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220. Cf. Donnelly v. Foss, infra.
 - (d) Nicholson v. Drury, 7 C. D. 48.
 - (e) Scrutton v. Pattillo, 19 Eq. 369.
 - (f) Twisden v. Wise, 1 Vern. 161.
 - (g) Aitchison v. Dixon, 10 Eq. 589.
 - (h) Parker v. Lechmere, 12 C. D.

- 256.
 - (i) Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1.
- (k) Harwood v. Fisher, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 110. See n. (a), p. 174.
- (l) Harrison v. Andrews, 13 Si. 595; Carr v. Taylor, 10 V. 574; Ex p. Blagden, 2 Rose, 249; Ex p. O'Ferrall, 1 G. & J. 347; Re Batchelor, 16 Eq. 481; M'Mahon v. Burchell, 3 Ha. 99.
- (m) M'Mahon v. Burchell, 5 Ha. 325; and see Hall v. Hill, 1 Dr. & War. 109.

mortgage in fee, will be a reduction thereof into possession (a), unless such receipt by the husband be in the character of trustee, when it will not have that effect (b).

The receipt by an agent appointed by the husband and wife either of a legacy due to the wife (c), or of money forming part of the estate of an intestate, of which the wife is administratrix, will amount to a reduction into possession by the husband in the former case of the legacy, in the latter of the wife's distributive share of the money (d), unless the agent receives the money as the separate property of the wife (e), and receipt by the wife of a chose in action with the assent of the husband will amount to a reduction into possession by the husband (f).

A transfer of the wife's stock into her husband's sole name would be a reduction into possession (g), and where the husband was a lunatic, the payment by order of the Court of stock belonging to the wife to the credit of the lunacy, was held as much a reduction into possession as a payment to the lunatic or his committee (h). It was however held in Ireland that fines due to the wife before marriage, which had been lodged in Court, remained choses in action, and were not reduced into possession by such lodgment (i).

And as a husband may, by transferring his wife's stock into his own name, reduce it into possession, so he may do so by transferring it into the names of trustees upon trusts inconsistent with his wife's title by survivorship (k).

Where, however, a husband directs or consents to an investment of stock belonging to his wife in a manner consistent with her equities, he will not be considered by such an act as destroying her equities, through a reduction into possession. Thus in Ryland v. Smith (l), the wife being under a will entitled to stock and to cash, part of a residue, the executors, at the request of the husband, transferred the stock into the names of trustees for the wife's separate use, and

- (a) Rees v. Keith, 11 Si. 388, 390.
- (b) Baker v. Hall, 12 V. 497, 8 R. R. 366; Wall v. Tomlinson, 16 V. 413, 10 R. R. 212.
- (c) Huntley v. Griffith, F. Moore, 452, Gouldsb. 2nd ed., p. 159, pl. 91.
 - (d) Re Barber, 11 C. D. 442.
- (e) Parker v. Lechmere, 12 C. D. 256.
- (f) Rogers v. Bolton, 8 L. R. Ir. 69.
- (g) 1 Bright's Husb. & W. 54.
- (h) Re Jenkins, 5 Russ. 183, 187.
- (i) Donnelly v. Foss, 7 L. R. Ir. 439.
- (k) Hansen v. Miller, 14 Si. 22 Burnham v. Bennett, 2 Coll Ch R 254
 - (l) 1 My. & C. 53.

paid the cash to the husband. The husband employed part of the cash in increasing the amount of the stock. He afterwards became bankrupt, and died. It was held by *Pepys*, M. R., that the stock transferred by the executors was not reduced into possession by the husband, and, therefore, belonged to the wife by survivorship, but that the assignees under the bankruptcy were entitled to the increase made by the husband.

Where there is a decree in a joint suit by husband and wife for money claimed in her right, if the husband die before any other proceedings, the benefit of the decree will survive to the wife (a); nor will her right by survivorship be prejudiced if nothing has been done in the suit to change the property (b). If, however, the property were changed, as, for instance, by the approval by the Court of a settlement to be made on the wife (c), or by an order for payment to the husband, the wife's right to take by survivorship will be gone (d).

Arrears of income of a married woman's life interest, in the hands of a receiver, which had been ordered to be received and applied by him in a suit in payment of her husband's incumbrances, and which had not been paid as directed, were held, by the effect of the order, to be reduced into possession so as to defeat the wife's right by survivorship (e).

A sale by a husband for a sum of money of his wife's share in certain chattels, which chattels were taken possession of by the purchaser, was held to amount to a reduction into possession by the husband if reduction was necessary in such a case (f).

Administration by Husband.—If a husband fail to reduce his wife's choses in action into possession during her lifetime, he will, upon her death before him, be entitled to them on taking out letters of administration to her. If the husband die without having taken out administration, his personal representative, upon taking out letters of administration to the wife, will become entitled to such

⁽a) Nanney v. Martin, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 68.

⁽b) Adams v. Lavender, M'Cle. & Yo. 41; Bond v. Simmons, 3 Atk. 20; Anon., 3 Atk. 726; Macaulay v. Philips, 4 V. 15.

⁽c) Macaulay v. Philips, 4 V. 19.

⁽d) Heygate v. Annesley, 3 Bro. Ch.

^{362;} Bourton v. Williams, L. R. 5 Ch. 655; but see Fleet v. Perrins, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500.

⁽e) Tidd v. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 857.

⁽f) Widgery v. Tepper, 7 C. D. 423.

choses in action (a). If probate be granted of the wife's will, the executors will be merely trustees of the beneficial interest in her choses in action for her husband surviving her, and he, or if he is dead his legal personal representatives, may sue the executors in respect of them (b). Where the choses in action formed part of settled separate estate and the wife died without having assigned them by act inter vivos or disposing of them by her will, the husband became entitled thereto on taking out administration (c), and separate estate under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, devolves in this manner also.

3. Chose in Action of a Married Woman-How far Assignable.

A husband can give no better right to another than he has himself; therefore all assignments made by the husband of the wife's choses in action, present or reversionary, vested or contingent, which are not, or cannot be, then reduced into possession, whether the assignment be in bankruptcy, or under the Insolvent Act, or to trustees for payment of debts, or to a purchaser for valuable consideration, even although the wife joins therein, pass only the interest which the husband himself has, and are therefore subject to the wife's legal right by survivorship.

The result of the principal cases (d) may be stated shortly thus. The assignment, although by the husband and wife, puts the assignee in the same situation as the husband. If the chose in action is not reversionary, the claim of the assignee is liable to be defeated either by the wife's equity to a settlement (e), or by her right of survivorship, until the chose is reduced into actual possession. If the chose is reversionary, and the wife survives her husband, she necessarily takes by survivorship, and the assignee takes nothing, but if the husband in such case survives the wife, the husband will become entitled on taking out administration (f), and through him his assignee.

- (a) Partington v. A.-G., L. R. 4 H. L.
 p. 109; In the goods of Harding, L. R.
 2 P. & D. 394; of Roberts, (1898) P. 149.
- (b) Smart v. Tranter, 43 C. D. 587; cf. Elliot v. North, (1901) 1 Ch. 424.
- (c) Proudley v. Fielder, 2 My. & K. 57; Re Lambert, 39 C. D. 626; Williams' Executors, 10th ed., p. 320.
- (d) See Hornsby v. Lee, supra; Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1; Honner
- v. Morton, 3 Russ. 65, 27 R. R. 15;
 Watson v. Dennis, 3 Russ. 90; Box v.
 B., 1 Dru. 42; Box v. Jackson, 1 Dru. 48; Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220;
 Wilkinson v. Gibson, 4 Eq. 162;
 Widgery v. Tepper, 7 C. D. 423; Re Butler's T., 3 L. R. Ir. 89.
 - (e) See Elibank v. Montolieu, post.
- (f) See (n.) "Administration by husband," p. 171.

In Le Vasseur v. Scratton (a), a female infant being entitled to the reversion of a chose in action, expectant on the decease of the survivor of A. and B., she and her husband covenanted, in contemplation of their marriage, to assign it to trustees, in trust, as to one moiety for the husband absolutely, and as to the other moiety, for the wife and the issue of the marriage. The husband died first, and afterwards A. and B. died. It was held by Shadwell, V.-C., that the chose in action survived to the wife, and that she was entitled to have it transferred to her. In Seaton v. S. (b), S. being eighteen years old, married in 1862. She was a ward of Court, but married without sanction. An inquiry into her fortune was ordered and a settlement executed, whereby she settled a reversionary interest in personalty to which she was entitled under the will of a testator who died before Malins' Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, came into operation, and this settlement was approved by the Court. She recognised the settlement by various acts, and applied to the P. D. and A. Division to vary it after a dissolution of her marriage had been decreed on her petition. Held, that no act by her short of an actual assignment to the trustees when discoverte, nor the sanction of the Court, nor the effect of the Infants' Settlement Act, could bind her, and that she was entitled to a transfer of the property. In Davies v. D. (c), a female infant settled two reversionary choses in action, she survived her husband, and then one of them fell into possession, which she directed to be paid to the trustees of the settlement. She was held to have confirmed the whole settlement so as to bind the second fund when it should fall in (d). In this case all disability was at an end at the date of the assignment, and the decision rests upon different considerations to those applied where an assignment or covenant, voidable as having been made by an infant feme sole, has been held validly confirmed after majority by her acts when married (e).

It is now clearly established that, whether the husband after an assignment of his wife's choses in action dies in the lifetime of the person having a prior interest, whereby the chose in action cannot,

- (a) 14 Si. 116.
- (b) (1888) 13 A. C. 61.
- (c) 9 Eq. 468.
- (d) See also Milner v. Harewood, 18 V. 259, 277.
 - (e) Barrow v. B., 4 K. & J.

409; Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263;

Re Hodson, (1894) 2 Ch. 421; see

Greenhill v. N. British, &c., Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474, and this case discussed in

Harle v. Jarman, (1895) 2 Ch. 419.

as against the wife, be reduced into possession, or whether he survives and dies before it is reduced into possession, the same result follows,—the chose in action will survive to the wife (a). And a release by a husband of a reversionary chose in action of his wife is as inoperative to bind his wife by survivorship as his assignment would be (b), although the release by the husband of a chose in action payable in præsenti is effectual to bar the wife's equity to a settlement (c).

Where an annuity or life interest in a fund is given to a married woman, and is not her separate property, the husband is not, with her concurrence, capable of effectually disposing of her life estate, except during his own life; for, if she outlive her husband, such part of it as would be enjoyed by her after the coverture determined would be reversionary only, and consequently the husband cannot make a title to such portion of the annuity or dividends of the fund as may accrue after his own death, and during the life of his wife surviving him (d).

Where personalty, a reversionary interest in which is given to a married woman, is brought into existence for the purpose of securing a loan to her husband, the assignment by the husband and wife with the object of effecting such security will, pro tanto, defeat the wife's right by survivorship. Thus, in Winter v. Easum (e), a married woman entitled to income for her separate use agreed to assist her husband in obtaining a loan from an insurance company. A policy was accordingly effected with the company, by which a sum was assured to the survivor of the husband and wife upon the death of the one first dying. By a mortgage deed of the same date, reciting an agreement for a loan by the office at the request of the husband and wife, the wife assigned her separate income, and the husband the policy by way of mortgage for securing the sum advanced by the company. By the same deed the husband and wife, the wife joining for the purpose of binding her separate estate, covenanted that the husband would pay the premiums on the policy; and there was a declaration by the husband alone that if he did not pay them

⁽a) Ellison v. Elwin, 13 Si. 309; Ashby v. A., 1 Coll. Ch. R. 553; see also Hastings v. Orde, 11 Si. 205; Wilkinson v. Charlesworth, 10 B. 324, 328; Rowland v. M'Donnel, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 365, 381; Borton v. B., 16 Si. 552.

⁽b) Rogers v. Acaster, 14 B. 445.

⁽c) See Lewin, Trusts (1904), p. 929, n. (g), citing M'Creery v. Searight,

⁵ L. R. Ir. 206, 641; Harrison v. Andrews, 13 Si. 595.

⁽d) Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 My. & C. 37; Harley v. H., 10 Ha. 325; Re Godfrey's T., 1 Ir. R. Eq. 531; Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1; but see Hore v. Becher, 12 Si. 465.

⁽e) 2 De G. J. & S. 272.

the mortgagees might pay them out of income, and a declaration by all parties that if the policy moneys became payable before the mortgage was paid, the company might pay it out of those moneys. After the death of the husband the wife claimed the moneys payable under the policy as being a chose in action not settled to her separate use, and therefore incapable of being effectually assigned during the husband's life. It was held that, although the policy if taken alone created an interest in the wife not capable of being assigned so as to bar her right by survivorship, yet as it had been created for the purpose of a mortgage, and as a part of the same transaction, and in pursuance of a contract that it should be a security to the company, the wife's interest was included in the security (a).

Where, however, a single woman insures her life, and afterwards marries, inasmuch as her contract with the insurance society is for a reversionary payment to herself, if the society with which she has insured assigns over its business to another society, it seems that the married woman cannot effectually adopt the liability of the latter society in lieu of that of the former (b).

It was finally determined in the case of Whittle v. Henning (c), after some conflicting decisions, that although a woman having a reversionary interest in personalty obtain an assignment of the interest of every other person therein, she would not thereby convert her reversionary interest into an interest in possession, or enable her husband to do indirectly what he could not do directly—assign her original interest, so as to bar her right by survivorship, and that if the reversionary fund is in Court, it would not be paid out, although the consent of all other persons interested in it be obtained.

But although a Court of equity will not give effect to an assignment by the husband of his wife's reversionary chose in action, so as to defeat her legal right by survivorship, it will be good against him if he survive his wife (see the principal case). And when it becomes an interest in possession it will be subject to the wife's equity to a settlement (d).

Where reversionary personal estate to which two married women

- (a) See also Stamford, &c., Banking Co. v. Ball, 31 L. J. Ch. 143.
 - (b) Conquest's Case, 1 C. D. 334, 342.
- (c) 2 Ph. 731, and see Richards v. Chambers, 10 V. 580; Story v. Tonge, 7 B. 91; Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 B. 496; Brandon v. Woodthorpe, 10 B
- 463; Cresswell v. Dewell, 4 Gif. 460; Re Butler's T., 3 L. R. Ir. 89. But see as to women married after 1882 Re Davenport, (1895) 1 Ch. 361.
- (d) See Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; Clarke v. Woodward, 25 B. 455; and note to Elibank v. Montolieu, post.

were absolutely entitled under a settlement prior to Malins' Act was invested by the trustees in breach of trust in the purchase of land, it was held by the C. A. that the interests of the married women could be disposed of by them by a duly acknowledged deed under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74 (a). The point is, whether at the date of the deed executed by the married woman, the interest in question is an interest in land (b).

A married woman who has obtained a decree for a judicial separation from her husband is entitled absolutely, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 25, and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 8, to her choses in action not reduced into possession, although she may have previously joined her husband in a mortgage thereof (c); and if the husband appears to oppose the application of his wife, he will be refused costs (d).

The same result follows when there has been a decree for the dissolution of marriage, for after the dissolution there is no right in the husband, whose right to reduce into possession only exists during the coverture (e). The order "nisi" is the decree which the Court eventually makes absolute, and the order absolute relates back to the decree "nisi," and renders any act done in the interval inoperative. Anything so done, therefore, by the husband or his assignee will not have the effect of reducing the wife's choses in action into possession (f); and although the wife, after a decree for the dissolution of the marriage, does not obtain possession of her "choses in action," her executors will be entitled thereto, and not the husband (g). So a married woman who has obtained a protection order under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 8; 41 Vict. c. 19, s. 4, in consequence of her husband's desertion, will become absolutely entitled to her choses in action not reduced into possession (h).

If the chose in action either is originally, or becomes, an interest presently actionable, it may be reduced into possession by actual

- (a) Re Durrant, 18 C. D. 106.
- (b) Miller v. Collins, (1896) 1 Ch. 573, overruling Re Newton's Trusts, 23 C. D. 181.
- (c) Re Insole, 1 Eq. 470; cf. Re Hughes, (1898) 1 Ch. 529.
 - (d) Johnson v. Lander, 7 Eq. 228.
- (e) Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220; Heath v. Lewis, 4 Gif. 665; Swift v. Wenman, 10 Eq. 15; Seaton v. S., 13
- A. C. 61, supra, p. 173; Fitzgerald v. Chapman, 1 C. D. 563.
- (f) Prole v. Soady, L. R. 3 Ch. 220; explained in Norman v. Villars, 2 Ex. D. 359.
 - (g) Wilkinson v. Gibson, 4 Eq. 162.
- (h) Re Coward, &c., 20 Eq. 179;Nicholson v. Drury, &c., Co., 7 C. D.48; Re Emery's T., 32 W. R. 357.

payment to the husband or his assignees: and the wife's right by survivorship and her equity to a settlement may, unless she has taken steps to insist upon it (a), be thereby defeated (b).

Joint Tenancy.—The effect of marriage on property in which a woman has an interest as joint tenant depends upon whether the marriage divests the property in the wife and vests it in the husband. If it does, then the joint tenancy is severed. But where some novus actus interveniens on the part of the husband is required, e.g., an assignment of the wife's chattels real, or the reduction into possession of her choses in action, in neither of these cases does marriage act as a severance. If, therefore, in such cases the wife dies before the husband has assigned the chattel real or reduced the chose in action into possession, the other joint tenants will take by survivorship (c).

Domicil.—Where a married woman, domiciled abroad, is entitled to reversionary interests in personalty, her rights or powers over such interests, and the rights of her husband, will be regulated by the law of their domicil (d).

- 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57 (Malins' Act).—This Act enables a married woman, in certain cases, to dispose of reversionary interests in personal estate not settled to her separate use by deed acknowledged in which her husband concurred.
- S. 1. "After the 31st day of December, 1857, it shall be lawful for every married woman by deed to dispose of every future or reversionary interest, whether vested or contingent, of such married woman, or her husband in her right, in any personal estate whatsoever to which she shall be entitled under any instrument made after the said 31st day of December, 1857 (except such a settlement as after mentioned), and also to release or extinguish any power which may be vested in or limited or reserved to her in regard to any such personal estate, as fully and effectually as she could do if she
 - (a) Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62.
- (b) Cunningham v. Antrobus, 16 Si. 436; Allday v. Fletcher, 1 De G. & J. 82.
- (c) See judgment of Bowen, L. J., in Re Butler's T., 38 C. D. 286;

Baillie v. Treherne, 17 C. D. 388, disapproved; Re Barton's Will, 10 Ha. 12; Palmer v. Rich, (1897) 1 Ch. 134.

(d) Guepratte v. Young, 4 De G. & S. 217; Duncan v. Cannan, 18 B. 128; 7 De G. M. & G. 78.

were a feme sole, and also to release and extinguish her right or equity to a settlement out of any personal estate to which she, or her husband in her right, may be entitled in possession under any such instrument as aforesaid, save and except that no such disposition, release, or extinguishment shall be valid unless the husband concur in the deed by which the same shall be effected, nor unless the deed be acknowledged by her as hereinafter directed: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any reversionary interest to which she shall become entitled by virtue of any deed, will, or instrument by which she shall be restrained from alienating or affecting the same."

"In any personal estate."—"Future or reversionary interest in any personal estate." These words do not include mere possibilities or expectancies (a). They include a policy of life insurance effected by a woman before her marriage (b).

"Any instrument made after," &c.—Where a married woman takes a reversionary interest under an appointment executed after the 31st day of December, 1857, and made in pursuance of a power contained in an instrument dated before that day, she will not, under this Act, be able to dispose of such reversionary interest as if she had become entitled to it under an instrument made after the 31st day of December, 1857 (c).

Effect of assignment hereunder.—An assignment, when duly made under this statute, passes and transfers personal property to which a married woman is entitled in reversion, discharged from the right of her husband, or anyone claiming under him, although he concurs in the assignment, as effectually as if she were a feme sole. In Re Batchelor (d), a married woman, whose husband was indebted to a testator, having become entitled under his will to a legacy in reversion, not limited to her separate use, joined with her husband in assigning it for value by deed duly executed and acknowledged by her under this Act. On the reversion falling in, the executors

⁽a) Allcard v. Walker, (1896) 2 Ch. 369.

⁽b) Witherby v. Rackham, 39 W. R.
363; and see Miller v. Collins, (1896)
1 Ch. 573, overruling Re Newton, 23
C. D. 181.

⁽c) Re Butler's T., Ir. R. 3 Eq. 138;cf. Re Elcom, (1894) 1 Ch. 303; but see Re Bennett, 73 L. T. 17.

⁽d) 16 Eq. 481. Cf. Re Jakeman, 23 C. D. 344; Re Briant, 39 C. D. 478.

claimed to be entitled to retain the amount of the debt out of the legacy. Selborne, C., held that there was no right of retainer, and that the assignee for value was entitled to be paid in full.

S. 2. "Every deed to be executed in" England or Wales (a) by a married woman for any of the purposes of this Act shall be acknowledged by her, in the manner prescribed by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74 (b); and every deed to be executed in Ireland by a married woman for any of the purposes of this Act shall be acknowledged by her in the manner prescribed by 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92 (c); and all and singular the clauses and provisions in the said Acts concerning the disposition of lands by married women, including the provisions for dispensing with the concurrence of the husbands of married women, in the cases in the said Acts mentioned, shall extend and be applicable to such interests in personal estate and to such powers as may be disposed of, released, or extinguished by virtue of this Act, as fully and effectually as if such interests or powers were interests in or powers over land.

"Shall be acknowledged."—See as to the effect of an acknowledgment and separate examination under the Fines and Recoveries Act cases cited below (d). In Roberts v. Cooper (e), a wife acknowledged a deed hereunder although the reversionary interests were derived under wills made before the 31st December, 1857. But the Court took this, and other conduct, into consideration in deciding as to her equity to a settlement.

S. 3. "Provided always, that the powers of disposition given to a married woman by this Act shall not interfere with any power which independently of this Act may be vested in or limited or reserved to her, so as to prevent her from exercising such power in any case, except so far as by any disposition made by her under this Act she may be prevented from so doing, in consequence of such power having been suspended or extinguished by such disposition."

⁽a) The Act does not extend to Scotland (s. 5).

⁽b) The Fines and Recoveries Act.

⁽c) The Irish Fines and Recoveries Act.

⁽d) Tennent v. Welch, 37 C. D. 622.
And cf. Re Rogers, L. R. 1 C. P. 47;
Ex p. Cockerell, 4 C. P. D. 39; Druitt v. Willens, 23 L. R. Ir. 436.

⁽e) (1891) 2 Ch. 335.

S. 4. "Provided always, that the powers of disposition hereby given to a married woman shall not enable her to dispose of any interest in personal estate settled upon her by any settlement or agreement for a settlement made on the occasion of her marriage."

A wife's resulting interest in her reversion remaining undisposed of by an agreement made in contemplation of her marriage, for the settlement of her property, falls within the proviso of this section, and her contingent reversionary interest under the agreement was held not to be a resulting trust, but to be an interest which accrued under the settlement (a).

S. 5. "This Act shall not extend to Scotland."

(a) Clarke v. Green, 2 Hem. & M. 474.

BOUNDARIES AND PARTITION.

WAKE v. CONYERS.

1759. 1 Eden, 331 (a). 1759. Reg. Lib. Min. Trin.

Boundaries.

All cases where the Court has entertained bills for establishing boundaries have been where the soil itself was in question, or there might have been a multiplicity of suits.

The Court has no power as of course to issue commissions to fix the boundaries of legal estates. Some equity must be superinduced by the acts of the parties, as some particular circumstances of fraud; or confusion, where one party has ploughed too near the other, or the like.

Bill to ascertain the boundaries of two manors dismissed, there being no dispute as to the soil.

The defendants, John Conyers, Esq., as tenant for life, his wife, Lady Henrietta, as entitled after his death to her jointure, and his son, an infant, as tenant in tail, were entitled to the manor or Epping, and also to the freehold of certain lands next adjoining to it, lying in the manor of Waltham; the boundary lines of the two manors passing through Mr. Conyers' park. He had cut down certain trees which, it was alleged by the bill, were standing on the line, and were boundary marks.

The present bill was filed by Sir William Wake, as prochein amy to his three infant sons, who were tenants in tail successively of the manor of Waltham, praying that the boundary of the manor of Waltham, so far as the same abuts on the manor of Epping, might be fixed and set out, and that a commission might issue for that purpose; and that the defendant John Conyers might set up new boundary marks in the room of those which he had cut down and destroyed.

Mr. Conyers by his answer admitted the cutting down of certain

(a) 2 Cox, 360, Hill's MSS.

trees, but denied that they were boundary marks; though he submitted to have the boundaries ascertained and settled, and that marks might be set up to perpetuate such boundaries.

On the opening, the Lord Keeper (*Henley*) objected to the nature of the suit, as being merely to settle the boundaries of the manor. He said he did not think the Court had jurisdiction, and desired it to stand over, for counsel to consider whether there was sufficient equity for the Court to entertain the bill.

It came on again this day (a).

The Attorney-General (Sir Charles Pratt), Wilbraham, and Browning, for the plaintiffs, cited the authorities and cases mentioned below (b).

Perrot and Hoskins, for the defendants.—This bill, under pretence of establishing boundaries, is, in fact, to settle manorial rights. It is said, that every question for the settling of boundaries is a proper subject for the jurisdiction of this Court. That is, however, not the case. Those cases which have been cited, in which a man, having joint occupation, has confounded the boundaries, have turned upon the fraud which has been relieved against. A similar principle has given the Court jurisdiction in the cases of rent-charge.

LORD KEEPER HENLEY (c).—This bill is merely for ascertaining the boundaries of these two manors, and is intended to bind the inheritance of the parties for ever. It struck me as new upon the opening. I have been, ever since I sat here, extremely jealous of the jurisdiction of this Court over legal inheritances. I was, therefore, desirous that some precedent should be produced to shew me that this Court could entertain a bill of this nature, to settle the boundaries of an incorporeal inheritance; but none such has been produced. There have, since I sat here, been several [bills] to fix boundaries where a right to the freehold of the soil has been

⁽a) June 16, 1759.

⁽b) Tothill, 84, 126, 127, 210; Bowman v. Yeat, 1 Ch. Ca. 146; Harding v. Countess of Suffolk, 1 Ch. R. 63; Cocks v. Foley, 1 Vern. 359; The Duke

of Dorset v. Serjeant Girdler, Pr. Ch. 531.

⁽c) Afterwards Lord Chancellor and Earl of Northington.

incidental. But I have seen such frightful consequences arising from them, that I think these suits are very far from deserving encouragement. They originally came into this Court under the equity of preventing multiplicity of suits; yet in those cases I have observed that they have been sometimes attended with more expense than if all the suits which they apprehended, and which they were brought to prevent, had actually been tried at law.

Hitherto these disputes have been only between persons of great fortune. But the consequences have been that the parties have been eager to come into this Court, without any attention being paid to see whether the prayer of the bill applies properly to the jurisdiction. An issue is directed, and after going down to the Assizes, at a very great expense, and a verdict being found for one party, the other is dissatisfied, and a new trial is directed. I was extremely unwilling to grant the last new trial, in the case of The Earl of Darlington v. Bowes (a), but on inquiring of the bar whether there was any instance of a decree made upon one verdict only, none could be produced; and if there were any, they were so few, that they could not be remembered. I therefore thought myself bound by the current of opinions to grant it. But I am determined, if any such case should ever come before me again, to consider it in a different light, and to have the matter more fully inquired into, and prevent, if possible, an expense which is a reproach to the law.

All the cases where the Court has entertained bills for establishing boundaries have been where the soil itself was in question, or where there might have been a multiplicity of suits.

The Court has, in my opinion (and if parties are not satisfied, they have resort elsewhere), no power to fix the boundaries of legal estates, unless some equity is superinduced by the act of the parties, as some particular circumstance of fraud, or confusion, where one party has ploughed too near the other, or the like; nor has this Court a power to issue such commissions of course, as here prayed.

In this case, it is said there is no legal remedy, and therefore there must be an equitable one; but this does not follow unless there is an equitable right. If there is a legal right, there must be a legal remedy; and if there is no legal right, there can, in this case, be no equitable one.

It is said, that, in some future time, there may be a casual right such as escheat, treasure trove, &c.; but am I to countenance such a suit as this before there is any such right, merely because it may happen, though when it does happen, it may perhaps be such a right as the parties will not think it worth their while to contend for?

If I were to make this a precedent, it would be, in effect, to issue commissions to settle boundaries all over the kingdom; for if of manors, why not of honours, of hundreds, and all other inferior denominations of districts? I shall always, while I have the honour to sit here, be very attentive to prevent the subject from great waste of expense about matters by no means adequate to it. Should I entertain such a bill as this, I should put it in the power of every opulent lord of a manor to distress, if not ruin, not only a poor man, but even a man of moderate fortune, whose estate happens to border upon his; for these suits are often attended with 2,000l. or 3,000l. expense—a dishonour to justice.

In order to give this Court jurisdiction, there must appear some equitable circumstances in the case. I know of no boundary marks to a manor in another's soil. The trees were Mr. Conyers' own: he had a right to cut them down; and if the plaintiffs are afraid of losing, in the course of time, the evidence of the boundaries of their manors, they may preserve it by perambulations as often as they please; but I cannot fix the limits of a legal right (if any), unless the jurisdiction of this Court is superinduced by some equitable circumstances, which it is not in this case.

Another consideration is, that the plaintiffs are infants, and so is one of the defendants; and shall I send the infant plaintiffs beforehand, when they know not the value of their estate, to bind the inheritance quia timent, under the protection of the father, who is not privy in estate to them? I am well satisfied that this bill ought to be dismissed.

NOTES.

1. Generally.

2. Cases in which a commission has been issued, or an issue directed, p. 186.

1. Generally.

The jurisdiction of the Court to issue a commission to ascertain

boundaries is very ancient (a), but its origin is by no means free from doubt.

The Lord Keeper, in the principal case, was of opinion, that suits to determine boundaries originally came into the Court of Chancery under the equity of preventing multiplicity of suits; but Grant, M. R., in a case where it became necessary to inquire by what principles the Court is guided in granting a commission of this description, observes, that "there are two writs in the register (b), concerning the adjustment of controverted boundaries, from one of which it is probable that the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Court of Chancery took its commencement. The first is the writ de rationalibus divisis (c); the other, the writ de perambulatione faciendâ (d). Both Lord Northington and Lord Thurlow, without referring to this writ or commission as the origin of the jurisdiction of the Court, have yet expressed an opinion, that consent was the ground on which it had been at first exercised. The next step would probably be, to grant the commission on the application of one party who shewed an equitable ground for obtaining it, such as, that a tenant or copyholder had destroyed, or not preserved, the boundaries between his own property and that of his lessor or lord. And to its exercise on such an equitable ground, no objection has ever been made" (e).

Doubtful, however, as the origin of the jurisdiction may be, it is certain that it has been viewed with extreme jealousy by modern equity judges, who have always been desirous that the rights of parties should, when practicable, be tried and determined in the ordinary legal mode. And although formerly a wider jurisdiction may have been exercised, the rule now acted upon is that laid down by the Lord Keeper in the principal case, "that the Court has no jurisdiction to fix the boundaries of legal estates, unless some equity is superinduced by the act of the parties" (f).

In the principal case the Lord Keeper refused to issue a commission to ascertain the boundaries of two adjacent manors, inasmuch as the soil itself was not in question, and his decision was followed by

- (a) Mullineux v. M., Peckering v. Kimpton, Toth. (ed. 1649) 39 (it is p. 101 in ed. 1671); Spyer v. S., Nels. 14; Boteler v. Spelman, Rep. t. Finch, 96; Wintle v. Carpenter, Ibid. 462; Glynn v. Scawen, Ibid. 239.
- (b) Since abolished: see 3 & 4 Will. 4,c. 27, s. 36.
- (c) Reg. Brev. 157 b.
- (d) Reg. Brev. Ib.
- (e) Speer v. Crawter, 2 Mer. 416; and see Story, Eq. Jur. (1892) p. 402.
- (f) See p. 183, supra, and Speer v. Crawter, 2 Mer. 418; O'Hara v. Strange, 11 Ir. Eq. R. 262; Ireland v. Wilson, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 623.

Grant, M. R., in Speer v. Crawter, supra. So likewise the Court has refused to entertain a bill filed by the rector of a parish for an account of tithes, and to have a commission to settle the boundaries of the parish and the glebe (a); and also a bill filed by a parish to avoid confusion in making their rates, and praying a commission to fix their boundaries for that purpose (b).

Where, moreover, a party has allowed boundaries to fall into confusion, he cannot ask for a commission against another who was not shewn to have obtained possession improperly. In Miller v. Warmington (c), a termor having, by himself or his under-tenants, suffered the boundaries between the demised premises and contiguous lands of his own to become confused, he was held not entitled after the expiration of the term to a commission to ascertain them in opposition to the assignee of the lessor, who then, and had since, continued in the possession of both, it not being shewn that such possession was improperly obtained.

The jurisdiction vested in the High Court of Chancery has been transferred to the High Court of Justice by the 16th section of the Judicature Act, 1873, and all the judges of the High Court have now the same jurisdiction (d). The jurisdiction therefore still exists, and the practice will probably be moulded to meet the requirements of modern times, and the alterations in modern procedure (e).

2. Cases in which a Commission has been issued, or an issue directed.

If the confusion of boundaries has been occasioned, not by the negligence of both, but by the fraud of one of the parties, where, for instance, he has been gradually encroaching, by ploughing or digging too near to the other, with the intention of obliterating the boundaries, a Court of equity has interfered (f).

Where such a relation exists between two parties, as that of tenant and landlord, which makes it the duty of the tenant to preserve the boundaries, if he permits them to be destroyed, so that the landlord's

- (a) Atkins v. Hatton, 2 Anst. 386.
- (b) St. Luke's v. St. Leonard's, 2 Anst. 395, cited Waring v. Hotham, 2 Dick. 550, nom.
 - (c) 1 J. & W. 484.
 - (d) See the Annual Practice, Part I.
- (e) Cf. Lascelles v. Butt, 2 C. D. 593; Arbitration Act, 1889, ss. 13 and
- 14; Spike v. Harding, 7 C. D. 871; Searle v. Cook, 43 C. D. 519; and
- Seton (1901), p. 1893.
- (f) Wintle v. Carpenter, Rep. t. Finch, 462; Bute v. Glamorganshire, &c., Co., 1 Ph. 681; Rous v. Barker,
- 4 Bro. P. C. 660, Toml. edit.; Atkins v. Hatton, 2 Anst. 386.

land cannot be distinguished from his, and restored specifically, he will, even in the absence of fraud on his part, be compelled to substitute land of equal value, the land or its value being ascertained by commission. "It has long been settled," observes Lord Eldon, "and that law is not now to be unhinged, that a tenant contracts, among other obligations resulting from that relation, to keep distinct from his own property during his tenancy, and to leave clearly distinct at the end of it, his landlord's property, not in any way confounded with his own. This is, therefore, a common equity, that a tenant, having put his landlord's property and his own together, for his own convenience, in order to make the most of it during his tenancy, is bound, at the end of the term, to render up specifically the landlord's land, and if he cannot, that a commission shall issue from a Court of equity to inquire what were the lands of the landlord, the Court taking care, to the intent that the tenant may discharge his obligation, to do what is right as to the possession in the meantime; and if the tenant has so confounded the boundaries, sub-dividing the land by hedges and stones, and destroying the metes and bounds, so that the landlord's land cannot be ascertained, the Court will inquire what was the value of the landlord's estate, valued fairly, but to the utmost, as against that tenant, who has himself destroyed the possibility of the landlord's having his own "(a).

The Court, moreover, has jurisdiction to ascertain the boundary during the term if the tenant has confused the lands demised with lands of his own, for it is clearly his duty, not merely to leave the boundary between his own land and his landlord's distinct at the expiration of the term, but also to keep it distinct during the term (b).

And it seems that the same result would follow, if the confusion of the boundaries was occasioned by a tenant for life (c); or where confusion of the boundaries of manors was occasioned by the acts or neglect of a tenant or lessee of one of the manors being the owner of the other (d).

- (a) A.-G. v. Fullerton, 2 V. & B. 264; and see Glynn v. Scawen, Rep. t. Finch, 239; Wintle v. Carpenter, Ib. 462; Aston v. Exeter, 6 V. 293; Leeds v. Strafford, 4 V. 180; Grierson v. Eyre, 9 V. 345; Willis v. Parkinson, 2 Mer. 507; Godfrey v.
- Littel, 1 Russ. & M. 59, 2 Russ. & M. 630; Brown v. Wales, 15 Eq. 142.
 - (b) Spike v. Harding, 7 C. D. 871.
- (c) A.-G. v. Stephens, 6 De G. M. & G. 133.
- (d) See Speer v. Crawter, 2 Mer. 415, 418; Clayton v. Cookes, 2 Atk. 449.

So, where several lands allotted to the holders of certain offices were for a long series of years in the possession of a single individual, in consequence of his holding all the offices, a confusion of boundaries taking place in consequence thereof seems to have been considered to be a good ground for proceedings in equity, though it was not necessary to determine the point (a).

And it seems where a confusion of lands was occasioned by a devisor, if they came into the hands of parties whose duty it was to ascertain the boundaries, a person entitled to part of such lands might come into equity to establish his claim. Thus in Hicks v. Hastings (b), a testatrix by her will appointed the manor of Watton (over which she had an equitable power of appointment) to uses, under which the plaintiff became entitled as tenant in tail in possession, and devised her residuary real estate to trustees upon trust to sell. The trustees sold (amongst other things) a field, part of which was shewn by the abstract to be parcel of the manor, and procured the legal estate in the whole to be conveyed to the purchaser. It was held by Page Wood, V.-C., that, notwithstanding the fault of the confusion lay with the party through whom the plaintiff claimed, the plaintiff was not precluded from establishing in the Court a claim to a portion of the land and to a proportional part of the rents from the time when he became of age. And an inquiry was directed, in what part of the field the plaintiff's portion was situated (c).

So relief would be granted not only against a party guilty of neglect or fraud in causing a confusion of boundaries, but also against all those who claimed under him, either as volunteers or purchasers, with notice (d).

The Court, in cases relating to confusion of boundaries, proceeds upon the same principle as it does where an agent or bailiff, or any other person in a fiduciary position, mixes the trust property with his own, that is, the *cestui que trust* will be held entitled to every portion of the blended property which the trustee cannot prove to be his own (e).

- (a) Kennedy v. Trott, 6 Moo. P. C. C. 467.
 - (b) 3 Kay & J. 701.
- (c) And see Clarke v. Yonge, 5 B. 523.
- (d) A.-G. v. Stephens, 6 De G. M. & G. 134; Hicks v. Hastings, 3 Kay & J.

701; Brown v. Wales, 15 Eq. 142.

(e) Lupton v. White, 15 V. 432; Panton v. P., cited 15 V. 440; Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 V. 46; Cook v. Addison, 7 Eq. 466; Re Oatway, (1903) 2 Ch. 356; Lewin (1904), p. 329.

The plaintiff must shew (1) some grounds of equitable relief: see supra, p. 184; (2) that some portion of the lands, the boundaries of which are alleged to have been confused, is in the possession of the defendant (a); (3) a clear title to some land in the possession of the defendant (b); (4) that without the aid of the Court the boundaries cannot be found (c).

In cases, however, where boundaries have become confused or lost by the acts of the parties, the action will generally take the form of a claim for a declaration of right and an injunction against trespass (d).

Although hearsay evidence is admissible on the question of parochial or manorial boundaries, it is not so as to the boundaries between two private proprietors (e). Nor is a tithe-map admissible in evidence as shewing boundaries in case of a disputed title (f). As to the evidence afforded by entries in parish books and receipts for rent, see the case cited below (g).

Where the quantity of land in the possession of the plaintiff is doubtful, the Court will direct an inquiry (h), or a commission or issue (i).

Another and a very old ground for equity interposing in cases of this kind, which is mentioned in the principal case, was to prevent multiplicity of suits (k). In the case of The Marquis of Bute v. The Glamorganshire Canal Company (l), a commission to ascertain boundaries was prayed for, and the bill, amongst other things, alleged that the defendants had gradually encroached upon the plaintiff's land, filling up the ditch or the greater part of it, and obliterating the boundary, and that the occupiers were fifty in number, and that it would be impracticable to proceed at law.

- (a) A.-G. v. Stephens, 6 De G. M. & G. 121.
 - (b) Ibid.
- (c) Miller v. Warmington, 1 J. & W.
- (d) Cf. Marshall v. Taylor, (1895) 1 Ch. 641.
- (e) Nicholls v. Parker, 14 East, 331 (n.); Clothier v. Chapman, Ib.; cf. Wills on Evidence, 2nd ed., p. 222 et seq.
- (f) Wilberforce v. Hearfield, 5 C.D. 709; Wills on Evidence, 2nd ed.,p. 229.

- (g) A.-G. v. Stephens, 1 Kay & J. 724.
- (h) Hicks v. Hastings, 3 Kay & J. 701.
- (i) Godfrey v. Littel, 2 Russ. & M. 630.
- (h) See Bouverie v. Prentice, 1 Bro. Ch. 200; Mayor, &c., v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 282, 284; and see Whaley v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & L. 370, 371; The Commissioners, &c., v. Glasse, L. R. 7 Ch. 456
 - (l) 1 Ph. 681.

The Courts have jurisdiction to issue a commission to ascertain boundaries in our colonies (a).

References.—A reference to Chambers may now be directed in lieu of the issue of a commission, further consideration being adjourned and costs reserved (b); or, semble, a reference under the 13th or 14th sections of the Arbitration Act, 1889; or an issue (c).

Forms of Commissions.—In the Forms of Commissions for ascertaining Boundaries it will be seen (d) that all proper consequential directions for compensation, apportionment, and accounts of rents and timber cut will be made. For a commission to set out the boundaries of two collieries, and the several closes and parcels of land thereto belonging, see Collingwood v. Jenison (e). For a decree to ascertain charity lands see cases cited below (f). For an order of reference to an engineer to make a plan of the medium line of high-water of the seashore in question, such plan to be deposited with the Clerk of Records, &c., to be inspected by the parties, see A.-G. v. Chambers (g).

Corporations.—As to authorising the identifying of land and other possessions of ecclesiastical and collegiate corporations, see 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 80.

Costs.—The costs of a commission for settling boundaries and separating freeholds and copyholds were ordered to be borne by the parties equally, though the interests were not equal, in Norris v. Le Neve (h). But in Habergham v. Stansfield (i), the costs of all parties were directed to be paid out of the testator's estate, rateably in the proportion of the value of the freeholds to the copyholds.

Right to Distrain lost by Confusion of Boundaries, &c.—A somewhat similar class of cases may be here mentioned, in which the owner of

- (a) Tulloch v. Hartley, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 114; Paget v. Ede, 18 Eq. 118; Penn v. Baltimore, post.
 - (b) Spike v. Harding, 7 C. D. 871.
- (c) Godfrey v. Littel, 1 Russ. & M. 59, 2 Ib. 630; R. S. C., 1883, O. 33, r. 1; O. 36, r. 5, Annual Practice, (1909), vol. i., pp. 485, 486.
 - (d) See Seton (1901), p. 1893.
 - (e) Ibid.

- (f) See A.-G. v. Bowyer, 5 V. 300; A.-G. v. Fullerton, 2 V. & B. 263; Reresby v. Farrer, 2 Vern. 414; Norris v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 32; A.-G. v. Wax Chandlers Co., L. R. 6 H. L. 14; Seton (1901), p. 1893.
 - (g) 4 De G. & J. 58.
 - (h) 3 Atk. 32.
 - (i) Seton (1901), p. 1893.

a rent will be entitled to relief in equity, "on the usage of payment," where, in consequence of the confusion of boundaries or otherwise, the particular lands on which the rent is a charge cannot be fixed on, as a fund for the legal remedy by distress (a).

But the Court will not grant relief unless the plaintiff can fix upon some house or parcel of land and say that it was part of the land sought to be charged; nor will it interfere in the case of heriots payable by custom out of the chattels of a deceased tenant by his executor, or against his heir, in the absence of his personal representatives (b).

Inclosure Acts.—Under the Inclosure Acts, 1845, 1876, the Board of Agriculture (c) has power, when lands are inconveniently mixed, to confirm an agreement for division made by the parties interested, and to counterchange the titles of parcels allotted on the division, and, with the consent of the lord in the case of copyhold lands, to appoint an assistant commissioner to make a redivision of intermixed lands (d).

Copyholds.—The Copyhold Act, 1894, s. 52, provides for the settlement of boundaries on an enfranchisement under that Act (e).

Charities.—Where charity lands have been occupied with other lands and the tenant cannot ascertain what part of the lands belongs to the charity, the Court of Chancery has frequently issued commissions to ascertain what belongs to the charity and what does not (f). As to the power of the Board of Charity Commissioners to ascertain lands charged with a rent for the benefit of a charity, not exceeding 10l, see 18 & 19 Vict. c. 124, s. 33.

- (a) See Leeds v. Powell, 1 Ves. Sen.
 171, 172; North v. Strafford, 3 P. W.
 148; Bouverie v. Prentice, 1 Bro. Ch.
 200; Leeds v. Corp. New Radnor, 2
 Bro. Ch. 518; Mayor of Basingstoke v.
 Bolton, 1 Drew. 289.
- (b) Mayor of Basingstoke v. Bolton, supra.
- (c) See the Board of Agriculture Act, 1889; Chitty's Statutes (Lely, 1894), "Agriculture."
- (d) See 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 70; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 56.
- (e) The Copyhold Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 46).
 - (f) See cases cited n. (a).

AGAR v. FAIRFAX. AGAR v. HOLDSWORTH.

1808-1811. 17 V. 533.

Partition.

Decree for partition among several joint proprietors; and no objection from a covenant not to inclose without general consent, rights of common, and the inequality and uncertainty of the shares in proportion to other estates. Form of decree.

The bill stated that Lord Fairfax and other persons were, in 1716, seised in fee of the manor of Bilbrough, in the county of the city of York, and of the greatest part of the lands in the said manor, and also of the whole of the piece of land in the said manor called Bilbrough Moor, then uninclosed; and by indentures of bargain and sale and release, dated the 14th of July, 1716, Lord Fairfax and the other persons so seised sold and conveyed all the said manors, lands, and Bilbrough Moor and other estates in the county of the city of York, to the use of Robert Fairfax and John Hardwicke and their heirs.

By indentures of lease and release, dated the 7th and 8th of September, 1716, reciting that part of the purchase-money paid for the premises, conveyed by the former deeds, was advanced to Robert Fairfax by Thomas March, under an agreement whereby he was to become the sole purchaser of the lands and hereditaments therein mentioned, Fairfax and Hardwicke conveyed to Thomas March and Arthur March the several lands, particularly described, situate in Bilbrough, and also all the said Thomas March's part and share of and in the moor or common called Bilbrough Moor, and of and in the soil, freehold, and inheritance of the same; which part or share, it was thereby declared, Thomas March had purchased of Robert Fairfax, together with the farms and lands thereby granted and released; and that the said moor was to be estimated and allotted

between the said Robert Fairfax and the said Thomas March, and the other purchasers under Robert Fairfax and John Hardwicke; viz., Charles Redman, Bernard Banks, Matthew Smith, and Nathaniel Hird, in proportion to the several farms and lands in Bilbrough aforesaid by them respectively purchased, and the valuations of the same, whenever the said moor or common called Bilbrough Moor should happen to be inclosed in time to come; but reserving to Fairfax and Hardwicke, their heirs and assigns, all the back lanes and the High Street, and a small waste thereupon in Bilbrough aforesaid, with liberty to them to inclose the same, subject, nevertheless (both before and after such inclosure), to such ways, &c., in and through the same, to be made by the said Thomas March, his heirs and assigns, as had been anciently and customarily used and enjoyed by the tenants, owners, or occupiers of the farms, lands, and premises thereby released to March and his heirs; to hold to Thomas and Arthur March, their heirs and assigns for ever.

The bill further stated that Redman, Banks, Smith, and Hird, respectively, purchased under Fairfax and Hardwicke divers farms and lands in Bilbrough, and also several parts or shares of Bilbrough Moor, and of and in the soil, freehold, and inheritance thereof, in proportion to the several farms and lands in Bilbrough aforesaid by them respectively purchased, and what should be the value thereof respectively, when the said piece of land called Bilbrough Moor should be divided or inclosed, in the same manner as the share of Thomas March in the said moor was to be estimated and allotted; and the said messuages, farms, lands, and premises, and the said parts or shares of Bilbrough Moor, were conveyed to Redman, Banks, Smith, and Hird, and their respective heirs and assigns, in fee simple; and Fairfax and Hardwicke retaining the remaining part of the said lands in Bilbrough, and a part or share of Bilbrough Moor, and of and in the freehold and inheritance thereof, in proportion to the farms and lands in Bilbrough aforesaid retained by them, and what should be the value thereof at the time when the said piece of land called Bilbrough Moor should be divided or inclosed, in the same manner as the share of the said Thomas March in Bilbrough Moor was to be estimated and allotted.

Arthur March, who was a trustee for Thomas March, died in his lifetime; and Robert Fairfax died in the lifetime of Hardwicke; and

by divers mesne conveyances, &c., the whole of the said premises, conveyed to Fairfax and Hardwicke, and Bilbrough Moor, became vested in the plaintiff, and such of the defendants to the original bill as therein named, in the manner, shares, and proportions therein stated: and they, and no other person, were seised in fee of the whole of Bilbrough Moor, and the freehold and inheritance thereof, as tenants in common, which had been used and enjoyed by them, and those under whom they derived title, as common of pasture, for horses, &c.

The bill prayed an account of the lands in Bilbrough, conveyed to Thomas and Arthur March, and those purchased by Redman and the other persons from Fairfax and Hardwicke, and of the lands retained by them: that the value of the said lands might be ascertained; and that a commission might be directed to issue, to ascertain the value of the said several lands, and the parts or shares of the plaintiff and the other persons named in Bilbrough Moor; and also to allot in severalty, make partition of, and divide Bilbrough Moor into six several parts or shares, in proportion to the amount of the true and just value of the several farms and lands in Bilbrough, so conveyed and purchased or retained; and that all the said shares of Bilbrough Moor, when so allotted, might be inclosed and held in severalty by the plaintiff and the other persons entitled, &c.

The answer stated, that in each of the derivative conveyances to the joint or sub-purchasers under Fairfax are contained covenants against inclosures of the moor without consent: viz., covenants by Robert Fairfax and John Hardwicke respectively, with each of the sub-purchasers, that neither he nor his heirs and assigns should or would inclose, or cause to be inclosed, any part of the said moor, other than the back lanes and small waste, as therein mentioned, without the consent of the said Thomas March, &c., his heirs or assigns; and Thomas March and the other sub-purchasers entered into similar covenants with Fairfax and Hardwicke not to inclose without the consent of them and their heirs. The answers also stated the persons in whom the estates so conveyed to Fairfax and Hardwicke were vested; and that those persons and their tenants, not exclusively, but together with others, had enjoyed and exercised the herbage and other rights and privileges in and upon Bilbrough Moor; and that the several rights, shares, and interests of the

persons entitled were uncertain, and in no wise ascertained; and the defendants submitted, that such partition as was sought by the bill ought not now to take place; particularly as such rights and interests, and the other rights and interests in and to the said moor, were uncertain and indeterminate, and the parties concerned were not agreed, and had not consented to having an inclosure or partition thereof; and submitted that the case now before the Court was not proper for a partition and inclosure by a Court of equity, but by Act of Parliament only, where facilities and benefits might be secured and objections and inconveniences obviated; the former of which could not be extended, and the latter removed, if the present attempt to obtain a partition and inclosure in this Court should succeed.

Mr. Richards and Mr. Bell, for the plaintiff.

Sir Samuel Romilly and Mr. Hall, for the defendants.—A bill for a partition under these circumstances is without precedent. Partition is of common right between parceners, joint tenants, and tenants in common; but it could not be compelled either at law or in equity, except amongst parceners, before the statute of Henry VIII.(a), which gave it to joint tenants and tenants in common of estates of inheritance; and in the following year (b) it was extended to particular estates. It cannot be applied to interests of any description beyond those defined limits, comprising persons with characters ascertained, and rights perfectly clear. These persons are represented as quasi-tenants in common. A tenancy in common may be of unequal, but not of unascertained shares. In the declaration between parceners or joint tenants, the demandant must state the title, and the distinct shares must appear; between tenants in common the declaration must state the title and share of the plaintiff, and the shares though not the distinct titles of the defendants. The statute of William III. (c), for advancing this remedy, adding particular ceremonies, declares, that in default of appearance, the Court may proceed to examine the demandant's title, and the quantity of his purpart; and shall for so much give judgment by default, and award

⁽a) Stat. 31 Hen. 8, c. 1, s. 2.

⁽b) Stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 32, s. 1.

⁽c) Stat. 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 31, repealed by S. L. Rev. Act, 1867.

a writ to make partition, whereby such purpart may be set out in severalty. The partition can only proceed upon the title so ascertained on the face of the instrument, not by inquiries.

It cannot be maintained that common rights form no objection. The lord could not, except under the Statute of Merton (a), have inclosed or taken any part of the waste; and that statute gives the right of approving, with the qualification, that it shall not be to the prejudice of the commoners, for whom it requires sufficient to be left. Even for the purpose of inclosure, partition cannot be made in prejudice of that right, and much less for any other purpose. statute of Edward VI. (b) accordingly declares the right of the commoner to pull down an inclosure by the lord infringing that right, and gives the remedy by assize, with treble damages. Formerly a greater degree of strictness prevailed upon partition here than in Courts of law; and that appears to be Lord Hardwicke's opinion, in Cartwright v. Pultney (c). In Lancashire there are many instances of rights enjoyed by several persons, capable of being ascertained, but still uncertain, of which, therefore, they cannot be considered tenants in common; and, if ascertained, they could not remain two days without variation, fluctuating continually, according to the management, husbandry, and cultivation of the different proprietors.

This property, therefore, enjoyed in common, but by unascertained, indefinite shares, is incapable of partition. It is impossible to frame a declaration, as the ascertained part cannot be proved, and no inquiry can be directed for that purpose. Further difficulties arise, from the nature of the property, with reference to rights long exercised and enjoyed upon it, independent of the title of these proprietors; being stocked, the herbage taken, &c., as it is said, by persons having no right; but it might be common appendant, or because of vicinage; or common appurtenant, or in gross; by grant or prescription. A very formidable impediment is the covenant against inclosing without mutual consent, which can be the only object of partition.

The form of the decree, in these cases, is not general. In *Curzon* v. *Lyster* (d), which was much considered, the direction was, that the persons named, any three or two of them, should go to, enter upon,

⁽a) Stat. 20 Hen. 3.

⁽c) 2 Atk. 380.

⁽b) 4 & 5 Edw. 6.

⁽d) Cited from a MS. note.

walk over, and survey the land, and make a fair partition, division, and allotment thereof in moieties: one to the plaintiff, the other to the defendant; and the parts so allotted to divide by metes and bounds, and to examine witnesses upon such interrogatories, as they should see occasion, &c. In some instances, close commissions were granted, the commissioners administering an oath of secrecy to the several persons before them. The commission in Curzon v. Lyster (a) originally was so; but according to Lord Redesdale's clear opinion, that is erroneous; the commission is, in all respects, analogous to the writ of partition. The commissioners are to do what the sheriff and jury would have done, and have no power to make any inquiry, except as to the very lands to be divided. The commission being in particular ascertained forms, a new one cannot be directed, and certainly not such as is now required, with power to compel a production of title deeds, to examine witnesses, and then to go upon each separate estate, ascertain the value, and divide accordingly, asking, in the alternative, either a commission or a reference to the Master, for the purpose of all these inquiries. The result will be several distinct cases, producing all the inconvenience which the covenant against inclosure without mutual consent was intended to prevent.

Mr. Richards, in reply.—All persons supposed to have rights of common were made defendants, and all disclaimed except two, who are parties claiming right of common, without stint, annexed to houses, directly contrary to law. If there are any common rights subsisting, they cannot be affected by partition. Admitting that the shares are not ascertained, that may and will be done by the commissioners, who will ascertain the shares in which all these joint proprietors of the land are interested; and for that purpose some previous inquiry may be necessary. In Calmady v. C. (b), much previous investigation was required to ascertain the shares and to make the proper distinction as to the costs. That course must be taken in every case where the parties differ as to their respective interests, either by an inquiry before the Master, or some other means, as in the case of dower, which is as much a right at law as partition, and depends, in this Court, on much the same principle.

⁽a) Supra.

The Court will find its way to the ultimate purpose; in the one case, the widow's right of dower; in the other, a partition among persons having an undivided interest, either as joint tenants, coparceners, or tenants in common.

This is clearly a tenancy in common: the trustees of Lord Fairfax, seised in fee of the whole, conveying distinct farms and shares of this moor to the several persons from whom these parties claim; under these circumstances, a partition is a matter of right: Parker v. Gerard (a). The shares are, in contemplation of law, ascertained, if they are capable of being ascertained, as they are, by reference to the prices paid by the several parties. In Leigh v. L. a manor, an entire thing, was the subject of partition; and it was impossible to know the value of a moiety of a sixth part without knowing the value of the whole. The only parties to the cause were those who were entitled to a moiety of a sixth; the commissioners must, therefore, have taken into consideration a subject of property, in the hands of persons not parties, and the duty of the commissioners was not less difficult than what is required by this bill,—a valuation having regard to the lands possessed by parties in the cause; in that case, a valuation with reference to shares of a manor not belonging to any party in the cause. This plaintiff prays the Court to declare the rights according to this deed, and that the commissioners shall divide according to the rights so declared. That object must be obtained, if not through commissioners, by a reference to the Master, under all the circumstances; these parties being clearly tenants in common, entitled in shares to be ascertained by comparison of the different farms and respective interests in the moor. The commissioners are to exercise their judgment according to the original price, or rather the present value, which is the true construction; and for owelty of partition they may, in their discretion, give more to one than another.

The covenant not to inclose is merely a private engagement, and cannot be considered as binding the parties not to apply to the law of the country, as a covenant to refer to arbitration will not prevent the party's assertion of his right in a Court of justice. This is a covenant inconsistent with the estate, applicable only to certain cases, and cannot prevent partition for ever. Partition is not within the (a) Amb. 236; see Warner v. Baynes, Amb. 589; Turner v. Morgan, 8 V. 143.

terms of a covenant not to inclose, and there may be great advantage from partition without inclosure. The commission in *Curzon* v. *Lyster* was settled by the Master, the forms being very different.

Cur. adv. vult.

Dec. 18, 1808.

SIR W. GRANT, M. R.—There are two cases in which the Court referred it to the Master to ascertain the interests of the parties, and afterwards directed a commission to issue: Calmady v. C. (a) and Duncan v. Howell. The uncertainty of the shares is not a ground for definitely refusing a partition; it is for refusing it at present. It cannot be referred to the commissioners to ascertain the interests: that must be done, as in those cases, by the Court, through the medium of the Master. In one of the cases, the form of the inquiry was, what undivided shares the several parties were entitled to, and for what estates and interests therein respectively.

The way in which it strikes me, is this. The parties have among them the whole interest in the soil and freehold, which they possess in common. Some of them seek a partition. It is said there cannot be a partition, on account of the uncertainty of their interests; the proportion to which each is entitled not being ascertained, that depending upon the quantity of interest each has in the estate of another, and the value of that estate, with reference to which value, the allotments of this moor are to be made among the parties, the owners of that estate, and of this moor also. That is no objection, as they are not the less tenants in common, though an operation must be performed before it can be ascertained to what undivided shares they were entitled as tenants in common. It must be seen what is the value of their shares in the other estate, by reference to which this allotment is to be made; and then they will be in the situation of parties having ascertained interests in this moor; but still they are tenants in common, and therefore have a right to a partition.

It seems to me to have been soundly objected, that it is impossible in the present situation to issue a commission, as then it must be referred to the commissioners, first, to ascertain their interests, and the proportions in which they are entitled, and then to make the allotment. The former was never done by commissioners. The

Court is to ascertain the proportions and rights of the parties, and when that is done, then the duty of the commissioners begins, to make the division in those ascertained proportions.

An objection was then taken to the rights of common over this moor. The rights of common are no objection to the commission, as that right will not be in the least affected by the partition, which regards only the freehold and inheritance of the soil. A partition never affects the interest of third parties. It is immaterial whether others have a right over that soil and freehold, which they have in common among them. Those rights will equally remain.

It is then said, there is a covenant not to inclose, except by consent of all the parties. I do not exactly understand what is the meaning of that covenant. If it is only, as it is expressed to be, against inclosure, what has that to do with partition? Partition does not require inclosure, but only that an allotment shall be made by metes and bounds. Whether they may have a right to inclose afterwards may depend upon other circumstances. It may depend upon the rights of third persons over this land, and upon the agreement of the parties themselves. The covenant against inclosure may have its effect, and I am not now called upon to say whether it shall or not.

It is then said, the rule by which the allotment is to be made, may be very unequal. It may be so, but it is a rule they have laid down for themselves. The inconvenience is of their own making, by the terms of their own agreement. If they were all agreed now, that there should be a partition, or that there should be an inclosure, this inconvenience as to the mode of making the valuation would still present itself.

There does not appear to me, therefore, in this case, anything to prevent a partition, after it shall have been ascertained what are the proportions in which the land is to be divided among the parties.

The decree declared, that the piece of land, called Bilbrough Moor, is to be allotted according to the present value of the several farms and lands in Bilbrough purchased by Thomas March, &c., and conveyed to them by the several indentures of the 7th and 8th, and 12th and 13th of September, 1716, and of the farms, &c., retained by Fairfax and Hardwicke, and directed a reference to the Master, to inquire and state to the Court what undivided shares the plaintiff,

and such of the defendants as had any estate of freehold or inheritance in the said moor, under the deeds of 1716, were entitled to, or interested in the said moor, and for what estates and interests therein respectively, &c.; and it was ordered that a partition should be made of Bilbrough Moor among the plaintiff and the said defendants, who by the report should appear to be entitled to any shares of freehold and inheritance of Bilbrough Moor, under the said deeds of 1716, according to such undivided shares thereof; and it was ordered, that a commission should issue for that purpose, all deeds in the power of the parties to be produced before the commissioners, with liberty to examine witnesses, &c.; and it was ordered, that what should be allotted to the several parties, should be held and enjoyed by them in severalty, and, if any of the parties were under any disability, they, when capable, and all other proper parties, should join in executing proper conveyances, &c., for conveying and vesting the several shares in and to the said parties respectively, according to their several rights and interests of, in, and to their several undivided parts and shares of and in the said moor, the costs of the commission and inquiry, and of the defendant Parkin (the heir of Hardwicke), whose costs were ordered to be paid by the plaintiff in the first instance, to be borne by the parties interested in the moor, in proportion to what should be their respective shares and interests in it, with liberty to apply.

From this decree a petition of appeal was presented, submitting, that, having regard to the nature and uncertainty of the rights of the parties, as well as of the value, and the particular circumstances of this case, it is not a case for partition, inclosure, or any relief to be administered in a Court of equity.

Mr. Richards and Mr. Bell, for the plaintiff.—Since the case of Warner v. Baynes (a), the difficulty of making partition has formed

(a) Amb. 589. See Turner v. Morgan, 8 V. 143. In that case the commission having been executed, an exception was taken by the defendant, on the ground that the commissioners allotted to the plaintiff the whole stack of chimneys, all the fireplaces, the only staircase, and all the conveniences in the yard. The Lord Chan-

cellor overruled the exception, saying, he did not know how to make a better partition for them; that he granted the commission with great reluctance, but was bound by authority; and it must be a strong case to induce the Court to interpose, as the parties ought to agree to buy and sell.

no objection in this Court. * * * Tenants in common having a right to partition at law, there must be some mode of having a calculation, if necessary, before their precise rights as tenants in common can be ascertained. Whatever is capable of division may be the subject of partition: manors, for instance; with every right of the lord; and even the waste grounds are divided: Sparrow v. Friend (the case of the manor of Brighton (a)); Lane v. Cox (the manor of Rolleston, in the county of Derby). In Parker v. Gerard (b) it was resisted. The property, situated in the north of England, consisted of cattle-gates, and of certain other rights, of a very peculiar nature; and partition was decreed in very minute fractions, according to the rights in the cattle-gates.

If there were other rights existing over this moor, that would not be an obstacle to partition among these persons having, by conveyance from the trustees, rights in the soil or freehold. * * * A covenant not to divide is not legal. There is no defect of parties; and the decree is right in form.

Sir Samuel Romilly and Mr. Hall, for the defendants.—There is no instance of such a bill as this; and the consequences it will lead to must be very important. * * * This is the case, not of all the owners except one agreeing, but of one, against the consent of all the rest, claiming a partition and conveyance, contrary to the express covenant, entered into on account of the difficulty, that there should be no partition unless they should all agree.

- * * All the authorities state, that a bill for partition is exactly the same as the writ at common law, with this single distinction, that, under the writ, those only are bound who are entitled to a subsisting estate of freehold, not those entitled in remainder, whom a Court of equity will bind as well as those who have particular estates: Parker v. Gerard (b); Turner v. Morgan (c).
- * * How can such a decree be executed? A considerable time may elapse between the report and the partition, and the value at the latter period, upon which the shares must depend, may be materially varied. The consequences of this jurisdiction may be easily imagined. Some of these estates having fallen to femes

⁽a) Cited from the decree.

⁽c) 8 V. 143.

⁽b) Amb. 236.

covert, infants, or persons in remote situations, may have been suffered to deteriorate; and that moment would be seized by a person who had improved his taking advantage of the consequence of superior wealth or the neglect of the others, to claim partition. For the very purpose of guarding against that, from a foresight of the difficulty, confusion, and injustice to which it would lead, was this covenant against inclosure, except by general consent, introduced. It is said, the covenant is void, as inconsistent with the nature of the estate, and it would be so; but this is the case, not of tenants in common, standing upon the common-law right, but of persons agreeing to hold, and looking to partition, in a mode not according to the law, protecting themselves against the improvidence of such an agreement in an unlimited way; and one of the parties to that special contract desires now to have a part performance, striking out that express provision for the consent of all. * * * Another difficulty arises from the rights of common of estovers and turbary, the bill stating the manner in which those rights have been always enjoyed.

The constant course of these decrees, is first to ascertain the shares, and then to come for a partition. * * * The reference, therefore, in the first instance, ought to be to ascertain, not the interests, but the value, computing the outgoings, &c., so as to ascertain the value at the time of division. This has not the character of a tenancy in common, in certain shares and proportions; and besides uncertainty, another objection is, that nothing passed immediately by this deed. The objection of uncertainty here is much stronger than in the case put by Walmesley in Corbett's Case (a), where the whole estate went to each on different days; but this consists of a great number of minute shares constantly They may have unequal shares, as Lord Hardwicke * * * No instance observes (b); but they cannot be uncertain. can be produced of partition under this difficulty, arising from the number of shares constantly varying, and an express provision that they should remain unascertained and indefinite.

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—The plaintiff in this cause is entitled to a partition; but the decree, though in terms as near as possible

⁽a) 1 Rep. 76. See 87 a.

to the case of Duncan v. Howell, I think, is not in form the exact decree authorised, under the circumstances of this case, by that precedent. The variation, however, will be in form merely, not in substance. The ground upon which the case of Calmady v. C. (a) proceeded was, that the plaintiff, shewing title to a part of the estate, was entitled to a partition; and though the titles of the defendants were not proved, a reference to the Master was directed for the purpose of ascertaining them; and the report finding that the plaintiff and the defendants were entitled to the whole subject, upon further directions the decree was made for a partition according to the shares so ascertained. I cannot find any other instance of such directions given as to the costs. How can I make infants pay costs?

This Court issues the commission, not under the authority of any Act of Parliament (b), but on account of the extreme difficulty attending the process of partition at law; where the plaintiff must prove his title, as he declares, and also the titles of the defendants; and judgment is given for partition according to the respective titles so proved. That is attended with so much difficulty, that by analogy to the jurisdiction of a Court of equity in the case of dower, a partition may be obtained by bill. The plaintiff must, however, state upon the record his own title and the titles of the defendants; and, with a view to enable the plaintiff to obtain a judgment for partition, the Court will direct inquiries, to ascertain who are, together with him, entitled to the whole subject. If, therefore, the state of the record, as originally framed, is not such as to authorise the Court to say, that the plaintiff and the defendants are respectively entitled in distinct shares, comprehending the whole subject, the proper course is to direct a reference to the Master, to ascertain what are the estates and interests of the plaintiff and the defendants respectively; and, if it appears that they, or some of them, are entitled to the whole, then to order a partition, according to the rights of all, or such of them as appear entitled; dismissing the bill as against those who do not appear to have any right.

The decree in Calmady v. C. is perfectly regular; directing the inquiry, and afterwards a commission to issue, to divide the estate among the several parties, who appear upon the Master's

⁽a) 2 V. 568.

report entitled to it. The omission in this decree to reserve further directions, is a mere informality, in not reserving a mode of dismissing from the record those who may have no title. Considerable difficulty arises in this case, from the covenant not to inclose.

The order afterwards pronounced by the Lord Chancellor, directed the decree to be affirmed, with the alteration after mentioned; viz., instead of the words, after the direction for the partition to be allotted, "according to the present value of the several farms and lands in Bilbrough, purchased, &c.," inserting the following words: "in shares according to the present respective values of the several farms and lands in Bilbrough respectively purchased;" and adding a declaration, that the plaintiff, being entitled to an undivided part of the said piece of land, called Bilbrough Moor, has a right to call for a partition of the said piece of land, as between him and the several persons entitled to the rest of the said piece of land: such partition to be made according to the declaration before mentioned; and directing a reference to the Master, to inquire and state, whether the plaintiff and the defendants respectively, or any and which of them, are entitled to the freehold and inheritance of Bilbrough Moor; and how; and if it shall appear, that all or any of them are so entitled to the said moor, then to ascertain the respective values of the farms and lands respectively purchased as aforesaid; and having so ascertained the respective values of the said farms and lands, the Master is to ascertain, as among the plaintiff and the defendants, whom he shall find to be entitled to Bilbrough Moor, in what undivided shares they are respectively entitled according to the declaration before mentioned; and in that case, a commission to issue to divide the said moor among the plaintiff and defendants, who by the report shall appear entitled to any shares of the freehold and inheritance of Bilbrough Moor, under the deed of 1716, according to such undivided shares thereof; with the usual directions for the production of deeds, &c., and liberty to examine witnesses; the shares allotted to the several parties to be held and enjoyed by them in severalty; and, if any parties appearing entitled to shares in Bilbrough Moor, are under any disability, and not capable of making the conveyance, they, when capable, and all other proper parties, to join in all proper conveyances, &c., respectively, according to their several

rights and interests of and in the several undivided shares of the said moor; and if the Master shall not find the plaintiff and defendants, or any of them, entitled to the freehold and inheritance of the said moor, to state that to the Court, before any further proceedings; and the consideration of costs and further directions was reserved, with liberty to apply.

The cause was heard (Dec. 11, 1810) for further directions, and upon the costs.

Mr. Richards and Mr. Bell, for the plaintiff.—They cited Calmady v. C. (a).

Sir Samuel Romilly and Mr. Hall, for the defendants.

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—This is really the great question, how costs are to be paid on partition. Several cases have occurred since Calmady v. C.; and I wish to know whether the practice has been uniform. It is, I apprehend, universally true, that no costs are given up to the hearing; of which I do not know an instance. As to the costs of making out the title being borne in proportion to the respective interests, that does not seem very just; as the expense may be greater of making out the title of a share worth 50l., than of one of the value of 5,000l. On the other hand, the decrees are short, in not providing that the costs of infants and married women shall be borne by the share in respect of which they were incurred. My impression is, that all the subsequent decrees have followed Calmady v. C.

(a) The decree in that cause ordered, that, when the defendant Hamlyn, an infant, should attain the age of twenty-one, the plaintiffs and the said defendant should execute mutual conveyances to each other of the several parts of the estate allotted to them; and in the meantime the plaintiffs and the defendant should hold and enjoy the several parts of the estate so allotted, &c.; and that the costs of issuing and executing the said com-

mission of partition, and also the costs of making out the title to the several parts of the said estate, be paid and borne by the plaintiffs and the said defendant, the infant, in the shares and proportions in which they are respectively entitled to the said estate under the said commission; and the decree provided for the raising of the plaintiffs' costs, but not for the raising of the infant defendant's

March 15, 1811.

The Lord Chancellor gave judgment upon the question of costs; declaring (a) that, as the party came into equity, instead of going to law, for his own convenience, the rule of law should be adopted, and therefore no costs should be given until the commission; that the costs of issuing, executing, and confirming the commission, should be borne by the parties, in proportion to the value of their respective interests; and there should be no costs of the subsequent proceedings (b).

NOTES.

1. Generally.

2. When, and of what property partition may be ordered, p. 208.

3. Who may claim partition, p. 210.

- 4. Modes in which partition is effected, p. 213.
- 5. Partition and sale under the Partition Acts, p. 217.
- 6. Other jurisdiction in partition, p. 232.

1. Generally,

Although Mr. Hargrave, in his note to Co. Litt. 169 b, has treated the jurisdiction of equity to compel partition between joint owners of real estate, as of modern origin, and as trenching upon the writ of partition, and wresting from the Courts of common law their ancient exclusive jurisdiction over the subject, he cites a case in Tothill, so far back as the 40 Elizabeth (c), which one might suppose would almost give the jurisdiction the sanction of antiquity. is, indeed, by no means clear that Courts of common law exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the subject, as Mr. Hargrave has assumed; but be that as it may, the Court of Chancery most probably assumed concurrent jurisdiction, not only, as is laid down in the principal case, from the extreme difficulty attending the process of partition at law, but also from the inadequacy of Courts of law by the writ of partition to deal properly with those cases in which partition was often desired. Many instances might be mentioned, in which the deficiency of Courts of law, in proceedings on the writ of partition, was supplied in equity, which appears, in an enlarged and liberal manner, to have acted upon the well-known rule of the Roman law:

⁽a) Ex relatione.

⁽b) See now as to costs, the Partition Act, 1868, s. 10, and cases cited post,

p. 227.

⁽c) See Toth. tit. "Partition."

"In communione vel societate nemo compellitur invitus detineri" (a). Upon the abolition of the writ of partition (b), equity acquired exclusive jurisdiction in cases of partition, and by s. 34, sub-s. 3, of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, all causes and matters for the partition and sale of real estates are assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice. But the statutes of Henry VIII. still provide for a partition being made between tenants in common, and recognise the right of the parties to it, although the common law writ was abolished as above stated (c).

2. When, and of what Property Partition may be ordered.

Difficulty of Partition.—The inconvenience or difficulty in making a partition has been held to be no objection to a decree (d). The absurdities to which this state of the law led, plainly pointed out the propriety of conferring upon the Courts, as has since been done, power in certain cases to order a sale instead of a partition of lands held in joint ownership. In the well-known case of Turner v. Morgan (e), there was a decree for a partition of a single house, and Sir Samuel Romilly in his argument mentions the case of one Benson, an attorney at Cockermouth, where the partition was actually carried into effect by building up a wall in the middle of a house (f). In Mayfair Property Co. v. Johnston (g), a garden wall was ordered to be partitioned, by dividing it longitudinally, and mutual conveyances were directed. Neither party in this case seems to have desired a sale (h). But it has never been considered necessary that every house on an estate should be divided, if a sufficient part of the whole could be allotted to each; and in making a division the Court would take the convenience of the parties into consideration (i).

Overriding Trust.—Where there are active trusts to be performed which may for some purpose require, in order that the testator's intention should be carried into effect, that the property should remain as an entirety in the trustees, no judgment for partition or sale can be made (k). For instance, where powers are given of

- (a) Cod. Lib. 3, tit. 37, 1. 5; Story, Eq. Jur. (1892) p. 426.
 - (b) See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 36.
- (c) See e.g. Mayfair Property Co. v. Johnston, (1894) 1 Ch. p. 513.
- (d) Warner v. Baynes, Amb. 589; Parker v. Gerard, Amb. 236.
 - (e) 8 V. 143.

- (f) See the note, ante, p. 201.
- (g) (1894) 1 Ch. 508.
- (h) See line 8 of the report, p. 511.
- (i) See Clarendon v. Hornby, 1 P. W. 446; Watson v. Northumberland, 11 V.
- 162; Lister v. L., 3 Y. & C. Ex. C. 540.
- (k) Taylor v. Grange, 15 C. D. p. 168; Cass v. Wood, 30 L. T. 670.

working quarries and making roads for that purpose (a); where the testator has fixed the time at which a sale is to be made (b), where a discretionary trust for sale is given (c). But where a mere power of sale is given for the purposes of division, a partition might be ordered, but would not be so if asked for vexatiously (d).

Disputed Legal Title.—A suit for partition being based on the assumption that there is no litigation, it was formerly held that a bill for a partition could not be made the means, even under Rolt's Act (e), for trying a disputed legal title. Thus in Slade v. Barlow (f), a plaintiff claiming to be legally entitled to an undivided share in a freehold estate, filed a bill for partition, raising the question, whether upon the construction of the settlor's will, the estate passed under a specific or under a residuary devise; it was held by James, V.-C., that the Court had no jurisdiction to try such a question in a partition suit, and the bill was ordered to be retained for a year with liberty to the plaintiff to bring such action as he might be advised (g).

Of what Property.—Freeholds have always been subject to partition, but copyholds and customary freeholds were first made so by 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, s. 85, and see now the Copyhold Act, 1894, s. 87; nevertheless, before the passing of the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, the Court might decree specific performance of an agreement to divide copyholds (h); or where there were both freeholds and copyholds to be divided, the Court might direct such a partition as to give the entire copyhold to one party, and the freehold, or a part of the freehold, to the other (i).

Leaseholds, also, under the statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 32, s. 1, were subject to a partition during the term, at the instance of the termor of an undivided share (k), and the rent was apportionable (l), but the Court has refused to decree partition of leaseholds where the

- (a) Taylor v. Grange, 15 C. D. p. 168; Cass v. Wood, 30 L. T. 670.
 - (b) Swaine v. Denby, 14 C. D. 326.
 - (c) Biggs v. Peacock, 22 C. D. 284.
 - (d) Boyd v. Allen, 24 C. D. 622.
 - (e) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42.
 - (f) 7 Eq. 296.
- (y) Potter v. Waller, 2 De G. & Sm. 410; Evans v. Bagshaw, 8 Eq. 469; Giffard v. Williams, L. R. 5 Ch. 546; Bolton v. B., 7 Eq. 298 (n.); Moore v. Kempston, Ir. R. 4 Eq. 306; Ward
- v. W., 18 W. R. 87; but see now Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, s.s. 7; R. S. C.,
 O. 18, r. 2; Seton (1901), p. 1873;
 Burt v. Hellyer, 14 Eq. 160; Waite v.
 Bingley, 21 C. D. p. 681.
 - (h) Bolton v. Ward, 4 Ha. 530.
- (i) Dillon v. Coppin, 6 B. 217 (n.);
 Jope v. Morshead, 6 B. 213; Clarke v.
 Clayton, 2 Gif. 333; Bowles v. Rump,
 W. R. 370.
 - (k) Baring v. Nash, 1 V. & B. 551.
 - (l) Ames v. Comyns, 16 W. R. 74.

landlord might immediately apply for an injunction to restrain the parties from executing it by any act amounting to waste (a); or where the Court could not protect one of the tenants in common from a breach of covenant, which might be committed by the other (b); and it seems, if the lessor had reserved to himself powers against his lessee, such as of entry, to work minerals, or cut timber, the Court would not have thought the case within the statute (c), so as to decree partition to the termor in his absence (d).

Partition has also been decreed of a manor (e); of an advowson (f); of tithes (g); of rent charges (h); and see (n.) "Difficulty of Partition," p. 208.

3. Who may Claim Partition.

Legal or Equitable Possession Necessary.—A person can only compel partition if entitled in possession (i), or entitled to call for the legal possession (k), or if entitled, subject to a mortgage of the whole (l). Such an action does not lie at the suit of a reversioner or remainderman (m), and a person seeking partition of leaseholds and claiming under a will not proved must obtain probate before relief can be granted (n).

Coparceners, Joint Tenants, &c.—Coparceners only, had at common law a right to compel partition (o), but by the Statute of Partition (p), joint-tenants and tenants in common of any estate of *inheritance* in their own right, or in right of their wives, might be compelled to make partition between them, and by 32 Hen. 8, c. 32, s. 1, joint-tenants and tenants in common for lives or years are declared compellable to make partition in the same way, and an infant tenant in common or joint-tenant may commence an action for partition (q).

- (a) North v. Guinan, Beat. 342.
- (b) Ib.
- (c) 32 Hen. 8, c. 32.
- (d) Ib.
- (e) Sparrow v. Friend, Dick. 348; Hanbury v. Hussey, 14 B. 152; Ley v. Cox, Ib. 157; Cattley v. Arnold, 4 Kay & J. 595.
- (f) Bodicoate v. Steer, Dick. 69; Matthews v. Bishop of Bath, Dick, 652; Seymour v. Bennett, 2 Atk. 483; Johnstone v. Baber, 6 De G. M. & G. 439; Young v. Y., 13 Eq. 174.
 - (g) Baxter v. Knollys, 1 Ves. Sen. 494.

- (h) See Rivis v. Watson, 5 M. & W. 255.
- (i) Co. Lit. p. 167 a; Evans v. Bag-shaw, 8 Eq. 469.
- (k) Taylor v. Grange, 13 C. D. 226;
 15 C. D. 168, and cf. Cartwright v. Pultney, 2 Atk. 380.
- (l) Waite v. Bingley, 21 C. D. 674, cited infra, p. 211.
 - (m) Evans v. Bagshaw, supra.
 - (n) Pinney v. Hunt, 6 C. D. 98.
 - (o) Co. Lit. 169 a.
 - (p) 31 Hen. 8, c. 1.
 - (q) Tuckfield v. Buller, Amb. 197.

Tenants for Life and Years.—Subject to the power conferred upon the Court by the Legislature under the Partition Acts, 1868 and 1876, to direct a sale instead of a partition, a decree of partition is a matter of right (a). Consequently, a decree may be obtained either by or against a person having only a limited interest, as a tenant for life (b); or a tenant in tail (c); or a tenant for life determinable upon marriage (d); a tenant by the curtesy (e); a tenant for a term (f); and where there are remaindermen who may come into esse and be entitled, they will be bound by a decree made against the tenant for life (g), and in an early case (h), the Court decreed a partition, notwithstanding femes coverts, infants, and incumbrancers, were concerned.

Lunatics, &c.—It is now settled that the next friend of a lunatic not so found may bring an action for partition, but no order for sale will be made until the Court is satisfied that it is for the benefit of the person of unsound mind (i). A lunatic may also be a defendant to such an action (k).

Mortgagor.—A mortgagor cannot sue for partition unless his mortgagee joins, for he has not the possession (l), and the nature of the property would be altered by the judgment (m). But if the mortgage is of the whole estate, one co-tenant can, subject to the rights of the mortgagees, who are not necessary parties, and whose rights are not affected, maintain an action against his co-tenant (n).

- (a) Baring v. Nash, 1 V. & B. 554;
 Parker v. Gerard, Amb. 236; Mayfair
 Property Co. v. Johnston, (1894) 1 Ch.
 p. 513.
 - (b) Gaskell v. G., 6 Si. 643.
 - (c) Brook v. Hertford, 2 P. W. 518.
 - (d) Hobson v. Sherwood, 4 B. 184.
 - (e) Co. Litt. 175 b.
- (f) Baring v. Nash, 1 V. & B. 551; Heaton v. Dearden, 16 B. 147.
- (g) Wills v. Slade, 6 V. 498; Gaskell v. G., 6 Si. 643.
- (h) Martyn v. Perryman, (1662) 1 Ch. R. 235.
- (i) Porter v. P., 37 C. D. 420, explaining Halfhide v. Robinson, L. R.
 9 Ch. 373; Watt v. Leach, 26 W. R. 475;
 Re Bolton, W. N. (88) 243; Willis v.
 W., 38 W. R. 7; Crook v. C., W. N.

- $(90)\ 26.$
- (k) As to the form of order, see Re Blooman, 6 W. R. 178; and see further as to such persons, Re Molyneux, 10 W. R. 512; Cowper v. Harmer, 57 L. J. Ch. 60; Re Watson, 58 L. T. 509; Singleton v. Hopkins, 4 W. R. 107; Moorehead v. M., 2 Ir. R. Eq. 492; Re Sherard, 4 De G. J. & S. 421; the Partition Act, 1868, s. 7, infra; the Trustee Act, 1850, s. 30; the Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 120; the Trustee Act, 1893, s. 30.
- (l) Watkins v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G. 622.
 - (m) Gibbs v. Haydon, 30 W. R. 726.
- (n) Waite v. Bingley, 21 C. D. 674;
 Swan v. S., 8 Price, 518; cf. Watkins
 v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G. 622.

In Sinclair v. James (a), the owner of the equity of redemption in a third share, subject to overriding mortgages over the whole, brought an action for partition and made the overriding mortgagees parties defendant. The action was on motion (b) dismissed as against the mortgagees of the entirety and the separate mortgagee of the plaintiff's share.

Mortgagee.—A mortgagee of an undivided share may commence an action for foreclosure and partition, and may move for a receiver of the rents of the undivided share of the mortgagor (c).

Legal Title.—It is essential to partition that the legal title should be before the Court (d), so where one of several tenants in common made a lease of his undivided share for 99 years, it was held that the lessee was a necessary party to a bill for partition (e), but a mortgagee of the entirety was not (f). Executors and trustees for sale of leaseholds, and devisees in trust, sufficiently represent those beneficially entitled (g).

Parties.—Since the Act of 1868 it is only necessary that a competent plaintiff and defendant should be named on the writ (h). Service of a notice of judgment under sect. 9 of that Act will now be sufficient to bind persons who formerly were made parties in the first instance, and if such service is dispensed with under sects. 3 and 4 of the Partition Act, 1876, parties interested may be bound as if served. An annuitant whose annuity is charged on the whole of the estate, is not a necessary party to a partition action (i).

Title.—The title of the plaintiff to an interest in the property of which he seeks partition must be clearly stated, and where he could show none, his bill has been dismissed (k). The title of the defendant may be alleged generally (l). The rule now, except in simple cases,

- (a) (1894) 3 Ch. 554.
- (b) Under R. S. C., 1883, O. 25, r. 4.
- (c) Fall v. Elkins, 9 W. R. 861; Davies v. D., 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1320; cf. Robinson v. Aston, 9 Jur. 224; Re Hawkesworth, Ir. R. 1 Eq. 179.
- (d) Miller v. Warmington, 1 J. & W. 493.
 - (e) Cornish v. Gest, 2 Cox, 27.
- (f) Swan v. S., 8 Price, 518; Clarke v. Clayton, 2 Gif. 333; Bowles v. Rump, 9 W. R. 370; Greenwood v. Percy, 26

- B. 572.
- (g) Stace v. Gage, 8 C. D. 451;
 Simpson v. Denny, 10 C. D. 28; R.
 S. C., 1883, O. 16, r. 8.
- (h) See e.g. Mason v. Keays, 78 L. T. 33 (C. A.).
- (i) Hixon v. Eastwood, W. N. (1868),
 p. 13; Poole v. P., W. N. (1885), 15.
 See "Rights of Third Parties," p. 215.
- (k) Parker v. Gerard, Amb. 236; Jope v. Morshead, 6 B. 213.
 - (1) Cartwright v. Pultney, 2 Atk. 380.

is to send a reference as to the title to Chambers (a), and also inquiries as to who are the persons interested, and for what estates and interests, and whether they are parties to the action, &c. (b). It seems, however, that a defendant in a partition suit was not entitled of right as against a co-defendant to an inquiry as to title (c). The uncertainty, therefore, of what are the shares of the different parties, is an objection, not to partition altogether, but to partition until such shares have been ascertained.

If the property is very small and the case simple, an immediate sale may be ordered on evidence showing the persons interested (d).

4. Mode in which Partition is Effected.

It is not the ordinary practice to issue a commission for the purpose of making a partition, as a partition can now be made more satisfactorily and much more cheaply by a Judge, in Chambers where inquiries are necessary, or at the hearing (e).

Commission.—Where commissioners are appointed for a partition the procedure is by summons (f).

The duties of commissioners in making their allotment are well set forth by Kindersley, V.-C., in Canning v. C. (g).

Judgment in Partition Actions (see p. 225).—Subject to the Partition Acts, a tenant in common, &c., is still entitled to an actual partition of the property held in common (h). In a judgment for partition the equitable rights of all the parties interested in the estate will be adjusted (i). Thus, although in point of law a defendant to a bill for partition might not have a lien on the premises for money expended in buildings and improvements, plaintiffs have not been allowed to take advantage of that expenditure without making an allowance: the Court, therefore, has refused to interfere but on such terms, and has ordered a reference to take

- (a) Hawkins v. Herbert, 37 W. R. 300; Wood v. Gregory, infra; cf. Re Stedman, 58 L. T. 709.
 - (b) See Seton (1901), pp. 1853, 1879.
- (c) Backhouse v. Paddon, 14 W. R. 273; and see note, "Disputed legal title," supra, p. 209.
- (d) Wood v. Gregory, 43 C. D. 82;Re Stedman, supra; Goodacre v. G.,W. N. (1888) 138.
- (e) See the Forms of Judgment for Partition, Seton (1901), p. 1853.
- (f) See Howard v. Barnwell, 2 N. R. 414; Seton, 1 ed., 189; Dan., 6 ed., p. 1336; Seton (1901), p. 1889.
- (g) 2 Drew. 436; and see Watson v.
 Northumberland, 11 V. 153; Corbet v. Davenant, 2 Bro. Ch. 252; Clarendon v. Hornby, 1 P. W. 446.
- (h) Mayfair Property Co. v. Johnston, (1894) 1 Ch. 508.
- (i) Story v. Johnson, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 586.

an account of what has been expended necessarily, or with the concurrence of the plaintiff (a).

And where one joint owner appears to have received more than his share of the rents and profits of the estate, the Court has directed an account (b), or where he had been in possession, he has been charged an occupation rent (c).

A tenant in common, however, occupying the premises, but admitting some co-tenants, and not excluding any, has been held not so chargeable (d), but he has been held to be chargeable if he excluded the others (e). However, unless a tenant in common in possession submits to be charged with an occupation rent, he will not be entitled to any account of substantial repairs and lasting improvements on any part of the property (f).

In $Re\ Jones\ (g)$ the owner of a moiety, who was also tenant for life of the whole, borrowed money on mortgage, which was with other moneys spent in permanent improvements of the property. In an action for partition after her death it was held, that the present value of the improvements, not exceeding the sum originally borrowed, must be borne rateably by the owners of both moieties.

A sum due in respect of occupation rent may be charged upon the particular share on further consideration (h), but not as against a mortgagee of this share.

The judgment may also direct that a sum be paid to one or the other of the parties for equality of partition (i).

And now in an action for partition, where one of the co-owners is in occupation, though not in exclusive occupation, of the property, the Court has jurisdiction under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 8, to appoint a receiver until the hearing, unless such co-owner elects to pay an occupation rent (k).

- (a) Swan v. S., 8 Price, 518, doubted by Pearson, J., in Re Leslie, 23 C. D.
 p. 564; Leigh v. Dickeson, 15 Q. B.
 D. 61, approved by North, J., in Re Jones, (1893) 2 Ch. p. 478; Kenrick v. Mountstephen, 48 W. R. 141. Cf. Rowley v. Ginnever, (1897) 2 Ch. 503.
- (b) Lorimer v. L., 5 Madd. 363; Hill v. Fulbrook, Jac. 574; Story v. Johnson, 1 Y. & C. 598; 2 Y. & C., 586; Hyde v. Hindly, 2 Cox. 408.
 - (c) Turner v. Morgan, 8 V. 145.
 - (d) M'Mahon v. Burchell, 5 Ha. 322.

- (e) Pascoe v. Swan, 27 B. 508.
- (f) Teasdale v. Sanderson, 33 B. 534; explained by North, J., in Re Jones, infra.
- (g) Re Jones, (1893) 2 Ch. 461; cf. Re Cook's Mortgage, (1896) 1 Ch. 923.
- (h) Graham v. Cole, Seton (1893),
 Form 19, p. 1541. Cp. Seton (1901),
 p. 1860; Hill v. Hickin, (1897) 2 Ch. 579.
- (i) Watson v. Gass, 30 W. R. 286; Seton (1893), Form 11, p. 1566.
 - (k) Porter v. Lopes, 7 C. D. 358.

A mill may be divided by giving to the parties every other tolldish, as would have been done at law in case of the writ de partitione faciendâ; and in this case æquitas sequitur legem (a), and an advowson may be divided by giving every other presentation to the church (b). In the case, however, of Johnstone v. Baber (c), the right to present to an advowson being vested in tenants in common, it was held that the right to nominate was not to be exercised according to seniority, but was to be determined by lot (d). In such cases, even under the old law, the Court would, it seems, direct the partition at once, by decree, without resorting to a commission (e). But under the modern law prior to the Benefices Act, 1898, the Court, in the case of any advowson, would have ordered it to be sold, and the proceeds to be divided amongst the parties according to their interests (f); because by reason of the nature of such property a sale, and a distribution of the proceeds thereof, after payment of costs, would have been more beneficial for the parties interested than a partition of the property between them.

But by the Benefices Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 48), s. 1, sub-s. 2, it is made unlawful to offer for sale by public auction any right of patronage, save in the case of an advowson to be sold in conjunction with any manor or with an estate of not less than 100 acres situate in the parish in which the benefice is situate, or in an adjoining parish, and belonging to the same owner as the advowson (g).

Rights of Third Parties.—A partition never affects the rights of third parties; tor instance, in the principal case, it was held, that the rights of common of others over the soil and freehold, which the parties to the bill had in common amongst them, would not be affected by the partition. So, where an action was commenced for a partition of an estate by the owner of one moiety against a defendant owning the other moiety, it was held, that an annuitant whose annuity was a charge on the whole estate, was not a necessary party to the action, but the order was drawn up with a declaration that it was without prejudice to the rights of the annuitant, and that inter se each of the parties to the action was liable to pay one half of the annuity (h).

- (a) Clarendon v. Hornby, 1 P. W. 447, per Lord Macclesfield.
 - (b) Ib.
 - (c) 6 De G. M. & G. 439.
 - (d) Seton (1893), Form 13, p. 1567.
- (e) Bodicoate v. Steer, 1 Dick, 69; Seton, Form 12, p. 1566.
 - (f) Young v. Y., 13 Eq. p. 175 (n.).
- (g) It appears that this enactment has considerably restricted the power of the Court to order sale in lieu of partition in the case of advowsons.
- (h) Poole v. P., W. N. (1885), 15. See as to mortgagees (n.) "Mortgagor," supra, p. 211.

Where, in a suit for partition, the defendants are desirous that there shall be no partition of their several shares, the partition may be confined to the aliquot share of the plaintiff (a).

Conveyances.—A partition at law vested the legal estate (b). A judgment for partition in the Chancery Division vests the equitable right only, and must be completed by conveyances or their equivalent. The judgment on further consideration for partition contains, therefore, directions for the execution of mutual conveyances, and for the disposal of the title deeds, &c. (c).

Where the shares have been allotted to each of the parties, the partition is perfected by reciprocal conveyances; and one party cannot impose upon another as a condition of his executing a conveyance, that all the other parties must join in the conveyance to him (d).

On the death, after judgment, of a person entitled to a share, the Court will direct, in case he has devised it, that it should be allotted to his devisee (e).

Where the shares of the parties were very minute and complicated, the Court, in order to save expense, instead of directing a conveyance of the several shares, has declared each of the parties trustees as to the shares allotted to the others of them, and then vested the whole trust estate in a single new trustee under the Trustee Acts, with directions to convey to the several parties their allotted shares (f).

Infants.—Where infants were parties, the conveyances formerly were respited until they came of age, and a day given them to show cause against the decree (g), but the practice now is to direct a conveyance at once, and then to declare the infant a trustee without giving him a day to show cause (h).

Title Deeds.—Where parties to a partition action are equally interested, the custody of the deed of partition and other deeds is

- (a) Hobson v. Sherwood, 4 B. 184.
- (b) Whaley v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & L. 372; Miller v. Warmington, 1 J. & W. 493
- (c) Seton (1901), p. 1869; Mayfair Property Co. v. Johnston, (1894) 1 Ch. p. 515; and as to title-deeds, see infra.
- (d) Orger v. Sparke, 9 W. R. 180; and see Bowra v. Wright, 4 De G. & Sm. 265.
- (e) Valentine v. Middleton, 2 Ir. Ch. R. 93.

- (f) Shepherd v. Churchill, 25 B. 21; and see Partition Act, 1868, s. 7, infra, and Beckett v. Sutton, 30 W. R. 490.
- (g) See Brook v. Hertford, 2 P. W.
 518, 519; Tuckfield v. Buller, Dick.
 240, Amb. 197; Thomas v. Gyles, 2
 Vern. 232; Wills v. Slade, 6 V. 498;
 A.-G. v. Hamilton, 1 Madd. 214.
- (h) Per Kay, J., in Mellor v. Porter, 25 C. D. p. 161; Davis v. Ingram, (1897) 1 Ch. 447; and see Partition Act, 1868, s. 7, infra; Trustee Act, 1893, s. 31.



given to the plaintiff; but if they are not, then they are usually given to the person who has the largest interest in the property (a). Where a great many persons were interested in a partition deed, it was directed to be enrolled, with liberty to any party to have a duplicate at his own expense (b). But if any of the deeds relate solely to any distinct part of the property allotted to any party, they will be delivered to him (c). The deeds are sometimes ordered to be deposited in the Central Office for the mutual benefit of the parties (d).

5. Partition and Sale under the Partition Acts.

The Partition Acts, 1868 and 1876, have very usefully increased the jurisdiction of Courts of equity (now assigned to the Chancery Division by Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34, s.s. 3), to direct sales instead of partitions.

The Partition Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 40).

S. 3. "In a suit for partition, where, if this Act had not been passed, a decree for partition might have been made, then if it appears to the Court, that, by reason of the nature of the property to which the suit relates, or of the number of the parties interested, or presumptively interested therein, or of the absence or disability of some of those parties, or of any other circumstance, a sale of the property and a distribution of the proceeds would be more beneficial for the parties interested, than a division of the property between or among them, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the request of any of the parties interested, and notwithstanding the dissent or disability of any others of them, direct a sale of the property accordingly, and may give all necessary or proper consequential directions."

"Suit for Partition."—See the definition given in the Act of 1876, s. 7, infra, p. 232.

"Where, if this Act had not been passed," &c.—These words, which occur in this and the two next sections, limit the operation of the Act to those cases in which partition might have been decreed before it was passed: as to which see Parts 2 and 3, supra.

"More beneficial."—That is in a money sense (e). The onus of proof is on those seeking a sale (f). The Court has ordered, as

- (a) Elton v. E., 27 B. 633; see Jones
- v. Robinson, 3 De G. M. & G. 911. (b) Elton v. E., 27 B, 632.
- (c) Jones v. Robinson, 3 De G. M. &
- (d) Seton (1901), p. 1891, and Forms,
- Ib. p. 1883.
- (e) Drinkwater v. Radcliffe, 20 Eq.
 523—528; Fleming v. Crouch, W. N.
 (1884) 111.
- (f) Huddersfield v. Jacomb, W. N. (1874) 80.

being more beneficial to the parties than a partition, the sale of an advowson (a); of a farm house and thirty acres of land divisible into thirty-six shares (b); of an estate comprising a first-class mansion, with a park of nearly 200 acres, above 3,000 acres of agricultural land, and a manor the rights of which extended over thirty square miles, divisible in moieties (c); and in Ireland, of an estate during the minority of three of the defendants, although there was a direction in the will under which they derived their interest in the estate that no sale should take place until the youngest of them should attain twenty-one (d).

"If it thinks fit."—The power is discretionary (e), and will not as a rule be interfered with on appeal (f).

"On the Request."—This is an absolute power of sale on the request of anybody, provided the Court is satisfied that it would be more beneficial for the parties interested than a division (g).

As to requests for sale by persons under disability, see the Act of 1876, s. 6 (h). A sale has been ordered at the request of a mortgagee (i).

"Direct a Sale."—This section gives power to the Court to sell for certain reasons. These reasons are specified in every case but one. The reasons specified are—the nature of the property, the number of the parties interested, the absence or disability of some of the parties. The reasons are unspecified in one case, viz., where by reason of any "other circumstance" a sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds would be more beneficial to the parties interested than a division of the property between or among them. Whenever that happens, and any party interested applies for a sale, the Court may direct a sale (k).

And the Court, if it thinks it to be beneficial so to do, may order a sale at the request of parties holding a small amount of shares against the wishes of those holding a very much larger amount. Thus, it has been held that a sale might be ordered at the request of a

- (a) Young v. Y., 13 Eq. 175.
- (b) Drinkwater v. Radeliffe, 20 Eq. 528.
- (c) Pemberton v. Barnes, L. R. 6 Ch. 685.
- (d) Thompson v. Richardson, Ir. R. 6 Eq. 596; see also Pitt v. Jones, 5 A. C. 651.
- (e) Pemberton v. Barnes, supra.
- (f) Dyer v. Paynter, 33 W. R. 806.
- (g) Per Jessel, M. R., in Drinkwater v. Radeliffe, supra.
 - (h) Post, p. 231.
 - (i) Davenport v. King, 49 L. T. 92.
- (k) Drinkwater v. Radcliffe, supra. See (n.) "Judgments," &c., p. 225.

person holding one-tenth against parties holding the other nine-tenths (a). But the onus lies on the owners of the smaller share who desire a sale, of showing that it is, under the circumstances, the most beneficial course for all parties (b).

S. 4. "In a suit for partition, where, if this Act had not been passed, a decree for partition might have been made, then if the party or parties interested, individually or collectively, to the extent of one moiety or upwards in the property to which the suit relates, request the Court to direct a sale of the property and a distribution of the proceeds, instead of a division of the property between or among the parties interested, the Court shall, unless it sees good reason to the contrary, direct a sale of the property accordingly, and give all necessary or proper consequential directions."

"Parties Interested * * * to Extent of One Moiety."—Where the owners of a moiety ask for a sale under this section, it is imperative on the Court to order a sale, unless it sees good reason to the contrary; that is to say, the onus is thrown on the persons who say that the Court ought not to order a sale, to show some good reason why it should not do so; otherwise the Court is bound to order it (c). The mere fact that the owners of the other moiety oppose a sale is not a sufficient reason to the contrary. "It would," said Hatherley, C., "be striking the 4th section out of the Act to say that the owners of the other moiety have no more to do than to come and say 'we do not wish for a sale'" (d).

With regard to the question who can be considered owner of a moiety, where real estate was settled as to one moiety to the separate use of P., a married woman, for life, with remainder as she should, notwithstanding coverture, by will, appoint, and in default to T., it was held, that although if M. did not appoint, her share would go over, she was the owner of one moiety of the estate within the meaning of the 4th section (e). A mortgagee is a person interested (f).

- "Request the Court."—The request may be withdrawn and a partition asked for (g).
- (a) Pemberton v. Barnes, L. R. 6 Ch. 699.
 - (b) Allen v. A., 21 W. R. 842.
- (c) Pemberton v. Barnes, L. R. 6 Ch.
 693; Lys. v. L., 7 Eq. 126, 128; Porter
 v. Lopes, 7 C. D. 358; Fleming v.
 Crouch, W. N. (1884) 111.
- (d) Pemberton v. Barnes, supra.
- (e) Parker v. Trigg, W. N. (1874), p.
- (f) Davenport v. King, 49 L. T. 92.
- (g) Williams v. Games, Pitt v. Jones, infra; and see Partition Act, 1876, s. 6, infra.

"Shall unless * * good reason to the contrary direct a Sale."—That is, shall direct a sale, irrespective of the nature of the property, irrespective of the number of persons, irrespective of absence or disability, irrespective of any special circumstances which make the Court think it beneficial. The parties interested to the extent of one moiety are entitled to a sale as of right, unless there is some good reason to the contrary shown; they have not to show any reason for the sale, but a reason to the contrary must be shown (a).

The fact that the owner of one moiety of an estate is yearly tenant of the whole property, and occupies it for commercial purposes, and also resides thereon, is no sufficient reason why a sale of the property should not be decreed hereunder (b). The fact, moreover, that the income of an infant defendant, interested in a moiety of the property in question, might be materially diminished by the Court directing a sale, is not a sufficient reason within the meaning of the section, against the Court directing a sale when asked for by the owner of the other moiety (c).

In a case in Ireland it has been laid down that the only "good reason to the contrary" is to show affirmatively that there is no difficulty in making an actual partition (d). See further as to "good reason," Pemberton v. Barnes (e), and Saxton v. Bartley (f).

S. 5. "In a suit for partition, where, if this Act had not been passed, a decree for partition might have been made, then, if any party interested in the property to which the suit relates, requests the Court to direct a sale of the property and a distribution of the proceeds instead of a division of the property between or among the parties interested, the Court may, if it thinks fit, unless the other parties interested in the property, or some of them, undertake to purchase the share of the party requesting a sale, direct a sale of the property and give all necessary or proper consequential directions; and in case of such undertaking being given, the Court may order a valuation of the share of the party requesting a sale, in such manner as the Court thinks fit, and may give all necessary or proper consequential directions."

- (a) Per Jessel, M. R., in Drinkwater v. Radcliffe, 20 Eq. 530; Pitt v. Jones, 5 A. C. 661.
- (b) Wilkinson v. Joberns, 16 Eq. 14; Roughton v. Gibson, W. N. (1877) (V.-C. B.), p. 32.
- (c) Rowe v. Gray, 5 C. D. 263; Roughton v. Gibson, 36 L. T. 93,
- 25 W. R. p. 269; but see Langmead v. Cockerton, 25 W. R. 315; Porter v. Lopes; Fleming v. Crouch, supra.
- (d) Re Langdale's Estate, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 572; Re Whitwell, 19 L. R. Ir. 45.
 - (e) L. R. 6 Ch. 693.
 - (f) 48 L, J. Ch. 519.

"May * * unless the other Parties * * undertake."—It is clear that the 5th section was intended for the benefit of part-owners who desire a sale; in which case the other parties interested who object to a sale may be compelled to buy the shares or have a sale, but there is nothing to compel a man to sell his shares at a valuation (a). The construction to be put upon the 5th section has been well explained by Jessel, M. R., in Drinkwater v. Radcliffe(b). "The 5th section," says his Lordship, "provides that, if any party interested in the property requests the Court to direct a sale of the property instead of a division, the Court may, if it thinks fit (this is discretionary), unless the other parties interested in the property undertake to purchase, give all necessary and proper directions for such sale. What does that mean? Under the 4th, where the parties requesting a sale have got more than a moiety, you do not want that; it consequently applies to the case of the owners of less than a moiety making the request. Now that case is provided for by the 3rd section; in every possible case where the Court thinks a sale is proper and for the benefit of the parties interested. Therefore the 5th must apply to a case where the Court sees no reason for preferring a sale to a partition. That case is not provided for by the 3rd, nor is it provided for by the 4th section. Where the Court sees no reason at all, still any party interested may apply; and then there is a limit imposed, and the limit is this, that the Court shall not exercise the new power given by the 5th section, which depends entirely upon the caprice of the party asking, without any opinion of the Court being expressed, if other people will buy. That is a check upon the new power-not, as it has been supposed to be, a limitation of the 3rd and 4th sections (c); but it is a new power given to any party, whether plaintiff or defendant, to apply with or without any reason whatever, to the Court for a sale, and he is entitled to ask for it unless somebody is going to buy; and then Williams v. Games says that if he does apply for it and somebody else does offer to buy his share, he may withdraw his request. That is my view of the law." This section does not qualify or control section 3, but is an independent clause giving an entirely new power (d). A party asking for a sale cannot be compelled to part with his share at a valuation, and the Court cannot order a sale if an undertaking be offered (e). The undertaking to purchase ought to be given at the

⁽a) Williams v. Games, L. R. 10 Ch. 204.

⁽c) See Pitt v. Jones, 5 A. C. 651.(d) Pitt v. Jones, 5 A. C. at p. 659.

⁽b) 20 Eq. 531.

⁽e) Pitt v. Jones, supra.

hearing (a), and may now be given, as in the case of a request for sale, by a party under disability (b). The onus of showing some good reason for ordering a sale hereunder is on the applicant (c), and the Court is not bound to order a sale hereunder, even if none of the persons interested undertake to purchase (d).

S. 6. "On any sale under this Act, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow any of the parties interested in the property to bid at the sale, on such terms as to non-payment of deposit, or as to setting off or accounting for the purchase-money, or any part thereof, instead of paying the same, or as to any other matters, as to the Court seem reasonable."

"The Court may."—Although as a general rule parties having the conduct of a sale are not allowed under the 6th section to bid (e), the Court, nevertheless, has, under peculiar circumstances, allowed this to be done (f). In another case on an order for sale, liberty was given to either party to bid, some third party in Chambers to have the conduct of the sale (g).

A defendant, moreover, the owner of a moiety, was allowed to bid, upon the terms, in the event of his becoming a purchaser, of paying into Court one moiety only of the purchase-money (h).

S. 7. This section, which enacted that section 30 of the Trustee Act, 1850, should extend and apply to cases, where in suits for partition the Court directed a sale instead of a division of the property, was repealed by the Trustee Act, 1893. Section 31 of that Act replaces this section and section 30 of the Trustee Act, 1850.

Section 31, supra, so far as concerns partition, enacts that "where a judgment is given for . . . partition or sale in lieu of partition . . . of any land . . . the High Court may declare that any of the parties to the action are trustees of the land or any part thereof within the meaning of this Act or may declare that the interests of unborn persons . . . are the interests of persons who on coming into existence would be trustees within the meaning of this Act and thereupon the High Court may make a vesting order

- (a) Drinkwater v. Radcliffe, 20 Eq. 528, 532.
- (b) Partition Act, 1868, s. 3, supra,p. 217; Partition Act, 1876, s. 6, p. 231.
 - (c) Richardson v. Feary, 39 C. D. 45.
 - (d) Ib.
 - (e) Gilbert v. Smith, 11 C. D. p. 82.
- (f) Pennington v. Dalbiac, 18 W. R. 684; not followed in Verrall v. Cathcart, 27 W. R. 645.
 - (q) Roughton v. Gibson, infra.
- (h) Wilkinson v. Joberns, 16 Eq. 14, 18; cf. Roughton v. Gibson, 25 W. R. 269.

relating to the rights of those persons, born and unborn, as if they had been trustees."

Independently of statute, wherever the Court had jurisdiction to make a decree for sale, such decree bound in equity the interests of all persons not in existence, and who could not be made parties to the suit; statutory authority was, however, necessary to enable the Court to effectuate the transfer of the legal estate (a).

Where the shares of parties to a partition suit were very minute and complicated, the Court declared each of the parties trustees as to the shares allotted to the other of them, and vested the whole in a single trustee with directions to convey to each of the parties their allotted shares (b).

S. 8. "Sections 23 to 25 (both inclusive) of the Act of the session of the 19th and 20th years of her Majesty's reign (c), 'to facilitate leases and sales of settled estates,' shall extend and apply to money to be received on any sale effected under the authority of this Act."

The Settled Estates Act, 1856, was repealed by the Settled Estates Act, 1877, sections 34 to 36 of which correspond to sections 23 to 25 of the repealed Act.

Sale out of Court.—Under this section the Court has power to order a sale out of Court and payment of the proceeds to trustees (d). In Strugnell v. S. (e) it was held that where some of the parties interested are not $sui\ juris$ and the trustees have no power of sale there is no jurisdiction hereunder to order a sale out of Court (f). This section applies to dealings with all estates, whether settled or not (g).

Conversion.—A judgment for sale in a partition action properly made converts the shares of the parties thereto (h), and the conversion takes place from the date of the judgment, and before sale (i).

Where, however, real estate is sold under a judgment on a partition action in the case of parties under disability, an equity for recon-

- (a) Basnett v. Moxon, 20 Eq. 182, 184; Stanley v. Wrigley, 3 Sm. & G. 18; Lees v. Coulton, 20 Eq. 20. As to the present practice with regard to infants, see Mellor v. Porter, 25 C. D. 161, and p. 216, supra; and as to lunatics, see p. 211, supra.
- (b) Shepherd v. Churchill, 25 B. 21; Orger v. Sparke, 9 W. R. 180.
- (c) Ch. 120 (Settled Estates Act, 1856).
- (d) Hayward v. Smith, 20 L. T. 70; Chubb v. Pettipher, W. N. (1872), p. 110, not followed in Baker v. B., unre-

ported; see Strugnell v. S., 27 C. D. 259.

(e) 27 C. D. 259.

- (f) And see Re Harvey's S. E., 21 C.
 D. 123; Higgs v. Dorkis, 13 Eq. 280;
 Aston v. Meredith, 13 Eq. 492.
 - (g) Re Barker, 17 C. D. 244.
- (h) Arnold v. Dixon, 19 Eq. 113; RePickard, 53 L. T. 293.
- (i) Hyett v. Mekin, 25 C. D. 735;
 Re Dodson, (1908) 2 Ch. 638; Burgess
 v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 649, following
 Steed v. Preece, 18 Eq. 192.

version arises by force of this section; this equity is applicable in the case of the share of an infant (a), or a married woman who has done nothing to affect her equity (b), and also in the case of the share of a person of unsound mind (c); and upon their deaths, their shares will be treated as realty (d). If a person suijuris becomes entitled as heir-at-law to the share of an infant in lands sold hereunder, he takes it as personal estate (e).

This equity was held not to exist where a married woman requested or consented to a sale under section 6 (infra) of the Partition Act, 1876, and the property was held to be converted (f). The share of a married woman who elected to treat it as personalty might, with her consent, be paid to her husband (g), and where the fund was under 200l, it was paid to her on her separate receipt, without separate examination, on an affidavit of no settlement (h). The equity is not, however, affected in the case of an infant requesting or giving his consent to a sale through his next friend (i).

- S. 9. "Any person who, if this Act had not been passed, might have maintained a suit for partition, may maintain such suit against any one or more of the parties interested, without serving the other or others (if any) of those parties; and it shall not be competent to any defendant in the suit to object for want of parties; and at the hearing of the cause, the Court may direct such inquiries as to the nature of the property, and the persons interested therein, and other matters as it thinks necessary or proper, with a view to an order for partition or sale being made on further consideration; but all persons who, if this Act had not been passed, would have been necessary parties to the suit, shall be served with notice of the decree or order on the hearing, and after such notice shall be bound by the proceedings, as if they had been originally parties to the suit, and shall be deemed parties to the suit; and all such persons may have liberty to
 - (a) Foster v. F., 1 C. D. 588.
- (b) Mildmay v. Quicke, 6 C. D. 553; Re Lloyd, 9 P. D. 65.
- (c) Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843; Re Barker, 17 C. D. 241; Re Pares, 12 C. D. 333; A.-G. v. Ailesbury, 14 Q. B. D. p. 901.
- (d) Howard v. Jalland, W. N.,(1891) 210. Approved in Re Norton,(1900) 1 Ch. 101.
- (e) Mordaunt v. Benwell, 19 C. D. 302.
 - (f) Wallace v. Greenwood, 16 C. D.

- 362; and see Hyett v. Mekin, supra; and cf. Fowler v. Scott, 19 W. R. 972.
- (g) Standering v. Hall, 11 C. D.652; Re Robins, 27 W. R. 705.
- (h) Wallace v. Greenwood, 16 C. D.
 362; cf. Topham v. Burgoyne, 41 L.
 T. 670. The limit is now 500l., Seton (1893), p. 789; Re Morton, W.N. (74)181.
- (i) Re Norton, (1900) 1 Ch. 101; approving Howard v. Jalland, supra, and questioning Wallace v. Greenwood, 16 C D. 362; but see Re Dodson, (1908) 2 Ch. at p. 643.

attend the proceedings; and any such person may, within a time limited by general orders, apply to the Court to add to the decree or order."

"Parties, &c."—As to parties to partition actions see supra (a).

"Shall be served."—A sale cannot be ordered until all parties are before the Court (b), or have been served with notice of the judgment (c), unless such service has been dispensed with (d), or they are sufficiently represented by their trustees (e), or death is presumed (f).

Judgments and Orders (see p. 213).—If all persons interested are parties, and the title is proved at the hearing, a judgment for sale may be then given (g). Where the defendants admit the title, an order may be made directing the usual inquiries as to the persons interested in the property (h); and in Ripley v. Sawyer (i) such inquiries were held to be sufficient protection to infants. Or an order for sale may be made conditional on the persons interested being certified as being parties to the action (k). The general rule is, however, to send a reference as to title to Chambers (l).

Where all the parties are not before the Court, a sale can only be ordered at the hearing on further consideration (m), or on certificate as above mentioned.

Inquiries may be directed in a District Registry, but the application for sale should be to the Judge to whom the action is assigned (n).

When in a partition suit a decree is made for sale dependent upon its being found under inquiries thereby directed that it would be

- (a) Note "Parties," p. 212.
- (b) Mildmay v. Quicke, 20 Eq. 537; Dodds v. Gronow, 17 W. R. 511.
 - (c) See R. S. C., 1883, Order 16, r. 40.
- (d) See Partition Act, 1876, s. 3, infra; R. S. C., 1883, O. 55, rr. 35, 35A; Phillips v. Andrews, 56 L. T. 108.
- (e) See Goodrich v. Marsh, W. N. (1878) 186; R. S. C., 1883, O. 16, r. 8; Stace v. Gage, 8 C. D. 451.
- (f) Jackson v. Lomas, 23 W. R. 744; Rawlinson v. Miller, 1 C. D. 52.
- (g) Mildmay v. Quicke, 20 Eq. 538; Lees v. Coulton, 20 Eq. 20; Powell v. P., L. R. 10 Ch. 130; Rawlinson v. Miller, 1 C. D. 52; Gilbert v. Smith, 2

- C. D. 686; Burnell v. B., 11 C. D. 213;Dodds v. Gronow, 17 W. R. 511; Re
- Stedman, 58 L. T. 709; Wood v. Gregory, 43 C. D. 82; Hawkins v. Herbert, 60 L. T. 142.
 - (h) Gilbert v. Smith, 2 C. D. 686.
- (i) 31 C. D. 494; cf. Willis v. W., 38 W. R. 7.
- (k) Senior v. Hereford, 4 C. D. 495; Scott v. Watson, Seton (1901), p. 1856.
 - (1) Hawkins v. Herbert, supra.
 - (m) Mildmay v. Quicke, supra.
- (n) Cf. Sykes v. Scholfield, 14 C. D. 629.

more beneficial than a partition, and that all parties entitled were parties to the suit, if a sale takes place before the certificate is made, the purchaser is entitled to be discharged, although a certificate may be afterwards made, finding that the proper parties are before the Court, and that a sale is beneficial (a). But where all the parties interested are in fact before the Court at the hearing, and are willing to convey, and a good title can be made independently of the Partition Act, 1868, the purchaser is bound to accept such title, and cannot rely upon a technical informality in the decree (b). The Court in ordering a sale at the request of the parties to the action, will not in the absence of the other parties interested, preface the judgment order for sale with an expression of its opinion that a sale is more beneficial than a partition (c).

"On further consideration."—These words are to be taken in a popular sense as referring to any consideration the cause receives after the inquiries have been made (d).

And in a judgment on a trial of a partition action, an inquiry as to incumbrances may be directed, as that would assist in clearing the title (e).

The Court has power to direct a sale in Chambers by auction before the chief clerk, or by an auctioneer (f), or may confirm a conditional contract for sale entered into between the parties (g).

It may also make an order for partition instead of sale (h), even in opposition to the chief clerk's certificate (i), or for partition of part and sale of the rest (k). The Court has refused to order a sale reserving the minerals (l), but it will bar the estate tail of a lunatic for the purposes of a sale (m).

Liberty may be given to the parties to bid at the sale, and to set off part of the purchase-money against their respective shares, and they will be charged interest thereon at the rate of 3 per cent. (n).

And by R. S. C., 1883, Order 51, r. 1a, in cases where a partition is

- (a) Powell v. P., L. R. 10 Ch. 130.
- (b) Rawlinson v. Miller, 1 C. D. 2; Cavendish v. C., L. R. 10 Ch. 319.
- (c) Re Hardiman, 16 C. D. 360; Waite v. Bingley, 21 C. D. 674.
- (d) Powell v. P., L. R. 10 Ch. 130,134; Mildmay v. Quicke, 20 Eq. 537.
 - (e) Seton (1901), Form 3, p. 1855.
- (f) Pemberton v. Barnes, 13 Eq 349,

- (g) Grove v. Comyn, 18 Eq. 387.
- (h) Dicks v. Batten, W. N. (1870),p. 173.
 - (i) Allen v. A., 21 W. R. 842.
- (k) Roebuck v. Chadebet, 8 Eq. 127; Pennington v. Dalbiac, 18 W. R. 684.
- (l) Lawe v. Stoney, W. N. (1876), p. 141.
 - (m) Re Pares, 12 C. D. 333.
 - (n) Re Dracup, (1894) 1 Ch. 59.

ordered, a Judge has power, in addition to the powers already existing, with a view to avoiding expense or delay, or for other good reason, to authorise the same to be carried out, either by laying proposals before the Judge in Chambers for his sanction; or by proceedings altogether out of Court, any moneys produced thereby being paid into Court or to trustees, or dealt with as the Judge may order. But the Judge is not to authorise proceedings altogether out of the Court, unless he is satisfied, that all persons interested in the estate to be sold are before the Court or are bound by the order for sale. And every order authorising proceedings, altogether out of Court, is to be prefaced by a declaration that the Judge is so satisfied, and by a statement of the evidence upon which such declaration is made (a).

"Notice of Decree."—See Partition Act, 1876, s. 3, infra, p. 229.

S. 10. "In a suit for partition, the Court may make such order as it thinks just respecting costs up to the time of the hearing."

"Costs."—The old practice as to costs is stated supra (b).

In a suit for sale under this Act, where the plaintiffs were owners of one moiety and the defendants of one fourth of the estate, and the owners of the remaining fourth were served with notice of the decree, it was held that the costs of all parties ought to be paid out of the estate, and Selborne, C., said that, having regard to this section, it could not be said that the Court was bound by the old rule as to costs of partition suits. That it was impossible to lay down a general rule on the subject, that there might be cases in which the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, would follow the old practice (c).

It is now settled practice to allow the costs of all necessary parties in an action for partition or sale, out of the entire estate or out of the entire proceeds of sale, on the broad principle that the costs properly incurred with the view of partition or realisation are incurred on behalf of all. The costs of each share would thus be borne by the estate, a rule which generally speaking works fairly (d).

- (a) See Annual Practice (1909), vol. i., pp. 738, 739, and the notes thereto; Willis v. W., 61 L. T. 610; Crook v. C., W. N. (1890) 26; Re Stedman, 58 L. T. 709; and for a form of order for sale out of Court, see Pitt v. White, 57 L. T. 650.
 - (b) Per Eldon, C., p. 206.
- (c) Simpson v. Ritchie, 16 Eq. 103; Osborn v. O., 6 Eq. 338; Miller v. Marriott, 7 Eq. 1; Leach v. Westall, 17 W. R. 313.
- (d) Belcher v. Williams, 45 C. D.
 p. 513; Catton v. Banks, (1893) 2 Ch.
 p. 224; Graham v. Clinton, 81 L. T.
 717; also Cannon v. Johnson, 11 Eq.

But the Court has a discretion (a), and the rule may be departed from under special circumstances (b). For instance, a defendant who improperly disputed the plaintiff's title, has been ordered to pay so much of the costs as he thereby occasioned (c), and the costs occasioned by adverse litigation between the parties interested in any share will, to some extent at any rate, have to be borne by that share and not by the estate generally (d).

North, J., in Belcher v. Williams (e), thought the "shares" ought to be taken as they were ascertained at the time when the chief clerk's certificate was made, but Kekewich, J., in Catton v. Banks (f), thought otherwise.

As to the costs of incumbrancers, if they are not parties and are not entitled to appear, then they will get no costs (g). If they are entitled to appear, then they will as a general rule get their costs out of the estate (h). But Kekewich, J., held in Catton v. Banks, supra, that only one set of costs should be allowed in respect of the share mortgaged. Thus in Catton v. Banks there were three shares, of which one was unincumbered, the second had two mortgages upon it, and the third one. Kekewich, J., held that there should be three sets of costs only, one for each share, whereas if the rule in Belcher v. Williams had been followed, there would have been six sets of costs.

As to the costs of trustees, see Hervey v. Olliver(k). The costs of infants (l), or of a lunatic (m), may be charged upon and ordered to be raised out of the shares allotted to them.

S. 11. This section gave power to make general orders under the Act(n).

90; Thompson v. Richardson, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 596; Ball v. Kemp-Welch, 14 C. D. 512; Osborn v. O., 6 Eq. 338; Miller v. Marriott, 7 Eq. 1; Simpson v. Ritchie, 16 Eq. 103.

(a) Sect. 10 of the Act, R. S. C., 1883, Order 65, r. 1; Judicature Act, 1890, s. 5; Annual Practice (1909), vol. i., p. 971.

(b) Wilkinson v. Joberns, 16 Eq. 14; Porter v. Lopes, 7 C. D. 367; Wilkinson v. Castle, 16 W. R. 501; Hills v. Archer, (1904) W. N. 113.

(c) Hill v. Fulbrook, Jac. 574; Wilkinson v. Castle, 16 W. R. 501; Morris v. Timmins, 1 B. 411, 418.

(d) Mildmay v. Quicke, 46 L. J. Ch. 667; Jennings v. Foster, W. N. (1884)

200; Hawkes v. H., 63 L. T. 488; Belcher v. Williams, 45 C. D. p. 514.

(e) 45 C. D. p. 515. Ancell v. Rolfe, 40 Sol. Jo. 230; W. N., (1896) 9.

(f) (1893) 2 Ch. p. 226; see Ancell v. Rolfe, supra.

(g) Mildmay v. Quicke, 46 L. J. Ch. 667, 669.

(h) Belcher v. Williams, supra; but see Ancell v. Rolfe, supra; and Re Vase, 84 L. T. 761.

(k) 57 L. T. 239.

(l) Cox v. C., 3 Kay & J. 544.

(m) Singleton v. Hopkins, 4 W.R. 107.

(n) See Judicature Act, 1881, s. 19 Annual Practice (1909), vol. ii., p. 578 (n.), "Rule Committee,"

S. 12. "In England, the County Courts shall have and exercise the like power and authority as the Court of Chancery in suits for partition (including the power and authority conferred by this Act), in any case where the property to which the suit relates does not exceed in value the sum of 500l., and the same shall be had and exercised in like manner, and subject to the like provisions as the power and authority conferred by s. 1 of the County Courts Act, 1865."

"County Courts."—See County Courts Act, 1888, and as to the transfer of actions to the Chancery Division, s. 68 thereof, and Rawlinson v. Miller (a), where the proceeds of sale exceeded 500l.

Chancery of Lancaster.—See Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1890, s. 3.

The Partition Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 17).

S. 3. "Where in an action for partition it appears to the Court that notice of the judgment on the hearing of the cause cannot be served on all the persons on whom that notice is, by the Partition Act, 1868, required to be served, or cannot be so served without expense disproportionate to the value of the property to which the action relates, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the request of any of the parties interested in the property, and notwithstanding the dissent or disability of any others of them, by order, dispense with that service on any person or class of persons specified in the order, and, instead thereof, may direct advertisements to be published at such times and in such manner as the Court shall think fit, calling upon all persons claiming to be interested in such property who have not been so served to come in and establish their respective claims in respect thereof before the judge in Chambers within a time to be thereby limited. After the expiration of the time so limited all persons who shall not have so come in and established such claims, whether they are within or without the jurisdiction of the Court (including persons under any disability) shall be bound by the proceedings in the action as if on the day of the date of the order dispensing with service they had been served with notice of the judgment, service whereof is dispensed with; and thereupon the powers of the Court under the Trustee Act, 1850, shall extend to their interests in the property to which the action relates, as if they had been parties to the action; and the Court may thereupon, if it shall think fit, direct a sale of the property, and give all necessary or proper consequential directions."

"May * * dispense."—For form of order giving liberty to apply for service being dispensed with see below (a).

"Advertisements."—If service is dispensed with, advertisements must be issued (b). But if the persons with regard to whom service is dispensed with have no beneficial interest, advertisements will not be necessary (c).

- S. 4. "Where an order is made under this Act dispensing with service of notice on any person or class of persons, and property is sold by order of the Court, the following provisions shall have effect:—
 - (1) The proceeds of sale shall be paid into Court to abide the further order of the Court.
 - (2) The Court shall, by order, fix a time, at the expiration of which the proceeds will be distributed, and may, from time to time, by further order extend that time.
 - (3) The Court shall direct such notices to be given by advertisements or otherwise, as it thinks best adapted for notifying to any persons on whom service is dispensed with, who may not have previously come in and established their claims, the fact of the sale, the time of the intended distribution, and the time within which a claim to participate in the proceeds must be made.
 - "Advertisements."—See this note to s. 3, supra.
 - (4) If at the expiration of the time so fixed or extended the interests of all the persons interested have been ascertained, the Court shall distribute the proceeds in accordance with the rights of those persons.
 - (5) If at the expiration of the time so fixed or extended the interests of all the persons interested have not been ascertained, and it appears to the Court that they cannot be ascertained, or cannot be ascertained without expense disproportionate to the value of the property or of the unascertained interests, the Court shall distribute the proceeds in such manner as appears to the Court to be most in accordance with the rights of the persons whose claims to participate in the proceeds have
 - (a) Seton (1901), Forms pp. 1853, et seq.; Re Hardiman, 16 C. D. 360; and cf. R. S. C., 1883, Order 55, rr. 35, 35A; Annual Practice (1909), Part I., pp. 835, 836.
- (b) Hacking v. Whalley, 51 L. J. Ch.944; Phillips v. Andrews, 56 L. T.108; and see s. 4, s.s. 3, supra.
- (c) Crossman v. Richards, W. N (1888) 167.

been established, whether all those persons are or are not before the Court, and with such reservations (if any) as to the Court may seem fit in favour of any other persons (whether ascertained or not) who may appear from the evidence before the Court to have any primâ facie rights which ought to be so provided for, although such rights may not have been fully established, but to the exclusion of all other persons, and thereupon all such other persons shall by virtue of this Act be excluded from participation in those proceeds on the distribution thereof, but notwithstanding the distribution any excluded person may recover from any participating person any portion received by him of the share of the excluded person."

- S. 5. "Where in an action for partition two or more sales are made, if any person who has by virtue of this Act been excluded from participation in the proceeds of any of those sales establishes his claim to participate in the proceeds of a subsequent sale, the shares of the other persons interested in the proceeds of the subsequent sale shall abate to the extent (if any) to which they were increased by the non-participation of the excluded person in the proceeds of the previous sale, and shall to that extent be applied in or towards payment to that person of the share to which he would have been entitled in the proceeds of the previous sale if his claim thereto had been established in due time."
- S. 6. "In an action for partition a request for sale may be made or an undertaking to purchase given on the part of a married woman, infant, person of unsound mind, or person under any other disability, by the next friend, guardian, committee in lunacy (if so authorised by order in lunacy), or other person authorised to act on behalf of the person under such disability; but the Court shall not be bound to comply with any such request or undertaking on the part of an infant, unless it appear that the sale or purchase will be for his benefit" (a).
- "Married Woman, Infant, &c."—The request for a sale by a married woman should be made by a writing signed by her authorising and requesting her solicitor to ask for a sale (b). The
- (a) This section only applies to cases within the Partition Act, 1868, s. 3; Miles v. Jarvis, 50 L. T. 48.

(b) Wallace v. Greenwood, 16 C. D.

362; Grange v. White, 18 C. D. 612; Re Norton, (1900) 1 Ch. 101, and see note on Partition Act, 1868, p. 224, supra.

request of an infant may be by his guardian ad litem (a). Persons of unsound mind and lunatics may bring an action for partition by their next friend (b).

S. 7. "For the purposes of the Partition Act, 1868, and of this Act, an action for partition shall include an action for sale and distribution of the proceeds, and in an action for partition it shall be sufficient to claim a sale and distribution of the proceeds, and it shall not be necessary to claim a partition."

6. Other Jurisdiction in Partition.

Inclosure Acts.—With regard to the jurisdiction of the Inclosure Commissioners, now the Board of Agriculture, as to partition see below (c).

Settled Land Act.—As to the power of a tenant for life to concur in making partition of lands see below (d).

Dower.—Upon the same principle as in cases of partition, although dower was originally a mere legal demand, a widow being a joint owner became entitled in equity to an assignment of one-third of the lands of which her husband was seised in fee or in tail, which her issue might by possibility have inherited, as her dower. The difficulty of proceeding at law (e), together, probably, with the necessity of obtaining a discovery from the heir, devisees, or trustees, gave equity a concurrent jurisdiction with the old Courts of law, which, it seems, would have been exercised without its being shown whether such difficulty actually existed or not (f).

The common law jurisdiction in dower fell into abeyance. Courts of Equity gave the dowress more effective remedies and enlarged her rights. In equity a dowress has two distinct rights, namely, first a right to one third of the rents and profits from the death of

- (a) Rimington v. Hartley, 14 C. D. 630; cf. Howard v. Jalland, W. N. (1891) 210; Davis v. Ingram, (1897) 1 Ch. 477; Seton (1901), p. 1875.
- (b) Porter v. P., 37 C. D. 420, supra. As to lunatics, see Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 120 (b).
- (c) See 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118, ss. 90, 91; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 99, ss. 13, 14; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 83, ss. 7, 11; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 79, ss. 31, 32; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 97, s. 5; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 31, ss. 7—11; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 43, ss. 10, 11; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 56, s. 33; the Board of
- Agriculture Act, 1889; Chitty's Statutes (Lely), title "Inclosure"; Seton (1901), p. 1892; and cf. Jacomb v. Turner, (1892) 1 Q. B. 47.
- (d) See the Settled Land Act, 1882, ss. 3, 4, 31, 45.
- (e) See per Cozens Hardy, M. R., Williams v. Thomas, (1909) 1 Ch. at p. 720.
- (f) Curtis v. C., 2 Bro. Ch. 620; and see Mundy v. M., 2 V. 122; Pulteney v. Warren, 6 V. 89; Strickland v. S., 6 B. 77, 81.

Agar v. Fairfax.

her husband, and next a right to have dower assigned to her, the first being in no way dependent upon the second. This latter right is not within the Real Property Limitation Acts, and if the widow has been in receipt of her share of the rents and profits her claim to an assignment is not prejudiced (a). Her rights may be lost by laches.

Widows, before the Dower Act (b), were only dowable out of legal estates; but by that Act every woman married after the 1st January, 1834, is dowable out of her husband's equitable estates of inheritance. The Act, however, has put her right to dower entirely in the hands of her husband, who may defeat it wholly or partly. Dower out of real estate of an intestate is subject to abatement in respect of the widow's charge of £500 imposed on the intestate's estate by the Intestates' Estates Act, 1890 (c).

Formerly, if the widow's right to dower were disputed, an issue was directed (d); or the bill retained for a certain time, with liberty to the widow to bring a writ of dower (e). But a writ may now be indorsed with a claim for dower (f).

The right being established, and the property out of which the widow is dowable being ascertained, the next step is to ascertain the dower; and this may be done either by a reference (g), or by directing a commission to issue, which is made out, executed, and returned in the same manner as a commission of partition (h).

As a general rule, on a bill to assign dower, no costs were given on either side (i). But if the defendant added another case, as by disputing the title of the widow, denying the marriage, or the seisin of the husband, or set up any other ground of defence in which he failed, he might be liable to pay the costs of the suit occasioned by that unsuccessful defence (k).

- (a) Williams v. Thomas, (1909) 1 Ch. 713
- (b) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105; Carson R. P. Statutes, (1902) p. 362.
 - (c) Re Charriere, (1896) 1 Ch. 912.
- (d) Mundy v. M., 2 V. 122; see also R. S. C., Order 33, r. 1, and notes Annual Practice (1909), Part I., pp. 451, et seq.
- (e) Curtis v. C., 2 Bro. Ch. 620; D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Sch. & L. 390.
- (f) R. S. C., 1883, App. A., Pt. 3, s. 4.
- (g) Goodenough v. G., 2 Dick. 795; Seton (1901), Form 1, p. 955.
- (h) Wild v. Wells, 1 Dick. 3; Huddlestone v. H., 1 Ch. R. 38; Lucas v. Calcraft, 1 Bro. Ch. 133, 2 Dick. 594; Mundy v. M., 2 V. 125, 4 Bro. Ch. 294; Seton (1901), Form 2, p. 955; R. S. C., 1883, App. K., 36; App. J., 13.
- (i) Lucas v. Calcraft, Mundy v. M., supra.
- (k) Bamford v. B., 5 Ha. 205; Fry
 v. Noble, 20 B. 598, 606; Harris v.
 H., 11 W. B. 62; Williams v. Gwyn,
 2 Wm. Saund. 45 (n.); and see further
 Seton (1901), p. 958.

COMPROMISES.

STAPILTON v. STAPILTON.

1739. 1 Atk. 2.

Compromise-Family Arrangement.

An agreement entered into upon a supposition of a right, or of a doubtful right, though it after comes out that the right was on the other side, shall be binding, and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties; for the right must always be on one side or the other; and, therefore, the compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation of an agreement.

Where agreements are entered into to save the honour of a family, and are reasonable ones, a Court of equity will, if possible, decree a performance of them.

By a deed, dated on the 21st of August, 1661, Philip Stapilton was tenant of the premises in question, for ninety-nine years, if he so long live, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to his right heirs.

Philip having two sons, Henry and Philip, they, by deeds of lease and release, the 9th and 10th of September, 1724, reciting, that, for settling and perpetuating all manors, &c., in the name and blood of the Stapiltons, and for making provision for his two sons, &c., for preventing disputes and controversies that might possibly arise between the said two sons, or any other person claiming an interest in all or any of the estates thereinafter mentioned, and for barring all estates tail, and for answering all and every the purpose and purposes of the parties thereto, and for and in consideration of the sum of 5s., released, and confirmed to Thomson and Fairfax all those manors, &c.: To have and to hold to them, their heirs and assigns, to the use (as to part) of Philip the father, his heirs and assigns for ever, and as to another part, to the use of Philip the

father for life, remainder to Henry the son for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and every other son in tail male, remainder to Philip the son for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to the daughters of Henry in tail, remainder to the daughters of Philip the son in tail, remainder to the right heirs of Philip the father. And as to the remaining part, to the use of Philip the father for life, with like limitations in the first place to Philip the son and his issue, and then to Henry and his issue, remainder in fee to the father.

There were covenants to suffer a recovery within twelve months and likewise for farther assurances. N.B. To this deed, the heir of the surviving trustee in the deed in 1661 was not a party.

But, by deeds of lease and release, dated the 28th and 29th of September, 1724, to which the heir of the surviving trustee of the deed of 1661 was a party, the father and two sons make Thomson and Fairfax tenants to the præcipe, in order to suffer a recovery for the purposes mentioned in the former deeds of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724.

Before any recovery suffered, Henry died, leaving issue the plaintiff.

Afterwards, by lease and release, the 12th and 13th of April, 1725, to which the heir of the surviving trustee of the deed of 1661 was a party, Philip the father and Philip the son covenant to suffer a recovery, in which Thomson and Fairfax were to be tenants to the præcipe, to the use, as to part, of Philip the father, his heirs and assigns; and as to the other part, to the use of Philip the father for life, remainder to Philip the son in fee.

In Trinity Term, 1725, a recovery was suffered, in which were the same tenant to the præcipe, the same demandant, and the same vouchees (except Henry, who was dead), as were covenanted to be by the first deed; it was likewise suffered within twelve months after the first deed.

The father Philip Stapilton, being dead, the plaintiff, as son and heir of Henry, brought this bill to establish his title to the premises in question, and for the whole estate as tenant in tail under the old settlement, and to be let into possession, and for an account of rents

received by Philip Stapilton the son, due since the death of the plaintiff's grandfather, and to have the same applied for the plaintiff's benefit during his infancy, and for an injunction to restrain the defendants from receiving any more rents.

The defendant Philip the son, by his answer confesses the several deeds before mentioned, but says, Henry was a bastard, and that, by virtue of the deed of 1725, and of the recovery, he was entitled to the whole estate in question.

Upon an issue directed, Henry was found illegitimate, and the cause was now heard upon the equity reserved, when the counsel for the plaintiff, waiving the claim to the whole estate, insisted upon these two points:—

Argument for the Plaintiff.—1st. That the recovery suffered in Trinity Term, 1725, should enure to the use of the deeds of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724, and not to the uses of the deed in 1725.

2ndly. Supposing it did not, yet that the deed of 1724 was such an agreement as this Court will carry into execution.

As to the first point, it was said that the uses, when once declared, cannot be altered, unless all the parties entitled to the uses join in the new declaration: and Henry did not join in the deed of 1725.

As to the second point: this cannot be considered as a voluntary agreement, for Henry's legitimacy was then doubtful, and, if he had proved legitimate, Philip would have come into this Court to have the agreement executed, and Henry would have been bound by it. This Court has decreed the performance of agreements like this founded upon mistakes; as in the cases of Frank v. F. (a) and Cann v. C. (b).

Argument for the Defendant.—For the defendant it was argued, as to the first point, that Henry being dead before the recovery was suffered, the intent of the parties in the first deed could not be pursued; for the plaintiff (supposing him legitimate) claims paramount his father, and the deed of 1661; therefore, as the recovery could not substantiate the first deed, supposing him legitimate, it shall not substantiate it now he is found illegitimate * * * *

As to the second point: take it as an agreement, this Court will

not decree a performance of it; for, supposing Henry had been found legitimate, this Court would not have decreed a performance of it against the plaintiff; so that, in regard to the defendant, it must be considered as a voluntary agreement, into which he was drawn without any valuable consideration; and the covenant for further assurance will be void, as the deed itself to which it is annexed is void: and so it was determined in the case of Furzaker v. Robinson (a).

LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.—The plaintiff in this case is entitled to have a decree. There was a sufficient foundation for Philip the father, and Henry and Philip, his two sons, to execute the lease and release of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724. It was to save the honour of the father and his family, and was a reasonable agreement; and, therefore, if it is possible for a Court of equity to decree a performance of it, it ought to be done.

It would be very hard for the defendant, on his side, to endeavour to set aside this agreement, and the effect of this deed. Consider the state and situation of the family at the time of making the agreement; Philip had these children grown up, had a very considerable real estate, both his sons then owned as legitimate, their father and mother had lived together as husband and wife for many years, and at the time of this agreement were so; there was a foresight in the father and mother that such a dispute between their two sons might hereafter arise, to their dishonour, and likewise that of the family.

The foundation of this agreement, the illegitimacy of the eldest son Henry, has now been determined by a trial, and it is found that Henry was a bastard; yet both the sons are of the same blood of the father equally, though not so in the notion of the law.

If the elder son should be found illegitimate (as he now is), the father knew he would be left without any provision, if no such agreement was made; and, on the other hand, if his legitimacy should be established, then Philip, the younger son, would have nothing. To prevent these disputes and ill consequences, the father brings both his sons into an agreement to make a division of his real estate. It is very plain the parties did not know who was

the heir of the surviving trustee in the settlement of 1661, at the time of the lease and release of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724; because they covenant a writ of entry should be sued out within twelve months, which is a very unusual time to limit to suffer a recovery, and done in order to give time to find out the heir of the surviving trustee, if they could find him out; but he was afterwards found, and made a party to the deeds of the 28th and 29th of September, 1724.

The bill is brought by the eldest son and heir of Henry, to have the benefit and possession of the whole estate, and to have an account of the rents and profits, and to be quieted in the possession, and for general relief. Upon the first hearing, an issue was directed to try whether Henry the father was legitimate, and it was found he was not: and now the plaintiff insists upon having the benefit of this agreement, whereby he is only entitled to a part; this being the bill of an infant, he may have a decree upon any matter arising upon the state of his case, though he has not particularly mentioned and insisted upon it, and prayed it by his bill; but it might be otherwise in the case of an adult person.

Upon this case there arise two general questions:-

First, Whether the plaintiff has any estate at law by virtue of any of the conveyances, or by the recovery?

Secondly, If he has no estate at law, or only a defeasible one, whether he is entitled to have the benefit of this agreement, and to have it carried into execution here?

The first question consists of two branches:-

First, Whether the lease and release of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724, will amount to a good declaration of the uses of the recovery, notwithstanding the subsequent deed of April, 1725?

Secondly, If not, whether the recovery of Trinity Term, 1725, having barred the estate tail, will make good any estate which passed by the lease and release of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724? (Both of these questions were decided by the Chancellor in the affirmative, upon grounds depending upon the law of Recoveries and the Statute of Uses. So much of the judgement as relates thereto is now omitted.)

* * * * It has been objected, that, if the plaintiff has any title, his remedy is at law; but I think it is more properly here.

He is an infant, and has come recently into this Court. Nor do I think this case depends entirely upon the point of law; for I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to have an execution of the agreement as a good and binding agreement in this Court.

The question is, whether there was any valuable consideration on all sides for entering into this agreement? If so, then there is a sufficient ground for coming here; but a mere volunteer is not entitled to come here for an execution of an agreement. But here is a proper consideration, as appears in the recital of the deed of 1724. Neither is it the common case of a bastard; for the law of England does allow of some privileges to a bastard eigne, and their parents are not punishable by the canon law for antenuptial fornication.

In the case of Cann v. C. (a), it was laid down by Lord Macclesfield, that an agreement, entered into upon a supposition of a right (b), or of a doubtful right, though it after comes out that the right was on the other side, shall be binding, and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties; for the right must always be on one side or the other; and therefore the compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation of an agreement.

Another objection has been made to this agreement, that the benefit on Henry and Philip's side was not mutual and equal. During both their lives, the benefit and obligation was mutual, and Henry would have been equally compellable to suffer a recovery with Philip. But it is said, that an alteration as to their mutual benefit has happened by the death of Henry; and it is said, that if Henry had been legitimate, the plaintiff would not have been compellable to suffer a recovery, because the issue in tail is not compellable to perform the covenants of his ancestor, the tenant in tail. But here, the chance was at first equal; and it is hard to say, that the act of God should hinder the agreement from being carried into execution; the chance was equal, who died first, Henry or Philip? If Henry had been legitimate, and Philip had died in Henry's life, leaving children, I am of opinion Philip's son would have been entitled to have come against Henry for an execution of the agreement; and,

field, instead of "a supposition of right," might have been "a doubtful right."

⁽a) 1 P. W. 723, 727.

⁽b) Lord Eldon in Stockley v. S., 1 V. & B. 31, 12 R. R., p. 189, observes that the words of Lord Maccles-

therefore, the chance was at first equal on both sides, and we are not to consider how the event has happened.

Another objection has been taken, that the father made use of his coercive power over Philip, to force him into this agreement; and it is said equity does not favour agreements made by compulsion. But this Court always considers the reasonableness of the agreement; besides, here is no proof of compulsion by the father: if there was any compulsion, it seems rather to have been made use of against Henry, who was then esteemed his eldest son; and, considering the consequence of setting aside this agreement, a Court of equity will be glad to lay hold of any just ground to carry it into execution, and to establish the peace of a family.

His Lordship, therefore, declared, that the plaintiff is entitled to the lands and premises limited in remainder, to the first son of Henry Stapilton, his father, by the deeds of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724, according to the uses therein, and to the benefit of the covenants in those deeds, and decreed the defendant Philip to come to an account for the rents of the said premises; and declared that Philip was entitled to hold the lands, limited by the deeds of the 9th and 10th of September, 1724, to Philip the elder for life, with remainder to the defendant for life, against the plaintiff and his heirs; and that the defendant should make further assurance to the plaintiff of his part, and the plaintiff the like assurance to the defendant of his part, and no costs on either side.

NOTES.

1. Compromises Generally.

The compromise of doubtful claims, whatever may be the actual rights of the parties, has, from the policy of preventing litigation, been generally upheld in all enlightened systems of jurisprudence. The authorities of the civil law upon the subject are collected in Burge's Comm. vol. 3, 742. So, in the law of Szotland, compromises, under the name of transactions, are equally favoured (a).

^{1.} Compromises Generally.

^{2.} Family Arrangements, p. 254.

⁽a) Stair's Inst. tit. 7, s. 9; Hotchkin v. Dickson, 2 Bli. 348; Stewart v. 11 W. R. 404, as to the old French law S., 6 Cl. & Fin. 911; and see Trigge then in force in Lower Canada.

With regard to our law, it is clear that if a person, after due deliberation, enter into an agreement for the purpose of compromising a claim made bona fide, to which he believed himself to be liable, and with the nature and extent of which he is fully acquainted, the compromise of such a claim is a sufficient consideration for the agreement, and a Court of equity, without inquiring whether he was in truth liable to the claim, will compel a specific performance (a). The Court will enforce specifically private compromises of rights, in the same way in which it will enforce other contracts (b). This supposes the existence of a concluded agreement, made between persons capable of contracting, for adequate consideration (c), with full knowledge (d), and without pressure (e), and which might at the time it was entered into have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them (f).

The real consideration and motive of a compromise, as well in our law as in the civil law and systems derived from it, is not the sacrifice of a right but the abandonment of a claim (g).

"In dealing with a compromise, always supposing it to be a thing that is within the power of each party, if honestly done, all that a Court of justice has to do is to ascertain that the claim or the representation on the one side is bonâ fide and truly made, and that on the other side the answer or defence or counterclaim is also bonâ fide and truly made. I mean by bona fides the truth of the parties, and above all this, that the compromise is not a sham, or an instrument to accomplish or to carry into effect any ulterior or collateral purpose, but that the thing sought to be done is within the very terms of the compromise—that all that the parties contemplate and desire to effect and to deal with is whether the claim on the one side or the defence on the other side shall be admitted or not; or whether if both things are bonâ fide brought forward there may not be some

- (a) Attwood v. —, 1 Russ. 353; Pickering v. P., 2 B. 56; Partridge v. Smith, 11 W. R. 714; Miles v. New Zealand, &c. Co., 32 C. D. 266.
- (b) Fry, Sp. Performance, (1903) pp. 22, 49, 457, 662 et seq.
- (c) Cf. Naylor v. Winch, 1 S. & S. 565; Lucy's case, 4 De G. M. & G. 356; Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S. 559, 570; Miles v. New Zealand, &c. Co., 32 C. D. 266.
 - (d) Pusey v. Desbouverie, 3 P. W.

- 315; Smith v. Pincombe, 3 Mac. & G. 653.
- (e) See Huguenin v. Baseley, and note, infra, p. 259. Re Margetson and Jones, (1897) 2 Ch. 314.
- (f) Cf. Williams v. W., L. R. 2 Ch. 294.
- (g) Pollock, Contracts, (1902) p. 193, citing Trigge v. Lavallée, 15 Moo. P. C. 271, 292; Wilby v. Elgee, L. R. 10 C. P. 497.

concession on the one side and some concession on the other side, so as to arrive at terms of agreement, which, if honestly made, is an honest settlement of an existing dispute. That is the characteristic of a compromise, and if it be not manifestly ultra vires of the parties, it is one that a Court of Justice ought to respect and ought not to permit to be questioned "(a).

A bonâ fide compromise of a real claim—that is, a bonâ fide claim, not frivolous or vexatious—is good consideration, whether the claim would have been successful or not(b). If a person believes as a fact that money is due to him for instance, then his claim is honest, and the compromise of that claim will be binding and will form a good consideration, although, if prosecuted, it might be defeated (c).

A distinction has been taken between an error of law and an error of fact. "It is a maxim of equity," says an eminent Judge(d), "that parties making a mistake in matters of fact shall not be held bound by acts committed by them under such mistake (e). When, however, they make a mistake in law, they cannot afterwards be heard to say that the contract shall on that account be set aside."

But in equity the line between mistakes in law and mistakes in fact has not been (at any rate of recent years) so clearly and sharply drawn (f). Private rights are matters of fact, and if parties contract under a mutual mistake as to their relative and respective rights, the result is that that agreement is liable to be set aside, as having proceeded upon a common mistake (g). But the sole error

- (a) Per Lord Westbury in Dixon v. Evans, L. R. 5 H. L., p. 619; see Holsworthy U.C. v. Holsworthy R. C., (1907) 2 Ch. 62.
- (b) Miles v. New Zealand, &c. Co., 32 C. D. 266, where Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449, which was doubted by *Brett*, L.J., in *Ex p*. Banner, 17 C. D., p. 489, was approved by the C. A.
- (c) Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S. 559. See judgment of Lord *Blackburn*, cited with approval by *Cotton*, L.J., in Miles v. New Zealand, &c. Co., supra, and see Ockford v. Barelli, 20 W. R. 116.
- (d) Lord Abinger in Marshall v. Collett, 1 Y. & C. Ex. C. at p. 238; and see Broughton v. Hutt, 3 De G. & J. 501; Cooper v. Phibbs,

- L. R. 2 H. L., p. 170; The Midland, &c. R. Co. of Ireland v. Kinder, 6 W. R. 511; Beauchamp v. Winn; L. R. 6 H. L. 223; Daniell v. Sinclair, 6 A. C. 181, 190; The Directors, &c. of the Midland, &c. R. Co. of Ireland v. Johnson, 6 H. L. Cas. 798, 811.
- (e) See The Monarch, 12 P. D., p. 7; Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Lister, (1895) 2 Ch., p. 284.
- (f) Daniell v. Sinclair, L. R. 6 H. L., p. 190.
- (g) See judgment of Lord Westbury in Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 170; Stone v. Godfrey, 5 De G. M. & G. 76; M'Carthy v. Decaix, 2 Russ. & M. 614, disapproved on another point in Harvey v. Farnie, 8 A. C, p. 52; Livesey v. L., 3 Russ. 287; and cf.

of the defendant would not be a ground for resisting specific performance (a).

It has been laid down that if a party, acting in ignorance of a plain and settled principle of law, is induced to give up a portion of his property to another under the name of a compromise, equity will relieve him from the effect of his mistake (b). But this statement is not very intelligible or easy of application, for the question remains, what is a plain and settled principle of law? (c). Questions on the construction of wills may depend upon principles which in the opinion of some competent persons are quite plain, but it seems clear that a compromise in respect of such instruments will be upheld, although in the result the opinion upon which the compromise was based turns out to be wrong (d). And it will be generally found that the cases in which relief has been given in consideration of a mere mistake of law have turned upon an admixture of other ingredients. such as misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence, imbecility or surprise. And it may be stated generally that ignorance of the law, with a full knowledge of the facts and unattended by any of such circumstances, will furnish no ground for the interposition of a Court of equity, the present disposition of the Courts being to narrow rather than to enlarge the operation of the above cases (e). But where the result of denying relief will be to give to the other parties an unconscionable advantage, and the mistake is admitted or proved,

Stewart v. S., 6 Cl. & Fin. 966 and 970; Manifold v. Johnston, (1902) 1 Ir. R. 7; Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch. 534; Re Roberts, (1905) 1 Ch. 704.

(α) See Fry, Sp. Per., (1903) pp. 334,
335, 561, citing Tamplin v. James,
15 C. D., p. 217; Powell v. Smith,
14 Eq. 85; Hart v. H., 18 C. D. 671;
Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch.
534; Van Praagh v. Everidge, (1902)
2 Ch. 266; (1903) 1 Ch. 434.

(b) Naylor v. Winch, 1 Si. & St. 555; Leonard v. L., 2 Ball & B. 180; Dunnage v. White, 1 Swans. 137; Ramsden v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sen. 304; Turner v. T., 2 Rep. Ch. 81; Bingham v. B., 1 Ves. Sen. 126; explained in Stewart v. S., 6 Cl. & Fin. 968; followed in Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 150; Lansdowne v. L., Mos. 364; 2 J. & W. 205; doubted in Stewart v. S., 6

Cl. & Fin. 966. In the following cases relief was refused and the compromise enforced: Worrall v. Jacobs, 3 Mer. 195; Pullen v. Ready, 2 Atk. 587 and infra; Stockley v. S., 1 V. & B. 30; Persse v. P., 7 Cl. & Fin. 318; Cann v. C., 1 P. W. 727; Heap v. Tonge, 9 Ha. 90; Mildmay v. Hungerford, 2 Vern. 243.

- (c) See Story, Eq. Jur., (1892) § 127.
- (d) See Pullen v. Ready, 2 Atk, 587, infra, p. 245; Naylor v. Winch, supra; Pickering v. P., 2 B. 31, 56.
- (e) See Story, Eq. Jur. (1892), § 138, and passim, citing Stewart v. S., 6 Cl. & Fin. 694 to 971; Kelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54, 57, 58; G. W. Ry. Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91.

equity will give relief, provided the parties can be placed in the same position as if the mistake had not occurred (a). But the Court must be satisfied that the conduct of the parties has been determined by mistake (b). On the whole it would seem that where the contract between the parties is to settle a *doubtful* right or question, whether it be of law or fact, by a give and take arrangement between themselves, such agreement will be upheld (c). But on the other hand where there is a common mistake of fact or of the law as to private rights which goes to the very root of the matter, so as to prevent any real agreement from being formed, relief will be given (d).

The following cases relating to mistake were also of the nature of family arrangements, which are said to be especially favoured in equity (e). Yet it is not clear that in the several cases which have come before the Courts the decisions would have been different if the parties had not been members of the same family (f). But in some old cases it has been stated that the Court, in the case of family arrangements, administers an equity which is not applied to agreements generally (g).

The question whether a person is heir of a certain person or not, often depends upon a doubtful fact, e.g. whether a marriage has or has not been celebrated; nevertheless, it is clear, that if, as in the principle case, that fact be doubtful, two claimants, although one of them is afterwards clearly proved to be heir, may settle all disputes, especially to save the honour of the family, by dividing the property (h).

In Neale v. N. (i), James Neale and Joseph Neale, having an apparent title to copyhold lands as tenants in common in fee under the will of their father, entered into a parol agreement to make partition of the devised lands, and divided them accordingly, James, the

- (a) Story, Eq. Jur., (1892) § 138 (c), (d) and (e); Ward & Co. v. Wallis, (1900) 1 Q. B. 675.
- (b) Stone v. Godfrey, 5 De G. M. & G. 76, 90.
- (c) Leonard v. L., 2 Ball. & B. at p. 182; see per *Bowen*, L.J., in Miles v. New Zealand Alford Co., 32 C. D. 291; cf. Fullerton v. Provincial Bank, &c., (1903) A. C. at p. 313.
- (d) See Pollock, Contracts, (1902) pp. 453, 454; Vaizey, Settlements, (1887) ch. 19, s. 2, p. 1500; Story, Eq. Jur., (1892) ch. 5, p. 64; Fry, Sp. Per., (1903)

- pp. 339, 341, 342, 343, 348; and see Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch. 534; Jennings v. J., (1898) 1 Ch. 378.
- (e) See the principal case and Stock-ley v. S., 1 V. & B. 23.
- (f) See Vaizey, Settlements (1887), p. 1501.
- (g) Stockley v. S., 1 V. & B. 29; Bellamy v. Sabine, 2 Ph. 425.
- (h) But see Lansdowne v. L., Mos. 364, commented upon in Stewart v. S., 6 Cl. & F. p. 966.
 - (i) 1 Keen. 672.

elder brother, taking somewhat the larger share, a doubt being then entertained whether their father had a right to devise the lands. James was, in fact, at the time of this agreement tenant in tail under the limitations of a surrender made by his grandfather; and, after James's death without issue, Joseph, having discovered his own title as tenant in tail, repudiated the agreement, and brought an action to recover the whole estate. On a bill being filed by the devisee of James, it was argued for Joseph that he had never agreed to abandon any right which he might thereafter acquire, and which was neither in his own contemplation nor in that of the party with whom the agreement was made; and that, in most of the cases which were cited, the parties had a full knowledge of all the circumstances enabling them to enter into a compromise. However, Langdale, M.R., decreed Joseph to do all necessary acts to bar the entail, and vest the parts of the lands allotted under the agreement to James, upon the trusts of James's will, being of opinion that the agreement, though parol, was yet in the nature of a family arrangement, and being followed by the uninterrupted several enjoyment (a) of the portions allotted to the two brothers respectively, was an agreement which the Court would enforce (b).

In Pullen v. Ready (c) there was a mistake of law common to all parties as to private rights. Legacies were given, to be forfeited upon marriage without consent; one of the legatees did marry without consent, and a family arrangement, without the advice of counsel. took place, and articles were executed, giving that legatee the benefit of the legacy. It was insisted afterwards that the arrangement was made under a mistake of law that the condition was only in terrorem. which, under the circumstances, it was not; but Lord Hardwicke decreed specific performance of the articles, saying that at the time of the execution of the article the marriage without consent could not but be known, and that the parties to it could not possibly be supposed to be ignorant of that fact which happened some years before. That it was said, they might know the fact, and yet not know the consequence in law: but if parties were entering into an agreement, and the very will out of which the forfeiture arose was lying before them and their counsel while the drafts were preparing, the parties should

⁽a) See Williams v. W., L. R. 2 Ch. 294.

⁽b) See also Frank v. F., 1 Ch. Ca. 84; approved by *Cottenham*, C. in Stewart v. S., 6 Cl. & Fin. 966, and see Hoghton v. H., 15 B. at p. 301;

Stockley v. S., 1 V. & B. 23; 12 R.R. p. 189; Heap v. Tonge, 9 Ha. 90; Manby v. Bewicke, 3 Kay & J. 342; Fowler v. F., 4 De G. & J. 250.

⁽c) 2 Atk. 587,

be supposed to be acquainted with the consequences of law as to that point, and should not be relieved under a pretence of being surprised, with such strong circumstances attending it (a).

In Lawton v. Campion (b) the children of John Lawton, a deceased remainderman, insisted as against their uncle Charles (a prior tenant for life in possession) that they were entitled, under the terms of a settlement, to have their portions raised from the death of their father in 1831. Some discussion took place, and a bill was filed by them. An arrangement was come to by deed, which, proceeding on the foundation of the validity of the claim, compromised the amount of the arrears of interest, and settled the amount of the future interest, which Charles thereby engaged to pay. It having been afterwards determined in another suit, that on the true construction of the settlement the claim of the children was unfounded, Charles instituted a suit to set aside the deed, and Romilly, M.R., made a decree in his favour. "In my opinion," said his Honor, "the thing compromised was not the right to have the portions immediately raised, but something collateral to it, and arising and flowing out of it. The liability of the plaintiff to pay was not, in fact, compromised; but the amount which he would have to pay, under a liability, assumed and admitted on both sides, was the thing compromised, and the only subject of the compromise. That is the view which I take of this case from the correspondence, and which the deed appears to me to confirm. It appears to me to have been entered into for the purpose of settling the question of the amount which the plaintiff was liable to pay to these ladies, and not to settle any question as to his liability to pay anything at all." And after referring to Harvey v. Cooke (c), as being exactly in point, his Honor added, "Undoubtedly a family arrangement was entered into in this case; but the question is, what it included. In my opinion, the liability of the plaintiff to pay anything, or in other words, the fact that the money was raisable on the death of John Lawton, was not an ingredient in that arrangement, and did not form a term of it. That question was not present to the mind of either party at the time when they entered into this arrangement, as one which could be contested; the arrangement was limited to matters in difference, flowing out of and proceeding from that which was considered to be an undoubted liability."

⁽a) See Cann v. C., 1 P. W. 723; Mildmay v. Hungerford, 2 Vern. 243; Powell v. Smith, 14 Eq. 85, but see jndgment of Lord Westbury in Cooper

v. Phibbs, supra, p. 242, and other cases there cited.

⁽b) 18 B. 87.

⁽c) 4 Russ, 57,

Upon a principle somewhat similar it has been determined that a compromise under the Court will not exclude a point of construction not then under consideration (a). But of course questions involved in the compromise will not be permitted to be reopened (b).

Where payments were made under a mistaken construction of a doubtful clause in a settlement, the Court refused to direct them to be refunded, after many years of acquiescence by all parties, and after the death of one of the authors of the settlement, especially as subsequent family arrangements had proceeded on the footing of that construction (c).

And where a deed of family arrangement has been acted upon for many years, and no fraud is imputed, the Court will not set aside or alter such deed upon the mere allegation by some of the parties to it, that its provisions did not carry out their intentions (d).

Where parties come to be relieved against the consequences of mistakes in law, it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that the conduct of the parties has been determined by those mistakes, otherwise great injustice may be done. Parties may be erroneously advised as to the law, but they may be told on what circumstances the question of law depends, and in what mode it may be tried, and they may determine that (whether the advice they have received be well or ill founded) they will give up the question in favour of the party with whom it arises. Cases of this nature, therefore, require the most careful examination, and particularly when they arise between parent and child (e).

Good Faith. Full Disclosure.—In forming an agreement of compromise by way of a family arrangement there must be a full disclosure of all material (f) circumstances in the knowledge of the parties thereto, and it is immaterial whether information withheld be asked for by other contracting parties or not; but no obligation to disclose material facts exists in the formation of other agreements of compromise (g). In Gordon v. G. (h), an agreement was entered into between two brothers, the younger of whom disputed the legitimacy

- (a) Bennett v. Merriman, 6 B. 360.
- (b) Re South American, &c. Co., (1895) 1 Ch. p. 50.
- (c) Clifton v. Cockburn, 3 My. & K. 76; and see G. W. Ry. Co. v. Cripps, 5 Ha. 91; Rogers v. Ingham, 3 C. D. 351.
 - (d) Bentley v. Mackay, 31 B. 143.
 - (e) Per Turner, V.-C., Stone v.
- Godfrey, 5 De G. M. & G. 90; Re Roberts, (1905) 1 Ch. 704.
- (f) See e.g. Maynard v. Eaton, L. R. 9 Ch. 414.
 - (g) Turner v. Green, (1895) 2 Ch. 205.
- (h) 3 Swans. 400; Re Roberts,
 supra; Watt v. Assets Co., (1905)
 A. C. 317.

of the elder, for the division of the family estates. At the time of the agreement the younger brother was apprised of a private ceremony of marriage which had passed between their parents, but did not communicate that fact to the elder. The legitimacy of the elder brother being established on the trial of an issue directed, Lord Eldon, after the lapse of nineteen years, rescinded the agreement.

"If," said his Lordship, "the youngest son, knowing that fact, of which the plaintiff was ignorant (and the Court held on the evidence that he did so know), dealt with him without disclosing it, whether the omission of disclosure originated in design, or in an honest opinion of the invalidity of the ceremony, and of a want of obligation on his part to make the communication, the agreement cannot be sanctioned by the Court" (a).

And where the defendants propounded a will for probate, which was opposed by the plaintiff, but ultimately a compromise was agreed to, under which the will was admitted to probate, the plaintiff having afterwards discovered that the will was a forgery, the compromise was set aside on the ground that one of the defendants had concealed his knowledge of the forgery, and probate was revoked by the Probate Division (b).

So, where a plaintiff entered into a compromise to accept from the defendant a smaller sum than was due, upon the representation made to him by the defendant's solicitor of the poverty of the defendant, and that his father, a man of property, would not assist him, whereas the father, to the knowledge of the solicitor making the representation, had lately died intestate, it was held the compromise could not be supported (c).

And if parties are not on *equal terms*, and one of them stands in such relation to the other as renders it incumbent on him to give a fuller account of the matter or question in dispute than he has done, the Court, although no intentional fraud may be imputable to such person, will not support a compromise entered into between the parties (d).

(a) And see Pusey v. Desbouverie, 3 P. W. 315, 321; Harvey v. Cooke, 4 Russ. 58; Groves v. Perkins, 6 Si. 576; Leonard v. L., 2 Ball & B. 171; Smith v. Pincombe, 3 Mac. & G. 653; Cook v. Greves, 30 B. 378; Greenwood v. G., 2 De G. J. & S. 28; Tennent v. Tennents, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 6, 9, 10; Fane v. F., 20 Eq. 698;

Re Roberts, (1905) 1 Ch. 704.

- (b) Priestman v. Thomas, 9 P. D.70; cf. Cole v. Langford, (1898) 2Q. B. 36.
- (c) Gilbert v. Endean, 9 C. D. 259, 266.
- (d) Pickering v. P., 2 B. 31, 56; Pusey v. Desbouverie, 3 P. W. 315, 320, 321; Sturge v. S., 12 B, 229,

A concealment, however, of truth, or a suggestion of what is false, will not affect the validity of a compromise, unless it be relevant to the matter to be compromised (a).

Contracts of this kind will not of course be supported if they are in any way unconscionable, as where the party surrendering his rights was a person liable to imposition and without professional advice (b), or where a person under the influence of threats, and under apprehension of arrest, and without adequate consideration or advice, has given a security as a compromise of doubtful rights (c), or where a deed in the nature of a family arrangement has been executed by a cestui que trust, under pressure from the trustees in violation of their duties (d).

Power of Legal Adviser to compromise.—Neither counsel (e) nor solicitors (f) can compromise a case against the express wishes of their clients, and an action for so doing will lie against the latter (g), but not against the former (h). Both counsel (i) and solicitors being in ordinary cases entrusted with the general management of a cause, have power to compromise it, unless expressly forbidden so to do (h), and a solicitor is not guilty of actual negligence, provided he acts bonâ fide and with reasonable care and skill, and the compromise is for the benefit of his client, and is not made in defiance of his express prohibition (l): and it seems that a compromise being within the apparent authority of counsel or solicitor, is binding on the client, notwithstanding he dissented,

- (a) Maynard v. Eaton, L. R. 9 Ch. 414; Watt v. Assets Co., (1905) A. C. 317.
- (b) Dunnage v. White, 1 Swans. 137. See also Stockley v. S., 1 V. & B. 31; 12 R. R. 184; Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch. 534; Jennings v. J., (1898) 1 Ch. 378.
 - (c) Scott v. S., 11 Ir. R. Eq. 74.
- (d) Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; and see Huguenin v. Baseley and Chesterfield v. Janssen, post, and notes. Cp. Re Scowby, (1897) 1 Ch. 741; Re Margetson & Jones, (1897) 2 Ch. 314.
- (e) Swinfen v. S., 27 L. J. Ch. 35, 491.
 - (f) Fray v. Vowles, 1 Ell. & Ell.

- 389.
 - (q) Fray v. Vowles, supra.
- (\hbar) Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 H. & N. 890
- (i) Strauss v. Francis, L. R. 1 Q. B. 379; Ellender v. Wood, 32 Sol. Jo. 628; The Alliance, &c. v. MacIvor & Co., 7 T. L. R. 599; Lewis v. L., 45 C. D. 281; Matthews v. Munster, 20 Q. B. D. 141.
- (k) Prestwich v. Poley, 18 C. B.
 (N. S.) 806; Berry v. Mullen, 5 Ir.
 R. Eq. 368; Re Newen, (1903) 1 Ch.
 812
- (l) Chown v. Parrott, 14 C. B. (N. S) 74; Re Newen, supra.

unless this dissent was brought to the knowledge of the opposite party at the time (a).

A consent to compromise given by counsel in the presence and with the sanction of his client may be withdrawn by leave of the Court before the order is drawn up, if given through error, mistake, surprise or inadvertence (b), but after that time it can only be set aside on the ground of common mistake (c). The rule in the Chancery Division and the Queen's Bench Division is now the same, and a consent given by the authority of the client cannot be withdrawn unless there has been mistake or surprise (d).

Infants (e). — If the Court, having all the necessary facts before it, sanctions a compromise on behalf of infants, and it afterwards turns out that the Court was mistaken, the infants have no redress, it being an error of judgment for which there is no remedy. But if by suppression or misstatement of facts the Court has been led to an erroneous conclusion, the persons who have done this are amenable to justice, and the Court will, if possible, set aside the transaction as against the innocent party (f).

The ordinary practice in cases of compromise in which infants are interested is to direct a reference to chambers as to whether the proposed compromise is beneficial (g): but if the judge is satisfied on the evidence before him, that will suffice (h). Where an action is pending, the terms of the proposed compromise should as a rule be brought before the Court, by a petition stating the terms, and

- (a) Strauss v. Francis, L. R. 1 Q. B.
 379; Brady v. Curran, 2 Ir. R.
 C. L. 314; Berry v. Mullen, 5 Ir. R.
 Eq. 368.
- (b) Holt v. Jesse, 3 C. D. 177; Rogers v. Horn, 26 W. R. 432; Hickman v. Berens, (1895) 2 Ch. 638; Harvey v. Croydon, &c., infra; Re West Devon, &c., 38 C. D. 51; Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch. 534.
- (c) Davis v. D., 13 C. D. 861; A.-G. v. Tomline, 7 C. D. 389; Furnival v. Bogle, 4 Russ. 142; Huddersfield B. Co. v. Lister, (1895) 2 Ch. p. 283; Wilding v. Sanderson, supra.
 - (d) Harvey v. Croydon, &c., 26 C. D.

- 249; Elsas v. Williams, 52 L. T. 39.
- (e) See generally as to the power of the Court to sanction compromises by persons under disability, Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420, 426, 430; Brooke v. Mostyn, L. R. 4 H. L. 304; and Seton, (1901) p. 986.
- (f) Brooke v. Mostyn, 2 De G. J. & S. 373, reversed on another point, L. R. 4 H. L. 304; see also Stainton v. The Carron Co., 6 Jur. (N. S.)
 - (g) Seton, (1901) pp. 984, 985.
- (h) Lippiat v. Holley, 1 B. 423; Wall v. Bushby, 1 Bro. Ch. 484,

verified by affidavits (a). In modern practice, a compromise on behalf of an infant is not unfrequently sanctioned upon summons, and where there is no action pending, the sanction is often obtained upon an originating summons under the provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order 55, r. 3 (f) (b).

The Court has no power to sanction a compromise against the opinion of the next friend, or the guardian ad litem and counsel, and if the next friend is exercising his discretion bona fide (c) he cannot be interfered with (d). Before sanctioning a compromise the Court requires an affidavit by the next friend or guardian, and by the solicitor, together with the written opinion of the junior counsel to the effect that they consider the proposed compromise for the benefit of the infants (e). On a petition for a compromise in which the interests of infants were concerned, the infants were not represented by a separate solicitor; the matter was ordered to stand over in order that they might be represented by an entirely independent solicitor, who could state that the compromise was for their benefit (f).

Married Woman.—The Court had jurisdiction to sanction, on behalf of a married woman, a compromise of a suit, to make a trustee liable for a breach of trust in relation to a fund in which the married woman has a reversionary interest not for her separate use (g). As to property to which she is entitled to her separate use, as she can contract to the extent of such property and can sue and defend as if she were a *feme sole* (h), she can bind herself by a compromise with respect to such property, or with respect to her litigation (i).

As to agreements to separate founded upon a compromise of litigation, see Wilson v. W. (k).

- (a) Gray v. Paull, 46 L. J. Ch. 818; see Re Birchall, infra.
- (b) See as to Court's jurisdiction, Re Wells, (1903) 1 Ch. 848.
- (c) See Rhodes v. Swithenbank, 22
 Q. B. D. 577; Murray v. Sitwell,
 (1902) W. N. 119.
 - (d) Re Birchall, infra.
- (e) Re Birchall (C. A.), 16 C. D. 41; Gray v. Paull, supra.
- (f) Howe v. Robinson, 34 Sol. Jo. 620.
- (g) Wall v. Rogers, 9 Eq. 58. And see as to her separate property, though subject to restraint on anticipation, Wilton v. Hill, 25 L. J. Ch. 150.
- (h) Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, s.s. 2.
- (i) See Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D., p. 622; and judgment of Selborne, C., in Cahill v. C., 8 A. C., p. 427.
- (k) Post, under head of "Husband and Wife."

Absent Parties.—By a rule of the Supreme Court (a), it is provided that "where in proceedings concerning a trust a compromise is proposed and some of the persons interested in the compromise are not parties to the proceedings, but there are other persons in the same interest before the Court and assenting to the compromise, the Court or a Judge, if satisfied that the compromise will be for the benefit of the absent persons, and that to require service on such persons would cause unreasonable expense or delay, may approve the compromise and order that the same shall be binding on the absent persons, and they shall be bound accordingly, except where the order has been obtained by fraud or non-disclosure of material facts" (b).

It is doubtful whether this rule applies where all the persons to be served are out of England (c). The Court under this rule may bind absent persons who have not assented to the compromise, but not such as have dissented from it, though it may sanction the compromise after making full provision for the rights of such dissentient parties (d).

Corporations and Companies.—A corporation or a company has, as incident to its existence, the same power of compromising claims made against it as an individual has (e), but *semble* in both cases, and certainly in the case of a company, it must bind itself by some formal proceeding—in the case of a company by the action of the directors, or by a resolution of the shareholders in a general meeting (f).

Enforcing Compromises.—The Court will specifically enforce private compromises of right provided there is a valid contract between the parties (g). It will also enforce by staying proceedings a compromise for putting an end to litigation (h), as in Eden v. Naish (i), where there was an agreement to compromise an action for the dissolution of a partnership after judgment therein; the terms were in writing

- (a) R. S. C. Nov. 1883, O. 16, r. 9a.
- (b) See Saragossa, &c. Ry. Co. v. Collingham, (1904) A. C. 159.
 - (c) Re Sapcote, 38 Sol. Jo. 281.
- (d) Collingham v. Sloper, (1894) 3 Ch. 716 (C. A.).
- (e) Re Norwich, &c. Society, 8 C. D. 334; Dixon v. Evans, L. R. 5 H. L.
- 606.
- (f) Miles v. New Zealand, &c. Co., 32 C. D., p. 286.
- (g) E.g. Turner v. Green, (1895) 2 Ch. 205.
- (h) See Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, s.s. 5.
 - (i) 7 C. D. 781.

and signed; the plaintiff alleged that he signed under a misapprehension; but upon a summons being taken out for a stay of proceedings on the terms of the agreement, an order for stay was made thereon (a). So on motion for judgment (b). See as to enforcing undertakings by attachment or committal Carter v. Roberts (c).

In Hart v. H. (d) specific performance was ordered of an agree ment to compromise a petition in the Divorce Court.

If a company is in liquidation a compromise entered into between the official liquidator and a stranger may be enforced by summons in the winding up (e).

In Smythe v. S(f) a compromise of certain divorce proceedings was made a rule of Court on an "ex parte" motion, the terms of the compromise providing that the agreement might be made a rule of the High Court. If such provision is not made it cannot be made a rule (g). A compromise may be enforced by motion in any Court in which pending proceedings are compromised (h).

If the intended compromise of an action fails, but the plaintiff has received some advantage, he will not be allowed to retain such advantage and continue the action (i).

Setting aside a Compromise.—A judgment, compromising an action, which has been passed and entered, cannot be set aside except by bringing a fresh action, unless (1) There has been a slip within R. S. C. 1883, O. 28, r. 11; (2) the judgment, as drawn up, does not correctly state the decision of the Court; (3) the parties consent (k). Different considerations may apply to interlocutory orders and judgments not passed and entered, but such applications are generally founded on allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, and it is

- (a) See Pryer v. Gribble, L. R.
 10 Ch., 534; Re Gaudet Frères, 12
 C. D. 882; Scully v. Dundonald, 8
 C. D. 658.
- (b) Sharpe v. Wilmot, 84 L. T. Jo. 297; Baker v. Blaker, 55 L. T. 723.
 - (c) (1903) 2 Ch. 312.
- (d) 18 C. D. 670; and see Lancaster v. L., (1896) P. 118, and n. (a), p. 258, infra.
 - (e) Re Gaudet, &c., 12 C. D. 882.
 - (f) 18 Q. B. D. 544.
 - (g) Graves v. G., 67 L. T. 420, dis-

- tinguished in Howard v. H., 77 L. T. 140.
- (h) The Alliance, &c. Syndicate v. MacIvor, &c. Co., 7 T. L. R. 599; cp. Re Scowby, (1897) 1 Ch. 741.
- (i) Henderson v. The Underwriting, &c. Asson., 65 L. T. 616, 732; Guy v. Walker, 8 T. L. R. 314.
- (k) Ainsworth v. Wilding, (1896) 1 Ch. 673, where the cases are collected; Chessum & Sons v. Gordon, (1901) 1 K. B. 694, 699; see also Re Scowby, (1897) 1 Ch. 741.

convenient that the evidence in support should be $viv\hat{a}$ voce and not by affidavit as to information and belief (a).

2. Family Arrangements.

"From the case of Stapilton v. S. (b) down to the present day the current of authorities has been uniform, and wherever doubts and disputes have arisen with regard to the rights of different members of the same family (and especially, I may observe, where those doubts have related to a question of legitimacy), and fair compromises have been entered into to preserve the harmony and affection, or to save the honour of the family, those arrangements have been sustained by this Court, albeit, perhaps, resting upon grounds which would not have been considered satisfactory if the transaction had occurred between mere strangers" (c).

And a family arrangement may also be implied without any express written contract, from a long course of dealing between the parties (d).

Any transaction between father, tenant for life, and son, tenant in tail of property, entered into upon barring the entail, is looked upon in the nature of a family arrangement; and in such a case, apparent inadequacy of consideration, and the circumstance that the property is reversionary, will have but little weight. In Cory v. C. (e), on it appearing that one of the parties to an agreement to settle family disputes was drunk at the time that the agreement was entered into, Lord Hardwicke thought that there was not sufficient ground on which to set the agreement aside, it being reasonable, and the circumstances not showing that any unfair advantage of the party's drunkenness was taken. And he observed, that, "if a son, tenant in tail, and a father, tenant for life, agree on something for the benefit of the younger children, and afterwards the son complains of paternal authority being exerted, though there might be some-

(a) See the judgment of Jessel, M.R., and Cotton, L.J., in Gilbert v. Endean,
9 C. D. p. 266; Mullins v. Howell,
11 C. D. p. 766; Wilding v. Sanderson, (1897) 2 Ch. 534.

(b) See the remarks of Sir T. Plumer on this case in Dunnage v. White, 1 Swan., p. 151, and of Lord Cottenham in Stewart v. S., 6 Cl. & Fin. p. 967.

(c) Per Sugden, C., in Westby v. W., 2 Dr. & War. 503; but see the obser-

vations of Mr. Vaizey, referred to supra, p. 244 (f). And see Stockley v. S., 1 V. & B. 23, 12 R. R. 184; Cood v. C., 33 B. 314; Williams v. W., L. R. 2 Ch. 294; Huguenin v. Baseley, p. 259, infra; Chesterfield v. Janssen, p. 303, infra.

(d) Clifton v. Cockburn, 3 My. & K. 76; Williams v. W., L. R. 2 Ch. 294.

(e) 1 Ves. Sen. 19.

thing of that sort, yet if the agreement be reasonable, the Court will not set it aside "(a).

In Bellamy v. Sabine (b) on an agreement between father and son, for disentailing an estate, and for a conveyance to the son in fee, the main consideration moving from the son was an undertaking to pay the father's debts; the circumstance of several of the most important items being left in blank was held insufficient to set the transaction aside as against the father, though the son was only just come of age, as a family arrangement of such a description could not be supposed to have depended upon a very exact calculation of the amount of debts (c).

"In regarding settlements of this character, claims to upset them, and the rights of parties thereunder, the Court gives weight to considerations which on other occasions would scarcely be allowed in the scale" (d). In re-settlements (e) it is a proper precaution to take care that the position of a son as tenant in tail is fully explained to him, and also the limitations of and burthens upon the property which are proposed to be made, and this either by the father's solicitor or an independent solicitor or counsel, and to omit these precautions is to incur risk (f). And in such cases the effect or extent of the parental influence (g) will not be regarded (h), unless where a father takes a benefit to the detriment of the son (i), when the Court may inquire whether there has been undue influence (k). Even if there is unfairness, the benefit being abandoned, the rest of the settlement will stand good (l). In Hoblyn v. H. (m) the son having had the advice of an experienced estate agent, the resettled estate was exonerated from a charge in favour of the father and

- (a) And see Wycherley v. W., 2 Eden, 175; Persse v. P., 7 Cl. & Fin. 318.
 - (b) 2 Ph. 425.
- (c) See also Hoghton v. H., 15 B. 305, where the law is fully considered by Romilly, M.R.; Dimsdale v. D., 3 Drew. 556; Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 597; Hartopp v. H., 21 B. 259; Head v. Godlee, John. 536; Jenner v. J., 2 De G. F. & J. 359.
- (d) Per Kekewich, J., in Hoblyn v. H., 41 C. D., p. 204; see Priestley v. Ellis, (1897) 1 Ch. 489.
 - (e) See Vaizey, Settlements (1887),

- p. 1505.
 - (f) See Hoblyn v. H., supra, p. 205. (g) Hartopp v. H., 21 B. 266; Dims-
- dale v. D., 3 Drew. 569.
 (h) Fane v. F., 20 Eq., p. 706;
 Turner v. Collins, L. R. 7 Ch., p. 340.
- (i) See Archer v. Hudson, 7 B. 560; Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 597.
- (k) Hoblyn v. H., 41 C. D., p. 207; Hoghton v. H., 15 B., p. 314; Jenner v. J., 2 De G. F. & J., p. 375.
 - (1) Hoblyn v. H., supra.
 - (m) Supra.

from the mother's jointure (a), but the rest of the re-settlement stood good.

A bonâ fide family arrangement (previous to the abolition of the usury laws) would not have been deemed usurious merely because it secured a loan with legal interest, and the borrower, by way of settlement, made other provisions for the lender (b).

And where a deed is honestly intended as a family arrangement, and not executed with the view of defeating creditors, it will be valid under 13 Eliz. c. 5, although some debts may be defeated thereby (c). But a deed, though valid as a family arrangement, may be void as against creditors (d).

If an arrangement between two parties is, on moral principles, fair, or is such as is sustainable, as between them, on the ground of its being a family transaction, it will not be rendered invalid because it may have been concocted and brought about by a third party, with a fraudulent intention of benefiting himself (e).

In a proper case a deed carrying into effect a compromise may be rectified. Thus where a deed was made for the purpose of carrying into effect a family arrangement, and it contained a declaration of trust inconsistent with the actual rights of the parties, and there was no evidence that the inconsistency was known to, or contemplated by, the parties or their solicitors, or that their actual rights were intended to be altered, it was held that the declaration ought to be varied (f).

It has been decided by the highest authority, that a compromise of a family dispute is not rendered invalid, in consequence of one of the parties not distinctly understanding his rights, if they were understood by his agents, by whose acts and knowledge, in the absence of fraud, the principal is bound (g), and the principal is the same in the law of Scotland as in the law of England and in the civil law (h).

Where a family arrangement is entered into upon the assumption that all the parties named in a deed will execute it, and one of them

- (a) See Heron v. H., 2 Atk. 160; Carpenter v. Heriot, 1 Eden, 338.
- (b) Arkwright v. Huntley, Printed Cases, D. P., 1825, cited Sugd. Prop. 86.
- (c) Re Johnson, 20 C. D. 389; see Re Maddever, 27 C. D., p. 526; Hance v. Harding, 20 Q. B. D. 732; cf. Re Parry, (1904) 1 K. B. 129.
 - (d) Penhall v. Elwin, 1 Sm. & G.

- 258.
- (e) See Bellamy v. Sabine, 2 Ph. 425.
 - (f) Ashurst v. Mill, 7 Ha. 502.
- (g) Stewart v. S., 6 Cl. & Fin. 911; where all the authorities are examined by Lord *Cottenham*. But see *Re* Roberts, (1905) 1 Ch. 704.
 - (h) Ibid.

does not do so, it will not be binding upon the others although they execute it (a); and the result is the same where one of the parties, from any incapacity, as, for instance, coverture, cannot execute the deed in a valid or binding form (b).

Where a bill alleged a judgment obtained by fraud and a subsequent compromise, and sought to have the whole transaction set aside on the ground of fraud or to have the compromise carried out, and in the opinion of the Court the case of fraud failed, the Court refused to enforce the compromise, and the whole bill was dismissed (c).

Letters written, after a dispute has arisen, with a view to a compromise and "without prejudice," cannot be used in evidence against the party by or on behalf of whom they were written. In *Hoghton* v. H. (d), Romilly, M. R., said, "that such communications made with a view to an amicable arrangement ought to be held very sacred; for if parties were to be afterwards prejudiced by their efforts to compromise, it would be impossible to attempt an amicable arrangement of differences" (e).

Husband and Wife.—In Jodrell v. J. (f) a singular deed between husband and wife was upheld as a family arrangement. In that case, a wife having instituted a suit against her husband for a divorce, an arrangement was come to, and the husband executed a deed, by which he assigned a house to trustees, upon trust to permit the wife to enjoy it and accommodate herself and children, and an income of 4,000l. a year was also provided for her separate use, to keep up the establishment for herself and children, "upon such a scale, and regulated in such a manner, as she should think fit;" and the surplus was to be repaid to the husband. The deed provided, that so long as the husband should be desirous

- (a) Peto v. P., 16 Si. 590.
- (b) Bolitho v. Hillyar. 34 B. 180; and see Taylor v. Cartwright, 14 Eq. 167
 - (c) Cawley v. Poole, 1 Hem. & M. 50.
- (d) 15 B. 321. See Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420.
- (e) And see Jones v. Foxall, 15 B. 388, 396; Re Monsell, 6 Ir. Ch. R., p. 254; and as to the general rule of evidence on this point, see Paddock v. Forrester, 3 Man. & G. 903; and the

judgment of the Court of Appeal in Walker v. Wiltshire, 23 Q. B. D. 335, overruling the judgment of V.-C. Kindersley in Williams v. Thomas, 2 Dr. & Sm. 29, 31 L. J. Ch., p. 676, that such letter might be used by the writer; and see Jones v. Foxall, 21 L. J. Ch. 725; Re Daintry, (1893) 2 Q. B. 116; 9 T. L. R. 452.

(f) 9 B. 45; cp. Barron v. Willis, (1900) 2 Ch. 121, (1902) A. C. 271.

to reside in the house, "and to conform to the spirit and intention of the deed, and to partake of the benefit of the establishment to be kept up therein by the wife, he should be at liberty so to do." The suit was discontinued, and the husband partook of the establishment. Langdale, M. R., held, that the deed was not void on any ground of public policy; and that, being a family arrangement, and a compromise of disputed rights, there was a sufficient consideration; that it was not void for uncertainty; and that the Court would enforce its due performance both by the wife and the husband.

With regard to the other points which were raised—want of consideration and the want of mutuality—Langdale, M. R., said: "I do not think that they ought to influence the mind of the Court at all. This is not a matter of pecuniary consideration, but a family arrangement,—a compromise of litigated rights between the parties."

Separation Deeds.—As to separation deeds generally, and as to the powers of a wife to make binding compromises with her husband with respect thereto, see Wilson v. W., under the heading of "Husband and Wife," post (a).

(a) As to the compromise of suits for 31 L. J. Ch. 160, 32 L. J. Ch. 168; restitution of conjugal rights, see Rowley v. R., L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. Stanes v. S., 3 P. D. 42; Hunt v. H., 63.

CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD (a).

HUGUENIN v. BASELEY.

1807. 14 V. 273; 9 R. R. 276.

Undue Influence-Voluntary Settlement obtained by an Agent.

Voluntary settlement by a widow upon the defendant, a clergyman, and his family set aside, as obtained by undue influence and abused confidence in the defendant, as an agent undertaking the management of her affairs; upon the principles of public policy and utility, applicable to the relation of guardian and ward.

The object of the bill in this cause was to set aside a conveyance made by the plaintiff Mrs. Huguenin, previously to her marriage with the other plaintiff, her second husband, as having been improperly and fraudulently obtained. The following are the principal circumstances established by evidence and admission, under which this relief was sought.

In 1803, Mrs. Huguenin, then Mrs. Hill, appeared to be entitled in fee simple to the manors of Cleydon and Hampton Gay, and other estates in Oxfordshire, under the ultimate limitation of the reversion by a will dated 1768, to her father, Richard Hindes, who had gone to Jamaica, where he acquired considerable property, real and personal, which upon his death also descended to her.

After some correspondence with their solicitors in England, she, in September, 1803, returned with her husband from Jamaica. He died in October, 1803; and in November, she being then about the age of forty, first became acquainted with the defendant, Thomas Baseley, a clergyman, who was also connected with the family of Hindes, and had with other persons, upon the death of the testator in

post, Fraud upon a Power; Strathmore v. Bowes, post, Fraud on Marital Rights.

⁽a) As to other cases of constructive fraud, see Fox v. Mackreth, post, Purchase by a Trustee; Aleyn v. Belchier,

1798, instituted a suit claiming as heirs-at-law of Richard Hindes; in which cause an inquiry, directed by the Lord Chancellor, produced the title of Mrs. Huguenin as the only child of Richard Hindes.

The bill stated, that the defendant Baseley, with the view of getting the control and management of the said estates, and of getting them ultimately settled upon himself, procured an introduction to Mrs. Huguenin; and having by various means ingratiated himself with her, represented that her solicitors had mismanaged and neglected her property, and induced her, then a stranger, having no friends or relations in England, and being quite ignorant of the value of property, to withdraw her affairs from those solicitors and to place them in the hands of the defendant; who, with such design, wrote the following letter, which she, by his inducement, caused to be copied and signed, and sent to the solicitors:

"Sirs,—Having been so unfortunate as to lose the best of husbands and the sincerest friend by the premature death of Mr. Hill, I feel myself, as it were, left in that unprotected state that I now want the assistance of some friend with whom I can advise in the adjustment of my affairs, and who will kindly interpose in seeing that my property is managed to the best advantage. From reflection, I have the greatest reason to believe that Providence has raised me up a friend, and that friend is Mr. Baseley, who will take upon him the trouble of bringing all my affairs into such a plan as I shall hereafter be enabled to conduct them with facility to myself. Impressed with this agreeable idea, I beg leave to inform you that I commit (subject to my own inspection) the perfect arrangement of my business with you into Mr. Baseley's hands; and hope that you will prepare, without any delay, every account that you have standing against me, with the deeds, &c., of the estate at Hampton. As I wish to leave London at Lady-day next, I must desire that no delay on your part will take place. Mr. Baseley will be ready to meet you on the business whenever you will appoint a day. determination, I remain, &c.

"ANN HILL."

The deeds were accordingly delivered to Baseley, and were deposited by him with his solicitor. The bill farther represented,

that the defendant artfully dissuaded the plaintiff from residing in the house at Hampton Gay, and letting the estate, as she had proposed, and recommended to her a surveyor, who gave a very unfavourable account of the situation of the estate; and the defendant Baseley soon afterwards offered her 400l. a year for a lease of the whole, clear of all expenses, and keeping the premises in repair, representing 420l. a year as the utmost value, which was confirmed by his solicitor; that she executed the deeds under the persuasion of the solicitor that they were her will, and the lease to Baseley, and that she had no intention to give away or settle her estate, &c.

By the deed dated the 5th of May, 1804, which was the subject of the bill, the plaintiff, Mrs. Huguenin, in consideration of 10s., conveyed the Hampton Gay estates to a trustee, his heirs and assigns, to the use that she and her assigns might, during her life, receive out of the said manor, &c., an annuity of 400l., secured by a trust term of 500 years; and subject thereto, to the use of the defendant Baseley, for life, without impeachment of waste, with remainders to trustees to preserve contingent remainders to his wife for life, to their children, born or to be born, in tail, with cross remainders, and the ultimate remainder to Mrs. Huguenin. The value of that estate was rather more than 400l. per annum.

The defendant, Thomas Baseley, by his answer represented, that from the time of his first acquaintance with the plaintiff, a great intimacy took place, and she expressed a great affection for him and his family; that she complained of the conduct of her solicitors, declaring her intention of taking the management of her affairs from them; and upon her application, he recommended to her his solicitor and a surveyor, and she intimated to the defendant her intention of settling her estates on him and his family, and requested him to write to her solicitors, to acquaint them that she should take her affairs out of their hands; and the defendant at her request did in her presence, and with her sanction, and according to her directions, write the form of a letter for that purpose, which the plaintiff, as he believes, copied, and sent to her solicitors; but the defendant positively denies that such letter was written at his instigation, or by his desire; on the contrary, he wrote the same at the pressing desire of the plaintiff; and though the language of the letter was the defendant's, yet the substance was in fact dictated by her. In

another part of the answer, the defendant denied that he induced her to send that letter, stating his belief that it was written by him, but that it was so written at the particular instance and request of the plaintiff, who desired him to draw up such letter, as before mentioned; and he believes he did, upon that occasion, state to the plaintiff, that, if it was her wish to discharge her solicitors, such letter ought to be in her own handwriting, as it would not be so proper for it to appear in his handwriting, and the plaintiff did copy such letter.

The answer further stated, that the plaintiff frequently expressed to the defendant a wish to settle her affairs, and make a disposition of her property, inquiring whether the defendant was related to her, and who was her heir-at-law; and being informed, expressed a great dislike to that family. And after various conversations, she repeated her determination to settle the Hampton Gay estate on the defendant and his family; and in March, 1804, without any persuasion, suggestion, or influence, she gave instructions accordingly; and the defendant understood her intention to be, to settle the estate so as to reserve to herself a rent-charge for her life about equal to the reasonable rent; and that it was her wish that the defendant should go and reside there immediately with his family, so that the mansion house might be kept up; declaring, that she would never reside there on account of the trouble of repairing, &c.; and the defendant denied all the charges of fraud, influence, &c.

The answer of the attorney who prepared the deed, stated, that when instructed by her to prepare the settlement, he recommended to her to make a will, which might be revoked or altered; when she replied, that she would not do it by will, on that account, as, if she should alter her situation, she intended it should not affect the settlement of her property. The defendant, according to the voluntary instructions of the plaintiff, prepared two deeds of settlement; viz., that of the 5th of May, 1804, as to the Hampton Gay estate, in the bill mentioned, and the other, dated the 21st of June, 1804, relating to all her other estates and property. In the former deed, blanks were left for the plaintiff's rent-charge and the names of the trustees, and she made alterations as to the uses among Baseley's children, and as to the ultimate limitation, which originally was to Baseley in fee. That deed was settled, and the other prepared

by counsel; and they were voluntarily and deliberately executed and the blanks filled up by her direction.

This answer farther stated, that, in the deed of the 21st of June, 1804, the defendant Thomas Baseley, and this defendant, and William Sleet, of Jamaica, were named trustees, and the estates and property therein comprised were conveyed and assigned upon trust during the life of the plaintiff, Ann Huguenin, to convey, &c., according to her appointment, and to her separate use, notwithstanding coverture; and, after her decease, for any future husband surviving her, for his life, with remainder to her children by any such marriage as tenants in common in tail, with cross-remainders; remainder to her mother, and William James Clarke and the survivor, and to the children of Clarke; with remainder to Thomas Baseley and the two other persons named as trustees, as tenants in common; and 5,000l. was settled on Mary Ann Eliot; and she was directed, during her minority, to be brought up by Mrs. Baseley, who was to receive the interest of her fortune; 2,000l. on Elizabeth Eleanor Clarke; 100l. a year on Mrs. Hindes; 200l. a year on William James Clarke; and by that deed are settled several estates in Jamaica, with the stock; several sums of money due from different persons; a leasehold estate in Middlesex; the Manor of Cleydon, in the county of Oxford, and all the estates real and personal, then late the property of Thomas Hindes, not before conveyed and settled by the plaintiff, and other estates real and personal, stated to be mentioned in the schedules.

This answer also denied all the charges of fraud, misrepresentation, &c.

Sir S. Romilly, Mr. Hollist, and Mr. Trower, for the plaintiffs.—
The authorities against permitting a transaction of bounty to take effect between persons standing in certain relations are numerous. Among those relations, that of guardian and ward is not for this purpose confined to persons so related in a strict sense—as under an appointment of guardian by will, or by order of this Court; but the rule includes any person placing himself in that situation (a):

⁽a) Hylton v. H., 2 Ves. Sen. 547; Lib. in Mr. Cox's note, 1 P. W. 121, to Pierse v. Waring, cited 1 Ves. Sen. 38; the Duke of Hamilton v. Mohun; 2 Ves. Sen. 548, stated from the Reg. Hatch v. H., 9 Ves. 292.

* * This is an instance of a very peculiar species of influence gained over the mind of this lady by no common means; appearing by the letter, written or dictated by the defendant for Mrs. Huguenin to copy, in terms which he cannot be supposed to use in the light and profane way that too frequently occurs. The English Courts of justice do not afford an instance of influence acquired by such means (a); but in foreign Courts such instances have occurred. According to Pothier, it has been decided, upon the same principles of public utility, that a confessor, or director of the conscience, a person to whom another trusted his spiritual concerns in matters of religion, cannot take any bounty from the person to whom he acts in that character, and the apprehension of the empire which these persons obtain, was carried so far that a gift to the order of which they were members was not allowed to have effect.

Mr. Richards, Mr. Fonblanque, Mr. Hart, Mr. Martin, Mr. Leach, and Mr. Wetherell, for the defendant.

Sir Samuel Romilly, in reply.—This bill puts the relief it prays, directly upon the ground of undue influence, exerted by the means of spiritual ascendency, distinctly charging that the defendant had taken upon himself to be the adviser of this lady, and the manager of her property, and stating the letter as an instance of that influence. But, divesting this case of that relation and influence, and considering it as the case of a stranger, the evidence of fraud or misapprehension is so strong, that this transaction could not possibly Upon all the evidence it cannot be represented that, when she executed the deed, she was apprised of its nature. sudden change in so short a period, from great anxiety about this estate, to be accounted for, but from the effect of a sort of fascination? Of what consequence was it to Mrs. Huguenin what repairs were to be done, what conditions were to be kept, according to the evidence, upon the supposition that she was parting with the estate for ever? The removal of her husband's corpse to be buried at Hampton Gay is another circumstance utterly inconsistent with the defendant's representation that she did not intend to remain the proprietor. Having a mother, a half-brother, and sister, she was not at a loss

⁽a) See Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden, 286, by a dissenting minister and unduly an instance of undue influence acquired exercised, 9 R. R., p. 282 (n.).

for an object of bounty. The evidence as to her conversation with the attorney, suggesting to her that a will would be revocable by a change of her circumstances, shows that she looked to the possibility of a second marriage. Her expression of satisfaction at having attained her object cannot be explained upon the supposition that she was giving away her estate, but may be accounted for if she was to get rid of the trouble attending it.

In these cases, one of the strongest circumstances is the appearance by one person of consulting only the interest of another, and neglecting his own. The passage in Cicero (a) is most applicable:—

"Totius autem injustitiæ nulla capitalior est quam eorum, qui, cum maximè fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur."

The duty imposed upon the defendant by merely undertaking the concerns of this lady, made it impossible for him to take the whole of her estate; for it is not necessary to go to the extent that he could not accept any bounty. He took upon him the entire management of her affairs-acting as her agent, receiving her rents, attending arbitrations, &c., &c. The rule is not confined to attorneys or persons entitled to reward. Proof v. Hines (b) was the case of a tradesman, who officiously interfered; the relief stands upon a general principle applying to all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another (c); and this case discovers one of a very peculiar nature,—influence obtained through the sacred character of a minister of religion. Though there is no case (d) in which the Court has proceeded upon such grounds, the general principle has prevailed, where the means of acquiring influence were much less powerful,—the respect of a child or ward for a parent or guardian. Pothier says, that, by a latitude of interpretation, proceeding upon principles of public utility, that ordinance, expressly concerning only a tutor or administrateur, has been extended to the master of a school; the director of the conscience; the physician, who is not permitted during his attendance to take a conveyance from the patient; and to other relations, in which authority or influence must be supposed to exist.

⁽a) Cic. de Off., lib. 1, s. 13.

approved of by Lord Cottenham.

⁽b) Cas. t. Talbot, 111.

⁽d) See Norton v. Relly, 2Eden, 286,

⁽c) See Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. &

supra.

C. 277, where this proposition is

For the proper determination of this case, however, it is not necessary to rely on such authorities. The decisions of English Courts of Justice are amply sufficient. The same doctrine, stated by your Lordship in Hatch v. H. (a), was laid down by Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, in Bridgman v. Green (b). There was in that case much evidence that the person was perfectly aware of what he was doing, and had repeatedly confirmed it. Upon that, Lord Chief Justice Wilmot's observation is, that it only tends to show more clearly the deep-rooted influence obtained over him (c). "In cases of forgery, instructions under the hand of the persons whose deed or will is supposed to be forged, to the same effect as the deed or will, are very material; but in cases of undue influence and imposition they prove nothing; for the same power which produces one, produces the other; and, therefore, instead of removing such an imputation, it is rather an additional evidence of it."

Having before (d) mentioned the distinction of the Roman law between liberality and profusion, he says, our laws strike no such boundary—"stat pro ratione voluntas is the law with us;" and this Court never did nor ever will annul donations merely as being improvident, and such as a wise man would not have made, or a man of very nice honour have accepted; nor will this Court measure the degrees of understanding, and say, that a weak man, provided he is out of the reach of a commission, may not give as well as a wise man. But though this Court disclaims any such jurisdiction, yet where a gift is immoderate, bears no proportion to the circumstances of the giver, where no reason appears, or the reason given is falsified, and the giver is a weak man, liable to be imposed upon, this Court will look upon such a gift with a very jealous eye, and very strictly examine the conduct of the persons in whose favour it is made; and if it sees that any arts or stratagems, or any undue means have been used—if it sees the least speck of imposition at the bottom, or that the donor is in such a situation with respect to the donee as may naturally give an undue influence over him-if there be the least scintilla of fraud, this Court will and ought to interpose; and by the exertion of such a jurisdiction, they are so far from infringing the right of alienation, which is the

⁽a) 9 V. 292, 7 R. R. 195.

⁽b) 2 Ves. Sen. 627; Wilm. 58.

⁽c) Wilm. 70.

⁽d) Wilm. 60, 61.

inseparable incident of property, that they act upon the principle of securing the full, ample, and uninfluenced enjoyment of it.

The ground, as between guardian and ward, is put upon the danger, either of inducing guardians to flatter the passions of their wards, or of the improper exercise of their authority, as the relation of husband and wife is guarded from the effects both of indulgence and severity.

If this reasoning has any weight, does not the principle apply with infinitely greater force to the present case? What is the authority of a guardian, or even parental authority; what are the means of influence, by severity or indulgence, in such a relation, compared with the power of religious impressions under the ascendency of a spiritual adviser; with such an engine to work upon the passions; to excite superstitious fears or pious hopes; to inspire as the object may be best promoted, despair or confidence; to alarm the conscience by the horrors of eternal misery, or support the drooping spirits by unfolding the prospect of eternal happiness: that good or evil, which is never to end? What are all other means to these? Are inferior considerations to have so much effect; and is no regard to be given to the most powerful motive that can actuate the human mind? Though no direct authority is produced, your Lordship, dispensing justice by the same rule as your predecessors, upon such a subject, not confined within the narrow limits of precedent, will, as a new relation appears, look into the principles that govern the human heart, and decide in a case, far the strongest that has yet occurred, upon this ground alone, from its infinite importance to the community.

November 23, 1807.

Lord Chancellor Eldon.—With regard to the interests of the wife and children of the defendant, there was no personal interference upon their part in the transactions that have produced this suit. If, therefore, their estates are to be taken from them, that relief must be given with reference to the conduct of other persons; and I should regret that any doubt could be entertained, whether it is not competent to a Court of equity to take away from third persons the benefits which they have derived from the fraud, imposition, or undue influence of others. The case of Bridgman v.

Green (a) is an express authority, that it is within the reach of the principle of this Court, to declare that interests so gained by third persons, cannot possibly be held by them; and Lord Hardwicke observes justly, that if a person could get out of the reach of the doctrine and principle of this Court, by giving interests to third persons, instead of reserving them to himself, it would be almost impossible ever to reach a case of fraud. In that instance, therefore, the interest of the son was considered as capable of being affected by the decree as the interest of the father. The case afterwards came before the Lords Commissioners; and Lord Chief Justice Wilmot expresses himself thus (b):—

"There is no pretence that Green's brother, or his wife, was party to any imposition, or had any due or undue influence over the plaintiff; but does it follow from thence, that they must keep the money? No: whoever receives it must take it tainted and infected with the undue influence and imposition of the person procuring the gift: his partitioning and cantoning it out amongst his relations and friends will not purify the gift, and protect it against the equity of the person imposed upon. Let the hand receiving it be ever so chaste, yet, if it comes through a polluted channel, the obligation of restitution will follow it."

This was also the doctrine of Lord Thurlow, in the case that has been referred to: Lutterel v. Lord Waltham, sometimes cited as Dixon v. Olmius (c); and, though it was not practically acted upon, Lord Thurlow was inclined to carry it farther. The object of the bill in that case was, that an estate should be enjoyed as if a recovery had been suffered, upon the ground that Lutterel had, while Lord Waltham was, upon his death-bed, engaged in suffering a recovery, prevented it with the view that the estate should devolve upon the person with whom he was connected. The estate was by the law vested in that individual: a much stronger case, therefore, than the acquisition of property through imposition. Lord Thurlow, whatever might have been his final decision upon that case, had no doubt that it was against conscience, that one person should hold a benefit which he derived through the fraud of another; and I have reason to know that his Lordship would not have discussed the case

⁽a) 2 Ves. Sen. 627; Wilm. 58.

so much at large, if it had been no more than that. These plaintiffs, therefore, if entitled to relief against Baseley, are equally entitled against all the branches of his family.

Then, as to persons concerned in these transactions, I agree with the argument, that it is not upon the feelings which a delicate and honourable man must experience, hearing these instruments, taken altogether, as I think myself bound to take them, nor upon any notion of discretion in this Court to prevent a voluntary gift, by a man stripping himself entirely of his property, if undue influence is not imputed, that any judge sitting here has ever thought himself at liberty to interpose. I agree, further, that the relief must proceed upon what is alleged and proved by the person complaining; that their complaints must be treated as effectual or ineffectual, according to what they have, not what they could have, represented: also, as to the defence, it may frequently happen that many passages may have taken place in the course of the transaction that are not brought into view; but the case must be dealt with as it is alleged and proved. I have, therefore, looked through this bill with reference to the frame of it, and I have no doubt this case might have been more clearly reached, if the situation of the parties had enabled them to go through all the difficulties as to amendment; also, that many circumstances might have been brought forward on behalf of the defendants, which I am bound not to look at; but taking the case as it stands, though there is in this bill much foul allegation, which, if not true ought not to be there, and a great deal of which is denied, and clearly disproved, there is enough upon the bill and in evidence, to show that this deed cannot stand, if the whole transaction, taken together, cannot stand.

This bill seeks relief only as to the deed of May, 1804. The deed of June relates to other estates; unquestionably has very different provisions, for very different persons; reserving a degree of dominion, and considerable dominion, to Mrs. Huguenin over that property; and I am disposed to think, that deed could not be made the subject of the same bill: at least, that it was not necessary to complicate this cause by making that a subject of the relief prayed. But the view I take of this case is this: that, attending to the effect of the letter, the evidence of the transactions among these parties, and attending more especially to the evidence of the attorney, the defence rests in a

great measure upon this: that the Court is, by the nature of the defence, required to look at this deed, not merely by itself, but as being more or less justified with reference to the whole of the transactions, in the course of which it was executed; and it is much the same as if the defendant had said, he puts his case, not upon that instrument merely, but as part of a general arrangement of the plaintiff's affairs; and that the deed is to be considered with regard not merely to its own contents, but to the whole transaction, of which this deed forms a part.

The great body of evidence shows the alarm of this lady at the trouble of taking possession of an estate dilapidated. Upon the evidence, until November, 1803, she had no acquaintance whatsoever with Baseley. Her age was about forty. She had left in the West Indies a mother; had great regard for a female child, Mary Ann Eliot; and had also a natural half-brother, named Clarke, of the age of sixteen, in whose education she appears to have been much interested. She brought him over to England; placed him with Mr. Baseley at an expense to herself of 200l. a year. Her brother-in-law, Benjamin Hill, states, that he, previously to the introduction of Baseley, managed her concerns; and that, until after that introduction, she expressed her entire satisfaction with the care of the solicitors in whose hands her affairs in this kingdom were placed, which is confirmed by another witness. The bill charges Baseley with infusing into her mind great dissatisfaction with the management, and the want of professional skill and care of those solicitors. The inference that this dissatisfaction was created in her mind by Baseley, is too strong: that she entertained that dissatisfaction is clear: that Baseley did not discourage it, that he gave in to it, is in evidence: that he created it, I cannot say: that he participated in, and acted upon it with her, is clearly established.

In October, preceding the month of January when her affairs were taken out of the hands of those solicitors, her husband, who came with her to England, died. She lived with, or was frequently with the two brothers of her deceased husband. The answer, therefore, stating that she was not without friends in this country is material; but in this view only, that it could be supposed she had ever consulted with them. There is, however, no evidence, that either Baseley ever stated to them what she proposed to do, or that the

attorney concerned in the transaction, as Lord Chief Justice Wilmot says, felt the obligation of talking both with the grantor and the grantee, before this proposition was carried into effect. Benjamin Hill, one of her brothers-in-law, laid aside all the business after the solicitors were discharged; and as to George Hill, though there is evidence that she did declare her purpose, it was in conversations, in which it was suggested to them both, and that ample provision was to be made for their children, which I fear had some influence with them. No such provision, however, was made.

It is doubtful, upon the report, whether Mrs. Huguenin had the immediate means of acting with the freedom of an affluent person. At the date of the report, the rents remained to be accounted for by Baseley, to the amount of 300l. or 400l. After the date of that report, small sums were lent to her: she had not even then paid the costs of the deed; she had borrowed 100l. from the attorney; and there is one item of 57l., advanced by Baseley after June, 1804, to discharge her husband from an arrest. Certainly, therefore, she was not in a condition of immediate affluence. Under the influence of her dissatisfaction at the conduct of the solicitors, in January, 1803, either she adopted the resolution of dismissing them, and placing the whole management of all her concerns in the hands of Baseley, calling upon him to assist her in executing it, or it was suggested to her by Baseley. My opinion is, that the weight of the evidence, which does not agree upon this, is, that she called upon Baseley, and desired him to assist her in executing that purpose of her own. If the proposition was her own, yet the transaction, in a Court of justice, has this character at least, that it was demonstration to Baseley that she placed confidence in him, as high as one individual ever placed in another. Where the evidence is contradictory, the fairest way to the defendant is to take his own account; and his answer represents it thus, that she called and requested him to write a letter to the solicitors; and at her request he did, in her presence, with her sanction, and by her direction, write the form of a letter, which he believes she copied and sent to them; but he positively denies that it was written at his instigation or by his desire, and says he wrote it at her pressing desire; and though the language was his, the substance was hers. Who dictated that letter is of very little importance. If at her dictation he wrote it, and permitted her to

send it, that is the most direct communication to him of the nature and extent of the confidence she placed in him; and the language of a Court of justice has in all times been, that, if a man does not choose to act upon the confidence appearing in the course of the transaction to be so reposed in him, he ought to reject it as soon as proposed. This letter is, therefore, upon the answer, to be taken as expressing her sentiments in his language. The effect of it is, at least, a communication to him of the information that she was unprotected by the death of her husband; that she wanted assistance for the purpose of advising her in the adjustment of her affairs; that she wanted that friend whom Providence had raised up for the purpose of kindly interposing in seeing that her property was managed to the best advantage, and her affairs brought into such a plan that she could conduct them with facility to herself.

This letter produced from the solicitors, rather too hastily, a total severance of themselves from the concern; and Baseley entered, to a certain degree at least, upon the management of them. The purposes expressed and alluded to in that letter, cannot mean that all her estate should be given away: that she was to be enabled to conduct her affairs with facility by giving up all her title. The attorney, who states that he was satisfied that she had made up her mind as to all her affairs, prepared in June these two deeds, conveying this estate, worth at that time, at the lowest calculation, 420l. a year, which Annesley wished to purchase upon the supposition that it was worth 610l. a year, subject to a rent-charge to herself, with a term in trustees to secure it to Baseley for life; with remainders to Mrs. Baseley for life, and to all their children, born or to be born, and the ultimate limitation to Mrs. Hill. A deed was prepared at the same time, which appears intended to be a conveyance of all her property, but which they were very much perplexed to describe. conveying all her freehold estates in the West Indies and everywhere. none of the parties knowing what they were; all the leaseholds for lives mentioned in a schedule, of which there are none; and all the leaseholds for years, of which there are some, to her for her separate use for life; with remainders to the husband whom she should marry, surviving her, and to Mrs. Hindes, and young Clarke and his children; and the ultimate limitation, for what reason is not explained, to Baseley and the attorney, and a person resident in the

West Indies: this co-temporaneous deed permitted to be made by her, having in contemplation a second marriage, which appears upon the deed itself.

To the question, whether these instruments being such as I have represented them, the consequence is, that this Court shall undo them, I answer, no, if they are the pure, voluntary, well-understood acts of her mind; but if they have not that character, if they are the result of her notion, that this is the true effect of that friendly assistance, that kind providential interference to which she was looking for the management of her affairs with advantage and facility to herself; if the conveyance was executed under the effect of that, which has always been considered in this Court as undue influence, if the deeds themselves, which are the best evidence, demonstrate, and if they are confirmed by extrinsic evidence, that they are not the pure, well-understood acts of her mind, this Court will undo them.

Has an instance ever occurred that a person, situated as this lady, was permitted to execute such instruments as these, with a purpose of marriage demonstrated upon one of them, and having a mother, and other persons whom she regarded with affection and anxiety for their welfare in life? Lord Hardwicke reasons with great force as to the voluntary deed, upon the same principle which induced me to ask, how it happens that there is no power of revocation in this instrument. There was in that deed a power of revocation: but it was a power to revoke in the presence of three persons, who, perhaps, never could be got together, which was therefore considered as if there had been no power of revocation; and the want of such power was considered strong evidence that the party did not understand the transaction, whence arose a strong inference of an undue purpose. There is in this case an attempt to show why there was not a power of revocation; and that is a part of the transaction one of the most liable to objection. The evidence and answer of the attorney go to this distinctly, that she informed him she was to have all her affairs He was struck with the circumstance of her making an irrevocable deed, and told her that she should make a will. she said that this was to be a permanent arrangement, is it too much to say the attorney permitted himself to be surprised into an act depriving her of her property for the benefit of Baseley's family, and for no provident or wise purpose fettering all her other property by

the various limitations in the other deed? I do not say instruments are to be set aside by the want of great delicacy in the person who prepared them: but I am bound to look at all the circumstances that led to the execution of a voluntary instrument, and to observe that the attorney did not state this improvident act to the brother of this lady, or, as Lord Chief Justice Wilmot says (a), go and talk both to the grantor and grantee upon it. What she said to him must have suggested to him a reason for resisting more strenuously. The Court cannot pay attention to such circumstances as are alleged upon this part of the case.

The deed, being drawn by the attorney, was laid before a conveyancer, and the simple question put was, whether a fine and recovery were necessary. Why that should be thought of I do not know, as she had the remainder in fee simple vested in possession. Some observation occurs upon the contents of that instrument. annuity of 400l. is merely reserved, payable quarterly, not secured by any personal obligation. The three trustees and the rent-charge are left in blank before the deed was laid before counsel, and the filling up those blanks is left to Baseley and herself; and the power of changing the trustees does not depend upon her pleasure, but is only given in the cases of inability or refusal to act. The reason that there is no power of revocation is, that the gentleman before whom the draft was laid thought his business was to execute the intention of the parties. There is a difference of opinion upon that, other gentlemen thinking some observation necessary. Upon the instructions for the other deed, however, they do not intimate that there is to be any power of revocation, or that she is to have any power to alter the uses. Not a word is dropped upon the subject. But by that deed this lady, who was so shocked at the notion of having a provision that was not to be permanent, has the power of making a deed or will to alter completely these uses. Is there any evidence showing why that power should be there?—a power not to revoke the uses, but much less convenient, yet open to all the objections that she could have to a temporary instrument, as not binding herself down.

Other observations occur upon these instruments. This latter

deed, in the limitation as to all the estates, provides an interest to a husband surviving, and to her children. According to the instructions, as to all the money property (and they settle property in the funds, though there was none), they omit the provision for the husband and children, which, however, they thought they had inserted, as there is, afterwards, a provision upon failure of children. Another circumstance as to the instrument of the 21st of June, 1804, is that the instructions as to the trustees' names mention Baseley, the attorney, Sleet, and Anderson; and the insertion of Anderson is material. It is proved that she frequently visited him, and he is named as a trustee; but his name is afterwards struck out. Clearly, at the time of the instructions, it was not intended that there should be an ultimate limitation to the trustees for their own use; but they were to be trustees for undefined purposes. The deed was originally drawn so expressing the trust to be for such uses as they should think necessary and proper; but that was afterwards struck out, and the use for the benefit of the trustees themselves substituted.

It does not rest there. Suppose these transactions entirely separate. Proposing to put under the fetters of these limitations all her considerable West India and other property, for the purposes of facility of management, and putting it out of her own reach, she is permitted to place her West India property under the care of a clergyman and an attorney in England, and a person resident in the West Indies. The power of management is certainly stated to be for her life, subject to her control; how efficacious, every one knows, without any control whatsoever after her death. The management is perfectly ad libitum, to lease and carve out of the estates other interests; and they have all discretionary powers as to the children, Mary Eliot, and Clarke; and she could not change any of the trustees without executing that power which it is supposed she had determined not to have.

If such is the nature of these deeds, and the defendant, according to the letter that is in evidence, permitted her to suppose that he was to take the management for her benefit, without considering what an agent engaged for reward can do, the known doctrine is, that the fruit of that relation, if it was not absolutely dissolved, cannot be permitted to subsist. Then, was the relation dissolved? Look at

the transactions from the date of the letter to the end of the year: possession taken, and her anxious wish that Baseley should be the occupier, proved; her satisfaction expressed at seeing the house repaired; her declarations that she could not possibly think of undertaking that trouble; and that it was with exultation and satisfaction, as some of the witnesses express it, that she got rid of the estate; that it was no object to her; that she had so much property, it was a subject of delight to her that Baseley was to occupy that which was given to him. Take it that she intended to give it to him, it is by no means out of the reach of the principle. tion is not whether she knew what she was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but how the intention was produced; whether all that care and providence was placed round her, as against those who advised her, which, from their situation, and relation with respect to her, they were bound to exert on her behalf. Her situation, with reference to pecuniary circumstances during the whole period, must also be attended to, her husband, a few weeks before, having been relieved from distress by a sum of money advanced by Baseley.

In that view of the case, no evidence out of these instruments could satisfy me that Mrs. Huguenin understood them. I believe further, that the parties to the transaction did not understand it. Repeating therefore, distinctly, that this Court is not to undo voluntary deeds, I represent the question thus—whether she executed these instruments not only voluntarily, but with that knowledge of all their effect, nature, and consequences, which the defendants Baseley and the attorney were bound by their duty to communicate to her, before she was suffered to execute them; and though, perhaps, they were not aware of the duties which this Court required from them in the situation in which they stood, where the decision rests upon the ground of public utility, for the purpose of maintaining the principle, it is necessary to impute knowledge which the party may not actually have had. These parties, therefore, cannot possibly hold the benefit of these instruments.

As to the costs, the same principles of public utility that require me to decree that these instruments shall be delivered up, compel me to make that decree at the cost of the defendant. As to ordering the deeds and papers to be delivered up, I have not, upon this form

of the bill, authority to examine here the contents of the rest of the attorney's bill of costs, who, by happening to be engaged in a transaction that cannot be maintained, would not lose his lien upon the papers with reference to other transactions. If, however, Mrs. Huguenin ought not to have been permitted to execute the deed, I am bound by the principle established in Bridgman v. Green (a), and other cases, to hold, that if an attorney thinks proper to do more than obey the instructions which he ought not to have permitted to take effect, the Court has frequently said that it is not sufficient; and if he has not only carried into execution an intention which he ought not to have permitted to take effect, but has also taken to himself an advantage with respect to the property, persons not being consulted who ought to have been consulted (alluding to the ultimate limitation to the trustees), it deserves serious consideration whether he shall not pay the costs if the others cannot. If, however, these papers are to be delivered up on payment of the attorney's bill, he cannot be permitted to charge for drawing instruments which the decree says ought not to have been executed.

One circumstance now occurs to me, which I shall notice, that it may not be supposed to have escaped me. If there is anything like consideration, it is the consideration that arises out of the circumstances that Baseley would repair and lay out money upon the estate. If that had been expressed, it would have amounted to so little, as valuable consideration, that the Court would not have been justified in paying much attention to it; but I cannot find in any of these cases in which a deed has been affected on account of undue influence, that the Court has ever attended to anything supposed merely to oblige the parties, if not expressed.

NOTES.

1. Generally, p. 278.

^{2.} Where undue influence is presumed from the relation between the parties, p. 281.

^{3.} Where there is no special confidential relationship between donor and donee, p. 294.

^{4.} How far the Court will interfere as against third parties, p. 296.5. Delay, acquiescence, confirmation, p. 299.

^{6.} Gifts by will, p. 300.

⁽a) 2 Ves. Sen. 627; Wilm. 58.

1. Generally.

Huguenin v. Baseley is a leading case on the jurisdiction of equity, to set aside, upon the principle of general public policy, voluntary donations "inter vivos," obtained by persons standing in some confidential, fiduciary, or other relation towards the donor, in which dominion may be exercised over him. Other instances of constructive fraud dealt with in these volumes are, fraud upon marital rights, Strathmore v. Bowes, see "Husband and Wife"; fraud upon a power, Aleyn v. Belchier, see "Powers"; purchase by a trustee from his cestui que trust, Fox v. Mackreth, see Trusts (Constructive).

The word "Constructive" negatives actual fraud, but affirms that the actual conditions will have similar consequences (a). Constructive fraud includes that vast number of cases in which transactions are disallowed, not on account of any evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a positive fraud or injury upon other persons, but because they are contrary to some general public policy, or to some fixed artificial policy of the law (b). "Fraud, in my opinion, is a term that should be reserved for something dishonest and morally wrong, and much mischief is, I think, done, as well as much unnecessary pain inflicted by its use where 'illegality' and 'illegal' are the really appropriate expressions" (c).

"The relief," says Lord Cottenham (d), "as Sir Samuel Romilly says in his celebrated reply in Huguenin v. Baseley, from the hearing of which I received so much pleasure that the recollection of it has not been diminished by the lapse of more than thirty years, the relief stands upon a general principle, applying to all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another:" "The obtaining of property, or of any benefit, through the undue and unconscientious abuse of influence by a person in whom trust and confidence are placed, has always been treated as a fraud of the gravest character" (e).

Courts of Equity will not, however, arrest or set aside an act or contract merely because a man of more honour would not have entered into it. They do not sit as custodes morum, enforcing the

⁽a) Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 522.

⁽b) See Story's Eq. Jur. (1892), pp. 166, 167.

⁽c) Per Wills, J., Ex p. Watson, 21 Q. B. D. p. 309; and see judgment of Kay, J. in Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D., p.

^{324.}

⁽d) Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & C. 277.

⁽e) Per the C. A. in Moxon v. Payne,L. R. 8 Ch., p. 887.

strict rules of morality. But they do sit to enforce what has been called a technical morality. If confidence is reposed it must be faithfully acted upon, and preserved from any admixture of imposition. If influence is acquired it must be kept free from the taint of selfish interest, and cunning, and overreaching bargains. If the means of personal control are given, they must be always restrained to purposes of good faith and personal good (a).

Lindley, L. J., in his judgment in Allcard v. Skinner (b), thus classifies the cases in which equity invalidates voluntary gifts, pointing out that the two groups often overlap.

- (1). Cases in which there has been some unfair and improper conduct, some coercion from outside, some over-reaching, some form of cheating, and generally, though not always, some personal advantage obtained by a donee placed in some close and confidential relation to the donor (c).
- (2). Cases in which the position of the donor to the donee has been such that it has been the duty of the donee to advise the donor, or even to manage his property for him. In such cases the Court throws upon the donee the burden of proving that he has not abused his position, and of proving that the gift made to him has not been brought about by any undue influence on his part. In this class of cases it has been considered necessary to show that the donor had independent advice, and was removed from the influence of the donee when the gift was made to him.

The question in the second group of cases is not whether the donor knew what he was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but how the intention was produced: "Whether all that care and providence was placed around him, as against those who advised him which, from their situation and relation with respect to the donor, they were bound to exercise in his behalf" (d). In these cases it is the duty of the donee to advise and take care of the donor, and where there is no such duty the language of Lord Eldon ceases to be applicable (e).

- (a) Cf. Story, Eq. Jur. (1892), § 308 et seq.; Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 608; Moncreiff on Fraud (1891), p. 291.
 - (b) 36 C. D., p. 181.
- (c) Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden, 286; Nollidge v. Prince, 2 Gif. 246; Lyon v. Home, 6 Eq. 655; Whyte v. Mead, 2 Ir. Eq. R. 420, all belong to this group.

And see Morley v. Loughnan, (1893) 1 Ch. 736.

- (d) See judgment of Lindley, L. J., in Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 182. Citing with approval from the judgment of Eldon, C., in the principal case.
- (e) Lindley, L. J., Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 182

"To protect people from being forced, tricked, or misled in any way by others into parting with their property, is one of the most legitimate objects of all laws; and the equitable doctrine of undue influence has grown out of and been developed by the necessity of grappling with insidious forms of spiritual tyranny, and with the infinite varieties of fraud" (a).

But where a gift is made to a person standing in a confidential relation to the donor, the Court will not set aside the gift, if of a small amount, simply on the ground that the donor had no independent advice; otherwise if the gift is so large as not to be accounted for on the ground of friendship, charity, &c. (b).

What amounts to Undue Influence.—"As no Court has ever attempted to define fraud (c), so no Court has ever attempted to define undue influence, which includes one of its many varieties "(d). It will be a question for the Judge to decide, upon the circumstances of each particular case, and such circumstances as the non-intervention of a disinterested person, or professional adviser on the behalf of the donor, especially if the donor is, from age or weakness of disposition, likely to be imposed upon (e); the statement of a consideration, where there was actually none (f); the absence of a power of revocation (g); the improvidence of the transaction (h), furnish a probable though not always a certain test of undue influence or fraud (i).

Sir F. Pollock, in his work on the Law of Contracts, thus states the equitable doctrine on this subject: "Any influence brought to bear upon a person entering into an agreement, or consenting to a disposal of property, which, having regard to the age and capacity of the party, the nature of the transaction and all the circumstances of the case, appears to have been such as to preclude the exercise of free and deliberate judgment, is considered by Courts of Equity, in

- (a) Per Lindley, L. J., Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 183.
- (b) Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 258; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 185.
- (c) See the numerous definitions of fraud given in Moncreiff on Fraud, 1891, p. 28. Kerr on Fraud (1902), pp. 1, seq.
- (d) Per Lindley, L. J., Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 183.
- (e) Griffiths v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & C. 269, Harvey v. Mount, 8 B. 439; Page v. Horne, 11 B. 227; Dutton

- Thompson, 23 C. D. 278.
- (f) Hawes v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. Ch
 156; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Y. & C. C.
 C. 104; Sharp v. Leach, 31 B. 491.
- (g) Coutts v. Ackworth, 8 Eq. 558; Wollaston v. Tribe, 9 Eq. 44; Everitt v. E., 10 Eq. 405; but see cases in (i), infra; Lyon v. Home, 6 Eq. 655.
 - (h) Harvey v. Mount, 8 B. 439.
- (i) Phillips v. Mullings, L. R. 7 Ch.
 244; Hall v. H., L. R. 8 Ch. 430;
 Armstrong v. A., 8 Ir. R. Eq. 1.

respect of gifts 'inter vivos,' to be undue influence, and is a ground for setting aside the act procured by its employment "(a).

2. Where Undue Influence is presumed from the Relation between the Parties.

Where a relation of confidence is shown to exist, or is presumed from the position of the parties, then the law on grounds of public policy presumes that the gift was the effect of influence induced by these relations, and the burden lies on the donce to show that the donor had independent advice, or adopted the transaction after the influence was removed, or some equivalent circumstances (b). And although the donor is of full age and capable of managing his affairs, and the gift is made without proof of any actual exercise of power or influence, and although as a fact no unfair advantage is taken of him, and no undue influence is brought to bear upon him by the donee, and although the gift is not for the private advantage of the donee, but for legitimate purposes, for which it has been used, yet the Court, from the special relationship which exists between the parties, will infer the existence of influence, and in the case of large gifts, not to be reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, relationship, &c., will throw upon the donee the burden of supporting the gift, by proving that the donor had, or could have had if he had wished it, independent advice, and was free to act upon it when given (c).

In the special relations dealt with under this heading, influence is presumed (d). This enumeration is not exhaustive, but is intended for the purpose of illustration. The Court has declined to fetter the rule by any enumeration of the description of persons against whom it ought to be freely used (e). The principle upon which equity will give relief as against the persons standing in the following special relations to the donor, will be extended and

- (a) Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 600, and see as to wills, infra, p. 300, "Gifts by Will."
- (b) See Hunter v. Atkins, 3 M. & K. 135; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 B. 241; judgment of Wright, J., in Morley v. Loughnan, (1893) 1 Ch., p. 752; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De G. M. & G. 136; Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252; Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D. 462; Liles v. Terry, (1895) 2
- Q. B. 679; De Witte v. Addison, 80L. T. 207.
- (c) See judgment of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L. JJ., in Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D. 145, passim; Archer v. Hudson, 7 B. 551; Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252.
- (d) See Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D. 462.
- (e) Per Cottenham, C., in Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & C. 277.

applied to all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another (a). In these cases the age or capacity of the donor, or the nature of the benefit are of little importance. The point is, had he independent and competent advice? (b). When such a relation is established, the Court will presume its continuance unless its determination is distinctly proved (c).

Parent and Child, and persons in loco parentis.—In Carpenter v. Heriot (d), where a father having advanced a child in his infancy, upon his coming of age took a bond from him to a greater amount than the sums advanced, and which it appears the son was totally unable to pay, Lord Keeper Henley held that the bond was obtained by parental influence, and decreed that it should not stand as a security for the sums advanced, but be set aside altogether. "A man of mature age and experience can make a gift to his father or mother because he stands free of all overriding influence except such as may spring from what I may call filial piety: but a young person (male or female) just of age requires the intervention of an independent mind and will, acting on his or her behalf and interest solely, in order to put him or her on an equality with the maturer donor who is capable of taking care of himself (e)."

The same principles are applicable to a person obtaining a voluntary gift, who has put himself in loco parentis towards the donor. Thus, in the case of Archer v. Hudson(f), a niece, two months after she came of age, and after her guardians had fully accounted to her, entered into a voluntary security for her uncle, by whom she had been brought up, and who was considered by the

- (a) Per Cottenham, C., in Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & C 277. And see Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; Tate v. Williamson, 1 Eq., p. 536; L. R. 2 Ch., p. 61.
- (b) Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252; Powell v. P., (1900) 1 Ch. 243; Willis v. Barron, (1902) A. C. 271; Wright v. Carter, (1903) 1 Ch. 27.
- (c) Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252. Commented on in Mitchell v. Homfray, 8 Q. B. D. 592; and see Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. 61.
 - (d) 1 Eden, 338.
- (e) Farwell, J. in Powell v. P., (1900) 1 Ch. p. 246; see also Cocking v.
- Pratt, 1 Ves. Sen. 401; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De G. M. & G. 133; Potts v. Surr, 34 B. 543, 552; Davies v. D., 4 Gif. 417; King v. K., 3 Jur. (N. S.) 609, 611; Chambers v. Crabbe, 34 B. 457; Heron v. H., 2 Atk. 160; Hawes v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. Ch. 156; Hoghton v. H., 15 B. 278; Bury v. Oppenheim, 26 B. 594; Turner v. Collins, L. R. 7 Ch. 329, 342; Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 597; Savery v. King, 5 H. L. Cas. 627.
- (f) 7 B. 551; see De Witte Addison, 80 L. T. 207; O'Connor Foley, (1905) 1 Ir. R, 1.

Court as standing in loco parentis. Languale, M. R., set aside the security. "Nobody," observed his Lordship, "has ever asserted that there cannot be a pecuniary transaction between a parent and child, the child being of age; but everybody will affirm in this Court that, if there be a pecuniary transaction between parent and child, just after the child attains the age of twenty-one years, and prior to what may be called a complete 'emancipation,' without any benefit moving to the child, the presumption is, that an undue influence has been exercised to procure that liability on the part of the child; and that it is the business and the duty of the party who endeavours to maintain such a transaction, to show that that presumption is adequately rebutted; and that it may be adequately rebutted is perfectly clear. This Court does not interfere to prevent an act even of bounty between parent and child; but it will take care (under the circumstances in which the parent and child are placed before the emancipation of the child) that such child is placed in such a position as will enable him to form an entirely free and unfettered judgment, independent altogether of any sort of control" (a).

If the transaction between parent and child is reasonable, and entered into with good faith, equity will not interfere (b). And so where the dealing between them is of the nature of a family arrangement, as when a father prevails upon a son, tenant in tail under a settlement, to take an estate for life only, with remainder to his first and every other son, the transaction will not be set aside upon the suggestion of the father's having an undue influence over him (c). So, if a son, tenant in tail, and a father, tenant for life, agree on something for the benefit of the younger children, and afterwards the son complains of paternal authority being exerted, though there might be something of that sort, yet, if the agreement be reasonable, the Court will not set it aside (d).

(a) And see Grosvenor v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659; Sharp v. Leach, 10 W. R. 878; Revett v. Harvey, 1 S. & S. 502; Dettmar v. Metropolitan, &c. Bank, 1 Hem. & M. 641; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 772; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De G. M. & G. 133, 146; Maitland v. Backhouse, 16 Si. 58; Potts v. Surr, 34 B. 543; Savery v. King, 5 H. L. Cas. 627; Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18

- C. D. 188; De Witte v. Addison, 80
 L. T. 207; M'Mackin v. Hibernian Bank, (1905) 1 Ir. R. 296.
- (b) Blackborn v. Edgeley, 1 P. W.
 600, 606; cf. Firmin v. Pulham, 2
 De G. & Sm. 99.
- (c) Tendril v. Smith, 2 Atk. 86; Jenner v. J., 2 De G. F. & J. 359.
- (d) Cory v. C., 1 Ves. Sen. 19; Hartopp v. H., 21 B. 259; see, as to

In regarding claims to set aside a re-settlement of family estates the Court regards considerations which would otherwise not be allowed. And it is not essential when the son is tenant in tail in remainder that he should have independent advice, and the Court will not inquire whether the influence of the father was exerted with more or less force. And even if the father obtains a benefit it is not necessarily unfair, and even if unfair the whole settlement will not be avoided (a).

Husband and Wife.—This is one of the confidential relationships enumerated by Lord Penzance in Parfitt v. Lawless (b); but in Barron v. Willis (c) Cozens-Hardy J. said: "It is settled by authority which binds me, although text writers seem to have adopted the opposite view, that the relation of husband and wife is not one of those in which the doctrine of Huguenin v. Baseley applies."

Guardian and Ward.—"Where," says Lord Hardwicke, "a man acts as guardian, or trustee, in the nature of a guardian, for an infant, the Court is extremely watchful to prevent that person's taking any advantage immediately upon his ward or cestui que trust coming of age, and at the time of settling accounts or delivering up the trust, because an undue advantage may be taken. It would give an opportunity, either by flattery or force-by good usage unfairly meant, or by bad usage imposed—to take such an advantage. And, therefore, the principle of the Court is of the same nature with relief in this Court, on the head of public utility; as in bonds obtained from young heirs, and rewards given to an attorney pending a cause, and marriage brokage bonds. All depends upon public utility; and, therefore, the Court will not suffer it, though, perhaps in a particular instance, there may not be any actual unfairness. * * * The rule of the Court as to guardians is extremely strict, and in some cases does infer some hardship: as where there has been a great deal of trouble, and the guardian has acted fairly and honestly; and yet he

family arrangements, Stapilton v. S., note, p. 254, supra; Meadows v. M., 16 B. 401; Baker v. Bradley, 2 Sm. & G. 531; Jenner v. J., 2 De G. F. & J. 359.

(a) Hoblyn v. H., 41, C. D. 200, supra, p. 255; see Fane v. F., 20 Eq. 698; Turner v. Collins, L. R. 7 Ch. 329. Cf. Dutton v. Thompson, 23 C. D. 278; Chesterfield v. Janssen, p. 328, infra.

(b) L. R. 2 P. & D. 462.

(c) (1899) 2 Ch. 578, 585, approved

Howes v. Bishop, (1909) 2 K. B. 390 (C. A.). See Nedby v. N., 5 De G. & Sm. 377; Grigby v. Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. 517. In the cases of Turnbull v. Duval, (1902) A. C. 429, and Chaplin v. Brammall, (1908) 1 K. B. 233, it appeared on the evidence that the wife's signature had been obtained by the husband by concealment of material facts and without independent advice. No question of presumption was raised.

shall have no allowance. But the Court has established that on great utility and on necessity, and on this principle of humanity, that it is a debt of humanity, that one man owes to another, as every man is liable to be in the same circumstances" (a). A gift from a ward to a guardian will be the more readily set aside, if, at the time of its being made, the guardianship accounts are not all settled, or the ward's property is retained by his guardian (b).

And such transactions will be set aside after a considerable lapse of time, when the donor has not been a free agent. Thus in Hatch v. H. (c) a guardian, who was incumbent of a living, obtained from his ward, soon after she came of age, a conveyance of the advowson of the living expressed to be made in consideration of her great friendship, kindness, and regard for him, the care taken of her by him, &c.; and of 10s. to his brother, who was the attorney who prepared the deed, and one of the attesting witnesses, and who afterwards became her husband. She continued to live with her guardian for about four years afterwards, when she married her guardian's brother; and sixteen years after her marriage, upon the death of her guardian, she and her husband filed a bill to be relieved against the conveyance. Eldon, C., considering that she had never been her own mistress, being with her guardian till her marriage, and with her husband since, notwithstanding the time which had elapsed, and taking into consideration the nature of the property, ordered the instrument to be delivered up to be cancelled; but as the husband was particeps criminis, the order was made without costs.

In The Duke of Hamilton v. Mohun (d) the duke being about to marry, entered with great deliberation into marriage articles, one of which was, that he should, within two days after the marriage, release his intended wife's mother, who was her guardian, of all accounts of the mesne profits of the estate. Cowper, C., admitting that there had been no surprise, held, that the covenant to make such release ought to be set aside, as it seemed to be extorted from the

- (a) Hylton v. H., 2 Ves. Sen. 549; see Maitland v. Backhouse, 16 Si. 58; Hatch v. H., 9 V. 292, 7 R. R. 195.
- (b) Pierse v. Waring, 1 P. W. 121, Cox's note; S.C., cited 2 Ves. Sen. 549; Hylton v. H., 2 Ves. Sen. 547. And see Dawson v. Massey, 1 Ball & B. 219, where a lease granted to a guar-
- dian, and Aylward v. Kearney, 2 Ball & B. 463, where leases granted to a guardian's son were set aside. See and consider Cray v. Mansfield, 1 Ves. Sen. 379; Wood v. Downes, 18 V. 127; Wright v. Proud, 13 V. 136; Thornber v. Sheard, 12 B. 589.
 - (c) 9 V. 292, 7 R. R. 195.
 - (d) 1 P. W. 118.

duke by one who had a power over the young lady as a parent, which ought not to have been made use of in that manner; that it was as if the mother should say, "You shall not have my daughter unless you will release all accounts;" and that, to tolerate such an agreement would be paving a way to guardians to sell infants under their wardship; and the greater the fortune was, the greater would be the temptation to treat in this manner with the guardian.

So a voluntary settlement made by a female ward soon after she came of age, under the influence of her guardian, and without the advice of an independent solicitor, and the effect of which was to deprive her of the control over her own property, was set aside as improvident, especially as no power of revocation (a) was reserved (b). The principle applies also to any person assuming the office and functions of a guardian although not legally so constituted (c).

Where, however, the influence, as well as the legal authority of the guardian over the ward, has completely ceased, and the ward has been put into possession of his property, after a full and fair settlement of accounts, equity will not interfere to set aside a reasonable gift to the guardian. See Hylton v. H. (d), Hatch v. H. (e), where Lord Eldon says, "There may not be a more moral act, one that would do more credit to a young man beginning the world, or afford a better omen for the future, than if, a trustee having done his duty, the cestui que trust, taking it into his fair, serious, and well-informed consideration, were to do an act of bounty like this. But the Court cannot permit it, except quite satisfied that the act is of that nature, for the reason often given."

Trustee and Cestui que trust.—Much the same principles apply as in the above-mentioned relations of parent and child, and guardian and ward (f).

A trustee, moreover, cannot bargain with his cestui que trust for a benefit, and it has even been laid down that a cestui que trust cannot give a benefit to his trustees (g).

Legal Adviser and Client.—Courts of equity have always acted strictly up to this rule, that a solicitor can, by act inter vivos, take

⁽a) See Wollaston v. Tribe, 9 Eq. 44; Phillips v. Mullings, L. R. 7 Ch., p. 247; James v. Couchman, 29 C. D., p. 217.

⁽b) Everitt v. E., 10 Eq. 405.

⁽c) Griffin v. De Veulle, 3 P. W. 131; Hylton v. H., 2 Ves. Sen. 547.

⁽d) 2 Ves. Sen. 549.

⁽e) 9 V. 296.

⁽f) See Hatch v. H., 9 V. 192, 7 R. R. 195; Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; Tate v. Williamson, 1 Eq., p. 536.

⁽g) Vaughton v. Noble, 30 B. 39.

nothing for his own benefit from his client pending a suit, save his demand, or indeed at any time while the connection between them subsists, with the influence attending it: for though the transaction be as righteous as ever was carried on, it is the settled law, that the connection must, as in the case of guardian and ward, be bona fide dissolved, before he can take anything beyond his regular fees (a). "All transactions between solicitor and client which result in the solicitor's obtaining a benefit for himself, are subjected by Courts of law to strict scrutiny, when called in question by the client and are treated as imposing obligations on the solicitor of greater or less stringency. In some cases the obligation goes so far as almost to bind the solicitor to abstain altogether from a transaction of the Thus a solicitor may not accept from his client, while the relation of solicitor and client exists, remuneration for his professional services beyond that to which he is legally entitled. Of the application of this rule O'Brien v. Lewis (b) is a striking example. In the great majority of cases, however, the law does not exact so much. A solicitor may, for example, purchase from his client, but there is imposed on him the burden of proving that his client was fully informed, and duly and honestly advised, and that the price was just (c)." In Liles v. Terry (d) the plaintiff made a voluntary conveyance of leasehold premises to the defendant, John F. Terry, upon trust for herself for life, and after her death upon trust for her niece, the wife of the defendant Terry, for her separate use absolutely. The plaintiff was a spinster of seventy-seven years of age. The defendant, J. F. Terry, had acted as her solicitor in respect of certain litigation about the property conveyed, and the plaintiff had promised that if he would so act without charge she would leave his wife the property. On an action to set aside the deed, Charles, J., held there was nothing to

(a) Proof v. Hines, Cas. t. Talbot, 116; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 V. 266, 5 R. R. 295; Walmesley v. Booth, 2 Atk. 25; Drapers' Co. v. Davis, 2 Atk. 295; Oldham v. Hand, 2 Ves. Sen. 259; Welles v. Middleton, 1 Cox, 112; 4 Bro. P. C. 245; Newman v. Payne, 2 V. 199; Hatch v. H., 9 V. 296, 7 R. R. 195; Wood v. Downes, 18 V. 120; and Strachan v. Brandon, 1 Eden, 303; Moore v. Prance, 9 Ha. 299; Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G. M. & G. 270; Re Ingle, 21 B. 275; Walker

v. Smith, 29 B. 394; Re Holme's Estate, 3 Gif. 337; O'Brien v. Lewis, 4 Gif. 221; Tomson v. Judge, 3 Drew. 306; Gardener v. Ennor, 35 B. 549; Morgan v. Minett, 6 C. D. 638; Tyars v. Alsop, 59 L. T. 369.

(b) 32 L. J. Ch. 569; 4 Gif. 221.

(c) Stirling, L. J. in Re Haslam & Hier Evans, (1902) 1 Ch. 765, 769; Wright v. Carter, (1903) 1 Ch. 27. But see Allison v. Clayhills, 97 L. T. 709.

(d) (1895) 2 Q. B. 679; Willis v. Barron, (1902) A. C. 271.

show undue influence or unprofessional conduct; that the plaintiff had had the matter fully explained to her; and that the deed carried out her intention; and gave judgment for defendants. The C. A. reversed the judgment, holding that as the confidential relation existed, it was impossible to rebut the presumption of undue influence, unless the donor had competent and independent advice; and that a gift to the wife stood on the same footing as a gift to the solicitor himself. And a solicitor, having the conduct of a suit, may not purchase the subject-matter of it (a).

Where, however, there was no cause pending, and it was proved that there was no undue influence exercised by the attorney, a gift to him has been held valid (b). But the presumption of undue influence arising from the relation is not sufficiently rebutted by the mere fact of the client having employed a separate and independent solicitor—even though without any fraud or collusion on the part of the two solicitors—to advise him in the matter of the gift; for the presumption will continue so long as the relation of solicitor and client continues for other purposes outside the gift, or at all events until it can be clearly inferred that the influence arising from the relation no longer exists (c).

There is no objection to a sale by a client to his solicitor, provided the solicitor can prove (1) that the client was fully informed; (2) that he had competent independent advice; and (3) that the price given was a fair one (d).

A voluntary conveyance to counsel by the client, expressed to be in consideration of the services of counsel, will be set aside on the ground of public policy (e).

Whenever a professional man is called upon to give his services to his client, whether to prepare a deed or will, the law imputes to him a knowledge of all the legal consequences to result therefrom, and requires that he should distinctly and clearly point out to his client all those consequences from whence a benefit may arise to himself from the instrument so prepared; and if he fail to do so,

⁽a) Simpson v. Lamb, 26 L. J. Q. B.
121; Davis v. Freethy, 24 Q. B. D.,
p. 523; and see Luddy's Trustee v.
Peard, 33 C. D. 500; and James v.
Kerr, 40 C. D. 449.

⁽b) Oldham v. Hand, 2 Ves. Sen. 259; and see Harris v. Tremenheere, 15 V. 34.

⁽c) Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G. M. & G. 270; Wright v. Carter, (1903) 1 Ch. 27.

⁽d) Wright v. Carter, (1903) 1 Ch. 27; Re Haslam & Hier Evans, (1902) 1 Ch. 765.

⁽e) Broun v. Kennedy, 33 B. 133; 4 De G. J. & S. 217.

a Court of equity will deprive him of it. In Segrave v. Kirwan (a) a barrister drew a will for a friend, and was made executor, in which character he became entitled to the personal estate; he was held, however, by Hart, C., to be a trustee for the next of kin (b).

And it has moreover been expressly decided, that the relation of counsel and client renders the parties mutually incapable of making any contract of hiring and service concerning advocacy in litigation (c). But agreements between a solicitor and his client for the remuneration of the former are now valid, subject to the conditions imposed by the under-mentioned Acts(d).

Religious Influence.—" The equitable doctrine of undue influence (in gifts 'inter vivos') has grown out of and been developed by the necessity of grappling with insidious forms of spiritual tyranny and with the infinite varieties of fraud" (e). "The influence of one mind over another is very subtle, and of all influences religious influence is the most dangerous and the most powerful, and to counteract it Courts of equity have gone very far "(f). "Equity will not allow a person who exercises or enjoys a dominant religious influence over another to benefit directly or indirectly by the gifts which the donor makes under, or in consequence of, such influence unless it is shown that the donor, at the time of making the gift, was allowed full and free opportunity for counsel and advice outside—the means of considering his worldly position and exercising an independent will about it. This is not a limitation placed upon the action of the donor; it is a fetter placed upon the conscience of the recipient of the gift, and one which arises out of

- (a) Beat. 157.
- (b) See also Bulkley v. Wilford, 2 Cl. & Fin. 102; Nanney v. Williams, 22 B. 452; Corley v. Stafford, 1 De G. & J. 235; Ex p. Collins, 2 Ir. Ch. R. 618; Garrett v. Wilkinson, 2 De G. & Sm. 244; Clark v. Girdwood, 7 C. D. 9; Cockburn v. Edwards, 18 C. D. 449, 455; Pooley's Trustees v. Whetham, 33 C. D. 111.
- (c) Kennedy v. Broun, 13 C. B. (N.S.) 677; Robertson v. Macdonough, 6 L. R. Ir. 433.
- (d) The Attorney and Solicitors Act, 1870, s. 4; Pontifex v. Farnham, 41. W. R. 238; Re Stuart, (1893) 2 Q. B. 201; Re Thomas, (1893) 1 Q. B. 670;

Re Thompson, (1894) 1 Q. B. 462; Re Van Laun, (1907) 1 K. B. 155; and see as to Court having jurisdiction to set aside agreement, Re Jones, (1895) 2 Ch. 719; affirmed by C. A., (1896) 1 Ch. 222. The Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881, s. 8; Re Palmer, 45 C. D. 291; Davis v. Freethy, 24 Q. B. D., p. 523; Re Druce, 94 L. T. Jo. 583; Re Frape, (1893) 2 Ch. 284; Re West, King & Co., (1892) 2 Q. B., p. 106; Re Baylis, (1896) 2 Ch. 107.

- (e) Per *Lindley*, L. J., Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 183. See as to gifts by will, infra, p. 300.
 - (f) Ibid.

public policy and fair play" (a). In Allcard v. Skinner (b) plaintiff A., being about thirty-five years of age, was introduced in 1868 by her spiritual adviser N. to the defendant S., who was the superior of a sisterhood of which N. was the spiritual adviser and confessor. In 1870 A. became entitled to certain property both as tenant for life and absolutely; she became a postulant in the same year, and made a will leaving all her property to defendant S. became a novice, and in 1871 she became a professed member of this society, and took the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. During the period in which she was a professed member of the society, from August, 1871, to May, 1879, she made over to defendant S. sums amounting to upwards of 5,000l., all of which, except about 1,000l., were spent for the purposes of the society. The sum of 1,000L remained in the hands of S. In May, 1879, she left the society and immediately revoked her will, but made no claim for the return of her property until March, 1885, and did not issue the writ in the action until August, 1885.

The C. A. (Lindley and Bowen, L. JJ., Cotton, L. J., dissentiente), held, affirming the decision of Kekewich, J., that under the circumstances the plaintiff had, by her conduct after she was free from all influence from N. or S., confirmed the gifts, and was barred therefore from obtaining the relief to which she would otherwise have been entitled. The C. A. found as a fact, that no pressure, except the inevitable pressure of the vows and rules, was brought to bear on the plaintiff; that no deception was practised upon her; that no unfair advantage was taken of her; that none of her money was obtained or applied for the private advantage of N. or S., or for any purpose other than the legitimate purposes of the sisterhood (c); nor was there any actual exercise of power or influence over her in respect of these gifts, either by N. or by S., apart from that necessarily incidental to their position in the sisterhood (d). Everything done by the plaintiff was in the opinion of the Court referable to her own willing submission to the vows she took, and to the rules which she approved. Nevertheless the Court held that these gifts were in fact made under a pressure which whilst it lasted she could not resist, and were therefore not past recall when that pressure was removed. If in 1879, when she was emancipated from the spell by which she

(d) Ibid., p. 183.

⁽a) Per Bowen, L. J., 36 C. D., p. 190. Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 179.

⁽b) 36 C. D. 145.

⁽c) See judgment of Lindley, L. J.,

was bound, she had invoked the aid of the Court to recover the money in the hands of S., she would have been entitled to its aid (a). There was no proof in this case that the plaintiff, at the time these gifts were made had an opportunity of obtaining free and independent advice, and knew that she might have obtained such advice if she wished for it, and there was a rule against consulting externs which pointed the other way; and even if such proof had been given, Lindley, L. J., doubted if the gifts could have been supported without further proof that she was free to act on the advice which might be given to her (b).

In Morley v. Loughnan (c), the defendant L., a man of no means, was a member of a religious sect known as the Plymouth Brother-This sect was divided into two orders, open brethren and exclusive brethren, and L. belonged to the exclusive order. In 1881 L. was employed as travelling companion to M., a person of large fortune, subject to epileptic fits, never physically or mentally strong, morbidly religious and easily influenced, but still not incapable of managing his own affairs. M. was at this time about thirty years old, was a member of the open order of Plymouth Brethren, and resided on his own estate. In 1883 he invited himself to stay with L., and from that time until his death in 1891, he, except for short intervals, continued so to reside, giving up his own home. During this period he became converted by L. to his own order of exclusive brethren; he was in a low and morbid condition, he made large payments to L., not requiring any accounts to be furnished to him; he placed his banking account at his disposal, and he made a series of wills in L.'s favour, and the aggregate amount obtained by L. from M. was 140,000l. In 1891 M. died by his own hand, bequeathing the remainder of his property to his brothers and sisters. In the same year the executors of his will commenced this action against L. to recover the 140,000l. as having been obtained by undue influence. L. had given certain sums, part of this money, to his brothers and brother-in-law, and these persons were subsequently made defendants for the purpose of making them liable to the extent of the gifts received by them. The Court (Wright, J.) held that the money was obtained by the exercise and abuse of personal influence and ascendency established and maintained for that very purpose under a cover of religion and religious brotherhood, that the gifts were not the result of M.'s own free will, but the effect of that

⁽a) Ibid. See pp. 186 and 191.

⁽c) (1893) 1 Ch. 736.

⁽b) Ibid. Page 184.

influence and domination. Further, that the case came also within the rule laid down by Bowen, L. J. in Allcard v. Skinner (a) as to fiduciary relationship, and that as to 50,000l., part of the 140,000l., which the Court held was given for furthering certain religious works, L. was liable on another ground, for as he had received it for a definite purpose, he could not repudiate that purpose and claim to keep it for his private and selfish ends. The Court also held that the claim must succeed against the other defendants, citing with approval the judgment of Eldon, C. in the principal case (b).

In Norton v. Relly(c) a grant of an annuity obtained by a dissenting minister having a spiritual ascendency over a woman under a state of religious delusion, was set aside upon principles of public policy (d).

In Huguenin v. Baseley the donation was set aside, it seems, not merely on the ground of the spiritual ascendency and undue influence obtained by the defendant over the mind of the plaintiff, Mrs. Huguenin, but also on the ground of his having abused the confidence placed in him by her, as an agent managing her affairs (e).

In Lyon v. Home (f) Mrs. Lyon, a widow, aged seventy-five, within a few days after seeing one Home, who claimed to be a "spiritual medium," was induced from the belief that she was fulfilling the wishes of her deceased husband, conveyed to her through the medium of Home, to adopt him as her son, to transfer 24,000l. to him; to make her will in his favour; afterwards to give him a further sum of 6,000l.; and also to settle upon him, subject to her life interest, the reversion of 30,000l. These gifts were made without consideration, and without power of revocation. It was held by Giffard, V.-C., that the relation proved to have existed between them implied the exercise of dominion and influence by Home over Mrs. Lyon, and, consequently, that as Home had failed to prove that

- (a) 36 C. D. 145.
- (b) Supra, p. 267.
- (c) A decision of Lord Northington's 2 Eden, 286.
- (d) See also Nottidge v. Prince, 2 Gif. 246; and see and consider Kirwan v. Cullen, 4 Ir. Ch. R. 322; Maccabe v. Hussey, 2 Dow. & Cl. 440. See as to the validity of gifts from nuns to their convents, Whyte v. Meade, 2 Ir. Eq. R. 420, referred to
- but distinguished by Cotton, L. J., in Allcard v. Skinner, supra; Fulham v. Macarthy, 1 H. L. Cas. 703; or to trustees for religious purposes, Re Metcalfe's Trusts, 2 De G. J. & S. 122, as to which, see article in 10 Jur. (N. S.), p. 91.
- (e) See Middleton v. Sherburne, 4 Y. & C. Ex. 390, 391; Moxon v. Payne, L. R. 8 Ch. 881, 887.
 - (f) 6 Eq. 655.

these gifts were the pure, voluntary well-understood acts of Mrs. Lyon's mind, they must be set aside (a).

Medical Attendant.—In Dent v. Bennett (b) a gift obtained by a medical attendant from his patient was set aside by Lord Cottenham, who held that medical attendants were undoubtedly within that class of persons whose acts, when dealing with their patients, ought to be watched with great jealousy, but he declined to "run the risk of in any degree fettering the exercise of the beneficial jurisdiction of the Court by any enumeration of the description of persons against whom it ought to be most freely used."

In Mitchell v. Homfray (c) the executors of Mrs. G., a widow, sought to recover a sum of 800l. from the defendant, who had acted as her medical attendant. In 1871, Mrs. G. was living at Gainford, and gave the defendant, her medical attendant, two cheques for 500l. and 300l., to buy a house. Defendant alleged the gift was made in pursuance of the wish of Mrs. G.'s husband, and that he the defendant had agreed to pay and had paid Mrs. G. an annuity of 40l. for her life. In 1882 Mrs. G. went to live elsewhere and the relation ceased, but she survived for three years. The case was tried before a jury, and on a new trial before a special jury they found that the advance of the 800l. was a gift; that there was no undue influence; that the relation of patient and medical adviser came to an end a year after the gift; that after such determination of the relationship, and after any effect produced by it had been removed, Mrs. G. had confirmed the gift. It was admitted that Mrs. G. had not received any independent advice when the gift was made, and that the defendant was at that time her medical adviser. The Court entered judgment for defendant, and the C. A. upheld the judgment (d).

Other Instances of Special Relationship.—The influence of a man over a woman to whom he is engaged to be married is presumed to be so great, that the Court will look with great vigilance at the circumstances and situation of the parties, and will not only consider the influence which the intended husband, either by soothing or violence, may have used, but require satisfactory evidence that it has not been used (e).

- (a) See also Gibson v. Russell, 2 Y.
 & C. C. C. 104; Fowler v. Wyatt, 22
 B. 232, 237.
 - (b) 4 My. & C. 262.
 - (c) 8 Q. B. D. 587.
 - (d) Cf. Pratt v. Barker, 4 Russ. 507;

Wright v. Proud, 13 V. 136; Tyars v. Alsop, 59 L. T. 369.

(e) Page v. Horne, 11 B. 227, 235,
236; Cobbett v. Brock, 20 B. 524;
Lovesy v. Smith, 15 C. D. 655; James v. Holmes, 31 L. J. Ch. 567.

So, the undue influence of an elder over a younger sister has been deemed fatal to the validity of a voluntary settlement in favour of the former. In Harvey v. Mount(a), a voluntary settlement by a younger sister of the whole of her present and future property principally in favour of her eldest sister, was set aside upon the same principle as the transaction in the principal case, viz., that the eldest sister had obtained great ascendency and influence over the younger sister, and was allowed to assume the management of all her affairs; the circumstances of the transaction moreover being open to suspicion, the settlement being very improvident, and the younger sister not having had the benefit of independent professional advice (b).

In Rhodes v. Bate (c) a person who acted as agent was held to occupy such a confidential relationship. As to the position in this respect of the promoter of a company, see the judgment of Lord Penzance in Erlanger v. New Sombrero, &c. Co. (d) and Sir F. Pollock's note thereon (e).

In Wheeler v. Sargeant (f) an executor before probate obtained a gift from a beneficiary. The plaintiff had no competent or independent advice, and the Court held that his position alone as executor without any words of pressure yet amounted in fact to pressure, and ordered restitution of the gift.

3. Where there is no Special Confidential Relationship between Donor and Donee.

In cases where the intimate relations before-mentioned do not exist between the donor and donee, fraud or undue influence must be proved against the donee in order that the gift may be set aside (g). And in such cases the age or capacity of the donor and the nature of the benefit are material (h).

- (a) 8 B. 439.
- (b) And see Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. W. 129, and note; Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sen. 627; Wilm. 58; Sharp v. Leach, 31 B. 491.
 - (c) L. R. 1 Ch. 252.
 - (d) 3 A. C. p. 1230.
- (e) Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 603; and cf. Lord Herschell's judgment in Bentinck v. Fenn, 12 A. C. 652.
 - (f) 3 R. 663.
 - (g) See Hunter v. Atkins, 3 My. &

K. 113; Beanland v. Bradley, 2 Sm. & G. 339; Blackie v. Clark, 15 B. 595; Toker v. T., 31 B. 629; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 171; and see Moncreiff, Fraud (1891), p. 291; Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 604, commenting upon Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 B. 234; Phillips v. Mullings, L. R. 7 Ch. 244; Rees v. De Bernardy, 12 T. L. R. 412; Turnbull v. Duval, (1902) A.C. 429.

(h) Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252.

Where a man induces a person of weak intellect and improvident habits to execute a settlement without independent legal advice and without understanding it, or knowing the amount of the property settled, or the effect of the settlement, it will be set aside, even although the execution of the settlement was not procured by any unworthy motives, but with the object of protecting the settlor against his own improvidence (a).

One party may acquire undue influence over another by operating on his fears, as for instance in Williams v. Bayley (b), in which case a son had taken to his and his father's bankers promissory notes purporting to be indorsed by his father. The son had forged the The bankers at an interview which took place indorsements. between them, the son, the father and the father's solicitor, said in effect to the father (c), "We have the means of prosecuting and transporting your son. Do you choose to come to his help and take on yourself the amount of his debts—the amount of these forgeries? If you do, we will not prosecute; if you do not, we will." The father thereupon executed an agreement to mortgage his property to the bankers, and the forged notes were given up to him. Two questions arose in the action brought by the father to set aside this agreement: was the plaintiff a free and voluntary agent, or did he give the security in question under undue pressure exerted by the defendants? Was the transaction independently of pressure illegal (d)? As to the first point Lord Westbury said: "A contract to give security for the debt of another which is a contract without consideration, is above all things a contract that should be based upon the free and voluntary agency of the individual who enters into it. But it is clear that the power of considering whether he ought to do it or not, whether it is prudent to do it or not, is altogether taken away from a father who is brought into the situation of either refusing, and leaving his son in that perilous position, or of taking on himself the amount of that civil obliga-And the decree setting aside the security was upheld on both grounds (e).

- (a) Dutton v. Thompson, 23 C. D.
 278; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750;
 cf. Chesterfield v. Janssen, infra; Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; Grosvenor v. Sherratt, 28 B. 659.
- (b) L. R. 1 H. L. 200, explained in Flower v. Sadler, 10 Q. B. D. 572.
- (c) See judgment of Cranworth, C., in Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 H. L., p. 212.
- (d) See judgment of Lord Westbury, id. p. 216.
- (e) See McClatchie v. Haslam, Seton (1893), p. 1942, F. 2; Davies v. London,

An appointment made in exercise of a power by a wife in favour of her husband will be considered good, unless the wife or other persons impeaching the instrument show that it was executed under circumstances sufficient to invalidate it, and the evidence of one of the witnesses that the wife was agitated and distressed and signed the deed in a reluctant manner, has been held to be insufficient (a).

In the absence of any fiduciary relation, such as that of guardian and ward, between the donor and donee, and also of any undue influence on the part of the latter, an infant may make a donation of any chattels or personal property in his actual possession (b).

"There are endless variations of the fiduciary position which do not fall under any strictly defined head. Some of those relations are continuing, others temporary; but in all the question is, whether the person parting with property by way of gift, or entering into a contract, had a full and free opportunity of judging for himself (c)."

The principle on which relief is given applies to all cases where influence is acquired and abused, and confidence reposed and betrayed (d).

Inadequate Consideration.—Mere inadequacy of consideration is by itself merely evidence of fraud or undue influence, but when coupled with other circumstances, such as weakness of mind (e), illness and ignorance (f), poverty (g), may have the effect of showing that the vendor was not a free and reasonable agent, and may throw the burden on the purchaser of showing the contract was fair (h).

4. How far the Court will Interfere as against Third Parties.

An interest obtained by undue influence, as Lord Eldon decided in the principal case, cannot be held by third parties, although

- &c. Marine Insurance Co., 8 C. D., p. 475; Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Cas. 2; Lound v. Grimwade, 39 C. D. 605.
- (a) Nedby v. N., 5 De G. & Sm. 377, 384; see Barron v. Willis, (1899) 2 Ch. 578, 585.
- (b) Taylor v. Johnston, 19 C. D. 603, 608.
- (c) Moncreiff on Fraud (1891), p. 293; and see Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. 55; Fox v. Mackreth, 1 Bro. Ch. 424, 2 R. R. 55, post; Eden v. Rids-
- dales, &c. Co., 23 Q. B. D. 368; cf. Lloyd v. Clark, 6 B. 309.
 - (d) Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750.(e) Longmate v. Ledger, 2 Giff. 157.
- (f) Clark v. Malpas, 31 B. 80; Baker v. Monk, 33 B. 419; cf. Rees v. De Bernardy, 12 T. L. R. 412.
 - (g) Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D. 312.
- (h) See Moncreiff on Fraud (1891), p. 294; Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 616. As to catching bargains with heirs, see Chesterfield v. Janssen, post.

innocent of fraud. "Whoever receives the gift, must take it tainted and infected with the undue influence and imposition of the person procuring the gift; his partitioning and cantoning it out amongst his relations and friends will not purify the gift and protect it against the equity of the person imposed upon. Let the hand receiving it be ever so chaste, yet, if it comes through a polluted channel, the obligation of restitution will follow it (a)."

And Wright, J., cited this passage with approval in Morley v. Loughnan (b), holding the brothers and brother-in-law of the defendant equally liable with the defendant to the extent of the sums which they had received from him.

Where persons, having notice of the undue influence which one party has power to exercise over another, combine with the former party in order to obtain an advantage for themselves, the transaction will be set aside. Thus, where a creditor obtains a security from a person likely to be under the influence of his debtor, as, for instance, in the case of a son or younger brother of the debtor's just come of age, the *onus* will lie upon the creditor of showing that such person understood the transaction, and that he did not act under any undue influence, otherwise the transaction will be set aside (c).

So in Maitland v. Irving (d), Irving and Brown, who were partners as coal-merchants, consented to postpone the payment of 5,000l. due to them from Maclean, in consideration of his procuring and giving the guarantee of the plaintiff, Miss Maitland, for that sum; and Maclean at the same time informed Irving and Brown that Miss Maitland was his niece, and was possessed of considerable property; that she had resided with him for some time, that he had been her guardian, and that she had been of age about a year and a half. Afterwards, another arrangement was made between Irving and Brown and Maclean, in pursuance of which Irving and Brown delivered up the guarantee, and Maclean procured and gave them the plaintiff's cheque for 3,000l. and her promissory note for 1,200l., as securities for his paying them those sums. Shadwell, V.-C., granted and afterwards continued an injunction, restraining Irving and

- (a) Per Wilmot, C.J., in Bridgman v. Green, Wilm. 58, 64. And see Goddard v. Carlisle, 9 Price, 169; Scholefield v. Templer, John. 155; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18 C. D., p. 197.
- (b) (1893) 1 Ch., p. 757; p. 291, supra.
- (c) Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 597; Sercombe v. Sanders, 34 B. 382; Berdoe v. Dawson, 34 B. 603; cf. Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252; Turnbull v. Duval, (1902) A. C. 429; Chaplin v. Brammall, (1908) 1 K. B. 233.
 - (d) 15 Si. 437.

Brown from prosecuting an action against the plaintiff to recover the 3,000l.; and notwithstanding they had obtained a verdict, he refused to order the money to be paid into Court. "The case," said his Honor, "has been argued for the defendants as if it were a case in which they had some ground to resist the rule in equity, because of their not being volunteers. But no consideration whatever was given to the young lady; on the contrary, she was induced to do the act upon an application made to her by a person, who, if he had performed his duty, would have advised her not to do that which he applied to her to do. She was influenced by him, or, at least, allowed by him, to give this very guarantee, which was a direct benefit to all the defenders (Maclean was a defendant), in the situation in which they then stood with respect to each other. The facts of the case seem to me to amount to this: that Irving and Brown, knowing the defenceless situation of the young lady, combined with Maclean, who disclosed it to them, in order that advantage might be taken of her defenceless situation, for the benefit of all the three. And my opinion is, that they must all three be considered as standing in the same situation. It is most necessary to consider the transaction in this view, because it is the foundation of the whole case; for, what subsequently took place was nothing more than a substitution of the note and the cheque for the guarantee ''(a).

The principles, however, laid down in the cases before mentioned are not applicable to bonâ fide business transactions. Thus in Blackie v. Clark (b), a married woman having separate estate, joined with her trustee, who was her confidential medical adviser, in granting annuities secured on her separate estate for his benefit. Upon her filing a bill to set them aside as against the grantees, it was held by Romilly, M. R., that the burden of proving their invalidity was on her, and as it appeared that she understood the transaction, and that no undue persuasion or coercion had been proved, the annuities could not be impeached.

In Corbett v. Brock (c), a debtor induced a lady, to whom he was engaged to be married, to become a security for a debt. After the marriage she insisted that she had been imposed upon. It was held by Romilly, M. R., that the only duty of a creditor (who was aware

⁽a) And see Maitland v. Backhouse,
16 Si. 58; Archer v. Hudson, 7 B. 551;
Espey v. Lake, 10 Ha. 261; Dettmar v. Metropolitan and Provincial Bank
Ltd., 1 Hem. & M. 641; Rhodes v.

Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252; W. v. B., 32 B. 574; Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R. 10 Ch. 15.

⁽b) 15 B. 595.

⁽c) 20 B. 524.

of the relation between the parties) towards the lady was to see that she had proper professional assistance, and that any fraud or misrepresentation of the debtor in the transaction, of which the creditor had no notice did not affect his security. "The fact of the intended husband saying, 'I am about to marry a lady who will give you security,' does not amount to notice to them that this security could only be obtained by undue influence (a)."

Where, however, a gift of property has been obtained by the exercise of undue influence, a purchaser for value subsequently taking with notice of the equity thereby created, or with notice of the circumstances from which the Court confers the equity, will be bound thereby (b).

And it seems that although a deed may be valid in respect to purchasers without notice of undue influence, as for instance, that of the father over his child as plaintiff in an action, it may at the same time be declared that so far as the father is concerned the deed is not binding in any way on the plaintiff (c).

It will be observed that in the principal case, the solicitor who prepared the deeds which were set aside as obtained by undue influence having been made a party to the suit, Lord *Eldon* observed that it deserved serious consideration "whether he should not pay the costs if the other defendant could not (d)."

5. Delay, Acquiescence, Confirmation.

Delay in asserting rights cannot be in equity a defence unless the plaintiff knows his rights (e). In Allcard v. Skinner (f), more than six years had elapsed since the influence had ceased, and the action was commenced, and following the analogy of the Statute of Limitations in actions for money had and received, such delay would be a very material element for consideration (g). And although

- (a) See Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 B. 234; Hoghton v. H., 15 B. 278.
- (b) Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18 C. D. 197; De Witte v. Addison, 80 L. T. 207.
- (c) Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18 C. D. 188, 199; cf. Wright v. Carter, (1903) 1 Ch. 27.
- (d) See Baker v. Loader, 16 Eq. 49; Beadles v. Burch, 10 Si. 332; Harvey v. Mount, 8 B. 439; but see Clark v. Girdwood, 7 C. D. 9.
 - (e) Per Cotton, L. J., in Allcard v.
- Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 174; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De G. M. & G. 133, where the action to set aside a deed was not brought until 10 years after its execution.
 - (f) 36 C. D. 145, supra, p. 290.
- (g) See judgment of Lindley, L. J., in Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 186; Smith v. Clay, 3 Bro. Ch. 639 (n.); Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & L. 607, 630. And see Tyars v. Alsop, &c., 59 L. T. 369.

delay is not a bar in itself, it is a fact to be considered in determining whether there has been an election on the part of the donor to confirm the gift (a).

In cases of this kind there can be no acquiescence until the donor knows his rights and is free from the influence, but ignorance of his rights which is the result of deliberate choice is no answer to a defence of laches and acquiescence. It is enough for the donee to show that the donor knew he might have rights, and being a free agent at the time, deliberately determined not to inquire what they were or to act upon them (b). And see infra, pp. 344, 346.

6. Gifts by Will.

The rules of equity in relation to gifts inter vivos, by which fraud is presumed when they are obtained from persons standing in certain relations to the donors, are not applicable to gifts by wills (c) "To be undue influence in the eye of the law there must be—to sum it up in one word—coercion. * * It is only when the will of the person who becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he or she does not desire to do that it is undue influence" (d). But the rule would seem to be wider than this; coercion or fraud, must be proved, e.g., misrepresentations as to the character of the natural objects of the testator's bounty (e). The influence of a person standing in a fiduciary relation to the testator may lawfully be exerted to obtain a will or legacy, so long as the testator thoroughly understands what he is doing and is a free agent (f); and the burden of proof of undue influence (g) lies upon

- (a) See judgment of *Bowen*, L. J., Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., pp. 191-193
- (b) See judgment of Kekewich, J., and of Lindley and Bowen, L. JJ., in Allcard v. Skinner, supra; and see Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, L. R. 5 P. C., p. 239; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De G. M. & G. 133; Stump v. Gaby, 2 De G. M. & G. 623; Jarratt v. Aldam, 9 Eq. 463; Moxon v. Payne, L. R. 8 Ch. 881; Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R. 10 Ch. 15; Mitchell v. Homfray, 8 Q. B. D. 587.
 - (c) See Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2

- P. & D. 462; Ashwell v. Lomi, L. R.P. & D. 477.
- (d) Per Sir J. Hannen, in Wingrove v. W., 11 P. D., p. 82; Boudains v. Richardson, (1906) A. C. 169.
- (e) Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Cas. 48; Allen v. McPherson, 1 H. L. Cas. 207; Hindson v. Weatherill, 5 De G. M. & G. 301.
- (f) See Wingrove v. W., 11 P. D. 81; and judgment of Lord Penzance, Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D., p. 469; Boudains v. Richardson, (1906) A. C. 169, 185.
 - (g) See Wingrove v. W., supra.

But "there is one rule which has always been those who assert it (a). laid down by the Courts having to deal with wills, and that is that a person, who is instrumental in the framing of a will, and who obtains a bounty by that will, is placed in a different position from other ordinary legatees, who are not called upon to substantiate the truth and honesty of the transaction as regards their legacies. It is enough in their case that the will was read over to the testator, and that he was of sound mind and memory, and capable of comprehending it. But there is a farther onus upon those who take for their own benefit, after having been instrumental in preparing or obtaining a will. They have thrown upon them the onus of showing the righteousness of the transaction (b)." In Hegarty v. King (c), it was held that a person propounding a will prepared by himself without assistance of any third person, and under which he takes a benefit, is bound to give clear and convincing evidence that the testator knew and approved of the clause under which he took a benefit, and that this principle applied even in the case of a near relative of the testator, and in the absence of such evidence, probate of that portion of the will may be refused, and granted of the remainder.

If proved that the instrument contains something induced by fraud, and therefore not the testator's will, this, if severable from the rest, may be struck out by the Probate Court and the will proved without it (d). But words or clauses in a will ought not to be omitted from probate except upon evidence pointedly addressed thereto and showing their improper character (e). The jurisdiction rests with the Court of Probate. The Chancery Division will not interfere and declare the legatee a trustee where this would amount

- (a) Boyse v. Rossborough, supra; Theobald on Wills, 7th ed. (1908), p. 27, citing Hindson v. Weatherill, 5 De G. M. & G. 301; Walker v. Smith, 29 B. 394; and Parfitt v. Lawless, L. R. 2 P. & D. 462.
- (b) Per Lord Hatherley, Fulton v. Andrews, L. R. 7 H. L., pp. 471, 472; cf. Donelly v. Broughton, (1891) A. C. 435; Tyrrell v. Painton, (1894) P. 151. In such a case the person opposing the will is justified in pleading undue influence and fraud, and, though

unsuccessful, ought not to be condemned in costs unless the issue was unreasonably raised. Wilson v. Bassil, (1903) P. 239.

- (c) 7 L. R. Ir. 18.
- (d) Rhodes v. R., 7 A. C. 192; Hindson v. Weatherill, 5 De G. M. & G. 301; Harter v. H., L. R. 3 P. & D., p. 20; Allen v. McPherson, 1 H. L. Cas. 209.
- (e) Karunaratne v. Ferdinandus, (1902) A. C. 405.

to a decision on appeal from the Probate Court (a), though it will where the gift is in accordance with the testator's intention, but the legatee is bound by a secret trust (b); and as to cases where the old Court of Chancery would declare a legatee trustee, see Allen v. McPherson (c).

(a) Meluish v. Milton, 3 C. D. 27.

(1902) 2 Ch. 866.

(b) See Re Boyes, 26 C. D. 531; Re Huxtable, (1902) 2 Ch. 793; Re Hetley,

(c) 1 H. L. Cas. 191.

EARL OF CHESTERFIELD v. SIR ABRAHAM JANSSEN (a).

1750-1. 2 Ves. Sen. 125 (b).

Post Obit Securities—Catching Bargains with Heirs Expectants and Reversioners—Confirmation.

A., aged thirty, borrows 5,000% from B., upon the security of a bond in the penalty of 20,000%, conditioned for payment of 10,000% if A. survived C., his grandmother, from whom he had great expectations, but not otherwise. A. survived C. a year and eight months, and soon after her death executed a new bond in the penalty of 20,000%, conditioned for payment of 10,000% to B., which he gave to B. on his delivering up to him the former bond to be cancelled.

A bill being filed by the executors of A. to be relieved against the latter bond, as given upon a usurious contract, and an unconscionable bargain, the Court was of opinion that the contract was not usurious, and, without giving any opinion whether the transaction was such as the Court ought to relieve against, as an unconscionable bargain with a person dealing with his expectancy, held, that the acts of A., after the decease of his grandmother, amounted to a confirmation of the original transaction, and gave relief only against the penalty of the last bond.

The state of the case upon the pleadings and proofs, as far as was material for the consideration of the Court was shortly this. John Spencer, in 1738, being possessed of an income of 7,000l. per annum, and of a personal estate in plate, jewels, and furniture, to a great value, and having contracted a debt to the amount of 20,000l. to several persons, mostly tradesmen, by whom he was pressed, and which he was desirous to pay off, proposed to borrow money, and particularly a sum of 5,000l. for that purpose.

As he had a well-grounded expectation of a great increase of

⁽α) For other cases of constructive fraud, see Fox v. Mackreth, post, Purchase by a trustee; Aleyn v. Belchier,

post, Fraud on a power; Strathmore v. Bowes, post, Fraud on marital rights.
(b) S. C., 1 Atk. 301; 1 Wils. 286.

Earl of Chesterfield v. Sir Abraham Janssen.

fortune on the death of his grandmother, the Duchess of Marlborough, if he survived her, he resolved to contract thereon. He was above thirty, originally of a hale constitution, but impaired; and, although afterwards he lived more regular, yet he was addicted to several habits prejudicial to his health, which he could not leave off. She was seventy-eight, of a good constitution for her age, and careful of her health.

He sent to market a proposal, which he supposed would easily meet with a purchaser, as it was natural to expect, in common course, that his grandmother should die first, though she was a good old life, and he but a bad young one. This proposal was, that if any one would lend him 5,000l. he would oblige himself to pay 10,000l. at or soon after the death of his grandmother, if he survived her, but to be totally lost if she survived him. This was rejected by several knowing persons as not sufficiently advantageous, as it was at first by the defendant, but afterwards accepted by him; and a bond of 20,000l., conditioned to pay 10,000l., was given on those terms.

[(a) The Duchess of Marlborough died the 18th of October, 1744, and in the month of December following, on the defendant's delivering to Mr. Spencer the bond above mentioned to be cancelled, he executed a new bond, whereby he became bound to the defendant in the penalty of 20,000l., conditioned for payment to the defendant of 10,000l., with lawful interest, on the 19th of April then next; and at the same time executed a warrant of attorney to empower a judgment to be recorded against him in the King's Bench, at the defendant's suit, for the said 20,000l. on the said bond. The defendant, by virtue of the said warrant of attorney, caused a judgment to be made out on the said bond against Mr. Spencer, at the defendant's suit, for the said 20,000l., to be recorded in the King's Bench of Hilary Term next ensuing the date of the said bond.

In the month of December, 1745, the defendant, by the invitation of Mr. Spencer, being with him at his house at Windsor, he, on the 14th of that month, gave the defendant a bill for 1,000l. on Hoare and Company, in part of the defendant's debt, and on the

⁽a) This statement between brackets, is taken from 1 Atk. 301.

21st of March following sent the defendant 1,000l. more by his steward.

On the 19th of June, 1746, Mr. Spencer died, but before his death made his will, and after payment of his debts and legacies, gave all the residue of his personal estate to be at his son's disposal, the present Mr. Spencer, provided he left no younger child, and appointed the plaintiffs to be guardians of his son, and also executors in trust for him during his minority.

The executors of Mr. Spencer, finding his specialty debts were very considerable, and that such as were upon simple contracts only, which likewise amounted to a very large sum, would receive but little satisfaction through the deficiency of the testator's assets, after payment of such sums as were really and bonâ fide due on specialties, brought a bill to be relieved against the defendant's demand, as being an unconscionable one, charging that the condition stipulated by his security was absolute and independent of any other contingency than that of a grandson of thirty years of age surviving a grandmother of eighty; and as the period or point of time limited for the payment (which was in one month after the death of the duchess) could not, by reason of her great age and infirmities, be removed to any great distance, but was every day approaching, and in fact happened soon after, so the requiring such a large sum as 10,000l. for the forbearance of 5,000l. for so short a time, being at the proportion of 200l. for every 100l., was a most unreasonable and usurious contract, and such as will never meet with the approbation or countenance of a Court of equity, especially where the demand is made upon the assets of an insolvent person, to the prejudice and defeating of his other just and honest creditors, and of an infant heir and residuary legatee; and that the executing a new bond to the defendant after the death of the Duchess of Marlborough, is only a continuance of the former transactions, and partook of the original fraud; and that, being an unrighteous and usurious bargain in the beginning, nothing which was done afterwards could help it; but on the contrary, defendant, in acquiring such new security and judgment, and thereby seeking to conceal the true transaction, did, as far as in him lay, add to the first fraud, and ought to be restrained from taking out execution on his judgment till the Court have first inquired into and determined upon the fraud; and therefore, it is

prayed that the defendant may be adjudged by the Court to be a creditor of Mr. Spencer, only for such sums as he shall appear to have bonâ fide advanced, with interest from the time of advancing the same, after deducting what he hath received; and that he may be decreed to come in, and receive a satisfaction for the residue of such principal sums only, and interest pari passu with Mr. Spencer's other creditors, according to the nature of his demand; and for an injunction to stay his proceedings at law till the hearing of the cause.

July the 21st, 1747, the injunction was continued upon the merits till the hearing.]

Mr. Noel, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Wilbraham, and Mr. Crowle, for the plaintiffs.—This case is of great importance to the estate of Mr. Spencer, but of greater to the public. The bill is to be relieved against an exorbitant, unconscientious demand, on the known terms in a Court of equity, payment of principal really advanced, and legal interest. There are three general points to be determined. First, how that contract would have stood if properly brought in judgment in a Court of law, and considered merely upon legal principles? Next, what the fate of it ought to be in a much stronger degree, in a Court of equity, when examined by principles of equity? Lastly, the subsequent transactions relied upon in the answer as a ratification of the original bargain.

As to the first, it is not good in point of law, and therefore usurious (a).

As to the second point: Courts of equity, not being tied up to rules, consider questions of this kind in a more extensive manner, and in general have avoided laying down any particular rule, as that would (like old statutes of usury) teach persons how far they might safely go; but declare, that wherever there is a spark of oppression—the motive on one side, necessity to apply for money, on the other, a covetous passion for undue lucre—they always relieve; not, indeed, setting it aside, but by giving what is really due. The following cases were cited upon this point:—Waller v. Dalt (b), which was intro-

parts of the case as relate thereto are omitted.

⁽a) The laws against usury are now abolished, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 101, and therefore such

⁽b) 1 Ch. Ca. 276.

ductive of Barny v. Beak (a), Berny v. Pitt (b), Birney v. Tison (c), Batty v. Lloyd(d), Nott v. Hill(e), Ardglasse v. Muschamp (f), Griffith (g), Curwyn v. Milner (h), Lawley v. Hooper (i). It is on the principle of public utility that Courts of equity have gone further than the law. So, from the general inconvenience, præmiums for places are not allowed, because there the office falls to the man; not that he is fit for it, but the office fit for So in Hall v. Potter (k), Shepley v. Woodhouse (l). No proof of fraud or undue advantage is requisite: the case speaks for it, and otherwise it would be saying, the Court will not relieve at all, as to such secret transactions witnesses are not called in. It is unjust and unreasonable, and in that light a Court of equity calls it a fraud, arising from avarice on one side and distress on the other; and will relieve on the same principles as in Sir Thomas Meere's and see Bosanquet v. Dashwood (n), Twistleton v. Case (m); Griffith (o).

As to the *third* point, all the other acts of Mr. Spencer were, when under the like circumstances, as originally, proceeding from his inability to do more. His acquiescence cannot be considered a ratification, but may be excused by his looking on it as a debt of honour and a sort of wager. The bond and judgment are an evidence he could not pay; he would go as far as possible; no money could be raised but by annual rents, whereas an immediate payment was to be made; and the borrower is a servant to the lender: Curwyn v. Milner(p), Wiseman v. Beake(q), Ardglasse v. Muschamp(r).

Mr. Attorney-General (Sir Dudley Rider), and Mr. Solicitor-General (Mr. Murray), for the defendant.—This is indeed a matter of importance, being a question whether a man's own act, without fraud, in full senses, and having the absolute disposal, shall bind him.

- (a) 2 Ch. Ca. 136.
- (b) 2 Vern. 14.
- (c) 2 Vent. 359.
- (d) 1 Vern. 141.
- (e) 1 Vern. 167, 271.
- (f) 1 Vern. 237.
- (g) 1 P. W. 310.
- (h) 3 P. W. 293 (n.).
- (i) 3 Atk. 278.

- (k) Show. P. C. 76, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr.
- 89.
- (1) 2 Atk. 535.
- (m) 1 Vern. 465.
- (n) Cas. t. Talbot, 40.
- (o) 1 P. W. 310.
- (p) 3 P. W. 293 (n.).
- (q) 2 Vern. 121.
- (r) 1 Vern. 237.

If (as had been argued) there was no other way in which the Court could assist the preservation of families from ruin, it is better the law should be wrong in itself than uncertain. So far as a Court of equity can prevent such destruction by general rules, it will lay down such rules, but will not endeavour to preserve a weak or wicked man; nor say, that by the rules of equity an honest and wise man cannot be protected in his honesty and wisdom. The question of law must arise out of the fact; the particular question of equity must depend on the fact also, considered under all its extensive circumstances, taking in the convenience and inconvenience, but still the ground to go upon must be made out by evidence. It will hereby be shown that this is a fair, honest, and honourable contract.

The circumstances come under these heads—first, the character, situation, and figure of life of the obligor; secondly, the same as to the obligee; thirdly, the motive or reasonableness thereof, inducing the obligor to solicit such a bargain; fourthly, the manner of transacting and concluding; fifthly, the fairness and equality of the price, from the chance, under all the circumstances, according to the probability at the time and the event, that has happened; sixthly, the opinion the obligor always had of this.

As to the first, it is material in all cases. His understanding is not charged by the bill to be weak, or likely to be imposed on, or that he was imposed on. He was turned of thirty—(in Wiseman v. Beake (a), the plaintiff, an expectant heir, was nearly forty, and a proctor)—no heir of any sort, in which the term is applied in these subjects; for if one, living with his father, is considered as heir (although nemo est heres viventis) he had no father, but was himself father of a family: he was in no state of quarrel with any relations; known never to have gamed, which, it is proved, he hated; and he had given up some former extravagances, and lived more temperately; was his own master; possessed of a fine family seat, with furniture suitable to his rank and figure; of 7,500l. per annum for life, besides present personal estate, contingent reversions, and hopes from his grandmother. The pressure on him for his debts of 20,000l. (it appears not how contracted) was from tradesmen. Justice obliged him to pay them; it would be scandalous not to do so, and prudence

required it, lest it might alter his grandmother's opinion of him. He must have paid this by the annual profits, joint or single annuities for his life, or selling his personal estate, reversion, or the chance he had from his grandmother: and this would have been, probably, the opinion of the best and wisest friend he had. None would advise the selling his personal estate, family pictures, &c., which would be declaring himself bankrupt. The annual profits would not do it, nor would his creditors wait without impatience for it. As to annuities (the way taken by a tenant for life who wants money for particular purposes), it certainly is not a beneficial way of contracting. * * * Then his only chance to raise money was this, and it was the most reasonable way, if fairly done and on reasonable terms; and otherwise his goods might be taken in execution and sold for little value, as generally happens.

Next, for the circumstances of the defendant, who is not charged in respect of his character, behaviour, or manner of dealing. * * * The defendant is not a person looking out for young men to prey upon; he did not think it a beneficial contract, and absolutely refused it; but afterwards accepted it, on particular application and pressing. Mr. Spencer himself, in private, fixed on what he thought the fair price, and does personally, and by agents, propose these terms to any who would buy; which were refused by several, only because not advantageous.

As to the manner, it is proposed, in the first moment, as a conditional bargain. If it turned out against the defendant, there was certainty of a loss: if for him, they might live so long as that there would be a very improbable chance of gain. No undue advantage is taken, for what is proposed is simply accepted.

As to the equality of it as a bargain of chance, whoever deals in or buys lives must have regard particularly to the constitution of the person, manner of life, and age. If the life is bad, the company will not insure at all: all circumstances must be considered, and it is enough to go on probable opinion. The bargain supposes an inequality in their lives, that the grandmother was most likely to die first: she was of good health, and took care of it; Mr. Spencer the contrary, from his course of life. * * * The defendant has proved, that none would give that, or so much as he did: the plaintiffs have proved nothing of that, which would have been

material to show the value of the contract. The disproportion, then, of the risk will not make it a bad contract: nor does this Court consider bargains in the nice scale of exact quality; nor adopt the rule of the Roman law, by which, if a bargain was one-half under value, it was set aside.

Lastly, his subsequent acts—as paying part, writing the letter himself to confess judgment, and taking every step after her death to carry it into execution—would not, perhaps, be of so much weight if they were not consistent with his private opinion: his declarations in private being that he was honourably and fairly dealt by. The judgment was freely given, and not complained of afterwards; so that, if it could have been set aside originally, it cannot now; and, being in his senses, he might have released any demand. A release in terms of all his right to set it aside would have operated in point of law. Then is it not so in equity? A release, indeed, may, like any other contract, be set aside in this Court; but that must be on new imposition in obtaining the judgment. Things did not remain in the same situation, for now the money became absolutely due; nor was he under the same necessity; and might have disputed it then. In Cole v. Gibbons (a) the contract had not a possibility of being fair; yet there was no relief, because it was confirmed with open eyes. In Standard v. Metcalf (b) the plaintiff lived with the defendant, her uncle, and soon after coming of age was prevailed on by him to settle her estate upon herself for life, remainder to her issue in tail, remainder to her uncle and his heirs; she afterwards became a lunatic. The transaction was thought on the face of it to be hard, and an imposition by the uncle, acting as guardian, there being no consideration, nor any occasion for it, not being for marriage: on a bill to set it aside, the defendant insisted it was fair, and that, after the settlement, she by will, to which he was not privy, had given the estate in the same way. Lord Talbot thought it an extraordinary contract, and unfair, though no proof of fraud, and said, if it depended on the settlement only, he should have relieved; but the will had confirmed it, which took off that ground to set it aside: on appeal it was affirmed, with this variation only, that as the bill was by the committee it ought not to bind the lunatic, but should be without prejudice to her, if she should become sane, and seek to set (a) 3 P. W. 290. (b) November, 1734.

it aside. The will did not operate there, but only showed a confirmation. So, but in a stronger degree, does the subsequent act here. * * *

To consider next the question of law (a).

Next, whether this Court can set aside this legal contract upon arguments of conscience arising out of the case, and that in the utmost latitude. The proper jurisdiction of equity is, indeed, to take every one's act according to conscience, and not suffer undue advantage to be taken of the strict forms of positive rules. As this is only a ground of equity, it may indeed be made out by any sort of evidence upon all the circumstances; and on all together the Court cannot say the defendant is guilty of misbehaviour (which is not charged or suggested), or say this ought not to stand. Here is no fraud or over-reaching—no evidence from whence imposition is to be presumed; and the amount of the cases cited for the plaintiffs is, that the Court will relieve against fraud in this as in other cases.

But supposing these points against the plaintiffs, another and a very general question has been made of the first impression-viz. supposing the transaction good in law and conscience, yet this Court should, for the sake of making a rule, set it aside on principles of policy or political reasoning; for, on fraud, there can be no case in which this Court will not relieve. No political principle can be stated on which it should be set aside; therefore, such a ground of determination is impossible in this Court. There may be a difficulty to tell what sort of rule. It is admitted that no certain one can be drawn, because it would be dangerous when applied to particular cases; and it is, therefore, said, Acts of Parliament cannot be made This Court does not exercise or assume a to meet cases of this kind. legislative power, but disclaims it, and never will make a law to set aside contracts on public principles out of that cause, if good in law and conscience, let the convenience or inconvenience be what it will. The contracts in Exchange-alley were all contingencies; yet it was necessary to have an Act (b) to set them aside, although easily proved inconvenient to the public. So, of fair and equal wagers, an Act of Parliament, 7 Anne, c. 16 (c), was forced to interpose. So of gaming

⁽a) See note, supra, p. 306. (c) Repealed Stat. Law Rev. Act, (b) 7 Geo. 2, c. 8, and 10 Geo. 2, 1867.

c. 8, repealed by 23 Vict. c. 28.

--money won at a fair hazard, without cheating; this Court never set it aside before the Legislature interposed: so that political arguments are never taken into consideration. * * *

Lastly, as to the case of post obits, it is said, where sons, whether in remainder, or otherwise, or filius familias, not having a fortune or emancipation of their own, are encouraged in riot and expense, the Court relieves, without evidence, from the particular purpose, because no son, in the life of his father, shall make such a bargain: but that is not the ground of relief, for that may be denied, like all other presumptions; from the reason of the thing, it is the misbehaviour to persons under this description to share in riot and encourage disobedience; which appears from Domat, under the general title "Loan;" * * * and, in another place he says, that on a bargain with filius familias, under such circumstances there may be relief, under such not; not saying but that a son might, for a proportion, even when filius familius, do it. As to which an observation arises on the case determined by Lord Nottingham, who relieved against many of these contracts on particular evidence. Lord North thought he went too far; Lord Jefferies, that he did not go far enough, which is not to be wondered at; for judging upon circumstantial evidence, they might draw different conclusions. Lord Nottingham's reasons, in his manuscript, show he did not think he was going on the general rule, that a son could not sell a contingency. The case is entitled Berny v. Pitt (a). Berny was drawn into several securities for money, to be paid after his father's death, who then was infirm, and kept alive by art; by some he was to pay five for one, and thus was involved in debts to 50,000l. or 60,000l., in all which he appeared to be circumvented and beset; most of the money pretended to be borrowed, being raised by delivery of wares, at an excessive price, as wine, hemp, &c., which could not be sold for a quarter of the price: but the plaintiff, from his necessity (his creditors being underhand procured to fall upon him), was willing to get money on terms against which he sought relief. Lord Nottingham first made him pay the principal borrowed, before he would give an injunction, but relieved him as to the rest at the hearing, because, he said, this infamous dealing ought to be suppressed. That the Star Chamber

used to punish, and this Court ought to do it; and that no family could be safe if this was suffered. But Pitt prevailed, and the bill against him was dismissed, though he gained about three for one; for it was in the time of his father's health, three years before his death, without any circumvention or practice, upon an express agreement to lose the principal if the son died in his father's life; which shows the ground of the determination-relieving against those defendants guilty of misbehaviour, yet thinking that a proper bargain might be made by the heir. Lord Jefferies, on the evidence of that case, when before him, laid a different stress, and relieved against Pitt also. From that time there is no case, until Twistleton v. Griffith (a), which turned on the particular fraud and circum-They cited further Curwyn v. Milner (b), Lawley v. Hooper (c), Batty v. Lloyd (d). * * * * Contracts for contingencies have been admitted; Beckley v. Newland (e), Hobson v. Trevor (f), Whitfield v. Fausset (g). * * * But what is this public good which is not to be defined? Is the end proposed by this, that none shall spend above his annual income? That is not to be secured in human nature, or prevented. Though the Romans had that law, they were allowed to spend their estates. Is property to be locked up to another generation?-for that effect it will have, which is contrary to the principles of the constitution of the legal part of the Government; the later books, perhaps for 200 years, giving a reason why the statute De Donis (h) is not to be kept and preserved, that mankind may apply their property to pay their debts; and judges have said, there is great inconvenience in people not being able to sell their own estates. Is the end proposed, that a man may raise money on easier terms if this is set aside? The consequence would be directly contrary. If one wants money, and a difficulty is laid upon contracting with fair, honest men, he will go into the hands of knaves, who will make him pay for running the risk of the law, and insist on more, when it is understood that he could not make a contingent bargain. This was not lent to feed riot, but to get rid of a pressure, which is a reasonable cause, and, therefore, no ground to

⁽a) 1 P. W. 310.

⁽b) 3 P. W. 293 (n.).

⁽c) 3 Atk. 278.

⁽d) 1 Vern. 141.

⁽e) 2 P. W. 182.

⁽f) 2 P. W. 191.

⁽g) 1 Ves. Sen. 387.

⁽h) 13 Edw. 1.

set it aside on political motives. As the law cannot find out a general rule to proceed on, much less will this Court; and in every case where equity cannot relieve, it is not fit to be relieved.

February 4, 1750-1.

The Court (Burnett, J., Strange, M. R., Lee, C. J. (Willes, C. J., absente); Hardwicke, C.) delivered their opinion. [The judgments, other than that of Hardwicke, C., are omitted. They agreed with that of the Lord Chancellor.]

LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.—Before I proceed to give my own opinion in this case, I must take notice that Lord Chief Justice Willes has signified to me his entire concurrence on these three points.

Next, that the great and able assistance I have had in this case has made my task extremely easy; and, as I concur in the decree I am advised to make, the great pains taken in clearing up and considering the points might have excused me from taking up any time. One thing I ought to say in the outset—that if I could have foreseen upon what particular point the judgment in this case would fundamentally turn, I should have spared the Judges the trouble of this attendance. As three points have been properly made at the Bar, it is necessary to say something to each.

The first is a mere question of law upon the Statutes of Usury (a).

* * The second question is, supposing the first contract to be valid in law, whether it was contrary to conscience, and to be relieved against in this Court upon any head or principle of equity. I will follow the prudent example of not giving any direct and conclusive opinion. As it would be unnecessary, it is the safest not to do it; yet it has been made necessary to say something on it. It cannot be said that such contracts deserve to be encouraged, for they generally proceed from excessive prodigality on one hand, and extortion on the other, which are vitia temporis, and pernicious in their consequences; and then it is the duty of a Court, if it can, to restrain them.

This Court has an undoubted jurisdiction to relieve against every species of fraud.

⁽a) See note (a), supra, p. 306.

- (1) † First, then, fraud which is dolus malus, may be actual, arising from facts and circumstances of imposition; which is the plainest case.
- (2) Secondly, it may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself, such as no man in his senses, and not under delusion, would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other, which are inequitable and unconscious bargains; and of such even the common law has taken notice; for which, if it would not look a little ludicrous, might be cited James v. Morgan (a).
- (3) A third kind of fraud is, which may be presumed from the circumstances and condition of the parties contracting; and this goes farther than the rule of law, which is, that it must be proved, not presumed; but it is widely established in this Court to prevent taking surreptitious advantage of the weakness or necessity of another, which knowingly to do is equally against conscience as to take advantage of his ignorance; a person is equally unable to judge for himself in one as the other.
- (4) A fourth kind of fraud may be collected or inferred, in the consideration of this Court, from the nature and circumstances of the transaction, as being an imposition and deceit on the other persons not parties to the fraudulent agreement. It may sound odd, that an agreement may be infected by being a deceit on others not parties; but such there are, and against such there has been relief. Of this kind have been marriage-brocage contracts, neither of the parties herein being deceived; but they tend necessarily to the deceit on the one party to the marriage, or of the parent, or of the friend. So, in a clandestine private agreement to return part of the portion of the wife, or provision stipulated for the husband, to the parent or guardian. In most of these cases it is done with their eyes open, and knowing

† Note.—The numbers have been added for the sake of reference.

(a) 1 Lev. 111. This case is thus quaintly reported by Levinz: "Assumpsit de payer pur un chival, un Barly-corn a nail, et double every nail; et averr que la feuront 32 nails en less soliers del chival, que dublant chescun nail, veignant al 500 quarters de Barly.

Et sur non assumpsit, le cause esteant try devant Hide al Hereford, il direct le jury pur donner le value del chival en damages esteant £8. Et issint ils fesoient et fuit apres move en arrest de judgment pur un petit fault en le declaration, que fuit over-rule: et judgment done pur le plaintiff."

what they do; but, if there is fraud therein, the Court holds it infected thereby, and relieves. So, where a debtor enters into a deed of composition with his creditors for 10s. in the pound, or any other rate, attended with a proviso that all creditors executed this within a certain period, if the debtor privately agrees with one creditor to induce him to sign this deed, that he will pay, or secure a greater sum in respect of his particular debt-in this there can be no particular deceit on the debtor who is party thereto, but it tends to deceit of the other creditors, who relied on an equal composition, and did it out of compassion to the debtor (a). This Court, therefore, relieves against all such underhand bargains. So, of premiums, contracted to be given for preferring or recommending to a public office or employment: none of the parties are defrauded; but the persons having the legal appointment of these offices are or may be deceived thereby: or if any person, agreeing to take the premium, has authority to appoint the officer, it tends to public mischief, by introducing an unworthy object for an unworthy consideration. These cases show what Courts of equity mean when they profess to go on reasons drawn from public utility. To weaken the force of such reasons, they have been called political arguments, and introducing politics into the decision of Courts of justice. This was showing the thing in the light which best served the argument for the defendant, but far from the true one, if the word "politics" is taken in the common acceptation; but if in its true original meaning, it comprehends everything that concerns the Government of the country, of which the administration of justice makes a considerable part; and in this sense it is admitted always. To apply this: thus far, and in this sense, is relief in a Court of equity founded on public utility. Particular persons, in contracts, shall not only transact bonâ fide between themselves, but shall not transact malâ fide in respect of other persons who stand in such a relation to either as to be affected by the contract, or the consequences of it; and as the rest of mankind, besides the parties contracting, are concerned, it is properly said to be governed on public utility.

- (5) The last head of fraud on which there has been relief is that which infects catching bargains with heirs, reversioners, or expectants,
- (a) Mare v. Sandford, 1 Gif. 288; 20 Eq. 65; Re Lenzberg's Policy, 7 M'Kewan v. Sanderson, 15 Eq. 229, C. D. 650.

in the life of the father, &c., against which relief always extended. These have been generally mixed cases, compounded of all or several species of fraud; there being sometimes proof of actual fraud, which is always decisive. There is always fraud presumed or inferred from the circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting-weakness on one side, usury on the other, or extortion or advantage taken of that weakness. There has been always an appearance of fraud from the nature of the bargain; which was the particular ground on which there was relief against Pitt, there being no declaration there of any circumvention, as appears from the book, but merely from the intrinsic unconscionableness of the bargain. In most of these cases have concurred deceit and illusion on other persons not privy to the fraudulent agreement. The father, ancestor, or relation, from whom was the expectation of the estate, has been kept in the dark; the heir, or expectant, has been kept from disclosing his circumstances, and resorting to them for advice, which might have tended to his relief, and also reformation: this misleads the ancestor, who has been seduced to leave his estate, not to his heir or family, but to a set of artful persons, who have divided the spoil beforehand.

Consider which of these species is in the present case. no colour of evidence of actual fraud in the defendant, who did not think he was doing anything immoral or unjust; although, if the declarations of Mr. Spencer can be believed, the defendant had a misgiving how far it could be held good in this Court. But though this case is clearer of actual fraud than almost any that has come, yet several things are insisted on for the plaintiffs—as necessity on one side, and advantage taken of it on the other; unconscionableness in its nature, from the terms of paying two for one, in case of the death of an old woman, the next week or day; that there was deceit upon her, who was in loco parentis, from whom were his great expectations. This was, however, the thing intended. also there are more circumstances alleged on the side of the defendant, to weaken and take off, than have concurred in most cases of this kind. Mr. Spencer was of the age of thirty; possessed of a great estate of his own; not weak in mind, but of good sense and parts—though in that the witnesses differ. If it was necessary to give an opinion upon this point, I should consider the weight of these objections, and the answers to them; but as it is not, I

will only consider the contingency inserted, which was to cure the whole.

I would not have thought that the insertion of such a contingency would in every case sanctify such a bargain. Suppose such a bargain made by a son in the life of his father or grandfather, on whom was his whole dependency; I appeal to everyone, what the consequence of it would be. Whether such a contingency is inserted or not, it will come to the same thing, the creditor knowing the fund for payment must depend on the debtor surviving the father or grandfather, whether it is said so or not; and therefore I have always thought there was great sense in what Vernon reports to be said by the Court in Berny v. Pitt, "that the expressing the death of the son in the life of the father makes the case worse."

I have not mentioned the reasons drawn from the discouragement of prodigality, and preventing the ruin of families—considerations of weight, and ingredients which the Court has often very wisely taken along with them. It is said, for the defendant, to be vain and wild for the Court to proceed on such principles. If it had been said it was ineffectual in many instances, I should have agreed thereto; but I cannot hold that to be vain and wild which the law of all countries, and all wise legislatures, have endeavoured at as far as possible. The senate and lawmakers in Rome were not so weak as not to know that a law to restrain prodigality, to prevent a son running in debt in the life of his father, would be vain in many cases; yet they made laws to this purpose, viz., the Macedonian decree (De Senatu Consulto Macedoniano, Dig. lib. xiv. tit. vi.), already mentioned; happy if they could in some degree prevent it; est aliquod prodire tenus.

It is said for the defendant, that this would be to assume a lesislative authority, and that several Acts of Parliament have been thought necessary to restrain and make void contracts of a pernicious tendency to the public. What can properly be called such an assuming in this Court I utterly disclaim; but, notwithstanding, I shall not be afraid to exercise a jurisdiction I find established, and shall adhere to precedents. As far, therefore, as the Court went in Berny v. Pitt (a), in Twistleton v. Griffith(b), in Curwyn v. Milner (c), and the opinion of Lord Talbot on the original transaction in Cole

⁽a) 2 Vern. 14. (b) 1 P. W. 310. (c) 3 P. W. 293 (n.).

v. Gibbons (a), so far, and as far as these principles do naturally and justly lead, I shall not scruple to follow. The Acts of Parliament (b) instanced will be found to be made (many of them), not for want of power in this Court to give relief in many of these contracts, but to make them void in law, to give the party a short remedy against them.

The judgment I am going to give will not be founded upon this: but I have done it that the work of this day may not be misunderstood, or precedents thought to be shaken: not that this establishes such a contract as is called fair, like killing fairly in a duel, which the law does not allow as an excuse for murder. Junct annuities and post obits are grown into traffic, which ought to abate of its fairness.

As to the *last* question, of the subsequent acts of Mr. Spencer: this is the point on which the determination of this case will depend, and I entirely agree with the opinion delivered already. Had the first bond been void by the Statutes of Usury, no new engagement would have made it better; the original would have infected it. But if a man is fully informed, and with his eyes open, he may fairly release and come to a new agreement, and bar himself of relief, which might be had in this Court. The material inquiry is, whether this was done, after full information, freely, without compulsion, &c.; and upon the best consideration of the evidence, it appears to be so done, and with fairness.

First, the condition of the necessity of Mr. Spencer was over: for though he had no power over the capital of this accession of estate, yet it was so great a one, that little more than one-third of a year's income would have paid off the whole. If that, then, be a state of necessity, how far shall it be carried?

Then the state of expectancy was over by the death of the duchess, and also the danger of her coming to the knowledge of his conduct and circumstances, and his fear of offending her, which was the principal restraint upon him; so that there was no ancestor or relation left upon whom any deceit could be committed in consequence of any new agreement; and it appears, that, before this new bond he had sufficient notice that he had a chance, at least, that he

might have relief in equity, from the defendant's own declaration to him of his doubt whether it would be good.

Lastly, there was no impediment against his seeking relief by disclosing the whole case at that time in a Court of justice.

Under these circumstances was the new engagement, without any fraud, contrivance, or surprise to draw him in, which operates more strongly than the deed of confirmation in Cole v. Gibbons (a), that it is too much too set it aside. The only difference to distinguish that from this case was, that there the releasor was not in the power of the releasee; here Mr. Spencer was debtor (b), and his creditor might immediately have distressed him by an action: but the answer is, there was neither an attempt nor threat to bring an action. It is objected further for the plaintiffs, that Cole v. Gibbons was a single case; and there are several precedents in which such new security and subsequent transaction were not sufficient to give a sanction to a demand of this kind, as in Lord Ardglasse v. Muschamp; but the circumstances there show it not to be at all applicable. Then the confirmation in Wiseman v. Beake (c) was still more extraordinary: and that was a very extraordinary invention of Serjeant Philips, of a bill to be foreclosed against a relief in equity. In both those cases the original transaction was grossly fraudulent; but I have only shown it here to be a doubtful object of relief in this Court, which surely is the most proper case of all others to put an end to by a new engagement

On the whole, therefore, the only relief is that which I am advised to give against the penalty of the last bond.

The only doubt which could arise on this is as to costs, to which the defendant is not entitled. The plaintiffs are only executors; they had a probable cause of litigating this contract, which is far from deserving favour, and were in the right to submit it to the judgment of the Court; and it is observable, that in Cole v. Gibbons, which was on this point, the bill was dismissed without costs, and no costs given on the bill, but, on the contrary, deducted. There was indeed, in that case, no penalty, as there is here; but still that does not take away the discretion of this Court in respect of costs, according to the circumstances of the case; and there are several cases of a bond with a penalty disputed, where, though the costs at law will

⁽a) 3 P. W. 290.

⁽c) 2 Vern. 121.

⁽b) See Fox v. Mackreth, post.

undoubtedly follow the demand, yet on the circumstances, costs in this Court are refused.

Therefore, let it be referred to the Master to take an account of the principal and interest due on the bonds of 1744, and the judgment thereon, and to tax the defendant his costs at law, and an account of the money paid by Mr. Spencer to the defendant; and let that first be applied to discharge the interest, and then to sink the principal, and all just allowances be made; and, on payment by the plaintiffs to the defendant of what is found due, let the defendant deliver up the bond to be cancelled, and acknowledge satisfaction on the judgment: but that must be at the expense of the plaintiffs. And, if the plaintiffs pay what is so found due, let there be no costs in this Court on either side; but, otherwise, let the bill be dismissed with costs.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. What dealings with reversionary interests are unimpeachable, p. 328.
- 3. What constitutes inadequacy of price, p. 331.
- 4. Sales of Reversions Act (1867), p. 332.
- 5. Money-lenders Act, 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 51), p. 336.
- As to terms upon which an unconscionable bargain will be set aside, p. 342.
- 7. Confirmation and acquiescence, p. 344.

1. Generally.

Chesterfield v. Janssen is a case of very frequent reference, celebrated alike for the able arguments of the counsel on both sides, and for the opinions of the learned judges who assisted Lord Hardwicke, but especially for the elaborate and learned judgment of Lord Hardwicke, in which he has classified the different species of frauds against which equity will give relief.

Having regard to modern authorities, it is convenient that the word "Fraud" should be restricted to the first head of fraud dealt with by Lord *Hardwicke*, that is, to cases in which there is some moral delinquency, some actual intentional fraud, and that the remaining divisions should be classified under the head of "Constructive Fraud" (a), which includes those numerous cases in which equity gives relief against acts and contracts, although untainted by

⁽a) Cf. Story, Eq. Jur. (1892), p. 164.

any actual evil design, on the ground of general public policy or on some fixed artificial policy of the law.

It is proposed in this note to notice only that species of constructive fraud in which equity gives relief on account of the hardness or unfairness of the bargain (a). Speaking of catching bargains with heirs, &c., which is only a branch of this subject, Lord Hardwicke says: "These have been generally mixed cases, compounded of all or several species of fraud, there being sometimes proof of actual fraud, which is always decisive. There is always fraud presumed or inferred from the circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting—weakness on the one side, usury on the other, or extortion or advantage taken of that weakness. There has been always an appearance of fraud from the nature of the bargain. * * *"

But "fraud does not here mean deceit or circumvention: it means an unconscientious use of the power arising out of these 'circumstances and conditions'; and when the relative position of the parties is such as primal facie to raise this presumption, the transaction cannot stand unless the person claiming the benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by contrary evidence, proving it to have been in point of fact fair, just, and reasonable" (b). The point to be considered is, Is the bargain a hard one? (c); Has an unfair advantage been taken? (d); Were the parties on equal terms? (e). The doctrine has nothing to do with fraud in the sense of moral delinquency but only with such unfair dealing as equity considers a fraud (f).

Inadequacy of Price.—Mere inadequacy of price, unless it were the result of fraud, surprise, or misrepresentation (g), has never been a sufficient ground to set aside a purchase of interests in possession, unless the inadequacy were so gross as to be of itself clear evidence

- (a) See the judgment, supra, p. 315, Classes 2, 3, 5.
- (b) Per Selborne, C., in Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 491, and see Ib., p. 492. See also Miller v. Cook, 10 Eq. 641; Tyler v. Yates, L. R. 6 Ch. 665; Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. 389; O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, L. R. 2 A. C. p. 833.
- (c) Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. p. 391.
- (d) Middleton v. Brown, 47 L. J. Ch. 411.

- (e) Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417.
- (f) See judgment of Jessel, M. R., in Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. 391, and of Kay, J., in Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D., p. 324; and James v. Kerr, 40 C. D., p. 460; Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 437.
- (g) Evans v. Llewellin, 2 Bro. Ch.
 150; Pickett v. Loggon, 14 V. 215;
 Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Ha. 222; 1 De G.
 M. & G. 660; Harrison v. Guest, 8
 H. L. C. 481.

of unfair dealing. "To set aside a conveyance," says Lord *Thurlow*, "there must be an inequality so strong, gross, and manifest, that it must be impossible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it" (a).

But, with regard to expectants (b), and reversioners (c), the authorities clearly show, even in the absence of the different species of frauds which are frequently ingredients in such transactions, that mere inadequacy of price was a sufficient ground, before the Sales of Reversions Act (see note 4, infra), for rescinding contracts or dealings with them for their expectancies or reversionary interests. In such cases the onus was on the purchaser to show that he had given the "fair" value (d), or the "market value" (e). Even after that Act undervalue remains a material element in cases in which relief is claimed on other grounds, e.g., inequality of the parties, and on proof of the inequality or other ground relied on the other contracting party must show that the transaction has been fair, just, and reasonable (f).

- "Expectants"; "Expectant Heirs."—" The phrase is used, not in its literal meaning, but as including everyone who has either a vested remainder or a contingent remainder in a family property, including a remainder in a portion, as well as a remainder in an estate, and everyone who has the hope of succession to the property of an ancestor, either by reason of his being the heir-apparent or presumptive, or by reason merely of the expectation of a devise or bequest on account of the supposed or presumed affection of his ancestor or relation. More than this, the doctrine as to expectant heirs has been extended to all reversioners and remaindermen, as appears from Tottenham v. Emmet (g), and Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (h). So that the doctrine not only includes the class I have mentioned, who in
- (a) Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 8; and see James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111; Stilwell v. Wilkins, Jac. 280; Rice v. Gordon, 11 B. 265; Longmate v. Ledger, 2 Giff. 157; Haygarth v. Wearing, 12 Eq. 320; Tennent v. Tennents, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 6; Butler v. Miller, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 195.
- (b) Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern. 121; Cole v. Gibbons, 3 P. W. 290; King v. Sayery, 1 Sm. & G. 271.
- (c) Kendall v. Beckett, 2 Russ. & M. 88; Bawtree v. Watson, 3 My. & K. 330; Davies v. Cooper, 5 My. & C.

- 270; Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 100.
- (d) Aldborough v. Trye, 7 Cl. & Fin. 436, 456.
- (e) Talbot v. Stainforth, 1 John. & H. 484, 503.
- (f) See judgment of Selborne, C., Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. pp. 490-491; Brenchley v. Higgins, 83 L. T. 751; 70 L. J. Ch. 788; and see O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, 2 A. C., p. 834, where this burden of proof was held to be satisfied.
 - (g) 14 W. R. 3.
 - (h) L. R. 8 Ch. 484.

some popular sense might be called expectant heirs, but also all remaindermen and reversioners" (a). In Nevill v. Snelling (b) the principle was extended to the case in which the plaintiff was a minor, without any property or any expectation of any, except such as was founded on his father's position in life. The money was borrowed from a money-lender simply on the credit of such expectations, and was advanced in the hope of extorting money from the father by threatening his son with bankruptcy. Denman, J., after reviewing the authorities, held that the securities should stand for the sums actually advanced, with five per cent. interest. find no case," he said, "which decides that the interference of the Court is limited to cases in which the dealings have been with expectant heirs or reversioners, or to cases in which the dealing has been one in relation to the expectancy. * * * real question in every case seems to me to be whether the dealings have been * * * fair, and whether undue advantage has been taken by the money lender of the weakness or necessities of the person raising the money" (c). In James v. Kerr (d) a person who merely claimed a share of real estate, but who entered into a hard bargain, was treated as being in a position analogous to an expectant heir. These cases, with the exception of Tottenham v. Emmet, were subsequent to the Sales of Reversions Act, 1867 (infra, note 4).

Application of the Rule.—These transactions most frequently come before the Courts in the shape of loans, sales, and mortgages, contracted or effected by expectants (e).

Where a reversioner has mortgaged his estate, or has granted an annuity, or has given a bond or other security for the payment of a sum of money or an annuity at the death of his father, the transaction, unless it appears to be reasonable or the price adequate, will be set aside upon proper terms (f). But in Benyon v.

 ⁽a) Per Jessel, M. R., in Beynon v.
 Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. 391. See also Fry
 v. Lane, 40 C. D. 312.

⁽b) 15 C. D. 679.

⁽c) Ib., pp. 702, 703. And see judgment of Hatherley, C., in O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, cited infra, p. 336; Croft v. Graham, 2 De G. J. & S. 155; Bromley v. Smith, 26 B. 644; Tyler v. Yates, L. R. 6 Ch. 665; Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 484;

Rae v. Jocye, 29 L. R. Ir. 500.

⁽d) 40 C. D. 449. And see Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 437.

⁽e) Curwyn v. Milner, 3 P. W. 293 (n.); Peacock v. Evans, 16 V. 512; and see Freme v. Brade, 2 De G. & J. 582; Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 437.

⁽f) Barny v. Beak, 2 Ch. Ca. 136; Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern, 121; Berny v. Pitt, 2 Vern, 14; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 1; Gowland v. De Faria,

Fitch (a), the Court, under the circumstances, held the mortgagee entitled to the amount for which the mortgagor had given bills, and not simply to the money actually advanced upon them.

In Re Maskell, &c., Contract (b) it appeared on the face of the title that the purchase money paid by the vendor to certain infants, parties by feoffment to a conveyance of gavelkind lands was not the full value of their shares, and that they were still under twenty-one. The Court held that the title could not be forced on the purchaser.

The application of the rule is not prevented by the fact, that the expectant heir was a person of mature age (c), nor that he perfectly understood the nature and extent of the transaction; nor is it necessary for the heir to show that he was in pecuniary distress at the time (d).

The onus, before the Sales of Reversions Act (e), lay upon the person dealing with a reversioner or expectant, to show that the transaction was reasonable, and the price given adequate (f); and that Act does not relieve him from the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction, though it will no longer be set aside merely for inadequacy of consideration (g).

If the bulk of the property sold is reversionary, the mere fact of a part of it being in possession (especially if colourably thrown into the contract, and bearing but a small proportion to the whole), does

17 V. 20; Evans v. Cheshire, Belt's Supp. to V. 300; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; Bromley v. Smith, 26 B. 644; Pennell v. Millar, 23 B. 172; Tottenham v. Emmet, 14 W. R. 3; Re Unsworth, 13 W. R. 488; Tottenham v. Green, 32 L. J. Ch. 201.

- (a) 35 B. 570.
- (b) (1895) 2 Ch. 525.
- (c) Earl of Portmore v. Taylor, 4 Si. 182; Davis v. Marlborough, 2 Swans. 143; and see the principal case, p. 308, supra; Clark v. Malpas, 4 De G. F. & J. 401; Tynte v. Hodge, 2 Hem. & M. 287, 296; Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. 389; Helsham v. Barnett, 21 W. R. 309; Howley v. Cook, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 570; Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern. 121, where the plaintiff was nearly 40, and was a proctor.
- (d) Bromley v. Smith, 26 B. 644;
 Salter v. Bradshaw, 26 B. 161;
 St. Albyn v. Harding, 27 B. 11;
 Foster

- v. Roberts, 29 B. 467; Emmet v. Tottenham, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1090.
 - (e) Infra, note 4.
- (f) Gowland v. De Faria, 17 V. 20; Davies v. Cooper, and Cooper v. Jackson, 5 My. & C. 270; King v. Savery, 5 H. L. Cas. 627; Edwards v. Burt, 2 De G. M. & G. 55; Salter v. Bradshaw, 26 B. 161; Bromley v. Smith, 26 B. 644; St. Albyn v. Harding, 27 B. 11; Foster v. Roberts, 29 B. 467; Talbot v. Staniforth, 1 J. & H. 484; Dally v. Wonham, 33 B. 154.
- (g) Brenchley v. Higgins, 83 L. T. 751; 70 L. J. Ch. 788; the language of the Court of Appeal appears to support this statement, though the decision itself may be explained by the fact that "the circumstances quite apart from the inadequate price considered alone, [showed] that there was unfair dealing," per Vaughan-Williams, L. J., 83 L. T. at p. 753.

not prevent the application of the rule of equity with respect to sales of interests in reversion (a).

The fact that the reversion depended upon contingencies that were supposed to be incapable of being valued by actuaries (b), did not relieve the purchaser from the burden of showing that the full value was given (c).

Sub-purchasers and persons taking with notice a transfer of securities impeachable as unconscionable, will be bound by the same equities as the parties to the original transaction (d).

Equity will also give relief, especially in the case of an expectant heir, against usurious loans (see now the Money-lenders Act, 1900, infra, note 5), effected under the mask of trading, where, instead of money being actually advanced, goods are supplied by a tradesman. merely for the purpose of being at once sold, and will in general set aside such transactions upon payment of what the goods produced upon a re-sale, and interest (e). In Barker v. Vansommer (f), a young man, immediately upon coming of age, and wanting to raise money, gave a bond for the price of some silks to be re-sold by him. "I take it," said Lord Thurlow, on setting aside the transaction. "as an advancement of goods, instead of money to supply his necessities." But the decision turned on the transaction being a loan at usurious interest (g). In King v. Hamlet (h), Brougham, C., refused to relieve against a mortgage of a reversionary interest given by an heir in necessitous circumstances, for the price of goods reasonably and fairly charged, which were immediately sold to raise money, at a loss on the whole transaction of 60l. per cent. The decision in this case was founded principally upon two propositions. to the effect, that where the heir deals, not behind the back of his father, but with his sanction and assistance, and has all the protection his father can give him, he is not entitled to relief. But

⁽a) Davis v. Marlborough, 2 Swans.
154; Earl of Portmore v. Taylor, 4 Si.
182; and see and consider Nesbitt v.
Berridge, 4 De G. J. & S. 54; Webster v. Cook, L. R. 2 Ch. 542; Tyler v.
Yates, 11 Eq. 265; L. R. 6 Ch. 665.

⁽b) See Baker v. Bent, 1 Russ. & M.
224; Davies v. Cooper, 5 My. & C.
270; Boothby v. B., 1 Mac. & G. 604.

⁽c) Talbot v. Staniforth, 1 John. & H. 484; Woodroffe v. Allen, 1 Hayes

[&]amp; J. 73.

⁽d) Nesbitt v. Berridge, 4 De G. J. & S. 45; Tottenham v. Green, 32 L. J. Ch. 201; Addis v. Campbell, 4 B. 401.

⁽e) Waller v. Dalt, 1 Dick. 8; Barnyv. Beak, 2 Ch. Ca. 136.

⁽f) 1 Bro. Ch. 149.

⁽g) See King v. Hamlet, 2 My. & K. 485.

⁽h) 2 My. & K. 456, affirmed 3 Cl. & Fin. 218, but without reasons.

these propositions have been questioned (a), and it may now be considered as established, notwithstanding the law as laid down by Lord *Brougham*, that the mere fact that the dealings with regard to an expectancy are known to his father's family or friends, or even that the person so dealing had professional advice, though material as evidence in rebutting the presumption of oppression and extortion (b), is not sufficient of itself to prevent relief in a proper case from being given (c).

Extension of the Principle.—Denman, J., commenting upon the distinction drawn by Courts of equity between the cases of expectant heirs and other persons, points out that even in the case of the former, stress is often laid upon other circumstances rather than upon their position as expectant heirs, and concludes that it is impossible to say, as a whole, that the Court will not interfere in any given case, though it may be a case in which that particular ground of interference does not exist, and he concludes that if the facts are such that the Court would have interfered before the repeal of the usury laws, it will still interfere except so far as the objections are founded upon the usury laws alone (d). The principle on which equity originally proceeded in setting aside transactions of this kind was the protection of family property, but it has been extended to all cases in which the parties to a contract have not met upon equal terms. In the case, therefore, of expectant heirs, or of persons under pressure without adequate protection, and in the case of dealings with uneducated ignorant persons, the burthen of showing the fairness of the transaction is thrown on the person who seeks to obtain the benefit of the contract (e). The following are typical cases:—In Wood v. Abrey (f), where the only professional person employed was the purchaser's solicitor, and the price was one-fourth of the value, and the vendor was in distressed circumstances; in

- (a) See Talbot v. Staniforth, 1 John.
 & H. 484, 502; Sugden, V. & P.
 11th ed., pp. 316, 1084; Dart, 7th ed.,
 (1905) ii., 751; King v. Savery, 5 H.
 L. Cas. 267; O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke,
 2 A. C., p. 828.
- (b) O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, 2 A. C. 814.
- (c) Talbot v. Staniforth, 1 John. & H. 484, 502; King v. Savery, 5 H. L. Cas. 627; Miller v. Cook, 10 Eq. 641, 647; Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. Ch.

- R. 100; Playford v. P., 4 Ha. 546.
- (d) Nevill v. Snelling, 15 C. D., pp. 696, 702; see now Money-lenders Act, 1900, infra, note 5.
- (e) See judgment of Hatherley, C., in O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, L. R. 2 Ch., p. 823; Nevill v. Snelling, supra, p. 324; Prees v. Coke, L. R. 6 Ch. 645; Evans v. Llewellin, 1 Cox, 333; Haygarth v. Wearing, 12 Eq. 320; Clark v. Malpas, 4 De G. F. & J. 401.
 - (f) 3 Madd. 417, 423.

Longmate v. Ledger (a), where property in possession was sold at an undervalue, and one solicitor acted for both parties, and the vendor was aged, infirm, and weak minded; in Baker v. Monk (b), where the vendor was an elderly woman in humble life, and the same solicitor acted for all parties. In James v. Kerr (c), K., a solicitor, advanced money to J., a man in poor circumstances, to enable him to meet the costs of a suit in which he claimed real estate, and J. gave K. a mortgage to secure 2251. "by way of bonus" if he won, and further advances. J. was held to be in a position analogous to that of an "expectant heir," and was allowed to redeem on payment of sums actually advanced. In short, wherever a purchase is made at a considerable undervalue from a person who is poor, or ignorant, or weak, and the vendor has no independent advice, the transaction may be set aside (d).

A further extension of the principle is given by the Money-lenders Act, 1900 (e), which is not limited to cases in which before the Act equity would have given relief (f).

2. What Dealings with Reversionary Interests are Unimpeachable.

Family Arrangements.—In regarding claims to upset re-settlements of family estates, the Court gives weight to considerations which in other cases would not be allowed in the scale. For the validity of such an arrangement, the son being tenant in tail in remainder, it is not essential that the son should have independent advice, and the Court will not inquire whether the influence of the father was exerted with more or less force (g). But if the father takes a direct benefit of considerable amount, although the amount will not be scrutinized severely (h), he must prove the transaction was fair and honest. And if unfair, such part of the settlement may be expunged (i).

- (a) 2 Giff. 157.
- (b) 4 De G. J. & S. 388.
- (c) 40 C. D. 449. And see Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 437, a next-of-kin agent.
- (d) Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D., p. 322; and see as to lunatics, Manby v. Bewicke, 3 Kay & J. 342; Nelson v. Duncombe, 9 B. 211; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 V. 12; and see Matthews v.

Baxter, L. R. 8 Ex. 132.

- (e) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51, infra, note 5.
 (f) Samuel v. Newbold, (1906) A.C.,
 461.
- (g) See Stapilton v. S., supra (n.), "Family arrangements."
 - (h) Hoblyn v. H., 41 C. D. 200.
- (i) Ib. And see the notes to Huguenin v. Baseley, ante, pp. 283, 284; and Stapilton v. S., ante, p. 254.

But the transaction must be strictly a family arrangement; so where a tenant for life purchased from his nephew the reversion in the family estate, without any provision for its resettlement, it was held that the case fell within the general rule as to dealings with reversionary interests (a). A settlement by an heir in favour of his wife and children is not within the doctrine laid down in the principal case (b).

Sale by Auction.—The sale of a reversionary interest by auction, if fairly conducted (c), rendered it unnecessary, before the Sales of Reversions Act, 1867, for the purchaser to show that he had given an adequate price, unless the circumstances were such as to affect the purchaser with notice of any impropriety in the transaction (d).

Other Cases.—The sale, however, of a reversionary interest might be presumed to be at an adequate value though it had not been by public auction. When the vendor and purchaser concur in a valuation thereof previously to the sale, by persons of competent skill, adequate value may be presumed (e); and so where a fair test of the market value can be obtained by the knowledge of the highest bid for it upon a previous attempt to sell it by auction (f). And the fact that a reversionary interest had been offered to and declined by many persons for a certain sum may be a sufficient reason for the Court declining to set aside a subsequent sale for the same price (g).

But where, before the Sales of Reversions Act (infra, note 4), upon the sale by private contract of a reversionary interest in lease-holds, nothing was done except obtaining the opinion of an actuary unacquainted with the local circumstances likely to influence the value, and in a suit to impeach the sale, the purchaser was unable to show that he had given the full value, the sale was set aside (h).

The purchase of a lot by private contract at an inadequate price would be set aside, although assigned by the same deed with a lot purchased by public auction (i).

- (a) Talbot v. Staniforth, 1 John. & H. 484.
 - (b) Shafto v. Adams, 4 Giff. 492.
- (c) See the Sale of Land by Auction Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 48; Dart 7th ed., (1905) i., 121; the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict, c. 71, s. 58.
- (d) See Shelly v. Nash, 3 Madd. 232; and Fox v. Wright, 6 Madd. 111; where post-obit bonds to raise 40,000%. were sold by auction without reserve.
- (e) Per Lord Cranworth, L. J., Edwards v. Burt, 2 De G. M. & G. 63.
 - (f) Lord v. Jeffkins, 35 B. 7.
- (g) Moth v. Atwood, 5 V. 845; Perfect v. Lane, 3 De G. F. & J. 369; but see Roche v. O'Brien, 1 Ball & B.
- (h) Edwards v. Burt, (1852) 2 De G. M. & G. 55; see Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 100.
 - (i) Newton v. Hunt, 5 Si. 511.

The rule as to the sale of reversionary interests is not applicable to a sale of property by the reversioner and the person having the prior interest; if, for instance, the father tenant for life, and the son remainderman in tail, concur together in selling estates, they form in fact, one vendor, with a present interest, and meet a purchaser with the same advantages as if a single person had the whole power over the estate; the onus, therefore, would not lie upon the purchaser, of showing that he gave an adequate price (a), unless other circumstances exist which might throw the onus upon the purchaser, as in the case of a purchase by an attorney from his client, or in the case of undue parental influence having been used (b).

The rule as to the sale of reversionary interests will not apply in the absence of any circumstances such as those referred to by Lord Hatherley in O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke (c), if the vendor is entitled to what is substantially an estate in possession, and the reversion subject only to an intervening life estate (d), nor where the contract is entered into between a tenant and the person entitled to the reversion and to the rents during the term (e). The rule has been held not to apply to the sale of a life interest in possession subject to rent charges which absorb nearly the whole of the income (f).

Where, even before the Sales of Reversions Act (g) came into operation, a person dealing with an heir or reversioner showed that the transaction was reasonable, and that a fair price had been given, either for a reversionary interest, annuity, or post obit bond, a Court of equity would not, in the absence of fraud, set it aside (h).

When the vendor had stated in his proposals the value of the corpus of the property, the onus was upon him, even before the Sales of Reversions Act (i), to allege and prove that the value was understated (k); and where the vendor refuses all professional advice and

- (a) See Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 422; Cooke v. Burtchaell, 2 Dr. & War. 165; Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarras, 3 De G. & Sm. 735, 736.
- (b) King v. Savery, 5 H. L. Cas. 627. See also Hannah v. Hodgson, 30 B. 19.
 - (c) 2 A. C. p. 823.
- (d) Wardle v. Carter, 7 Si. 490; cf. Nesbitt v. Berridge, 32 B. 282.
 - (e) Scott v. Dunbar, 1 Moll. 459.
- (f) Webster v. Cook, L. R. 2 Ch. 542; disapproved of by Stuart, V.-C., in

- Tyler v. Yates, 11 Eq. 265, see infra, p. 335. And see Howley v. Cook, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 570.
 - (g) Infra, note 4.
- (h) Dews v. Brandt, Ch. Ca. 7; Batty v. Lloyd, 1 Vern. 141; Wharton v. May, 5 V. 27; Curling v. Townshend, 19 V. 634; Aldborough v. Trye, 7 Cl. & Fin. 436.
 - (i) Infra, note 4.
- (k) Perfect v. Lane, 3 De G. F. & J. 369.

presses the sale it will be upheld, although the other circumstances of the case would have justified relief (a).

A fair agreement between expectants or heirs, to divide the property which may be left between them, or to any one of them, is not contrary to public policy, and specific performance has been enforced (b).

3. What Constitutes Inadequacy of Price.

There is no rule in our law as to what difference between the real value of the property and the consideration paid constitutes inadequacy of price; this the judge must decide, having regard to the circumstances existing at the date of the contract, and not to subsequent events (c).

In many cases sales of reversions were set aside for inadequacy where the difference between the assumed value and the price given was very small. Thus in Edwards v. Browne (d), where the market value appeared to have been rather more than 1,900l., and the price paid was 1,700l. So in the case of Edwards v. Burt (e), where the value was taken to be 580l., and the price was 500l., and 50l. payable on a future contingency; and see Jones v. Ricketts (f), and Foster v. Roberts (g), where the M. R. remarked that the tendency of the decisions was to establish that unless a person gave much more than the value it was impossible, save under a sale by auction, to purchase a reversionary interest with safety.

When it becomes necessary to consider the value of a reversionary interest, much difficulty arises from the conflicting evidence usually given—on the one hand, by auctioneers and surveyors, who estimate the value by the *market price*; on the other, by actuaries, who generally estimate the value according to the tables. It is, however, now fully established, that, in calculating the value of a reversionary interest, the Court will be guided, not by the tables, but by the "market value," which is generally about two-thirds of the estimated value (h); and in the case of real estate, its nature, position, and

- (a) Harrison v. Guest, 8 H.L.Cas. 481.
- (b) Beckley v. Newland, 2 P. W. 182. See also Wethered v. W., 2 Si. 183; Harwood v. Tooke, 2 Si. 192; Hyde v. White, 5 Si. 524.
- (c) See O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, 2
 A. C. p. 829; Perfect v. Lane, 3 De G.
 F. & J. 369; Gowland v. De Faria, 17
 V. 20; Boothby v. B., 1 H. & Tw.
 214; Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2
- Ch. 437. And see (n.) (2) "Sale by Auction," supra.
 - (d) 2 Coll. Ch. R. 100.
 - (e) 2 De G. M. & G. 62.
 - (f) 31 B. 130.
 - (g) 29 B. 471.
- (ħ) Dart, 7th ed. (1905), ii., p. 754,
 citing Potts v. Curtis, You. 543, Sug. 279; Bettyes v. Maynard, 31 W. R. 461.

other particulars ought to be considered as affecting the value of the interest sold (a).

4. Sales of Reversions Act (31 Vict. c. 4, 1867).

Section 1: "No purchase made bonâ fide and without fraud or unfair dealing, of any reversionary interest in real or personal estate, shall hereafter be opened or set aside merely on the ground of undervalue."

Section 2: "The word 'purchase' in this Act shall include every kind of contract, conveyance, or assignment, under or by which any beneficial interest in any kind of property may be acquired."

This Act (which by s. 3 came into operation on 1st January, 1868) was passed to abolish the equitable doctrine which set aside a sale of a reversionary interest solely on the ground of inadequacy of consideration, and threw upon the purchaser the onus of proving adequacy (b). It is carefully limited to purchases made bonâ fide and without fraud or unfair dealing.

The doctrines of equity as to the relief of expectant heirs from unconscionable bargains have not been affected by the repeal of the usury laws or by this statute (c). Whether the Act has, or can have, if strictly construed, any operation save in the case of sales is doubtful. Jessel, M. R., in $Beynon \ v. \ Cook \ (d)$, held that it could not apply to loans by way of mortgage of reversions.

Section 1. "Bonâ fide and without Fraud."—"The Act is carefully limited to purchases made bonâ fide, and without fraud or unfair dealing, and leaves undervalue still a material element in cases in which it is not the sole equitable ground of relief. These changes in the law have in no degree whatever altered the onus probandi in

(a) See Hincksman v. Smith, 3 Russ. 433; Headen v. Rosher, M'Cle. & Yo. 89; Newton v. Hunt, 5 Si. 511; Wardle v. Carter, 7 Si. 490; Ryle v. Swindells, M'Cle. 519; Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 100; Davies v. Cooper, 5 My. & C. 270; Aldborough v. Trye, 7 Cl. & Fin. 436; Bernal v. Donegal, 3 Dow, 133; Edwards v. Burt, 2 De G. M. & G. 55, 57; Perfect v. Lane, 3 De G. F. & J. 369; Tynte v. Hodge, 2 Hem. & M. 287.

- (b) Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. 389.
- (c) Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 484; James v. Kerr, 40 C. D. 449.
- (d) L. R. 10 Ch. at p. 392, but cf. Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 484, where Selborne, C., appears to consider that the Act might apply to a loan on the personal security of an "expectant," though under the circumstances of that case he held that the Act had no application thereto.

those cases which, according to the language of Lord Hardwicke, raise from the circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting—weakness on one side, usury on the other, or extortion, or advantage taken of that weakness—a presumption of fraud (a).

In Miller v. Cook (b) the defendant, a money-lender, having agreed with the plaintiff, who was just twenty-one years of age, and was in difficulties, to lend him 150l. on his reversionary interest under his father's will, exacted securities for 2001., with interest at 20 per cent., reducible to 10 per cent. on punctual payment, and advanced only 123l., but claimed interest on the whole amount secured, and there were immediate powers of sale on non-payment of principal and interest upon a certain day. The plaintiff had been assisted by Mr. Ring, a solicitor, who, however, stated that he had not been accurately informed of the transaction. Stuart, V.-C., held, that the transaction being unconscionable, the deeds executed by the plaintiff should only stand as securities for the moneys actually advanced with interest at 5 per cent. "As to the argument," said his Honor, "on the recent statute, concerning dealings with reversionary interests, the exception in the statute as to unfairness leaves the settled law as to cases like the present untouched. Nor is the case of the defendant assisted by the presence of Mr. Ring, who appeared as the plaintiff's friend. The evidence shows that the advice of Mr. Ring was founded on misunderstanding or misrepresentation In the present case, besides the other objections to the contract, the terms of the powers of sale are oppressive, and put the plaintiff completely at the mercy of the defendant. The power to sell without any notice to the plaintiff enabled the defendant at any moment to extinguish the right of redemption."

In Tyler v. Yates (c), where a young man charged a reversion with exorbitant sums for interest on loans principally made to his brother, an infant, on bills of exchange which he had accepted for the infant, it was held by Hatherley, C., affirming the decision of Stuart V.-C., that the charges so given should stand as security for the sums actually advanced with interest at 5 per cent. (d).

- (a) Per Selborne, C., in Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 490; As to the meaning of fraud in this connection see supra, p. 322; O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke 2 A. C., p. 833; Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D. 312; James v. Kerr, 40 C. D. 449; and see Rae v. Joyce,
- 29 L. R. Ir. 500.
- (b) 10 Eq. 641; See Money-lenders Act (1900), infra, note (5).
 - (c) 11 Eq. 265; L. R. 6 Ch. 665.
- (d) See Money-lenders Act (1900), infra, note (5).

In Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (a) the plaintiff, then a young nobleman in his twenty-second year, entitled to a large property in the event of his surviving his father, being largely indebted, upon the introduction of a creditor applied to Morris, who advanced 3,000l. in payment of the debt, and 3,800l. to the plaintiff, taking his acceptance at three months for 8,000l., the difference, 1,200l., being retained by Morris as discount at the rate of 1s. in the pound per month. At the same time an insurance was effected on the plaintiff's life for 6.000l., the first premium being paid by the plaintiff out of the money advanced. The acceptance of 8,000l. becoming due on the 4th of October, 1870, the plaintiff, through the agency of one Addison, had his acceptance of 8,000l. cancelled, giving Morris bills dated the 19th of December at three months for 11,000l. and receiving a balance of 207l. only, the rest of the money beyond the 8,000l. being for discount, extra payment on the policy of assurance, and 275l. commission paid to Addison. The plaintiff had no professional assistance in these matters, and no application was made to his father or to the solicitor of the father. Selborne, C., held, affirming the decree of Wickens, V.-C., that a decree ought to be made for delivering up the bills on payment of the sums actually advanced and interest at 5 per cent. (b).

In Webster v. Cook (c), the plaintiff being entitled to a life interest in an estate, subject to two jointures of 1,000l. and 500l. a year, and to a mortgage of 23,000l., by an indenture dated the 17th of August, 1864, in consideration of 1,000l., covenanted to pay the defendant 3,300l. on the death of the jointress having the jointure for 1,000l. a year, and in the meantime interest at 1l. per cent. per annum until her death, and after her death at the rate of 10l. per cent. until the sum was paid. He also covenanted to insure his life for 3,500l., and pay the premiums thereof. He further assigned his life interest by way of security for the payment of the 3,000l., interest and premiums, with a provision for redemption on payment of 1,500l. on the 17th of August, 1865, or the sums of 1,850l. on the 17th of August, 1866, with all interest and premiums up to those days respectively. By a memorandum on the 5th of January, 1865, he agreed that a debt of 400l. due from him with interest at 5l. per cent. per month should be tacked to the security of

⁽a) L. R. 8 Ch. 484, and see note (d), p. 332, supra.

⁽b) See note (1) generally, "Expec-

tants, Expectant heirs," supra, and "Extension of the principle."

⁽c) L. R. 2 Ch. 542.

The plaintiff was in urgent distress for money, and without professional advice when he contracted the loan, and his clear income from the estate afterwards was about 215l. On the 1st of July, 1865, his solicitors wrote to the defendant, offering to redeem on payment of the sum actually advanced, and interest at 5l. per cent., and on not receiving any answer filed a bill to redeem on those terms. Romilly, M. R., treating the transaction as the sale, pro tanto, of a reversion on the death of the jointress at an inadequate value, was of opinion that the mortgage and assignment made to secure it must be cancelled, and the property reconveyed on payment of the principal sum advanced, together with interest at 5l. per cent. per annum from the date of the advance, but refused to give any relief as to the 400l. Chelmsford, C., on appeal reversed the order of the M. R., made a decree for redemption on payment of 1,500l., with interest at 1l. per cent. on the sum of 3,300l. down to the 17th of August, 1865, and afterwards on 1,500l. at 5l. per cent., and of the sums paid by the defendant for premiums with interest thereon and of the sum of 400l. and interest thereon at the rate of 5l. per cent. per month. His Lordship said that if it had been the case of the sale of a reversion he should have had no difficulty in determining that there was sufficient evidence adduced by the plaintiff of the inadequacy of price, and the onus would have been upon the defendant to prove that the transaction was reasonable. But his Lordship was at a loss to discover what reversion there was in the plaintiff, for which the parties could be said to have dealt, that the policy of law which throws its protection round all reversioners, might be questionable, and had been questioned, and that the principle ought not to be extended by analogy.

The decision of Lord *Chelmsford* has been strongly disapproved of by *Stuart*, V.-C., who considered it was decided upon a mistake, and therefore could not be looked upon as a case of authority (a).

"Merely on the ground of undervalue."—Whether the estate sold be in possession or in reversion, the inadequacy of consideration may be so great as of itself to furnish evidence of fraud (b), and so where the price is grossly inadequate, notwithstanding the Act, the

⁽a) Tyler v. Yates, 11 Eq. p. 276; Helsham v. Barnett, 21 W. R. 309; Howley v. Cook, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 570; and see note, "Extension of the principle," supra, p. 327.

⁽b) See note (1) supra, "Inadequacy of price," and see Brenchley v. Higgins, 83 L. T. 751; 70 L. J. Ch. 788, especially judgment of Romer, L. J.

old rule applies with full (a) force to the purchase of a reversionary interest (b). Undervalue is, therefore, still a material element in cases in which it is not the sole ground of relief (c), and it may be the sole ground for relief when the inadequacy is so great as of itself to amount to evidence of fraud (d).

But in determining whether the contract is a hard one, the point to be considered is, not so much the quantum of the consideration as the fairness of the transaction generally (e). In cases where the onus lies on the purchaser of showing that there was nothing unconscientious on his part, if he succeeds in doing so and the bargain appears to have been made bonû fide, and without fraud or unfair dealing, then, although the price is in fact inadequate, the transaction will not be set aside: O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke (f). In this case Lord Hatherley, agreeing with the Court below, thought the whole case ought to be opened upon the ground that the expectant, although the defendant had suggested his employment of a solicitor, had not on account of his poverty employed one, whereas if he had done so, the solicitor would probably have pointed out the very bad health of the defendant's father, upon whose death shortly afterwards the reversion fell into possession, and would have either obtained a better price for the sale of the reversion or have suggested a loan in lieu thereof. But the majority of the Court took the view that although the price was inadequate, and although there was no independent advice, yet the particular circumstances of the case sufficiently explained these suspicious circumstances, and that the purchaser had discharged the onus thrown upon him by showing that the transaction was a fair one.

5. Money-lenders Act, 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 51).

By this Act which came into operation on the 1st of November, 1900 (g), it is enacted:

- (a) See Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D. 312, 322.
- (b) Dart, V. & P., 7th ed. (1905), ii., p. 756; Fry v. Lane, supra.
- (c) Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. p. 491.
- (d) See judgment of Lord *Thurlow*, Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 8, and see Brenchley v. Higgins, 83 L. T. 751; 70 L. J. Ch. 788.
- (e) Middleton v. Brown, 47 L. J. Ch. 411; O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, infra.
- (f) 2 A. C. 814, where the majority of the House of Lords, consisting of Lords Blackburn, Gordon, and O'Hayan, Lord Hatherley, diss., reversed the decision of the C. of A., Ireland (Bull, C., and Christian, L. J.).
 - (g) Sec. 7 (2).

- 1.—(1) Where proceedings are taken in any Court by a moneylender for the recovery of any money lent after the commencement of this Act, or the enforcement of any agreement or security made or taken after the commencement of this Act in respect of money lent either before or after the commencement of this Act, and there is evidence which satisfies the Court that the interest charged in respect of the sum actually lent is excessive, or that the amounts charged for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonus, premium, renewals, or any other charges, are excessive, and that, in either case, the transaction is harsh and unconscionable, or is otherwise such that a Court of equity would give relief, the Court may re-open the transaction, and take an account between the money-lender and the person sued, and may, notwithstanding any statement or settlement of account or any agreement purporting to close previous dealings and create a new obligation, re-open any account already taken between them, and relieve the person sued from payment of any sum in excess of the sum adjudged by the Court to be fairly due in respect of such principal, interest and charges, as the Court, having regard to the risk and all the circumstances, may adjudge to be reasonable; and if any such excess has been paid, or allowed in account, by the debtor, may order the creditor to repay it; and may set aside, either wholly or in part, or revise, or alter, any security given or agreement made in respect of money lent by the moneylender, and if the money-lender has parted with the security may order him to indemnify the borrower or other person sued.
- (2) Any Court in which proceedings might be taken for the recovery of money lent by a money-lender shall have and may at the instance of the borrower or surety or other person liable, exercise the like powers as may be exercised under this section, where proceedings are taken for the recovery of money lent, and the Court shall have power, notwithstanding any provision or agreement to the contrary, to entertain any application under this Act by the borrower or surety, or other person liable, notwithstanding that the time for repayment of the loan, or any instalment thereof, may not have arrived.
- (3) On any application relating to the admission or amount of a proof by a money-lender in any bankruptcy proceedings, the Court may exercise the like powers as may be exercised under this section when proceedings are taken for the recovery of money.
 - (4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to any

transaction which, whatever its form may be, is substantially one of money-lending by a money-lender.

- (5) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall affect the rights of any bonâ fide assignee or holder for value without notice.
- (6) Nothing in this section shall be construed as derogating from the existing powers or jurisdiction of any Court.
- (7) In the application of this Act to Scotland this section shall be read as if the words "or is otherwise such that a Court of equity would give relief" were omitted therefrom.

Scope of the Act.—The Act which deals only with contracts made with money-lenders (a) makes as to such contracts a new departure in principle. "Although the Court of Chancery from the earliest times was familiar with questions more or less analogous, it never assumed to deal with them on the principle on which this Act grants relief. In certain cases which, in modern times at any rate, have been confined to dealings with expectant heirs, including the whole class of persons for convenience sake comprehended under that designation, the Court of Chancery gave relief on terms. On the plaintiff submitting to do equity by repaying what was justly due, the Court set aside the transaction which it considered unrighteous, and ordered that the securities impeached should stand as a security for the money actually advanced with interest. But the Court never remodelled the bargain. 'The Chancery' as a great Judge said many years ago, 'mends no man's bargains' (b). So the Act involves a new departure in principle, and the working of the machinery is entrusted to hands rougher it may be, but not less ready, and not, I think, less competent for the purpose which the Legislature had in view" (c).

Money-lender.—Defined by s. 6, infra.

Excessive Interest.—Where relief is claimed on the ground of excessive interest it must be shown that the excessive interest renders the bargain harsh and unconscionable, and in estimating this the Court must take into account all the circumstances including the element of risk (d). Under certain circumstances 75 per cent. per annum may not be excessive (e).

- (a) As to which see definition s. 6, infra.
- (b) Lord Nottingham in Maynard v. Moseley, 3 Sw. 655.
- (c) Per Lord Macnaghten, Samuel v. Newbold, (1906) A. C. p. 468.
- (d) Wells v. Allott, (1904) 2 K. B. 843; Poncione v. Higgins, 21 T. L. R. 11.
- (e) Carringtons Ltd. v. Smith, (1906) 1 K. B. 79; see, however, Part v. Bond, 93 L. T. 49,

Harsh and Unconscionable, or is otherwise such that a Court of Equity would give Relief.—It was held in Wilton v. Osborn (a) that the words "or otherwise is such that a Court of Equity would give relief" were not exclusive of the words "harsh and unconscionable," and that in order to entitle the person sued to relief the transaction must be such that a Court of Equity would relieve against it on the ground of its being harsh and unconscionable. Consequently unless the borrower was one of the class known as expectant heirs relief would not be granted to him (if of full capacity) merely on the ground of excessive interest or exorbitant charges unless it could be shown that he had been overreached, tricked, or deceived, and that the money-lender had taken an undue advantage of his weakness and necessities. This decision was, however, overruled by the Court of Appeal (b) and the House of Lords has since held that the relief afforded by the Act is not limited to cases in which before the Act the Court of Chancery would have given relief (c). The policy of the Act is to prevent oppression, leaving it to the discretion of the Court to weigh each case upon its own merits and to look behind a class of contracts which peculiarly lend themselves to an abuse of power (d).

May Re-open any Account. — The Court has power when re-opening an existing money-lending transaction, to re-open also one that is past and closed provided it is relevant to or in some way connected with the existing transaction (e), but it cannot re-open a transaction entirely unconnected with the transaction, the subject matter of the action, and as to which no case is raised by the borrower by counter-claim or otherwise (f).

Sum Adjudged to be fairly Due in respect of . . . Interest.— In adjudging the amount fairly due (g) in respect of interest the Court has to take into account all the factors of the particular case including the element of risk, and the amount due for interest must therefore vary with the circumstances. There is no fixed rule as to

- (a) (1901) 2 K. B. 110.
- (b) Re a Debtor, (1903) 1 K. B. 705.
- (c) Samuel v. Newbold, (1906) A. C. 461.
- (d) Id. As to the words "harsh and unconscionable," see Part v. Bond; 93 L. T. 49; Levere v. Greenwood, 20 T. L. R. 389; Wells v. Joyce, (1905) 2 I. R. 134.
 - (e) Saunders v. Newbold, (1905) 1

Ch. 260.

(f) Ib.

(g) Where in a money-lender's action the defendant admits that he owes part of the money advanced, summary judgment will be given for the amount admitted to be due without interest, and leave given to defend as to the balance. Lazarus v. Smith, (1908) 2 K. B. 266.

what is fair interest in any circumstances, and having regard to the fact that 75 per cent. per annum has been held to be fair interest under circumstances of great risk to the lender (a) the limits of possible variation are very wide (b).

Application Relating to the Admission or Amount of Proof(c).—
The jurisdiction of the Court under this sub-section only arises where there is a proof by the money-lender actually before the Court. Therefore where the money-lender has withdrawn his proof under circumstances in which he can properly do so the Court cannot entertain an application to take an account of dealings between the money-lender and the bankrupt (d).

Section 2 of the Act provides for the registration of money-lenders, and for the carrying on of the business of a money-lender in the registered name of the money-lender and at his registered address (e), and in no other name and at no other address, and by sub-s. (c) a money-lender as defined by the Act:—

Shall not enter into any agreement in the course of his business as a money-lender with respect to the advance and repayment of money, or take any security for money in the course of his business as a money-lender, otherwise than in his registered name.

A money-lender who enters into a contract of money-lending without complying with the provisions of s. 2 is under a statutory incapacity to enforce the bargain which he has made. The consequence of that is that whether it is the borrower or the lender, who brings the matter before the Court, the transaction is absolutely void (f). The lender cannot compel the borrower to return the money lent, while the borrower can compel the lender to return the

- (a) Carringtons Ltd. v. Smith, (1906) 1 K. B. 79.
- (b) The following rates of interest have been allowed in various cases: 5 per cent. Poncione v. Higgins, 21 T. L. R. 11; 10 per cent. Part v. Bond, 93 L. T. 49; Saunders v. Newbold, (1905) 1 Ch. 260; 20 per cent. Carringtons Ltd. v. Valerie, 16 May, 1905, unreported, but see Matthews' Law of Money-lending, 1906, p. 46; Samuel v. Bell, 22 T. L. R. 118.
 - (c) Sub-s. (3) supra.

- (d) Re Attree, (1907) 2 K. B. 868.
- (e) An isolated transaction elsewhere is a breach of this sub-section, Gadd v. Provincial Union Bank, (1909) 2 K. B. 353. See also as to this subsection, Staffordshire Financial Co. v. Hunt, (1907) W. N. 258; Ex p. Carden, 52 Sol. Jo. 209; and King v. Massey, 24 T. L. R. 710.
- (f) Victorian Daylesford Syndicate v. Dott, (1905) 2 Ch. 624; Bonnard v. Dott, (1906) 1 Ch. 740; Ex p. Carden, 52 Sol. Jo. 209.

securities for the loan on the terms of repaying the amount of money lent (a) or can obtain a declaration from the Court that the transaction is illegal and void without having any terms imposed on him as to the return of the money (b).

Section 3 deals with regulations as to registration of moneylenders. Section 4 imposes penalties for false statements and representations. Section 5 amends the Betting and Loans (Infants) Act. 1892.

Section 6. The expression "money-lender" in this Act shall include every person whose business is that of money-lending, or who advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on that business; but shall not include:—

- (a) any pawnbroker in respect of business carried on by him in accordance with the provisions of the Acts for the time being in force in relation to pawnbrokers; or
- (b) any registered society within the meaning of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, or any society registered or having rules certified under sections two or four of that Act, or under the Benefit Building Societies Act, 1836, or the Loan Societies Act, 1840, or under the Building Societies Acts, 1874 to 1894; or
- (c) any body corporate, incorporated or empowered by a special Act of Parliament to lend money in accordance with such special Act; or
- (d) any person bonâ fide carrying on the business of banking or insurance or bonâ fide carrying on any business not having for its primary object the lending of money, in the course of which and for the purposes whereof he lends money; or
- (e) any body corporate for the time being exempted from registration under this Act by order of the Board of Trade made and published pursuant to regulations of the Board of Trade.

The section limits the application of the Act to persons whose main business is that of money-lending. "The Act was intended to apply only to persons who are really carrying on the business of

⁽a) Bonnard v. Dott, (1906) 1 Ch. (b) Chapman v. Michaelson, (1909) 745; Lodge v. National Union Investment Co. Ltd., (1907) 1 Ch. 300.

money-lending as a business, not to persons who lend money as an incident of another business or to a few old friends by way of friendship. This particular Act was supposed to be required to save the foolish from the extortion of a certain class of the community who are called money-lenders as an offensive term" (a). So where an art dealer took from his customers bills in payment of the amounts they owed him and renewed and discounted such bills from time to time and also assisted two art businesses and some old friends by loans of money and discounting bills, but did not advertise himself as a money-lender and did not discount bills for any outsiders it was held that he was not a money-lender within the Act (b).

6. As to the terms upon which an Unconscionable Bargain will be set aside.

Actions to set aside unconscionable bargains are treated as redemption actions (c), and relief is given upon payment of the sum actually advanced, with interest, usually at 5l. per cent. (d), together with money expended by the defendant in lasting and valuable improvements on the premises, and costs (e), except the costs of an unsuccessful reference as to value (f).

In James v. Kerr (g) the mortgagee was disallowed a bonus, which the mortgagor had covenanted to pay, as being a collateral

- (a) Per Farwell, J., Litchfield v. Dreyfus, (1906) 1 K. B. p. 590.
- (b) Litchfield v. Dreyfus, (1906) 1 K. B. 584.
 - (c) Seton (1901), p. 2344.
- (d) Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 484; Tyler v. Yates, L. R. 6 Ch. 665; Miller v. Cook, 10 Eq. 641; Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D., p. 325; James v. Kerr, 40 C. D., p. 461; Rae v. Joyce, 29 L. R. Ir. 500; as to non-allowance of compound interest, see Gowland v. De Faria, 17 V. 20; see Money-lenders Act, 1900, s. 1, and cases thereunder cited, supra, p. 340.
 - (e) Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & L.
- 490; Salter v. Bradshaw, 26 B. 161; Twistleton v. Griffith, 1 P. W. 310; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 1; Peacock v. Evans, 16 V. 512; Wharton v. May, 5 V. 27; Curling v. Townshend, 19 V. 633; Bowes v. Heaps, 3 V. & B. 117; Evans v. Cheshire, Belt's Suppl. to V. 312; Fox v. Wright, 6 Madd. 111; Bawtree v. Watson, 3 My. & K. 341; Miller v. Cook, 10 Eq. 641.
- (f) Boothby v. B., 15 B. 212, 214; Edwards v. Burt, 2 De G. M. & G. 55, 65; Jones v. Ricketts, 31 B. 130.
- (g) 40 C. D. 449, and see Rees v.De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 457.

advantage (a). In Pennell v. Millar (b) a mortgagee was disallowed what he had paid for premiums on life policies (c).

And in default of payment of principal and interest and costs if allowed to the defendant, the action will be dismissed with costs(d).

Misconduct on the part of the defendant has been held to disentitle him to costs (e); so, where he has refused proper terms before the suit was instituted, he has been compelled to pay the costs of litigation which he rendered necessary (f).

If no moral fraud has been proved, and the charges of misconduct go further than the evidence warrants, no costs will be given (g), or the plaintiff may be ordered to pay the costs (h). Sometimes where the ground of relief was undervalue only, the plaintiff has obtained relief only on payment of costs (i). On the other hand, the purchaser will be charged with what he has actually received and interest, but it seems he will not, like a mortgagee, be charged with what without wilful default he might have received (k). As to the terms on which relief was given as against a sub-purchaser with notice, see Addis v. Campbell (l).

Accounts settled for the purpose of advances on post-obit bonds, or mortgages of reversionary interests, will not be treated as settled accounts (m).

- (a) And see Mainland v. Upjohn, 41 C. D. 126.
 - (b) 23 B. 172.
- (c) And see Bromley v. Smith, 26 B. 644; Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D. p. 325; Darcy v. Croft, 9 Ir. Ch. R. 19; and cf. Re Leslie, 23 C. D. 552; explained Re Winchelsea's Policy Trusts, 39 C. D. 168; Seton (1901), p. 2342, Form 3.
- (d) Croft v. Graham, 2 De G. J. & S. 155, Seton (1901), p. 2341, Form 1; Benyon v. Fitch, 35 B. 570, 578; Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. 498, Seton (1901), p. 2342, Form 3.
- (e) Howley v. Cook, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 570; Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils. 320; Gowland v. De Faria, 17 V. 20; Moroney v. O'Dea, 1 Ball & B. 109, and the reporter's note; Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417; Bawtree v. Watson, 3 My. & K. 339; Tyler v. Yates, 11 Eq. 265.
 - (f) Benyon v. Fitch, 35 B. 570,

- 578; Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch.
 389; Nevill v. Snelling, 15 C. D. 679;
 Wyatt v. Cook, 16 W. R. 502.
 - (g) Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D., p. 324.
- (h) St. Albyn v. Harding, 27 B. 11; but see Tyler v. Yates, 11 Eq. 265; O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, 2 A. C. 814.
- (i) Twistleton v. Griffith, 1 P. W.
 310; Bawtree v. Watson, 3 My. & K.
 p. 341; Bromley v. Smith, 26 B. 644;
 Dart, V. & P. 7th ed. (1905), ii., 759.
- (k) Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & L. 489; but see the decree, ib., contra, 490; Re Slater's Trusts, 11 C. D. 227
 - (l) 4 B. 401, infra, p. 345.
- (m) Croft v. Graham, 5 Giff. 1; Tottenham v. Green, 32 L. J. Ch. 201. As to deductions for commission and bonus, see Mainland v. Upjohn, 41 C. D. 126; The Benwell Tower, 72 L. T., p. 670.

7. Confirmation and Acquiescence.

Impeachable transactions may be rendered valid by acts of confirmation (a), especially when of a formal character after advice taken (b), as by will or deed (c), or acquiescence for a great length of time (d) on the part of a person who is cognisant of his right to relief (e); for it has been well said, "that the presumption which a Court of justice most properly entertains against stale demands (f) can never be more properly applied than in a case where the burden of proof upon a most material point in controversy is thrown upon the defendant" (g).

But confirmation or acquiescence must be founded on full knowledge of the facts, and must be in relation to a transaction to which effect may be given thereby (h), and it will be of no avail whilst the plaintiff continues in the same situation as when he entered into the contract, for in such cases it has always been presumed, that the same distress, which pressed him to enter into the contract, prevented him from coming to set it aside; it is only when he is relieved from that distress that he can be expected to resist the performance of the contract (i); and in Curuyn v. Milner (k) relief was given even after payment of the money due on a post-obit bond, the payment having been made from fear of an execution.

In Rae v. Joyce (l) a mortgage was held a hard and unconscionable bargain, although the deed was approved by the married woman's solicitor, and was duly acknowledged.

- (a) Cole v. Gibbons, 3 P. W. 289.
- (b) Lyddon v. Moss, 4 De G. & J. 104.
- (c) Stump v. Gaby, 2 De G.M. & G. 623.
- (d) Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarras, 3 De G. & Sm. 735; Addis v. Campbell, 4 B. 401; Lord v. Jeffkins, 35 B. 7; Turner v. Collins, L. R. 7 Ch. 329.
- (e) See supra p. 299, and Gerrard v. O'Reilly, 3 Dr. & Wa. 414; Rees v. De Bernardy, (1896) 2 Ch. 437.
- (f) See Salter v. Bradshaw, 26 B. 161, infra, and the judgment of Lindley, L. J., in Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D., p. 186.
- (g) Sibbering v. Earl of Balcarras, 3 De G. & Sm. 737.

- (h) La Banque Jacques-Cartier v.
 La Banque d'Épargne, &c., 13 A. C.
 111; Lyddon v. Moss, 4 De G. & J.
 104.
- (i) Gowland v. De Faria, 17 V. 20, cited with approval by Kay, J., in Fry v. Lane, 40 C. D., p. 324; Ray v. Jocye, 29 L. R. Ir. 500; Medlicott v. O'Donel, 1 Ball & B. 156; Kendall v. Beckett, 2 Russ. & M. 88; Edwards v. Browne, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 100; Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R. 10 Ch. 15; Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch. 391 (n). See Huguenin v. Baseley, supra; Fox v. Mackreth, post, and note.
 - (k) 3 P. W. 292 (n).
 - (l) 29 L. R. Ir. 500.

So, where a person bought a reversion at a gross undervalue, from an heir in distressed circumstances, and resold it at a large profit to a sub-purchaser who had full notice of the original fraud, and the reversioner being still in distress, was induced by the original purchaser to join in and confirm the re-sale, and to concur in suffering recoveries which were necessary to perfect the title, but nothing was paid or secured to him as a consideration for such concurrence, the transaction was set aside as against the sub-purchaser on the repayment of the price paid on the first purchase (a).

Where, moreover, a sale of a reversion has taken place at undervalue time will not begin to run against the vendor until the reversion falls into possession. See *Salter* v. *Bradshaw* (b), in which case the transaction was set aside after the lapse of forty years (c).

Where a transaction is not merely voidable or impeachable, but is absolutely void, upon principles of public policy, then as is laid down by Lord *Hardwicke* in the principal case, it is incapable of confirmation. Thus, a usurious contract was, and a marriage brokage contract still is, void *ab initio*, and does not admit of confirmation (d).

Infants' Relief Act, 1874.—By this Act (e), which came into operation on the 7th of August, 1874, it is enacted:

- S. 1. "All contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, henceforth entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries) and all accounts stated with infants, shall be absolutely void; provided always that this enactment shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may, by any existing or future statute, or by the rules of common law or equity enter, except such as now by law are voidable."
- S. 2. "No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full age of any

⁽a) Addis v. Campbell, 4 B. 401; and see King v. Savery, 1 Sm. & G. 271; 5 H. L. Cas. 627; Wright v. Vanderplank, 2 K. & J. 1.

⁽b) 26 B. 161.

⁽c) See also Beynon v. Cook, L. R.

¹⁰ Ch. 389; Allcard v. Skinner, 36C. D., p. 186.

⁽d) Shirley v. Martin, 3 P. W. 74 (n.); Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves. Sen. 506, 507.

⁽e) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62.

promise or contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age "(a).

(a) See as to the effect of this Act, Ex p. Kibble, L. R. 10 Ch. 373; Ex p. Jones, 18 C. D. 109; Coxhead v. Mullis, 3 C. P. D. 439; Northcote v. Doughty, 4 C. P. D. 385; Ditcham v. Worrall, 5 C. P. D. 410; Brown v.

Harker, 68 L. T. 488; Holmes v. Brierley, 59 L. T. 70; Valentini v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 166; Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin, 10 T. L. R. 642; Smith v. King, (1892) 2 Q. B. 543; Edwards v. Carter, (1893) A. C. 360.

CONVERSION (a).

FLETCHER v. ASHBURNER.

June, 1779. 1 Bro. Ch. 497.

Conversion.

Where a real estate is ordered to be sold, it becomes personalty, and shall go accordingly.

JOHN FLETCHER, by his will devised his burgage houses and free rents in Kendal, and all his personal estate, to trustees and the survivor, and the heirs, executors, and administrators, of such survivor, in trust to sell so much as should be sufficient to pay his debts, and then to permit his wife Agnes to enjoy the residue during her life, if she so long continued his chaste widow, and after her decease, to sell and dispose thereof, and the money arising thereby, after deducting charges, and half-a-guinea each to the trustees for their trouble, to pay to and between his son William and daughter Mary, share and share alike; provided, that if his wife should happen to marry again, the trustees should, immediately after the marriage, sell all the estate and effects given to her for her life, and, after such deductions as aforesaid, should pay the remainder of the money to and amongst his wife, his son William, and daughter Mary, share and share alike equally; and in case either his son William or his daughter Mary should die before his or their legacy should become due, that the share or legacy of him or her so dying should go to the survivor of them.

The testator died, leaving Agnes his widow, William his only son and heir-at-law, and Mary his daughter.

Agnes, by the custom of burgage tenure, was entitled to hold the burgage houses in Kendal during her chaste viduity, against the disposition of her husband by will.

Mary attained twenty-one, but died unmarried, in the life of her

(a) As to conversion between tenant for life and remainderman, see Howe v. Dartmouth.

mother and brother. William was twenty-one at the death of the testator, and died without issue, in the life of his mother; the mother died the widow of the testator.

Upon her death a bill was filed by the heir-at-law of William, and John the testator, against the trustees and the personal representatives of the testator and of the widow, to have a conveyance of the real estates devised by the will to the plaintiff, the heir-at-law.

The representative of the widow, who was the sole next of kin of William, the son, by answer claimed the property as personal; alleging, that, by the direction to the trustees to sell the real estates, they became as personal property, and, as such, were to go to the personal representative of William, the son, who survived his sister.

The cause was heard the 11th December, 1778, where the first objection taken was, that the personal representative of William was not before the Court.

But Sir Thomas Sewell, M. R., was of opinion there were sufficient parties to sustain the question; that the personal representative was a mere formal party; and that, if he thought proper to make a decree, a personal representative might be brought before the Master.

Mr. Madocks and Mr. Wilson further argued, with respect to the principal question, that the real estates devised by the will were still to be considered as real estates, and to go to the real, not the personal, representative; that it was clearly the intention of the testator that the estate should remain, and, whilst it did so, was to be enjoyed by one person; that he directed it to be sold merely for the purpose of a division; that, in consequence of the death of the daughter no division was to be made, and therefore the reason for the directions ceased; and, from thenceforth, the son alone becoming entitled, upon the death of his mother, it was to be considered as land. They relied upon the case of Flanagan v. F., 8th June, 1768, before Lord Camden, which was a devise of real and personal estate to trustees in trust, out of the personal estate, and by sale of a sufficient part of the real, to pay debts; the surplus, after payment of debts, to A. A suit was instituted for payment of the debts, and the real estates decreed to be sold; part was sold: and afterwards A. died leaving a son and daughter; the cause was revived against the son; and it being apprehended that sufficient was not sold to pay the

debts a further part of the real estate was sold under the order of the Court. It was afterwards proved that the money produced by the first sale was sufficient to pay the debts; the question was, whether the heir or the personal representative was entitled to this money. It was alleged by Mr. Wilson, who cited the case, that Lord Camden's determination was, that whatever quality the fund then had, such it should retain; and he decreed for the personal representative. The other cases mentioned were Cruse v. Barley (a) and Digby v. Legard (b).

Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Chambre (on behalf of the defendants, the executors of the widow), contended that the testator had, by his will, directed the real estate, after the death of his widow, to be sold, and blended with his personal estate, and the whole to be divided between his children, or in case either of them should die in the life of his wife, to the survivor. Upon the case of Flanagan v. F. it was observed that the Court determined the produce of the real estate to be considered as personal, because the Court had itself directed the sale to be made and the property to be changed for payment of debts. The cases of Digby v. Legard and Cruse v. Barley were treated as inapplicable to the present case, being cases of lapsed devises: Durour v. Motteux and Mallabar v. M. were cited, as decisive of the question in favour of the defendants.

Sir Thomas Sewell, M. R., in June, gave his opinion. He observed, that nothing was better established than this principle: that money directed to be employed in the purchase of land, and land directed to be sold and turned into money, are to be considered as that species of property into which they are directed to be converted; and this in whatever manner the direction is given, whether by will, by way of contract, marriage articles, settlement, or otherwise; and whether the money is actually deposited, or only covenanted to be paid, whether the land is actually conveyed, or only agreed to be conveyed, the owner of the fund, or the contracting parties, may make land money or money land. The cases established this rule universally.

If any difficulty has arisen, it has arisen from special circumstances. In the case of Sweetapple v. Bindon (c), it was determined that a

⁽a) 3 P. W. 20.

⁽b) 3 P. W. 22.

⁽c) 2 Vern. 536.

husband was entitled to money to be laid out in land, as tenant by the curtesy: and although it is held that a wife is not entitled to dower in a similar case, yet it is allowed that it is so held, because cases have been determined, and not from any principle.

The cases of land to be turned into money are fewer than those of money to be employed in the purchase of land.

The principal cases have been where real estates have been directed to be sold, and some part of the disposition has failed; so that something has resulted to the heir-at-law, as in the cases of *Emblyn* v. *Freeman* and *Cruse* v. *Barley*. These are all cases where a devise has failed, and the thing devised has not accrued to the representative or devisee, but to the heir-at-law of the testator.

The case of Durour v. Motteux is a strong case to the point now before the Court; and, if anything could strengthen the general rule, the circumstances of the present case would do so. The testator has blended the real and personal estate together, and disposed of them without distinction, for the benefit of his wife and children. Both real and personal estate are made one fund. In the case of Durour v. Motteux, Lord Hardwicke made this a principal ground for considering the whole fund as personal estate; in the present case it might be uncertain, till the death of the widow, whether the estates must not be absolutely sold; both the children, indeed, died before her; but she might have married before the death of one or both. The interests of both the children were vested, subject, as to one of them, to be defeated in case either of them died before the mother.

There could be no election to take the fund as land or money; for, where an estate is directed to be sold, and the money divided amongst several persons, none has a right to say that any part shall not be sold (a); the question, therefore, is merely between the real and personal representatives of the son, whether the personal representative shall take the fund as personal property, according to the will, or the heir-at-law shall take it, as if no will had been made.

The case of Flanagan v. F. (b) is a strong authority that it shall be taken as personal estate, according to the will. In that

(a) See also Deeth v. Hale, 2 Moll. 317; Smith v. Claxton, 4 Madd. 493; Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 J. & W. 59; Trower v. Knightley, 6 Madd. 134.

(b) 1 Bro. Ch. 500, cited and ex-

plained by Mr. Scott arguendo in Ackroyd v. Smithson. Approved also by Jessel, M. R., in Steed v. Preece, 18 Eq. 196.

case the testatrix, Sarah Wooley, by will, dated 28th March, 1749, gave and devised all her real and personal estates to Francis Plumtree, in trust, in the first place, out of her personal estate, as far as it would extend, and, in the next place, by sale of her real estate, or a sufficient part thereof, to raise so much money as should be sufficient to pay her debts and legacies; and, after payment thereof, in trust to convey the residue of the real estate which should remain unsold, and pay the produce of such part as should be sold, and all other the residue of her real estates, between her father, James Flanagan, and her brother, James Flanagan, their heirs, executors, and administrators, equally. A bill was brought by the creditors for sale of the real estate, to supply the deficiency of the personal estate, for payment of debts, and a decree was made for a sale; and if any of the money to arise by the sale should remain after payment of the debts and legacies, it was directed to be paid to James Flanagan, the father, and James Flanagan the son, equally; and if any estate should remain unsold, the trustees were directed to convey it to them and their heirs, equally; after the decree, James Flanagan, the son, died leaving a daughter, and a son, born after his death; part of the estate was sold, and afterwards, James Flanagan, the grandfather, died, leaving his grandson his heir, and his grandson and granddaughter his sole next of kin; after the death of the grandfather, a further part of the estate was sold, under an apprehension that the produce of the first sale was insufficient to pay the debts and legacies: it appeared, however, that the produce of the first sale was sufficient. A bill was afterwards brought by the son of James Flanagan, the son claiming a moiety of the surplus, as the real estate of James Flanagan, his grandfather, to whom he was become heir, against the personal representative of his grandfather, and against the daughter of James Flanagan, the son, who claimed a moiety as one of the next of kin of her grandfather. It was objected, that the second sale, after the death of the grandfather, was improper. The Court determined, that the second sale, actually made under the decree of the Court, before the Master, could not be considered as improperly made; that there was no fraud, no practice, and that the money ought to go to the personal representative of the grandfather. The case of Digby v. Legard is a different question. There the testatrix (Elizabeth Byerley) directed her real estates to be sold to pay debts and legacies,

and gave the residue to five persons, to be equally divided between them, one of whom (Lady Cayley) died in her lifetime. It was resolved that the devise, so far, failed totally, and should accrue to the heir-at-law. The language of the decree is such, that the benefit of the devise to Lady Cayley should accrue to the testatrix's heir-at-law, Mr. Jervoice, who was a lunatic, and should be paid to his committee, as real estate descended to him. The case of Scudamore v. S. shows, that in all cases where the dispute is between representatives, the heir or executor shall have the fund, according to the will or contract of the persons who gave or created There was a case of Ogle v. Cook (a), heard 19th February, 1748, which was this: Mr. Ogle made his will in 1744, and gave his real estate to trustees to sell, and to vest the money in stock, and pay the interest to his wife during the widowhood, and after her death, or marriage, to his two daughters equally, except that the eldest was to have 1000l. more than the other; he gave the residue of his personal estate in the same way. He afterwards conveyed the real estate to one of the trustees named in his will, to whom he was considerably indebted, in trust to sell so much as should be necessary to pay the debt, and as to the residue, in trust for Mrs. Ogle: part of the estate was sold, and then Mr. Ogle died. His youngest daughter died in his lifetime. The bill was brought by the widow and the eldest daughter, against the son who was the heir, and the trustees, to have the residue of the estate sold, and claiming the share of the youngest daughter, as personal estate of Mr. Ogle, to be divided between them and the son as his next of kin. The son insisted the conveyance to the trustee was a revocation of the will; and, if not, that the share of the dead daughter was to be considered as real estate of Mr. Ogle, and descended to him as heir. It was determined that the conveyance was a revocation only pro tanto, to let in the debt; and that so much of the estate as remained unsold, should be sold, and that the money raised, or to be raised, by sale of the estate, made part of the personal estate of Mr. Ogle. There was another case about the same time which is in 1 Ves. Sen. 174 (b), where by marriage articles

⁽a) See Collins v. Wakeman, 2 V. 686, where Lord Loughborough says, that he had caused the Reg. Lib. to be examined, and it was found that

the point supposed to have been decided by Ogle v. Cook was in reality left undecided.

⁽b) Cunningham v. Moody.

500l. was agreed to be laid out in purchase of lands, to be settled to the use of the husband for life, with remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, with remainder to the wife for life, with remainder to the children of the marriage, as the husband and wife should appoint; and in default of a joint appointment, as the survivor should appoint; and in default of any appointment, to the children, to be equally divided among them; if more than one, as tenants in common, in tail general, with cross remainders; and if but one, to that child in tail general; and no appointment was made. The father and mother being dead, and the daughter being married the trustees paid the 500l. to her and her husband, and they received it as money, and executed a release. The daughter had a child, which died, and she afterwards died without issue. A daughter of the settlor, by a second marriage, filed a bill against the husband, representative of his wife, the daughter by the first marriage, for the 500l., considering it as land; and it was observed, that she was entitled to the money, but that the husband of her deceased sister was entitled to the interest during his life, as tenant by the curtesy.

In the present case, William Fletcher, the son, had the whole beneficial title vested in him as money, subject to his mother's interest for life or widowhood. She was his sole next of kin, and her personal representatives are now entitled to the estate as money; the bill must, therefore, be dismissed without costs.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Conversion of money into land by contract or will, p. 354.
- 3. Conversion of land into money, p. 359.
- 4. When conversion takes place, p. 361.
- 5. Conversion for fiscal purposes, p. 369.
- 6. Of the period at which conversion commences, p. 372.
- 7. Election to take property unconverted, p. 378.
- 8. Conversion by the Court or third parties, p. 386.

1. Generally.

In the judgment of Sir *Thomas Sewell* in the principal case, the equitable doctrine of constructive conversion, which now applies to all Divisions of the High Court (a), is thus accurately stated, viz.:

(a) Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, s.s. 11.

"that money directed to be employed in the purchase of land, and land directed to be sold and turned into money, are to be considered as that species of property into which they are directed to be converted; and this, in whatever manner the direction is given—whether by will, by way of contract, marriage articles, settlement, or otherwise, and whether the money is actually deposited, or only covenanted to be paid; whether the land is actually conveyed, or only agreed to be conveyed. The owner of the fund, or the contracting parties, may make land money, or money land:"(a).

The doctrine of conversion proceeds upon the principle, that equity considers "what ought to have been done shall be taken as done, and a rule so powerful it is as to alter the very nature of things, to make money land, and, on the contrary, turn land into money." It follows, that the neglect of trustees to perform their duty, either by converting land into money or money into land, will not affect the rights of others (b).

The law of conversion appears to be the same in Scotland as in England (c). As to the effect of a direction to convert foreign lands, see Re Piercey (d).

As to conversion of land for partnership purposes, see Lake v. Craddock, Vol. II.

2. Conversion of Money into Land by Contract or Will.

Money agreed or directed to be laid out in land, becomes land so completely, as to acquire all the properties of land; thus it will be considered as real and not personal assets. Since the passing of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, such money will be liable, as other real assets, to the payment of simple contract debts. Such money will also be subject to tenancy by the curtesy; thus, in Sweetapple v. Bindon (e) where A. bequeathed 300l. to be laid out in land, and settled to the use of her daughter and her children, and if her daughter died without issue, to go over, the husband of the daughter was held to be tenant by the curtesy, although no purchase had been made during his wife's lifetime (f).

But by a singular anomaly, founded on precedent rather than

- (a) Wheldale v. Partridge, 5 V. 396; 7 R. R. 37.
- (b) Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. W. 222; Scudamore v. S., Pr. Ch. 543.
- (c) Buchanan v. Angus, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 374.
- (d) (1895) 1 Ch. 83; and see West-lake, Private I. L., 4th ed., 204.
 - (e) 2 Vern. 536.
- (f) And see Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 174; Dodson v. Hay, 3 Bro. Ch. 404; Follett v. Tyrer, 14 Si. 125.

reason (a), a woman was in equity not dowable out of such money (b); but now by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, women married after the 1st of January, 1834, whose dower has not been barred, will be dowable out of equitable estates (c), and possibly they may be held dowable out of money to be laid out in lands of inheritance.

Where real estate was devised subject to a condition that the devisee should settle the hereditaments devised to him by his grand-father's will, the word "hereditaments" was held to include money in the hands of trustees subject to a trust for investment in land (d).

Money agreed or directed to be laid out in the purchase of land will pass under a general devise of all the lands of the person entitled to it (e), or by a devise of "all his lands in a particular county or elsewhere" (f).

But money, agreed or directed to be laid out in the purchase of land, if it continue impressed with the character of land, will not pass as money by a general bequest to a legatee in exercise of a power or otherwise; though it will by a particular description, as so much money to be laid out in land, or "as so much money left me by the will of A." (g).

Fiscal Duties.—See Conversion for fiscal purposes, p. 369.

Escheat, &c.—Money agreed or directed to be laid out in land, and settled upon a person in fee, will not upon his death without heirs be converted in equity, there being no equity in the Crown to alter the actual condition of the property (h) so that it should escheat to the Crown.

Money in Court.—Questions frequently arise as to the mode in which money in Court, impressed with the character of realty,

- (a) See the judgment supra, p.
- (b) Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 176; Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 687; but see Fletcher v. Robinson, Pr. Ch. 250; S. C., 2 P. W. 709; Otway v. Hudson, 2 Vern. 583; Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. W. 700; Re Lismore, 1 Hog. 177.
 - (c) See Re Michell, (1892) 2 Ch., p. 99.
 - (d) Re Gosselin, (1906) 1 Ch. 120.
- (e) Greenhill v. G., 2 Vern. 679, Pr. Ch. 320; Guidot v. G., 3 Atk. 256; Rashleigh v. Master, 1 V. 201; S.C., 3 Bro. Ch. 99; Biddulph v. B., 12 V. 161; Green v. Stephens, 17 V. 77; Re Scarth, 10 C. D. 499.

- (f) Lingen v. Sowray, 1 P. W. 172. Cf. Re Cleveland's S. E., (1893) 3 Ch. 244.
- (g) Cross v. Addenbrook, 3 P. W.
 222, (n.); Edwards v. Warwick, 2 P.
 W. 171; Gillies v. Longlands, 4 De G.
 & Sm. 372; Chandler v. Pocock, 15 C.
 D. 491, 16 C. D. 648; Re Kingston,
 5 L. R. Ir. 169; Cookson v. C., 12 Cl.
 & Fin. 121; Re Greaves, 23 C. D. 313;
 Jarman (1893), p. 548.
- (h) Walker v. Denne, 2 V. 170, 185;
 Re Bond, (1901) 1 Ch. 15; and see
 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177;
 Henchman v. A.-G., 3 My. & K. 483,
 494. See Ackroyd v. Smithson, infra.

can be laid out upon lands settled in the same manner as the money (a).

Mortmain.—See this note, infra, p. 360; and as to failure of trust to convert by operation of the statute, pp. 401, 403.

Rights of Heir-Money agreed or directed to be laid out in the purchase of land acquires the descendible properties of land. the heir claims payment of the money from strangers, he will, it seems, in all cases be preferred to the personal representatives of his ancestor. Thus, where money has been bequeathed to be invested in land, for the use of the ancestor and his heirs; or where, on the marriage of the ancestor, money has been actually paid, either by him or by a stranger, to trustees, to be laid out in land, to be settled upon the ancestor for his life, remainder to his wife for her life, with remainder to their issue, and in default of issue, to the ancestor and his heirs; or if, on the marriage of the ancestor, there be a covenant on the part of a stranger to lay out money in the purchase of land to be settled to the same uses, and in any of these cases the ancestor die without issue—the heir of the ancestor, and not his personal representatives, will be entitled to the money to be laid out in the purchase of land(b).

If the heir seeks payment of the money from the personal representatives of the ancestor, his claims will be superior to those of the personal representatives, if there be any prior outstanding equitable interest in the fund in another person. Thus, where the ancestor has covenanted to lay out a sum of money in land, to be settled upon himself for life, remainder to his wife for her life, remainder to the issue of the marriage; remainder to his own right heirs, if, on the death of the ancestor, the wife or any issue be living, although they may afterwards die, the heir can call upon the personal representatives for the money (c). So where money was liable to be invested in land to be settled to uses in strict settlement, and all the uses were exhausted except a legal jointure, it was held by

(a) As to which see the Settled Estates Act, 1877, s. 34; Carson R.P.S. (1902), p. 638; Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 21, Ib. p. 673, Partition Act, 1868, s. 8, Ib. p. 734. See also Re Lloyd, 9 P. D. 65; Re Harman, (1894) 3 Ch. 607.

(b) Scudamore v. S., Pr. Ch. 543; Disher v. D., 1 P. W. 204; Chaplin v. Hor er, 1 P. W. 487; Edwards v. Warwick, 2. P. W. 171; Knights v. Atkins, 3 Vern. 20.

(c) Kettleby v. Atwood, 1 Vern. 298, 471; Lancy v. Fairechild, 2 Vern. 101; Chaplin v. Horner, 1 P. W. 483; Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. W. 211; Cas. t. Talbot, 80; Oldham v. Hughes, 2 Atk. 452; Wrightson v. Macaulay, 4 Ha. 487.

Jessel, M.R., that the jointress having an equity to compel the investment of the money in land, the same must be treated as real estate as between the real and personal representatives of the person who, subject to the jointure, was entitled thereto, though it seems it would be otherwise as to portioners (a).

But if there is no outstanding equitable interest, as where, in such a case as Kettleby v. Atwood (b), the wife dies in the lifetime of the ancestor, leaving no issue of the marriage, then, as the obligation to lay out and the right to call for the money centre in the same person viz., the ancestor—the covenant, without any act on his part, will be considered as discharged: the money, to use a quaint expression, is "at home," and the heir will have no equity against the representatives of his ancestor. Thus, in Chichester v. Bickerstaff (c), it appears that, on the marriage of Sir John Chichester with the daughter of Sir Charles Bickerstaff, Sir Charles, by articles, was to pay 1,500l. in part of the portion, which, together with 1,500l. more, to be advanced by Sir John within three years after the marriage, was to be invested in land, and settled on Sir John for life, his intended wife for life, remainder to their issue, remainder to Sir John's right heirs. Within a year of the marriage the wife died, and Sir John three days after, without issue. Sir John by his will made Sir Charles his executor, and devised the residue of his personal estate, after debts, &c., paid, to Frances Chichester, his sister. The heir-at-law of Sir John filed a bill against Sir Charles to compel him to pay the 1,500l. (i.e., the 1,500l. to be advanced by Sir John), insisting that, by virtue of the marriage articles, the money ought to be looked on and considered in equity as land, and therefore belonged to him as heir. But Lord Somers said: "This money, though once bound by the articles, yet when the wife died without issue, became free again, and was under the power and disposal of Sir John, as the land would likewise have been in case a purchase had been made pursuant to the articles, and therefore would have been assets to a creditor, and must have gone to the executor or administrator of Sir John; and this case is much stronger where there is a residuary legatee;" and dismissed the bill. Doubts were thrown upon this case by Jekyll, M.R., in Lechmere v. Carlisle (d), and by Lord Talbot in Lechmere v. L. (e); but in the great case of Pulteney v. Darlington(f), Lord Thurlow expressed his opinion it was right.

⁽a) Walrond v. Rosslyn, 11 C. D. 640.

⁽b) 1 Vern. 298.

⁽c) 2 Vern. 295.

⁽d) 3 P. W. 221.

⁽e) Cas. t. Talbot, 90.

⁽f) 1 Bro. Ch. 238.

In that case money impressed with the qualities of realty had come to the hands of the person (Lord Bath) solely entitled to it under the ultimate limitation in fee; and the person so entitled, without taking any notice of the particular sum, devised all his manors, &c., which he was seised or possessed of, or to which he was in anywise entitled in possession, reversion, or remainder, or which should thereafter be purchased with any trust moneys (except certain estates therein mentioned), to his brother H. in fee, and gave him all the residue of his personal estate, and made him executor. His brother H. subsequently, by his will, gave all his estates, by local descriptions, to certain uses therein mentioned, and all his money, securities for money, goods, chattels, and personal estate, not before disposed of, to his executors, for certain trusts mentioned in his will. Thurlow, C., dismissed the bill brought by the heir-at-law to have the money laid out in land. "If," said he, "A. B. has in his possession 20,000l. to be laid out in land for his use, he has nobody to sue; the right and the thing centering in one person, the action is extinguished;" and after citing and commenting upon the cases on this subject, his Lordship added: "The use I make of these cases, notwithstanding the dicta they contain, is this, that where a sum of money is in the hands of one without any other use but for himself, it will be money, and the heir cannot claim. . . . But whether that is clearly so or not, circumstances of demeanour in the person (even though slight) will be sufficient to decide it: a very little would do; receiving it from the trustees, there is no doubt, would be sufficient. Lord Bath did receive it: he had it in his hands. Suppose he had it by way of covenant—otherwise, where would there be an end? If he kept it, subject to a covenant to lay it out for fifty years, should the heir come for it at the end of that term? It would lead to infinite inconveniences." This decision was affirmed on appeal to the House of Lords (a), and "went," as Eldon, C., says, in Wheldale v. Partridge (b), "no further than this, that if the property was at home, in the possession of the person under whom they claimed as heir and executor, the heir could not take it; but if it stood out in a third person he might; and the question in that cause was, not upon the equity between the heir and executor, but whether the money was at home "(c).

⁽a) 7 Bro. Ch. 530.

⁽b) 8 V. 235.

^{483;} Bowes v. Shrewsbury, 5 Bro. P.

C. 144; Rich v. Whitfield, 2 Eq. 583;

⁽c) Chaplin v. Horner, 1 P. W. Chandler v. Pocock, 16 C. D. 648.

In Walker v. Denne (a), Loughborough, C., observed, that, as between the heir and personal representative, their rights were pure legal rights; that chance decided what should be real, what personal; and that neither had a scintilla of equity to make the property that which it was not in fact; but this doctrine has been repeatedly dissented from in subsequent decisions (b).

Macclesfield, C., stated, "that if a party voluntarily and without any consideration covenants to lay out money in a purchase of land to be settled on him and his heirs, the Court would compel the execution of such contract, though merely voluntary, for in all cases where it is a measuring cast betwixt an executor and an heir, the latter shall in equity have the preference" (c); the more correct principle appears to be that neither should be favoured, and that right to the fund must depend upon the character with which it is impressed (d).

3. Conversion of Land into Money.

Land agreed or directed to be sold will be considered as money, and as such will not pass under a devise of land (e), but will pass under a general residuary bequest of personal estate by the *cestui* que trust(f); and in case of intestacy, will go to his personal representatives (g), even where conversion is not to take place until after his death (h); and they may maintain an action, in the case of a contract to sell by a vendor, against his heir-at-law and the purchaser for specific performance (i).

Aliens.—An alien, although he could not, previously to the Naturalization Act, 1870, hold land as against the Crown, would, nevertheless, be entitled to the proceeds arising from the sale of land

- (a) 2 V. 175, 176.
- (b) See Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 V. 235; Thornton v. Hawley, 10 V. 138; Kirkman v. Miles, 13 V. 338; Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 521; Re Pedder's Settlement, 5 De G. M. & G. 890.
- (c) Edwards v. Warwick, 2 P. W. 176; Lechmere v. L., Cas. t. Talbot, 90, 91; Hayter v. Rod, 1 P. W. 364; Scudamore v. S., Pr. Ch. 544; Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 689; Wilson v. Beddard, 12 Si. 32.
- (d) Cf. Re Gunn, 9 P. D. 242; Re Grimthorpe, (1908) 2 Ch. 675; Oxenden v. Compton, 2 V. 69, 2 R. R. 131,

- (e) Adams v. Austin, 3 Russ. 100, 461.
- (f) Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 521; Elliott v. Fisher, 12 Si. 505; Farrar v. Winterton, 5 B. 1.
- (g) Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 296;
 Burton v. Hodsoll, 2 Si. 24; Biggs v.
 Andrews, 5 Si. 424; Griffith v. Ricketts,
 7 Ha. 299; Hardey v. Hawkshaw, 12
 B. 552.
- (h) Clarke v. Franklin, 4 Kay & J. 257.
- (i) Baden v. Pembroke, 2 Vern. 58; Hoddel v. Pugh, 33 B. 489; Fry, S.P. (1903), p. 84.

devised to trustees to sell for his benefit (a). Where, however, there was no trust for absolute conversion, and the heir was an alien, the Crown was entitled to the estate (b). But now, by the Naturalization Act, 1870 (83 & 34 Vict. c. 14), s. 2, which is not retrospective, aliens may hold or dispose of property of every description like British-born subjects (c). The Court will execute a trust of lands for an alien (created prior to the Naturalization Act, 1870), in favour of the Crown (d).

Mortmain.—A bequest of money to arise from the sale of real estate, or a legacy from a fund to be produced by such a sale, was formerly within the Mortmain Act(e), not because it came within its express words, but because it came within its meaning, inasmuch as if such a bequest were allowed, the charity to whom the bequest was made might elect to take the land (f). And even when land has been directed to be converted into money by a former instrument, a bequest of the whole or part of the proceeds thereof by a party entitled thereto was void under the Mortmain Act(g).

Now by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 73), s. 3, "land" is defined so as to include tenements and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal of any tenure, but not money secured on land or other personal estate arising from or connected with land. By s. 5 land may be assured by will to or for the benefit of any charitable use, but except as provided by the Act, such land is to be sold within one year from the death of the testator. The Act further provides (s. 7) that any personal estate by will directed to be laid out in the purchase of land to or for the benefit of any charitable use, except as provided by the Act, be held for the benefit of the charitable uses as though there had been no such direction to lay it out in the purchase of land. Thus the proceeds of land subject to an immediate trust for sale are not land within the meaning

- (a) Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 1 B. 79, affirmed on appeal by Lord Cottenham, 4 My. & C. 525.
- (b) Fourdrin v. Gowdey, 3 My. & K. 383.
- (c) Sharp v. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343. See also 33 & 34 Vict. c. 102, and 35 & 36 Vict. c. 39.
- (d) Barrow v. Wadkin, 24 B. 1; Sharp v. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343.
 - (e) 9 Geo. 2, c. 36.

- (f) A.-G. v. Weymouth, Amb. 20; Paice v. The Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 V. 364; A.-G. v. Harley, 5 Madd. 321; The Incorporated, &c., Society v. Coles, 5 De G. M. & G. 331; Robinson v. R., 19 B. 201.
- (g) A.-G. v. Harley, 5 Madd. 321;
 Brook v. Badley, 4 Eq. 106, L. R. 3
 Ch. 672; Re Watts, 29 C. D. 947.

of the Act of 1891 (a). But an immediate terminable interest in the income of land subject to a trust for sale at a future date is land within the meaning of the Act (b).

Locke King's Act.—A share of the proceeds of freeholds settled, by deed, on trust for conversion, is not an interest in land within the Act, and therefore a mortgage charged on the freehold must be paid out of the residuary estate. And, semble, that where an interest in land is given by the testator with the option of retaining it in specie or of having it converted; then if it is taken without conversion it must bear the burthen of the charge (c).

4. When Conversion takes place.

By Contract.—The question between the real and personal representatives is, whether the vendor at the time of his death was either absolutely or contingently under such an agreement as equity would enforce against him (d). Where no specific performance of a contract is possible there is no conversion (e). Where the property, however, has, either by operation of law or of contract, been converted, there is no equity between the real and personal representatives, or between legal devisees and personal legatees (f).

A mere notice to treat given by a railway company, or other persons having compulsory powers to purchase lands, to an owner of land in fee (being sui~juris), although it may so far constitute an obligation as to enable the company to restrain the landowner from putting up the property for sale by auction (g), or creating any onerous interest thereon (h), will not operate as a conversion of the land into personalty (i), although the landowner state the price he is willing to accept, if he die before the acceptance of his offer (h). Nor will conversion take place where the contract with the landowner

- (a) Re Sidebottom, (1902) 2 Ch. 389.
- (b) Re Ryland, (1903) 1 Ch. 467.
- (c) Lewis v. L., 13 Eq. 218.
- (d) See Dart (1905), p. 296; Lysaght v. Edwards, 2 C. D. p. 506; Theobald, Wills (1908), 260. But subject to Locke King's Act, Re Cockcroft, 24 C. D. 94, ante, p. 31.
- (e) Edwards v. West, 7 C. D. 858; Thomas v. Howell, 34 C. D. 166.
 - (f) Frewen v. F., L. R. 10 Ch. 610.

- (g) Met. Ry. Co. v. Woodhouse, 13 W. R. 516.
- (h) Mercer v. L. St. H. S. L. Ry., (1903) 1 K. B. 652.
- (i) Haynes v. H., 1 Dr. & Sm. 426; but see Walker v. The E. C. Ry. Co., 6 Ha. 594.
- (k) Re Battersea Park Acts, Re Arnold, 32 B. 591; Richmond v. N. L. Ry. Co., 5 Eq. 352, 358.

merely fixes the price per acre, without mentioning the quantity to be taken, and the purchase-money paid for the land taken after the owner's death will be realty (a).

But where a notice to take lands by a company under their compulsory powers is followed up by the company and landowner fixing upon the price, the contract is complete, and conversion will take place (b), and the result is the same where the price is ascertained either by arbitration (c), by the valuation of two surveyors (d), or the verdict of a jury (e). So where A. devises an estate to B. and contracts to sell it, but dies before completion, the devise to B. will be adeemed, and the purchasemoney will form part of the testator's personal estate from the time fixed for completion (f). But until completion the devisee or heir would be entitled to the rents (g). Where an heir adopted a parol contract of his ancestor to sell land it was held to have been converted, and the proceeds to belong to the personal representatives of the ancestor (h).

When a person who has entered into a binding contract for the purchase of land in fee dies before the contract is completed, his devisee or heir-at-law becomes entitled to the land, and before the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, and the 40 & 41 Vict. c. 34 (i), could compel payment of the purchase-money out of the personal estate (k). Further, the rights of the purchaser's real representatives were not affected by anything which took place subsequently. Thus, if the contract ceased to be binding on the purchaser's representatives in consequence of the felling of ornamental timber by the vendor (l), or was rescinded by the vendor on the ground of

- (a) Ex p. Walker, Drew. 508.
- (b) Ex p. Hawkins, 13 Si. 569; Watts v. W., 17 Eq. 217; Re The Manchester, &c., Ry. Co., 19 B. 365; The Regent's Canal Co. v. Ware, 23 B. 575; Nash v. The Worcester, &c., Commissioners, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 973; Adams v. L. and Blackwall Ry. Co., 2 Mac. & G. 118; Re Pigott, 18 C. D. 146, 150.
- (c) Harding v. Met. Ry. Co., L. R. 7 Ch. 154.
 - (d) Watts v. W., 17 Eq. 217.
 - (e) Haynes v. H., 1 Dr. & Sm. 426.
 - (f) Watts v. W., 17 Eq. 217; Re

- Manchester, &c., Ry. Co., 19 B. 365.
- (g) Watts v. W., supra; Townley v. Bedwell, 14 V. 591; and see further Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox, 167, infra, p. 374; Knollys v. Shepherd, 1 J. & W. 499; Edwards v. West, 7 C. D. 858.
- (h) Frayne v. Taylor, 33 L. J. Ch.228. Cf. Parry v. Spencer, 56 L. T.159.
- (i) Ante, pp. 28 and 30.
- (k) Garnett v. Acton, 28 B. 333; Langford v. Pitt, 2 P. W. 629, 632; Broome v. Monck, 10 V. 597, 612, 615.
 - (l) Dart (1905), p. 307.

delay (a), or under a power reserved to him in the contract (b), the real representative of the purchaser was held entitled to the purchase-money (c). Sed qu? How far this is still the law where the real representative takes subject to the vendor's lien (d).

Where a person contracted with a builder to erect a house on a piece of freehold land belonging to him, and died intestate before the house was finished, it was held by *Romilly*, M.R., that the heir-at-law was entitled to have the house finished at the expense of the personal estate of the intestate (e).

As to a contract with an option to purchase, see infra, note (6).

Conveyancing Act, 1881.—Formerly the devisee or heir-at-law of the person who had contracted for the sale of land, on his death, was obliged to join in the conveyance. Now, however, by the 4th section of the above Act, it is enacted:

"(1.) Where at the death of any person there is subsisting a contract enforceable against his heir or devisee, for the sale of the fee simple or other freehold interest, descendible to his heirs general, in any land, his personal representative shall, by virtue of this Act, have power to convey the land, for all the estate and interest vested in him at his death, in any manner proper for giving effect to the contract.

"(2.) A conveyance made under this section shall not affect the beneficial rights of any person claiming under any testamentary disposition or as heir or next of kin of a testator or

intestate.

Under Direction to Convert.—The direction to convert either money into land or land into money must be express, and imperative (f); for if conversion be merely optional, the property will be considered as real or personal, according to the actual condition in which it is found. Thus, where A. gave 500l. to B., in trust that B. should lay out the same upon a purchase of lands or

- (a) Whittaker v. W., 4 Bro. Ch. 31; Thomas v. Howell, 55 L. T. 629.
 - (b) Hudson v. Cook, 13 Eq. 417.
- (c) See also Curre v. Bowyer, 5 B. 6, (n.); Ayles v. Cox, 16 B. 23.
- (d) Re Cockcroft, 24 C. D. 94; see Williams, V. & P., p. 477.
- (e) Cooper v. Jarman, 3 Eq. 98; followed in Re Day, (1898) 2 Ch. 510;
- 67 L. J. Ch. 619.
- (f) A mere declaration that personalty shall devolve or pass as realty is in itself inoperative, though it may help the Court to construe a doubtful instrument as creating an imperative trust for conversion; Re Walker, (1908) 2 Ch. 705.

put the same out on good securities, for the separate use of his daughter H. (the plaintiff's then wife), her heirs, executors, and administrators, and died in 1729. In 1731, H., the daughter, died without issue, before the money was invested in a purchase. husband, as administrator, brought a bill for the money against the heir of H., and the money was decreed to the administrator; for, the wife not having signified any intention of a preference, the Court would take it as it was found: if the wife had signified any intention, it should have been observed, but it was not reasonable at that time to give either her heir or administrator, or the trustee, liberty to elect; for, Lord Talbot said, it was originally personal estate, and yet remained so, and nothing could be collected from the will as to what was the testator's principal intention (a). So, if money is directed to be laid out "in Government or other securities or in the purchase of freeholds," or "to remain at interest, or be laid out in land," or "to be laid out in freeholds or leaseholds;" or if similar expressions are made use of, leaving the nature of the investment optional, or which do not sufficiently indicate an intention that the money should be laid out in land at all events, no conversion will take place until the trustees have actually exercised their discretion, which, when clearly given to them, the Court will not control (b). So where such is clearly the intention of the testator, the destination of the property, even under the will itself, may depend upon the exercise by trustees of their option to sell(c).

The vesting also of property may be made, by clear and unequivocal terms, to depend upon the time when the option to sell is exercised (d). But if there is a trust for sale, non sale will not prevent the property vesting (e).

A mere power to trustees of residuary real estates given together with residuary personalty to executors upon trust, will not have the effect of converting the real estate, even though it be accompanied by a declaration that the testator's residuary estate shall for the

- (a) Curling v. May, 3 Atk. 255; Re Ibbitson, 7 Eq. 226.
- (b) Walter v. Maunde, 19 V. 424; Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102; Walker v. Denne, 2 V. 170; Wheldale v. Partridge, 5 V. 388, 7 R. R. 37; Atwell v. A., 13 Eq. 23; Re Whitty's T., 9 Ir. R. Eq. 41.
 - (c) Polley v. Seymour, 2 Y. & C.
- Ex. 708; Brown v. Bigg, 7 V. 279; Harding v. Trotter, 21 L. T. 279; Yates v. Y., 28 B. 637; Re Sinclair, 56 L. T. 83; cf. Re Ocock, 40 Sol. Jo. 210.
- (d) Elwin v. E., 8 V. 547; Faulkener v. Hollingsworth, Ib. 558.
 - (e) Minor v. Battison, 1 A. C. 428.

purpose of transmission be impressed with the quality of personal estate from the time of his decease (a). So where trustees have a mere power with the *consent* of a person in possession of certain settled estates to lay out personal property in land to be settled to the same uses, no absolute conversion takes place (b). And where a mortgage deed contained a power of sale with a trust of the surplus proceeds in favour of the mortgagor, "his heirs and assigns," it was held that the surplus proceeds of sale must be treated as personalty notwithstanding the language of the trust (c). But the context may show that the power is in the nature of a trust, and that conversion is imperative (d).

Although conversion is apparently optional, as where trustees are directed to lay out personalty, "either in the purchase of lands of inheritance, or at interest," "in freeholds, leaseholds, or copyholds," or "in land or some other securities," as they shall think most fit and proper; yet if the limitations are adapted only to real estates, so as to manifest the testator's intention that land should be ultimately purchased, the money must be considered as land, although it be not actually so invested by trustees (e). In Earlon v. Saunders (f), W. P. devised lands to trustees, to the use of his wife for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, remainder to others in fee, as tenants in common. And he directed that 400l. should be raised by his executrix out of his personal estate, and paid by her to his trustees, or one of them, who should lay out the same in a purchase of lands or any other security or securities, as they should think proper and convenient; and he directed that the lands so to be purchased, and the security or securities on which the 400l. should be so laid out, should be made to and settled on the trustees, their heirs and assigns, in trust and to the use of his wife for life, and after her decease to such uses, and under such provisions, conditions, and limitations, as his lands before devised were limited. Lord Hardwicke held, that conversion was not at the election of the trustees. "This Court," he said, "never admits

⁽a) Hyett v. Mekin, 25 C. D. 735.

⁽b) De Beauvoir v. De B., 3 H. L.
Cas. 524; Lucas v. Brandreth, 28
B. 273; Edwards v. Tuck, 23 B. 268;
Re Bird, (1892) 1 Ch. 279.

⁽c) Re Grange, (1907) 2 Ch. 20, and see infra, note (6).

⁽d) Grieveson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen,

^{653;} and cases infra, p. 368.

⁽e) Cowley v. Hartstonge, 1 Dow, 361; Hereford v. Ravenhill, 5 B. 51; Cookson v. Reay, 5 B. 22, 12 Cl. & Fin. 120; and see Johnson v. Arnold, 1 Ves. Sen. 169; Simpson v. Ashworth, 6 B. 412; Ralph v. Carrick, 5 C. D. 984.

⁽f) Amb. 241.

trustees to have such election, to change the right, unless it is expressly given to them. Here the money is to be laid out in land or securities, for such uses as the land is before settled. If it is laid out in securities (which are personal), all the limitations might not take place; for if there was a son born, he would take the whole money, as being tenant in tail, and the subsequent limitations would be defeated. The only way to make the clause consistent is, that the money be laid out on securities till lands are purchased, and the interest and dividends, in the meantime, to go to such persons as would be entitled to the land "(a).

When there is a direction that money should be laid out in the purchase of land, a mere temporary provision, that in the meantime and until such purchase could be found, the money is to be placed out on securities, will not prevent immediate conversion from taking place (b). If, however, it appears to be the intention that in a particular event, as, for instance, the death of a husband before his wife, the investment in securities is not to be of a merely temporary but of a final character, conversion will not take place (c).

When there is a trust to sell within a particular time, it will be considered merely as directory, and conversion will take place, although no sale takes place within the time mentioned (d). So also when lands are directed to be sold, although the sale is to take place as soon as the trustees should see necessary for the benefit of the cestui que trust (e).

Conversion in favour of a particular legatee, to whom the proceeds of sale are bequeathed, will not be prevented by a devise of the property in an alternative event, in terms applicable to its unconverted state, inasmuch as the testator may have contemplated the possibility of the event taking place before a sale; moreover, it may have been intended that as to one legatee, the property might be real, and as to the other legatee, to whom it was given on

- (a) See also Edwards v. Warwick, 2 P. W. 171; Thornton v. Hawley, 10 V. 138, infra, p. 367; Johnson v. Arnold, 1 Ves. Sen. 169; Hereford v. Ravenhill, 5 B. 51; Cookson v. Reay, 5 B. 22, 12 Cl. & Fin, 121; but see Atwell v. A., 13 Eq. 23; Evans v. Ball, 30 W. R. 899.
- (b) Edwards v. Warwick, 2 P. W. 171.
- (c) Wheldale v. Partridge, 5 V. 388, 8 V. 227.
- (d) Pearce v. Gardner, 10 Ha. 287; Cuff v. Hall, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 972; Tily v. Smith, 1 Coll. 434.
- (e) Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. W. 320; see also Robinson v. R., 19 B. 494; Re Raw, 26 C. D. 601; Re Heathcote, 58 L. T. 43.

an alternative event, personalty (a). But a trust for conversion will not be prevented from being imperative in both alternatives, because it is less necessary for distribution in one event than the other (b).

Sale at Request or on Consent.—Where conversion is to take place at the request of certain persons, if the words of request are merely inserted for the purpose of enforcing the obligation to convert, although a conversion has taken place without consent, it will be considered to have been properly made. Thus, where the limitations are only adapted to real estate, a direction to lay out money after the request of persons, in the purchase of lands, followed by a declaration, that *until* the purchase should be made, the money should be placed out on securities, and a disposition of the dividends and interest in the meantime, to the same persons to whom the rents and profits of the estates to be purchased would go, will be construed as imperative, although no request may have been made. In fact, "nothing is more common than to direct money to be laid out upon request. The object of that is, only to ensure that the act shall be done when the request is made—not to prevent it until request" (c). So where real property was vested in trustees upon trust at the request of A. and B. and the survivor, and after their deaths at discretion, to sell and hold the proceeds upon trust for A. and B. successively for life, and then for the children equally. It was held after the deaths of A. and B. when there were three adult children living, that the trust for sale was not spent, the children not having elected to require a conveyance of the land, and that it could be exercised by the trustees without the concurrence of the beneficiaries (d). But where words requiring the request or consent of parties to a sale are inserted for the purpose of giving a discretion to them, if the sale takes place without their request or consent the proceeds of the sale will still be considered as land. Thus, where the sale was to be "with the joint consent and

- (a) Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 296; Cowley v. Hartstonge, 1 Dow, 381; Ward v. Arch, 15 Si. 389.
- (b) Wall v. Colshead, 2 De G. & J. 683; Wilson v. Coles, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1003; Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 680.
- (c) Per Grant, M. R., Thornton v. Hawley, 10 V. 137; Triquet v. Thornton, 13 V. 345; Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102; Symons v. Rutter, 2 Vern. 227, approved in Pulteney v. Darlington, 1

Bro. Ch. 238; Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. W. 219; Costello v. O'Rorke, 3 Ir. R. Eq. 172; Wrightson v. Macaulay, 4 Ha. 487; Batteste v. Maunsell, 10 Ir. R. Eq. 97, 314; A.-G. v. Dodd, (1894) 2 Q. B. 150; but see Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 530.

(d) Re Tweedie and Miles, 27 C. D.
315; Biggs v. Peacock, 22 C. D. 284;
cf. A.-G. v. Dodd, (1894) 2 Q. B. 150.

approbation of the husband and wife, and not without; "conversion was held to be not imperative, but at the option of the husband and wife (a). A person, however, whose consent or approbation to a sale is required, will not be allowed to delay it to another person's prejudice and to his own advantage (b).

Discretionary Power of Sale or Trust for Sale.—Where there is a mere discretionary power to convert real property into personalty, and to distribute it amongst certain persons, such persons must take the property in the actual condition in which they find it (c). The discretionary power of sale may be in form a trust, as in Re Hotchkys (d), and the discretion of the trustees will not be interfered with by the Court (e).

The result will be different where the power is imperative, and in the nature of a trust. Thus, in Grieveson v. Kirsopp (f), where a testator-gave to his widow, "for the benefit and advantage of his children," power of selling his W. estate, and by a codicil, he expressed himself in effect thus: "I do empower my wife to sell all my estates whatsoever, and the money arising from such sale, together with my personal estate, she my said wife shall and may divide and proportion among my said children, as she shall think fit and proper, or as she shall direct by will." The widow died without having sold or appointed the estate. Langdale, M.R., held that the power was in the nature of a trust for the children, and that, subject to such appointment as the widow might have made, the children were entitled in equal shares; and that the direction to sell, expressed as it was, operated as a conversion of the real estate, and that the children were entitled to take the money to arise from the sale as personalty (g); and in such a case the Court would enforce the trust (h).

- (a) Davies v. Goodhew, 6 Si. 585; Re Taylor's Settlement, 9 Ha. 596; Huskisson v. Lefevre, 26 B. 157; Sykes v. Sheard, 33 B. 114.
- (b) Lord v. Wightwick, 4 De G. M. & G. 803; 6 H. L. Cas. 217.
- (c) Walter v. Maunde, 19 V. 424; Rich v. Whitfield, 2 Eq. 583; Polley v. Seymour, 2 Y. & C. Ex. C. 708; Cowley v. Hartstonge, 1 Dow, 378; Bourne v. B., 2 Ha. 35; Edwards v. Tuck, 23 B. 268; Lucas v. Brandreth, 28 B. 273; Yates v. Y., 28 B. 637; Re Beaumont's T., 32 B. 191; Re Ibbitson, 7 Eq.
- 226; Miller v. M., 13 Eq. 263; Atwell v. A., 13 Eq. 23.
- (d) 32 C. D. 408, 416. See also Robinson v. R., 19 B. 494; Biggs v. Peacock, 22 C. D. 284; Re Raw, 26 C. D. 601.
- (e) Re Courtier, 34 C. D. 136; Re Ocock, 40 Sol. Jo. 210.
 - (f) 2 Keen, 653.
- (g) See also Burrell v. Baskerfield,
 11 B. 525; Nickisson v. Cockill, 3
 De G. J. & S. 622; Re Heathcote, 58
 L. T. 43.
 - (h) Re Courtier, 34 C. D. 136.

Implied Conversion.—The conversion of land into money may be implied without any express words directing a sale as in Mower v. Orr (a), where the property, consisting of real and personal estate, was divided into shares, with directions as to the investment of some of such shares, and the realty was held to be converted. But in order to effect such conversion the intention must be clear (b).

Double Conversion.—A double conversion may be directed leaving the notional character of the land unchanged. Thus, when land is directed to be sold and the proceeds invested in the purchase of land, it will be regarded as real estate though no sale has actually taken place (c), and after a sale of such land before the trust for reinvestment is executed the proceeds will be regarded as real estate (d). But if part of such land be sold, and the money not yet reinvested, the money will not pass under a devise of all the testator's interest in the land, if there is any part of the land unsold which would answer the description, nor if such land be sold will the money pass by the devise of lands in a particular county (e).

5. Conversion for Fiscal Purposes—Death Duties.

In cases where the question whether the Crown has the right to demand payment of some particular death duty turns on whether the property in respect of which the duty is claimed is real or personal, and also in cases where the question whether the burden of estate duty payable to the Crown shall be borne ultimately by property then in the actual form of land in respect of which the duty is claimed or by the general personal estate of a deceased person, the Courts have (subject to the provisions of the statute imposing the duty in question) given the fullest effect to the doctrine of conversion. The physical or outward form of the property is disregarded, and the decision turns upon its notional character under the doctrine of conversion (f).

- (a) 7 Ha. 475.
- (b) Cornick v. Pearce, Ib. 477; Greenway v. G., 1 Gif. 131; 2 De G. F. & J. 128; Affleck v. James, 17 Si. 121; Murton v. Markby, 18 B. 196; Lucas v. Brandreth, 28 B. 273; Tait v. Lathbury, 1 Eq. 174; Re Garnett Orme and Hargreaves Contract, 25 C. D. 595; Re Holloway, 60 L. T. 46.
- (c) Sperling v. Toll, 1 Ves. Sen. 70; Pearson v. Lane, 17 V. 101.
- (d) Re Bird, (1892) 1 Ch. 279; Re Pedder's Settlement, 5 De G. M. & G. 890.
- (e) Re Cleveland's S. E., (1893) 3 Ch. 244.
- (f) A.-G. v. Brunning, 8 H. L. Cas 243; Forbes v. Steven, 10 Eq. 178; Re Gunn, 9 P. D. 242; A.-G. v. Ailesbury, 12 A. C. 672; A.-G. v. Dodd, (1894) 2 Q. B. 150; A.-G. v. Johnson, (1907) 2 K. B. 885.

The application of the principle in the levying and payment of death duties is stated below, under the heads of the principal duties.

Probate Duty.—This duty has ceased to be leviable in the case of every person dying after the 1st of August, 1894, and is replaced by estate duty (a). It however continues necessary to consider conversion in relation to probate duty, for the liability to probate duty is unaffected in the case of persons dying before the 2nd of August, 1894, and the liability of particular property to estate duty may be affected by the previous liability of that property to probate duty (b).

Probate duty attached to whatever the personal representative became entitled to *virtute officii*, whatever might be the particular source from which it came, or whatever might be the form, position, or condition of the property at the death of the testator (c).

So where a testator entered into a binding contract to sell land, and died without receiving all the purchase-money, such part of it as was received by his executors was liable to probate duty, because it was received by them as part of the testator's personal estate (d). Again, where land directed by will to be absolutely converted into money resulted to the heir-at-law in consequence of a failure of some of the trusts as personalty, although there might have been no actual conversion, it would as personalty be liable to probate and legacy duty upon the death of the heir-at-law (e).

Where a testator disposed of freehold property, absolutely converted into personalty by a former settlement, it was considered personalty, liable to probate duty, and the will disposing thereof entitled to probate (f). Realty converted into personalty, but to be again changed to realty, is not property of such a nature (g).

Probate duty was payable on real estate notionally converted into personalty in equity, in consequence of its having been purchased with partnership capital, and used for partnership

⁽a) Finance Act, 1894, s. 1 sched. 1.

⁽b) A.-G. v. Londesborough, (1905)
1 K. B. 98; Berry v. Gaukroger, (1903)
2 Ch. 116.

⁽c) A.-G. v. Brunning, 8 H. L. Cas. 243; Forbes v. Steven, 10 Eq. 178.

⁽d) A.-G. v. Brunning, 8 H. L. Cas. 243; see Re Goodall, 65 L. J. Ch. 63.

⁽e) A.-G. v. Lomas, L. R. 9 Ex. 29; Re Richerson, (1892) 1 Ch. 379. It was not liable to probate duty on the death of the testator, for it did not pass to his executor virtute officii.

⁽f) Re Gunn, 9 P. D. 242. Before Real Representative Act, 1897, there was no probate of a will of realty only.

⁽g) Re Lloyd, 9 P. D. 65.

purposes in trade (a). Money of a lunatic laid out in land by an order containing a declaration that the property was to be considered personalty, is liable to this duty although it is realty at the lunatic's death, and the persons beneficially interested elect to take it as land (b).

Legacy Duty and Succession Duty.—Legacy duty is payable in respect of all real estate of the deceased converted in equity at the date of his death; as, for instance, real estate sold by him, but not then conveyed (c), or his share in foreign real estate forming part of the assets of a partnership of which he was a member, and à fortiori his share in partnership real assets in England (d). Where the deceased died before the 1st of July, 1888, "moneys to arise from the sale, mortgage or other disposition of any real or heritable estate directed to be sold, mortgaged or otherwise disposed of," were made liable to the payment of legacy duty under the Stamp Act, 1815 (e). Such moneys are now, where the deceased died on or after the 1st of July, 1888, liable to succession duty as on a succession to personal property (f). The duties payable in respect of personal estate directed to be applied in the purchase of real estate are regulated by the statutes cited below (g).

Estate Duty.—This duty is leviable on all property, real or personal, which passes on the death of a person dying after the commencement of the Finance Act, 1894. This common liability of realty and personalty deprives the doctrine of some of the importance which it previously had under the law of probate duty. It is still of some importance as between the Crown and subject, and of great importance as between beneficiaries claiming under the deceased.

As between Crown and Subject.—A trust enforceable in an

- (a) Forbes v. Steven, 10 Eq. 178; Stokes v. Ducroz, 62 L. T. 176; A.-G. v. Hubbuck, 13 Q. B. D. 275; A.-G. v. Ailesbury, 12 A. C. 672, 684. But see Re Goodall, 44 W. R. 70; 65 L. J. Ch. 63.
 - (b) A.-G. v. Ailesbury, 12 A. C. 672.
- (c) A.-G. v. Brunning, 8 H. L. Cas. 243.
 - (d) Forbes v. Steven, 10 Eq. 178.
- (e) 55 Geo. III. c. 184, sched. iii. The principal cases on the construction of this section are discussed, Vol. I., pp. 349, 350, of the last edition of

this work. It should be noted that s. 29 of the Succession Duty Act, 1853, rendered moneys arising under trusts for the sale of land which were not chargeable with legacy duty under the Stamp Act liable to succession duty as personal estate.

(f) 51 Vict. c. 8, s. 21 (2).

(g) 36 Geo. III. c. 52, s. 19; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, s. 30, and see Re De Lancey, L. R. 5 Ex. 102; De Lancey v. Reg., L. R. 7 Ex. 110; Macfarlane v. Lord Advocate, (1894) A. C. 291; Kenlis v. Hodgson, (1895) 2 Ch. 458.

English Court against English trustees for the conversion of foreign real estate causes that real estate to be regarded as locally situate in England and liable to estate duty (a). Again, where a testator dying before the commencement of the Act of 1894 directs the conversion of personal estate into realty and settles the converted personalty, the payment of probate duty upon such personalty exempts land purchased under the trust from the payment of estate duty on the death of a person having a limited interest under the settlement or under a compound settlement made up of the will and a resettlement (b).

As between Beneficiaries.—It is to be noted that real property of the deceased in the United Kingdom effectually converted in equity in his life passes to his executors as such, and bears no charge under s. 9 (1) of the Act of 1894. The estate duty attributable thereto will accordingly be borne by the general residuary estate (c).

6. Of the Period from which Conversion Commences.

Where absolute conversion is directed to be made by *deed*, whatever be the time at which conversion is directed, it will take place from the delivery of the deed (d).

In the case of a will it will take place from the death of testator (e), although there may be a direction that a sale should take place "whenever it should appear advantageous" (f); unless it be directed to take place at another time, as, for instance, upon the death of a person entitled for life independently of the will (g).

Rents until Conversion.—Until conversion actually takes place, the person to whom the interest of the proceeds of the estate directed to be sold is given, will be entitled, in lieu thereof, to the rents of the estate (h). Thus, if an estate be devised to trustees upon

- (a) A.-G. v. Johnson, (1907) 2 K. B.
 885; cf. Lord Sudeley v. A.-G., (1897)
 A. C. 11; Re Smyth, (1898) 1 Ch. 89.
- (b) A.-G. v. Earl of Londesborough (1905) 1 K. B. 98.
- (c) Cf. Re Grimthorpe (1908) 1 Ch. 666; (1908) 2 Ch. 675.
- (d) Griffith v. Ricketts, 7 Ha. 299; Clarke v. Franklin, 4 Kay & J. 257. But where a settlor settled real estate upon trust for sale after his own death and the purposes for which conversion was directed failed in his lifetime, it was held that there being no enforce-
- able trust the question of conversion could not arise after his death. Re Grimthorpe, (1908) 2 Ch. 675.
- (e) Beauclerk v. Mead, 2 Atk. 167; see Ward v. Arch, 15 Si. 389; Hutcheon v. Mannington, 1 V. 336.
- (f) Robinson v. R., 19 B. 495; Re Raw, 26 C. D. 601.
- (g) Fitzgerald v. Jervoise, 5 Madd. 25.
- (h) See Re Searle, (1900) 2 Ch. 829. Re Darnley, (1907) 1 Ch. 159. Re Oliver, (1908) 2 Ch. 74.

trust for sale after the testator's death, or after the death of A., and to pay the interest of the proceeds to B., for life, B. will be entitled to the rents of this estate in the first instance from the death of the testator; in the second from the death of A., until the sale of the estate takes place (a).

When lands are directed to be sold and the proceeds to be invested in the purchase of other lands to be settled to the use of a person for life without impeachment of waste, although there is a direction that the rents and *profits* of the lands till sold are to be to the use of the same persons who would be entitled to the lands to be purchased, the tenant for life cannot cut timber on the estate to be sold, because if he were allowed to do so on that estate as well as on that to be bought, he would have double waste (b).

Conversion depending upon an Option.—Mortgages.—Where a mortgage of freehold estate contains a power of sale, with a direction that the surplus moneys to arise from the sale shall be paid to the mortgagor, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, if the estate be sold in the *lifetime* of the mortgagor, the surplus moneys will be the personal estate of the mortgagor (c); but if the estate be unsold at the death of the mortgagor, the equity of redemption devolves upon his heir or devisee; if a sale subsequently takes place, the heir or devisee, as the case may be, will be entitled to the surplus produce (d).

Option to Purchase.—It has been held in several cases, commencing with Lawes v. Bennett (e), that the exercise of an option of purchase given in a lease has a retroactive effect and operates as between the real and personal representatives of the lessor to convert the reversion into personalty as from the date of the lease (f).

The decisions of the Court of Appeal in Woodall v. Clifton (g), and the judgments of Warrington, J. in that case and in Corporation of Worthing v. Heather (h), have greatly limited the operation of this

- (a) Pearson v. Lane, 17 V. 101; Casamajor v. Strode, 19 V. 391 (n.); Fitzgerald v. Jervoise, 5 Madd. 25, where the marginal note is inaccurate; Miller v. M., 13 Eq. 263.
- (b) Plymouth v. Archer, 1 Bro. Ch. 159; Burges v. Lamb, 16 V. 180.
 - (c) Re Grange, (1907) 2 Ch. 20.
- (d) Bourne v. B., 2 Ha. 35; see also Wright v. Rose, 2 S. & S. 323; Clarke
- v. Franklin, 4 Kay & J. 260; Re Cooper's T., 4 De G. M. & G. 768; Re Underwood, 3 Kay. & J. 745.; Jones v. Davies, 8 C. D. 205.
 - (e) 1 Cox, 167; 1 R. R. 10.
- (f) See also Re Goodall, 65 L. J. Ch. 63.
 - (g) (1905) 2 Ch. 257.
- (h) (1905) 2 Ch. at p. 259; (1906) 2 Ch. 532.

rule. As the law now stands, an option of purchase given by a lessor to his lessee and his assigns (1) is not a covenant running with the land enforceable against an assignee of the reversion (a), nor enforceable apparently by an assignee of the lease unless expressly assigned (b); (2) is not specifically enforceable by either the lessee or those claiming through him unless, when granted, it is limited so as to be exercisable only within the time allowed by the rule of perpetuities (c), but even when not so limited it creates a valid contractual obligation, for the breach of which an action for damages at common law may be brought (d). The law as stated in the text must be read subject to the effect of Woodall v. Clifton, In Lawes v. Bennett (f), Witterwronge, in 1758, supra (e). demised a farm to Douglas, his executors, administrators, and assigns, for seven years, and there was an agreement endorsed upon the lease, that if Douglas should, before the 29th of

- (a) Woodall v. Clifton (C. A.), supra. This decision is not reconcilable with the decision of the C. A. in Re Adams, 27 C. D. 394, and see infra, note p. 378.
- (b) Semble. It could be specially assigned. Cf. Manchester Brewery v. Coombs (1901) 2 Ch. at p. 619.
- (c) Woodall v. Clifton, supra, judgment of Warrington, J.; Worthing Corp. v. Heather, supra, judgment of Warrington, J.
- (d) Worthing Corp. v. Heather, supra. For a detailed criticism of this decision see articles by Mr. T. Cyprian Williams in 51 Sol. Jo., pp. 648, 669, where all the decisions are reviewed. It is respectfully submitted that Mr. Williams' conclusions are correct, and that the decision cannot be supported either on principle or authority. The effect of the decision of the C. A. in I. E. R. Coy. v. Assoc. Portland Cement, &c. (reported whilst this note was in the press), 257 L. R. 61, upon this point is not clear.
- (e) It is to be observed that in no case prior to Woodall v. Clifton, supra, did the decision of the Court turn upon the point actually decided by the Court

of Appeal in that case, but that in Lawes v. Bennett, and the cases following that decision, it was assumed by the Court (see e.g., Weeding v. W., 1 J. & H. 424, where the point was taken, but Page Wood, V.-C., held himself bound by Lawes v. Bennett) that the covenant giving the option bound the reversion and passed to assignees, of the lease. The effect of Woodall v. Clifton upon the rule in Lawes v. Bennett is uncertain. If the option is not enforceable against assignees it is not clear on what principle it can be held to impose a positive duty specifically enforceable against the devisee. If it is not specifically enforceable against him the basis of the rule appears to be gone. It is submitted that in any event, in view of the decisions of Warrington, J., in the cases above cited, that a contract of purchase property made in exercise of an option not in its inception complying with the rule of perpetuities works no conversion of the land as from the date of the contract creating the option.

(f) 1 Cox, 167, 1 R. R. 10. See Re Adams, 27 C. D. 394.

September, 1765, give notice in writing of his wish to purchase the inheritance of the premises for 3,000l., Witterwronge agreed to sell and to execute to him a proper conveyance thereof. Witterwronge died in 1763, having by his will devised all his real estates to the defendant Bennett, and all his personal estate to the defendant Bennett, and to the plaintiff Mary, the sister of the defendant Bennett, equally. In 1762 Douglas assigned the lease and the benefit of the agreement to Waller, and on the 2nd of February, 1765, Waller called upon Bennett to perform the contract entered into by Witterwronge, and he, Bennett, accordingly executed a conveyance to Waller in fee. Bennett having died, a bill was filed by Lawes, the husband of Bennett's sister, against the personal representative of Bennett, claiming a moiety of the 3,000l. and interest, and Kenyon, M. R., so decreed, saying: "It is very clear, that if a man seised of a real estate contract to sell it, and die before the contract is carried into execution, it is personal property of him. Then the only possible difficulty in this case is, that it is left to the election of Douglas whether it shall be real or personal. * * * When the party who has the power of making the election has elected, the whole is to be referred back to the original agreement, and the only difference is, that the real estate is converted into personal at a future period "(a). In Re Isaacs (b), I. demised certain premises of which he was owner in fee to C. for the life of the lessor, with an option to purchase within six months after his decease. I. died intestate, and C. gave notice to the administrator and heir-at-law of I. that he intended to exercise the option. Chitty, J., held the principle of Lawes v. Bennett (c) applied, and the purchase-money went to the personal representative.

But the principle of Lawes v. Bennett is not to be extended, and it has, therefore, been held to apply only between the real and personal representatives of the vendor, and not as between vendor and purchaser. Thus, in Edwards v. West (d), a landlord covenanted to insure for 14,000l., and the tenant had the option at a fixed time to purchase for 15,200l. There was no stipulation whatever (except in a contingency which did not happen) with

⁽a) See also Townley v. Bedwell, 14
V. 596, 9 R. R. 352; Weeding v. W.,
1 John & H. 424; Collingwood v.
Row, 26 L. J. Ch. 649; Woods v.
Hyde, 10 W. R. 339.

⁽b) (1894) 3 Ch. 506.

⁽c) 1 Cox, 167, 1 R. R. 10.

⁽d) 7 C. D. 858; cf. Andrews v. Patriotic Ass., &c., 18 L. R. Ir. 355; Re Adams, &c., 27 C. D. 394; Re Goodall, 65 L. J. Ch. 63.

regard to the insurance moneys. Before the time for exercising the option of the buildings demised were burnt, and the landlord received from the insurance offices nearly 12,000l. for the damage done. The tenant then exercised his option to purchase, and claimed the insurance money as part of his purchase, on the ground that the option to purchase when exercised related back to the time of the contract giving the option, since which it was argued the property had been partially converted into personalty by the fire and the receipt of the insurance money, and that the purchaser was entitled to it in that shape. Fry, J., being of opinion that conversion, according to general principles, cannot relate back to an earlier date than that of the contract constituted by the exercise of the option, said, that although he should follow Lawes v. Bennett (a) in a case between real and personal representatives of the person who granted the option, nevertheless, as that case, according to the language of Lord Eldon, in Townley v. Bedwell (b), and of Kindersley, V.-C., in Collingwood v. Row (c), was not consistent with the general principles applicable to cases of conversion, he did not think that he was at liberty to extend the doctrine, so as to imply that there was a conversion from the date of the contract giving the option as between vendor and purchaser, and he held the purchaser had no claim to the insurance money.

And, moreover, where the giver of the option dies testate, there may be such an indication of intention in the testator's will as to take the case out of the rule in Lawes v. Bennett (d). Thus, in Re Pyle (e), a testator, by his will in 1886, devised certain real estate specifically, and the residue of his realty and personalty to others. By a codicil in June, 1890, he confirmed his will. On the same day, but whether before or after the execution of the codicil was not known, he granted a lease of the specifically devised property with an option of purchase to the lessee. After the testator's death the lessee exercised the option. Held, by Stirling, J., that there was sufficient indication of an intention to take the case out of the rule in Lawes v. Bennett, that the principle laid down by Wood, V.-C., in Weeding v. W. (f), applied, and that the specific devisees were entitled to the proceeds of sale.

- (a) 1 Cox, 167, 1 R. R. 10.
- (b) 14 V. 591, 9 R. R. 352.
- (c) 3 Jur. (N. S.) 785.
- (d) See Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sm. 722, and remarks of Chitty, J.,

thereon in Re Isaacs, (1894) 3 Ch., p. 510.

- (e) (1895) 1 Ch. 724.
- (f) 1 John. & H. p. 431.

In Reynard v. Arnold (a), a tenant who had an option of purchasing the property, was bound to insure against fire, and it was agreed that all moneys recovered under the insurance should be applied in reinstating the premises. He insured in a sufficient sum. The premises were damaged by fire, and it then appeared that the landlord had a policy on the premises in another office, of which the tenant had no notice. Both policies had average clauses, the two offices apportioned the amount of loss between the two policies, and the landlord received what was thus payable under the policy effected by him. The tenant shortly after the fire gave notice to exercise his option of purchase, and proposed that the insurance moneys under both policies should go in part payment of the purchase-money. The landlord claimed to retain for his own benefit the money received under the policy effected by him, and insisted on the money under the other policy being applied in reinstating the premises, and on the tenant declining to do this, brought ejectment against him. It was held, that the landlord was not entitled to retain for his own benefit the moneys received under the policy effected by him, nor to insist on the moneys being applied in reinstating the property, after the tenant had exercised his option of purchase. It is obvious that the money which the lessor had received from the insurance office was the measure of the injury which he had done to the lessee by diminishing his rights to receive under his policy; see observations of Fry, J. in Edwards v. West (b).

Until, however, the option to purchase is exercised, the rents and profits will go to the persons who were entitled to the property up to that time, as real estate. Thus, in Townley v. Bedwell (c), a testator granted a lease to Townley for thirty-three years, with a proviso that "if Townley, his executors, administrators, or assigns should be desirous to purchase the premises within six years, he, Townley, should pay to the testator, his heirs or assigns, 600l." The testator died without having devised the premises; and before the expiration of the lease Townley declared his option to purchase. It was held by Eldon, C., upon the authority of Lawes v. Bennett, that from the time of the option Townley was entitled to the premises, and that he should pay interest upon the purchasemoney, which money and interest he held to be personal estate of

⁽a) L. R. 10 Ch. 386; cf. Andrews v. Patriotic Ass., &c., 18 L. R. Ir. 355.

⁽b) 7 C. D. 864.

⁽c) 14 V. 591, 9 R. R. 352.

the testator, and which ought to go to his next of kin, but that the rents of the premises, until the option, belonged to the heir (a).

Where after the date of the contract giving the option, a specific devise is made of the property subject to it, and a general bequest of the personal estate, the purchase-money will go to the specific devisee, when the option is exercised (b). Where such a will is made before the contract the proceeds of sale will go to the residuary legatee (c).

Where a person has an option given to him of purchasing land at a fixed price, and the land is purchased for a larger sum by a company under parliamentary powers before the time for exercising the option arrives, the person having the option will be entitled to the difference between the price fixed for him and the sum given by the railway company (d).

It was held by the Court of Appeal in $Re\ Adams\ (e)$, that an option to purchase the fee simple of the premises given by a covenant of the lessor to the lessee of a term of years, his executors, and administrators, is attached to the lease, and will pass with it to the personal representative of the lessee, and also that if the lease had been simply assigned by the lessee without any more words, the option would have passed with it to the assignee (f). An option may give a mere personal right, not exercisable after the death of the person to whom it is given (g).

7. Election to take Property Unconverted.

Who may Elect.—The notional conversion hereinbefore considered

- (a) See also Ex p. Hardy, 30 B. 206; Collingwood v. Row, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 785, 26 L. J. Ch. 649, 5 W. R. 484; Goold v. Teague, 7 W. R. 84; Weeding v. W., 1 John. & H. 424; Woods v. Hyde, 10 W. R. 339.
- (b) Drant v. Vause, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 580; Collingwood v. Row, 5 W. R. 484.
- (c) Weeding v. W., 1 John. & H. 424; Goold v. Teague, 7 W. R. 84; Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sm. 722.
- (d) Re Cant's Estate, 4 De G. & J.503; 1 Gif. 12; Ex p. Hardy, ReKerry, W. N. ('89) 3.
- (e) 27 C. D. 394. In that case (which came before the Court on a vendor and purchaser summons) an option had been exercised by the administrator, who was also the heir
- of the original lessee, and a conveyance had been executed by the devisee of the reversion. The question raised on the summons was whether the administrator on a subsequent sale could make a good title without the concurrence of the next of kin of the lessee. The Court held that he could not. Since the decision in Woodall v. Clifton, supra, the propositions that an option of purchase is attached to and passes with the lease (which were not necessary for the decision in Re Adams) are (semble) not law.
- (f) Ib., per Cotton, L. J., at p. 402; per Pearson, J., 24 C. D. 206; see Woodall v. Clifton, (1905) 2 Ch. 257.
 - (g) Re Cousins, 30 C. D. 203.

may be put an end to by an absolute owner, who, being sui juris, is competent to do so, by electing to take the property in its actual state; and the Court will not direct a conversion against this election, because, when converted, he might immediately reconvert it; for, as is quaintly observed by Lord Cowper, in Seeley v. Jago (a), "Equity, like nature, will do nothing in vain." So where the obligation to lay out money in land and the right to call for the money centre in the same person the obligation is at an end, and the property is "at home" (b). Similarly where trustees have a power to sell land comprised in a will or settlement, the cestuis que trustent where the property has become vested in them absolutely, and they are sui juris, may by electing to take the property as it stands, put an entire end to the power and the trusts (c), but if they do not make such election the trustees may exercise the power, if such appears to have been the intention of the testator or settlor (d).

An infant cannot ordinarily elect (e), but the Court may sanction his election or elect for him(f).

A lunatic cannot elect (g), and the right will not, where it can be avoided, be exercised by the Court (h).

A married woman under the old law was incompetent to make such an election by a contract or ordinary deed (i).

Before the Married Woman's Property Act, 1881, a married woman, with the concurrence of her husband, under the Fines and Recoveries Act (k), could by deed executed in compliance with its provisions, make her election to take or dispose of money to be laid out in land (l). So, likewise, she might by a similar deed elect

- (a) 1 P. W. 389.
- (b) Chichester v. Bickerstaff, 2 Vern. 295; Pulteney v. Darlington, 7 Bro. P. C. 530; Chandler v. Pocock, 16 C. D. 648 (a general power of appointment by will). Cf. Re Cleveland's S. E., (1893) 3 Ch. 244; Re Daveron, Ib., p. 421.
- (c) Re Cotton's Trustees, 19 C. D. 624. Cf. Re Jenkins, (1903) 2 Ch. 362.
 - (d) Ib. Re Jump, (1903) 1 Ch. 129.
- (e) Carr v. Ellison, 2 Bro. Ch. 56; Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 102; Spencer v. Harrison, 5 C. P. D. 97.
- (f) Robinson v. R., 19 B. 494; Jessopp v. Watson, 1 My. & K. 665; see p. 388, infra.
 - (g) See Re Jump, (1903) 1 Ch. 129.

- (h) Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 296; Re Wharton, 5 De G. M. & G. 33; Dixie v. Wright, 32 B. 662; Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263. See p 386, infra; Re Douglas & Powell's Contract, (1902) 2 Ch. 296.
- (i) Oldham v. Hughes, 2 Atk. 452; Frank v. F., 3 My. & C. 171; but see and cf. Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. p. 426; Streatfield v. S., infra, note 7.
- (k) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 40, 71, 77. Money properly invested in a mortgage of land is an interest in land within s. 77. Miller v. Collins, (1896) 1 Ch. 573.
- (l) See also Forbes v. Adams, 9 Si. 462.

to take real estate directed to be converted into money (a), even though her interest were reversionary (b), and her husband, it seems, would not be precluded from concurring in a deed, by his having previously executed a deed in favour of creditors, or having been made bankrupt and obtained his discharge (c). If there be a fund in Court impressed with the character of realty, a woman married under the old law, upon being separately examined, may elect to have it paid out to her husband as personalty (d).

A married woman, however, was never under any such disability as regards property settled to her separate use without restraint on anticipation (e), and is of course free to elect as to property which is her separate estate by virtue of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. And under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act (f), she may dispose of her reversionary interest in real property to a railway company, so as to convert the proceeds into personalty (g). As to the right of a jointress to insist, after a sale of the land on which her jointure is secured, on reconversion, see Walrond v. Rosslyn (h).

Person entitled subject to Charge.—A person entitled (subject to a charge) to real property vested in trustees upon trust for sale, may elect to take it as realty, and if he do so, and the trustees sell after the decease of the person so electing, his heir will be entitled to the residue after payment of the charge (i).

Delegated Power.—The power to reconvert or elect to retain property in its actual state may be delegated by the settlor to trustees or others, but it seems that they cannot exercise the power after the estate has become vested in persons absolutely entitled thereto (k), but secus, if it is a trust, and either the necessity for the interference of the trustees continues (l), or all the cestuis que trustent do not concur (m) in electing reconversion, or legacies are charged upon real estate directed to be converted (n).

- (a) May v. Roper, 4 Si. 360; and Briggs v. Chamberlain, 11 Ha. 69; Franks v. Bollans, L. R. 3 Ch. 717; Bowyer v. Woodman, 3 Eq. 313.
- (b) Tuer v. Turner, 20 B. 560; Franks v. Bollans, L. R. 3 Ch. 717; Re Durrant, 18 C. D. 106 (see these cases discussed, Harle v. Jarman, (1895) 2 Ch. 419).
 - (c) Re Jakeman, 23 C. D. 344.
 - (d) Standering v. Hall, 11 C. D. 652.
 - (e) Re Davidson, 11 C. D. 341.
 - (f) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18.

- (g) Cooper v. Gostling, 4 Gif. 449.
- (h) 11 C. D. 640.
- (i) Re Gardner, 1 Eq. R. 57; Mutlow v. Bigg, 1 C. D. 385.
- (k) Doncaster v. D., 3 Kay & J. 26;Rich v. Whitfield, 2 Eq. 583; and seeRe Bird, (1892) 1 Ch. 279.
 - (1) Re Cooke's Contract, 4 C. D. 454.
- (m) Biggs v. Peacock, 22 C. D. 284.See Re Tweedie & Miles, 27 C. D. 315;and Re Lord Sudeley, (1894) 1 Ch. 334.
- (n) Re Dyson & Fowke, (1896) 2 Ch.

Tenants in Common.—Where an estate is directed to be sold, and the money arising from the sale to be divided among several persons, all of them must concur in electing to take the estate unconverted, for none of them has a right to say that any part shall not be sold, and elect to take his share in land; for, to allow election in such a case, would be injurious to the sale of the entirety (a). No election can therefore take place so long as any beneficiary is disabled from electing (b). But if money be directed to be laid out in land, to the use of several persons as tenants in common, any one of them may elect to take his share of the money, for it has been said the residue of the money may be quite as advantageously invested in the purchase of land as the whole (c).

Remainderman.—The question, how far a remainderman can elect does not appear to be very clearly settled. If, however, in the case of money impressed with the character of land a remainderman were to elect to take it as money his election would be defeated upon the tenant for life electing to call for an investment in land, and if after that election the remainderman died intestate, his heir-at-law would be entitled upon the death of the tenant for life (d). however, be supposed that if in such case the tenant for life died without having elected, the next of kin of the remainderman would be entitled (e). It seems, however, to have been laid down that a person in the position of a remainderman, whose interest in the nature of the property is uncertain, as being dependent upon the option of the tenant for life, cannot elect in such a manner as to change its nature: see Sisson v. Giles(f), where Westbury, C., distinctly lays down the following proposition: that "in order to effect a reconversion, the parties directing it must be absolutely interested in the property in question. If they had only a limited or defeasible interest, there could be no reconversion" (g). remainderman may, however, by act inter vivos, or by will, dispose

- (a) Deeth v. Hale, 2 Moll. 317; Smith v. Claxton, 4 Madd. 484, 494; Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 J. & W. 59; Trower v. Knightley, 6 Madd. 134; Elliott v. Fisher, 12 Si. 505; Holloway v. Radcliffe, 23 B. 163, 171; Re Davidson, 11 C. D. 341, 348; Re Heathcote, 58 L. T. 43.
- (b) Re Douglas & Powell, (1902) 2 Ch. 296; Re Jump, (1903) 1 Ch. 129.
- (c) Seeley v. Jago, 1 P. W. 389; Walker v. Denne, 2 V. 182.

- (d) Holloway v. Radcliffe, 23 B. 163; Re Gardner, 1 Eq. R. 57.
- (e) Re Skeggs, 2 De G. J. & S. 533; Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 521; Gillies v. Longlands, 4 De G. & Sm. 372; Re Pedder's Settlement, 5 De G. M. & G. 890; Re Stewart, 1 Sm. & G. 32.

(f) 3 De G. J. & S. 614.

(g) And see Meek v. Devenish, 6
C. D. 566; Walrond v. Rosslyn, 11
C. D. 640.

of property, either as real or personal, so that he describes it in such a manner as to show what he meant to pass (a).

It has been held that a person contingently entitled to the proceeds of real estate directed to be sold, may, pending the contingency, elect to take the estate as realty, and when the contingency happens, such election will become operative (b).

Tenant in Tail.—A tenant in tail of money to be invested in land might, as against his issue, whom he might bar by fine, elect to take it in its actual state, and upon his election immediate payment would be made to him by the Court (c). But where there were remainders over, payment would not be made to the tenant in tail except by the consent of the remainderman, who could only be barred by a recovery (d). "Upon a bill by a tenant in fee," says Lord Hardwicke, "the Court would decree it to be paid in money, because he might immediately sell the land and turn it into money; and the old rule was, that the Court would also decree it so upon a bill by tenant in tail, with remainders over. And thus it stood, till the case of Colwell v. Shadwell (e), where Lord Cowper held the remainderman should have his chance, as it could not be barred but by recovery, which required time, and would not direct it to be paid in money; and the accident of the death of tenant in tail in that case, before a recovery, showed the remainderman's interest in so glaring a light, that it has established the precedent ever since. But where the remainder can be barred by fine, the Court will decree it in money" (f). It is not essential that the election by a tenant in tail alone, or a tenant in tail and the remainderman, should be made in a suit, for if the tenant in tail with remainder to himself received the money to be laid out in land from the trustees, or if the tenant in tail with remainder to a stranger, with the concurrence of the remainderman, received it from the trustee, the election will be effectually made (g). By the Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries (h), it is enacted, that money to be invested in the purchase of lands, to be settled so that any person, if the lands were

- (a) Lingen v. Sowray, 1 P. W. 172; Harcourt v. Seymour, 2 Si. (N. S.) 12; Re Skeggs, 2 De G. J. & S. 533.
- (b) Meek v. Devenish, 6 C. D. 566; Re Potter, 3 T. L. R. 420; and see and cf. Re Daveron, (1893) 3 Ch. 421; Re Appleby, (1903) 1 Ch. 565.
- (c) Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 176.
 - (d) Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 440.

- (e) 1 P. W. 471, 485.
- (f) Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 176.
- (g) Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 448; Bath v. Bradford, 2 Ves. Sen. 590; overruling dicta in Pulteney v. Darlington, 1 Bro. Ch. 236; Pearson v. Lane, 17 V. 106.
 - (h) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 71.

purchased, would have an estate tail therein, shall, for all the purposes of the Act, be treated as the lands to be purchased, and be considered subject to the same estates as the lands to be purchased would, if purchased, have been actually subject to; and all the previous clauses in this Act, so far as circumstances will admit, are to apply to such money, in the same manner as if such money were directed to be laid out in the purchase of freehold lands, and such lands were actually purchased and settled. It is now settled that a fund in Court representing entailed land will not be paid out without a disentailing deed (a). Where entailed land has been sold and the money is in Court, a subsequent deed purporting to disentail the land does not disentail the money (b). The costs of the disentailing deed must be paid by a company paying the money into Court (c).

How Election may be made.—Supposing the person competent to elect, election may be made either, 1. by express declaration, or, 2. by acts from which the Court will presume an election to have been made. But neither declaration nor act must be equivocal (d).

1. An express declaration to elect, though but slight (e), if it be unequivocal (f), may be made by parol (g).

Where a person entitled absolutely, or subject to a preceding life interest, to a fund to be invested in the purchase of land, bequeaths it by the description of so much money agreed to be laid out in land, this bequest will show a sufficient intention to elect to take the fund as personalty. So likewise a person absolutely entitled to land notionally converted into money, will be held to have elected to take it in its present state, by a devise thereof as all his landed property at a particular place (h), especially if the devise thereof be to uses in strict settlement (i).

- 2. The presumption that a person has made an election will arise from very slight circumstances (k). Thus, if a person keeps land
- (a) Re Broadwood, 1 C. D. 438; Re Reynolds, 3 C. D. 61.
- (b) Mills v. Fox, 37 C. D. 153; Carson R. P. S., (1902) p. 310.
- (c) Ib., and Re N. Staffs. Ry. Co., 3 Gif. 224.
- (d) Edwards v. Warwick, 2 P. W. 171; Dixon v. Gayfere, 17 B. 433; Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314; Meredith v. Vick, 23 B. 559.
- (e) Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 V. 236; 7 R. R. 37.
 - (f) Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 531;

Re Pedder's Settlt., 5 De G. M. & G. 890.

- (g) Edwards v. Warwick, 2 P. W. 174; Chaloner v. Butcher, 3 Atk. 685; Pulteney v. Darlington, 1 Bro. Ch. 237; Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 V. 236, 7 R. R. 37.
- (h) Sharp v. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343; Re Lord Grimthorpe, (1908) 1 Ch. 666.
- (i) Meek v. Devenish, 6 C. D. 566, 573.
- (k) Pulteney v. Darlington, 1 Bro. Ch. 238; Van v. Barnett, 19 V. 109;

for some length of time unsold, a presumption will arise that he elected to take it as land (a), even when legacies to be payable out of the proceeds of the realty are unpaid, if the assent of the unpaid legatees to the election be expressed, or can from their conduct be inferred (b), and à fortiori where he has actually paid off a charge on such estate (c).

But the presumption will not arise when land has been retained a long time unsold if one of the beneficiaries has not during that time been competent to elect to take it unsold (d); nor will it arise when a person has been in possession for a short time only, more especially in the case where several are interested in common. Kirkman v. Miles (e), where the persons entitled to the proceeds to arise from the sale of land had entered upon and occupied it for two years, and neither they nor the trustees had taken any steps to sell the estate, nor had they made any requisition to the trustees for that purpose, Grant, M. R. held, "that only two years was too short to presume an election" (f). The presumption will be sufficient where the person entitled to the money to arise from lands to be converted, not only enters into the possession of the lands, but also takes into his custody the deeds without which the trustees could neither recover the estate, nor sell it: thus in Davies v. Ashford (g), real estates were, by marriage settlement, conveyed to trustees, in trust to sell, and to hold the proceeds in trust for the husband and wife for their lives successively, remainder in trust for their children, remainder in trust for the survivor of the husband and wife absolutely; there was no child of the marriage. The husband survived his wife, and after her death got possession of the settlement and of the title-deeds, and remained in possession of them, and also of the estates, until his death. Shadwell, V.-C., held that he thereby had elected to take the estates as land. "I admit," said his Honour, "that the settlement contained a clear trust for sale, which must have been exercised unless the husband did some

Cookson v. C., 12 Cl. & Fin. 121; Dixon v. Gayfere, 17 B. 433.

- (a) Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 301; Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 688; Dixon v. Gayfere, 17 B. 433; Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314; Re Gordon, 6 C. D. 531; Re Davidson, 11 C. D. 341; Potter v. Dudeney, 56 L. T. 395.
 - (b) Mutlow v. Bigg, 1 C. D. 385.
 - (c) Re Davidson, 11 C. D. 341.
 - (d) Re Douglas & Powell's Contract,

- (1902) 2 Ch. 296. (e) 13 V. 338.
- (f) See also Cookson v. C., 12 Cl. & Fin. 121; Brown v. B., 33 B. 399; Parker v. Williams, 15 W. R. 1006; but see Inwood v. Twyne, 2 Eden, 148; Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 688; Re Davidson, 11 C. D. 341; Re Lewis, 30 C. D. 654.
 - (g) 15 Si. 44.

act which showed that he meant the trust to be at an end, and to take the estates as land. It does not distinctly appear in whose custody the title deeds originally were; but it is clear that there was a change in the possession of them and that the husband got them into his custody. Now, was not that, of necessity, a destruction of the trust; for the trustees could not have compelled the husband to deliver up the deeds, and without doing so, they could not have made any effectual sale of the estates "(a). Where securities for monies were assigned to trustees, to be invested in land to be settled upon a man and his wife for life, with an ultimate limitation to the man's right heirs; and the husband died after some of the money had been put out upon other securities in trust for him, "his executors and administrators," Lord Keeper Harcourt held, that the husband had elected to take the securities as personal estate, upon the ground that the placing the money out upon different trusts was an alteration of the nature of it, since the testator's declaring the trust to his executors and administrators, seemed tantamount with his having declared that it should not go to his heirs (b). Upon the same principle, in the case of land to be converted into money, Lord Hardwicke held, that a grant of a lease, reserving rent to the grantor, her heirs and assigns, was strong evidence of the intention of the grantor to elect that it should continue as land, though she could not reserve otherwise (c). So it has been held that a new letting to a tenant from year to year, by a lessor entitled to the proceeds of land directed to be sold, will amount to an election, upon the ground that he would have been liable to an action by the tenant if the trustees had afterwards exercised the trust for sale, supposing that they had sold the estate and that the tenant had been evicted (d).

Election may be presumed from many circumstances taken together. In one case the fact that the person absolutely entitled to a sum of money to be invested in land, subject to a provision for his wife in bar of dower, had included such sum in a statement of his

⁽a) See also Padbury v. Clark, 2 Mac. & G. 298; Brown v. B., 33 B. 399; Sisson v. Giles, 3 De G. J. & S. 614; Potter v. Dudeney, 56 L. T. 395.

⁽b) Lingen v. Sowray, 1 P. W.
172. See also Cookson v. C., 12 Cl. & Fin. 121; Harcourt v. Seymour, 2 Si. (N. S.) 12.

⁽c) Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 680, 689; Mutlow v. Bigg, 1 C. D. 385; See also Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 B. 314.

⁽d) Re Gordon, 6 C. D. 531, 537; but see Meek v. Devenish, 6 C. D. 566. Cf. Potter v. Dudeney, 56 L. T. 395.

personal property found among his papers after his death, was held to be of considerable weight (a); and in another case the execution of a deed by the parties interested in such sum, describing it as monies they were entitled to receive, and declaring trusts for investment in securities, was held to be a sufficient indication of their intention, to elect to take the sum of money in its unconverted state, although the trusts of the monies and securities were declared by reference to trusts of an instrument which assumed the conversion of the money into land (b).

Where the person absolutely entitled to money to be laid out in land receives the money from the trustees, he elects to take it as money (c), but not where he receives the income, although for a considerable time (d).

If trustees resist the demand of persons absolutely entitled to property to elect to take it unconverted, such persons may get an injunction to prevent the trustees selling the property, provided the necessary provisions be made for charges thereon (e).

8. Conversion by the Court or Third Parties.

Where conversion is rightfully made, whether by a Court of competent jurisdiction or a trustee, all the consequences of a conversion must follow: and there is no equity in favour of the heir or any one else to take the property in any other form than that in which it is found (f). But a wrongful conversion of property by trustees will not affect the interests of the cestuis que trustent. Thus, if real property be wrongfully converted into personalty, or personalty into realty, each property so converted will be considered to retain its original character.

Lunatics.—When the conversion of land into money takes place by the direction of the Court in Lunacy, which must be presumed to have acted rightfully and lawfully (g), the interests of the real and personal representatives of the lunatic are unaffected thereby (h);

- (a) Harcourt v. Seymour, 2 Si. (N. S.) 12.
- (b) Cookson v. Reay, 5 B. 22; Cookson v. C., 12 Cl. & Fin. 125.
- (c) Pulteney v. Darlington, 1 Bro. Ch. 238; Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 440; Rook v. Warth, 1 Ves. Sen. 461.
- (d) Gillies v. Longlands, 4 De G. & Sm. 372; Re Pedder's Sett., 5 De G. M. & G. 890.
- (e) Meek v. Devenish, 6 C. D. 566, 571.
- (f) Per Jessel, M. R., Steed v. Preece, 18 Eq. 197, p. 391, infra; and see Hyett v. Mekin, 25 C. D. 735; Re Bird, (1892) 1 Ch. 279; Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648; Re Dodson, (1908) 2 Ch. 638.
 - (g) Re Smith, L. R. 10 Ch. p. 84.
 - (h) Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 123,

but if the conversion is made without the direction of the Court, but properly, then, as there are no equities between the heir-at-law and the next of kin, they will take the properties to which they are respectively entitled according to the character in which they find them (a).

In the case of a lunatic, the Court will not in general alter the state of a lunatic's property so as to affect his successors; it will however do so when it is for the benefit of the lunatic himself (b); and in dealing with the property of a lunatic this principle is continually borne in mind by the Court. But even then it will interfere only with the greatest caution, and will do nothing unnecessary or uncalled for (c).

Acting upon this principle, if an application were made to sell a part of the real estate of a lunatic for the payment of debts, if the Court found that the maintenance of the lunatic would be better provided for, and his advantage promoted, by disposing of a real estate, inconvenient and ill-conditioned, and that it would be for the benefit of the lunatic so to pay the debts, and keep together the personal estate, the Court would have no difficulty in making an order upon such an application (d): So where a lunatic, seised ex parte paternâ of estate A., and ex parte maternâ of estate B., the latter being subject to a mortgage; and timber cut upon A. having been applied in discharge of the mortgage upon B., it was on a question between the heirs held that A. was not to be recouped (e). So timber may be ordered to be cut on a lunatic's estate, and applied in payment of debts or redemption of the land tax (f). And the produce of timber cut and sold by the order of the Court on a lunatic's estate, although it may not be wanted for any particular purpose, will be considered on his death as part of his personal assets (g).

But although the Court will not lightly change one species of property into another, it is because the lunatic on recovery may

- (a) Steed v. Preece, 18 Eq. 192.
- (b) See e.g. Baldwyn v. Smith, (1900) 1 Ch. 588, confirmation by Court of voidable purchase of land.
- (c) Oxenden v. Compton, 2 V. 72; Re Pares, 12 C. D. 333; Re Barker, 17 C. D. 241; A.-G. v. Ailesbury, 12 A. C. 672; Re Ryder, 20 C. D. 514; Re Tugwell, 27 C. D. 309; Re Gist, (1904) 1 Ch. 398. See the Lunacy Acts, 1890, 1891; Re Douglas & Powell's Contract, (1902) 2 Ch. 296.
 - (d) Per Eldon, C., in Ex p. Phillips,

19 V. 124.

- (e) Per Eldon, C., in Ex p. Phillips,
 19 V. 123, 124; but see Re Leeming,
 7 Jur. (N. S.) 115, 3 De G. F. & J. 43;
 Re Melly, 49 L. T. 429.
- (f) Ex p. Bromfield, 1 V. 455, 457; Ex p. Phillips, 19 V. 118.
- (g) Ex p. Bromfield, 1 V. 453; S. C., 3 Bro. Ch. 510; Oxenden v. Compton, 2 V. 69; S. C. 4 Bro. Ch. 231; Ex p. Phillips, 19 V. 118, overruling the dictum of Lord Hardwicke in Anandale v. A., 2 Ves. Sen. 384.

reasonably expect to find his property in the same state as when he became of unsound mind, and not because such changes might prejudice the interests of his representatives (a).

If the committees of a lunatic took upon themselves without leave of the Court for their own advantage to change the property of the lunatic, they would not be allowed to take advantage of their own fraud (b), but where the conversion is by a stranger tortiously, there will be no re-conversion as between the real and personal representatives (c).

Infants.—Until the passing of the Wills Act (d) a distinction existed between an adult lunatic and an infant: an adult lunatic on his recovery always had, though by different modes, the same power of disposition both over his real and personal property; to convert, therefore, one species of property into another, would not injure the lunatic. An infant, however, before the Act, might dispose of personal estate before he attained the age of twenty-one, but he could not devise real estate until he attained that age (e). The Court, therefore, would not convert his personalty into realty, because that would deprive him of a power of disposition which the law gave to him over personalty; nor would it convert realty into personalty, because by so doing a power would have been conferred upon him contrary to the policy of the law (f). Where the Court is satisfied that it is for the benefit of the infant that property should be converted it will order a mortgage or sale, as for instance in the case of repairs (g). Even in the above cases (h) the

- (a) Ex. p. Annandale, Amb. 81; Awdley v. A., 2 Vern. 192; Ex. p. Bromfield, 1 V. 463. And see cases cited note (c), p. 387, supra, and Pope, Lunacy (1890), p. 161, and the Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 123.
- (b) Ex p. Ludlow, 2 Atk. 407; Ex p. Bromfield, 1 V. 462; Awdley v. A., 2 Vern. 192; so in the case of Re Badcock, 4 My. & C. 440.
 - (c) Anon., cit. 1 V. 462.
 - (d) 1 Viet. c. 26.
- (e) Winchelsea v. Norcliffe, 1 Vern.437; Ex p. Phillips, 19 V. 124.
- (f) Ex p. Phillips, 19 V. 122; Witter v. W., 3 P. W. 99; Rook v. Warth, 1 Ves. Sen. 461; Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 413; Ashburton v. A.,
- 6 V. 6; Ware v. Polhill, 11 V. 278; Inwood v. Twyne, 2 Eden, 152. The Wills Act abolished one of the reasons for the rule by taking away from an infant the power of making a will of personalty; but the rule itself has probably disappeared; but see Simpson on Infants, 3rd ed. (1909), 290.
- (g) Ex p. Grimstone, Amb. 708; Inwood v. Twyne, 2 Eden, 148; Re Jackson, Re Household, 27 C. D. 553; Conway v. Fenton, 40 C. D. 512; and see Settled Estates Act, 1877, s. 34 (n.), Carson, R. P. S. (1902), 639; Settled Land Act, 1890, s. 15, Carson, p. 716.
- (h) Ex p. Grimstone, supra; Inwood v. Twyne, supra.

conversion would be sub modo only, and if the infant die under twenty-one the converted personalty would pass to his administrator (a), and perhaps the rule laid down in Re Badcock (b) with regard to a lunatic's estate will be held applicable to an infant's, namely that personalty may be laid out in ordinary repairs, but if a large outlay is required, the money expended will retain in equity its character of personalty (c). Following the old distinction, however, the proceeds of timber cut on the estate of an infant would, it seems, be considered as part of the realty, and descend to the heir (d). A distinction was taken in the case of Mason v. M. (e), between the case of timber cut on the estate of an infant seised in tail, and an infant seised in fee, inasmuch as in the latter case the timber being taken as realty went to the infant absolutely, whereas in the former case, if it were taken as realty, it might go to the remainderman, and it ought therefore to be taken as personalty. And Clarke, M. R., in a subsequent case, allowed the distinction (f).

Moreover, where the personal estate of the infant has been applied in paying off a charge or redeeming a mortgage, it has been ordered that it shall be considered as personal estate for the benefit of the infant (g). Lord Eldon, in a well-known case, says, "I have uniformly made it a rule, since I have sat here, where property of one nature has been applied for the benefit of an infant to property of another nature, to have an express provision, that if he shall not attain the age at which he shall have a disposable power, the representative shall not be prejudiced in any degree by the act done by the Court in contemplation of the infant's benefit, in all the circumstance surprise or accident can throw round it" (h).

In the case of descendible freeholds of an infant the line of descent may be altered, by the act of a guardian of the infant, as by the renewal of a lease for lives of which the infant is seised ex parte maternâ, for the new lease being considered as a new

- (a) Simpson on Infants, (1909) p. 290.
- (b) 4 My. & C. 440; Re Gist, (1904) 1 Ch. 398.
- (c) Simpson on Infants, (1909) p. 290, and see Lewin, 11th ed. (1904), p. 1218.
- (d) Tullit v. T., Amb. 370, 1 Dick. 322; Ex p. Phillips, 19 V. 124; but see Ex p. Bromfield, 3 Bro. Ch. 516; and Dyer v. D., 34 Beav. 504.
- (e) Amb. 371.
- (f) Tullit v. T., Amb. 371.
- (y) Ex p. Bromfield, 3 Bro. Ch. 516; Tullit v. T., 1 Dick. 323; but see Ex p. Grimstone, Amb. 708; Zoach v. Lloyd, cited 2 Vern. 192; Dennis v. Badd, cited ib. 193; Winchelsea v. Norcliffe, 1 Vern. 436.
- (h) Ware v. Polhill, 11 V. 278; A.-G. v. Ailesbury, 12 A. C. 672.

acquisition and vesting in the infant as a purchaser, will descend to the heirs ex parte paternâ, as it is immaterial to the infant which of the heirs takes it. And it was said by Hardwicke, C., "to be not like the case of an infant's personal estate turned into real; for the reason of that being still considered as personal estate, is, because of the different ages at which the infant might dispose of his personal and his real estate, and not out of favour to any one representative more than another "(a).

But since the Wills Act the reason for the distinction, running through the decisions, between the conversion of the property of infants and lunatics, no longer exists; and the leaning of the Court appears to be to simplify the law by assimilating the case of infants to that of lunatics (b). Further it is now clear that an order of the Court rightfully made for the sale of real estate operates as a conversion from the date of the order so that the proceeds of sale are personalty (c). Accordingly where the Court for the benefit of an infant converts property of one description into property of another description, it will go to the heir-at-law or next of kin, according to its character at the death of the infant. This principle was acted on in Dyer v. D. (d); in that case timber which was deteriorating was cut by order of the Court, and for the benefit of the estate, on the property of an infant, who was equitable tenant in fee subject to an executory devise over in the event of his dying under twenty-one without issue. He afterwards died under twenty-one without issue. It was held by Romilly, M. R., that the proceeds of the sale of the timber were the personal estate of the infant, that so much of the realty was converted into personalty, not when the order was made, but at the time when the timber was severed. In Field v. Brown (e) the same judge, however, had held that where, during the life of a person having a limited interest, timber is directed to be cut on a settled estate, the proceeds of the timber were to be considered as realty until some person absolutely entitled thereto elected to take them as personalty. But where both the tenant for life, and the tenant in fee in remainder of land were lunatic, and under an order made in an administration suit timber was cut and sold, it was held that the proceeds of the timber were, subject to the life interest,

Mason v. Day, Pr. Ch. 319.

by Burgess v. Booth, supra.

⁽a) Pierson v. Shore, 1 Atk. 480; 735. (d) 34 B. 504.

⁽b) Lewin, 11th ed., p. 1218.

⁽e) 27 B. 90, is apparently overruled

⁽c) Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch.

⁽C. A.) 648; Hyett v. Mekin, 25 C. D.

personal estate of the tenant in fee (a), and so it would be if the order were made upon the application of the remaindermen entitled in fee simple subject to the prior estate (b).

Conversion for Particular Purpose.—When realty has been converted by the Court or trustees for a particular purpose which does not exhaust the whole proceeds of the sale, the surplus is to be taken as personalty. In Steed v. Preece (c), which was a suit by trustees for administration of the trusts of the instrument under which these persons were entitled, and also asking for partition (before the Act of 1868), a decree was made by which, the Court being of opinion that a sale would be for the benefit of the infant defendant, and the adult defendant consenting, a sale was ordered. A sale was made under the decree, and the purchase-money paid into Court, and upon further consideration the adult's share was paid to him, and the infant's share carried to his separate account. The infant afterwards died without having attained twenty-one. Jessel, M. R., after reviewing the authorities, and approving Flanaghan v. F. cited in the judgment in the principal case (supra, p. 350), held that the fund in Court belonged to his legal personal representatives, and was not to be treated as realty; that if a conversion is rightfully made, whether by the Court or a trustee, all the consequences of a conversion must follow; and the heir or any one else must take the property in the form in which it is found unless there be any equity in favour of the heir, or any one else, for re-conversion (d).

The judgment itself may of course make a special provision, as where a decree ordering real estate devised in strict settlement to be sold for payment of debts, directed that if more were sold than was sufficient for that purpose the surplus should be laid out in land to be settled to the same uses as the devised estate (e).

Insurance Moneys.—Questions have arisen with regard to moneys arising from insurance against fire of settled property, whether they were to be considered as the personalty of the party who had kept

⁽a) Hartley v. Pendarves, (1901) 2 Ch. 498, doubting Field v. Brown, 27 B 90

⁽b) Phillips v. Daycock, W. N. (1867), p. 54.

⁽c) 18 Eq. 192; Burgess v. Booth, (1908) 2 Ch. 648 (C. A.).

⁽d) Foster v. F., 1 C. D. 588;

Batteste v. Maunsell, 10 Ir. R. Eq. 97; Re Barker, 17 C. D. 241, sale of lunatic's real estate under Partition Act, 1868; and see pp. 223 et seq., supra.

⁽e) Fellow v. Jermyn, W. N. (77) 95, and see A.-G. v. Ailesbury, 12 A. C. 672.

up the insurance or as real estate for the benefit of the parties entitled to the estate; for instance in Warwicker v. Bretnall (a) during the infancy of a tenant in tail of freehold estates devised in strict settlement, a part of the estates consisting of a corn mill was let on lease, and the rents were received by his mother on his behalf, and she thereout paid the premiums necessary for keeping up a policy which had been effected in her name for insuring the mill against fire. The will contained no provision for fire insurance. The mill having been burnt down, and it not being considered for the benefit of any person interested in the settled estates that it should be rebuilt, it was held that the insurance moneys belonged to the infant tenant in tail as his personal estate, and were not treated as real estate for the benefit of all persons interested in the settled estate.

Sales Under Statute.—Where the sale of property belonging to persons under disability is directed by the Court under the Partition Act, 1868, there is an equity for reconversion under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, ss. 34, 35, 36, which are imported into that Act (b). On the death, intestate, of the person entitled to the proceeds of a sale under the Partition Act in its reconverted state, the heir-at-law will be entitled thereto, as money and not as realty. In Mordaunt v. Benwell (c) a decree for the sale of real estate having been made in a partition suit, the property was sold and the proceeds paid into Court. Three of the persons entitled to the shares in the property died intestate before the money was distributed, leaving their father their heir-at-law and sole next of kin. He took out administration to each of them, and then died intestate. It was held that the father took his children's shares of the money as their heir-at-law, but that he took them as money, and that on his death they passed to his personal representative and not to his heir-at-law. Where, in a partition action, an order for sale is made at the request of the person under disability under the Partition Act (d), the same equity for reconversion arises (e).

⁽a) 23 C. D. 188; Gaussen v. Whatman, 93 L. T. 101.

⁽b) Foster v. F., 1 C. D. 588, the case of an infant; Mildmay v. Quicke, 6 C. D. 553; Re Lloyd, 9 P. D. 65; Fowler v. Scott, 19 W. R. 972, married women; Re Barker, 17 Ch. D. 241;

Grimwood v. Bartels, 25 W. R. 843, Iunatics; see supra, pp. 223 et seq.

⁽c) 19 C. D. 302.

⁽d) (1876) s. 6; Carson R. P. S. 740.

⁽e) Re Norton, (1900) 1 Ch. 101, distinguishing Wallace v. Greenwood, 16 C. D. 362.

Where money is paid into Court, the produce of real estate converted by compulsory powers under Acts of Parliament, as under the 69th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, it in general remains in Court subject to the rights of the parties interested in it to have it reinvested in land (a), and is to be considered as money or personal estate in Court, subject to a trust to be invested in land, and therefore impressed with the quality of real estate (b), until some act is done by the owner showing his election to take it as personalty (c). But the accumulations will be personal estate (d). It is not essential to the reconversion of the money paid into Court under the 69th section, that the property should be in settlement, because the directions therein that such money is to be invested in the purchase of lands to be conveyed in the same manner as the lands taken "stood settled" means "stood limited," words applicable to an estate in fee of a person under disability (e). Where land belonging to a person of unsound mind has been taken under the Act, and the money paid into Court, and the landowner was found lunatic and died intestate, Pearson, J., ordered the money to be paid out to her heir (f), dissenting from the decision of Lord Cranworth in Ex p. Flamank, a similar case (g). But where the payment in is made under the 78th section of the L. C. C. Act it will be treated as personalty (h).

By the Irish Church Act, 1869 (i), every advowson, with perpetual right of presentation to a living in the Established Church in Ireland, was converted into personalty, viz., the right to receive the compensation which should be assessed by the Commissioners: it was held that the executors of a testator and not the devisees of his livings were entitled to the compensation under the Act (k).

- (a) See, as to payment out to party becoming absolutely entitled, Re Hobson's Trusts, 7 C. D. 708; Re Smith, 40 Ch. D. 386; Re Morgan, (1900) 2 Ch. 474.
- (b) Re Stewart, 1 Sm. & G. 32, 39; The M. Ry. Co. v. Oswin, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 80; Re Taylor, 9 Ha. 596.
 - (c) Re Horner's Estate, 5 De G. &

- Sm. 483; Re Stewart, 1 Sm. & G. 39.
 - (d) Dixie v. Wright, 32 B. 662.
 - (e) Kelland v. Fulford, 6 C. D. 491.
 - (f) Re Tugwell, 27 C. D. 309.
 - (g) 1 Si. (N. S.) 260.
 - (h) Re Harrop, 3 Drew, 726.
 - (i) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 42.
 - (k) Frewen v. F., L. R. 10 Ch. 610.

ACKROYD v. SMITHSON (a).

Lincoln's Inn Hall, 1780. 1 Bro. Ch. 503.

Resulting Trust on Failure of the Purposes for which Conversion has been directed.

Testator gave several legacies, and ordered his real and personal estate to be sold, his debts and legacies to be paid out of the proceeds arising from the sale, and the residue thereof he gave to certain legatees, in the proportion of their legacies. Two of the residuary legatees died, living the testator. These shares are lapsed; and so far as they are constituted of personal estate, shall go to the next of kin, and so far as they are constituted of real estate, to the heir-at-law.

CHRISTOPHER HOLDSWORTH bequeathed pecuniary legacies to certain persons, all which, together with other legacies given by his will, he directed to be paid at the end of six months after his decease; and the said testator gave all his real estate not thereinbefore devised, and all his personal estate whatsoever, unto the defendants Smithson and Ibbetson, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, in trust that they should, as soon as convenient after his decease, sell all his said messuages, &c., for such price or prices as could be got for the same, and thereby to convert such real and personal estate so to them devised, and every part thereof, into ready money, and by and out of the money arising by such sale to pay all his debts, legacies, and funeral expenses, and charges of proving his will; and after payment thereof, in trust out of such monies to arise as aforesaid, to pay all legacies and annuities thereby bequeathed, at the time and in the manner thereby directed; and if, after such payments made, and putting out of the funds, as thereby directed, for raising the annuities thereby given, and indemnifying his trustees from all charges, expenses, and loss which might attend the carrying the trusts of his will into execution, there

⁽a) This report was copied by Mr. from Lord Redesdale's MSS. Brown from the notes of Lord Eldon—

should remain an overplus in the hands of the trustees, which he apprehended there would be to a considerable amount, he directed that they and the survivors of them should, within six months after the same should be ascertained, pay the same unto his said legatees, in proportion to their several and respective legacies therein to them bequeathed; and the testator thereby willed and devised that two several sums of 250l. each, which he had therein directed to be put out on securities in the names of his trustees, and the interest arising therefrom to be respectively paid to M. Thackeray and R. Gaunt during their respective lives, should, upon the several deaths of them, the said M. Thackeray and R. Gaunt, be paid in the like proportions unto them his said several and respective legatees.

Benjamin Wright and Mrs. Molyneaux, two of the said legatees, died in the lifetime of the testator.

The bill was filed by the next of kin of the testator against the trustees, the surviving legatees and the heir-at-law claiming the legacies given to the deceased legatees, their shares in the overplus, and in the two sums of 250l. as lapsed and become part of the personal estate of the testator.

The cause came on at the Rolls, 10th July, 1778, when his Honour (Sir *Thomas Sewell*), being of opinion that the surviving legatees took the whole residue, in proportion to their several legacies, dismissed the bill without costs.

From this decree the plaintiffs appealed to the Lord Chancellor Thurlow, and, the cause coming on to be heard before his Lordship,

Mr. Kenyon attempted to support the decree.

But Lord Chancellor *Thurlow* being clear (without hearing much argument) that this was a tenancy in common in the residue, and that, therefore, the shares of the legatees who died in the testator's lifetime were undisposed of, said the only question was, whether such shares belonged wholly to the next of kin or to the heir-at-law.

The Attorney-General (a), Mr. Madocks, and Mr. Selwyn (for the plaintiffs, the next of kin), contended, that the testator had converted

(a) Alexander Wedderburne, Esq., afterwards Earl of Rosslyn.

his real estate into money out and out; that he had mixed two funds, and made all personal estate; that the cases, therefore, of Mallabar v. M. (a), and Durour v. Motteux (b), must govern the decision here, and that the blending the funds distinguished this case from that of Digby v. Legard (c). Mr. Selwyn mentioned the cases of Flanagan v. F. (d), Fletcher v. Ashburner (e), and Ogle v. Cook (f).

Lord Chancellor *Thurlow* thought the two former cases did not apply, but being in general of opinion with the counsel for the next of kin, asked the counsel for the heir-at-law upon what grounds they could support his claim.

Mr. Scott (g), for the heir-at-law, said, they claimed on his behalf such interest in the monies produced by the sale of the testator's real estates, as the deceased residuary legatees would have been entitled to, if they had survived the testator; or so much of their shares of the overplus, now in the events which have happened, undisposed of, as is constituted by the produce of the testator's real estate. That the heir-at-law is entitled to every interest in land not disposed of by his ancestor, is so much of a truism that it calls for no reasoning to support it. It is not necessary for the heir-at-law to deny that the intention of the testator has designed him nothing; his intention has certainly been equally unpropitious to his next of kin; but it is not enough that the testator did not intend that his heir should take: he must make a disposition in favour of another; if he has not actually disposed of all his real estate, if he has not made an universal heir, the law will give such part of his real estate as he has not actually and eventually disposed of, even against his intention, and à fortiori in a case where he has expressed no intention, to the hæres natus. If the interest of the deceased legatees had been an interest in the produce of mere real estate, not blended with the produce of personal estate, it has been admitted, upon both hearings, that the benefit of the lapsed devises would, according to the case of Digby v. Legard, and the principle of the case of Emblyn v. Freeman (h), and of many

⁽a) Cas. t. Talbot, 79.

⁽b) 1 Ves. Sen. 320.

⁽c) Cited 1 Bro. Ch. 501.

⁽d) Cited 1 Bro. Ch. 500.

⁽e) 1 Bro. Ch. 497, ante.

⁽f) 1 Bro. Ch. 501.

⁽g) Afterwards Earl of Eldon, from whose notes this argument is taken.

⁽h) Pr. Ch. 541.

others, have accrued to the heir-at-law. It is admitted, and cannot be denied, that where a testator directs real estate to be sold for special purposes, if any of those purposes become incapable of taking effect, the heir-at-law shall take; because there is an end of the disposition when there is an end of the purposes for which it was made; but it is contended here, the testator had not a special intention, but that he meant the produce of his real estate should be considered as personal estate; that he intended to convert it out and out; that he has not kept the funds distinct, but that he has blended them so as to be incapable of being distinguished, and that the cases, therefore, of Durour v. Motteux, and Mallabar v. M., are authorities in point, that the whole fund is personal. We admit that a person may decide what shall be the nature of his property after his death, so as to preclude all questions between real and personal representatives. But we insist, that if he has not actually and eventually so decided, they, upon whom the law casts the title to personal estate, can no more claim in a Court of equity money arising from the sale of land, than the heir can claim property admitted to be of a personal nature. As to the question of fact, whether he meant that, in some event only, or that, in all events, the produce of his real estates should be considered as personalty, we admit that, in favour of his residuary legatees, he meant to convert the whole into personalty, in case all his residuary legatees should eventually take the whole; but we contend, that he has intimated no intention as to that part of the produce, as to which his disposition in the event which has happened, has failed of effect. He converts it out and out, indeed, if you speak of his intention as to the qualities of the property, which his legatees were to take; but, as to such part of the property as, in the event, they have not taken, he has not determined upon its nature; he never meant to determine upon its nature, as between his heir-at-law and his personal representative or next of kin, because he appears not to have adverted to the possibility of any events taking place, which would give the one or the other an interest in his property, and he designed no part of his property for either. In the event, the one or other must take some part of it; but, to say he has made it all personal property, and that therefore the law must give it to the next of kin, is to apply an argument deduced from what was the testator's intention in case events had taken place which have not

occurred, for the sake of proving a similar intention, if circumstances happened directly contrary to those with relation to which only the testator framed his intention. To argue from what the testator intended with respect to residuary legatees, by way of proving that he intended the same in favour of his next of kin, is to reason from a case in which intention is expressed, to prove a like intention in a case which supposes the absence of intention; though the testator, therefore, intended that his legatees, if they had lived, should take their respective shares of such part of the general surplus as was produced by the sale of the real estates as money, he has not declared any intention relative to its nature, in case that particular intent of his should be disappointed. In the event, therefore, which has happened, it is so much money undisposed of, arising from the sale of lands. Such money in this Court is land, and as such the heir claims it. Suppose all the fifteen legatees had died in the lifetime of the testator, would it not have been competent to the heir-at-law to have insisted in equity, that no sale should be made of the real estate? Would it have been possible to contend that, because the testator had blended the funds, in order to make a disposition which never took effect, and without a view to any other given circumstances, that he had therefore blended them, if, in the event, he had made no disposition; that, because he had made the real estate personal, to give it to his residuary legatees, and to disappoint his heir, whether his residuary legatees did or did not, in the event, take the benefit of that disposition? The fact of his having blended the funds proves not a mere inattention, not mere indifference to the interest both of his next of kin and his heir-at-law, but it proves a purpose hostile to both. Can that fact, then, be a ground from whence to infer that, in a change of circumstances, he had a purpose of kindness and bounty to the next of kin, and adverse to the interest of the heir only? The reason of the intention ceasing, the intention should be taken to have ceased. The testator meant to change the legal qualities of his property, when he meant to alter the disposition which the law would make of his property; but if, in the event, the law was to make the disposition of any part of the property, he meant, for aught that appears to the contrary (and something must appear to the contrary, to defeat the claim of the heir), that the law which made the disposition should decide

on the qualities of the property of which it was to dispose. If, then, in case all the residuary legatees had died, the heir could have prevented a sale, is it to be said, that, because a sale must be made, he shall not have that part of its produce which the objects of the testator's bounty cannot take? It is not true, that where it is necessary that a sale should be made, to effectuate the testator's purposes which are capable of taking effect, that such sale will convert the nature of that part of its produce which cannot be applied according to the testator's intention. He then cited, distinguished and commented upon the following cases: Emblyn v. Freeman (a), Digby v. Legard (b), Mallabar v. M. (c), Durour v. Motteux (d), Cruse v. Barley (e), Flanagan v. F. (f), Scudamore v. S. (g), Ogle v. Cook (h).

LORD CHANCELLOR THURLOW reversed the decree, and directed an account to be taken of the personal estate, and the money arising from the sale of the real estate, and that the share of the deceased legatees in the overplus should be divided between the next of kin and the heir; that is, so much of those shares as was constituted of the personal estate, to the next of kin, and so much as was made up of the produce of the real estate, to the heir.

He said, that he fully approved the determination in Digby v. Legard. That he used to think, when it was necessary for any purposes of the testator's disposition, to convert the land into money, that the undisposed money would be personalty; but the cases fully proved the contrary. It would be too much to say, that if all the legatees had died, the heir could, as he certainly might, he said, prevent a sale, and yet to say that, because a sale was necessary, the heir should not take the undisposed part of the produce. The heir must stand in the place of the residuary legatees who died, as to the produce of the real estate. He said, he approved the distinctions made on behalf of the heir, and decreed as before.

- (a) Pr. Ch. 541.
- (b) Cited 1 Bro. Ch. 501.
- (c) Cas. t. Talbot, 79.
- (d) 1 Ves. Sen. 320.
- (e) 3 P. W. 20.

- (f) Cited 1 Bro. Ch. 500.
- (g) Pr. Ch. 513.
- (h) As to which see Collins v. Wakeman, 2 V. 686.

NOTES.

- Resulting trusts on failure of disposition of money to arise from sale of land.
- 2. Resulting trusts when money is directed to be laid out in land upon uses which wholly or partially fail, p. 402.
- 3. How the heir and next of kin take property directed to be converted, p.404.
- 4. When a residuary devise or bequest comprehends property which would otherwise have resulted to heir or next of kin, p. 406.
- 5. Undisposed of interest where no heir or next of kin, p. 411.

1. Resulting Trusts on Failure of Disposition of Money to arise from Sale of Land.

In Ackroyd v. Smithson, it will be observed that the disposition of the money to arise from the sale of the real estate was originally complete, but a lapse by the death of two of the residuary legatees in the lifetime of the testator caused the failure of the disposition as to their two shares, which, although actually converted into money, resulted to the heir-at-law as undisposed-of real estate.

Since the case of Ackroyd v. Smithson, so celebrated for the elaborate argument of Mr. Scott, afterwards Lord Eldon, it has never been doubted, that, where a testator directs real estate to be sold, and the produce of the sale to be applied for a purpose which either wholly or partially fails, the undisposed-of beneficial interest will result to his heir-at-law and will not go to his next of kin, although the land may have been actually converted into money. Where a testator means, with regard to a particular purpose, to convert his real estate into personal, if that purpose cannot be served, the Court will not infer an intention to convert the estate for any other purpose not expressed (a).

The same result follows where money arising from land directed to be sold is given over on an event which does not happen. Thus in Jessopp v. Watson (b), a testator directed a mixed fund, composed of the produce of his real and personal estate (see the principal case) to be applied to certain specified purposes, and the residue to be divided among his children, or child, at twenty-one, if sons, and twenty-one or marriage, if daughters, and if there was no child who should become entitled under the trusts, to such person as he should by his codicil appoint. The testator died without having made a codicil, leaving an only daughter, his heiress-at law, who died under

⁽a) Per Eldon, C., Hill v. Cock, 1 H. L. Cas. 656. V. & B. 175; Bective v. Hodgson, 10 (b) 1 My. & K. 665.

twenty-one, intestate and unmarried. Leach, M. R., held, that so much of the residuary fund as was constituted of real estate descended to the heiress, and that so much as was constituted of personal property went to the next of kin (a).

So, where land is directed to be converted into money, and the whole, or part, is given for a purpose which fails on account of illegality, the whole or part which, on this account, remains undisposed of, results to the heir-at-law as real estate. As, for instance, where money, to arise from the sale of land, is limited so that the bequest is void, as violating the rule against perpetuities (b). Eyre v. Marsden (c), accumulations were directed to be made for more than twenty-one years from the death of the testator out of the income of his residuary real estate to be converted into money. The direction was void under the Thellusson Act (d), as to the excess of the accumulation over the twenty-one years, and the excess accumulations were held to result to the heir-at-law, and not to the next of kin. "It happens," observes Langdale, M. R., "that there is a failure of the testator's intent. The income of the money arising from the sale of the real estates cannot be allowed to accumulate, and applied as the testator meant. The purposes of the will, as far as they can be lawfully carried into effect, do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest arising out of the real estate, and I think that the heir is entitled to the unexhausted interest." In Simmons v. Pitt (e), which was the converse case, a testator by his will disposed of an existing charge upon real estate, directing that it should form part of his residuary personal estate and that the residue should be laid out in land, and accumulations made out of the income thereof, which were partially void under the Thellusson The charge was disposed of as personal estate, and was personal estate before it was appointed, and therefore the accumulations, in so far as they were excessive, went, notwithstanding the direction to convert into land, to the next of kin as personal estate.

Where a trust for sale is bad as not limited to take effect within

- (a) See also Fitch v. Weber, 6 Ha. 145; Roberts v. Walker, 1 Russ. & M. 752. Ogle v. Cook, cited in the principal case, is not an exception to the general rule: see Collins v. Wakeman, 2 V. 686.
 - (b) Burley v. Evelyn, 16 Si. 290;w. & T.—VOL. I.
- Buchanan v. Harrison, 1 John. & H. 662.
- (c) 2 Keen, 564; and see Wildes v. Davies, 1 Sm. & G. 475; Halford v. Stains, 16 Si. 488.
 - (d) 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98.
 - (e) L. R. 8 Ch. 978.

the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuity, but the persons entitled to the proceeds of sale are all ascertainable within the period, the trust for sale is disregarded and the beneficiaries take the property as real estate (a).

An express direction that the proceeds of the sale of real estate shall be deemed personalty will not prevent the operation of the rule in favour of the heir-at-law; for however absolute such direction for conversion may be, it will be construed to extend to the purposes of the will only (b), and although a direction that the proceeds of real estate shall be deemed personalty be followed by an express declaration that the heir-at-law shall not take in case of lapse, he will not, unless there be a disposition thereof, be excluded from what the law in the absence of such disposition would give to him. Thus, in Fitch v. Weber (c), a testatrix devised and bequeathed her real and personal estate, in trust as to the real estate for sale as soon after her decease as conveniently could be, and declared that the trustees should stand possessed of the proceeds of the sale, as a fund of personal and not real estate; for which purpose she declared such proceeds, or any part thereof, should not in any event lapse or result for the benefit of her heir-at-law; and, after giving legacies, the testatrix directed her trustees to pay and apply the residue of her estate and effects as she should by any codicil to that her will direct or appoint. The testatrix made no codicil. Wigram, V.-C., after an elaborate examination of the authorities, held, that the heir-at-law was entitled to the proceeds of the real estate undisposed of by the will. See further on this point, Parts 3 and 4, post.

2. Resulting Trusts when Money is directed to be laid out in Land upon Uses which wholly or partially fail.

The principle upon which Ackroyd v. Smithson was decided, applies also to the converse case of money directed to be laid out in the purchase of real estate, devised to uses which partially fail, as well as those which wholly fail to take effect; for the undisposed-of

⁽a) Goodier v. Edmunds, (1893) 3 Ch.455; Re Daveron, Ib. 421; Re Appleby, (1903) 1 Ch. 565.

⁽b) See Collins v. Wakeman, Amphlett v. Parke, 2 Russ. & M. 221; Taylor v. T., 3 De G. M. & G. 190,

overruling Phillips v. P., 1 My. & K. 649; Robinson v. London Hospital, 10 Ha. 19; Ellis v. Bartrum, 25 B. 110; Bedford v. B., 35 B. 584, and Part 4, post.

⁽c) 6 Ha. 145.

interest in the money or the estate, if purchased with the money. will result for the benefit of the next of kin of the testator, and will not go to the heir-at-law. In Cogan v. Stevens (a), the testator ordered that 30,000l. should be laid out immediately by his executors in the purchase of an estate or estates in the county of Devon or Cornwall, the income of which should belong to his widow during her life, and after her decease to certain persons (all of whom died during the life of his widow, without issue), in tail, with remainder to a The money was not laid out, and the gift to the charity being void under the then law of mortmain (b), it was held by Lord Cottenham, that the next of kin, and not the heir-at-law of the testator, were entitled to the fund. "The result of the whole authorities," said his Lordship, "seems to be, that, before Ackroyd v. Smithson, no distinction was recognised between the doctrine as applicable to a conversion of money into land, or land into money: that, as to both, an opinion prevailed that when a conversion was necessary, and part of the object failed, the unappropriated proceeds belonged to that representative on whom the law cast that description of property in which such proceeds were found to exist. This, as to land converted into money, was corrected in Ackroyd v. Smithson; but no case has occurred in which the point has been argued and determined as to money converted into land. I say argued and determined, because, if determined in Leslie v. Devonshire (c), and Fletcher v. Chapman (d), it certainly was not argued; but there are undoubtedly dicta of very eminent Judges, since that time, which seem to show an impression on their mind, that the principle of Ackroyd v. Smithson was not to be applied to a conversion of money into land. Those learned Judges had not the benefit, which I have had, of hearing the point fully and most ably argued; and having, after the fullest consideration, come to the conclusion that that principle does apply to the present case; and as I am not bound by any of the authorities to maintain a distinction which was not originally supposed to exist, and which cannot be maintained in reason, and which, therefore, if maintained, would be a reproach to the law as it stands, I feel myself fully justified in preserving the uniformity of the rule, as applicable to the two cases. by deciding against the claim of the plaintiff; and I may be allowed

⁽a) 1 B. 482 (n.).

⁽c) 2 Bro. Ch. 187.

⁽b) See now the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1891, s. 7.

⁽d) 3 Bro. P. C. 1.

to express some satisfaction in finding I am not compelled by authority to hold that any heir should take, as such, what had no inheritable quality, but was pure personal estate, at the time of the ancestor's death, or that, as devisee, he should take that which was never destined for him, but was in most unquestionable terms given to another "(a). As to whether the next of kin take the property resulting to them as real or personal estate, see Part 3.

3. How the Heir and Next of Kin take Property directed to be converted.

Conversion absolute—Partial Failure of Objects of.—Where an absolute conversion of land is directed for the general purposes of the will, and some of these purposes fail, yet, the conversion being effectual, the surplus proceeds of the land sold, and the unsold land, both result to the heir as personal estate, and if the heir is dead go to his personal representatives. In Re Richerson (b), a testator devised his real estate upon trust for sale, and directed that the proceeds should form part of his residuary personal estate, which he bequeathed to a class which failed. In 1890 the trusts came to an end. Part of the land was sold, part was unsold. The heir had died in 1872 intestate. Chitty, J., held that the proceeds of the real estate sold, and the realty unsold, both went to the personal representative of the heir (c); and probate duty was payable upon the land unsold (d). Semble, that in such a case as the above, no act on the part of the heir electing to take such partial interest as real estate would change its character (e).

Conversion absolute—Entire Failure of Objects of.—If there is a total failure of the objects for which conversion was directed, the heir will take the estate as realty (f). And a sale unnecessarily made by trustees will not vary the rights of the parties, as the

⁽a) See also Hereford v. Ravenhill, 1 B. 481.

⁽b) (1892) 1 Ch. 379.

⁽c) See Wright v. W., 16 V. 188, 10 R. R. 161; Smith v. Claxton, 4 Madd. 484; Dixon v. Dawson, 2 S. & S. 327; Jessopp v. Watson, 1 My. & K. 665; Hatfield v. Pryme, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 204; Wilson v. Coles, 28 B. 215; Wall v. Colshead, 2 De G. & J. 683; A.-G.

v. Lomas, L. R. 9 Ex. 29; Hamilton v. Foot, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 572, 578.

⁽d) A.-G. v. Lomas, L. R. 9 Ex. 29.

⁽e) Jarman (1893), 566; see Re Wragg, 63 L. T. 219.

⁽f) Chitty v. Parker, 2 V. 271. See remarks on this case in A.-G. v. Lomas, supra; Bagster v. Fackerell, 26 B. 469; Buchanan v. Harrison, 1 John. & H. 662.

proceeds will in that case be considered as the real estate of the heir (a). If the testator were seised ex parte maternâ, his heir in the maternal line will be entitled (b).

In Smith v. Claxton (c), Leach, M. R., said: "Where a devisor directs his lands to be sold, and the produce divided between A. and B., the obvious purpose of the testator is, that there shall be a sale, for the convenience of division; and A. and B. take their several interests as money, and not land. So, if A. dies in the lifetime of the devisor, and the heir stands in his place, the purpose of the devisor, that there shall be a sale for the convenience of division, still applies to the case; and the heir will take the share of A. as A. would have taken it—as money, and not land. But in the case put, let it be supposed that A. and B. both died in the lifetime of the devisor, and the whole interest in the land descends to the heir; the question would then be, whether the devisor can be considered as having expressed any purpose of sale applicable to that event, so as to give the interest of the heir the quality of money. The obvious purpose of the devisor being, that there should be a sale for the convenience of division between his devisees, that purpose could have no application to a case in which the devisees wholly failed; and the heir would, therefore, take the whole interest as land (d)."

Conversion directed for Particular Purpose.—Where a conversion is directed not absolutely, for all the purposes of the will, but for a particular purpose, such as payment of debts, all that is not required for that purpose results to the heir as land, as if the conversion had entirely failed (e).

Where trust to Convert is illegal.—See supra, p. 401.

Personal Estate.—The same principles apply in the case of personalty directed to be converted. If it is directed to be laid out in land for the general purposes of the will, it goes, if the trusts partially fail, to the next of kin as real estate (f); both the personalty which has been so invested, and that which has not (g).

- (a) Davenport v. Coltman, 12 Si.
 610; Cooke v. Dealey, 22 B. 196; cf.
 Bowra v. Rhodes, 31 L. J. Ch. 676;
 Re Richerson, (1892) 1 Ch. p. 383.
- (b) Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Bro. Ch. 128; Wood v. Skelton, 6 Si. 176; Buchanan v. Harrison, 1 John. & H. 673.
 - (c) 4 Madd. 492.
 - (d) See also Bagster v. Fackerell, 26
- B. 469; Wall v. Colshead, 2 De G. & J. 683.
- (e) Wright v. W., 16 V. 188; Re Richerson, (1892) 1 Ch. 379.
- (f) Curteis v. Wormald, 10 C. D. 172; overruling Reynolds v. Godlee, Johns. 536; and cf. Cogan v. Stevens, 1 B. 482, supra, p. 403.
- (g) See Re Richerson, (1892) 1 Ch. at p. 384.

4. When a Residuary Devise or Bequest comprehends Property which would otherwise have resulted to the Heir or Next of Kin.

In the cases we have before considered, the competition has been between the heir-at-law and the next of kin, where there has been a resulting trust for one of them; but whatever may result to either the heir-at-law or next of kin, may, by appropriate words, be given to others. The question is, does the will of the testator show a clear intention that the conversion directed is to be an absolute conversion for all the purposes of his will? Unless this intention is clearly indicated, the conversion will be deemed to be directed for the particular purposes of the will only.

Heir and Residuary Legatec.—First, with regard to that class of cases in which the competition has been between the heir-at-law and the residuary legatee. Unless an intention is expressed in, or can be inferred from the whole will, that the proceeds of the sale of real estate undisposed of is to form part of his personal estate, it will not pass under a residuary bequest.

Thus in Maugham v. Mason (a), a testator devised freehold chambers to trustees and their heirs, upon trust to sell, and to apply the money arising by such sale toward payment of legacies, and the rents, until sale, to be applied to the same uses; and, after giving some pecuniary and specific legacies, as to the rest, residue, and remainder of his personal estate, after payment of his debts, legacies, and funeral expenses, he bequeathed the same to his trustees, upon trust to convert all the said residue into money, and to lay out the same in the purchase of freehold property, to be settled as therein The executors paid all the debts, funeral expenses, and legacies, out of the personal estate, not making sale of the real estate. Grant, M. R., held, that the real estate, after payment of legacies, which were a primary charge upon the personalty, resulted to the heir-at-law, and did not pass under the residuary bequest. "The observation," said his Honour, "is perhaps minute, that the money, produced by the sale of the real estate, could not with propriety be spoken of as personal property to be converted into money; at most, however, this is a general bequest of the residue of his personal estate; and the question is, what was meant to be included under that description. Properly speaking, nothing is the personal estate of a testator that was not so at his death. He may certainly so

express himself as to show that something else was intended; but where there is nothing but a direction to sell land, with application of the money to a particular purpose, and a subsequent bequest of the rest and residue of the personal estate, I know of no case in which it has been held that the surplus, after the particular purpose is answered, forms part of the personal estate, so as to pass by the residuary bequest. The mere disposition of the residue of personal estate can never solve the question, what is personal estate. The clause may be so conceived as to show the sense in which those words are used; but here is nothing more than those words, unaccompanied with anything explanatory of the sense in which they were used (a)."

Where, however, a testator expressly declares, that the money arising from the sale of real estate shall be considered as part of the personalty, it will pass under a general residuary bequest of personalty in the same will (b), and it is liable to the trusts which attach to such residuary personal estate, and to the legal incidents affecting it (c); and the intention that the proceeds of the sale of real estate should pass under a residuary bequest of personal estate, may be inferred from expressions in the will irresistibly leading to such a conclusion: and the blending of the real with the personal estate has been considered as furnishing an indication of such intention. In Court v. Buckland (d) a testator devised and bequeathed the residue of his personal and his real estate upon trust for sale, and upon trust to dispose of the moneys to arise from such estates after payment of debts, &c. upon the trusts thereinafter declared. He declared, also, that from the time of his decease the unsold real and personal estate should be subject to the trusts thereinafter declared concerning the sale moneys, and that the rents, &c. should be deemed annual income, and that until sale such real estate should be transmissible as personal estate, and be considered as converted in equity. He then directed a sum to be set aside out of the sale moneys and invested, and after the death of his wife to form part of his residuary personal estate, and subject thereto, and to the payment of his debts,

v. Foot, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 572.

⁽a) See also Berry v. Usher, 11 V. 87; Kellet v. K., 3 Dow, 248; Collins v. Wakeman, 2 V. 683; Robinson v. London Hospital, 10 Ha. 27; Re Cameron, 26 C. D. 19; Dixon v. Dawson, 2 S. & S. 327; Collis v. Robins, 1 De G. & Sm. 131; Hamilton

⁽b) Kidney v. Coussmaker, 1 V. 436.

⁽c) Bright v. Larcher, 3 De G. & J. 156; Field v. Peckett, 29 B. 568.

⁽d) 1 C. D. 605.

&c., his trustees were to hold his residuary personal estate in trust as to one moiety for his son, and as to the other for his daughter. The son died in the testator's lifetime intestate, leaving a son. Jessel, M. R., whilst recognising the general rule, held that the intention was that the proceeds of sale of the real estate should be included in the "residuary personal estate," and should not go to the heir-at-law. In Singleton v. Tomlinson (a), a testator directed his executors to pay his funeral expenses and debts out of the proceeds of his property, and reciting that he was possessed of landed and chattel property, directed his executors to sell his lands, and after some specific devises and bequests, constituted T. his residuary legatee. Held, there was a conversion not for a specific purpose only but out and out, and that the surplus passed to the residuary legatee and not to the heir (b).

Failure of Gifts of Money out of Proceeds of Sale of Real Estate.— It has always been held that a will as to personalty speaks at the time of death of the testator. The residuary legatee has, therefore, always taken not only what is undisposed of by the expressions of the will, but that which becomes undisposed of at the death, by disappointment of the intentions of the will. Before the Wills Act (c), it was otherwise as to the residuary devisee of real estate, or of the price of real estate. As to him, the will spoke only at the time of making it, and he took as specific devisee the lands or the price of them, not included in the particular devises contained in the will; but where part of the proceeds of sale was directed to be applied to a particular purpose which failed, either by lapse or illegality, such part would go to the heir-at-law, unless he was excluded directly or by inference, and not to the residuary devisee of the proceeds. In Jones v. Mitchell (d), the testatrix by will gave 800l. out of the money to be produced by the sale of her real estates, to trustees, for the benefit of certain charitable institutions: and she gave the residue of the money to J. R. The gift of the 800l. being void, Leach, V.-C., held that the heir of the testatrix, and not J. R., was entitled to it. devisor," said his Honour, "at the time of making the will, intended that the residuary devisee of the price of the land should take such

⁽a) 3 A. C. 404.

⁽b) And see Hutcheson v. Hammond,
3 Bro. Ch. 148; Wright v. W., 16 V.
188; Kellet v. K., 3 Dow, 248; Byam v. Munton, 1 Russ. & M. 503; Mallabar v. M., Cas. t. Talb. 78; Brown v. Bigg,

⁷ V. 280; Griffiths v. Pruen, 11 Si. 202; Bromley v. Wright, 7 Ha. 334; Spencer v. Wilson, 16 Eq. 501.

⁽c) 1 Vict. c. 26. See infra, p. 410,

⁽d) 1 S. & S. 290.

residue, subject to the deduction of the 800l., and not the 800l., which is therefore undisposed of, and results to the heir." The residue was, in fact, considered as the gift of a specific sum, after deducting 800l. from the purchase-money, and J. R. had no right, therefore, in any event, to take more than the sum given to him (a).

The fact, however, of the testator having blended the produce of his real with his personal estate, has in some cases been considered a sufficient reason for excluding the heir, in favour of the residuary legatee, of the produce of the real and personal estate, by applying to the mixed fund the rule applicable to personalty, such rule being, even under the old law, that the residuary legatee of personalty takes what is not effectually disposed of (b). In Cruse v. Barley (c) the funds were blended, a contingent legacy given thereout failed, but the heir was held entitled.

In the case of Amphlett v. Parke(d), a leading authority upon this subject, a testatrix gave her real estates upon trust to be sold, and directed the moneys to arise from such sale, to be considered and taken as part of her personal estate; she then directed, that, out of the moneys to arise from such sale, and out of all other her personal estate, certain pecuniary legacies should be paid; and bequeathed all the residue of her personal estate, and of the moneys arising from the sale of her real estates, upon trust for two persons and their children. Some of the pecuniary legacies having lapsed, it was held by Lord Brougham, reversing the decision of Sir John Leach, that the conversion of the real estate into personal, directed by the will, was not absolute, but partial only, for the purpose of making good the pecuniary legacies, and that such of those legacies as had lapsed, in so far as they were payable out of the produce of real estate, had lapsed for the benefit of the heir-at-law. "The rule," observed his Lordship, "which I have stated to be extracted from all the cases is that you must clearly prove that the heir-at-law is excluded; that the words prevent the possibility of considering anything to be left as a resulting trust for him; and that the burden of such proof lies

Sen. 320; the dictum of Lord *Thurlow* in Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Bro. Ch. 148; Kennel v. Abbot, 4 V. 802; Green v. Jackson, 5 Russ. 35; Salt v. Chattaway, 3 B. 576.

⁽a) See Jarman (1893), p. 599; also Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Bro. Ch. 128; Collins v. Wakeman, 2 V. 683 (a case probably of "exception") Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 V. & B. 294; contra, Page v. Leapingwell, 18 V. 463, 11 R. R. 234; Noel v. Henley, 7 Price, 240.

⁽b) See Durour v. Motteux, 1 Ves.

⁽c) 3 P. W. 20. See Theobald on Wills, 7th ed., 257.

⁽d) 2 Russ. & M. 221. See Jarman (1893), 604-607.

upon those who claim in opposition to him. It is not at all inconsistent with that rule, but rather flows from it, and I agree in holding, that a testator may provide, not only that the undisposed residue, which is strictly personal, shall go to the residuary legatee, but that all lapsed legacies, of whatever nature, shall also go to him; and that, if it is clear, therefore from express words, that he gave him the lapsed legacies that were to be raised by the sale of real property, and failed in consequence of lapse, mortmain, or any other cause; if he says, for instance, 'I give all the lapsed legacies as parcel of my residue, to the residuary legatee, cadit quæstio; there is no doubt he may; and if he can do it by express words, he can do it by plain and obvious intention to be gathered from the whole instrument. If you once arrive at the conclusion, that the testator has displaced the heir, then, of course, the lapsed fund falls into the residue by express intention."

The cases in which a contest could take place between the heir and the residuary devisee are now rare, for by the 25th section of the Wills Act, it is enacted "that unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, such real estate or interest therein as shall be comprised, or intended to be comprised, in any devise in such will contained, which shall fail, or be void, by reason of the death of the devisee in the lifetime of the testator, or by reason of such devise being contrary to law, or otherwise incapable of taking effect, shall be included in the residuary devise (if any) contained in such will." By section 33 of the same Act, it is also enacted that devises or bequests to a child or other issue of the testator who shall die leaving issue living at the testator's death shall not lapse.

Residuary Legatee.—When the proceeds of the sale of real and personal estate are made a mixed fund, the context of the will may pass surplus proceeds to the residuary legatee (a), and where the conversion is absolute for the general purposes of the will, the residue of converted realty goes to the residuary legatee (b).

Charges and Exceptions.—A sum expressly excepted out of the produce of sale (c), but not attempted to be disposed of, belonged to the heir, but since the last-mentioned Act it would go to the residuary devisee (d). But if the devise to a particular person or for a

⁽a) Evans v. Crosbie, 15 Si. 602;

Wildes v. Davies, 1 Sm. & G. 475.

⁽b) Singleton v. Tomlinson, 3 A. C. 404, supra, p. 408; cf. Gethin v.

Allen, 23 L. R. Ir. 236.

⁽c) As in Collins v. Wakeman, 2 V. 683.

⁽d) See Jarman (1893), 598, 603, 608.

particular purpose is intended to be a charge only, as distinguished from an exception, the failure of the particular devise will enure for the benefit of the specific devisee, and not for that of the residuary legatee (a).

5. Undisposed-of Interest where no Heir or Next of Kin.

If the author of a resulting trust dies intestate as to the resulting interest, and without heirs, any real estate consisting of any estate or interest, whether legal or equitable, and whether devised to trustees or not, escheats (subject to the Intestates Estates Act, 1890, p. 412, infra) in the case of freeholds, to the Crown, and in case of copyholds to the lord under s. 4 of the Intestates Estates Act, 1884 (b). Before this Act the trustees of such legal estate would in such a case have been entitled beneficially (c). By s. 7 of this Act where any beneficial interest in the real estate of any deceased person, whether the estate or interest of such deceased person therein was legal or equitable, is owing to the failure of the objects of the devise or other circumstances happening before or after the death of such person in whole or in part not effectually disposed of, such person shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have died intestate in respect of such part of the said beneficial interest as is ineffectually disposed of (d).

As to personal estate before 1 Wm. 4, c. 40, the executors took the undisposed-of interests beneficially, subject to the payment of debts; unless the will showed an intention that they should be trustees of it. The Act gives them such undisposed of residue as trustees for the next of kin, unless a contrary intention is expressed by the will (e). But, if there are no next of kin, since the Act does not apply as between the executors and the Crown, and the executors will take beneficially, unless a contrary intention is shown (f). A contrary intention will be inferred from the gift of a pecuniary legacy to a sole executor or of equal pecuniary legacies to all the executors,

- (a) See Jarman (1893), 316, 321, 608, and Carter v. Haswell, 26 L. J. Ch. 576.
- (b) Intestates Estates Act, 1884. As to s. 4 of the Act, see *Re* Wood, (1896) 2 Ch. 596.
- (c) See as to freeholds, Taylor v. Haygarth, 14 Si. 8; Walker v. Denne, 2 V. 185; Re Van Hagan, 16 C. D. 18; Re Lashmar, (1891) 1 Ch. 258; Re
- Wood, supra: as to copyholds, Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177; Gallard v. Hawkins, 27 C. D. 298.
 - (d) Re Wood, (1896) 2 Ch. 596.
- (e) See Harrison v. H., 2 H. & M. 237.
- (f) Re Bacon's Will, (1886) 31 C. D. 460.

but when once there is inequality, whether in respect of pecuniary legacies, or in respect of specific legacies, then there is no presumption of a contrary intention sufficient to displace the legal title of the executors (a). If they are appointed trustees as well as executors they do not take, and the personal estate goes to the Crown (b). By the Intestates Estates Act, 1890, the real and personal estates of persons dying wholly intestate after 1st September, 1890, leaving a widow but no issue, are to the extent of 500l. to belong to the widow (c).

As to a resulting trust in the case of a friendly society where the objects for which subscription had been made did not exhaust the fund, see *Cunnack* v. *Edwards* (d).

(a) Re Glukman, (1908) 1 Ch. 552; (1908) A. C. 411.

(b) Taylor v. Haygarth, 14 Si. 8; Re Gozman, 15 C. D. 67.

(c) See Re Twigg, (1892) 1 Ch. 579; Re Heath, (1907) 2 Ch. 270.

(d) (1896) 2 Ch. 679. See also Braithwaite v. A.-G. (1909) 1 Ch. 510.

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSÀ.

WARD v. TURNER (a).

1752. 2 Ves. Sen. 431.

Donatio Mortis Causâ.

Delivery necessary to donations mortis causâ; but the delivery of receipts for South-Sea Annuities is not sufficient, though strong evidence of the intent.

The end of the bill was to have a transfer of 600l. New South-Sea Annuities made to the plaintiff, as executor of John Mosely, and to have certain specific parts of the personal estate of William Fly, dead, intestate, delivered or made over to the plaintiff. Another prayer of the bill was to have an account of what was due to Mosely for services performed to Fly, against whose estate this demand was made.

The case the plaintiff made was this: he was executor of Mosely, who was related to Fly by affinity, having married his aunt; that Fly had great obligations to Mosely, who took care of him in his infancy; and to his house Fly use to come from school when it broke up: and afterwards, Mosely, who, in the latter part of his life, appeared to be in very mean circumstances, lived with Fly as his servant until Fly's death, had his victuals there, performed services to him, and had now and then a shilling given him. From thence Fly made profession of a strong intent to do for him at his death, and had great kindness for him; in pursuance of which, as Fly drew near his end, being in a very bad state of health, during that time he made Mosely several donations mortis causâ, in prospect of death. Four times were fixed on by the witnesses, of which several were examined in the cause, speaking of actual gifts, and declarations supporting them. First,

18th January, 1746, which was spoken to by the porter of Furnival's Inn. The second, 6th February, 1746, which was the principal proof relied on by the plaintiff to support the gifts of these annuities, and was proved by Fly's barber, who, being sent for by Fly, found Mosely with him, and no other, and swore to the particular words used, and declarations made: that Fly said to him, viz.: "I intend to give him (speaking of Mosely) Longford estate for his life; but I have considered of it; and that which is worth 40l. a year to another, is not worth so much to him; for if the tenants wanted an abatement for repairs, he would allow it; and, therefore, I will do better for him." That thereupon Fly went to his escritoire, and, taking three papers, said, "I give you, Mosely, these papers, which are receipts for South-Sea Annuities, and will serve you after I am dead." third, 23rd February, which was proved by one who swore that in his presence Fly said, "Mosely, I give you all the goods and plate in this house." Fourthly, 3rd March, by the said barber, who swore that Fly declared to him, and to another person, who only were present, that he gave to Mosely all his household goods, money, arrears of rent, and everything that should be found in his house, except his sword, gun, and books, and that this, together with those three receipts, would make, 2,000l.: that he wished a gentleman of his acquaintance had his sword and gun, but all the rest he gave to Mosely. He died in April following.

Argument for the plaintiff.—These were argued to be so many declarations of bounty, supported by so many witnesses at different times. Two questions arose: first, Whether in fact these things were given? secondly, Whether properly given in point of law?

Argument for the defendant.—On the part of the defendant, administrator of Fly, there was no evidence to impeach the evidence of the gift, but to invalidate it to a certain degree, principally from the behaviour of Mosely after the death of Fly, as not like one who thought he had a right to these donations from him: for it was sworn, that being at the house of Fly at his death, he continued there until Midsummer; he did not say these goods were his own upon application made to buy them, but that they were Turner's, the administrator, and next of kin; sent to Turner desiring him

to take them away; and they were sent away, and Mosely assisted in packing them up, and declared he would not go into mourning, for, that Fly had given him nothing that he could help.

LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.—There are two general questions. What is the weight and strength of the evidence in point of fact? Next, the result of that evidence in point of law, or the law arising on this fact?

As to the first, and as to the conviction arising therefrom, there is, to be sure, very strong evidence on the part of the plaintiff, of Fly's general intention of bounty, which is not to be disputed; but as to the evidence of the particular gifts, I cannot help taking notice, that the declarations relied on by the plaintiff to prove them, are all made to persons of extreme low degree, his porter, barber, &c. It is observable, also, that Fly was bred an attorney: had some property; some real estate; was a man of business; and must be presumed, from his profession and education, to know something of what the law required to make a will; and certainly it would be more easy for him to have made a will in writing, than to have taken all these several steps, to give away these parts of his estate. It is likewise observable, that the behaviour of Mosely, and his declarations after the death of Fly, are some impeachment and weakening of the plaintiff's evidence; for it is extraordinary, that, if he thought himself entitled, he should not insist upon these goods being his own, instead of suffering them to be taken away, and assisting therein. At the same time, if I was to ground my opinion upon any objection to the evidence in point of fact, I should not determine it, but send it to be tried; for this is as proper a case to be tried as any other.

It is not insisted upon by the plaintiff as a testamentary cause; for if he was to insist on that, it would overturn his demand, as he has no probate; but it is insisted on as a donation mortis causâ. Trover might be brought for it; for it would transfer the property: but though I have searched for it, I do not find a case of that kind in the books, of such an action at law: but it might be tried at law, was there a foundation for it; and if I was to ground my opinion upon the evidence in point of fact, I would direct a trial.

But, according to my opinion, there is no reason to give the

parties that trouble: for next, supposing the fact well proved, the consideration is the result in point of law.

The relief sought, is founded upon these gifts being good donations mortis causâ.

First, as to any specific parts (if they may be so called), except the annuities. They are clearly not good, (as I declared at the hearing,) there being no pretence of any delivery in any shape whatever. They are so general, as, in my opinion, if they prove anything, to prove an intent to make a nuncupative will of all his personal estate, (this is exclusive of annuities,) saying, "Mosely, I give you all the plate and goods in this house," or, "If I die, all are yours;" but nothing was delivered. It is said, he had possession by living in the house, and did not want delivery, but he lived as a servant, who had no possession; so that, if a servant had them in custody, it would be a possession for his master. The other declarations are not only of the goods, but of all money and arrears of rent, and extend almost to everything; consequently, there is no ground to carry it so far; and it is impossible to support any of these gifts in prospect of death, as I have declared already.

Next, as to the gift of this annuity. If the witnesses deserve credit, it is strong evidence of a general intent of bounty; but it rather turns against the plaintiff, for it shows a general intent to give the whole to Mosely, by making a nuncupative will or wills at different times. If that was to be admitted to support these several gifts as so many donations mortis causâ, it would overturn not only the letter but the whole spirit and intent of the Statute of Frauds. But, notwithstanding, suppose this gift of the annuities was just, as if it was a distinct and independent donation from the other matters insisted on as gifts, the question is, whether it is such a gift as the law of England allows, as a donation mortis causâ? First, the fact of the gift is proved only by one witness: whereas the civil law, from which this doctrine is taken, requires five witnesses thereto; for Justinian when he allowed these gifts, was apprehensive of fraud arising from them, and takes notice in that very chapter relied on for the plaintiff that he had made a constitution to regulate it, that it should be in the presence of five, limited in point of value, &c., which shows how jealous he was of it. Besides, the witness swears to this in very formal words; and, though it is pretty hard to object

to a witness as loose and uncertain on one hand, and the contrary on the other, yet this argues either a very strong memory or a pretty strong assurance in swearing. But the express gift, as he swears, is only of the three receipts. That is the form of the gift. Taking it therefore according to the substance of the gift, that this amounted to a declaration that Fly, by giving these receipts, intended to give the annuities, upon this the principal point arises, whether delivery of the thing given by way of donation mortis causâ is necessary; and, if necessary, whether this delivery of the receipts is sufficient delivery of the thing given by way of donation mortis causâ? I am of opinion, that delivery is necessary to make good such a gift, and that the delivery of these receipts for the consideration-money of the purchase of them was no sufficient delivery to validate this act. To clear this, it is proper to consider the notion of a donation mortis causâ, according to the civil and Roman law, and the law of England.

According to the civil and Roman law there is a great variety, and several passages therein are pretty difficult to reconcile (a). Digest, lib. 39, tit. 6, Law 38, requires, that both donor and donee should be present at the time of the gift, "quo præsens præsenti dat;" which looks as if delivery was intended at the time. It is "quo" there, and in several editions: but in the Lyons edition of Gothofredus' Corpus, it is "quod;" which makes it sense. Next, in Digest, same tit., parag. 1, it speaks of it throughout as a restoring of the same thing, if the donor should recover: as if a restitution was to be. It is proper to take notice, that in the Roman law there were three kinds of donations mortis causâ. And in Voet on the Pandect, lib. 39, tit. 6, parag. 3, in his 2nd vol., p. 710, the division is agreeable to that made of these donations by Swinburne. The first is a donation by one in no present danger, but in consideration of mortality if he died; and this is strictly compared to a legacy; for the property was to pass at the death, not at the time. The second kind is, where the property passed at the time, defeasible in case of an escape from that danger in view, or of recovery from that illness. The third was, where, though he was moved with the danger, yet not thinking it so immediate as to vest the property immediately in the person, but put in possession

⁽a) See Tate v. Hilbert, 2 V. 111, 2 R. R. 175; and Agnew v. Belfast, &c. Co., (1896) 2 Ir. R. p. 209.

of the person as an inchoate gift, to take effect in case he should Vinius's Comment. on this place of Justinian is more particular—puts the remedy by action the donor might have, in case he repented or revoked. That is, on the last kind of donation mortis causâ, where he did not part with the property immediately, he should have a real action; but where he actually parted with the property, but the gift was to be defeated by his revocation or recovery, or escape from that danger he was in, condictionem habeat (which is a personal action) to make the irritancy, or to recover damages for the thing: so that it differed not but in the nature of the action. And in Calvin's Lexicon, &c., that is the distinction. Swinburne, on the text I have quoted, implies there should be a delivery; saying, that legacies differ from such donations, for that legacies are not delivered by the testator, but to be paid or delivered by the administrator; putting the distinction upon the one being delivered in life, the other after death. But, notwithstanding this, several books in the civil law import the contrary; particularly Vinius, in his Comment., lib. 2, tit. 7, s. 1, numero 2; Covarruvias, vol. 1, rub. 3, and Voet on the Pandects, same chapter, num. 3 and num. 6, which passages show the different expression and opinions, some importing a delivery, others not. mentioned them to come at that which seems the distinction, reconciling them all, according to what is laid down by Voet, num. 6, that they did not require an absolute delivery of possession to the first or third kind of gift I have mentioned; but in the other case, where the property was to pass immediately, it was required; which is the meaning of the expression in Voet, "in mortis causâ donatione dominium non transit sine traditione" and of that other expression in Voet. With this distinction, those passages in the civil law are properly reconciled.

Though I know these donations mortis causâ could never come directly in question in the Ecclesiastical Court, they might collaterally; and on these two heads I inquired whether there have been any cases there upon this, viz., in suits against an administrator on account of assets by the next of kin, where the administrator had insisted he could not administer such a part, because it was given mortis causâ; or, if there is a will, in which there are specific legacies, and one of those legacies he had given in his life by way of

donation mortis causa, there it might come in question in the Ecclesiastical Court; but I cannot find it has. The nearest case to it is Ousley v. Carrol (a), June, 1722, in the Prerogative Court, before Dr. Bettesworth. There was left a writing in the presence of three witnesses, not in the form of a will but a deed, viz.: "I have given and granted, and give and grant, to my five sisters, and children of the sixth, their heirs, executors, and administrators, in case they survive me, all my goods and chattels, and real and personal estate, and all which I may claim in right of my own, whether alive or dead." The dispute was by a person claiming as his wife, and who had been so, but divorced, who insisted this was no will, but a deed of gift mortis causâ (and a gift mortis causâ may be made in writing as well as otherwise, and so it might by the Roman and civil law); but the Ecclesiastical Judge was of an opinion this was testamentary, proved it as such, as a testamentary act, and probate was granted, from which there was no appeal; but a case was there cited of Shargold v. Shargold, upon a deed of gift by Dr. Pope, not to take place until his death, and sixpence delivered by way of symbol, to put the grantee in possession; that was pronounced for as a will, not as a donation mortis causa; which I mention to show how far the Ecclesiastical Court has considered these things as testamentary.

Having considered these donations, the different species, and how far delivery is necessary by the Roman and civil law, I will consider it according to the law of England. They are undoubtedly taken from the civil law; but not to be allowed of here farther than the civil law on that head has been received and allowed. Taking the law of England to consist (as Hob. says) of rules of law and equity, it might have come in question in cases of action of trover and detinue; but I have never found any action on that head. Consider it, therefore, as in this Court, the civil law not binding here, but as far as received and allowed; which must be from adjudged cases and authorities, proving that the civil law has been received in England, in respect of such donations, only so far as attended with delivery, or what the civil law calls traditio, for which see Swinburne (who, being an English writer on the civil law, what he lays down is some evidence of what has been received here), Part 1, s. 7; but, in

⁽a) See Thorold v. T., 1 Phillim. 1; A.-G. v. Jones, 3 Price, 368.

other places, s. 6, in tit. Definition of Legacy, he is still more express. In both places, in one directly, in the other collaterally, he lays down that delivery is necessary.

Next, consider it on the resolutions of this Court; the same thing results from them. There are not many cases on this head, and they are somewhat loose. The first is Drury v. Smith (a), where Lord Cowper founded himself on this, and the possession transmitted and changed: next Lawson v. L. (b). All that I can collect from thence is, that the [gift of the] purse was held good, because delivered to the wife herself. As to the other legacy of 100l. bill, I cannot say on what it depended. It is a kind of compound gift; so many collateral circumstances are taken into it, that nothing can be inferred from it; but, being a draught on his goldsmith, that draught was delivered; so that it does not contradict what I lay down; and there was delivery, so far as it was capable. In Jones v. Selby (c), the result is, that the opinion of the Master of the Rolls was founded plainly on this, of the delivery of possession, holding, that the gift of the tally, as contained in the hair trunk, was a good donation mortis causâ; and that Lord Cowper avoided determining that, on the foundation of the subsequent point of a satisfaction or ademption, on which he grounded his determination. In all the instances, it is absolutely necessary to be the person's after the party's death; though, in some cases, it vests the property, in others not. But, to explain more fully Lord Cowper's opinion there, I will refer you back to Drury v. Smith, and to Hedges v. H. (d), which turned on another point; but there Lord Cowper laid down a necessity of delivery very strongly; where he says, testator "gives with his own hands." Snellgrove v. Baily (e), determined by me, 11th March, 1744, was urged, where a bond was given in prospect of death; the manner of gift was admitted; the bond was delivered; and I held it a good donation mortis causâ. It was argued, that there was no want of actual delivery there, or possession, the bond being but a chose in action; and, therefore, there was no delivery but of the paper. If I went too far in that case, it is not a reason I should go further, and I

⁽a) 1 P. W. 404.

⁽b) 1 P. W. 441.

⁽c) Pr. Ch. 300.

⁽d) Pr. Ch. 269.

⁽e) 3 Atk. 214.

choose to stop there. But I am of opinion that decree was right, and differs from this case; for, though it is true that a bond, which is specialty, is a chose in action, and its principal value consists in the thing in action, yet some property is conveyed by the delivery: for the property is vested, and to this degree, that the law books say, the person to whom this specialty is given, may cancel, burn, and destroy it; the consequence of which is, that it puts it in his power to destroy the obligee's power of bringing an action, because no one can bring an action on a bond without a profert in curiam (a). Another thing made it amount to a delivery, that the law allows it a locality; and, therefore, a bond is bona notabilia, so as to require a prerogative administration, where a bond is in one diocese and goods in another. Not that this is conclusive; this reasoning I have gone upon, is agreeable to Jenk. Cent. 109, case 9, relating to delivery to effectuate gifts. How Jenkins applied that rule of law he mentions there, I know not; but rather apprehend he applied it to a donation mortis causa: for if to a donation intervivos, I doubt he went too far.

Another case is Miller v. M. (b), which is a very strong case, so far as that opinion goes, to require delivery; which case, I believe, was hinted at as inconsistent with my decree; but there is a great difference between delivery of a bond (which is a specialty, is itself the foundation of the action, and the destruction of which destroys the demand), and the delivery of a note payable to bearer, which is only evidence of the contract. Therefore, from the authority of Swinburne, and all these cases, the consequence is, that by the civil law, as received and allowed in England, and consequently by the law of England, tradition or delivery is necessary to make a good donation mortis causâ; which brings it to the question, whether delivery of the three receipts was a sufficient delivery of the thing given, to effectuate the gift. I am of opinion it was not.

It is argued, that though some delivery is necessary, yet delivery of the thing is not necessary, but delivery of anything by way of symbol is sufficient; but I cannot agree to that; nor do I find any authority for that in the civil law, which required delivery to some gifts, or in the law of England, which required delivery throughout. Where the civil law requires it, they require actual tradition,

⁽a) An action may, however, now be v. Elwes, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 543. brought without profert. See Duffield (b) 3 P. W. 356.

delivery over of the thing. So in all the cases in this Court, delivery of the thing given is relied on, and not in the name of the thing, as in the delivery of sixpence, in Shargold v. S.; if it was allowed any effect, that would have been a gift mortis causa, not as a will, but that was allowed as testamentary, proved as a will, and stood. The only case wherein such a symbol seems to be held good, is Jones v. Selby; but I am of opinion that amounted to the same thing as delivery of possession of the tally, provided it was in the trunk at the time. Therefore, it was rightly compared to the cases upon 21 Jac. 1, as Ryall v. Rowles (a), and others. It never was imagined, on that statute, that delivery of a mere symbol in the name of the thing, would be sufficient to take it out of that statute; yet, notwithstanding delivery of the key of bulky goods, where wines, &c., are, has been allowed as delivery of the possession, because it is the way of coming at the possession, or to make use of the thing; and, therefore, the key is not a symbol, which would not do. If so, then delivery of these receipts amounts to so much waste paper; for if one purchases stock or annuities, what avail are they after acceptance of the stock? It is true, they are of some avail as to the identity of the person coming to receive; but after that is over, they are nothing but waste paper, and are seldom taken care of afterwards. Suppose Fly, instead of delivering over these receipts to Mosely, had delivered over the broker's note, whom he had employed, that had not been a good delivery of the possession. There is no colour for it; it is no evidence of the thing, or part of the title to it; for suppose it had been in a mortgage in question, and a separate receipt had been taken for the mortgage money, not on the back of the deed (which was a very common way formerly, and is frequently seen in the evidence of ancient titles), and the mortgagee had delivered over this separate receipt for the consideration-money, that would not have been a good delivery of the possession, nor given the mortgage, mortis causâ, by force of that act (b). Nor does it appear to me, by proof, that possession of these three receipts continued with Mosely

the delivery of the receipt upon the back of it, but by force of the delivery of the deed would be a good donatio mortis causâ. Per Lord Eldon in Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 543.

⁽a) 1 Ves. Sen. 348; p. 98, ante.

⁽b) That reasoning is quite idle unless Lord *Hardwicke* meant to say that delivery of the deed with a receipt upon the back of it, not by force of

from the time they were given, in February, to the time of Fly's death; for there is a witness who speaks, that, in some short time before his death, Fly showed him these receipts, and said, he intended them for his uncle Mosely. Therefore, I am of opinion, it would be most dangerous to allow this donation mortis causâ, from parol proof of delivery of such receipts, which are not regarded or taken care of after acceptance; and if these annuities are called choses in action, there is less reason to allow of it in this case than in any other chose in action, because stocks and annuities are capable of a transfer of the legal property by Act of Parliament, which might be done easily; and if the intestate had such an aversion to make a will as supposed, he might have transferred to Mosely; consequently, this is merely legatory, and amounts to a nuncupative will, and contrary to the Statute of Frauds, and would introduce a greater breach on that law than was ever yet made; for if you take away the necessity of delivery of the thing given, it remains merely nuncupative. To this purpose, consider the clauses in the Statute of Frauds (a) relating to this; which seems to me to be applied directly to prevent a mischief of this sort. The clauses are in ss. 19, 20, 21, 22 (b), which have very anxious provisions against dispositions of this kind, requiring three witnesses, solemn declaration of the testator, fixing the place of making, and to be reduced into writing in six days after making. These are in cases where no will was made. Next, comes another requisite, where a will has been made. If what the plaintiff insists on is right in point of law, that this gift of the annuities by delivery of the receipts was good, yet, though Fly had made a will before, it had been equally good, notwithstanding that will, because this relates to revocation of a will in writing by anything amounting to a testamentary act. It would be good against the will, as appears from the cases. Would not that be quite contrary to the plain provision of this clause, taking away delivery of the thing? Here is, then, a revocation of a will by words only, viz.: "This is yours when I die;" all these clauses, therefore,

men, non-commissioned officers of marines, and marines, so far as relates to money arising from service, see ss. 11 & 12, and 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 20.

⁽a) 29 Car. 2, c. 3.

⁽b) These sections are repealed by 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 2; but as to the wills of soldiers on service, or mariners, and as to the wills of petty officers, sea-

will be overturned, if such evidence is admitted. But it is said, if this is not allowed, it will be impossible to make a donation mortis causa, of stock or annuities, because in their nature they are not capable of actual delivery. I am of opinion, it cannot, without a transfer, or something amounting to that: and there is no harm in it, considering how much of the personal estate of this kingdom, vastly the greatest proportion of it, subsists now in stock and funds; and all the anxious provisions of the Statute of Frauds will signify nothing, if a donation of stock, attended only by delivery of the paper, is allowed. It might be supported to the extent of any given value, and would leave these things under the greatest degree of uncertainty, and amount to a repeal of that useful law as to all this part of the property of the subjects of this kingdom. Therefore. notwithstanding the strong evidence of the intent, this gift of annuities is not sufficiently made within the rules of the authorities; and I am of opinion not to carry it further. If any doubt remains in any one's mind, I will add (what I very seldom do, though it has been done by my predecessors), that I should be very glad to have this point settled by the supreme authority; for it highly ought to be settled, if there is a doubt, considering so large a property of this kind.

The bill ought to be dismissed therefore, without costs, as to the demand of these annuities, or any other part of the intestate's estate by way of donation *mortis causâ*.

But as there was a plain intent of bounty and kindness to this old man, who lived with him as a servant, and it seems in expectation of what should be given at his death, therefore, on the other part of the bill an inquiry should be, what Mosely deserved over and above his maintenance, for services performed during the life of Fly. The account should be taken from a reasonable time, if the plaintiff thinks fit to pay it.

NOTES.

1. Generally.

2. Requisites to a donatio mortis causâ, p. 427.

3. What may be the subject of a donatio mortis causa, p. 434,

4. Evidence, p. 437.

1. Generally.

In Ward v. Turner, which is a leading case on the doctrine of donations mortis causa, Lord Hardwicke, with great learning,

discusses the authorities upon the civil law, from which it has been imported into the law of England (a). In the subsequent case of $Tate\ v$. $Hilbert\ (b)$, $Ward\ v$. $Turner\ was\ commented\ on$, and the civil law more fully explained, by Lord Rosslyn, in his very able judgment. A donatio mortis causâ is a sort of amphibious gift, being neither entirely inter vivos nor testamentary. It is an act inter vivos by which the donee is to have the absolute title to the subject of the gift not at once but if the donor dies. If the donor dies the title becomes absolute not under but as against his executor. In order to make the gift valid it must be made so as to take complete effect on the donor's death. The Court must find that the donor intended it to be absolute if he died, but he need not actually say so (c). It may be made by parol, or by writing or deed (d), and the Wills Act(e) has not either in words or in effect abolished these donations (f).

Distinction between a donatio mortis causâ and a donation inter vivos and legacies.—A donatio mortis causâ resembles a legacy, inasmuch as it is ambulatory and incomplete during the life of the donor, and may be revoked by him at any time before death, and is liable to his debts on a deficiency of assets (g), and is subject to legacy duty (h), and in the above respects (except as to a gift to a wife) it differs from a gift inter vivos, and it also differs from a gift inter vivos in the following important particular, namely, that an incomplete voluntary gift inter vivos will not be perfected by the assistance of equity (i), whereas in the case of a donatio mortis causâ, equity will insist upon executors or administrators, as trustees for the donee, doing what may be necessary to complete the gift (k).

A donatio mortis causâ differs from a legacy, inasmuch as probate of it is unnecessary (l), and it is taken against, and not from, the executor (m), whose assent to its enjoyment is not necessary, and

- (a) Cf. also articles in vol. ii. Law Quarterly Review, p. 444, and 90 L. T., p. 140.
- (b) 2 V. 111, 2 R. R. 175; Staniland v. Willot, 3 Mac. & G. 674.
- (c) Re Beaumont, (1902) 1 Ch. 889, 892.
- (d) See the principal case, and Johnson v. Smith, 1 Ves. Sen. 314; Tate v. Hilbert, 2 V. 120.
 - (e) 1 Vict. c. 26.
- (f) Moore v. Darton, 4 De G. & Sm. 517.

- (g) Smith v. Casen, 1 P. W. 406.
- (h) 8 & 9 Viet. e. 76; 44 Viet. e. 12, s. 38 (2).
- (i) Ellisson v. E., Vol. II., post.
- (k) See judgments of Cotton and Lindley, L. JJ., Re Dillon, 44 C. D., pp. 82, 83. See however Re Beaumont, (1902) 1 Ch. 889.
- (l) See Rigden v. Vallier, 2 Ves. Sen. 258, note "Testamentary gifts," infra, p. 426.
- (m) Re Beaumont, (1902) 1 Ch. 889, 892.

before the Judicature Acts, its validity might be tried by an action at law (a).

Where the property in a thing made the subject of a donatio mortis causâ does not pass by delivery, as, for instance, in the case of a bond, the done may, upon indemnifying the personal representatives of the donor, sue in their names for the debt secured by such bond (b).

If the donor recover of his illness, or if he resume the possession of the gift, it will be defeated (c).

But if the donor does not resume the gift, it has been held that he cannot revoke it by will, for upon his death the gift becomes complete (d); it was, however, decided in that case, that a donatio mortis causâ may be satisfied by a legacy.

It is clear that the donee may be put to his election, if the subject of the donation is bequeathed to another person, and some benefit is conferred by the will upon the donee (e).

Practice.—By the Judicature Act, 1873, all the Divisions of the Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction in equity as well as in law; and any Division can entertain an action to establish a donatio mortis causâ (f). But where there is any such question, the usual and convenient course is to issue an originating summons under R. S. C. 1883, O. 55, r. 3, in the Chancery Division, and thereon if necessary an issue or inquiry may be directed (g).

Testamentary gifts.—If an instrument is clearly testamentary, that is, an instrument not intended to take effect until after the death of the person executing it, and dependent upon his death for its vigour and effect (h), and such instrument is not duly executed as a will, it will not be supported as a donatio mortis causâ (i).

- (a) See Thompson v. Hodgson, 2 Stra. 777, and cf. note, "Practice," infra.
- (b) Gardner v. Parker, 3 Madd. 184. See note, "Where the legal title does not pass by delivery," infra, p. 431.
 - (c) Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 231.
- (d) See Jones v. Selby, Pr. Ch. 300; but cf. Hambrooke v. Simmons, 4 Russ. 25.
- (e) See Johnson v. Smith, 1 Ves. Sen. 314.

- (f) See Judicature Act, 1873, ss. 16, 24, 25.
- (y) See e.g., Re Dillon, 44 C. D.
 76; Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bli. (N. S.)
 531; Hambrooke v. Simmons, 4 Russ.
 25; Gillespie v. Croker, 16 Ir. Ch. R.
 182; Neilan v. Farrell, 29 L. R. Ir. 12.
- (h) See Cook v. C., L. R. 1 P. & D., p. 243.
- (i) Re Hughes, 36 W. R. 821; Solicitor to Treasury v. Lewis, (1900) 2 Ch. 812.

But a gift in writing, without delivery, would probably be considered as testamentary (a).

2. Requisites to a Donatio mortis causâ.

The following circumstances are requisite in order to constitute a good donatio mortis causâ:—

- 1. The gift must be made by the donor in contemplation of the conceived approach of death (b); but a gift will be presumed to be so made, where the donor is "in his last sickness," or "languishing on his death-bed" (c), but not where suicide is contemplated (d).
- 2. The gift must be intended to take complete effect only after the donor's decease (e). But it is not absolutely necessary that the donor should expressly declare that the gift is to be returned to him if he recover, for if it be made in the extremity of sickness, or in contemplation of death, the law implies a condition, that it is to be held only by the donee in the event of the donor's death. Thus, in Gardner v. Parker (f), A. being seriously ill, two days before his death, in the presence of a servant, gave B. a bond, saying at the same time, "There, take that, and keep it." Leach, V.-C., held the gift to be a donatio mortis causâ. "The doubt," said his Honour, "here is, that the donor has not expressed that the bond was to be returned if he recovered. This bond was given in the extremity of sickness, and in contemplation of death; and it is to be inferred, that it was the intention of the donor that it should be held as a gift only in case of his death. If a gift is made in expectation of death, there is an implied condition, that it is to be held only in the event of death "(g).

If, however, it appear from the circumstances of the transaction, that the donor intended to make an immediate or irrevocable gift, it will not be a good donatio mortis causâ. Thus, in Edwards v. Jones (h) M. C., the obligee of a bond, five days before her death,

- (a) Rigden v. Vallier, 2 Ves. Sen. 258; Tapley v. Kent, 1 Robert. 400; Re Hughes, 36 W. R. 821.
- (b) Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 530; Edwards v. Jones, 1 My. & C. 233, 236; Hedges v. H., Pr. Ch. 269; Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swans. 92, 100. Art. 91 L. T. 92; Re Kirkley, 257 L. R. 522.
- (c) Miller v. M., 3 P. W. 356; Lawson v. L., 1 P. W. 441; Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swans. 100; but see the dictum of Eyre, C. B., in Blount v.
- Burrow, 1 V. 546, not found in 4 Bro. Ch. 72.
- (d) Agnew v. Belfast, &c. Co., (1896) 2 I. R. 204.
- (e) Edwards v. Jones, 1 My. & C. 233; Tate v. Hilbert, 3 V. 120.
 - (f) 3 Madd. 184.
- (g) See Tate v. Leithead, Kay, 658,
 662; Lawson v. L., 1 P. W. 441; Miller v.
 M., 3 P. W. 358; Jones v. Selby, Pr. Ch.
 300; Re Beaumont, (1902) 1 Ch. 889.
 - (h) 1 My. & C. 226.

signed an indorsement, not under seal, upon the bond as follows: "I. M. C., do hereby assign and transfer the within bond or obligation, and all my right, title, and interest thereto, unto and to the use of my niece E. E., with full power and authority for the said E. E. to sue for and recover the amount thereof, and all interest now due, or hereafter to become due, thereon." It was argued, that if the gift could not, in consequence of its being incomplete (a), take effect as a donatio inter vivos, it would take effect as a donatio mortis causâ. But Lord Cottenham held that it could not take effect as a donatio mortis causâ, as an absolute and irrevocable gift was intended (b).

Although there be an actual legal transfer of property such as, standing by itself alone, would amount to a complete gift inter vivos it will nevertheless be a donatio mortis causâ if there be annexed to the gift a condition either express or implied, that it is only to take effect in the event of the death of the giver, and upon his recovery the donee will be a mere trustee (c) unless there be a confirmation of the gift, so as to convert it into, or give it the effect of, an absolute irrevocable gift inter vivos (d).

- 3. Subject to the observations of the C. A. in $Re\ Dillon\ (e)$, hereinafter referred to (f), there must also be a delivery or traditio of either property or the indicia of title to property (g), to the donee for his own use (h); or upon trust for another person (i); or for a particular purpose, as in $Blount\ v.\ Burrow\ (h)$, where the donor, twelve days before his death, delivered to the donee four India bonds, to enable him to carry on and maintain a law-suit, which the donor had commenced. This was held to be a good donatio mortis causâ, but an issue was directed to try whether the bonds were delivered. Delivery need not be contemporaneous with the gift: an antecedent delivery of the chattel alio intuitu to the donee satisfies the rule (l).
- (a) See as to this, Re Dillon, 44
 C. D., p. 82; Re Weston, (1902) 1
 Ch. 680; Re Beaumont, (1902) 1 Ch. 889; Re Andrews, (1902) 2 Ch. 394.
- (b) See also Moore v. M., 18 Eq. 474, 484.
- (c) Staniland v. Willott, 3 Mac. & G. 664.
 - (d) Ib. 681.
 - (e) 44 C. D. 76, 82, 83.
 - (f) P. 434.
 - (g) Re Beaumont, supra; Re Weston,

- supra; Re Andrews, supra.
- (h) Tate v. Hilbert, 2 V. 120, 2 R. R. 175.
- (i) Drury v. Smith, 1 P. W. 405; Farquharson v. Cave, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 367; Moore v. Darton, 4 De G. & Sm. 517; and see Bibby v. Coulter, Ridg. Cas. t. H. 206 (n.); Dunne v. Boyd, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 609.
 - (k) 4 Bro. Ch. 71.
 - (l) Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283.

A delivery in order to be effectual, must be made either to the donee himself or to some one for him. A mere delivery to an agent, in the character of agent for the giver, will not be sufficient (a); the delivery also, when there are any declarations made by the donor relative to the subject-matter of the gift, should be contemporaneous with them (b).

It is said that a donatio mortis causâ cannot be made merely by parol, without delivery, as in the case of the alleged gift of the household goods and plate in the principal case (c). And in Spratley v. Wilson (d), Gibbs, C. J., held, but subsequently altered his opinion (e), that it was a sufficient delivery where a person in extremis said, "I have left my watch at Mr. R.'s at Charing Cross: fetch it away, and I will make you a present of it;" but if the donor has done all in his power to make the gift complete, then, possibly (f), his legal personal representatives would be compelled to perfect it.

In Bunn v. Markham (g) a person supposing himself in extremis, caused India bonds, bank notes, and guineas, to be brought out of his iron chest, and laid on his bed; he then caused them to be sealed up in three parcels, and the amount of the contents to be written on them, with the words, "For Mrs. and Miss C.," the plaintiffs; he then directed the brother to replace them in the iron chest, to be locked up, the keys to be sealed up, and directed "to be delivered to J." (his solicitor), and one of his executors, after his decease, and replaced in his own custody near his bed; and afterwards spoke of this property as given to the plaintiffs. It was held not to be a donatio mortis causâ, for want of a sufficient delivery, and on account of the donor continuing in possession (h).

Trust or Condition.—It was, indeed, argued in Hambrooke v. Simmons (i) that a donatio mortis causâ could not be coupled with

- (a) Farquharson v. Cave, 2 Coll.
 Ch. R. 356, 367; cf. Moore v. Darton,
 4 De G. & Sm. 517; Re Kirkley, 257
 L. R. 522.
- (b) Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dr. & War. 285; Hawkins v. Blewitt, 2 Esp. 664; Dunne v. Boyd, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 609.
- (c) See Tate v. Hilbert, 2 V. 120;
 Smith v. S., 2 Stra. 955; Warriner v.
 Rogers, 16 Eq. 340.
 - (d) 1 Holt, N. P., 10.
 - (e) See Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt.

- 227.
- (f) See the judgment of Cotton, L. J., in Re Dillon, 44 C. D. 76.
 - (g) 7 Taunt. 224.
- (h) See also Farquharson v. Cave, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 356; Walsh v. Studdart, 4 Dr. & War. 159; Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dr. & War. 285; Powell v. Hellicar, 27 B. 261; Maguire v. Dodd, 9 Ir. Ch. R. 452; Re Johnson, 92 L. T. 357; but consider Re Dillon, 44 C. D. 76.
 - (i) 4 Russ. 25.

a condition, or made subject to a trust; but as an issue was directed, which left the question of law, as well as of fact, to the consideration of a court of law, the point was not decided. However, in the subsequent case of Hills v. H. (a), where a person on her death-bed gave a pocket-book, containing 80l. in cash and notes, to her brother, wishing that he should bury her, and that he should have all she had, it was held, in the Exchequer, by Abinger, C. B., Parke, B., Alderson, B., and Rolfe, B., that it was a good donatio mortis causâ, although coupled with a trust. "I cannot see," said Mr. Baron Rolfe, "how the annexation of a trust to the gift can make any difference. If it be lawful so to give the property out and out to the party for his own use, I cannot see that it makes any difference, that with it he is to pay for a particular thing. If a man on his death-bed gives another 1,000l., is it any addition to the evils attending this mode of bestowing property, that he attaches a condition to it; as, for instance, that he stipulates, that his brother shall receive an outfit to India? The case of Blount v. Burrow is expressly in point, and disposes of the question; and I have no doubt that other cases might be found." These decisions rightly follow the civil law, according to which it is clear, that a donatio mortis causâ might be made the subject of a trust or condition (b). But delivery, which is essential, may be antecedent to the gift (c).

Dominion must be parted with.—Even if there be a delivery to the done or to some one for him, it will not be good, unless the donor (subject of course to the ordinary condition making void the gift, which is always either expressed or implied in case of his recovery) parts with the dominion over the thing given. Thus, in Hawkins v. Blewitt(d), in an action of trover for a box containing money and wearing apparel, by an administrator, the case on the part of the plaintiff was, that the intestate in his last illness ordered the box to be carried to the house of the defendant, who was his aunt, and to be delivered to her; but he gave no other directions respecting it, nor said anything about giving it to her. It was, however, further given in evidence, that on the next day, the key was brought to the intestate, who desired it to be taken back, saying that he should want some articles of clothing out of it.

⁽a) 8 M. & W. 401.

⁽b) Dig. lib. 31, tit. 1, I. 77, s. 1, cited 4 Russ. 27, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 356; Cod. lib. 6, tit. 42, l. 9, cited 4 Russ. 27, but see Bibby v. Coulter, Ridg.

Cas. t. H. 206 (n.)

⁽c) Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283; cf. Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dr. & War. 285.

⁽d) 2 Esp. 663.

The plaintiff had a verdict. Lord Kenyon, C.J., said, "In the case of a donatio mortis causâ, possession must be immediately given; that has been done here: a delivery has taken place, but it is also necessary that by parting with the possession, the deceased should also part with the dominion over it. That has not been done here. The bringing back the key by her the next morning to the intestate, and his declaration that he should want one of the articles of his apparel contained in it, are sufficient to show that he had no intention of making any gift or disposition of the box. It seems rather to have been left in the defendant's care for safe custody, and was so considered by herself" (a).

In Re Johnson (b), a testatrix shortly prior to her decease had intrusted a box to the care of a friend, and had requested this friend to carry out her instructions. At a subsequent interview the testatrix showed the friend a key with a label attached thereto, saying: "If I die this will be sent to you." On the day of the testatrix's death the key with the label was received by the friend, and the box was found to contain share certificates and valuables, with a paper giving directions as to the persons to whom the testatrix desired the contents of the box to be given, and it was held by Farwell, J., that, inasmuch as the testatrix had retained the key, she had not parted with her dominion over the property contained in the box, and consequently that the handing over of the box did not constitute a valid donatio mortis causâ.

In Taylor v. T. (c), T. in his last illness showed a deposit note to his daughter, the plaintiff, and told her in effect it was to belong to her in the event of his death. The plaintiff took the note, and by her father's directions put it in a cash-box for safe custody. The cash-box was kept in the father's bedroom, but she had the key. Held, a good donatio mortis causâ (d). But if looking at the transaction as a whole the intention of the deceased is that the articles parted with should be dealt with as part of the property disposed of as from his death, and over which he means to retain dominion during his life, there is no donatio mortis causâ (e).

Where the legal title does not pass by delivery.—A delivery

⁽a) See also Reddel v. Dobree, 10 Si. 244; Tapley v. Kent, 1 Robert. 400;

Warriner v. Rogers, 16 Eq. 340.

⁽b) 92 L. T. 357.

⁽c) 56 L. J. Ch. 597.

⁽d) Cf. Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 227.

⁽e) Solicitor to Treasury v. Lewis, (1900) 2 Ch. 812.

of a thing by way of symbol, according to the opinion of Lord Hardwicke in the principal case, is not a sufficient delivery. Thus, he held that the delivery of the receipts for South Sea Stock was not a sufficient delivery to constitute a donatio mortis causâ, but he said that an actual transfer, or something amounting to that, would have been necessary (a). The same conclusion has been arrived at with regard to scrip certificates of railway stock (b) and certificates of shares in a building society (c). And it has been held that the delivery of the book of a depositor in a private savings-bank, is not a sufficient delivery to constitute a donation of the money deposited (d). But the delivery of a Post Office Savings Bank Book may constitute a good donatio mortis causâ of the balance standing to the credit of the depositor (e). Neither the delivery of a note not payable to the bearer (f), nor as a general rule the delivery of a cheque (g) upon a banker (h), can operate as a donatio mortis causâ.

But in Re Dillon (i) in the Court of Appeal, the Lords Justices Cotton and Lindley pointed out that there may be a good donatio mortis causâ where the instrument does not pass the legal property by delivery, for an equitable right is thereby created and the executors or administrators will be held trustees for the donee for the purpose of giving effect to the gift (k). In the case of a donatio mortis causâ the Court will interfere to make the gift complete, although it will not do so in the case of a donatio inter vivos (l).

In Re Mead (m) a testator who held a banker's deposit note for 3,700l, in his last illness, two days before his death, expressed a wish to give 500l, part of the amount, to his wife. At his request a friend filled up a seven days' notice to the bank to withdraw the deposit, and the testator signed it; the friend then took the notice to the bank. The testator afterwards signed a form of cheque, which was on the back of the note, "Pay self or bearer 500l.;"

- (a) Supra, p. 428; but see Re Dillon,44 C. D. 76, 82, and 83; and Moore v.Darton, 4 De G. & Sm. 517.
 - (b) Moore v. M., 18 Eq. 474.
 - (c) Re Weston, (1902) 1 Ch. 680.
- (d) M'Gonnell v. Murray, 3 Ir. R. Eq. 460.
- (e) Re Weston, (1902) 1 Ch. 680; Re Andrews, (1902) 2 Ch. 394.
 - (f) Miller v. M., 3 P. W. 356.
 - (g) See infra, p. 435.

- (h) Tate v. Hilbert, 2 V. 111; Rolls v. Pearce, 5 C. D. 730; Hewitt v. Kaye, 6 Eq. 198; Beak v. B., 13 Eq. 489; Bromley v. Brunton, 6 Eq. 275; Re Beaumont, (1902) 1 Ch. 889.
 - (i) 44 C. D. 76, 82, 83.
- (k) And cf. Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 497.
 - (l) See Ellisson v. E., Vol. II., post.
 - (m) 15 C. D. 651.

the note was then handed to the wife. The testator died before the expiration of the seven days' notice. The practice of the bank was, when a customer withdrew part of a sum, which he had placed on deposit, to give him a fresh note for the balance. It was held that there had not been a valid donatio mortis causâ of the 500l., inasmuch as the donor did not intend to give the deposit note, but only to give by means of a cheque part of the money deposited (a).

In Re Dillon (b) a testator who held a banker's deposit note, not transferable, for 580l. in his last illness shortly before his death took out the note and filled in and signed upon a stamp a form of cheque indorsed on the note, "Pay self or bearer 580l. and interest." He then handed the paper to E. D., who was a relation attending him, saying, "Now you understand if I get well you'll give it me back; and if not it will be all right." Held by C. A. that the gift was valid, for assuming the gift of the cheque to be invalid, yet the intention was to give the deposit note as well as the cheque.

In Lawson v. L. (c), A., during his last illness, drew a bill upon a goldsmith for the payment of 100l. to his wife, with a written indorsement that the money was "to buy her mourning," and A. delivered the note to his wife; it was held that she was entitled to the money. And Lord Rosslyn, in Tate v. Hilbert (d), considered the case perfectly well decided. "For," he observed, "taking the whole bill together, it is an appointment of the money in the banker's hands to the extent of 100l., for the particular purpose expressed in a written appointment; which is a purpose that necessarily supposes his death."

In Jones v. Selby (e) it was held by Trevor, M. R., that the delivery of the key of a trunk, with words of gift of the trunk and its contents, was a good delivery of a tally upon Government for 500l. contained in the trunk. Lord Hardwicke observes, that the transaction "amounted to the same thing as a delivery of possession of the tally, provided that it was in the trunk at the time."

In Boutts v. Ellis (f), a person four days before his death said to his wife, "I am a dying man, you will want money before my affairs are wound up." On the following day he signed and delivered to her a crossed cheque upon his bankers for 1,000l., and on the next

⁽a) Per Cotton, L. J., Re Dillon, 44 C. D., p. 82; Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283.

⁽c) 1 P. W. 441; see supra, p. 420;

⁽b) 44 C. D., p. 76.

cf. Hopkinson v. Forster, 19 Eq. 74.

⁽d) 2 V. 111, 2 R. R., p. 183.

⁽e) Pr. Ch. 300.

⁽f) 4 De G. M. & G. 249.

W. & T.—VOL. I.

day but one, remembering that the cheque was crossed, he asked a friend who visited him to take it and give the wife another for it; which the friend did, but his cheque was post-dated. The donor's cheque was paid before his death to his friend, who, after that event, gave to the widow a cheque not post-dated for the other. It was held by the Lords Justices, affirming the decision of Sir J. Romilly, M. R. (a), that the transaction constituted a good donatio mortis causâ. Where a deposit is invested by the Post Office Savings Bank for the depositor in Government stock under the regulations contained in the deposit book by having the stock placed on the Savings Bank Investment Account of the National Debt Commissioners and credited to the depositor, the delivery of the investment certificate and the deposit book does not constitute a good donatio mortis causâ of the Government stock (b).

3. What may be the Subject of a Donatio mortis causâ.

The following note must be read subject to the expressions of opinion made by the Lords Justices Cotton and Lindley, in their judgments in Re Dillon (c). Cotton, L. J., there stated that Duffield v. Elwes (d) shows that there may be a good donatio mortis causâ of an instrument which does not pass by delivery, and that the Court will aid the equitable title by making the executors or administrators of the deceased do everything necessary to complete the gift to the donee, and Lindley, L. J., said that the statement of the existing law that a man could not make a donatio mortis causâ of his own cheque might some day require consideration.

Negotiable instruments which are commonly treated as money for other purposes pass as donations (e).

There may be a donatio mortis causâ of a bond (f), though not of a mere simple contract debt, nor by the delivery of a mere symbol (g). So, likewise, of bank-notes (h); of a deposit-note given by a bank to the donor (i), and although the receipt is expressed to be not

- (a) Reported 17 B. 121.
- (b) Re Andrews, (1902) 2 Ch. 394.
- (c) 44 C. D. 76, and supra, p. 432; and see Porter v. Walsh, (1895) 1 Ir. R., p. 287.
 - (d) 1 Bli. (N. S.) 497, infra, p. 436.
- (e) Ranklin v. Weguelin, 27 B. 309; Veal v. V., ib. 303.
- (f) Snellgrove v. Baily, 3 Atk. 214; Ridg. Cas. t. H. 202.
- (g) Per Leach, V.-C., in Gardner v. Parker, 3 Madd. 185; Blount v. Burrow, 4 Bro. Ch. 71; Hirst v. Beach, 4 Madd. 351, 356; Clavering v. Yorke, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 363 (n.).
- (h) Miller v. M., 3 P. W. 356; Shanley v. Harvey, 2 Ed. Rep. 125; Ashton v. Dawson, Sel. Ca. 14.
- (i) Amis v. Witt, 33 B. 619; Moore v. M., 18 Eq. 474; Dunne v.

transferable (a), or although the depositor is required by the bank to sign a cheque indorsed on the note (b), and whether it be indorsed or not (c); and it seems, also, of all other notes, or bills payable to the bearer (d), or to order, though not indorsed by the donor (e), but not of an I.O.U. (f).

In Re Beaumont (g), B., who was very ill and in expectation of death, drew a cheque for 300l. in favour of E., to whom it was at once handed. E. indorsed the cheque and presented it for payment at B.'s bank, where his account was overdrawn. bank manager refused payment, stating that the signature of the drawer was not like the ordinary signature of B., and that he required some confirmation of the signature. Two days later B. died without the cheque having been cashed. Buckley, J., in holding that there had been no valid donatio mortis causâ, said: "In order that the gift may be valid it must, I think, be shown that the donor handed over either property or the indicia of title to property which belonged to him. His own cheque is not property; it is only a revocable order such that if the banker acts on it the donee will have the money for which it relates. Even without actual payment of the cheque there may be a good gift-for instance, if there is an undertaking by the banker to the donee to hold the amount of the cheque for the latter that may be enough. Unless there is that, or something equivalent to it, there is no delivery of property, but only a delivery of that which, if acted upon, will procure the delivery of property. . . . The mere drawing of the cheque and handing it to the donee, coupled with the subsequent facts, did not amount to such a traditio as was required in order to give the donee a right to the amount of the cheque on the death of the donor. Even if the account had been in credit the drawee would not, I think, have obtained any right to the property. If a cheque were given by a donor who was dangerously ill, and the drawee went to a branch of the bank in the country and asked for payment, and the manager said 'The cash

Boyd, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 609; Taylor v. T., 56 L. J. Ch. 597; Re Farman, 58 L. T. 12; Cain v. Moon, (1896) 2 Q. B. 283.

- (a) Cassidy v. Belfast B. Co., 22 L. R. Ir. 68; Duffin v. D., 62 L. T. 615; Re Dillon, 44 C. D. 76.
- (b) Re Dillon, 44 C. D. 76; Re Mead, 15 C. D. 651.
- (c) Porter v. Walsh, (1895) 1 Ir. R. 286.
- (d) Miller v. M., 3 P. W. 356; Hill v. Chapman, 2 Bro. Ch. 612; and see Jones v. Selby, Pr. Ch. 300; Bibby v. Coulter, Ridg. Cas. t. H. 206 (n.).

(e) Ranklin v. Weguelin, 27 B. 309; Veal v. V., ib. 303; Porter v. Walsh, infra.

- (f) Duckworth v. Lee, (1899) 1 Ir. R. 405.
 - (g) (1902) 1 Ch. 889.

is locked up for the night; come to-morrow and I will pay you,' and the drawer died in the night, it might very well be that there was a good appropriation by the undertaking to answer the cheque, and a good donatio mortis causâ. . . . There was no promise to pay in the case before me; and if there is a promise not to pay but only to lend, that is not sufficient."

The delivery of a bond is still sufficient as a donatio mortis causû of the debt for which it is a security, although an action may, in certain cases, be maintained at law without profert of the bond (a).

So likewise a policy of insurance on the life of the donor will pass by delivery as a donatio mortis causa (b).

A delivery of the mortgage deeds of real estate will constitute a valid donatio mortis causû. In Duffield v. Elwes (c), a man, in contemplation of speedily approaching death, wishing to make a larger provision for his daughter than he had done by will, delivered, or caused to be delivered to her, certain deeds, which consisted of (1.) a conveyance in fee of lands to secure 2,927l., with the usual covenant for payment of the money lent, and a bond by way of collateral security. (2.) An assignment of a mortgage debt of 30,000l., and of a judgment for that sum recovered on a bond, with the conveyance of the land, and the usual covenant for the payment of the money. It was held by the House of Lords, reversing the decision of Leach, V.-C. (d), that there was a good donatio mortis causâ, and that the daughter was entitled to the benefit of the securities. Lord Eldon, "the delivery of a bond would, as it is admitted—(notwithstanding any change in the doctrine about profert)-if the delivery of a bond would give the debt in that bond, so as to secure to the donee of that bond the debt so given by the delivery of the bond, the question is, whether, the person having got, by the delivery of that bond, a right to call upon the executor to make his title by suing or giving him authority to sue upon the bond, what are we to do with the other securities if they are not given up? But there is another question, to which an answer is to be given: What are we to do with respect to the other securities, if they are delivered? In the one case, the bond and mortgage are delivered; in the other the judgment, which is to be considered on the same ground as a specialty, is delivered; with that, the evidences of the debts are all

(c) 1 Bli. (N. S.) 497; Porter v.

⁽a) Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bli. (N. S.)

^{7.} Walsh, (1895) 1 Ir. R. 284; (1896) 1 (b) Witt v. Amis, 1 B. & S. 109; Ir. R. 148 (C. A.).

⁽b) Witt v. Amis, 1 B. & S. 109; Amis v Witt, 33 B. 619.

⁽d) 1 S. & S. 239.

delivered. The instrument containing the covenant to pay is delivered. They are all delivered in such a way that the donor could never have got the deeds back again. Then the question is, whether regard being had to what is the nature of a mortgage, contradistinguishing it from an estate in land, those circumstances do not as effectually give the property in the debt as if the debt was secured by a bond only? * * The opinion which I have formed is, that this is a good donatio mortis causâ, raising by operation of law a trust; a trust which, being raised by operation of law, is not within the Statute of Frauds, but a trust which a Court of equity will execute (a)."

The delivery by a creditor to the debtor or his agent of that which is essential to the recovery of the debt is, it seems, sufficient. Thus, in *Moore* v. *Darton* (b), where, upon a loan, the borrower had given the lender a receipt in the following form: "Received of Miss Darton 500l., to bear interest at 4l. per cent. per annum," it was held by Knight Bruce, V.-C., that a delivery of the receipt to an agent of the borrower by the creditor on her death-bed, stating that she wished the debt to be cancelled, was a good donatio mortis causâ.

4. Evidence.

The evidence to establish a donatio mortis causa should be clear and satisfactory, especially in those cases where the relation between the donor and donee is such as to give rise to suspicion that undue influence may have been used, as in the case of an alleged donation from a client to his solicitor (c), or from a person in extremis to a priest attending him to administer the last offices of religion (d).

There is no absolute rule of the Court that a gift of this kind may not be established by the evidence of the claimant alone (e). For the law does not require corroboration; the law is, that when an attempt is made to charge a dead person's estate, the evidence ought to be looked at with great care and thoroughly sifted, and the mind of the Judge who hears it ought to be first of all in a state of suspicion; but if, in the end, the tribunal is satisfied, that is sufficient (f).

- (a) See also Meredith v. Watson, 17 Jur. 1063; Re Patterson, 12 W. R. 941; Re Dillon, 44 C. D. 76.
- (b) 4 De G. & Sm. 517, cited by Cotton, L. J., in Re Dillon, supra.
- (c) Walsh v. Studdart, 4 Dr. & War. 159.
 - (d) Thompson v. Heffernan, ib. 285.
- (e) M'Gonnell v. Murray, 3 Ir. R. Eq. 465; Hayslep v. Gymer, 1 A. & E. 162.
- (f) See judgment of Esher, M. R., in Re Garnett, 31 C. D., p. 9; and of Sir J. Hannen in Re Hodgson, 31 C. D., p. 183; Rawlinson v. Scholes, 79 L. T. 350; Re Griffin, (1899) 1 Ch. 408, 413.

ELECTION.

NOYS v. MORDAUNT.

1706. 2 Vern. 581 (a).

Election.

A., having two daughters, B. and C., devises fee-simple lands to B., and lands which were settled upon him in tail to C. If B. will claim a share of the entailed lands under the settlement, she must quit the fee-simple lands; for the testator having disposed of the whole of his estate amongst his children, what he gave them was upon the implied condition they should release to each other.

John Everard, having two daughters, in 1686 makes his will, and devises to Margaret, his eldest daughter, his lands in Beeston, and 800l. in money; to Mary, his second daughter, his lands in Stanborn and Broom, and 1,800l. in money, provided and on condition she released, conveyed, and assured Beeston lands to her sister Margaret; and devised to his said second daughter 1,300l. in money (b). Provided, if he should have a son, what was devised to his daughters to be void; and in such case gave to Margaret 1,200l., and to Mary 1,000l. Provided, if he should have another daughter, then he gave the 800l. devised to Margaret to such afterborn daughter; and the lands at Stanborn and Broom, and the 1,300l. devised to Mary, the second daughter, to the said Mary and such after-born daughter, equally between them.

He shortly afterwards died, and left his wife enceinte of a daughter, Elizabeth. Mary married Higgs, and died without issue, not having given any release to Margaret, her sister, according to the will.

⁽a) S. C., Eq. Ca. Abr. 273, pl. 3; Prec. Ch. 265; Gilb. Eq. Rep. 2.

⁽b) This last bequest of 1,300l. in

money seems to be a repetition of the first bequest of that sum with the lands in Stanborn and Broom,

Noys v. Mordaunt.

Elizabeth claimed not only the lands devised to her by the will, and a moiety of what was devised to her sister Mary, but also a moiety of the Beeston lands, devised to Margaret: the same, on the testator's marriage, being settled on himself for life, and his wife for her jointure, and to the first and other sons, and, in default of issue male, to the heirs of his body.

Question was, whether she should be at liberty so to do, or ought not to acquiesce in the will, or renounce any benefit thereby.

LORD KEEPER COWPER.—In all cases of this kind, where a man is disposing of his estate amongst his children, and gives to one feesimple lands, and to another lands entailed or under settlement (a), it is upon an *implied condition* that each party acquit and release the other; especially as in this case, where, plainly, he had the distribution of his whole estate under his consideration, and has given much more to Elizabeth than what belonged to her by the settlement, and had it in his power to cut off the entail.

(a) That is to say, entailed or settled lands are given, or upon such one upon the one to whom the fee-simple jointly with the other.

STREATFIELD v. STREATFIELD.

1735. Cas t. Talbot, 176.

Election.

The ancestor, by articles previous to his marriage, agrees to settle certain lands to the use of himself and his intended wife, remainder to the issue of the marriage in the usual manner. After marriage he makes a deed, not pursuant to the articles, and has a son and two daughters; and upon the marriage of his son, settles other lands, in consideration of this last marriage, in the usual manner, and levies a fine of the former lands to the use of himself in fee; and then makes his will, and devises part of the former lands to his two daughters, and the rest of his real estate to trustees, to the use of his grandson for life, with usual remainders: and with direction, out of the profits to educate the grandson, and to place out the rest of the profits to be paid to the grandson at twenty-one years of age; and if he does not attain that age, to be paid to his said daughters, their executors, &c. The grandson is not to be bound by the deed, which did not pursue the articles, but then he shall make his election when he comes of age, and if he chooses to take lands which ought to have been settled. the daughters (his aunts) shall be reprised out of the lands devised to him.

THOMAS STREATFIELD, the plaintiff's grandfather, by articles previous to his marriage, May 31st, 1677, agreed to settle lands in Sevenoake [in the county of Kent] to the use of himself and Martha, his intended wife, for their lives and the life of the survivor; and after the survivor's decease, to the use of the heirs of the body of him the said Thomas on his wife begotten, with other remainders over.

The marriage soon after took effect, and by deed, dated April 5th, 1698, reciting the foresaid articles, he settled his lands at Sevenoake to the use of himself and his wife for their lives, and the life of the longest liver of them, without impeachment of waste during the life of Thomas, and after their decease, to the use of the heirs of the body of the said Thomas, on the said Martha to be begotten; and for want of such issue, remainder to the right heirs of Thomas. They had

issue, Thomas (their only son), and two daughters, Margaret and Martha.

In the year 1716, upon the marriage of Thomas, the son, the father settled other lands (of which he was seised in fee), of the yearly value of 355l., to the use of his son for life, remainder to the daughters of the marriage, remainder in fee to the son, with a power to raise 2,000l. for younger children.

After the son's death [leaving a son called Thomas], Thomas, the father, in the year 1723, levied a fine of the lands comprised in the deed of 1698 to the use of himself in fee, and in the year 1725 made his will, and thereby devised part of those lands (a) to his two daughters, Margaret and Martha; "And also all other his manors, messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments whatsoever, either in possession, reversion, or remainder, not thereinbefore given or disposed of, situate in the counties of Kent, Surrey, or elsewhere, to trustees in trust for the plaintiff Thomas, his grandson, for life; remainder to his first and other sons in tail male; remainder to his daughters in tail; remainder to Margaret and Martha, with several remainders over." Then comes this clause: "And my will and meaning farther is, and I do hereby authorise and appoint the trustees, and the survivor of them, to receive the rents and profits of the said estates to them devised, and out of the same to allow and expend, for the education of my grandson Thomas, so much as they shall think fit during his minority; and that the trustees shall place out at interest such monies arising out of the rents and profits of the said estates; which said monies, with interest arising therefrom, my will is be paid to my grandson Thomas at his age of twenty-one years, if he so long live; or, in case he dies before that age, then that the same shall be paid to my two daughters, Margaret and Martha, their executors, &c."

The testator died in the year 1730.

The question was, whether the settlement in 1698 was a proper execution of the articles of 1677? and if not, whether the general devise to the plaintiff should be taken as a satisfaction for what he was entitled to under the articles of 1677?

Mr. Solicitor-General, Mr. Browne, Mr. Fazakerley, and Mr. Noel argued for the plaintiff.

⁽a) I.e., viz. the lands at Sevenoake in Kent.

Mr. Attorney-General, Mr. Strange, and Mr. Peere Williams argued for the defendant.

Lord Chancellor Talbot.—It cannot be doubted but that, upon application to this Court for the carrying into execution the articles of 1677, the Court would have decreed it to be done in the strictest manner, and would never leave it in the husband's power to defeat and annul everything he had been doing: and the nature of the provision is strong enough for this purpose, without any express words, and I must, therefore, consider what was the operation of the deed of 1698, which is declared to be in performance of the true intent and meaning of the articles. If it be so, all is well; but if it be not, it only shows that the parties intended it so, but were mistaken. So was the case of West v. Errissey (a), where the articles were, by the House of Lords, decreed to be made good; and the same must be done in this case, if nothing intervenes to prevent it.

The settlement in 1716, whereby the grandfather settled other lands upon his son's marriage, has been called a satisfaction for those articles; but to me it appears neither an actual satisfaction nor to have been intended as such. The grandfather had done that in 1698, which he apprehended to be a satisfaction for the articles; but this deed proceeds upon considerations quite different from those of the articles, the persons claiming under this being purchasers for a consideration entirely new, the limitations being entirely different; and, therefore, it would be absurd to call this a satisfaction for another thing it hath nothing to do with, and to which it is no way relative.

The next thing to be considered is, the fine levied of the lands in question in the year 1728, by the grandfather; the intent whereof was to have the absolute ownership of those lands in him. And one reason why no application hath been made till now to have those articles carried into execution, might be that during the grandfather's life nobody was entitled to anything in possession under them.

Then comes the will in 1725, whereby he gives part of those lands, settled in 1698, to his daughters; thereby showing his apprehension to be, that, by a fine, he had given himself a power of disposing of

them; and it would be a very strained construction to say that he intended this, not as a present devise to his daughters, but to take effect out of the reversion of the lands comprised in the articles.

The next thing is the devise to the trustees for his grandson, the plaintiff, upon his attaining the age of twenty-one; and the question here is whether the general words shall ever pass lands not capable of the limitation in the will? And to that have been cited Rose and Bartlett's case (a), and other cases; but they cannot influence the present case: for the testator had legally a power to dispose of those lands; and though they might be affected with a trust in equity, yet that cannot be supposed to lie in his conusance, he having done an act to enable himself to dispose of these lands. And it differs from the case that was put of an express trust, and the trustee devises all his lands; for there the trustee cannot be ignorant that the lands which he holds in trust are not his own. But what makes his intent clear is, that he hath devised part of these lands to his daughters, and he must have looked upon himself as master of the one part as well as the other; I, therefore, think his intent was clear to pass these lands by the will; and if so, we must now consider what will be the effect of this will.

If the plaintiff has a lien upon the lands of the articles, then he may stand to them if he pleases; but when a man takes upon him to devise what he had no power over, upon a supposition that his will will be acquiesced under, this Court compels the devisee, if he will take advantage of the will, to take entirely but not partially under it: as was done in Noys and Mordaunt's case (b); there being a tacit condition annexed to all devises of this nature, that the devisee do not disturb the disposition which the devisor hath made. So are the several cases that have been decreed upon the custom of London.

The only difficulty in the present case is, that what is given to the plaintiff is precarious, nothing being given to him if he dies before twenty-one, and, if after, then but an estate for life; and that he appears before the Court in a favourable light of being heir-at-law; but this will not alter the case. The estates which the testator has given him were undoubtedly in his power; he hath given them to

trustees until his grandson attain twenty-one, and has disposed of them in such a manner as that there can never be any undisposed residue to go to the plaintiff as heir-at-law; and surely it is as much in the power of the Court to make this beguest, thus limited to be a satisfaction, if the party will stand to the will, as in the other cases. Indeed, if he takes by the will, there is nothing to make satisfaction to his sisters for their general chance under the articles; but that is because nothing is left them by the will; and they cannot be said to be quite destitute of provision, since it is just and reasonable that they should be maintained by their mother, who is entitled to a large and ample provision by her marriage settlement: nor can what is devised to the plaintiff be looked upon as intended by the testator to go towards the maintenance of younger children; for, if the plaintiff dies before twenty-one, then all the profits already received are to go to his aunts; and so by that construction I must take the maintenance out of their estate, and oblige them to contribute to the maintenance of distant relations, viz., nieces, at the same time that the mother (who hath an ample provision) would be left at large, and under no tie of maintaining her own children.

And so decreed (a) the plaintiff to have six months after he comes of age, to make his election, whether he will stand to the will or the articles. And if he makes his election to stand to the latter, then so much of the other lands devised to him as will amount to the value of the lands comprised in the articles, and which were devised to Margaret and Martha, to be conveyed to them in fee.

NOTES.

- 1. Election generally.
- 2. Election in cases of deeds, p. 455.
- 3. Election in cases of wills, &c., p. 457.
- 4. Election in appointments under powers, p. 459.
- 5. Election—(A) Compulsory; (B) Implied, p. 462.
- 6. Election by parties under disabilities, p. 465.
- 7. Confirmation and ratification of contracts and election, p. 467.
- 8. Death of person to elect without electing, p. 468.

1. Election generally.

Election is the obligation imposed upon a party by Courts of equity to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights

(a) See the decree, 1 Swans. 447; Reg. Lib. B. 1735, fol. 205.

or claims in cases where there is clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both. Every case of election, therefore, presupposes a plurality of gifts or rights, with an intention, express or implied, of the party who has a right to control one or both that one should be a substitute for the other. The party who is to take has a choice, but he cannot enjoy the benefit of both (a). The principle is stated thus in Jarman on Wills (b): "That he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will must adopt the whole contents of the instrument" (c). The principle of the doctrine of election is now well settled. It is founded on the presumption of a general intention in the authors of an instrument that effect shall be given to every part of it (d), but this presumption may be rebutted (e). It is applicable to every species of instrument, whether deed or will (f), and it applies to every kind of property-immediate, remote, contingent, real or personal (g); also to the interest of next of kin in the unascertained residue of an intestate's personal estate (h).

To illustrate the doctrine of election, suppose A., by will or deed, gives to B. property belonging to C., and by the same instrument gives other property belonging to himself to C., a Court of equity will hold C. to be entitled to the gift made to him by A., only upon the implied condition of his conforming with all the provisions of the instrument, by renouncing the right to his own property in favour of B.; he must, consequently, make his choice, or, as it is technically termed, he is put to his election, to take either under or against the instrument; if C. elects to take under, and consequently to conform with all the provisions of, the instrument, no difficulty arises, as B. will take C.'s

- (a) Story (1892), 732; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swans. 394, note (b); Thellusson v. Woodford, 13 V. 220, 9 R. R. 175.
 - (b) (1893), p. 415.
- (c) See Walpole v. Conway, Barn. C. 159; Kirkham v. Smith, 1 Ves. Sen. 258; Macnamara v. Jones, 1 Bro. Ch. 411; Frank v. Standish, 1 Bro. Ch. 588 (n.); Blake v. Bunbury, 4 Bro. Ch. 21; Swan v. Holmes, 19 B. 471; Wintour v. Clifton, 21 B. 447, 8 De G. M. & G. 641; Cosby v. Ashtown, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 219; Heazle v. Fitzmaurice, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 481;

Schroder v. S., Kay, 584, 585.

- (d) Hamilton v. H., (1892) 1 Ch., p. 399.
- (e) Re Vardon's Trusts, 31 C. D., p. 279; Re Wells, 42 C. D., p. 658; Hamilton v. H., supra.
- (f) Lord Redesdale, in Birmingham v. Kirwan, 2 Sch. & L. 444, 450.
- (g) Wilson v. Townshend, 2 V. 693,
 3 R. R. 31; Webb v. Shaftesbury,
 7 V. 480, 6 R. R. 154; Morgan v. M.,
 4 Ir. Ch. R. 606; Sadlier v. Butler, 1
 Ir. R. Eq. 415.
- (h) Cooper v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 53; Bennett v. Houldsworth, 6 C. D. 671.

property, and C. will take the property given to him by A.; but if C. elects to take against the instrument, that is to say, retains his own property and at the same time sets up a claim to the property given to him by A., an important question formerly arose whether he thereupon incurs a forfeiture of the whole of the benefit conferred upon him by the instrument, or is merely bound to make compensation out of it to the person who is disappointed by his election.

Compensation.—The principal case of Streatfield v. S. is a distinct authority for the doctrine of compensation, which may now be considered as fully established (a), and it may now be laid down in accordance with Mr. Swanston's learned note to Gretton v. Haward (b), "1st. That, in the event of election to take against the instrument, Courts of equity assume jurisdiction to sequester the benefit intended for the refractory donee, in order to secure compensation to those whom his election disappoints. 2nd. That the surplus after compensation does not devolve as undisposed of, but is restored to the donee, the purpose being satisfied for which alone the Court controlled his legal right" (c). The compensation is a charge upon the benefits received under the instrument (d). If the election is not against but under the will the doctrine of compensation does not apply (e). Where a beneficiary under a will, being put to his election, elects to take against the will, the amount of the compensation is to be ascertained at the date of the death of the testator and not at the time when the election is made (f).

And after the death of a person who has elected to take against

(a) Webster v. Milford, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 363, marg.; Bor v. B., 3 Bro. P. C., Toml. edit. 167; Ardesoife v. Bennet, Dick. 465; Lewis v. King, 2 Bro. Ch. 600; Freke v. Barrington, 3 Bro. Ch. 284; Whistler v. Webster, 2 V. 372, 2 R. R. 260; Ward v. Baugh, 4 V. 627, 4 R. R. 307; Cavan v. Pulteney, 2 V. 560, 3 R. R. 8; Blake v. Bunbury, 1 V. 523, 1 R. R. 111; Welby v. W., 2 V. & B. 190, 191; Dashwood v. Peyton, 18 V. 49, 11 R. R. 145; Tibbitts v. T., Jac. 316; Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow. 179; Minchin v. Gabbett, (1896) 1 Ir. R. 1, where Rancliffe v. Parkyns is discussed.

(b) 1 Swans. 433, approved in Ker v.

Wauchope, 1 Bli. 25.

(c) See also Padbury v. Clark, 2 Mac. & G. 298; Greenwood v. Penny, 12 B. 403; Howells v. Jenkins, 1 De G. J. & S. 617; Grissell v. Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291; Pickersgill v. Rodger, 5 C. D. 163; Schroder v. S., Kay, 578; Howells v. Jenkins, 1 De G. J. & S. 617; Cooper v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 53.

(d) Pickersgill v. Rodger, 5 C. D. 163; but not upon interests taken against a will: Greenwood v. Penny, 12 B. 403.

(e) Re Chesham, 31 C. D. 466; and cf. Pickersgill v. Rodger, supra.

(f) Re Hancock, (1905) 1 Ch. 16.

an instrument, compensation will be directed to be made out of his estate to the party who has sustained a loss thereby, so far as such loss does not exceed the benefit taken under the instrument by the person making such election (a), and such party may now commence an action for damages or compensation (b). Where several persons were put to their election as between benefits under a settlement and a will, and they all elected to take against the will, it was held that they were respectively bound to make compensation to other persons so electing, as well as to persons who took under the will only; also that all compensation so paid to any person electing to take against the will must be included in the benefits received by him under the will (c).

Where a person who elects to take a fund against an instrument has been previously receiving money under it, he must on making his election repay such money, and the persons interested under the trusts of the instrument have a lien for the repayment thereof on the fund which he elects to take (d).

As the doctrine of election depends upon compensation, it follows that it will not be applicable when made contrary to the instrument unless there be a free and disposable fund passing thereby from which compensation can be made. Thus it was held, in Bristow v. Warde (e), that where, under a power to appoint to children, the father made an appointment to persons not objects of the power, any child might set it aside and claim as in default of appointment, and also take a specific share appointed to him. "The doctrine of election," said Loughborough, C., "never can be applied, but where, if an election is made contrary to the will, the interest that would pass by the will can be laid hold of, to compensate for what is taken away; therefore in all cases there must be some free disposable property given to the person, which can be made a compensation for what the testator takes away. That cannot apply to this case, where no part of his property is comprised in the will but that which he had power to distribute "(f).

- (a) Rogers v. Jones, 3 C. D. 688, 690; Fytche v. F., 19 L. T. 343; Pickersgill v. Rodger, 5 C. D. 163; Seton (1901), p. 1591.
 - (b) Rogers v. Jones, 7 C. D. 345.
 - (c) Re Booth, (1906) 2 Ch. 321.
- (d) Codrington v. Lindsay, L. R. 8 Ch. 578; Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L.
- 854; Carter v. Silber, (1891) 3 Ch. 553;
 S. C., reversed on other grounds, (1893)
 A. C. 360; Hamilton v. H., (1892) 1
 Ch. 396.
 - (e) 2 V. 336, 2 R. R. 235.
- (f) See also Box v. Barrett, 3 Eq. 244; Pickersgill v. Rodger, 5 C. D. 163; Re Fowler's Trusts, 27 B. 342;

Upon the same principle in the case of a married woman, to whom an interest with a restraint on anticipation is given by the same instrument as that which gives rise to a question of election, the doctrine of election does not apply, as the nature of her interest in the property, to be relinquished by way of compensation, has by the terms of the instrument been made inalienable (a). Hamilton v. H. (b), on the marriage of a lady in 1879, she being an infant, the settlement (ante-nuptial) (c) contained a covenant to settle after-acquired property, and gave her certain interests, some without power of anticipation. She was divorced, and brought an action to avoid the covenant. She married again before trial, and her second husband was made co-plaintiff. Held, that if she elected against the settlement the interests as to which she was not restrained were to be applied in compensating the persons disappointed by such election, but that she could not give up the interests subject to restraint. Held also, following Codrington v. C. (d), that the date of the action to repudiate was not the date of her election, but that she was still entitled to exercise that right, within a time to be limited.

A person will not be obliged to elect between benefits conferred upon him by an instrument, and an interest which he takes derivatively from another, who has elected to take in opposition to the instrument. Thus it was held, that a husband might be tenant by the curtesy of an estate tail, which his wife had elected to take in opposition to a will, under which he had accepted benefits: for as the wife made complete compensation to the persons disappointed by her election, there could not be a second election, because in fact there was no one entitled to compensation (e).

Nor will a person be compelled to elect between a benefit conferred upon him by an instrument, and an interest which he took adversely

and as to heirlooms, Re Chesham, 31 C. D. 466.

(a) Smith v. Lucas, 18 C. D. 531; followed in Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263; Re Wheatley, 27 C. D. 606; Re Vardon's Trusts, (C. A.) 31 C. D. 275; Willoughby v. Middleton, 2 John. & H., 344, though cited without disapproval by Selborne, C., in Codrington v. Lindsay, L. R. 8 Ch. at p. 587, must be considered overruled on this point. In Haynes v. Foster, (1901) 1

Ch. 361, the beneficiary was discovert at the date that the obligation to elect arose, but was not put to her election. Quære, whether this decision is reconcilable with principle.

- (b) (1892) 1 Ch. 396.
- (c) Voidable but not void, see infra, note 7.
 - (d) L. R. 7 H. L. 854.
- (e) Cavan v. Pulteney, 2 V. 544, 3 R. R. 8, 3 V. 384.

to the instrument and derivatively from the real owner, who took no benefit under the instrument (a).

If, however, the title to certain property, whether derivative or otherwise, were vested in the owner before the testator's death, the owner must elect between benefits conferred upon him by the testator's will and that property if the testator has devised it to others (b).

It seems to be doubtful whether the doctine of election applies to grants from the Crown, for the Crown is always in existence and can always be applied to, to set right the grant (c).

Where, however, two persons A. and B. joined in a petition to the Crown, representing an estate to have escheated, and procured a grant of it to be made to them, it was held that the assignees of A. could not afterwards set up a claim to one part under a prior title in himself, while taking the benefit of the grant as to the rest (d).

In order to raise a case of election, at any rate in the case of a will, there must appear in the will itself a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of that which is not his own (e): and it is immaterial whether he knew the property not to be his own, or by mistake conceived it to be his own; for, in either case, if the *intention to dispose* of it appears clearly, his diposition will be sufficient to raise a case of election (f). Parol evidence of the intention of the testator is not admissible (g).

It is immaterial that a party put to his election by a will had after the date thereof at the instance of the testator put into settlement

- (a) Howells v. Jenkins, 2 John. & H. 706; and see Grissell v. Swinhoe, 7 Eq. 291.
- (b) See Cooper v. C., supra; Brodie v. Barry, 2 V. & B. 127; Bennett v. Houldsworth, 6 C. D. 671.
 - (c) Per Plumer, M. R., 2 J. & W. 345.
- (d) Cumming v. Forrester, 2 J. & W. 334.
- (e) Forrester v. Cotton, 1 Eden, 532; Judd v. Pratt, 13 V. 168, 15 V. 390; Dashwood v. Peyton, 18 V. 27; Blake v. Bunbury 4 Bro. Ch. 21, 1 R. R. 111; Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow, 149, 179; discussed in Minchin v. Gabbett, (1896) 1 Ir. R. 1; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swans. 359; Jervoise v. J., 17 B. 566; Padbury v. Clark, 2 Mac. & G. 298; Lee v. Egremont, 5
- De G. & Sm. 348; Wintour v. Clifton, 21 B. 447, 8 De G. M. & G. 641; and Stephens v. S., 3 Drew. 697, 1 De G. & J. 62; Poole v. Odling, 10 W. R. 591; Fox v. Charlton, 10 W. R. 506; Thornton v. T., 11 Ir. Ch. R. 474; Box v. Barrett, 3 Eq. 244; Sadlier v Butler, 1 Ir. Eq. 415; Re Harris, (1909) 2 Ch. 206.
- (f) Whistler v. Webster, 2 V. 370, 2 R. R. 260; Thellusson v. Woodford, 13 V. 221, 9 R. R. 175; Welby v. W., 2 V. & B. 199; overruling Cull v. Showell, Amb. 727; Whitley v. W., 31 B. 173; Coutts v. Acworth, 9 Eq. 519; Griffith-Boscawen v. Scott, 26 C. D. 358; Re Booker, (1886) W. N. 18.
- (g) Galvin v. Devereux, (1903) 1 Ir. R. 185; and see infra, p. 453.

property belonging to himself, which the testator affects to dispose of by his will. Thus in *Middleton* v. *Windross* (a) a testator gave all his property equally among his three daughters, Sarah, Margaret, and Jane, and directed Jane within twelve months after attaining twenty-one to bring into hotchpot an estate to which she was entitled under the will of her grandfather. On Jane's marriage, subsequently to the date of the will, she, at the instance and under the superintendence of her father, settled the estate upon herself and her husband successively for life, with remainder to the children of the marriage. Afterwards, by the testator's advice, the estate was sold by the trustees for 3,000l. In a suit to administer the testator's estate, it was held that the 3,000l., less the costs of the sale, ought to be brought into account in respect of Jane's share.

Moreover, though part of the benefits proposed by a testator to be conferred upon another may fail, what remains will be sufficient to constitute a case for election (b).

The mere recital in a will that a party is entitled to certain property, but not declaring the intention of the testator to give it to him, will not be sufficient to raise a case of election (c). So in Box v. Barrett (d), under a settlement the four daughters of a testator took equal shares subject to his life interest. The testator, by his will, recited that under the settlement his two daughters, Ellen and Emily, would become entitled to certain hereditaments, and that in making his will he had taken that into consideration, and had not devised them so large a share under his will as he would have done had they not been so entitled. He then devised to his daughters Ellen and Emily certain estates, and to his other daughters, Edith and Eliza, certain other estates of much larger value. The will did not purport to dispose of or affect the settled estates. It was held by Romilly, M. R., that as the will did not purport to make any disposition of the settled estates, and was only made under a mistaken impression, Edith and Eliza were not put to their election (e).

The difficulty of sustaining a case of election is always much greater where the testator has a partial interest in the property dealt with than where he purports to devise an estate in which he

⁽a) 16 Eq. 212.

⁽b) Newman v. N., 1 Bro. Ch. 186.

⁽c) Dashwood v. Peyton, 18 V. 41; Forrester v. Cotton, 1 Eden, 532, 535; Blake v. Bunbury, 1 V. 514, 523, 1 R. R. 111.

⁽d) 3 Eq. 244.

⁽e) See also Langslow v. L., 21 B. 552; Blacket v. Lamb, 14 B. 482; Banks v. B., 17 B. 352; Re Fowler's Trust, 27 B. 362.

has no interest at all (a). For if the testator has some interest, the Court will lean as far as possible to a construction which would make him deal only with that to which he is entitled (b); and if a testator entitled to a share of a house or lands devise his interest or property therein, it is clear that he only intended his own interest therein to pass (c).

Where, however, a testator entitled only to part of an estate uses words in devising it which show clearly that he intended to pass the entirety, if the owner of the other part takes other benefits by the will, he will be put to his election: as for instance where a person entitled only to a moiety of a house devises it as "all my messuage, now on lease to A. and in his occupation "(d), especially if there are also directions to repair the property specifically devised (e), or if the testator in another part of the will correctly described a moiety, when it was his intention to give a moiety (f). And where the wife of the testator alone was entitled to a particular property, a devise of it as "my interest in the A. property" will put the wife to her election (g). And a specific devise by a particular description may be considered a sufficient indication of an intention of a partial owner of property to pass the entirety thereof (h). So where a sum of 10,000l. Consols was in settlement in trust for two sisters for life, and after their deaths as to two-thirds of the capital in trust for their brother, and as to one-third in trust for the two sisters; and the brother bequeathed "the whole of his property" to trustees as to part on certain trusts for his sisters, afterwards bequeathing the property "including the 10,000l. trust money" to other persons, it was held that the sisters must elect between the benefits given them by the will and their interest in the 10,000l. Consols (i).

Where a testator is entitled only to a reversion in lands devised, the question sometimes arises whether he intended to include in the

- (a) Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow, 185; discussed in Minchin v. Gabbett, (1896) 1 Ir. R. 1; Henry v. H., 6 Ir. R. Eq. 286.
- (b) Maddison v. Chapman, 1 John.
 & H. 470; Re Bidwell's Settlement,
 11 W. R. 161; Galvin v. Devereux,
 (1903) 1 Ir. R. 185.
 - (c) Henry v. H., 6 Ir. R. Eq. 286.
 - (d) Padbury v. Clark, 2 Mac. & G. 298.
 - (e) Ibid.
 - (f) Ibid.

- (g) Whitley v. W., 31 B. 173; but see Read v. Crop, 1 Bro. Ch. 492; Wintour v. Clifton, 8 De G. M. & G. 644; Grosvenor v. Durston, 25 B. 97; Usticke v. Peters, 4 Kay & J. 437; Galvin v. Devereux, (1903) 1 Ir. R. 185.
- (h) Fitzsimons v. F., 28 B. 417; Howells v. Jenkins, 1 De G. J. & S. 617; Miller v. Thurgood, 33 B. 496; Wilkinson v. Dent, L. R. 6 Ch. 339; but see Chave v. C., 2 John. & H. 713 (n.)
 - (i) Swan v. Holmes, 19 B. 471.

devise the immediate and absolute interest, or to confine it to his own estate only. Primâ facie, doubtless the testator would be understood to refer only to what he had power to dispose of. He may, however, show a contrary intention; if for instance he has either devised the land in question upon limitations, or has conferred powers on the devisees which either cannot take effect or probably will be incapable of taking effect if a reversionary interest only passes to the devisees, then the intention to include the immediate interest will be sufficiently indicated to raise a case of election (a). So too a direction that an annuity is to be paid to a person for life, out of lands of which the testator has only the reversion, sufficiently indicates an intention to dispose of the whole (b). But such indications of intention will not prevail against an express confirmation of the settlement creating the estates, which come before the testator's reversion (c). But a confirmation of a part of the settlement leaves the remainder unconfirmed (d).

A devise of an estate does not per se import an intention to devise it free from incumbrances to the devisee, so as to put the incumbrancers taking benefits under the will to their election (e). The intention to do so must appear conclusively from the words of the will, as, for instance, if the testator repudiates the instrument creating the charge, and the dispositions of the will are inconsistent with that instrument, it will show that he intended the property to pass free from the charge (f). So if a testator entitled to an estate, subject to an incumbrance, secured by a long term, devise such estate for a term to take effect immediately upon the death of the testator, and for the immediate purpose of raising money for the payment of annuities and legacies, the incumbrancers deriving other interests under the will, if they take by it, must give effect to it, and permit the estate to go in the new channel free from incumbrances as the testator intended (g).

General Devise or Bequest.—A mere general devise will not comprehend property of which the devisor is not owner, although at the date

- (a) Welby v. W., 2 V. & B. 187, 198; Wintour v. Clifton, 8 De G. M. & G. 641.
- (b) Usticke v. Peters, 4 Kay & J. 437, 455.
- (c) Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow, 149; discussed in Minchin v. Gabbett, (1896) 1 Ir. R. 1.
 - (d) Blake v. Bunbury, 1 V. 514.
- (e) Stephens v. S., 1 De G. & J. 62, 3 Drew. 697; Henry v. H., 6 Ir. R. Eq. 286; Maddison v. Chapman, 1 John. & H. 470.
- (f) Sadlier v. Butler, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 413, 423.
- (g) Blake v. Bunbury, 1 V. 514, 523.

of his will and his death he had no property of his own to which the words were applicable (a). Nor will the fact that the devise is to uses in strict settlement extend general words to more than the testator's interest, though his devisable interest is only an estate pour autre vie (b).

Parol evidence, dehors the will, is not admissible for the purpose of showing that a testator considering property to be his own, which did not actually belong to him, intended to comprise it in a general devise or bequest (c). But in Pickersgill v. Rodger (d), Jessel, M. R., said: "The presumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary is that the testator by his will intends merely to devise or bequeath that which belongs to him... it is only a presumption which may be rebutted even by parol evidence, and it may be rebutted by evidence showing that under a misapprehension of law, the testator believed that the property which did not belong to him did really belong to him."

Where a testator holds property with another in joint tenancy, since on his death without severance the whole will go to the surviving joint-tenant, it will not pass by a general bequest in the testator's will to a third party so as to raise a case of election against the surviving joint-tenant taking other benefits by the will. Thus, where a testator, both before and after making his will, transferred certain Government stock unto the names of himself and his wife and by his will made a general bequest of all his funded property or estate of whatsoever kind to trustees for his wife for her life, and after her decease as therein mentioned, it was held that the will did not purport to dispose of the stock in terms sufficiently clear and distinct, or to put the wife upon her election (e); for in order to raise a case of election in such a case the stock in question must be specifically and clearly referred to (f).

- (a) Read v. Crop, 1 Bro. Ch. 492;
 Jervoise v. J., 17 B. 566; Thornton v.
 T., 11 Ir. Ch. R. 474; Timewell v.
 Perkins, 2 Atk. 102.
- (b) Cosby v. Ashtown, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 219, 226, 231.
- (c) Doe v. Chichester, 4 Dow, 76, 89, 90; and see Pole v. Somers, 6 V. 322; Druce v. Denison, 6 V. 402; Clementson v. Gandy, 1 Keen, 309; Pulteney v. Darlington, 2 V. 544, 3 V. 384, on this point would seem clearly no longer law.
- (d) 5 C. D. 170; but this dictum is, it is submitted, not sustainable.
- (e) Dummer v. Pitcher, 2 My. & K. 262; Blonmart v. Player, 2 S. & S. 507; Crabb v. C., 1 My. & K. 511; Smith v. Lyne, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 345; Allen v. Anderson, 5 Ha. 163; Seaman v. Woods, 24 B. 372; Re Harris, (1909) 2 Ch. 206.
- (f) Coates v. Stevens, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 66; Grosvenor v. Durston, 25 B. 97; Shuttleworth v. Greaves, 4 My. & C. 38; A.-G. v. Fletcher, 5 L. J. Ch. 75.

But a testator may in his will itself show an intention under a general devise to dispose of lands which are not absolutely his own, as for instance by describing them as being in the occupation of himself or his tenants (a). So if a testator devise land in a particular locality, if there is any property of the testator answering the description it will be confined to that (b).

Exclusion of Election.—The rule of election, the subject of this note, which depends, as before observed, upon an implied condition, will not be excluded by the parties being expressly put to their election, as between the benefits conferred upon them and sums due to them from the person conferring such benefits. Thus in Wilkinson v. Dent (c) a testatrix devised "all and singular the estate and mines of Aroa" to trustees in trust for sale, and gave to T. D. 10,000l., which was to be taken in full satisfaction of any sums which she might owe him at her decease, and to W. D. 3,000l., which she declared was to be taken in satisfaction of any rent-charge out of a certain part of her real estate. Her will contained the usual devise of trust and mortgage estates. She was in possession of the entirety of the Aroa estate, but was owner only of one moiety, being in possession of the other moiety by virtue of a mortgage, the money due upon which was subject to trusts, under which T. D. and W. D. on her death became entitled, each to one fifth. It was held that T. D. and W. D. were put to their election between the benefits they took under the will and their shares in the mortgage money. "The question," said James, L. J., "is, whether there is testamentary bounty to persons whose estate and right are, under another part of the will, interfered with. It appears to me clear, that this question must be answered in the affirmative, though, before the amount of the bounty can be ascertained, the amount of the claims which the legatees had against the testatrix must be ascertained "(d).

But the ordinary doctrine of election may be excluded by an apparent expression of intention by a testator that only one of several gifts, to an object of his bounty, is conditional on his giving up what a testator purports to take away from him. For instance, if a testator had an eldest son, owner of a bit of property, and it would be convenient that this bit of property should go along with a property which the testator is devising to his second son. So, the testator

⁽a) See Honywood v. Forster, 30 B. 14.

⁽c) L. R. 6 Ch. 339.

⁽b) Rancliffe v. Parkyns, 6 Dow, 149; Maddison v. Chapman, 1 John. & H. 470.

⁽d) See also Coutts v. Acworth, 9 Eq. 519, and consider Synge v. S., L. R. 9 Ch. 128.

devises this bit of property to the second son; and amongst other gifts to his eldest son, he gives him a piece of property which he states in his will to be in lieu of his bit of property which the testator purported to take away from him. In such case, the eldest son would merely be put to his choice between those two bits of property (a).

Creditors.—The doctrine of election is not applicable to creditors. Thus, if before the time when real estate was made assets for payment of debts a testator devised land in payment thereof, and bequeathed in favour of other persons funds, then assets for payment of debts, it was held that the creditors were not put to their election, and might assert their rights against such funds, without giving up their claim under the devise to the land (b). In $Deg \ v. \ D.$ (c), where a father devised his own estate and an estate of his son's for the payment of debts, the son was allowed as a creditor of his father to share with the other creditors in the benefit conferred upon them by the provision for payment of debts, without being obliged to give up his own estate. But these questions will not arise often now, as real estates are liable to the payment of debts by simple contract as well as specialty (d).

2. Election in Cases of Deeds.

The question of election principally arises in "cases of wills, because deeds being generally matters of contract, the contract is not to be interpreted otherwise than as the consideration expressed requires" (e). Election under deeds is of a different kind to that arising under wills (f), for there need not be in the case of deeds a clear intention on the part of the settlor or others to dispose of property which was not his own; the principle upon which cases of election are raised in deeds being that which Lord Redesdale in Birmingham v. Kirwan (g) states to be the general foundation of the law of election, viz., that a person cannot "approbate and reprobate" under the same instrument. Thus if a person comes in directly

- (a) See East v. Cook, 2 Ves. Sen. 30, as explained by James, L. J., in Wilkinson v. Dent, supra. See also Bor v. B., 3 Bro. P. C., Toml. edit. 167; Fytche v. F., 19 L. T. 343; Coote v. Gordon, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 180; and see Brown v. Parry, cited Jarman on Wills, (1893) p. 434.
- (b) Kidney v. Coussmaker, 12 V. 136, 2 R. R. 118; Cooper v. C., L. R. 7
- H. L., p. 66; Clark v. Guise, 2 Ves. Sen. 617.
 - (c) 2 P. W. 412, 418.
 - (d) See 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104.
- (e) Per Lord Redesdale, in Birmingham v. Kirwan, 2 Sch. & L., 444, cited by Lord Hatherley in Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L., p. 867.
 - (f) As to which see infra, p. 457_{\bullet}
 - (g) 2 Sch. & L. 444, 448.

under a settlement, and asks to have the benefit of such of its provisions as give him an advantage, and at the same time claims adversely to what was intended to be the rest of the settlement, because it was not binding, then a case of election arises. In Brown v. B. (a) marriage articles executed when a lady was a minor contained a covenant by the husband to settle her interest in real and personal estate, including after-acquired property, on the usual trusts; and she died without having confirmed the articles, leaving her husband surviving, and an only child, her heiress-at-law, who claimed an interest under the articles in the personal estate and also claimed the real estate attempted to be settled as heiress-at-law of her mother. It was held that the heiress-at-law was put to her election. "In the present case," said Romilly, M. R., "the plaintiff comes in and claims directly under the limitation of the personal estate for her benefit under the settlement and claims the real estate adversely to the settlement on the ground that in the event the settlement did not bind it. I think, therefore, that she claims beneficially under the settlement directly, and that consequently she must elect whether she will take adversely to it or under it; if the latter, she must give effect to the whole of it as far as she can "(b).

With regard to marriage settlements, James, L. J., laid down this simple rule in Codrington v. Lindsay (c): "The only safe rule to guide the Court is to consider everything that is brought or expressed to be brought into settlement by anybody from any source as one aggregate trust fund. So considering it, it seems to me very easy and very right to read all the trusts thus: out of the aggregate property settled A. is to have so much and no more, B. so much and no more, the issue to have such interests and no more or other. Then if by paramount title A. or B. or any of the issue takes out of the aggregate something other than the share expressed to be given, he or she must take that in full satisfaction of the expressed share or interest"; and he more than doubted the propriety of Campbell v. Ingilby (d), which was the only exception he thought to this rule. In that case the heirat-law of an infant claimed property as not being bound by a settlement made by the infant, and Romilly, M. R., held that if he had no

(a) 2 Eq. 481.

(b) See Anderson v. Abbott, 23 B. 457; Willoughby v. Middleton, 2 John. & H. 344, but see p. 448, supra; Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 854; Griffith-Boscawen v. Scott, 26 C. D. 358; Hamilton v. H., (1892) 1 Ch. 396.

(c) L. R. 8 Ch., p. 592; affirmed L. R. 7 H. L. 854.

(d) 21 B. 567, 1 De G. & J. 393, affirmed on other grounds; and see *Romilly*, M. R.'s, explanation of his decision in Brown v. B., 2 Eq. 481.

benefit and claimed none under the settlement, he might assert his right, there being no case of election.

The principle of approbation and reprobation has been applied (a) to voluntary deeds (b); to cases of contract for valuable consideration resting in articles (c); to contracts for value completely executed by conveyance and assignments (d).

3. Election in Cases of Wills.

Where by the same will several gifts are given, some beneficial, others onerous, but all of them the property of the testator, in the absence of the intention of the testator to make the acceptance of the burden a condition of the benefit (e) the devisee may take what is beneficial and reject what is onerous (f). But where the question arises upon a single and undivided gift, such gift is $prim\hat{a}$ facie evidence that it was the testator's intention that the gift should be one, and that it was the testator's intention that the legatee should either take it all or take none of it (g).

But even in such a case the Court might sometimes be able to discover some subtle indication of an intention that the legatee should be at liberty to take part of the gift and leave the rest (h). In Syer v. Gladstone (i) a freehold house and the furniture therein were left to A. and B. for life. The house was mortgaged for more than its value; A. and B. were held entitled to use the furniture, without keeping down the interest on the mortgage (k).

In contradistinction to the decisions last noticed, the rule as to election, properly so called, is to be confined to a gift under a will,

- (a) See per Selborne, C., in Codrington v. Lindsay, L. R. 8 Ch. 587.
- (b) Llewellyn v. Mackworth, Barn.C. 445; Anderson v. Abbott, 23 B. 457.
- (c) Savill v. S., 2 Coll. Ch. R. 721; Brown v. B., 2 Eq. 481.
- (d) Bigland v. Huddleston, 3 Bro. Ch. 285 (n.); Chetwynd v. Fleetwood, 4 Bro. P. C. 435, edit. 1784; Green v. G. 2 Mer. 86; Bacon v. Cosby, 4 De G. & Sm. 261; Mosley v. Ward, 29 B. 407; Willoughby v. Middleton, 2 John. & H. 344.
- (e) Talbot v. Radnor, 3 My. & K. 252; Green v. Britten, 42 L. J. Ch. 187; Fairclough v. Johnstone, 16 Ir. Ch. 442; Warren v. Rudall, 1 John.

- & H. 13; and see Long v. Kent, 13 W. R. 961.
- (f) Andrew v. Trinity Hall, 9 V. 525; Moffett v. Bates, 3 Sm. & G. 468; Warren v. Rudall, 1 John. & H. 1; Aston v. Wood, 22 W. R. 893.
- (g) Guthrie v. Walrond, 22 C. D. 573, 577; Green v. Britten, 42 L. J. Ch.
- (h) Per Fry, J., in Guthrie v. Walrond, 22 C. D. 577.
- (i) 30 C. D. 614; and see additional report, (1902) 1 Ch. 211 (n.).
- (k) See Re Hotchkys, 32 C. D., p. 419; Frewen v. Law Life Assurance Society, (1896) 2 Ch. 511; Re Kensington, (1902) 1 Ch. 203; Honywood v. H., (1902) 1 Ch. 347.

and a claim dehors the will, and adverse to it, and is not to be applied as between one clause in a will and another clause in the same will as in the case of deeds (a).

Although, under the old law, a devise to the heir was in a certain sense inoperative, as he took by descent as heir, and not by purchase as devisee, it has been held, ever since the decision of Noys v. Mordaunt, supra, p. 439, to be a sufficient gift to him of the testator's property to raise a case of election, should the testator devise or bequeath to another property belonging to the heir (b); à fortiori will the heir now be put to his election, since, by the Act for the Amendment of the Law of Inheritance (c), where lands are devised by the will of a testator dying after the 31st of December, 1833, to the heir, he will take as devisee by purchase, and not by descent (d). In a case before the Real Estate Charges Act, 1877, the testator had contracted to purchase freehold property and had died before completion, leaving the balance of the purchase-money unpaid. The heir electing against the will, required the executors to pay the balance out of the residuary personal estate, and took a conveyance to himself. It was held that the parties disappointed had no lien on the property, but that the heir and his estate after his death were liable to account to them for all benefits taken under the will (e).

Whether under the law before the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the disability of coverture prevented a case of election from ever being raised against anyone, whether her husband, her heir, or a third person, by the will of a married woman is uncertain (f). It was decided that under her will, valid as to her separate estate but purporting also to dispose of real estate not her separate estate, "no case of election could be raised against her heir" (g). Whether her husband could be put to election between benefits taken by him under a will of his wife's separate estate, and property disposed of

- (a) See Wollaston v. King, 8 Eq. 165; Wallinger v. W., 9 Eq. 301; Bizzey v. Flight, 3 C. D. 269; Warren v. Rudall, 1 John. & H. 1; and see p. 461, infra.
- (b) Welby v. W., 2 V. & B. 190;Anon., Gilb. 15; Thellusson v. Woodford, 13 V. 209.
 - (c) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106.
- (d) See Schroder v. S., Kay, 578. For the position of the heir in regard to property acquired by the testator after the date of the will, and wills
- insufficient through defect of form or testator's incapacity to pass realty, see cases collected in last edition, Vol. I., 434, 435, and especially Hearle v. Greenbank, 1 Ves. Sen. 298; Thellusson v. Woodford, 13 V. 209; Jacob v. J., 78 L. T. 451, 825.
- (e) Greenwood v. Penny, (1850) 12 B. 402; and see above, pp. 362, 363.
- (f) See per Parker, J., Re Harris, (1909) 2 Ch. 206, pp. 215, 216.
- (g) Re De Burgh Lawson, 34 W. R. 39.

by that will, but claimed by him jure mariti, was discussed but not determined in Rich v. Cockell (a). It has been recently decided that the husband will be put to his election when the will operates under the Act of 1882, and would have passed the property as to which the question arises had it been actually held by the testatrix as her separate estate at the date of the will. The fact that the marriage having taken place before 1883 the property in reality had been acquired jure mariti by the husband before that date is immaterial (b).

The heir of immovable property, situate out of England, becoming entitled to it in consequence of the will by which it is devised to another not being conformable to the solemnities required by the lex situs, and taking also under the same will real or personal property in this country, will be compelled, if the intention to dispose of land out of England is clear, to elect between the heritable property which has descended to him as heir and the benefits given to him by the will (c). But if the intention does not so appear, if for instance the devise is general, then secus (d).

4. Election in Appointments under Powers.

The doctrine of election is applicable to appointments under a power. Thus where an express appointment is made to a stranger to the power, which is therefore void, and a benefit is conferred by the same instrument upon a person entitled in default of appointment, the latter will be put to his election (e).

If the donee of a non-exclusive power of appointment among a class to whom this property is limited in default of appointment appoints exclusively to one object, and by the same instrument confers benefits on the others, the latter will be put to their election. Thus where a person has power to appoint to two, "and he appoints to one only, and gives a legacy to the other, that is a case of election" (f). So where a testator, having power under a settlement

- (a) 9 V. 369.
- (b) Re Harris, supra.
- (c) Brodie v. Barry, 2 V. & B. 127; Orrell v. O., L. R. 6 Ch. 302; M'Call v. M'C., 1 Dr. 283; Harrison v. H., L. R. 8 Ch. 342; and see Dewar v. Maitland, 2 Eq. 834 (land in St. Kitts); Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby, (1908) A. C. 224; Ker v. Wauchope, 1 Bli. 1.
- (d) Johnson v. Telfourd, 1 Russ. & M. 244; Allen v. Anderson, 5 Ha. 163; Maxwell v. M., 2 De G. M. & G.
- 705; Lamb. v. L., 5 W. R. 720; Maxwell v. Hyslop, 4 Eq. 407; Baring v. Ashburton, 54 L. T. 463 (land in France).
- (e) Sug. Pow. 578, 8th edit.; Whistler v. Webster, 2 V. 367, 2 R. R. 260; Reid v. R., 25 B. 469; Ex p. Bernard, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 133; Tomkyns v. Blane, 28 B. 422; Re Fowler, 27 B. 362.
- (f) Sug. Pow. 589, 8th edit.; Wollen v. Tanner, 5 V. 218; Vane v. Dungannon, 2 Sch. & L. 117.

to appoint the settled hereditaments to children of his first marriage only, appointed the settled hereditaments (describing them as his own property) in favour of a son of the first marriage, subject to a charge in favour of his other children, including the children of his second marriage, and he devised property of his own to the same son, subject to the same charges in favour of his other children "so as to equalize the shares of all his children in all his property," it was held by Fry, J., that a case of election was raised in favour of the children of the second marriage (a).

Where the donee of a power makes a valid appointment to objects of the power, and by a subsequent instrument after the expiration or exhaustion of the power purports to revoke the former appointment, reappointing in favour of another object, and by the same instrument gives benefits to the former appointees, the latter will be put to their election (b). But where a second appointment made in exercise of the power gives larger shares in the appointed fund only partially appointed by the first appointment in favour both of the objects benefiting by the former appointment and other objects of the power, no question of election arises (c).

Where a person having a power to appoint delegates the power (which he has really no right to do) to another by his will and thereby also confers benefits upon the objects of the power, they cannot retain the benefits given to them by the will and also claim the property against the execution of the power so improperly delegated (d).

The doctrine of election is also applicable where there is a revocation in excess of the power, and benefits are conferred upon the person disappointed by such revocation. Thus where an appointment was made of the interest of a fund to a person for life irrevocably, and after his decease the fund was appointed to others with power to the appointor, by deed or will, to revoke the appointments subsequent to the life interest, and the appointor afterwards, supposing she had complete dominion over the fund, revoked all the appointments before made, giving the person entitled to the interest of the fund for life part of it absolutely, and the remainder of the fund to others, the person to whom, under the first appointment, a

⁽a) White v. W., 22 C. D. 555; distinguishing Carver v. Bowles, 3 Russ.& M. 304, and Woolridge v. W., 1 John. 63.

⁽b) See Cooper v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 53.

⁽c) See England v. Lavers, 3 Eq. 63, explained in Re Tancred's Settlement, (1903) 1 Ch. 715. Cf. Re Keon, 3 L. R. Ir. 228.

⁽d) Ingram v. I., cited 1 Ves. Sen. 259.

life interest was given in the whole fund was compelled to elect between the life interest in the whole fund and his interest in part of the fund given to him absolutely under the second appointment (a). And it was directed that the costs should be borne by each share in proportion. In other words, the taker of each share was to bear the proportion of the burthen falling to the share he took (b). In no instance, however, has a case of election been raised where a testator gave no property absolutely his own to an object of the power out of which, in the event of his not acquiescing in an appointment by the donee to a person not an object of the power, the latter could be compensated (c).

Neither will the non-execution of the power upon an erroneous impression stated in the will that by its non-execution one person who is a legatee will divide the fund, the subject of the power, equally with another, raise a case of election (d).

No case of election arises between two appointments under distinct limited powers. Thus, in Re Applin's Trusts (e), A. had power to appoint by will a fund to any one or more of his children. He had under a distinct instrument power to appoint another fund amongst his children, to any one of them, but not exclusively, and they were to take equally in default of appointment. He had five children. By his will he exercised the first power in favour of S., one of his children, and the second in favour of two others of his children. The second power was accordingly badly exercised, and S. took a share in default of appointment. It was held that no case of election was raised against S. (f).

Where moreover there is an attempt to execute a power in violation of the rules of law no question of election will arise. Thus where a person makes an appointment void for remoteness to a person not an object of this power, although by the same instrument he gives property of his own to the persons entitled in default of appointment, the latter will not be compelled to elect, for in such case the instrument must be read as if the invalid appointment were not in it at all (g).

- (a) Coutts v. Acworth, 9 Eq. 519.
- (b) Ibid. 532.
- (c) See Re Fowler's Trusts, 27 B. 362; Armstrong v. Lynn, 9 Ir. R. Eq. 186.
 - (d) Langslow v. L., 21 B. 552.
 - (e) 13 W. R. 1062.
 - (f) See also Re Fowler's Trusts, 27

B. 362.

(g) Wollaston v. King, 8 Eq. 165, 175; Re Warren's Trusts, 26 C. D. 208, 219; Re Handcock's Trusts, 23 L. R. Ir. 34; Re Oliver's Settlement, (1905) 1 Ch. 191; Re Beale's Settlement, (1905) 1 Ch. 256; Re Wright, (1906) 2 Ch. 288. In the three last

Similarly where a person appoints simply to objects of the power, and gives them property of his own, subsequently directing them to settle the property so appointed on persons not objects of the power, the instrument of appointment will be read as if it contained no such direction, and no case of election will arise (a). But, where there is a clause of forfeiture of the legacies on non-compliance with such direction, full effect will be given thereto (b).

Mere precatory words, requesting appointees, objects of the power, to leave the fund appointed to others, not objects of the power, will not raise a case of election (c).

5. Election—(A) Compulsory; (B) Implied.

(A) Compulsory.—Election may be compulsory, as where a person is compelled to elect by a judgment of the Court. Persons compelled to elect are entitled previously to ascertain the relative value of their own property, and that conferred upon them, and time will be allowed to them for that purpose (d); and as to the apportionment of debts upon different funds, see Cooper v. C. (e). Probably a judgment with the necessary inquiries could now be obtained upon an originating summons under R. S. C. 1883, Order 55, r. 3 (g) (f).

An election made under a mistaken impression will not be binding, for in all cases of election the Court, while it enforces the rule of equity, that the party shall not avail himself of both his claims, is anxious to secure to him the option of either, and not to hold him concluded by equivocal acts, performed, perhaps, in ignorance of the value of the funds (g).

cited cases Re Bradshaw, (1902) 1 Ch. 436, was not followed, and whilst in the press it has been overruled in the C. A. Re Nash, (1909) W. N. 226.

(a) Carver v. Bowles, 2 Russ. & My.
301; Blacket v. Lamb, 14 B. 482;
Woolridge v. W., John. 63; Churchill v. C., 5 Eq. 44; Roach v. Trood, 3
C. D. 429; King v. K., 15 Ir. Ch. R.
479, overruling Moriarty v. Martin, 3
Ir. Ch. R. 26; but see and cf. White v.
W., 22 C. D. 555.

(b) King v. K., supra.

(c) Blacket v. Lamb, 14 B. 482; Kampf v. Jones, 2 Keen, 756; Carver v. Bowles, 2 Russ. & M. 301.

(d) Newman v. N., 1 Bro. Ch. 186;

Wake v. W., 3 Bro. Ch. 255; Chalmers v. Storil, 2 V. & B. 222; Hender v. Rose, 3 P. W. 124 (n.); Whistler v. Webster, 2 V. 367; Douglas v. D., 12 Eq. 617; Codrington v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 868. As to the date at which compensation is to be ascertained, see Re Hancock, (1905) 1 Ch. 16.

(e) L. R. 6 Ch. 15.

(f) See Davies v. D., 38 C. D., p. 212; Re Royle, 43 C. D. 18.

(g) Pusey v. Desbouverie, 3 P. W. 315; Boynton v. B., 1 Bro. Ch. 445; Wake v. W., 3 Bro. Ch. 255; Kidney v. Coussmaker, 12 V. 136; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swans. 381, and note.

A person who does not elect within the time limited will be considered as having elected to take against the instrument putting him to his election (a).

(B) Implied.—Election is either express (about which it is unnecessary to say anything) or implied. And here considerable difficulty often arises in deciding what acts of acceptance or acquiescence amount to an implied election; and this question, it seems, must be determined more upon the circumstances of each particular case than upon any general principle. There is generally an inquiry directed as to whom the premises (belonging to another), in the testator's will mentioned, belonged at his death, and if they belonged to A. (a person to whom he had given by will benefits), whether A. had elected in his lifetime to take under the testator's will (b). On a question of election by a party bound to elect between two properties, it is necessary to inquire into the circumstances of the property against which the election is supposed to have been made; for if a party so situated, not being called on to elect, continues in the receipt of the rents and profits of both properties, such receipt cannot be construed into an election to take the one and reject the other; and, in like manner, if one of the properties does not yield rent to be received, and the party liable to elect deals with it as his own,—as, for instance, by mortgaging it (particularly if this be done with the knowledge and concurrence of the party entitled to call for an election)—such dealing will be unavailable to prove an actual election as against the receipt of the rent of the other property (c). Any acts, to be binding upon a person, must be done with a full knowledge of his rights (d); also with the knowledge of the right to elect (e), and with the intention of electing (f).

Although before an heir can be put to his election he is entitled to know everything which concerns the situation and the value of the property in reference to which he may be required to make his election, there is no authority for the proposition that where an

- (a) See the decree in Streatfield v. S., 1 Swans. 447.
- (b) Peck v. P., Seton, 6th ed., (1901), p. 1590.
- (c) Padbury v. Clark, 2 Mac. & G.
 298; and see Morgan v. M., 4 Ir.
 Ch. R. 606, 614; Re Turner, 66 L. T.
 758.
 - (d) Wilson v. Thornbury, L. R. 10 Ch.
- 239; Re Davidson, 11 C. D. 341.
- (e) Briscoe v. B., 7 Ir. Eq. R. 123; Sweetman v. S., 2 Ir. R. Eq. 141.
- (f) Stratford v. Powell, 1 Ball & B. 1; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swans. 380, 387; Edwards v. Morgan, 1 Bli. (N. S.) 401; Worthington v. Wiginton, 20 B. 67; Wintour v. Clifton, 8 De G. M. & G. 641.

heir has chosen deliberately to confirm a devise of lands, which, without his confirmation, would be invalid, there must be, in order to enable the Court to hold that those claiming under him are bound by his confirmation, some distinct evidence of his knowledge of his rights (a).

It is difficult to lay down any rule as to what length of time, after acts done by which election is usually implied, will be binding upon a party, and prevent him from setting up the plea of ignorance of his rights. In Wake v. W. (b), it was held that three years' receipt of a legacy and annuity, under a will by a widow in ignorance of her rights, did not preclude her from making her election; in Reynard v. Spence (c), where a widow had received an annuity for five years, it was held, she had not elected (d). And in Sopwith v. Maugham (e), where a widow had for sixteen years enjoyed a provision under a will in ignorance of her right to dower, in express satisfaction of which the provision was made for her, she was held not to have elected.

But a person may by his unequivocal acts suffer specific enjoyment by others until it becomes inequitable to disturb it (f).

A sale of his own property, devised by the testator to others, will be considered an election to take against the will by a person taking a beneficial interest under the will (g), and election may be inferred from one (h) or a series of unequivocal acts (i). And acts of implied election which will bind a party will also bind his representatives (k). And some acts, which it appears would not be binding upon him if insisted upon in his lifetime, will bind his representatives "upon that principle only," as observed by Lord Hardwicke, "not to disturb things long acquiesced in families, upon the foot of rights

- (a) Dewar v. Maitland, 2 Eq. 838.
- (b) 1 V. 335.
- (c) 4 B. 103.
- (d) See also Butricke v. Brodhurst, 3 Bro. Ch. 90; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swans. 386; Fytche v. F., 7 Eq. 494.
 - (e) 30 B. 235.
- (f) Tibbits v. T., 19 V. 663; Dewar v. Maitland, 2 Eq. 834; and see as to election implied by acting on a contract and taking the benefit of it, Greenhill v. North British, &c., Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474, discussed in Harle v.

- Jarman, (1895) 2 Ch. 419.
 - (g) Rogers v. Jones, 3 C. D. 688.
- (h) Barrow v. B., 4 K. & J. 409; Greenhill v. North British, &c., Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474.
- (i) Spread v. Morgan. 11 H. L. Cas. 588; Briscoe v. B., 1 Jo. & Lat. 334; Giddings v. G., 3 Russ. 241.
- (k) Northumberland v. Aylesford, Amb. 540, 657; Dewar v. Maitland, supra; Stratford v. Powell, 1 Ball & B. 1; Ardesoife v. Bennett, Dick. 463.

which those, in whose place they stand, never called in question" (a). But if the representatives of those who were bound to elect, and who have accepted benefits under the instrument imposing the obligation of election, but without explicitly electing, can offer compensation, and place the other party in the same situation as if those benefits had not been accepted, they may renounce them and determine for themselves (b).

A person entitled in remainder to an interest in property is not bound by the election of a party having a prior interest (c), and every member of a class, moreover, as, for instance, next of kin, has a distinct right to elect, and will not be bound by the election of the majority nor of the administrator (d).

So where a defendant has elected to take estates appointed by the will of the testator, who has bequeathed to others the defendant's share of funds in settlement, the defendant will be directed to execute a proper release of his share and interest in the settlement to the trustees thereof, such release to be settled by the judge (e).

If within a reasonable time no act is done affirming or disaffirming a voidable covenant it will be held binding (f).

6. Election by Parties under Disabilities.

Infants.—Where an infant is put to election, the period of election is, in some instances, as in Streatfield v. S., deferred until after he comes of age (g). In other cases there has been a reference to inquire what would be most beneficial to the infant (h). And where the Court had sufficient materials before it an order has been made for an infant to elect without a reference to Chambers (i).

Married Women.—The practice as to election by women married under the old law before 1883 in cases in which they are not restrained from anticipation, as to which see supra, p. 448 (k),

- (a) Tomkyns v. Ladbroke, 2 Ves. Sen. 593; Worthington v. Wiginton, 20 B. 67; Sopwith v. Maugham, 30 B. 235, 239; Whitley v. W., 31 B. 173.
- (b) Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swans. 385; Moore v. Butler, 2 Sch. & L. 268; Tysson v. Benyon, 2 Bro. Ch. 5.
- (c) Ward v. Baugh, 4 V. 643, 4 R. R.307; Hutchison v. Skelton, 2 Macq.H. L. Cas. 492, 495.
 - (d) Fytche v. F., 7 Eq. 494.
- (e) Fleming v. Buchanan, Seton, 6th edit. (1901), p. 1591.

- (f) Burnaby v. Equitable, &c., Soc., 28 C. D. 416; cited with approval, Re Hodson, (1894) 2 Ch., p. 426; and see Edwards v. Carter, (1893) A. C. 360.
- (g) Boughton v. B., 2 Ves. Sen. 12; Bor. v. B., 3 Bro. P. C. 173, Toml. edit.
- (h) Gretton v. Haward, 1 Swans. 413; Brown v. B., 2 Eq. 481; Seton v. Smith, 11 Si. 59.
- (i) Blunt v. Lack, 26 L. J. Oh. 148; Lamb v. L., 5 W. R. 772.
- (k) And see Hamilton v. H., (1892) 1 Ch. 396; Smith v. Lucas, 18 C. D.

varies (a); but in general there will be an inquiry what is most beneficial for them, and they will be required to elect within a limited time (b). But where the married woman has manifestly the better interest, the inquiry may be dispensed with (c).

An adult married woman may elect so as to affect her interest in real property without deed acknowledged; and where she has once so elected, the Court can order a conveyance accordingly; and the transaction will be enforced against her heir (d). With regard to separate estate under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the married woman can elect as a *feme sole*.

Lunatics, &c.—The right to elect to take under or against a will may, where a lunatic is so found, be exercised by his committee under the direction of the Court. Where not so found, as it cannot be exercised by himself, it may be by his representatives after his death (e).

7. Confirmation and Ratification of Contracts and Election.

The consequences resulting from the exercise of the common law right of confirming a voidable or unenforceable contract have an apparent resemblance under certain circumstances to the consequences resulting from election proper. In the former case, however, the person confirming makes his own imperfect disposition absolutely binding on himself, or, if he repudiates, frees himself from all liability thereunder; in the latter case he either gives effect to the act of another, or refusing to do so, a case for compensation arises. No case of election proper can arise save where a person is called upon to choose between a right vested in himself and a benefit conferred upon him by another. A certain amount of confusion has, however, been caused by the employment of phraseology appropriate to cases of election (f) in decisions where the sole

531; Re Vardon's Trusts, 31 C. D. 275; Haynes v. Foster, (1901) 1 Ch. 361; and Robinson v. Wheelwright, 6 De G. M. & G. 535, where it was held that the Court could not enable her to bind such an interest, but see the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 39.

(a) See Mr. Swanston's note to Gretton v. Haward, 1 Swans. 413; Re Jones, (1893) 2 Ch. 461, and see as to married woman of unsound mind, Jones v. Lloyd, 18 Eq. 265; Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263.

- (b) Cooper v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 53, 67, 79.
- (c) Wilson v. Townshend, 2 V. 693,
 3 R. R. 31; Hamilton v. H., (1892)
 1 Ch. p. 408.
- (d) Ardesoife v. Bennet, Dick. 463; and see discussion below in note 7, Barrow v. B., 4 Kay & J. 409; Smith v. Lucas, 18 C. D. 531; Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263; Re Hodson, (1894) 2 Ch. 421, infra, p. 467.
 - (e) Re Hewson, 23 L. J. Ch. 256.
 - (f) See observations of North, J., in

question was whether by her acts after marriage a married woman had confirmed an ante-nuptial settlement of her own property made by her whilst an infant.

There has never been any doubt but that a settlement made by an infant was merely voidable and not void: it could be confirmed after majority, and if not repudiated within a reasonable time it became binding (a). Before the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, there were certain apparent difficulties in applying the general principle to ante-nuptial settlements by married women. A married woman under the old law could neither convey her freeholds or assign her reversionary choses in action except when empowered by statute, and then only by deed acknowledged (b), nor contract save in regard to separate estate existing at the date of the contract (c). It was nevertheless established that her ante-nuptial settlement made during her infancy could be confirmed by her when of age. though then married, and so bind freeholds and reversionary choses in action included in the settlement (d). It was also held that such a settlement unless repudiated within a reasonable time after majority became binding (e).

It is also clear that the validity of an express confirmation by a married woman did not depend upon her having separate estate and so possessing contractual capacity at the date of the confirmation (f).

Harle v. Jarman, (1895) 2 Ch. at p. 427, discussing Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263; Re Hodson, (1894) 2 Ch. 421, infra.

- (a) See Davies v. D., L. R. 9 Eq. 468. The rule is unaffected by the Infants' Relief Act, 1874: Duncan v. Dixon, 44 C. D. 211; Edwards v. Carter, (1893) A. C. 360, reported in C. A., Carter v. Silber, (1892) 2 Ch. 278. Cf. Cooper v. C., 13 A. C. 88; qu. whether Re Jones, (1893) 2 Ch. 461, is reconcilable with Edwards v. Carter, supra.
- (b) Fines and Recoveries Act, 1883, ss. 77 et seq.; Malins Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57.
- (c) See infra, notes to Hulme v. Tenant.
- (d) Barrow v. B., 4 K. & J. 409; Wilder v. Pigott, 22 C. D. 263; Re
- Hodson, (1894) 2 Ch. 421. In Greenhill v. North British Insurance Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 474, Stirling, J., applied the principle of Barrow v. B. and Wilder v. Pigott to a case where a married woman had enjoyed the benefit of ante-nuptial marriage articles unenforceable against her under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds; and held that a mortgage, made by her during coverture, of a reversionary chose in action comprised in the settlement, under a power in the settlement, was valid.
- (e) Burnaby v. Equitable Reversionary Int. Soc., 28 C. D. 416; Re Hodson, (1894) 2 Ch. p. 425; Edwards v. Carter, supra.
- (f) Smith v. Lucas, 18 C. D. 531, was apparently never law on this point. See Re Hodson, (1894) 2 Ch. at p. 425; Edwards v. Carter, supra;

The general principle has no application to a *void* contract, and accordingly a post-nuptial settlement made by a woman married under the law before 1883 was incapable of being confirmed by her (a). The Married Women's Property Act, 1882, has removed all difficulties in applying the general principle recognised in Edwards v. Carter, supra, to settlements made after that Act.

8. Death of Person to Elect without Electing.

If a person under an obligation to elect dies without having done so, and property which he takes beneficially under the will, and his own property bequeathed to strangers, go the same way; if, for instance, both be personal property vesting either in his legatees or in the case of the intestacy of such person, in his next of kin; such persons would be entitled to elect (b). Each of the next of kin has a separate right of election, so that neither the election of the majority nor of one of them being the heir or administrator binds the others. Those of the next of kin who elect to take under the will, will be entitled to all the beneficial interest by the will conferred on the intestate; and any of them electing to take against the will must not only give up all benefits under it, but are bound to bring into account the interest of the person through whom he claims (c).

Where a person dies without having made any election between his own property (personalty bequeathed by the will to legates) and real estate which he took under the will, and which go beneficially in different ways, viz., the former to the executors and the latter to his heir-at-law or devisee, there can be no election on the part either of the executor on the one hand, or the heir-at-law on the other hand; each will retain the property to which he is legally entitled; but the party taking the testator's own property, i.e., in the case supposed, the realty, will be under an obligation to make good what is sufficient to satisfy the disappointed legatees, and the amount sufficient for that purpose will be a charge on the real estate (d).

As to election in cases of conversion, see Fletcher v. Ashburner, supra, p. 378.

Viditz v. O'Hagan, (1899) 2 Ch. at p. 576 (reversed 1900, 2 Ch. 87, on other grounds).

(a) Seaton v. S., 13 A. C. 61; and see Harle v. Jarman, (1895) 2 Ch. 419.

(b) Fytche v. F., 7 Eq. 494, and see Re Hewson, 23 L. J. Ch. 256; Cooper

v. C., L. R. 7 H. L. 53.

(c) Fytche v. F., 7 Eq. 494; following Ward v. Baugh, 4 V. 623, 4 R. R. 307.

(d) Pickersgill v. Rodger, 5 C. D. 163, 175. This would seem unaffected by the Land Transfer Act, 1897, Part I.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

SAVAGE v. FOSTER.

Trinity Term, 9 Geo. 1. In Chancery. [Reported. 9 Modern Reports, 35.]

Where a person knowing his own title, and not giving notice of it to a purchaser, shall never set it up against the purchaser.

Margaret Smith, being seised of the lands in question, upon her marriage with Peter Flavill settled the same upon trustees and their heirs, to the use of the said Peter Flavill for life, then upon Margaret his intended wife for life; remainder after the death of the said Peter and Margaret, to the heirs of the said Peter on the body of the said Margaret to be begotten; remainder to the right heirs of the said Margaret for ever.

The said Peter and Margaret had issue only one daughter, the now defendant, who was married to one Foster.

Peter Flavill died, and then his widow married one Brown, by whom she had issue one other daughter, and no more; which daughter being courted by one Williams, but he refusing to marry her without such a fortune which Margaret her mother was not able to give without breaking through this settlement, Margaret conveyed the said lands to the aforesaid Williams, &c.; and the defendant Mrs. Foster, and her husband, who knew that the lands were settled on her in tail as aforesaid, solicited her mother, Margaret Brown, to make a conveyance in favour of the said Williams, and were assisting in carrying on the marriage between him and her half-sister Brown.

Whereupon the said Margaret conveyed these lands, &c., to the use of herself for life, remainder to Williams and his heirs; then the marriage took effect; and afterwards Williams sold these lands to the plaintiff Savage, who entered and built a house thereon.

And now Mrs. Foster, who was the issue in tail by virtue of the said settlement, and endeavouring to set it up against the title of the plaintiff, who was the purchaser, he exhibited a bill against her

to have his title established against that settlement; for that she having full notice of the purchase, and of her own title, she gave no notice thereof to the plaintiff, and therefore ought not to be at liberty now to impeach it, though she was a *feme covert*, but that she should be concluded by this fact as well as if she were an infant.

It was argued for the defendant Mrs. Foster.—That two things are necessary to bind the right in cases of this nature: the one is, that the party must know his own title to the lands; and the other is, that he must be instrumental in promoting the purchase thereof by the vendee, without giving him notice of such title; for it would be of dangerous consequence if the bare permission of him to proceed in the purchase should be a foundation to bind his right in this Court on the foot of fraud. It is true, the defendant knew she had a title under this settlement, but she apprehended she was not to take till after her mother's death; she knew likewise that her sister was about to marry with Williams, but did not know upon what terms; but if she had known the terms of that marriage, she was then a feme covert, and her husband ought to have given the plaintiff notice of her title; therefore his negligence shall not prejudice her, who had done nothing to lose her inheritance and the entire benefit of this settlement for ever.

On the other side it was first denied, that the two things beforementioned by the plaintiff's (quære defendant's) counsel are necessary to have relief in cases of this nature; the one, that the party should know his own title; and the other, that he should be instrumental in carrying on the purchase by another, without giving him notice of such title. It is true he ought to know his own title, and that must necessarily be intended in this case, because the defendant had the custody of this deed of settlement; but it is not necessary that the person interested should be active or instrumental in carrying on the agreement in order to a purchase; for if the party knew his own title, there can be no danger that his right should be bound by the purchase, because it was in his power to help himself, by giving the purchaser notice of such right; and though this defendant was a feme covert, yet it was a fraud in her not to give the purchaser notice of her right; and therefore it shall be bound for ever; and the rather, because the defendant solicited her mother to make this conveyance in favour of Williams, upon the marriage of her sister, and for that the plaintiff hath entered and built on the lands.

THE COURT.—Where there is a parol agreement made for a lease, and the lessee, by virtue of such agreement, enters and builds, this Court will establish it on the foot of fraud in the lessor, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, &c.; because contracts executed in part are not always within the statute, though executory contracts are (a).

Now this bill is brought to be relieved against a fraud in the defendant, who would avoid the plaintiff's title by an elder settlement, though she was privy to, and assisting in, carrying on the marriage of him under whom the plaintiff claims, and never gave any notice of her title to the purchaser.

Now when anything in order to a purchase is publicly transacted, and a third person knowing thereof, and of his own right to the lands intended to be purchased, he shall never afterwards be admitted to set up such right to avoid the purchase; for it was an apparent fraud in him not to give notice of his title to the intended purchaser, and in such case infancy or coverture shall be no excuse; for though the law prescribes formal conveyances and assurances for the sales and contracts of infants and feme coverts, which every person who contracts with them is presumed to know; and if they do not take such conveyances as are necessary, they are to be blamed for their own carelessness, when they act with their eyes open; yet when their right is secret, and not known to the purchaser, but to themselves, or to such others who will not give the purchaser notice of such right, so that there is no laches in him, this Court will relieve against that right, if the person interested will not give the purchaser notice of it, knowing he is about to make the purchase; neither is it necessary, that such infant or feme covert should be active in promoting the purchase, if it appears that they were so privy to it that it could not be done without their knowledge.

THEREFORE IT WAS DECREED, that the defendant should levy a fine to the plaintiff to extinguish her right to the lands in this settlement, and that the plaintiff should have a perpetual injunction to quiet his possession; and that if the defendant shall levy the fine quietly, and without delay, then the plaintiff shall have no costs, otherwise he (quære, she) shall pay costs.

And the case of Watts v. Cresswell (b) was now remembered,

where tenant for life borrowed money, and his son, who was next in remainder, and an infant, was a witness to the deed of mortgage; this Court gave relief on the foot of fraud, because the infant did not give the mortgagee notice of his title.

So in the case of one Clare (a), who was an infant, and clerk to an attorney, and had a mortgage on his master's estate, and engrossed a subsequent mortgage thereof to another, without giving notice that the estate was mortgaged before to him; and for that reason his mortgage was postponed on the foot of fraud.

Nota.—In the next sessions of Parliament, the defendant petitioned to appeal, or to have a rehearing at the peril of costs, and offered to levy a fine on that condition; but it was rejected for not coming in time.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Cases illustrating the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel, p. 477.
- 3. Infancy and Coverture, p. 491.

1. Generally.

"Estoppel is not a cause of action—it is a rule of evidence which precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement previously made by himself" (b).

It has been described as "an impediment or bar by which a man is precluded from alleging or denying a fact, in consequence of his own previous act allegation or denial to the contrary" (c).

Estoppel may assist a plaintiff or a defendant. "It shall be as you represented it to be. No man shall set up his own iniquity as a defence any more than as a cause of action" (d).

The rule is: Where a person by words or conduct causes another reasonably to believe the existence of a certain state of things and that it was meant he should act on that belief, and thereby induces

- (a) Clare v. Earl of Bedford, 13 Vin. Ab. 536, 537.
- (b) Per *Lindley*, L. J., in Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. at p. 101.
- (c) Jacob, Law Dict., adopted by Ewart, Estoppel by Misrepresenta-
- tion, p. 4, where he criticises the definition in Cababé on Estoppel at p. 108.
- (d) Per Lord Mansfield in Montefiori v. M., 1 W. Bl. 363.

him so to act upon it as to alter his previous position, the former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time (a).

The doctrine of estoppel by representation is a very old head of equity and is founded upon a broad principle which enters so deeply into the ordinary dealings and conduct of mankind that it has been doubted whether any great advantage is to be gained by endeavouring to reduce it to rules, such as those formulated in Carr v. L. & N. W. Ru. (b).

Kay, L. J., in Low v. Bouverie (c), states the result of the authorities thus:—

- 1. There has been from ancient times a jurisdiction in Courts of equity in certain cases to enforce a personal demand against one who has made an untrue representation upon which the person to whom it was made intended to act, if such person did act upon the faith of it and suffered loss by so acting (d).
- 2. This was readily done where the representation was fraudulently made, in which case an action for deceit would lie at law.
- 3. Relief will also be given at law and in equity even though the representation was innocently made without fraud in all cases where the suit will be effective if the defendant is estopped from denying the truth of the representation (e).
- 4. Where there is no estoppel an innocent misrepresentation will not support an action at law for damages occasioned thereby (f).
- 5. Estoppel is effective where an action must succeed or fail if the defendant or plaintiff is prevented from proving a particular fact alleged. But the rule does not apply to an action of deceit, for there the plaintiff relies, not on the truth of the statement, but upon its falsehood, and he is bound to prove not only that the representation was untrue, but also that it was fraudulent (g).
- (a) Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. at p. 474, as explained in Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. at p. 663. See also Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank, &c., L. R. 6 H. L. at p. 361; Carr v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 316; Pollock, Contracts (1902), p. 523; Moncrieff on Fraud (1891), p. 237; and Cababé on Estoppel, p. 108.
- (b) L. R. 10 C. P. 316. See per Lord Macnaghten in Whitechurch v.

Cavanagh, (1902) A. C. at p. 130.

(c) (1891) 3 Ch. at p. 111.

- (d) See Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. 469; Colonial Bank v. Cady, 15 A. C. 267; Farquharson v. King, (1902) A. C. 325.
 - (e) See No. 5.
 - (f) Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. 337.
- (g) Scarf v. Jardine, 7 A. C. atp. 350; Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C.337.

6. It is doubtful whether relief in the nature of a personal demand has been given in equity in cases which did not involve fraud, or to which the doctrine of estoppel would not apply. Slim v. Croucher (a), which was probably the only instance of such relief being given, is no longer law since Derry v. Peek(b).

It is therefore now clear that a representation constitutes a cause of action in itself only when it is fraudulent or amounts to a contract or warranty. Frequently the line between Fraud, Warranty, and Estoppel is difficult to draw; and in suits in equity, where the judge had not, as in actions at law, the assistance of the jury in finding the facts, it is often difficult to determine the exact principle on which the decision was based, and many of the reported cases on estoppel are "uncommonly near contract" (c).

From the language used in some of these cases the idea arose that there was a doctrine in equity that a person who made a representation which turned out to be untrue could, even in the absence of fraud, be compelled to make it good (d), but it is now clear that no such doctrine exists (e).

Estoppel is distinguished from an Admission by the fact that a party is not conclusively bound by the latter. He may retract it or explain it away (f).

The cases establish the following proposition: that if A. desires to avail himself of the doctrine of estoppel against B., he must shew that B., no matter whether fraudulently or innocently, made (g) a representation of a fact (h) which was not true, or not true as

- (a) 1 De G. F. & J. 518.
- (b) 14 A. C. 337. See also Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82; Swan v. N. B. Australasian Co., 2 H. & C. 175; Carr v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 307; Burkinshaw v. Nicolls, 3 A. C. 1004; Re Bahia, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 584; and Balkis Consolidated Co. v. Tomkinson, (1893) A. C. 396.
- (c) Per Lord Blackburn in Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 A. C. at p. 953.
- (d) See Hammersley v. De Beil, 12 Cl. & Fin. 45; Slim v. Croucher, 1 De G. F. & J. 518.
- (e) Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. 337; Low
 v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82; Pollock,
 Contract (1902), p. 524, and App. K.
 p. 713; Moncrieff on Fraud (1891),

- p. 101.
- (f) Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. at p. 318; Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 577; and cf. Re Holland, (1902) 2 Ch. at pp. 379, 380.
- (g) Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vern. 136; Hunsden v. Cheyney, 2 Vern. 149; Burrowes v. Lock, 10 V. 470; 8 R. R. 33, 856; Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. at p. 109; Weiner v. Gill, (1905) 2 K. B. 172; and Farquharson v. King, (1902) A. C. 325.
- (h) Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. Ca. 185, followed in Chadwick v. Manning, (1896) A. C. 231. See also Maddison v. Alderson, 8 A. C. 473; and Re Moore, (1899) 1 Ch. 627.

intended to be understood (a); that A. was unaware of the untruth of such representation, and did not wilfully abstain from investigating its truth (b); and that he reasonably, in consequence of such representation (c), acted or refrained from acting to his prejudice.

If the representation was fraudulent, its ambiguity would not be a defence; but in the absence of fraud, it must be proved to be clear and certain, and such as to mislead any reasonable man (d).

Misrepresentation may be either fraudulent or innocent. It may be by words or acts, or by refraining from words or acts, that is, by concealment (e).

"It is perhaps doubtful whether it is right to speak of concealment as in any way distinct from actual misrepresentation, because it always occurs with actual representation, and possibly it would be more correct to say that the fraud is not in concealment, but in the words or actions, in consequence of their incompleteness" (f).

In the absence of a duty to disclose, mere silence will not give rise to an estoppel (g). The duty may come from the fiduciary relations of the parties, or from contract, or even from the conduct of the parties, as, for instance, in the principal case (h) there would have been no duty on the plaintiff to disclose her title but for her acts in encouraging and assisting the marriage. Her silence thereby became equivalent to a representation that she had no material facts to disclose (i).

The principle on which conduct of this kind, or that known as "holding out," "lying by," or "acquiescence" (k), may work an

- (a) Piggott v. Stratton, 1 De G. F. & J. 33.
- (b) See Re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 9, and Re Building Estates Co., Parbury's Case, (1896) 1 Ch. 100.
- (c) See Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654; Farquharson v. King, (1902) A. C. 325; Bell v. Marsh, (1903) 1 Ch. 528; and Longman v. Bath Electric Tramway Co., (1905) 1 Ch. 646.
- (d) Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654; per Kay, L. J., in Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 109. Cf. Right v. Bucknell, 2 B. & Ad. 278; Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 10 Ch. 22; and General Finance, &c., Co. v. Liberator B. Society, 10 C. D. 15.
 - (e) Moncrieff on Fraud (1891),

pp. 82, 83.

(f) Monerieff on Fraud (1891), p. 86.

(y) Moncrieff on Fraud (1891), pp. 90, 328; Osborn v. Lea, 9 Mod. 96; Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 A. C. 954; Russell v. Watts, 10 A. C. 590, 613; Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377 (distinguished in Andrews v. Mockford, (1896) 1 Q. B. 372); and Ogilvie v. West Australian, &c., Corporation, (1896) A. C. 257.

(h) Ante, p. 469.

(i) See also Burrowes v. Lock, 10 V. 470; Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82; and Moncrieff on Fraud (1891), p. 328.

(k) See per Fry, J., Willmott v. Barber, 15 C. D. 96, post, p. 484.

estoppel is: "If a person having a right, and seeing another person about to commit, or in the course of committing, an act infringing on that right, stands by in such a manner as really to induce the person committing the act, and who might have otherwise abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its being committed, he cannot afterwards be heard to complain of the act" (a).

Estoppel will not aid a mere volunteer (b).

A person cannot rely by way of estoppel on a statement induced by his own misrepresentation or by his concealment of a material fact, the disclosure of which would have been calculated to make his informant hesitate before making the statement, or where the circumstances would have deterred a reasonable man from acting on such statement (c). So too a misrepresentation which does not deceive cannot be relied on as an estoppel (d).

The case of Bristol, &c., A. B. Co. v. Maggs (e) was decided on the principle laid down in Hussey v. Horne-Payne (f), viz., that the correspondence did not disclose a completed contract; but a dictum of Kay, J. (g), has caused the suggestion that the case might also be supported on the ground of estoppel; that the party setting up the contract was precluded from doing so because he had afterwards negotiated on the footing that there was no complete agreement (h); and the same principle would, conversely, apply to a person claiming that a contract set up was null and void (i). It is very doubtful if this extension of the doctrine can be supported (k).

Fraudulent Misrepresentation may also be the ground of an action of deceit. "Where a man makes a statement, to be acted on by others, which is false, and which is known by him to be false, or is

- (a) De Bussche v. Alt, 8 C. D. at p. 314. See also Teasdale v. T., Sel. Ch. Ca. 170; Powell v. Thomas, 6 Ha. 300; Jackson v. Cator, 5 V. 688, 5 R. R. 144; Dann v. Spurrier, 7 V. 231, 6 R. R. 119; McManus v. Cooke, 35 C. D. at p. 695; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 C. D. at p. 192; Bell v. Marsh, (1903) 1 Ch. 528; Re Lewis, (1904) 2 Ch. 656; and Cababé on Estoppel, p. 82.
- (b) Dictum of Romer, J., in Lovett v. L., (1898) 1 Ch. 82.
- (c) Porter v. Moore, (1904) 2 Ch. 367; Whitechurch v. Cavanagh, (1902)

- A. C. at p. 145; Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. at p. 113.
- (d) Nelson v. Stocker, 4 De G. & J. 458; and cf. Re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co., (1893) 3 Ch. 9.
 - (e) 44 C. D. 616.
 - (f) 4 A. C. 311.
 - (g) 44 C. D. at p. 625.
 - (h) Fry, S. P. (1903) pp. 245-247.
- (i) Fry, S. P. (1903) p. 323, citing Campbell v. Fleming, 1 Ad. & E. 40.
- (k) See per North, J., in Bellamy v. Debenham, 45 C. D. at p. 495; and cf. Jorden v. Money, post, p. 477.

made by him recklessly without care whether it is true or false, he is liable to an action of deceit at the suit of anyone to whom it was addressed (a), and who was materially induced by the misstatement to do an act to his prejudice" (b).

In contract too, if there be a false representation of a material fact made by one of the parties or his agent, whereby the other is deceived, then, however honestly the representation may have been made, and however free from blame the person who made it (c), the party deceived may claim rescission of the contract, or, if the statement amount to a warranty, he may sue upon it (d).

The old rule that estoppel against estoppel sets the matter at large has been recently criticised (e).

2. Cases illustrating the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel.

It is not strictly correct to speak of a representation; for, although in most cases estoppel arises on a representation, yet, when grounded on negligence or even silence, it is almost impossible to spell out a representation, though the person estopped did induce a reasonable belief in the existence of a certain state of facts. Classification of the ways in which representations may be made is impossible.

The belief must be in an existing state of facts. Thus, in $Jorden\ v.\ Money\ (f)$, a lady to whom a gentleman owed a debt on a bond had on several occasions announced her intention of abandoning her claim, and especially at the time when he was about to marry. After the marriage, she sued on the bond. It was urged that, upon the doctrine of representation, she was not at liberty afterwards to enforce her claim. The House of Lords, but not unanimously, decided that she was not estopped, on the ground that the doctrine

- (a) Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L.
 390; Angus v. Clifford, (1891) 2 Ch.
 449; Le Lievre v. Gould, (1893) 1
 Q. B. 491; and Andrews v. Mockford, (1896) 1 Q. B. 372.
- (b) Per Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. at p. 374.
- (c) Per Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. at p. 359; Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 C. D. 12; and Aaron's Reefs v. Twiss, (1896) A. C. 273.
 - (d) Starkey v. Bank of England,
- (1903) A. C. 114; Barclay v. Sheffield Corporation, (1905) A. C. 392; Bank of England v. Cutler, (1908) 2 K. B. 208; and Monorieff on Fraud (1891), at p. 336.
- (e) Poulton v. Adjustable, &c., Co., (1908) 2 Ch. p. 432.
- (f) 5 H. L. Ca. 185, distinguishing Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. C. C. 543; followed in Chadwick v. Manning, (1896) A. C. 231.

'does not apply to a case where the representation is not of a fact, but a statement of something which the party does or does not intend to do'(a).

In Slim v. Croucher (b), a person, being asked to lend on security of a lease which the borrower represented he was entitled to have granted to him, applied to the lessor and received from him an assurance that he was willing to grant a lease to the borrower. In fact, the lease had already been granted, but the lessor had forgotten it, and the borrower had mortgaged his interest. The money having been advanced on the faith of the lessor's statement, the Court of Appeal (c) ordered the lessor to repay the money advanced with interest and costs. The Court distinctly held that there was no fraud, but proceeded upon the authority of dicta of Eldon, L. C., in Evans v. Bicknell (d), and upon the ground that the plaintiff was to be placed as far as possible in the position he was in before the representation was made (e).

Since Derry v. Peek(f), this case must be taken not to be law. But if the borrower had been in a position to sue, the landlord might have been estopped, as against him, from denying his ability to make the grant (g).

As against his landlord, a tenant is estopped from denying the former's title, unless he has been ejected by title paramount (h). But strangers are not so bound, and, therefore, if a lessor by estoppel distrains their goods on the premises, they may prove he has no title (i).

Mere payment of money as rent under the erroneous belief that there was a tenancy does not estop the person paying from shewing there was no tenancy (k).

In Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton (1) the lessor sued for rent,

- (a) See also Maddison v. Alderson,
 8 A. C. at p. 473; Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank,
 L. R. 6 H. L. 352; Gillman v. Carbutt,
 61 L. T. 281; Montefiori v. M., 1
 W. Bl. 363; Gale v. Lindo, 1 Vern.
 475; Dalbiac v. D., 16 V. 125; West v. Jones, 1 Si. (N. S.) 208.
 - (b) 1 De G. F. & J. 518.
- (c) Campbell, L.C., Knight-Bruce and Turner, L. JJ.
 - (d) 6 V. 174, 5 R. R. 245.
 - (e) See the judgment of Kay, L. J.,

- in Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. at p. 109.
- (f) 14 A. C. 337.
- (g) See Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6
 H. L. 390; Brownlie v. Campbell, 5
 A. C. at p. 953.
- (h) Cuthbertson v. Irving, 4 H. & N. 742.
- (i) Tadman v. Henman, (1893) 2 Q. B. 168.
- (k) Batten Pool v. Kennedy, (1907) 1 Ch. 256.
 - (l) (1894) 2 Q. B. 836.

and the lessee counter-claimed for a nuisance from vibration of machinery worked by the lessor on adjoining land. The lessor proposed to shew that a house of ordinary stability would not have been affected, but, it being shewn that he let it in its then condition, he was held estopped from denying that it was of ordinary stability.

In Piggott v. Stratton (a) the defendant, a lessee, induced the plaintiff to take an underlease of land for building purposes by stating he held the adjoining land under the same head lease, and could not, owing to its terms, build upon it so as to obstruct the sea view from the land he was subletting. The plaintiff built a house on the land, and then the defendant surrendered his lease, and took a new one which omitted the restrictions, and then commenced building in such a way as to obstruct the view from plaintiff's The same Court which decided Slim v. Croucher held that defendant must be restrained on the ground of estoppel. What the defendant had said was a true representation of an existing fact, but was intended to be understood, and was in fact understood, as an assurance that he had no power to obstruct the sea view during the lease, and that the underlessee would be safe from such obstruction (b).

In Ramsden v. Dyson (c), Thornton, by parol agreement with Ramsden's agent, took land belonging to Ramsden. All parties knew the land was to be built upon. The ground rent was fixed at Thornton laid out 1,800l. on building. Afterwards he applied to the agent for another piece of land for the same purpose, and in his application declared himself willing to take the land as tenant at The land was allotted to him at a rent of 1l. 0s. 7d. When a building was erected on the land, the person who had taken the land was entered in Ramsden's books as tenant. It was admitted that such tenants would never be disturbed while the ground rent Transfers were effected by notice to the agent who altered the name entered on the books. In many cases the land was surrendered and the new tenant accepted much after the form of transfer of copyholds. The tenants of the estate were very numerous. Thornton alleged that there was believed to exist, and that Ramsden's agents had encouraged such belief, a "tenant right tenure," that a person who had so taken lands was entitled to a lease

Mellor v. Walmesley, (1905) 2 Ch. 164.

⁽a) 1 De G. F. & J. 33.

⁽b) See per Lord Macnaghten in Spicer v. Martin, 14 A. C. at p. 23; cf.

⁽c) L. R. 1 H. L. 129.

for sixty years, renewable every twenty years on payment of a fine of double the ground rent. Such leases had been granted, but there was no direct evidence that they were granted on a claim of right. There was evidence that a railway company when negotiating the purchase of part of the estate had refused to do so unless such leases were granted, and that in fact they were granted, and thus the tenants received compensation for their buildings. The House of Lords (Lord Kingsdown dissenting) held that the circumstances did not shew the existence of anything greater than a tenancy from year to year, and did not establish any title to compel the grant of a lease. The landlord having brought ejectment, equity therefore would not interfere to stay it (a).

Unless a recital be clear and unambiguous, no estoppel can be based on it. Where, therefore, a conveyance recited that a person was legally or equitably entitled, and in fact he had only an equitable title, he was not estopped from dealing with the legal title which he subsequently acquired (b). Nor in a mortgage deed do the covenants for title, whether read in connection with the word "grant" or not, amount to that precise averment that the mortgagor is seised of the legal estate which is necessary to create an estoppel (c). And where a recital was inaccurate only by reason of omissions no estoppel was allowed (d). Lord Holt in Salter v. Kidley (e) has laid it down that a general recital is not an estoppel. Where the other party knows the recital is untrue, no estoppel can arise (f).

In The Onward Building Society v. Smithson (g) the defendants, who were trustees with a power of sale, in 1875 sold lands to T. In 1876 T. executed a legal mortgage to B. In 1877 T. fraudulently procured from the defendants a second conveyance for value of the same property upon the representation that it had not been sold. The conveyance recited the seisin of their testator at his death, the devise to the defendants upon trust, the power of sale and the agreement to sell free from incumbrances, and the defendants covenanted that they had not encumbered and that they had good right to convey. T. then mortgaged the premises to the plaintiffs under the

⁽a) See also Keith v. Gancia, (1904) 1 Ch. 774; cf. Canterbury v. Cooper, 99 L. T. 612.

⁽b) Right v. Bucknell, 2 B. & Ad.
278; Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 10 Ch.
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⁽d) Lovett v. L., (1898) 1 Ch. 82.

⁽e) 1 Show. 59.

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false title. T. having absconded, and the plaintiffs' security proving insufficient owing to the mortgage to B., they sued the defendants on their covenants for title with T. The Court of Appeal held that, apart from estoppel, the plaintiffs, as assignees of the equity of redemption, had no locus standi to sue the defendants, and that the recitals were not sufficiently precise to estop the defendants from denying that at the date of the conveyance they were the owners of the legal estate. It would seem that even if there had been an estoppel the action must have failed, as the plaintiffs would have had no better right than their assignor. The deed nowhere expressly stated that at the date of the conveyance the defendants had an estate in fee in the land to convey without incumbrances, though the recitals led to that inference. Estoppel, however, cannot rest on mere inference (a).

If a person represents himself as a partner, or knowingly suffers himself to be represented as a partner, he will be liable as such to any person who has given credit to the firm on the faith thereof (b). The question most frequently arises when a partner retires. A notice in the *Gazette* is a sufficient notice to future customers of the firm, but existing customers require actual notice (c). They then have the option to claim against the old firm, or accept the liability of the new. But if, after notice, they go on dealing with the new firm, they will be deemed to have elected to accept the liability of the new firm (d). But until existing customers have actual notice, a retiring partner may be made liable, although he has ceased to have any interest in the firm.

There is in general no active duty to give information (e), or to take precaution against fraud (f).

Thus, where an executor wrote to inform a beneficiary that he was entitled to certain property under the testator's will, but did not inform him of the exact conditions, it was held that he was not estopped, as he was under no duty to give exact information, and that which he had given was inaccurate only by omission (g).

Where the owner of a chattel parts with the possession of it, he

- (a) See per *Lindley*, L. J., at pp. 13, 14
- (b) Partnership Act, 1890, s. 14; Re Fraser, (1892) 2 Q. B. 633.
- (c) Partnership Act, 1890, ss. 36, 37.
- (d) Scarf v. Jardine, 7 A. C. 345, 350.
- (e) Osborn v. Lea, 9 Mod. 96; Re Lewis, (1904) 2 Ch. 656.
- (f) Scholfield v. Londesborough, (1896) A. C. 514; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 V. 174, 5 R. R. 245.
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will not, by that alone, be estopped from setting up his title (a). Nor will a trustee, who, without fraud, allows the tenant for life to have the deeds, if the latter is enabled thereby to mortgage the estate in fee simple (b).

A trustee is bound to give information to his cestui que trust (c), but not to a stranger (d).

But a duty to give information may arise from the circumstances. If a person mixes in a transaction in such a way that his silence will cause a wrong belief in the facts, then it his duty to disclose them. The leading case (e) is an illustration. Thus where the absolute owner of a term is present when her son declares he is entitled to it on her death, and witnesses the deed whereby he settles his interest, she will be held estopped from denying her son's title (f). And in Neville \forall . Wilkinson (g), on the treaty for the marriage of N., W. drew up a statement of N.'s debts in order that the bride's father might know his position. He omitted a debt due to himself, and the marriage took place on the faith of that statement. W. afterwards sued for his debt. Lord Thurlow restrained him on the ground that the omission amounted to a representation that nothing was due to him.

A person giving information is bound to give it accurately, but, in the absence of a statement that it is complete, will not be liable for omissions (h).

This is the distinction between Burrowes v. Lock (i) and Low v. Bouverie(k), for, in the former case, the trustee stated, in effect, that the $cestui\ que\ trust$ was then absolutely entitled, while, in the latter, he simply mentioned such incumbrances as occurred to him, but did not say there were no others.

Burrowes v. Lock may perhaps be also supported on the ground of fraud (1) or perhaps warranty (m). The facts were as follows:—

- (a) Weiner v. Gill, (1905) 2 K. B.
 172; London J. S. Bank v. Simmons, (1892) A. C. at p. 215.
- (b) Evans v. Bicknell, 6 V. 174, 5 R. R. 245.
 - (c) Re Tillott, (1892) 1 Ch. 86.
- (d) Burrowes v. Lock, 10 V. 470, 8 R. R. 33, 856; and Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82.
 - (e) Ante, p. 469.
- (f) Hunsden v. Cheyney, 2 Vern. 150; cf. Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vern. 136.

- (g) 1 Bro. C. C. 543.
- (h) Burrowes v. Lock, 10 V. 470,
 8 R. R. 33, 858; Low v. Bouverie,
 (1891) 3 Ch. 82; and Re Lewis, (1904)
 2 Ch. 656.
- (i) 10 V. 470, 8 R. R. 33, 856; Low v. Bouverie (1891) 3 Ch. p. 94 (n).
 - (k) (1891) 3 Ch. 82.
- (l) Per Lindley, L. J., (1891) 3 Ch. at p. 102.
- (m) Per Lord Blackburn in Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 A. C. at p. 953.

E. C., being entitled to a share in a residuary trust fund, in 1790 entered into a deed of family arrangement under which one-tenth of his share was to be paid to J. C. In 1801 E. C. negotiated the sale of his share to the plaintiff B., and in answer to an inquiry by the intending assignee, J. L. the trustee of the estate wrote, "Wm. Edward Cartwright [E. C.] is entitled to his share of money secured by debentures on Lord Dillon's estate, when sold to pay them off, which he can dispose of to any one." J. L. had had notice of the deed of 1790, but did not inform the intending assignee thereof, and the latter accordingly took an assignment of the share by a deed of the 21st November, 1801, and gave notice thereof to J. L. On the 20th November, 1802, the fund was paid to J. L., who retained E. C.'s share, and on the plaintiff applying to J. L. for payment J. C. set up his claim under the deed of 1790. The Court decreed in effect that J. L. should pay the whole sum to B.

In Low v. Bouverie (a) a person, being entitled under a settlement to a life interest in certain funds, applied to the plaintiff for a loan on the security of such interest. The plaintiff's solicitors thereupon wrote to the defendant Bouverie, who was one of the trustees of the settlement, asking what the trust fund consisted of, and whether the proposed borrower was still entitled to the full benefit of his life interest in such fund. The defendant replied stating that the life interest was subject to certain charges, specifically mentioning them, but did not say there were no others. The advance was made on the security of a mortgage of the borrower's life interest. Subsequently, the plaintiff discovered that the life interest was subject to several incumbrances prior to his own, but which the defendant, although he had received notice, had forgotten to mention to the The plaintiff's security being insufficient, he sued the defendant to have him declared liable to pay the amount due on the mortgage. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that there was no breach of duty, as defendant was under no obligation to do more than answer such inquiries honestly (fraud was not alleged); that there was no warranty, as the plaintiff and defendant were not contracting parties; that there was no estoppel, because in order to create an estoppel the representation must be clear and unambiguous, and the defendant had not said that there were no incumbrances except those mentioned; and also that to create an estoppel, the person to whom it is made must be misled by it, and of this

there was no evidence, or not sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court (a).

If a person, having an incumbrance on an estate, deny the fact on an inquiry by an intending purchaser, equity will relieve against the incumbrance (b). And this applies where the non-disclosure is of a right to be recouped out of the estate, if a certain incumbrance is levied out of the referee's estate (c).

The principles on which Acquiescence will estop the owner of a right from asserting it were laid down by Fry, J., in Willmott v. Barber (d). "A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights. What, then, are the elements or requisites necessary to constitute fraud of that description? In the first place, the plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights. Secondly, the plaintiff must have expended some money, or must have done some act (not necessarily on the defendant's land) on the faith of his mistaken belief. Thirdly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of his own right, which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff. If he does not know of it, he is in the same position as the plaintiff, and the doctrine of acquiescence is founded upon conduct with knowledge of your legal rights (e). Fourthly, the defendant must know of the plaintiff's mistaken belief of his rights. If he does not, there is nothing which calls upon him to assert his own rights. Lastly, the defendant must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money, or in the other acts which he has done, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right. Where all these elements exist, there is fraud of such a nature as will entitle the Court to restrain the possessor of the legal title from exercising it, but, in my judgment, nothing short of this will do "(f).

Where the servant or agent of a person has abused his position,

⁽a) See judgment of Kay, L. J., (1891) 3 Ch. at pp. 113, 114.

⁽b) Ibbotson v. Rhodes, 2 Vern. 554; Amy's Case, cited 2 Ch. Ca. 128; Hickson v. Aylward, 3 Mol. 1; Berrisford v. Milward, 2 Atk. 49; cf. Stronge v. Hawkes, 4 De. G. M. & G. 186.

⁽c) Boyd v. Belton, 1 Jo. & Lat. 730.

⁽d) 15 C. D. 96, reversed on a question of costs only, 17 C. D. 772; see Dann v. Spurrier, 7 V. 231, 6 R. R. 119, and the cases ante, p. 476.

⁽e) Cf. Bell v. Marsh, (1903) 1 Ch.528, and Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vern.156.

⁽f) And see Procter v. Bennis, 36 C. D. 740.

but has acted within the scope of his authority, his principal is estopped from setting up the true facts.

In Rimmer v. Webster (a) the estoppel was based on the principle that where an owner has not only transferred property to an agent or trustee, but has acknowledged that the transferee has paid full consideration for it, he cannot set up his equitable title against a person to whom the transferee has disposed of the property for value, for he voluntarily arms the transferee with the means of dealing with the estate as the absolute, legal and equitable owner free from every shadow of incumbrances or adverse equity.

In Farquharson v. King (b) the appellants' clerk had a limited authority to sell to known customers, and the dock company, with whom they stored timber, was instructed to accept the delivery orders he signed. The clerk fraudulently signed transfer orders to himself in an assumed name, and in that name gave delivery orders to the respondents, who knew nothing of the appellants or of the clerk in his own name. The jury found that the appellants did not so act as to hold the clerk out as their agent to sell goods to the respondents, and the House of Lords accordingly held that the appellants were not estopped from setting up their own title.

In Whitechurch v. Cavanagh (c) it was held that, in permitting its secretary to certify transfers of shares, a company does not thereby authorise him to do more than give a receipt for shares actually lodged, and, consequently, is not estopped from setting up the truth in an action based on the fact that the secretary had given a receipt or acknowledgment for shares which had not actually been lodged (d).

In Re Economic Fire Office (e), the company granted a policy to G. & Co. guaranteeing the fidelity of G., who paid the first year's premium. It was contemplated that each premium under the policy should be paid by G. personally and the receipt sent by him to G. & Co. G. borrowed the amount of the second year's premium from the company's agent, who gave him a receipt for it, and this he sent to G. & Co. G. afterwards absconded, and G. & Co.

⁽a) (1902) 2 Ch. 163; Burgis v. Constantine, (1908) 2 K. B. 484.

⁽b) (1902) A. C. 325.

⁽c) (1902) A. C. 117.

⁽d) See also Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated Co., (1906) A. C. 439; Swan v. N. B. Australasian Co., 2 H. & C. 175; Carr v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.,

^{L. R. 10 C. P. 307; Biggs v. Evans, (1894) 1 Q. B. 88; Robinson v. Montgomery Brewery Co., (1896) 2 Ch. 841; Union Credit Bank v. Mersey Docks, &c., Board, (1899) 2 Q. B. 205, 210.}

⁽e) 12 T. L. R. 142.

were held entitled to prove for their claim in the winding-up of the company, because the company were estopped by the receipt from denying payment of the premium.

In Ogilvie v. West Australian Mortgage, &c., Corporation (a), certain entries debited by a bank to its customer were in respect of cheques forged by one of its servants. The customer was first informed thereof by the bank's accredited agent, who requested his silence; he made no complaint, doing so honestly and with a view to what he believed to be the bank's interest, and was held not estopped from relying on the forgery (b).

Numerous questions of estoppel have arisen on points of Company Law.

The shares of a company cannot be issued at a discount (c). If, therefore, shares are issued as fully paid, on which the full amount has not actually been paid, and in respect of which no contract has been filed, the shareholder is liable for the amount remaining unpaid on them (d); and this liability exists not only in order to pay creditors, but also to adjust the liability of the contributories inter se (e).

In Bloomenthal v. Ford (f), however, a person being requested to lend money to a company on the security of fully paid shares of the company, did so, receiving certificates that he was holder of 10,000 fully paid shares. No money had in fact been paid on the shares, which were issued from the company direct to the lender, who did not know this, but believed the representation that they were fully paid. An order for winding-up the company having been made, it was held that the company and liquidator were estopped from denying that the shares were fully paid (g).

In Re Eddystone Marine, &c., Co. (h) a private company passed resolutions allotting certain shares as fully paid up to the directors, and a contract was executed between the company and the allottees, and duly registered, by which it was agreed that such shares should be allotted to them in consideration of services rendered. The contract recited that the company was indebted to the allottees for

⁽a) (1896) A. C. 257; dist. McKenzie v. British Linen Co., 6 A. C. 82.

⁽b) And see also Smith v. Prosser, (1907) 2 K. B. 735.

⁽c) Companies (Con.) Act, 1908, s. 89. Buckley, (1909) pp. 211-7.

⁽d) Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 A. C. 409; Ooregum Gold, &c., Co. v.

Roper, (1892) A. C. 133.

⁽e) Welton v. Saffery, (1897) A. C. 299.

⁽f) (1897) A. C. 156.

 ⁽g) Cf. Burkinshaw v. Nicolls, 3
 A. C. 1004.

⁽h) (1893) 3 Ch. 9.

services rendered and expenses incurred. There was in fact no consideration for the allotment, and in the winding-up the liquidator placed the allottees on the list of contributories, and Wright, J., held they were rightly so placed. The Court of Appeal affirmed his decision, rejecting the argument that the company were estopped by the recitals, as the facts were known to all parties, and the company could not do something which was ultra vires by putting an untruth into the document.

On the other hand, in Re Building Estates Co., Parbury's Case (a), an estoppel was allowed under these circumstances. P. gave W. 500l. on a promise to secure an allotment of shares in a new company. W. was entitled under an agreement (not filed) to a certain number of fully paid shares, and, after the company was incorporated, W. caused one hundred shares to be allotted to P. as his nominee. The certificate issued to P. untruly stated that the shares were fully paid. The company never received any of the 500l. and P. never repudiated the shares. It was held that P. was not liable to be placed on the list of contributories.

A company cannot purchase its own shares, and a surrender of shares releasing the holder from all future liability is therefore void, unless the circumstances are such that would justify a forfeiture of the shares (b).

Where a company registers a transfer of shares and issues a certificate to the transferee, the certificate amounts to a statement intended to be acted on by purchasers that the transferee is entitled to the shares, and the company is estopped from denying its truth (c). But where the purchaser relies not on the certificate, but on a transfer from the holder, which is in fact a forgery, then the company is not estopped from denying the transferee's title (d).

Although the company may be estopped, yet a director present at the meeting at which the certificate was passed is not estopped, for the duty of examining and checking share certificates may as a rule be properly left to the secretary. But probably a director signing the certificate would be estopped from denying its truth (e).

- (a) (1896) 1 Ch. 100.
- (b) Bellerby v. Rowland, (1902) 2 Ch. 14.
- (c) Re Bahia, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 584; Hart v. Frontino, L. R. 5 Ex. 111; Balkis Consolidated Co. v. Tomkinson, (1893) A. C. 396; Re Ottos Kopje, &c., Mines, (1893) 1 Ch. 618; Re Concessions Trust, McKay's
- Case, (1896) 2 Ch. 757; and Dixon v. Kennaway, (1900) 1 Ch. 833.
- (d) Simm v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co., 5 Q. B. D. 188; Foster v. Tyne Pontoon, &c., Co., 63 L. J. Q. B. 50.
- (e) Dixon v. Kennaway, (1900) 1 Ch. 833.

In order to fix a director with liability in respect of his qualification shares, when they have been registered in his name without any application by him and without his knowledge, it must be shown that he acted as a director at a time when he could not properly so act without possessing the qualification (a). In any other case he is not estopped, and there is no need for him to take such shares direct from the company (b), and a statement in a prospectus that the directors would take all the ordinary shares which were not taken by the vendors is a mere statement of intention and will not estop (c).

In Robinson v. Montgomery Brewery Co. (d) a company applied to its broker for a loan of 3,000l. on security of 8,000l. debenture stock which, by the trust deed, was assignable free from equities. He asked G. to lend 6,000l., and the company issued a certificate that G. was holder of 8,000l. debenture stock. G. thereupon paid the broker 6,000l. and the latter paid the company 3,000l. Held, that, although the certificate was not a negotiable instrument, G. was entitled to assume that the broker had full authority to deal with it, and he was not bound to see that the company actually received the money (e).

In The Colonial Bank v. Cady (f), certain shares in a New York company were vested in the executors of W. The certificates were so framed as to contemplate the holder of them being entitled to transfer them by a form which, though on the same paper as the certificate, was a separate instrument, and, when signed by the person who on the face of the instrument was stated to be the owner, purported to transfer to someone else the property in the shares. The executors, in order to get themselves registered in the books of the company, entrusted the certificates to B., who, in fraud of the trust reposed in him, pledged the certificates with the bank to raise money for himself. The shares were not negotiable instruments, and the executors had been informed that to obtain registration they must sign their names on the form printed on the

⁽a) Re Printing, &c., Co., Ex p. Cammell, (1894) 1 Ch. 528; Re Portuguese, &c., Mines, Ex p. Lord Inchiquin, (1891) 3 Ch. 28.

⁽b) Re Metropolitan Public Carriage Co., Brown's Case, L. R. 9 Ch. 102.

⁽c) Re Moore Brothers & Co., (1899) 1 Ch. 627.

⁽d) (1896) 2 Ch. 841.

⁽e) See also Roberts v. Security Co., 13 T. L. R. 79. As to estoppel from denial of authority to apply for shares, see Re Consort Deep Level Co., W. N. (1897) 25. And under the Companies Clauses Act, 1845 s. 18, see Barton v. L. & N. W. Ry., 24 Q. B. D. 77. (f) 15 A. C. 267.

certificates, which they did without filling up the blanks. They never intended to part with the property in them. It was held by the House of Lords that the form of the transfer was equally consistent with either of the two purposes that the executors were going to transfer to someone else or that they were signing in order to get themselves registered. That the bank, therefore, must be taken to have known that the possession of B. was consistent with either of such purposes, and that it could not assume, when dealing with a broker in possession of such certificates, that he had authority to complete a transfer, and that, therefore, the executors were not estopped from setting up their title against the bank (a). But a person who takes negotiable securities in good faith and for value will obtain a good title though he takes from one who had none (b).

As to bills of exchange, cheques, and other negotiable instruments, questions may arise between the holder and persons liable on the bill, or between the banker and his customer.

Where a person signs a blank stamped paper and hands it to another to issue as a negotiable instrument, he impliedly authorises the paper to be filled up to the full amount allowed by the stamp (c). But that does not apply where the blank paper is only entrusted to an agent for safe custody, and with no authority at all to issue it without further instructions (d).

No estoppel arises against a person who has been induced to sign a promissory note by a fraudulent representation that he is witnessing a deed, and at the time he does so he believes the representation and has no knowledge of the existence of the note, and the jury acquit him of negligence (e).

The acceptor of a bill of exchange is not under any duty towards subsequent holders to take precautions against fraudulent alterations after acceptance, and where such alterations were made in spaces

- (a) Cf. the judgment of Cairns, L. C., in Goodwin v. Robarts, 1 A. C. at p. 470, and Bentinck v. London J. S. Bank, (1893) 2 Ch. 144.
- (b) London J. S. Bank v. Simmons, (1892) A. C. 201; Edelstein v. Schuler, (1902) 2 K. B. 144.
- (c) Young v. Grote, 1 Bing. 253; Scholfield v. Londesborough, (1896) A. C. at p. 536; Lloyds Bank v. Cooke, (1907) 1 K. B. 794; Glennie v. Bruce-
- Smith, (1908) 1 K. B. 263. Herdman v. Wheeler, (1902) 1 K. B. 361, is not a case of estoppel.
- (d) Smith v. Prosser, (1907) 2 K. B.735. Cf. Swan v. N. B. AustralasianCo., 2 H. & C. 175.
- (e) Lewis v. Clay, 67 L. J. Q. B. 224. Cf. Longman v. Bath Electric Tramways, (1905) 1 Ch. 646, and Howatson v. Webb, (1908) 1 Ch. 1.

left blank it was held that the acceptor was not estopped from proving that he had only accepted for the original amount (a). It may be, however, that the drawer of a cheque is under such a duty towards his banker (b).

A banker cannot debit his customer with payments made to persons claiming under forged endorsements, unless there are circumstances amounting to a direction from the customer to pay the bill without reference to the genuineness of the indorsement or equivalent to an admission of its genuineness, whereby the banker is induced to alter his position (c).

Analogous to the doctrine of estoppel is the rule of law laid down in Collen v. Wright (d), which has been recently considered by the Courts in relation to the position of stockbrokers. In Starkey v. Bank of England (e), a broker applied to the Bank of England for a power of attorney for the sale of Consols. He believed he was instructed by the stockholder, and bona fide induced the bank to transfer the Consols to a purchaser upon a power of attorney on which the stockholder's signature was forged. It was held that the broker had impliedly warranted his authority, and was therefore liable to indemnify the bank against the stockholder's claim for restitution. The same rule was applied in Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay (f), where the bank had innocently sent to the plaintiffs a forged transfer to be registered (q). In all these cases, it is a question of fact. Was the plaintiff, being invested with a duty of a ministerial nature, called upon to exercise that duty at the request, direction, or demand of the defendant? If he was, and thereby incurred liability to third parties, there is implied by law a contract by the defendant to indemnify the plaintiff against the liability (h).

- (a) Scholfield v. Londesborough, (1896) A. C. 514; Imperial Bank of Canada v. Bank of Hamilton, (1903) A. C. 49; and Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Marshall, (1906) A. C. 559; Kepitigalla Co. v. National Bank, (1909) 2 K. B. 1010, 25 T. L. R. 402.
- (b) Young v. Grote, 1 Bing. 253; see per Lord Watson in Scholfield v. Londesborough, (1896) A. C. at pp. 536, 537; and see article by Mr. Beven, (1907) 23 L. Q. R. p. 390.
- (c) Robarts v. Tucker, 16 Q. B. 560; Bank of England v. Vagliano, (1891) A. C. 160, and cases cited above.
 - (d) 8 E. & B. 647.
 - (e) (1903) A. C. 114.
 - (f) (1905) A. C. 392.
- (g) See also Bank of England v. Cutler, (1908) 2 K. B. 208; and 25 T. L. R. 509.
- (h) See per Lord Davey, (1905) A. C. at p. 399.

3. Infancy and Coverture.

The law on this subject is well summed up in the principal case: "In the case of fraud, infancy or coverture shall be 'no excuse; for though the law prescribes formal conveyances and assurances for the sales and contracts of infants and feme coverts, which every person who contracts with them is presumed to know; and if they do not take such conveyances as are necessary, they are to be blamed for their own carelessness, when they act with their eyes open; yet, when their right is secret, and not known to the purchaser, but to themselves, or to such others who will not give the purchaser notice of such right, so that there is no laches in him, this Court will relieve against that right, if the person interested will not give the purchaser notice of it, knowing he is about to make the purchase; neither is it necessary that such infant or feme covert should be active in promoting the purchase, if it appears that they were so privy to it that it could not be done without their knowledge."

Infants.—Where a person enters into a contract during his minority, he is not, either at law or in equity, bound thereby after his majority on the mere ground that without any false assertion on his part the other party believed him to be of age (a). And the mere fact that an infant carries on trade is not a representation that he is of age (b).

In order, however, that relief may be obtained against an infant, it is not essential that he should actively encourage the fraud (c), if he be privy to it. Thus in Watts v. Creswell (d), cited in the principal case, a tenant for life borrowed money, and his son, who was next in remainder, and an infant, was a witness to the mortgage deed, and the Court relieved on the ground of the fraud in the infant, by not giving notice to the mortgagee of his title. That certainly was a very strong case; for the young man who was employed in soliciting the loan had only heard that the lands were settled upon him after his father's death. But Lord Cowper said: "If an infant is old and

⁽a) Stikeman v. Dawson, 1 De G. & Sm. 90. But see Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & Ald. 147; Belton v. Hodges, 9 Bing. 363, at p. 369; and Levene v. Brougham, 25 T. L. R. 265.

⁽b) Ex p. Jones, 18 C. D. 109.

⁽c) But see the judgment in Stikeman v. Dawson, supra.

⁽d) 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 515.

cunning enough to contrive and carry on a fraud, he ought to make satisfaction for it." •

The principle invariably acted upon by the Court of equity is this, that an infant shall not take advantage of his own wrong. Thus in Clarke v. Cobley (a) a woman, at the time of her marriage, was indebted on two promissory notes. After the marriage the husband gave his bond for the amount to the creditor, who thereupon delivered up the notes. The bond having been put in suit, the husband pleaded his infancy at the time of giving the bond. On a bill being filed in equity for relief, the Court ordered the notes to be returned to the plaintiff with directions that the defendant should not plead the Statute of Limitations to any action the plaintiff should bring on the notes, or any other plea which the defendant could not have pleaded at the time the bond was given. And see Lemprière v. Lange (b), where a lease obtained by an infant upon an implied representation that he was of age was set aside as void on the ground of fraud, and possession was ordered to be given up; but it does not appear to be very obvious why the Master of the Rolls refused to make him liable for use and occupation.

Although a mortgage by an infant, falsely representing himself to be of age, might be good as against himself, nevertheless it will not be so as against a subsequent mortgage made after he attained his majority to a person who advanced his money without notice of the first mortgage. In Inman v. I. (c) an infant charged his reversionary interest in a fund with payment of a sum lent to him upon his promissory note, and executed a statutory declaration stating (untruly) that he was then of full age. After attaining twenty-one, he mortgaged his interest in the fund for an amount exceeding what was ultimately available, without disclosing the fact of the prior charge. It was held by Bacon, V.-C., that the charge given by the infant during his infancy and incapacity to contract was avoided by the subsequent mortgage executed by him, when of full age and capable of contracting, to a mortgagee without notice; but a learned author points out that the report is not altogether consistent, and that possibly the Court was influenced by the nature of the previous transaction in which the infant had agreed to pay 75 per cent. for an advance made to him (d).

⁽a) 2 Cox, 173.

⁽b) 12 C. D. 675.

⁽c) 15 Eq. 260.

⁽d) Simpson on Infants (1909), p. 63, but see Pollock on Contracts, 7th ed.,

p. 79.

Although an infant may falsely represent himself of age, a person aware that he was not of age, and who was therefore not deceived by such representation, cannot obtain relief in equity (a).

An infant known to the other party to be so, is not bound by acquiescence, as by allowing another to act on the faith that the infant will do or not do certain things, but if the acquiescence or untrue representation continue after twenty-one, he will be bound (b).

Married Women—Savage v. Foster (c) is said to be the only case where the Court decreed a wife to levy a fine (d). A married woman has now by law full power of control or alienation over her real estate (e). But if married before 1883, as to property the title to which accrued before then, s. 77 (2) of the Fines and Recoveries Act governs her power of alienation, which can only be exercised in the manner which that statute prescribes; and in such case when she has contracted without complying with the statutory conditions her contract cannot be specifically enforced against her (f).

But there is a wide difference between holding a married woman not bound by a contract and holding her not bound by misrepresentation and fraud (g), and she has frequently been held bound by equitable estoppel (h).

A married woman restrained from anticipation can, however, no more bind her interest by admission than by assignment or release (i).

In Sharp v. Foy (k), in a settlement made on the marriage of a female infant her husband covenanted that if and when his wife attained twenty-one he would concur with her if she would consent in settling her real estate. She attained twenty-one, but no settlement of the real estate was made. The husband and wife then joined in a mortgage of the wife's realty to secure a loan to the husband, and the mortgagee was informed by both husband and wife that no settlement existed. The mortgagee discovered the

- (a) Nelson v. Stocker, 4 De G. & J. 458.
- (b) Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & Ald. 147; Belton v. Hodges, 9 Bing. 365; Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 89.
 - (c) Supra, p. 469.
- (d) See Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. p. 422 arguendo.
 - (e) Married Women's Property Acts,
- 1882, 1893, and 1907.
 - (f) Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420.
- (g) Per Giffard, L. J., in Re Lush's T., L. R. 4 Ch. p. 601.
- (h) See Vaughan v. Vanderstegen,
- Drew. 363, 378, 379.
 Bateman (Lady) v. Faber (1898),
- 1 Ch. 144. (k) L. R. 4 Ch. 35.

settlement, before the mortgage deed had been acknowledged by the wife. On bill by the mortgagee it was held the misrepresentation of the wife constituted a fraud which bound her estate, and consequently that the mortgagee had priority over the persons interested under the settlement (a), and she may bar her equity to a settlement by a fraud though influenced to commit it by her husband (b).

In Bagot v. Chapman (c) a married woman, entitled to a reversionary interest, was induced by her husband to execute a document which he represented to be a power of attorney enabling him to raise money at some future time. It was, in fact, a mortgage of a reversionary interest with a personal covenant for payment by the wife. The wife knew that if her husband did raise money on the document it would come out of her interest, but she did not intend to create a present charge or incur any personal liability. It was held she was at liberty to plead non est factum, and consequently was not estopped from setting up her title against the mortgagee.

cf. Arnold v. Woodhams, 16 Eq. 34.

⁽a) See Mills v. Fox, 37 C. D. 153. (c) (1907) 2 Ch. 222, but see Howat-(b) Re Lush's T., L. R. 4 Ch. 591; son v. Webb, (1908) 1 Ch. 1 (C. A.).

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

MR. JUSTICE EYRE v. COUNTESS OF SHAFTSBURY.

1722. 2 P. W. 103; Gilb. Eq. Rep. 172.

Guardian and Ward.

A guardianship, devised to three persons, without saying "and to the survivors or survivor of them," yet the survivor shall have it (a).

The right of the testamentary guardian, by the express words of the Act of Parliament, takes place of all other guardians, and his authority, by that law, is a continuation of the paternal authority.

The mother of a ward of the Court, contriving and effecting his marriage, without obtaining the consent of the testamentary guardian, or making an application to the Court, is liable for a contempt of the Court, although the marriage be in other respects proper.

THE late Earl of Shaftsbury, by his will, dated the 10th of November, 1710, devised the guardianship of the person and estate of his infant child (the present Earl) to Mr. Justice Eyre and two others (since deceased), without saying "and to the survivor of them;" and this devise of the guardianship was until the child should come to twenty-one years of age.

Lord Shaftsbury died beyond sea, and the infant earl was now twelve years of age, when Mr. Justice Eyre, perceiving that his lordship had not a proper governor provided for him by the countess his mother, and that the person who was ordered to attend him as his gentleman was not a fit person for that purpose, petitioned the Lord Chancellor that he, as sole surviving guardian, might have the ordering, as he should think proper, of such governor, gentleman, and other

servants to attend the said infant earl; and that the person of the said infant earl might be delivered over to the petitioner.

Argument for the Respondent (a).—On the behalf of the countess, it was insisted by the Solicitor-General, Mr. Lutwiche, Mr. Cowper, and Mr. Talbot, that the guardianship, being devised to three, without saying "and to the survivor of them," the same did not survive; that it was but a bare authority, and no interest, in regard no profit could be made thereof; that, if a power were given to three, and one of them should die, the survivor could not execute such power; that, if two were made committee of a lunatic, on the death of one of them, the commitment would determine; that this was a trust annexed to the person, and not assignable, nor was it reasonable it should survive, forasmuch as the testator might think it proper to trust three, but not to invest a smaller number with a charge of that importance.

Also it was said, that, if the infant earl should die without issue under age, in such case the late earl by his will had given an annuity of 500L per annum to Mr. Justice Eyre, which made it improper that he alone should be intrusted with the person of the infant earl, who would be a gainer on his dying without issue and under age; that, the will having appointed three guardians to the infant, it was the same thing as if the testator had appointed those three jointly, and then it was plain, that, if one should die, the survivors could not act; that, according to Auditor Curle's case (b), where an office is granted to two, on the death of one of the grantees, the office determines.

And though it might be attended with some inconvenience were such guardianship or authority to determine on the death of one of the persons intrusted, yet it must be allowed to have been in the power of the testator to have prevented this inconvenience by limiting the guardianship to the survivor by express words (c).

It was, moreover, urged, that this was a matter of trust; for every guardianship was a trust (d); that the Crown, as parens patriæ, was the supreme guardian and superintendent over all infants; and since this was a trust, it was consequently in the discretion of the Court, whether or no they would do so hard a thing as to take away

⁽a) The arguments have been greatly retrenched.

⁽b) 11 Co. 2 b.

⁽c) Salk, 465.

⁽d) See Duke of Beaufort v. Berty,1 P. W. 704; Frederick v. F., 1 P.W. 721,

an infant under thirteen years of age, from so careful a mother as the countess was; that the tender calls of nature were on the mother's side; and then there were two physicians (Dr. Robinson and Dr. Friend), who both testified that the infant earl was of a tender and sickly constitution; so that at least the Court might refuse to grant this in a summary way, or otherwise than upon a bill.

Argument for the Petitioner (a).—On the other side it was said, that this guardianship was not devised to three jointly, but to three until the infant earl should come to twenty-one; that a guardian had not only a bare authority, but also an interest, for he might bring a writ of ravishment of ward, or might make a lease during the minority of the infant, as was determined in the case of Shopland v. Rydler (b); so that guardians had an interest coupled with their authority, and consequently the office would survive.

It was true it could not be granted over: no more could the office of executorship: but yet there could be no question but that, if there had been two executors, and one should die, the other would take the whole executorship as survivor.

And as to the objection, that there was no profit in the guardianship, and therefore it should not survive, the same way of reasoning would hold in the case of an executorship, for that was barely a trust and no ways profitable; notwithstanding which, being a legal interest, it would survive. It was likewise said, that in case where three guardians were appointed, if this were supposed to be but a joint authority, and consequently not to survive, it would prove a great inconvenience, and in a good measure frustrate the intention of the person appointing them.

As to what was held in Auditor Curle's case (viz.), where an office has been usually granted to two, and one of them dies, that this is a determination of such office, the reason must be supposed to be, because they both make but one officer, as in the case of the sheriffs of Middlesex.

That, with regard to the 500l per annum given to Mr. Justice Eyre, in case of the infant's death without issue and under age, that

could be no objection in case of a testamentary guardian appointed by the party himself, whatever it might be where the guardian was to be appointed by the Court; for, where the testator himself says that J. S. shall be guardian of his son, and by the same will also declares that the said guardian shall have the whole estate in case the child shall die within age, surely that would be good; much more shall the devise in our case, which is but a small part of the estate.

Then, as to the objection of hardship from the guardians being empowered to impose servants, governors, &c., who, when put upon the young lord by such guardian, would probably not regard the countess, as having no dependence upon her, this might be as well turned the other way (viz.), that if they were put in by the mother, they would have no regard to the guardian, who yet was intended by the will to be in loco parentis, and to supply the father's place.

That Dr. Stubbs, the governor, might be a good scholar and a pious man, and yet it would not necessarily follow that he was a proper governor to attend the young earl to court, or to noble families or at the exercises of dancing and riding, which it was fit his lord-ship should be acquainted with. Besides, it was of great consequence, in regard such servants are apt to flatter their young masters, and to entertain their thoughts with such things as would be rather pleasing than useful to them. * * *

LORD CHANCELLOR MACCLESFIELD.—The father, by the statute (a), has a right to dispose of the guardianship of his child until twenty-one, and, having done so here, it will be (b) binding, unless some misbehaviour be shown in the guardian, in which case, it being a matter of trust, this Court has a superintendency over it.

But as to the objection, that this right of guardianship does not survive, because it is not said in the will in express terms that it shall go to the survivor, there seems to be no colour for it; because, where several guardians are appointed by a will, each of them seems to be a complete guardian, like the case where there are two or three churchwardens of a parish, each of them is a distinct churchwarden; and it would be mischievous, and of very ill effect, if, where there

⁽a) 12 Car. 2, c. 24.

⁽b) See Dillon v. Lady Mountcashell, 4 Bro. P. C. 366, Toml. ed.

are several guardians appointed by a will, and some refuse to act, that the rest should not be able to do anything; and yet this must be the consequence if a guardianship devised to several should be taken to be one joint naked authority; such construction would make the Act of little force. A guardian has an authority coupled with an interest, and may bring a writ of ravishment of ward (a) on the infant's being taken from him; and though it is true that the damages recovered shall, by the statute, go towards the benefit of the ward, yet the declaration must lay it ad damnum of the guardian the plaintiff.

The reason of Auditor Curle's case (b), where, on the office of auditor being granted to two, without saying "and to the survivor," such office, on the death of one, was held to be determined, was because, in such case, both made but one officer, as the two sheriffs of Middlesex make, as to their office, but one person. In the present case, here is a plain right placed and vested in Mr. Justice Eyre, as the surviving guardian, and who, everyone is assured, will well execute such trust, which it will be impossible for him to do without being allowed to place and choose the governor, gentleman, &c., to attend upon and take care of this young nobleman.

And, though Dr. Stubbs may be a good, learned, and pious man, yet he may not be so fit to attend the young earl to all places; for instance, to courts, places of exercise and diversion, &c., at which it may be proper for his lordship to appear.

But I must differ from Mr. Justice Eyre, as to sending the infant to a public school, which may be thought likely to instil into him notions of slavery.

Wherefore, per Cur., discharge Dr. Stubbs from being governor, as also Mr. Bennett from being gentleman, and deliver the infant

(a) This writ was given by the Stat. West. 2 (13 Ed. 1, c. 35) to the Guardian in Chivalry to recover the body of the ward. And by the equity of Stat. West. 2 (13 Ed. 1, c. 24), which gave a writ in consimili casu the guardian in socage might have ravishment of ward. Military tenures were abolished by 12 Car. 2, c. 24, by which an action of ravishment of ward or

trespass was given to the testamentary guardian. The writ in consimili casu was abolished by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 36, and the ordinary remedy to recover the body of an infant either by the father or the guardian is now by Habeas corpus. See Re Marston, 17 W. R. (Q. B. Ir.), 794.

(b) 11 Co. 2 b.

into the hands of his guardian, Mr. Justice Eyre, who desired the young earl might dine with him. But the Lord Chancellor said, that this was in confidence, that the Judge should return him to his mother the countess, at night; for that, as yet, the Court would not make any order touching the custody of the earl's person.

Afterwards, on the Great Seal's being taken from the Earl of Macclesfield, and placed in the hands of three Lords Commissioners, on the 18th of March, 1724, Mr. Justice Eyre (lately made Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer) exhibited his petition to the Lords Commissioners, setting forth the former proceedings; and that the infant earl, who was now just fourteen years of age, and had been married to Lady Susannah Noel, daughter to the Countess of Gainsborough, was detained from the petitioner; that such marriage was without the consent or privity of the said Lord Chief Baron, the surviving guardian. Therefore the petitioner thought it his duty to lay these things before the Court, praying that the custody or tuition of the infant lord might be granted to him, and that the Court would make such order touching this matter as they should think proper.

Upon this the Dowager Countess of Shaftsbury petitioned the Lords Commissioners, that the order of the late Lord Macclesfield, declaring the right of guardianship to belong to the Lord Chief Baron Eyre, and directing the person of the infant earl to be delivered to the said Lord Chief Baron, might be set aside.

Also, the infant earl petitioned the Lords Commissioners, insisting that the guardianship of his lordship, given by the will, was determined by the death of two of the guardians, and praying that his lordship, being now of the age of fourteen years, might be at liberty to choose his guardian.

On hearing these petitions the Court ordered a sequestration, unless cause, both against the Countess (dowager) of Shaftsbury, and against the Countess of Gainsborough, for their contempt in contriving and effecting this marriage without the consent of the guardian, and without applying to the Court. And the person of the infant earl was ordered to be restored by the Countess Dowager of Shaftsbury to the Lord Chief Baron, it being the opinion of the

Court, that though the declaration made by the late Lord Chancellor that the right of guardianship did belong to the Lord Chief Baron, as surviving guardian, and the order made thereupon was ever so erroneous, yet that the same was a good order until reversed, and, consequently, it was a contempt to break it.

Judgment by the Lords Commissioners.—On the 15th of May, the three Lords Commissioners (viz.), Sir Joseph Jekyll, M. R., Mr. Baron Gilbert, and Mr. Justice Raymond, having heard this matter solemnly argued by counsel on both sides, gave their judgment, which was delivered by the Lord Commissioner Jekyll, that the Court were all of opinion the sequestration against the Countess of Shaftsbury ought to be absolute.

LORD COMMISSIONER JEKYLL.—The marriage of a ward without the consent of the guardian is a ravishment of the ward (a), and aggravated in this respect, that, after such ravishment by marriage, the ward cannot be restored to such condition as he was in before, it being rendered impossible by the wrong of the ravisher.

By the Statute of Westminster 2(b), it is enacted that if one be guilty of ravishment, either of a male or female ward, if the ward be restored, though not married, the ravisher shall be punished with two years' imprisonment; but if the ward be not restored, or if he be restored and be married, the party guilty of such ravishment (if he cannot make satisfaction for the marriage) shall be punished by imprisonment for life, or by abjuring the realm, at the discretion of the Court where he is tried; so that a ravishment of a ward became an offence not only against the guardian, but against the king; and whereas, on the ward's being married, the ravisher was to be punished by perpetual imprisonment, or by abjuring the realm, this shows the greatness of the offence, by the grievousness of the punishment.

And the matter of marrying infants without the proper consent of guardians, is provided against, both at law and in this Court, especially the latter, it being notorious that a Court of equity entertains no greater jealousy of, nor shows more resentment against anything than the unlawful marriage of infants.

In the case of the marriage of a lunatic (viz.), that of Mr. Packer's marrying Mrs. Ash (a), the Court committed Mr. Packer, the parson, and others that were their agents, and Packer continued in custody for a considerable time; and infants and lunatics may be compared together, both of these being unable to take care of themselves.

In the case where an infant is committed by the Court to the custody or care of any one, such committee gives a recognisance that the infant shall not marry without leave of the Court, which form is very rarely altered, and on special circumstances; so that, if the infant marries, though without the privity, or knowledge, or neglect of the committee, yet the recognisance is, in strictness, forfeited, whatever favour the Court upon application may think fit to show such committee, when he appears not to have been in fault (b).

In Lord Somers's time, Mr. Goodwin married an infant (Mrs. Knight), and was committed, and this commitment was followed by an Act of Parliament for dissolving the marriage.

So, on Sir Edward Hannes's daughter and heir, who was an infant, being inveigled from her guardian, Dr. Waugh, and married to one Willis, though Mrs. Hannes was not taken from a guardian assigned by the Court, yet, in that case, both Mr. Willis, and the parson, and the agents, were all committed by the Master of the Rolls, Sir John Trevor, and the order afterwards confirmed by Lord Harcourt.

And, as this Court punishes the instruments where such marriage is had without the consent of the guardian, so, if there be only an apprehension that the infant will be married unequally, either by the guardian or by his neglect, a Court of equity will interpose, and send for the infant and commit him to the custody of a proper person, or relation, in order to prevent such danger: as was done in the case of the infant Lady Catherine Annesley, by Lord Chancellor *Harcourt*, and likewise in another case, viz., that of Mr. Vernon, of Staffordshire, by Lord *Macclesfield* (c).

But the present case is still of a higher nature, as it is the case of

⁽a) See Packer v. Wyndham, Prec. Ch. 412.

⁽b) See Dr. Davis's Case, 1 P. W. 698; but this practice has some time since been discontinued, except perhaps in the case of a female ward

being allowed to go out of the jurisdiction; Jeffrys v. Vanteswarstwarth, Barn. 144, 145.

⁽c) See Lord Raymond's Case, Cas. t. Talbot, 58; Smith v. S., 3 Atk. 304.

a peer of the realm, in whose education the public is interested, and where the guardianship of him is devised by a peer of the realm, viz., by the will of the late Lord Shaftsbury.

As to the objection that has been made to the order of this Court, that there are no words therein, that the infant shall not be married without the consent of the guardian:

Resp. The Court could not suppose, or foresee, that any person would marry the infant without the guardian's consent; and, for that reason, there was no express provision against it in the order; but still this prohibition is implied, viz., that no person, without the leave of the guardian, should marry this infant; besides, by the same reason that these words ought to be inserted, the order should likewise have provided that no person should take away or ravish this ward from the guardian, &c., all which things are surely implied; but, further, it is a sufficient answer to this objection, that such negative words are never inserted in the order.

But then it is objected, here is no disparagement in this marriage; for a smuch as the birth of the noble lady to whom Lord Shaftsbury is married, and also her quality, are equal to those of her husband; and she has had the advantage of being educated under the Countess of Gainsborough, her mother, a lady of great honour, virtue, and quality.

Resp. Admitting all this to be so, yet it may be reasonably supposed, that, if the infant earl had staid till he had attained his age, and could have made a jointure and settlement, in such case his Lordship might have had a better portion.

But, in reality, though there be no disparagement, yet this is only by way of extenuation, and can never be urged as a justification; for, it is the marriage without the consent of the guardian that constitutes the offence; so that, such marriage having been to one of equal degree and fortune, can at most tend but to extenuate.

And it is observable, that the disparagement of the ward was not where such ward, without the guardian's consent, married one of inferior degree, as a villein, citizen, or burgess, but where the guardian himself married the ward to one of inferior degree; for which see the Statute of Merton, cap. 6 & 7, 2 Inst. 89—92.

Object. The punishment of this ravishment of ward by sequestration, or otherwise, would be fruitless, since the marriage, having been

once solemnised and perfected, the same cannot be afterwards rescinded or dissolved.

Resp. The like objection might be made, though the marriage were ever so much to the disparagement of the ward; but in all these cases the reason of inflicting punishments is for example's sake, and to deter others from the like offence of ravishment of wards.

Object. This marriage is by the Countess, the mother of the infant earl, who is guardian by nature and nurture, and so cannot be guilty of ravishment of ward.

Resp. The right of a testamentary guardian takes place of a guardianship by nature; by the express words of the Act of Parliament (a), the guardian by will takes place of all other guardians, and his authority, by that law, is a continuation of the paternal authority.

Object. There is no instance of any one case, where a complaint has been against an infant's mother, for taking away her own child.

Resp. The Lords Selkirk and Orkney, guardians of the infant Duke of Hamilton, petitioned against the Duchess of Hamilton for taking away the infant Duke out of their custody, and their complaint was received; upon which the Court would have proceeded against the mother, but the guardians could not make out their right of guardianship by reason of some defect in the instrument under which they claimed.

So that, all these objections being answered, the Court are of opinion, that the sequestration against the Countess Dowager of Shaftsbury ought to be made absolute.

As to the case of Lady Gainsborough, that seems to differ; and here the question is, whether the Countess of Gainsborough's consenting that her daughter should be married to the infant earl, be not a contempt?

8 Edw. 3, c. 52. The case was a writ of ravishment of ward, which was brought against four men and a woman: the men took away the ward, and the woman, knowing that the four men had taken away the ward, married the ward to her daughter, upon which *Herle*, C. J., gave the rule, that the woman was equally guilty with the four men of the ravishment of the ward, the marriage of

the infant, without the consent of the guardian, constituting the offence; and though the guardian be not appointed by the Court, nor any commitment made by the Court of the infant, yet have those been punished who have married the ward without the consent of the guardian, as appears from the above cited case of Mrs. Hannes, where the case was nothing more than that of marrying the infant without the consent of the testamentary guardian, and the decree was only for an account of Sir Edward Hannes, the father's personal estate, and for an allowance of maintenance for the infant.

Whereas, in the principal case, the decree goes something further, as it directs that the will of the late Earl of Shaftsbury should be performed, part of which will is, that the infant earl should be under the care and guardianship of the persons named therein.

In 3 Co. 38 (Ratcliffe's Case), it was resolved, that every ancestor, whether male or female, might bring an action of trespass or ravishment of ward against any one for taking away his heir-apparent, male or female, and for marrying such heir; and that it is not material of what age such heir then was; and as the ancestor might bring such action for taking away and marrying the heir, so also might the guardian for taking away and marrying the ward.

It does not appear that the late Earl of Gainsborough left any testamentary guardians of his children; so that as the Countess was guardian of them by nature, the marriage of her daughter belonged to her: consequently it is to be presumed that she married her daughter to the infant earl; at least, if she did not, she may purge herself by oath.

But it is material that the Lord C. B. Eyre, the guardian of the infant earl, has not, in his petition, made out any direct charge, or prayed anything against the Countess of Gainsborough; and, possibly the Court may not be bound, ex officio, to punish for a ravishment of a ward where there is no complaint.

The Court has the care, but not the guardianship of infants; and the Lord C. B. Eyre is not a guardian appointed by the Court (a), but by the will of the father, in which respect the Court is the less concerned.

And though the stat. 12 Car. 2, c. 24, says, that a testamentary guardian may maintain an action of ravishment of ward, if the infant be taken from him, yet the statute does not enjoin him to do it, but refers the same to the discretion of the guardian.

So that, in this case, forasmuch as the testamentary guardian has not complained of or prayed any redress against Lady Gainsborough, the Court will do nothing against her, but discharge the order of sequestration with respect to her (a).

And now we come to the petition of the infant Earl of Shaftsbury, where it is first objected, that though the Court might, upon a petition, make a provisional order for the taking care of an infant, yet that they ought not to make an order determining the right of guardianship, unless the matter be brought judicially before them by bill, answer, and proofs.

Resp. In this case here are a bill and answer, and both the will and the devise of the guardianship are set out by the bill; whereupon the decree says, that the trusts of the will shall be performed, one of which said trusts is the guardianship of the infant.

It is not material that the earl was defendant, for so it was in the case of Mrs. Hannes, who was married to Mr. Willis without the consent of the guardian; and this Court may upon petition only, without any bill or decree, make an order to determine the right of guardianship, in regard the care of all infants is lodged in the king as pater patriæ, and by the king this care is delegated to his Court of Chancery.

In F. N. B. 232, the king is bound, of common right and by the laws, to defend his subjects, their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, and by the law of this realm, every loyal subject is taken to be within the king's protection; for which reason it is, that idiots and lunatics, who are incapable to take care of themselves, are provided for by the king as pater patriæ; and there is the same reason to extend this care to infants.

This is the reason given in the writ de idiota inquirendo, which the king issues out to take care of him who regimini sui ipsius et bonorum, et terrarum suarum minimè sufficit, which reason also appears in the writ de lunatico inquirendo; and in 4 Rep. 123, b.

(Beverley's Case), infants, as well as idiots, are said to be under the care and protection of the Crown, as persons equally unable to take care of themselves.

In like manner, in the case of charity, the king, pro bono publico, has an original right to superintend the care thereof, so that, abstracted from the statute of 43 Eliz. c. 4, relating to charitable uses, and antecedent to it, as well as since, it has been every day's practice to file informations in Chancery in the Attorney-General's name, for the establishment of charities.

Also in the case of Lord Falkland v. Bertie (a), the Lord Somers, in delivering his opinion, takes notice, that several things are under the care and superintendency of the king, as he is pater patriæ, and instances in all charities, idiots, lunatics, and infants.

Indeed, several Acts of Parliament have made alterations in some cases of this nature, which so far stand altered, and no further; but unless there be express words in an Act of Parliament for that purpose, the original jurisdiction of this Court remains as before; but there is not any one Act that has taken away the original jurisdiction of this Court with respect to this care and superintendency in the case of infants, charities, idiots, and lunatics. Since the statute which took away the Court of Wards (b), the jurisdiction of wardship returns to the Court of Chancery (c): and it appears by the Register 21, b. 198, that a writ may issue out of this Court to remove the guardian of an infant, and to put another guardian in his stead.

The law is particularly favourable to, and careful of an infant's interest; and though the infant himself cannot bring an account against the guardian, until his coming of age, yet a third person may bring a bill for an account against the guardian, even during the minority of the infant (d).

So in all decrees against infants, even in the plainest cases, a day must be given them to show cause when they come of age.

Lord Somers has often said, that this Court should be always open for petitions; and orders on petitions, in regard to the

⁽a) 2 Vern. 333.

⁽b) Established by 32 Hen. 8, c. 46; 33 Hen. 8, c. 22. Abolished by 12 Car. 2, c. 24, s. 3. See Co. Litt. 77 a.

⁷⁷ b.

⁽c) 2 Vern. 342.

⁽d) See Pomfret v. Lord Windsor, 2 Ves. Sen. 484.

guardianship of infants, have not only been provisional, but in some cases decisive, as to the right of guardianship.

Thus, in the case of Lord Tenham and Barrett (a), there was no bill depending in this Court, but only a petition, desiring that Lady Tenham, the mother, being a Papist, might not have the guardianship of the infant, determined on petition against the mother: upon which an appeal was brought to the House of Lords, before whom it was never objected, nor once thought of, that this Court could not, on a petition only, determine the right of guardianship: and on the appeal the Lords also determined the right against the mother.

Also in the case of a testamentary guardian, such guardian having a plain legal right upon the words of the will, and the whole case arising thereon, there can be no need of a bill in equity: no proofs of either side are requisite, or can avail; and therefore the matter is properly determinable upon a petition without a bill.

But in the last place it is objected, that, upon the wording of this will, the Lord Chief Baron has no right to the guardianship, the same being devised to him and two others, without saying, and to the survivor of them: and that this is a joint personal confidence wherewith three are intrusted, wherefore, by the death of any one, the guardianship is determined; and to prove that a guardianship is personal, it has been urged, that it is not assignable, nor will it go to executors or administrators.

Resp. I admit a guardianship is not assignable, neither will it go to executors or administrators; but for all that, it is coupled with an interest, and is not a naked authority. I admit, also, it has been said, that where a naked authority is given to two, if one dies, the survivor cannot act; but the same book, viz., 1 Inst. 112, 113, says, that where an authority is coupled with an interest, it does survive. In the case of Gardiner v. Sheldon (b), the case of a guardian is compared to that of an executor or administrator, which is not assignable, but yet survives; and though a guardian be not in all respects to be compared to an executor, in regard the latter may continue his executorship, by appointing an executor by his will, yet

⁽a) See 9 Mod. 40; 14 Vin. Ab. p. Toml. edit.

172, note to Ca. 1; 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 16,
nom. Reynolds v. Lady Tenham; Lady
Tenham v. Lennard, 4 Bro. P. C. 302.

the case of a guardianship devised to two is strictly like the case of an administration granted to two (especially where the debts amount to as much as the assets); for in that case, as well as in the case of two guardians, an administrator cannot assign his administratorship; it will not go to his executors or administrators, but to the surviving administrator (a); such an administrator is accountable to the creditor for everything, as much as the guardian is to the infant; such an administrator can make no profit.

And that a guardianship is coupled with an interest is most apparent, in that a guardian may bring an action and avow in his own name, may make leases (b) during the minority of the infant, and may grant copyholds (c) even in reversion, as dominus protempore.

A guardianship is not properly an office, nor to be resembled (for instance) to the office of a parkership; for the former has an interest in the infant's estate; but a parker has no right or interest in the park, or land inclosed therein, and the owner of the land may determine such office by disparking the park or killing the deer; and whereas in Poph. 204, it is said, that where the Lord Grey committed the custody of his son to four, and one of them died, the authority determined; this case is put upon the clause of the statute of 4 & 5 Phil. & Mar. cap. 8 (d), which says, "that whosoever takes a damsel unmarried, and under the age of sixteen, out of the custody of their father or mother, or any such person to whom the father in his lifetime, or by his will, or by any act in his life-time, has appointed the same, shall be subject to the pain of two years' imprisonment, or to the payment of such fine as the Court shall appoint." So that, by that Act, as to this special purpose, the father might by will or deed appoint the custody of his daughter, but such appointee had not the like interest as the guardian has: he had but a bare authority.

As to Auditor Curle's Case (e), that depended upon the statute

⁽a) Adams v. Buckland, 2 Vern. 514; Hudson v. H., Cas. t. Talbot, 127.

⁽b) 2 Roll. Abr. 41, pl. 4; but a lease by the testamentary guardians will be valid only during the minority of the ward: Roe d. Parry v. Hodgson,

² Wills. 129; Shaw v. S., Vern. & Scriv. 607. See Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 60.

⁽c) 2 Roll. Abr. 41, pl. 3.

⁽d) Repealed by 9 Geo. 4, c. 31.

⁽e) 11 Co. 2 b.

of the 32 Hen. 8, cap. 46; but in the principal case, when the now infant earl was so very young as not to be above a year old, and the testator had appointed him three guardians, it was hardly probable that the testator himself could imagine that all those three guardians should live until the child's age of twenty-one; and then to say, that the guardianship shall determine by the death of any one of the guardians, would be to affirm, that the more care the father takes of the child's education, the less it shall profit the child, because by the death of any one of these guardians the child shall be without a guardian, and the more of them were appointed by the father, the less likelihood there would be that they all should live till the child should arrive to twenty-one.

LORD COMMISSIONER GILBERT.— * * * (a) In this case there have been four questions made.* *

1st Question.—First, Whether the Court has jurisdiction?

Now, touching the wardship at law, there was a two-fold jurisdiction.

The first was, when the tenures were in being; and there, till the Court of Wards was erected, the whole jurisdiction of the king's wards where the lands were held in chivalry, was under the jurisdiction of this Court.

So likewise, in relation to subjects, this Court determined touching the wardships of the body, who was the prior, and who was the posterior lord.

For the wardship of the body of the heir went to the lord who had the prior homage; and that was determined in the Court of Chancery, where several lords applied for the writ of ravishment, which was an original writ.

But this sort of guardianship was a sort of dominion of masters over servants and vassals, and was introduced among the Gothic nations, to breed them to arms; and it was a great burthen upon the people, and is fallen now with the tenures.

But the Crown has another jurisdiction, and that is as pater patrix, as a father over his children.

The king has a right to take care of infants, lunatics, and idiots,

(a) For the full judgment of Lord v. S. (see Gilb. Eq. Rep. 172). Commissioner Gilbert, see Shaftsbury

that cannot take care of themselves; and this care cannot be exercised otherwise than by appointing them proper curators or committees. [The Lord Commissioner then referred on this point to Fleta, cap. 9, fol. 4, de Tutelis; to Bracton, lib. 2, cap. 38, fol. 86; to Staunford, in his Exposition of the King's Prerogative, p. 37; to Beverley's Case (a); and to Falkland v. Bertie (b).]

There are since innumerable precedents, wherein this Court has determined touching the guardianship of infants, as in the case of Freeman and The Bishop of Oxford, the 5th of July, 1719, where the Bishop of Exeter, surviving guardian to the father's will, applies to the Court, and the infant is sent from Oxford to Cambridge.

And in Vernon and Vernon's Case (c), several orders were made upon petition, and among the rest, one upon petition, that the infant was conversant with the daughter of the guardian, that he should be immediately sent for, and ordered forthwith to Eton School.

And in Anesley and Anesley's Case (d), it was ordered to take the infant from the mother, and a sequestration against the Duke of Buckingham and the mother for not producing the infant.

Now, as the king has the protection of infants, I don't see any other protection can be than by assigning them their guardians; and where should that protection be exercised but in that Court where care is taken of all persons under natural disabilities? * * *

2nd Question.—The second question is, whether the Court can declare the right of guardianship by petition, or whether it must be by bill? * * * (e).

3rd Question.—The third question is, whether this be a legal declaration of the right of guardianship; that is to say, whether it will survive or not? And here it has been argued, that the guardianship is a naked authority, and so cannot survive.

But 'tis agreed, that if it be an authority coupled with an interest it will survive.

Indeed, in the civil law they looked upon it to be a naked authority; but yet, where there were several guardians, and one only gave security, it was executed by him alone. See Vinnius, tit. 24, De Satisfactione Tutor. et Curator.

- (a) 4 Rep. 126.
- (b) 2 Vern. 333.
- (c) 10 Geo. 1, cited 1 V. 456.
- (d) Cited Ridg. 149; 8 Mod. 214.
- (e) See now Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, O. 25, r. 5; O. 55, rr. 25, 26.

But if it were an authority, it is not like an authority to do a single act where it must be done by them all, because it is the will of the party that authorises them all, and so one alone can't execute it.

But in this case the authority must, from the nature of the thing, be joint and several; for one alone must receive the money of the infant, and not meet altogether for that purpose.

And were it an authority, or were it not, it is to be construed joint and several; else the more guardians were appointed for the security of the infant, he would be the less secure, because upon the death of any one of them the guardianship would be at an end.

But no doubt, with us, it must be reckoned an interest.

For the law has appointed remedies, both droitural and possessory, to recover the guardianship.

First, Droitural.—And that was the writ de custodia terræ et hæredis: and Fitzherbert has compared the droitural and possessory action, in the title De Custodia Terræ et Hæredis, fol. 133.

The Statute of Merton, c. 6, provideth, that, in the writ of right of ward, the plaintiff shall recover the value of the marriage.

Secondly, Possessory.—And that, at common law, was the action of trespass; and in this, at common law, he could only recover damages for his ward, and not the ward itself.

The Statute of Westminster 2 (a), gives a writ of ravishment of ward, in which the plaintiff recovered the body of the heir, and not damages only.

And by the Equity of Westminster 2 (b), a writ of ravishment lay for the guardian in socage, as a writ in consimili casu.

Everyone will allow the guardian in chivalry had an interest; and if the guardian in socage would have the writ in consimili casu, he must have an interest also.

And a man may as well have an interest of honour, which every person has in relation to his family, as an interest of profit.

And it appears, in Ratcliffe's Case (c), that the father had an action of trepass for taking away his son and heir quare filium et hæredem rapuit, though he was not in propriety of speech counted

⁽a) 13 Ed. 1, c. 35.

⁽b) 13 Ed. 1, c. 24.

⁽c) 3 Co. 37.

the guardian; for the heir was looked upon as part of the family. But the father, however, had an interest in the son, and so it was trespass to take him away.

But the father had not a writ de custodia terræ et hæredis, because the father was no guardian. Nor was there any need of a droitural action, because he was always in possession of his son; and so an action of trespass lies for the marrying his heir apparent, whether he be within age or of full age, because it is an injury to marry and destroy the hopes of his family by an improvident marriage (a).

And this lies even against the lord, for the father had the custody against the lord; for the father, being tenant in chivalry, could breed his son to arms; but no collateral ancestor had the custody against the lord.

And, therefore, this makes the difference that is mentioned in Ratcliffe's Case (b), that a collateral ancestor may have a writ of ravishment against any person that ravishes consanguineum et hæredem; (that is) his heir apparent, because that is an injury to himself.

But the action does not lie against the feudal lord, because he has a right to marry him.

And every man may be said to have an interest in his heir apparent, because nothing imports him more than to continue his name in proper representatives.

But the father at common law could not appoint a guardian, because the law had appointed a guardian, whether the father was tenant in chivalry or in socage.

The first law that gave the father the power of appointing was 4 & 5 Phil. & Mar. c. 8 (c). The words of the statute are, "that nobody shall take away any maid or woman-child unmarried, being within the age of sixteen years, out or from the possession, custody, or governance, and against the will of the father of such maid or woman-child, or of such person or persons to whom the father of such maid or woman-child, by his last will and testament, or by any other

⁽a) Fitz. Abr. tit. Garde, 32.

Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 1. As to India, by 9 Geo. 4, c. 74, s. 125.

⁽b) 3 Co. 37.

⁽c) Repealed as to England by 9

w. & T.--vol. 1.

act in his lifetime, hath or shall appoint, assign, bequeath, give or grant the order, keeping, education, or governance of such maid or woman-child."

This gives authority to appoint the custody of a female child for a special purpose. He that takes away the female child, and marries her or deflowers her, is an offender within that statute.

So, this being a custody for a special purpose, it was properly enough construed to be a naked authority.

Therefore I take the case in Poph. 204, to be good law, that, when two persons are appointed guardians by authority of this statute, and one of them dies, it will not survive, because that statute gives an authority to a special purpose, to make the ravisher criminal within that law.

But the 12 Car. 2, c. 24, gave the father a power, by deed executed in writing, or by act executed in his lifetime, or by his last will and testament, to appoint the custody and tuition of his child or children till the age of twenty-one years; and such disposition of the custody to be as good and effectual against all and every person claiming the custody of such child or children as guardians in socage or otherwise; and the persons to whom such custody shall be disposed, to have a writ of ravishment of ward or trespass.

This statute was formed by Sir Matthew Hale, and, when wardships were taken away, introduced the testamentary guardians: and this testamentary guardian, by the rules of the civil law, was to take place before all others.

But our testamentary guardian is not a naked authority, but is made after the model of a guardian in socage, and, by consequence, an interest passes to the guardian.

And the Act (Rights), given to the guardian in socage, are given by this law.

But 'tis said, that every interest is assignable, transferable, or devisable, and that the guardianship is not; and therefore it is a naked authority and not an interest.

Every interest of profit is assignable, because it is the nature of property, that the person who is the owner should have dominion over it, so as to assign or transfer it.

But the guardian in socage has no interest of profit: it is an interest of honour, and for the honour of the family committed to his

next of kin, and therefore is inherent to the blood, and can't be assignable.

Because a stranger could not have that interest to take care of the ward, nor have it at heart.

The guardian in socage was accountable to the infant when he came to the age of fourteen, and he could not transfer that account to another.

The testamentary guardian, as is said, is formed after the manner of guardian in socage, and comes instead of him, and is in loco parentis.

Therefore, though it be not assignable, nor transferable, yet it is such an interest as shall survive.

4th Question, Contempt of the Court.—The fourth question is, whether the ladies, or either of them, are in contempt of the Court?

And it is very plainly sworn upon the Lady Shaftsbury, that she has owned that she has seen him married and bedded.

The mother's being present in this case, is a plain evidence of assent.

And the mother can't marry her child without the consent of the testamentary guardian.

For the father, who had the power over his child by law, has placed it under the power of the testamentary guardian.

Therefore it is taken out of the power of the mother.

But it is objected, that this Lord Shaftsbury has married the Lady Susannah Noel, a lady of birth, quality, and fortune, and therefore is married without disparagement, and that this will be no contempt of the Court.

When the ward is put under the protection of this Court by the testamentary guardian, it is a contempt of the Court to marry him without the consent of the guardian.

It is a breach of filial duty for children to marry without the consent of the parent.

The testamentary guardian is in loco parentis, and he having put the ward under the protection of the Court, it is then a contempt to marry him without the guardian's consent, and the contempt being in marrying him without the consent of the guardian, an improvident marriage is only an aggravation of the offence, if that had been the case.

There is nothing in the objection, that the mother has the natural power over her son, and that jura sanguinis nulla lege civili possunt dirimi.

For the father, whilst living was the head of the family: he had power over his child, and he might dispose of him by law. And it is the duty even of the mother to pay that respect to the memory of her deceased husband, as not to marry her son without the consent of the guardian appointed by the father.

And when the child is by the guardian put under the protection of this Court, it will be a contempt even of the mother to marry him without the consent of the guardian.

As to the Lady Gainsborough, this contempt is not sworn upon her.

For an order for sequestration in the case of a peer, or a commitment in the case of a common person, is a judicial act of the Court, and therefore must be founded on a proper affidavit, as I apprehend.

The order is the judgment of the Court, the sequestration or commitment is but the execution of it.

And therefore the judgment is to be founded upon truth, and not upon conjecture only.

For if she be examined upon subsequent interrogatories, this will not make good the determination of the Court by a matter ex post facto.

Wherefore he agreed with Lord Jekyll in toto, as did also Lord Commissioner Raymond (a).

NOTES.

- 1. Generally, p. 517.
- 2. Guardianship by Nature and Nurture, p. 517.
- 3. Wards of Court, p. 521.
- 4. Testamentary Guardians, p. 532.
- 5. Jurisdiction of Court, p. 537.
- 6. Custody, p. 548.
- 7. Foreign Guardians, &c., p. 554.
- 8. Powers under Statutes, p. 555.

1. Generally.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over infants probably resulted from the right of the Crown over the persons and property of infants as parens patrice where they have no other guardian. This jurisdiction was exercised by the Chancellor, as a part of the general delegation of the authority of the Crown, virtute officii (a), and whatever may be its origin it is now firmly established, and it is a settled maxim that the Crown is the universal guardian of infants and of their property (b).

Under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34, subs. 3, all causes and matters relating to "the wardship of infants and the care of infants' estates" are assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court, and by sect. 25, subs. 10, of the same Act, "in questions relating to the custody and education of infants the rules of equity shall prevail" (c). But the jurisdiction of the Chancery Division is concurrent with that of each of the other Divisions of the Supreme Court (d), and extends to infants who are not wards of Court and who have no property (e), although the Court cannot interfere with regard to the maintenance or education of infants, unless it has some means of providing for them (f): and it also extends over the whole period of infancy (g).

2. Guardianship by Nature and Nurture.

Rights of Father.—Passing over the different species of guardianships discussed in the principal case, some of which have been either abolished by statute, have fallen into disuse, or have become of little practical importance, such as guardianship in chivalry, guardianship in socage, guardianship by custom, guardianship by

- (a) See Re Spence, 2 Ph. 247; Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. p. 246; Thomasset v. T., (1894) P. p. 299; and also Wellesley v. W., 2 Bligh, 136; Co. Litt. 88 b, Hargrave's note (70); 2 Fonbl. Eq. 224; Story, Eq. (1892) p. 910; Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 129.
- (b) Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 19; Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. W. 702, 796; Reg. v. Gyngall, supra.
- (c) See judgment of Kay, L. J., in Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. p. 248; Thomasset v. T., (1894) P. p. 300; Barnardo v. McHugh, (1891)

- A. C. 398.
- (d) Re Goldsworthy, 2. Q. B. D. 75; Re Ethel Brown, 13 Q. B. D. 614; Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. 317; Thomasset v. T., (1894) P. 295, overruling Blandlord v. B., (1892) P. 148.
- (e) Re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch. 143, C. A.; and see Re Fynn, 2 De G. & Sm. p. 481; Re Spence, 2 Ph. 247; Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. p. 20.
- (f') See Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. p. 332; Re McGrath, supra; Thomasset v. T., supra; Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. p. 21.
 - (g) Thomasset v. T., supra.

the appointment of the spiritual Courts, guardianship by election, and guardianship under stat. 4 & 5 Phil. & Mar. c. 8 (a), it may be laid down as indisputable law that the father is by nature and nurture the guardian of his legitimate children, though wards of Court, and is entitled to their custody and control until they are twenty-one years of age (b).

"The strict common law gave to the father the guardianship of his children during the age of nurture and until the age of discretion (c). The limit was fixed at fourteen years in the case of a boy and sixteen years in the case of a girl, but beyond this * * * the father had no actual guardianship except only in the case of the heir apparent, in which case he was guardian by nature till twenty-one * * * . But for a great number of years the term 'guardian by nature' has not been confined, so far as the father is concerned, to the case of heirs apparent, but has been used on the contrary to denote that sort of guardianship which the ordinary law of nature entrusts to the father, until the age of infancy has completely passed and gone (d)."

Equity followed and gave effect to the common law conception of paternal authority, restraining the father's powers only where restraint was absolutely necessary for the welfare of the child. By the statutory changes below noted (e), the common law relations between father and mother as to the custody and control of children have been profoundly modified.

The father has the right to determine questions relating to the education and religious training of his child (f), and the child must, though the father has died without leaving any directions, be brought up in the father's religion (g), except where the welfare of the infant

- (a) See the notes of Mr. Hargrave, Co. Litt. 88 b., and Simpson on Infants (1909), pp. 105, 188.
- (b) See judgment of Brett and Bowen, L. JJ., Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. pp. 326 and 336.
- (c) See further as to this, Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. pp. 250, 251; Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. p. 326; Thomasset v. T., infra; Reg. v. Lewis, 9 T. L. R. 226.
- (d) Per Bowen, L. J., ib. p. 335; and see Re Salisbury, 2 C. D. p. 31; Woolf v. Pemberton, 6 C. D. 19; Smart v. S., (1892) A. C. 425; Ex p. Hopkins, 3 P. W. 152, 154; Stileman
- v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 480; Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 21; De Manneville v. De M., 10 V. 52, 62; Thomasset v. T., (1894) P. p. 298.
 - (e) See infra, pp. 555-559.
- (f) As to religion, see especially Re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch. p. 148; Re Newton, (1896) 1 Ch. 740, infra, p. 542; Re Clarke, 21 C. D. 821; Re Montagu, 28 C. D. 82; Re Nevin, (1891) 2 Ch. 299; Re Scanlan, 40 C. D. 200; Re White, 9 T. L. R. 575; Re Agar-Ellis, 10 C. D. 49, 24 C. D. 317, C. A.
- (g) Talbot v. Shrewsbury, 4 My. &C. 672; Re North, 8 L. T. 309;

requires the rule to be disregarded, as where it is of sufficient age to have received and formed, and has received and formed, other religious impressions (a); and neither the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 (b), nor the Poor Law Act, 1889, affect this rule (c). A father cannot release this right (d) nor bind himself to exercise it in a particular way (e), but after his death circumstances may arise which may lead the Court to consider whether the right has not been waived (f).

As against their mother he may place the children with another person (g), or put restrictions on their intercourse with their mother in a proper case, as where he believes that in the absence of such restrictions she would alienate their affection from himself (h), even when he is himself abroad (i), except where his paternal authority is controlled by the Court acting under either its inherent or statutory jurisdiction (k).

The father, moreover, is entitled to judge not only what is for his children's benefit as regards the guardianship of their persons but also of their estates: it has been held, therefore, that he is ordinarily, assuming that he has no interests hostile to the children, and has been guilty of no neglect or default, the proper person to conduct a suit on their behalf as next friend (l); and if the father be dead the nearest paternal relations are entitled to nominate the next friend (m).

Where a person confers a benefit upon the father or upon the children for their maintenance, or otherwise, upon condition that the father gives up the guardianship of them, if he accepts the benefit himself or commits the care of his children to the guardian nominated by the stranger, he will not be allowed afterwards to prejudice their

Hawksworth v. H., L. R. 6 Ch. p. 542; Re Montagu, 28 C. D. 82; F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688.

- (a) Re McGrath, Re Newton, supra;
 Re Besant, 11 C. D. p. 519, C. A. See
 Part 5, p. 514. F. v. F.; ubi supra;
 Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.
 - (b) See Re Scanlan, 40 C. D. 200.
- (c) See the Poor Law Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 56, s. 1, s.s. 6; and Simpson on Infants (1909), p. 115; and cf. the Custody of Children Act, 1891, s. 4, p. 558, infra.
- (d) Andrews v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. 636;R. v. Barnardo, 23 Q. B. D. p. 310.

- (e) Ib. and Re Meades, Ir. R. 5 Eq. 98.
 - (f) Re Clarke, 21 C. D. p. 825.
- (g) Ex p. M. Clellan, 1 Dowl. 81;
 Ex p. Glover, 4 Dowl. 291; Ex p.
 Skinner, 9 Moore, 278.
 - (h) Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. 317.
- (i) Re Emily Suttor, 2 Fost. & Fin. 267.
- (k) Part 5, p. 537, infra, and Part 8, p. 555, infra.
- (l) Woolf v. Pemberton, 6 C. D. 19, 22, 23.
 - (m) Talbot v. T., 17 Eq. 347.

interests by asserting his legal right, either by interfering with their education or enforcing the delivery up to him of their persons (a). Although a father can, before it is acted upon, rescind and abandon an agreement by which he has given up the custody of his child to a third person (b), yet if it could not be revoked without injuriously affecting the interests of the child the father has been restrained from exercising the rights which at law he undoubtedly retained (c). But the Court will not deprive a father of the custody of his children merely because a person makes an offer to maintain them, even although it might be for the benefit of the children that such offer be acceded to (d).

Before the Custody of Infants Act (e), an agreement by a father to give up to his wife the custody and education of their children, was contrary to public policy, and would not be enforced in equity against the husband, even although he might have been guilty of adultery and cruelty to his wife (f); unless he had been guilty of such gross misconduct as totally to unfit him to have the custody and control of his children, as, for instance, where he had criminally assaulted a daughter (g), but the law upon this subject was altered by sect. 2 of the last mentioned Act.

The Court will not interfere with what has been well termed the "sacred right" of a father over his children (h), except under the circumstances mentioned in Part 5, p. 537, infra.

Rights of Mother.—The father's right at common law to the control and custody of his legitimate children is, subject to the paramount consideration of their welfare (i), absolute as against the mother (k). He alone had the right to appoint testamentary guardians, and if he exercised this power the mother had no right to interfere with

- (a) Colston v. Morris, Jac. 227 (n.); Potts v. Norton, 2 P. W. 109 (n.); Blake v. B., Amb. 306; Powell v. Cleaver, 2 Bro. Ch. 499; see also Lyons v. Blenkin, Jac. 245; Andrews v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. 622; Faquani v. Selwyn, Jac. 268 (n.).
- (b) Hill v. Gomme, 1 B. 540; R. v. Barnado, 23 Q. B. D. p. 310.
- (c) Reg. v. Smith, 22 L. J. Q. B. 117. (d) Anon., Jac. 264; Re Fynn, 2 De G. & Sm. 457; Clavering v.
- Ellison, 3 Dr. 451.
 (e) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12, s. 2, infra, p. 555.
- (f) Hope v. H., 8 De G. M. & G.
 731; Vansittart v. V., 2 De G.
 & J. 249. See further Hamilton v.
 Hector, L. R. 6 Ch. 701; Walrond v.
 W., 1 Johns. 18; Re Matthews, 26
 B. 463.
 - (g) Swift v. S., 34 B. 266.
- (h) Re Plomley, 47 L. T. 283, approved Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. pp. 328-329.
 - (i) Thomasset v. T., (1894) P. p. 300.
- (k) Ex p. Skinner, 9 Moore, 278; Ex p. Bartlett, 2 Coll. 661; Re Thomas, 22 L. J. Ch. 275; Simpson on Infants (1909), p. 106.

them (a); but if no such guardian were appointed by the father, then the mother became guardian by nature and gurture (b). "The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 (c), revolutionised the law and gave to a mother surviving her husband rights which were entirely new. Her legal position before the Act was, as regards the guardianship of her children, most unfortunate, cruel, and unjust. This state of things was brought to the attention of the Legislature. They saw that it should be altered, and s. 2 of the Act accordingly enacts that on the death of the father of an infant, the mother, if surviving, shall be the guardian of the infant either alone, if no guardian has been appointed by the father, or jointly with any guardian appointed by the father (d)." But if a wife is divorced for adultery, she, by sect. 35 of the Divorce Act (e), may, at the discretion of the Court, be deprived of the custody of, and of access to, her children (f); and the discretion of the Court may be exercised after decree (g).

If the child is illegitimate the mother has a $prim\hat{a}$ facie, not an absolute right (h), to its custody up to the age of fourteen in preference to the reputed father, or any other person (i), and this right must be recognised, unless there are strong grounds for displacing her (k).

3. Wards of Court.

- 1. Generally.—The term "ward of Court" is used to express either that a person is under the care of a guardian appointed by the Court, or that an infant is under the care of the Court of Chancery by reason of such infant being either actually a party to an action in
- (a) Reynolds v. Teynham, 4 Bro. P. C. 302; but see now Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, s. 2, infra, p. 555.
- (b) Villareal v. Mellish, 2 Swans. 533; Mellish v. De Costa, 2 Atk. 14; Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 158; Mendes v. M., 1 Ves. Sen. 91; The Queen v. Clarke, Re Alicia Race, 7 Ell. & Bl. 186; Re Moore, 11 Ir. C. L. 1; and see Re D'Arcys, ib., p. 298; see the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, s. 3, infra, p. 556.
 - (c) See infra, Part 8, p. 555.
- (d) Per Lindley, M. R. in Re X., X.v. Y., (1899) 1 Ch. at p. 530.
 - (e) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85.
 - (f) Handley v. H., (1891) P. 124;

- Witt v. W., ib., p. 163.
 - (g) Manders v. M., 7 T. L. R. 149.
- (h) Re Ullee, 53 L. T. 711; 54 L. T. 286; Barnardo v. McHugh, infra; Humphrys v. Polak, (1901) 2 K. B. 385.
- (i) Barnardo v. McHugh, (1891)
 A. C. 388; Re White, 10 L. T. 349;
 Reg. v. Nash, 10 Q. B. D. 454; Re
 Taylor, 4 C. D. 157; Humphrys v.
 Polak, ubi supra; Seton (1901), p. 1042.
- (k) Re Carey, 10 Q. B. D. 454; The Guardians of St. Mary Abbott's, 4 T. L. R. 63; Reg. v. Bolton Union, 36 Sol. Jo. 255; Reg. v. Lewis, 9 T. L. R. 226; Ex p. Emerson, 11 T. L. R. 218; and see the Custody of Children Act, 1891, infra; Rex v. New, 20 T. L. R. 583.

which the property of the infant is being administered, or being in the position of a party (a).

An order made on summons or petition for a guardian (b); or for maintenance (c); or payment into Court of the fund of an infant under the Trustee Relief Act(d); or money paid to the separate account of an infant in an administration action to which the infant was not a party will make the infant a ward of Court (e). But the jurisdiction exists from the fact that the infant is a British subject, and not from the fact of there being property under control of the Court (f), therefore where such an infant is an alien, the Court on a petition by the infant alien for payment out will not require a settlement, but may in its discretion pay it to the person proved to be entitled to receive it according to foreign law (g).

But payment in of an infant's legacy under the Legacy Duty Act (h), or of purchase-money under the Lands Clauses Act, belonging to an infant (i), or an order approving a settlement under the Infant Settlements Act (k), does not constitute the infant a ward of Court (h), nor does an order under the Divorce Act, 1857, s. 35 (l).

Taking Ward out of the Jurisdiction.—See infra, p. 547.

2. Marriage of Infants, &c.—A male infant may contract marriage at 14, a female at 12 (m).—Under the Marriage Acts (n), the consent to the marriage of an infant must be given by the father, or if he be dead, by the guardians or one of them, and if there be none, by the mother if unmarried, and if not by the guardians appointed by the Court of Chancery or one of them; and such consent is required for the marriage of such a party so under age, unless there be no person authorised to give such consent (o).

And although the infant has no property, a guardian for the purpose

- (a) Stuart v. Marquis of Bute, 9 H.
 L. C. 440; Brown v. Collins, 25 C. D.
 60; Gynn v. Gilbard, 1 Dr. & Sm.
 356; Re Leigh, 40 C. D. 290. For forms of order relating to the appointment of guardians and cognate matters see Seton (1901), p. 990, et seq.
- (b) Stuart v. Marquis of Bute, 9 H. L. C. 440.
 - (c) Re Graham, 10 Eq. 530.
 - (d) Re Benand, 16 W. R. 538.
- (e) De Pereda v. De Mancha, 19
 C. D. 451, but see Brown v. Collins,
 25 C. D. p. 62.

- (f) Brown v. Collins, supra; Re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch. 143.
- (g) Brown v. Collins 25 C. D. 56; Hope v. H., 4 De G. M. & G. 328, 345.
 - (h) Re Hillary, 2 Dr. & S. 461.
- (i) Re Wilts, &c. Ry. Co., 2 Dr. & S. 552.
 - (k) Re Strong, 26 L. J. Ch. 64.
 - (l) Hyde v. H., 13 P. D. 166.
 - (m) Simpson (1909), p. 74.
- (n) 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, and 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85; Simpson (1909), p. 109.
 - (o) 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 16.

of giving consent may be appointed by the Court of Chancery on petition, as where the father and mother are dead and there is no guardian (a), or if the father, guardian, or mother be non compos or beyond seas, or unreasonably refuse to consent to the marriage (b). When a marriage takes place, the law presumes that it was with due consent till the contrary appear (c), and after a considerable lapse of time a presumption arises that consent has been given. That presumption, however, may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary (d). It is to be noticed that the consent required by sect. 16 of 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, is directory merely, and a marriage without such consent is valid (e).

As to the penalties in the case of the marriage of persons under age without proper consent when the licence or the publication of the banns has been procured by false swearing or fraud, see 4 Geo. 4 c. 76, ss. 23, 24. As to the same penalties being extended by the Marriage and Registration Amendment Act, 1856(f) in the case of a marriage before a registrar had by means of any false declaration, notice, or certificate (g). Where the infant is not a ward of Court, the Court can do nothing unless jurisdiction be given it by an application before marriage (h).

In the case of wards of Court, even when they have parents living, or guardians, it is necessary to apply to the Court for leave for them to marry, which will only be granted upon its appearing that the marriage is suitable as to age and rank, and that the settlement proposed is proper (i). The Court will prevent a clandestine marriage, by ordering that the ward shall not be married without leave of the Court, and that the person desirous of marrying the ward shall not have access, by letter or otherwise (k). It will likewise restrain the guardian or father from allowing the marriage to take place (l).

- (a) Re Woolscombe, 1 Madd. 213; Ex p. Becher, 1 Bro. Ch. 556.
 - (b) 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 17.
- (c) Balfour v. Carpenter, 1 Phill. Ecc. R. 221; Osborne v. Goldham, Selby v. S., ib. 223.
- (d) Harrison v. Mayor of Southampton, 22 L. J. Ch. 722.
- (e) Reg. v. Birmingham, 8 B. & C. 29, 2 Man. & Ry. 230.
 - (f) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119.
- (g) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, s. 19. As to Quakers and Jews, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, s. 21; 23 Vict. c. 18, s. 2. As to marriage of British subjects resident in

- foreign countries, see 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23.
 - (h) Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 286.
- (i) Smith v. S., 3 Atk. 305; The Earl of Plymouth v. Lewis, Dick. 861; Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 29; Simpson (1909), pp. 279 et seq.
- (k) Seton (1901), p. 1053, form 9 and note; Pearce v. Crutchfield, 14 V. 206; Smith v. S., 3 Atk. 304; Goodall v. Harris, 2 P. W. 560; Warter v. Yorke, 19 V. 451; Dawson v. Thompson, 12 L. T. 178.
- (l) Lord Raymond's Case, Cas. t. Talbot, 58.

If the Court considers the proposed marriage unsuitable, it makes no difference that the guardian has given his consent (a), or semble the father either (b). It is the duty of a guardian to prevent an unfitting marriage (c), and if he connives at such a marriage the Court will commit the ward to the care of others (d).

Formerly there was a disinclination on the part of the Court to sanction the marriage of an infant ward, where it was impossible for him by reason of his infancy to settle his real estate so as to go along with his title, and to make a provision for his younger children (e).

Infants, however, are now enabled (f), with the approbation of the Court, to make binding settlements, or contracts for settlement, of their real and personal estate (q) upon or in contemplation of marriage, which have the same effect as if the infants were then twenty-one, but this enactment does not extend to powers of which it is expressly declared that they shall not be exercised by an infant (sect. 1) (h). A ward of Court cannot be compelled to make a marriage settlement of his property (i). The death of an infant tenant in tail under twenty-one avoids any appointment or disentailing assurance executed under the Act (k). The sanction of the Court to any settlement or contract for a settlement may be given upon an application in chambers by the infant or guardian (1); and if there be no guardian, the Court may require one to be appointed or not as it shall think fit; and also may require any persons interested, or appearing to be interested, to be served with notice of such application (sect. 3); but the Act is not applicable to any male infant under the age of twenty years, or to any female infant under the age of seventeen years (sect. 4).

- (a) Gordon v. Irwin, 4 Bro. P. C. 355.
- (b) Per Eldon, C., Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ., p. 29; and see Beard v. Travers, 1 Ves. Sen. 313.
 - (c) Baker v. Taylor, 1 C. & P. 101.
- (d) See Vernon v. V., cited p. 511. supra; Toombes v. Elers, Dick. 88; Lord Shipbrook v. Lord Hinchinbrook, Dick. 547; Foster v. Denny, 2 Ch. Ca. 237; Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 157, Dick. 88; Smith v. S., 3 Atk. 307.
 - (e) Honywood v. H., 20 B. 451.
 - (f) The Infants' Settlement Act (18

- & 19 Vict. c. 43), extended to Ireland by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 83.
- (y) Moore v. Johnson, (1891) 3 Ch. 48.
- (h) Re Dalton, 25 L. J. Ch. 751; Re Catherine Strong, 26 L. J. Ch. 64.
- (i) Re Leigh, 40 C. D. 290; Seaton v. S., 13 A. C. 64.
- (k) Sect. 2; Scott v. Hanbury, (1891) 1 Ch. 298; see Re Armit, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 352.
- (l) R. S. C., 1883, O. 55, r. 2 (10).
 The Act requires a petition, Peareth v.
 Marriott, W. N. (1866) 48.

The Act extends to a post-nuptial settlement if the infant is a ward of Court (a). It is doubtful whether there is jurisdiction to direct a settlement under the Act after an infant, married under twenty or seventeen, has attained that age (b). Although in Re Phillips (c), Chitty, J., directed a settlement under those circumstances.

As a petition under the Act does not make the infant a ward of Court (d), the Court does not inquire into the propriety of the marriage, but only as to what is the proper settlement to be made thereon (e).

It has been held that the Court in the case of an infant not a ward of the Court, has no power under the Act, to direct a post-nuptial settlement on the infant who had married after attaining the age at which she was capable of contracting marriage (f).

For orders on marriages and settlement of infants' property, see Seton (1901), 1051 et seq. As to the evidence required on applications under this Act, see R. S. C. (1883), Ord. LV. r. 26.

The ward of Court (g) marrying without leave, and the person who, although an infant (h), marries him or her, and also those who contrive or assist at the marriage as abettors, including the clergyman, are guilty of a contempt of Court, and may be committed to close confinement in prison (i); and if they be peers or

- (a) Powell v. Oakley, 34 B. 575; Re Sampson and Wall, 25 C. D. 482. But cf. judgment of Cotton, L. J., in Leigh v. L., infra, and cf. Seaton v. S., infra.
- (b) Seaton v. S., 13 A. C. 61; Re Leigh, 40 C. D. 290.
 - (c) 34 C. D. 467.
- (d) Ex p. Dalton, 3 Sm. & G. 331, 6 De G. M. & G. 201, 205; Re Strong, 26 L. J. Ch. 64.
- (e) See Re Strong, 5 W. R. 107; Re Smith, 22 W. R. 294.
- (f) Re Potter, 7 Eq. 484, and see Wortham v. Pemberton, 1 De G. & Sm. 644.
- (g) Re H.'s Settlement, (1909) 2 Ch. 260, applying dictum of *Cotton*, L. J., in *Re* Leigh, 40 C. D. 294.
 - (h) Edes v. Brereton, West., Cas. t.

Hardw. 348.

(i) Herbert's Case, 3 P. W. 116; Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 515; More v. M., 2 Atk. 157; Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 301; Stevens v. Savage, 1 V. 154; Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89; Winch v. James, 4 V. 386; Priestley v. Lamb, 6 V. 420; Millet v. Rowse, 7 V. 419; Pearce v. Crutchfield, 16 V. 48; Ball v. Coutts, 1 V. & B. 292; Birkett v. Hibbert, 3 My. & K. 227; Baseley v. B., 4 Cl. & Fin. 378; Wortham v. Pemberton, 1 De G. & Sm. 644; Martin v. Foster, 7 De G. M. & G. 98; Gynn v. Gilbard, 1 Dr. & Sm. 356; Re Tweedale's Settlement, Johns. 109, 111; Re Sampson and Wall, 25 C. D. 482.

peeresses a sequestration will be ordered against them, as was the case against the Countess of Shaftsbury in the principal case, and proceedings have been stayed in a suit by a person who has married a ward of the Court and would not appear (a); and the contempt is equally great, although the father of the ward be alive (b), and whether the marriage be valid or invalid (c). "I do not admit," says Lord Eldon, "that, as there is no marriage, there is no contempt. The endeavour to marry is a contempt" (d).

For orders committing husband and abettors, see Seton (1901), 1055 et seq.

If it is doubtful whether a marriage is valid or not, an inquiry upon that subject will be directed, and all intercourse will in the meantime be restrained, and if it be found that the marriage of a ward is invalid, a valid marriage will be ordered (e).

In one case where a male ward had been led into a marriage derogatory to his rank, which turned out to be invalid, a different practice was adopted. Thus, in Warter v. Yorke (f), although it appeared that a woman who had gone through the ceremony of marriage with an infant ward of the Court, was pregnant, Lord Eldon, upon the Master's report, pronounced an order, that, on the part of the infant, a suit should be instituted in the Ecclesiastical Court, for nullity of the marriage, at the expense of the infant's estate, and the parties to the transaction were to be restrained from all intercourse, personal, by correspondence, or otherwise, with the infant (g).

It seems that, although the parties contriving or assisting at a marriage are not aware that the infant is a ward of the Court, their ignorance, although it may be urged in mitigation of the offence (h), will not be sufficient to acquit them of contempt of Court (i). In Salles v. Savignon (k), although the bill, the object of which was to

- (a) Brummell v. McPherson, 7 V.237; Re Strong, 5 W. R. 107; 26 L. J.Ch. 64.
 - (b) Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 301.
- (c) Salles v. Savignon, 6 V. 572; Bathurst v. Murray, 8 V. 74; Re Walker, L. & G. t. Sugd. 299.
 - (d) Warter v. Yorke, 19 V. 453.
- (e) Bathurst v. Murray, 8 V. 74; Re Walker, L. & G. t. Sugd. 299; Re Murray, 3 D. & War. 83; Re Wood, Seton (1901), 1059.

- (f) 16 V. 451.
- (g) And see Bathurst v. Murray, 8 V. 74.
- (h) More v. M., 2 Atk. 157; S. C. Barn. C. 404.
- (i) Mr. Herbert's Case, 3 P. W. 116.
 See King v. Harwood, 2 Lev. 32, 1
 Vent. 178; Nicholson v. Squire, 16 V.
 259; Martin v. Foster, 7 De G. M. & G. 98.
 - (k) 6 V. 572.

make the lady a ward of the Court, was only filed on the day of her marriage, Lord *Eldon* held, that the marriage in fact was sufficient to ground a contempt of Court.

Although the communication of the fact of a contempt having been committed by the marriage of a ward of the Court be not made to the Court until some years after the marriage, there is no doubt but that the Court has jurisdiction, and may feel it a duty to punish that contempt (a). "Yet it would not," Lord Eldon there observes, "be a very wholesome exercise of discretion to visit that offence strongly, if, upon attention to circumstances that have occurred in the course of six, seven, or eight years, it is not very strongly called upon to vindicate the jurisdiction; and in these cases, where it is exercised really for the benefit of the party, the Court ought to look with great attention to all the circumstances of each case" (b).

And the Court has restrained proceedings taken in the Ecclesiastical Court against the ward or his guardian for alimony and restitution of conjugal rights by a person who married the ward in contempt of the Court (c).

The punishment for the contempt of Court by marrying or aiding in the marriage of a ward of the Court, is, as before observed, commitment to prison, by way of punishment; and in the principal case Lady Shaftsbury being a peeress, a sequestration was issued against her. It would seem, therefore, that privilege of Parliament will not shield a person from being committed for contempt of Court (d). Prosecutions for conspiracy or perjury for making a false declaration as to age or consent may also be directed (e).

Punishment, however, for the offence was not the only object of the commitment, as it was frequently made use of by the Court as the means of compelling the husband to make a proper settlement (f); and an inquiry might be directed as to whether the marriage was valid, what was the fortune of the infant ward, and what would be a proper settlement (g); and where there were *mitigating* circumstances, the husband, upon petition, undertaking to make a settlement approved

- (a) Ball v. Coutts, 1 V. & B. 302.
- (b) Ib.
- (c) Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 515.
- (d) See Mr. Long Wellesley's Case, 2 Russ. & My. 639; Ex p. Mitchell, 2 Atk. 172; Re Armstrong, 2(189) 1 Q. B. p. 328.
- (e) Ball v. Coutts, 1 V. & B. 292; Wade v. Broughton, 3 V. & B. 172; Millet v. Rowse, 7 V. 419; Cox v. Bennett, 22 W. R. 819.
 - (f) Ball v. Coutts, 1 V. & B. 300.
- (g) See Buckmaster v. B., 35 C. D. p. 22.

of by the Court, might obtain his discharge (a). But in a flagrant case, he would not be discharged, upon his offering to execute a proper settlement until the Court considered him sufficiently punished (b); nor, if the Court had ordered that he should be indicted for a conspiracy in procuring the marriage (c); at any rate, until he had either been acquitted, or upon being found guilty, had suffered punishment (d); and in general the husband in such cases would not be discharged until a certificate that the marriage was valid had been produced, and a proper settlement had been executed, and costs paid by him (e).

But the power of the Court is now considerably hampered (f), for the adult husband, in marriages made on and after January 1st, 1883, can no longer effect a valid settlement of the infant wife's property (g), and by recent decisions it is now clear that there is no jurisdiction to compel a ward to make a settlement (h), whilst it is doubtful to what extent there is jurisdiction to order a post-nuptial settlement (i).

If a ward enters into an engagement and the intended husband gives an undertaking to abide by the orders of the Court, and the marriage is intentionally postponed until the lady becomes of age, the Court cannot interfere either with the lady or her property (k).

Settlement on Marriage of a Ward of Court.—Where the marriage takes place by the leave of the Court, a settlement will be directed to be made.

It is difficult to lay down any rule upon the subject, as so much depends upon the circumstances of the parties, and, as *Turner*, L. J., said in *Martin* v. *Foster* (l), "the Court will give its sanction to any arrangement such as a prudent father would approve of." As a rule the husband would take the first life-interest in his own property, and the wife the first life-interest in hers to her separate use, without power of anticipation. Then provision would be made for the

- (a) Stevens v. Savage, 1 V. 154; Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89; Seton (1901), Form 16, p. 1057.
- (b) Bathurst v. Murray, 8 V. .79; Baseley v. B., 4 Cl. & Fin. 378.
 - (c) Priestley v. Lamb, 6 V. 424.
 - (d) Millet v. Rowse, 7 V. 419.
- (e) Field v. Brown, 17 B. 146; Stevens v. Savage, 1 V. 154; Millet v. Rowse, 7 V. 419; Cox v. Bennett, 22 W. R. 819; Seton (1901), Form 18,
- p. 1058.
- (f) See Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 283.
- (g) See The Married Women's P. Act, 1882; and M. W. P. A., 1907.
- (h) Re Leigh, 40 C. D. 290; Seaton v. S., 13 A. C. 61.
 - (i) Leigh v. L., Seaton v. S., supra.
 - (k) Bolton v. B., (1891) 3 Ch. 270.
 - (l) 7 De G. M. & G. 102.

issue of the marriage, and, in default of issue, the husband's property is limited to himself absolutely, and the property of the wife, if she survive her husband, to her absolutely, but if she die in his lifetime, according as she shall appoint by will, and in default of appointment to her statutory next-of-kin. It is now general to give the wife a power of appointment whether she survive the husband or not (a). If she be illegitimate and so have no next-of-kin, the ultimate limitation will be to her absolutely (b). Provision should also be made for the children of a second marriage (c).

Formerly if a female ward, of age, made a settlement without the leave of the Court, the Court nevertheless still considered her under its protection, and would inquire, if necessary, whether the settlement was a proper one (d). And where proposals for a settlement on the marriage of a ward had been entertained by the Court, the parties were not allowed to defeat the intention of the Court, by deferring the marriage until the ward came of age and then entering into fresh settlements (e). So, too, if the proposed settlement were refused by the Court and the marriage took place after the ward's majority on terms not approved by the Court, the Court would interfere (f).

So an improper settlement, where the marriage took place the day after the female ward came of age, was rectified, she having been surprised into its execution (g).

An improper settlement has also been varied or rectified by the Court after the lapse of a considerable length of time, subject, nevertheless, to the due protection of the rights and interests of persons who have come into esse since the time of the marriage (h); and of the husband (i); and of third parties, see Blackie v. Clark (k), where Romilly, M. R., refused to rectify the settlement to the prejudice of incumbrancers.

But it now seems to be clearly settled that the Court has no

- (a) Ex p. Smith, 22 W. R. 294; Smith v. Iliffe, 20 Eq. 666.
- (b) Scott v. Hanbury, (1891) 1 Ch. 299.
- (c) Rudge v. Weedon, 11 B. 98; Long v. L., 2 S. & S. 124.
- (d) Austen v. Halsey, 2 S. & S. 123 (n.).
- (e) Hobson v. Ferraby, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 412.
 - (f) Money v. M., 3 Drew. 256; Re

Donne, 2 Moll. 490; Biddles v. Jackson, 26 B. 282; Cook v. Fryer, 1 Ha. 498; sed vide Sams v. Cronin, 22 W. R. 204; and cf. Bolton v. B., (1891) 3 Ch. 270.

- (g) Long v. L., 2 S. & S. 119.
- (h) Cave v. C., 15 B. 227; Smith v. Iliffe, 20 Eq. 666.
 - (i) Re Hoare, 4 Gif. 254.
 - (k) 15 B. 595.

jurisdiction over the person or property of its wards after they have come of age (a).

Where the marriage takes place in contempt of the Court, that is to say, without previously obtaining the consent of the Court, the nature of the settlement will depend in a great measure upon the fortune, position, and conduct of the husband. And before the husband can purge his contempt he must make a settlement satisfactory to the Court. But, as before stated, this power is now very greatly restricted (b).

When the contempt is gross, the settlement will be framed in such a manner as to exclude the husband from all interest, and the rule will only be departed from in cases where it could be clearly shewn that the departure would be for the benefit of the lady (c); but the wife will be given power, in default of issue, to appoint in the husband's favour by will. If the wife be the offending party she cannot in the same manner be excluded from the husband's property, as he is bound to support her (d); and the Court will not appoint trustees of the marriage settlement persons who are on unpleasant terms with the wife (e).

When the contempt has not been of an aggravated character, as for instance where the husband was ignorant at the time of the marriage that his wife was a ward of the Court, and there are "alleviating circumstances" attending the contempt, the settlement will be more favourable to the husband (f). A life interest in part of the income of the wife may be given to him during the coverture (g), and the wife should generally have power to appoint to him by will (h).

The mere fact, however, of marriage with a female ward of Court, without the Court's consent, will confer upon the Court a jurisdiction to decline, during the joint lives of the husband and wife, to part with

- (a) Longbottom v. Pearce, 3 De G. & J. 545 (n.); White v. Herrick, L. R. 4 Ch. 345; Sams v. Cronin, 22 W. R. 204; overruling Biddles v. Jackson, 26 B. 282, 3 De G. & J. 544; Bolton v. B., (1891) 3 Ch. 270.
 - (b) Supra, pp. 528, 529.
- (c) Wade v. Hopkinson, 19 B. 613, 619; Hodgens v. H., 4 Cl. & Fin. 323; Baseley v. B., Ib., p. 378 (n.); Field v. Brown, 19 B. 176; Field v. Moore, 7 De G. M. & G. 691; Birkett v. Hibbert, 3 My. & K. 227; sed vide
- Martin v. Foster, 7 De G. M. & G. 98.
- (d) Re Murray, 3 Dr. & War. 83; Re Sampson and Wall, 25 C. D. 482; Field v. Moore, 19 B. 176, disapproved.
- (e) Re Sampson and Wall, 25 C. D. 482.
- (f) Richardson v. Merrifield, 4 De G. & Sm. 161; Wilkinson v. Joughin, infra.
 - (g) Bathurst v. Murray, 8 V. 74.
- (h) Millet v. Rowse, 7 V. 419; Wilkinson v. Joughin, 41 L. J. Ch. 234.

a fund in its own power and custody belonging to the ward, even upon the application of the husband and wife and upon the consent of the wife in Court, until such settlement should have been made thereof as should appear advisable and proper under the circumstances of the case (a). It seems, however, to be doubtful whether the Court in such a case would have power to correct or enforce a settlement against the wishes both of the husband and wife (b).

It may be here mentioned that when a proper case is made out, the Legislature has annulled marriages where infants have by fraud, misrepresentation, or violence been induced to go through the ceremony of marriage. See cases collected in the report of the proceedings in *Field's Marriage*, annulling Bill (c).

The sanction of the Court given to a settlement made by an infant ward under the Infants' Settlement Act(d), removes only objections to the validity of the settlement arising from the infancy of the settlor. The statute deals with the incapacity arising from infancy alone (e).

As a man on marriage became (in cases unaffected by the Married Women's Property Acts) entitled to a woman's personal estate not settled to her separate use, his covenant to settle it bound her as well as him. The Court, apart from statute, has no jurisdiction to enable an infant to alienate, and so in a case where a female ward, entitled to leaseholds for her separate use, made a settlement under the order of the Court giving a power of sale to trustees, it was held, that a sale made by the trustees during her minority was not valid (f).

As to confirmation by a woman after the death of her husband of a voidable settlement made upon her marriage, while an infant, see $Davies \ v. \ D. \ (g)$. If actually void it cannot be confirmed (h).

Where a marriage has been solemnised between parties, one or both of whom is or are under age, by a false oath or fraud, the parent or guardian whose consent has not been obtained may, by information in the Court of Chancery, obtain a forfeiture of the property the offending party takes by the marriage, and the Court has

- (a) Martin v. Foster, 7 De G. M. &
 G. 98; Biddles v. Jackson, 3 De G. &
 J. 544, 26 B. 282; Gynn v. Gilbard,
 1 Dr. & Sm. 356; Cator v. Mason, 2
 W. R. 667.
- (b) Martin v. Foster, 7 De G. M. &G. 98, 101; Re Sampson and Wall, 25C. D. 482.
 - (c) 2 H. L. Cas. 48.

- (d) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43.
- (e) Seaton v. S., 13 A. C., p. 69.
- (f) (1831) Simpson v. Jones, 2 Russ. & M. 365.
 - (g) 9 Eq. 468.
- (h) Per Lindley, L. J., Buckmaster v.
 B., 35 C. D., p. 37; Seaton v. S., 13
 A. C. 61.

power, under 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 23 (a), to make a settlement thereof, any agreement or settlement by the parties inconsistent with that to be made by the Court being void (sect. 24); and the principle upon which the Court acts in carrying into effect the directions of the Act is to prevent the offending party from deriving any pecuniary benefit from the marriage, as far as may be, without prejudicing the pecuniary interests of the innocent party and the issue of the marriage (b). Where the fund in possession was small, the Court, instead of ordering a settlement, after declaring the forfeiture, directed the trustees to transfer the residue of the fund into Court, and declared the trusts (c).

The form of order in A.-G. v. Clements (d) declared the trusts of the funds both in possession and reversion.

The offending husband will not be allowed his costs out of the fund (e).

4. Testamentary Guardians.

Before the passing of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, the husband had the exclusive right of appointing a testamentary guardian; the wife now has a co-ordinate right. He may appoint and she may appoint, and if there is an appointment by each, both persons appointed are guardians (f). If the mother survives the father, she is sole guardian if the father has not appointed a guardian; if he has, she is joint guardian with the person appointed. But the Court may appoint a guardian to act with her.

As to the Power of the Father.

By the Act of 12 Car. 2, c. 24, s. 8 (g), it is enacted "that where any person hath, or shall have, any child or children under the age of one-and-twenty years, and not married at the time of his death, it shall be lawful to and for the father of such child or children, whether

- (a) This statute is made practically inoperative by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882.
- (b) See A.-G. v. Lucas, 2 Ph. 753; A.-G. v. Read, 12 Eq. 38; and see A.-G. v. Mullay, 4 Russ. 329, 7 B. 351; A.-G. v. Severne, 1 Coll. Ch. R. 313.
- (c) A.-G. v. Clements, 12 Eq. 32; Thorpe v. Owen, 2 W. R. 208; Wilkinson v. Joughin, 41 L. J. Ch. 234.
 - (d) 12 Eq. 36.
 - (e) A.-G. v. Akers, W. N. (1872), p.

- 45; A.-G. v. Clements, 12 Eq. 32, 36. See Seton (1901), p. 1064; cf. Lee v. Hutton, 14 Jur. 638.
- (f) Re X., X. v. Y., (1899) 1 Ch. 526, per Rigby, L. J., at p. 533, and see below, p. 555.
- (y) A similar Act was passed in Ireland, 14 & 15 Car. 2 (Ir.), c. 19, except that no persons could be appointed guardians who did not belong to the Church of England.

born at the time of the decease of the father, or at that time en ventre sa mère, or whether such father be within the age of one-andtwenty years, or of full age, by his deed executed in his lifetime, or by his last will and testament in writing, in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, in such manner and from time to time as he shall respectively think fit, to dispose of the custody and tuition of such child or children, for, and during such time as he or they shall respectively remain under the age of one-and-twenty years, or any lesser time, to any person or persons in possession or remainder, other than Popish recusants; and such disposition of the custody of such child or children, made since the 24th of February, 1655, or hereafter to be made, shall be good and effectual against all and every person or persons claiming the custody or tuition of such child or children as guardian in socage or otherwise: And such person or persons to whom the custody of such child or children hath been, or shall be so disposed or devised as aforesaid, shall and may maintain an action of ravishment of ward or trespass, against any person or persons which shall wrongfully take away or detain such child or children, for the recovery of such child or children, and shall and may recover damages for the same in the said action, for the use and benefit of such child or children." Sect. 9: "Such person or persons to whom the custody of such child or children hath been, or shall be so disposed or devised, shall and may take into his or their custody to the use of such child or children the profits of all lands, tenements, and hereditaments of such child or children, and also the custody, tuition, and management of the goods, chattels, and personal estate of such child or children, till their respective age of one-and-twenty years, or any lesser time, according to such disposition as aforesaid; and may bring such action or actions in relation thereto as by law a guardian in common socage might do "(a).

The testamentary guardianship is a prolongation of the paternal authority (b). The right given to him is the right of tuition and custody. It is given to him as a trust to be exercised, but the Court will interfere with his discretion in exercising that trust in a way in which it will never interfere with the discretion of a father (c). Illegitimate children are not within the Act (d).

⁽a) See Bedell v. Constable, Vaugh. 177; Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 302; Re Helyar, (1902) 1 Ch. 391.

⁽b) See the principal case, and Wellesley v. W., 2 Bli. (N. S.), p. 145; Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 189.

⁽c) Per Cotton, L. J., in Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., p. 332.

⁽d) Ward v. St. Paul, 2 Bro. Ch. 583; Peckham v. P., 2 Cox, 46; Sleeman v. Wilson, 13 Eq. 36.

Although a father has no right, under 12 Car. 2, c. 24, to nominate guardians for his natural children, the Court would generally appoint those whom he has selected (a); and would not allow the mother to remove them from their residence with their guardians, although she was allowed reasonable access to them (b).

As to the exception of Popish recusants, Roman Catholic and other disabilities are now removed (c), and it seems that the religious tenets of the person appointing, and of the persons appointed, testamentary guardians, will not be any obstacle to the validity of the appointment. Thus an appointment by a Jew (d), or of a Roman Catholic, though an ecclesiastic in England (c), or in Ireland (f), or of a dissenter (g), will be valid. But although the Court would allow the appointment of members of a firm individually as guardians, it will not recognise the appointment of a firm, as "the house of Messrs. A. B. and C.," in that capacity (h).

The mother may be appointed testamentary guardian (i), but in the present state of the law such an appointment is practically without meaning (k).

A father, moreover, may appoint a person to be guardian upon the happening of some future event (l), but if the event do not take place the person so appointed will not be guardian. Thus, a man appointed his wife guardian of his son, and added that if his wife married again before his son attained twenty-one, from thenceforth he appointed his brother sole guardian. The wife, not having married again, died before the son attained twenty-one, and it was held that the brother could not be guardian (m).

If an unmarried woman be appointed, and afterwards marries, the husband is not guardian, nor is the guardianship forfeited by his

- (a) Peckham v. P., 2 Cox, 46; Ward v. St. Paul, 2 Bro. Ch. 583; but see now the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, infra.
 - (b) Ord v. Blackett, 9 Mod. 116.
- (c) See as to Popish recusants, 3 Jac. 1, c. 5; 25 Car. 2, c. 2. 's. 5, repealed by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 102; 26 & 27 Vict. c. 125; the R. C. Emancipation Act, 10 G. 4, c. 7. As to persons denying the Trinity or the Christian religion, see 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 32, repealed as to the Trinity, 53 G. 3, c. 160; and see Simpson, Infants (1909).
- p. 192.
- (d) Villareal v. Mellish, 2 Swans. 538.
- (e) Talbot v. Shrewsbury, 4 My. & C. 673.
 - (f) Re Byrnes, 7 Ir. R. C. L. 199.
 - (g) Corbett v. Tottenham, 1 Ball & . 59.
 - (h) De Mazar v. Pybus, 4 V. 647.
 - (i) See Selby v. S., infra.
- (k) See Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, s. 2, infra.
 - (l) Selby v. S., 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 488.
 - (m) Selby v. S., supra.

misdemeanour (a); but if the infant be a ward of Court, the Court may inquire what ought to be done, and either continues the woman as guardian, or not, as may appear the better course (b).

By the Wills Act (c), the power of making a will is taken away from an infant, who can, therefore, now only appoint a guardian for his children by deed.

No particular form of words is essential for the appointment of guardians. Thus, where a testator desires "his son and daughter to be under the care and direction of A. B. and C. D." (d), or directs M. to "take the care and management of B. house, and my children" (e), they will be held to have been properly appointed guardians under the Act (f).

But where a testator devises his land "to A. B. during the minority of his son and heir in trust for his heir, and for his maintenance and education until he be of age" (g), or appoints A. B. to "be guardian of the estate" of his infant children (h), A. B. will not thereby be constituted a testamentary guardian.

An appointment of a guardian by deed is said by Eldon, C., "to be only a testamentary instrument in the form of a deed or will" (i), and may be revoked by a will (k). But a testamentary appointment of guardian is not revoked by a subsequent informal appointment of others (l), or by a codicil, by which the care, charge, and education of the children is left to another (m), and where persons are trustees and guardians, although the trusteeship may be revoked, they will still remain guardians (n).

The office of testamentary guardian, where there are more than one, goes to the survivor (see the principal case), and sect. 8 of 12 Car. 2, c. 24, sanctions a father in giving authority to a surviving guardian to nominate a person in the place of one who has died (o).

- (a) Com. Dig. Guardian, E. 2.
- (b) Jones v. Powell, 9 B. 345; Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 195.
 - (c) 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 7.
- (d) Bridges v. Hales, Mos. 108, and see Teynham v. Lennard, 4 Bro. P. C., Toml. ed. 302, where the appointment was by parol, but see s. 8, supra, and Re Matthews, 12 Ir. C. L. 233; Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 191.
 - (e) Miller v. Harris, 14 Si. 540.
- (f) See also Mendes v. M., 3 Atk. 619; Re Park, 14 Si. 89; but see

- Edwards v. Wise, Barn. C. 139.
- (g) Bedell v. Constable, Vaugh. 184.
- (h) Re Lord Norbury, 9 Ir. R. Eq. 134.
- (i) Ex p. Ilchester, 7 V. 367.
- (k) Shaftsbury v. Hannam, Cas. t. Finch, 323.
 - (l) Ex p. Ilchester, supra.
- (m) Hare v. H., 5 B. 629, and see Knott v. Cottee, 2 Ph. 192.
 - (n) Re Park, 14 Si. 89.
 - (o) Re Parnell, L. R. 2 P. & D. 379.

A guardianship, however, as is laid down in the principal case, is not assignable (a).

Testamentary guardians, before acting, may disclaim (b), but if they have once acted, they cannot renounce (c), although where there is no charge against them, they may be removed with their consent (d), and the Court may appoint other persons as quasi guardians to have charge of the infant until further order (c).

Where a will contains simply an appointment of a guardian but no disposition of personal property, or an appointment of an executor, probate is not necessary, neither can the will be proved (f).

A testamentary guardian will not be disabled from exercising the office from having been a witness to the execution of the deed by which he was appointed (g).

A testamentary guardian of minor children is entitled to a grant of administration for their use and benefit, preferably to a guardian elected by the children, and a grant made to the latter will be revoked, and a fresh grant made to the testamentary guardian (h).

A testamentary guardian is a trustee by construction, not by name, of all property which comes into his hands as guardian (i), and the Statute of Limitations is (k) inapplicable to accounts of such property as between him and his wards (l). They may, however, lose all right to make any claim against him or his estate by acquiescence (m).

The guardianship may be appointed to last until twenty-one, or for any less time (n). If no period is mentioned for its duration, it will last during minority (o). It is not determined, as was decided in the principal case, by the marriage of a male infant. In *Mendes* v. M.(p), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that the marriage of a female ward would determine the guardianship, but this dictum

- (a) See also Mellish v. De Costa, 2
 Atk. 14; Reynolds v. Tenham, 9 Mod.
 40; Villareal v. Mellish, 2 Swans. 536.
- (b) O'Keeffe v. Casey, 1 Sch. & L. 106.
 - (c) Spencer v. Chesterfield, Amb. 146.
 - (d) Re McCullochs, Dr. 276.
 - (e) Spencer v. Chesterfield, Amb. 146.
- (f) Lady Chester's Case, 1 Vent. 207; Re Morton, 12 W. R. 320; Gilliat v. G., 28 B. 481.
 - (g) Morgan v. Hatchell, 19 B. 86.
 - (h) Re Morris, 2 Sw. & Tr. 360.

- (i) Sleeman v. Wilson, 13 Eq. 36; and see Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., p. 332.
- (k) Cf. Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, s.s. 2; and the Trustee Act, 1888, s. 8.
- (l) Mathew v. Brise, 14 B. 341; but see Re Page, (1893) 1 Ch. 304; Re Davies, (1898) 2 Ch. 142.
 - (m) Sleeman v. Wilson, 13 Eq. 36.
- (n) Vaugh. 184; Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 193.
- (o) Mendes v. M., 1 Ves. Sen. 91; but see Vaugh. 184, 185.
 - (v) 1 Ves. Sen. 91.

does not appear in the case as reported in 3 Atk. 624, and in another case the same Judge held that the guardianship of a person appointed by the Court of Chancery did not determine by marriage of a female ward (a).

With respect to the real estate of his ward a testamentary guardian had no estate, but only certain undefined powers (b). Under the Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 60, if the tenant for life is an infant the powers of a tenant for life under the Act may be exercised by the trustees of the settlement, or, if there are none, then as the Court, on the application of the testamentary or other guardian, may direct.

The appointment of persons trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts does not constitute them trustees with power of sale of the settled land under s. 42 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, so as to entitle them to possession during the infant's minority and defeat the right of the testamentary guardian to possession (c).

As to the power of the mother see the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, s. 3, infra, p. 555.

5. Jurisdiction of Court.

Over Father.—"The law of England has recognised the natural rights of a father, not as guardian of his children, but as the father, because he is the father. * * The father has greater rights than the testamentary or any other guardian. These are sacred rights because the duties of a father are sacred duties" (d). "The Court must not be tempted to interfere with the natural order and course of family life, the very basis of which is the authority of the father, except it be in those special cases in which the State is called upon, for reasons of urgency, to set aside the parental authority, and to intervene for itself" (e). For as parents are entrusted with the custody of the persons and the education of their children, upon the presumption that the children will be properly taken care of, will be brought up with due education, and will be treated with kindness and affection, when this presumption is removed by the conduct of the parents, the Court will interfere, and will appoint a

- (a) Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 160; Jones v. Powell, 9 B. 345.
- (b) Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 195; citing Gardner v. Blanc, 1 Ha. 381.
 - (c) Re Helyar, (1902) 1 Ch. 391.
 - (d) Per Brett, M. R., Re Agar-Ellis,
- 24 C. D., pp. 328, 329, approving Re Plomley, 47 L. T. 284.
- (e) Per Bowen, I. J., in Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., p. 335. Cf. Smart v. S., (1892) A. C. 425.

suitable person as guardian (a), or, if the father be living, to act as guardian (b).

The High Court will not exercise this delicate and difficult jurisdiction unless and until it is "satisfied not only that it has the means of acting safely and beneficially, but also that the father has so conducted himself, or has shewn himself to be a person of such description, or is placed in such a position, as to render it not merely better for the children, but essential to their safety or to their welfare in some very serious and important respect, that his rights should be treated as lost or suspended,—should be superseded or interfered with "(c).

But it is impossible to state "in other than elastic terms the grounds on which the Court should think fit to interfere" (d). "The course of legislation shews distinctly a growing sense that the power formerly accorded by law to fathers of families was excessive, and that the welfare of the children, now recognised as the paramount consideration (e), required that it should be cut down" (f).

In former editions of this work, it is stated that the Court will interfere between a father and his children "when they are wards of Court" (g); but the words "wards of Court" would there seem to be used in the sense that all British subjects who are infants are wards of Court, because they are subject to that sort of parental jurisdiction which is entrusted to the Court in this country, and which may be exercised, as it has been in many cases (h), whether they have property or not, although where the infant has no property it makes it extremely difficult to exercise it (i). This jurisdiction is exercisable over a foreign minor in England (k).

In Re Agar-Ellis (1), the C. A. decided that the Court will

- (a) See Story, Eq. (1892), p. 920; and judgment of *James*, L. J., in *Re Agar-Ellis*, 10 C. D. 71,
- (b) See Ex p. Mountfort, 15 V. 446, and cp. Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.
- (c) Per Knight-Bruce, V.-C., in Re Fynn, 2 De G. & Sm. 457; Re Curtis, 28 L. J. Ch. 458; cited Re Coldsworthy, 2 Q. B. D. 75; Re Newton, (1896) 1 Ch. 740, 748.
 - (d) Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., p. 432.
- (e) Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B.
 232; Re Newton, (1896) 1 Ch. 740;
 F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688; Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.

- (f) See Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., p. 435.
 - (g) See edition 1886, p. 733.
- (h) See Re Fynn, 2 De G. & Sm.
 457; Re Spence, 2 Ph. 247; Warde v.
 W., 2 Ph. 786; Re Scanlan, 40 C. D.
 200; Re McGrath, (1892) 2 Ch. 511.
- (i) See judgment of Kay, J., in Brown v. Collins, 25 C. D., p. 60; see Simpson on Infants (1909), p. 127, and Re Bagnell (1908), B. No. 1395, there cited.
- (k) See infra, Westlake, Private Int. Law, 4th edit. 45; cf. Re Burbidge, (1902) 1 Ch. 426 (lunacy).
 - (l) 24 C. D. 317.

not interfere with the paternal authority, although the infants are wards of Court, unless there is gross moral turpitude (a), or abdication of paternal authority (b), or the father seeks to remove the child, being a ward of Court, out of the jurisdiction of the Court without its consent (c).

Where the character of the father is good, although he may be poor and insolvent, his children will not be taken from him (d), for mere poverty is no ground for the interference of the Court (e); but where the father is insolvent, and his character is bad, and he has deserted his children, or is endangering their property, and neglecting their education, à fortiori if he is out of the jurisdiction, the Court will interfere (f).

In Creuze v. Hunter(g), a petition was presented stating the entangled state of Mr. Hunter's property, and that he was an outlaw, and resided abroad, and that his son, an infant, was entitled in remainder to a very considerable estate, as also to maintenance by the will of his grandfather, and praying that Mr. Hunter might be restrained from taking his son abroad, or improperly interfering with his education, which was then principally directed by his mother, who lived separate from her husband. Affidavits were filed on both sides, imputing very improper conduct to both father and mother. Thurlow, C., ordered that the father should be restrained from interfering with the management of his child without the consent of Lord Hawke and Mr. Adams, whom both parties allowed to be proper persons for such a purpose, and observed, that he was of opinion that the Court had arms long enough to reach such a case, and prevent a parent from prejudicing the health or future prospects of the child; and that whenever a case was brought before him, he would act upon this opinion, and that he certainly

(a) Ex p. Warner, 4 Bro. Ch. 101; Re Fynn, 2 De G. & Sm. 457; Warde v. W., 2 Ph. 786; Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1; Re Newton, (1896) 1 Ch., p. 753.

308; Re Plomley, 47 L. T. 283; Re Fynn, supra; Creuze v. Hunter, infra.

⁽b) Lyon v. Blenkin, Jac. 245; Powell v. Cleaver, 2 Bro. Ch. 499; Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Cox, 242; Re Lyons, 22 L. T. 770; Vidler v. Collyer, 47 L. T. 283; Re Newton, (1896) 1 Ch., p. 752.

⁽c) Rochford v. Hackman, Kay,

⁽d) Kilpatrick v. K., Macphers. 143.

⁽e) Re Curtis, 28 L. J. Ch. 463.

⁽f) See Kiffin v. K., cited 1 P. W. 705; Ex p. Mountfort, 15 V. 445; Wilcox v. Drake, Dick. 631; Re England, 1 Russ. & M. 499; Thomas v. Roberts, 3 De G. & Sm. 758; and see Re Cormicks, 2 Ir. Eq. R. 264, and the Children Act, 1908, ss. 12—28.

⁽g) 2 Cox, 242.

would not allow the child to be sacrificed to the views of the father (a).

Where both the father and mother had been guilty of misconduct, the guardianship of the infants was committed to other persons, but the infants were given the benefit of the income of the trust property so as to assist the parents (b).

But where there was no property available for the support of the children though their father was not able to maintain them, and was of such a character that the Court would not have appointed him a guardian, yet the Court would not interfere by the appointment of a guardian, where the mother being unable to support the children, her mother not having any property to settle, only offered to undertake and covenant to maintain them, although it would have been most beneficial to the infants to have been taken out of the custody of their father (c).

Where the father has committed a breach of marital duty (d); or where the father, holding speculative religious opinions which might be detrimental to the happiness of his children and imperil their welfare, has deserted his wife, the Court has not hesitated, in exercise of its jurisdiction, to remove the children from their father (e). In Wellesley v. Beaufort (f), the habits of the father, whose children were taken from him, were profligate, and his language often profane, and he cohabited in his own house in open adultery with the wife of another man. And where the Court was satisfied that the father of children of from ten to two years old had committed an unnatural crime, the Court not only refused to give possession of the children to the father, but even after he had escaped conviction by the witnesses not appearing against him, would not allow the children to have any intercourse with him; and even if they had been with him, it would have felt it to be proper to remove them (g), and if a father

⁽a) See S. C., 2 Bro. Ch. 500 (n.), Belt's edit.; Jac. 250 (n.); Ex p. Warner, 4 Bro. Ch. 101; Skinner v. Warner, Dick. 779.

⁽b) Allen v. Coster, 1 B. 202.

⁽c) Re Fynn, 2 De G. & Sm. 457. See this case discussed Smart v. S., (1892) A. C. at pp. 432, 433.

⁽d) Re Halliday, 17 Jur. 56; Re Elderton, 25 C. D. 220.

⁽e) See Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jac.

^{266 (}n.); Curtis v. C., 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1147; Re Meades, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 98; Re Grimes, Ib. 465; and cf. Re Besant, 11 C. D. 508, which was decided on the Infants' Custody Act, 1873, p. 555, infra, and see especially the judgment in Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., p. 432.

⁽f) 2 Russ. 1, affirmed H. of L. 2 Bligh (N. S.), 124.

⁽g) Anon., 2 Sim. (N. S.) 54.

be living in a state of habitual drunkenness (a), incapacitating himself from taking care of his children's education, especially if he poisons the minds of his children with blasphemy, the Court would take care that the children should not be under the control of a person so debased and so likely to injure them (b).

Where a father had for four years abandoned his wife and his child—a ward of Court—and laboured under religious delusion such as rendered him totally unfit to superintend the education of his child, he was restrained from interfering with his custody, and there was a reference to approve of a proper person to act as guardian (c). And where a father who had been bankrupt, had by his cruel behaviour to his wife compelled her to exhibit articles of peace against him under which he was committed to Newgate for want of bail, previous to which event he had no settled place of abode, and was unable to provide for his infant children or wife, there was a reference to approve of a proper person to have the care of their persons and superintendence of their education during their minorities, and the father was restrained from removing them from the several schools and situations where they had been placed by their mother and her relations (d). Gross ill-treatment and cruelty by a father to his children will justify the Court in superseding his authority (e).

However, acts on the part of a father which, although somewhat cruel, amount to little more than harshness or severity (f), although they may be such as may prevent his wife from living happily with him, provided they be not such as to contaminate the morals of his children (g), will not afford sufficient grounds for the Court to interfere with the father's power over his children; nor will the fact that he had *formerly* been given up to idleness, profligacy, and drunkenness (h).

The Court, apart from statute (i), had no jurisdiction to compel the father to allow the mother to have access to their child,

- (a) Cf. Re Newton, (1896) 1 Ch., p. 753.
- (b) See Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 30; De Manneville v. De M., 10 V. 62; Warde v. W., 2 Ph. 786.
- (c) Thomas v. Roberts, 3 De G. & Sm. 758.
 - (d) Ex p. Warner, 4 Bro. Ch. 101.
- (e) See Whitfield v. Hales, 12 V. 492; Re Newton, supra; and cf. the Children Act, 1908, ss. 12—28.
 - (f) See Curtis v. C., 5 Jur. (N. S.)

- to have access to their child, 1147, and cases there cited as to the rights of family life, approved by *Bowen*, L. J., *Re* Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., p. 337.
 - (g) Re Spence, 2 Ph. 252.
- (h) Re Halliday, 17 Jur. 56. But cf.Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., pp. 435, 436.
- (i) See Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, s. 5, infra, p. 556; and see *Re* A. & B., (1897) 1 Ch. 786, Custody of Children Act, 1891, s. 4.

and so refused to deprive a father, though living in adultery, of the custody of his child, where he did not bring the child in contact with the woman with whom he was so living; or to order him to permit the mother to have access to the child, where no misconduct on his part was shewn with reference to the management and education of the child. Thus, in Ball v. B. (a), where a lady and her daughter, who was about fourteen years of age, presented a petition, stating that the father was living in habitual adultery with another woman, on account of which a divorce had been obtained, and praying that the daughter might be placed under the mother's care, she offering to maintain her at her own expense, or that the mother might be permitted to have access to her at all convenient times, Hart, V.-C., dismissed the petition. "This Court," said his Honour, "has nothing to do with the fact of the father's adultery, unless the father brings the child into contact with the woman. All the cases on this subject go upon that distinction, when adultery is the ground of a petition for depriving the father of the common law right over the custody of his children. * * * Some conduct of the father, with reference to the management and education of the child, must be shown to warrant an interference with his legal right "(b).

In Re Newton (c), John Newton was the father of two girls, the only survivors of six children of his marriage, aged respectively fifteen and eleven years. He was a fish-dealer in a small way of business, and was a Roman Catholic. The mother, who was a Protestant, died in 1888. On the marriage it had been agreed that the children should be brought up as Roman Catholics. The father had not insisted on this agreement being carried out, and during the mother's life the children were brought up in her faith, and this state of things continued for a long time after her death. From 1888 to 1894 the father was of intemperate habits, and had been convicted several times of being drunk and disorderly. In October, 1890, an aunt had left the two children an annuity of 50l. each. The father had dissipated money paid to him for their maintenance, and had neglected them so much that their halfbrother removed them from the father's house. In December. 1894, an order was made, the father not appearing, that the infants

⁽a) 2 Si. 35.

⁽b) See as to access in case where infant was a ward of Court, Anon., Jac. 264 (n.), and judgment of Bowen, L. J., in Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., p.

^{335,} infra, p. 551; and the Custody of Infants Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 12), infra

⁽c) (1896) 1 Ch. 740. Cp. Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.

should be given into the custody of a medical man, and the father was restrained from interfering with them. The father did not appeal from the order of December, 1894, but in 1895 took out a summons asking that the two girls might be transferred from the Protestant school where they were being educated to a Roman Catholic school, and the summons was supported by evidence to the effect that he had become a reformed character. The C. A., confirming the judgment of *Kekewich*, J., who had an interview with the eldest girl, held that it would be injurious to the welfare of the children that their religious training should be altered, and on the whole circumstances of the case refused the application.

Where children are taken from the custody of the parent, access or communication with him will, if proper, be permitted (a); for into whatsoever hands the custody of the children might fall, it would be their duty to consult the interest and happiness of the children, by allowing filial affection and duty towards their father to operate to the utmost (b).

Over Testamentary Guardian.—The Court will much more readily interfere in the case of a testamentary guardian than with the authority or discretion of a father. In the latter case it does not interfere because of the great trust and faith it has in the natural affection of the father to perform his duties, and therefore gives him corresponding rights (c). The testamentary guardian stands in an entirely different position; his rights are given to him as a trust to be exercised, and the Court will interfere with his discretion in exercising that trust in a way in which it never will interfere with the discretion of a father (d).

Such a guardian can now be removed (e), although before the Act this was doubtful (f); and, upon a proper case being made out, he will be suspended (g), and a proper person will be appointed to act as guardian, and to superintend the maintenance and education of the infant (h). But, as was decided in the principal case, the pecuniary interest which a testamentary guardian may have in

- (a) Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 43.
 - (b) Per Eldon, C., Ibid.
 - (c) Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. 328.
- (d) Ib., p. 332; Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. W. 704; Talbot v. Shrewsbury, 4 My. & Cr. 673.
 - (e) See Guardianship of Infants
- Act, 1886, s. 6, infra, p. 557; F. v. F., (1902) 1 Ch. 688.
- (f) Ingham v. Bickerdike, 6 Madd. 275.
 - (g) Beattie v. Johnson, 1 Ph. 31.
- (h) Foster v. Denny, 2 Ch. Ca. 237; Andrews v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. 622; Ingham v. Bickerdike, 6 Madd. 275.

the death of the ward will be no ground for superseding him (a). On the bankruptcy or insolvency of a testamentary guardian, a proper person will be appointed to have the care of the person (b) or to have the care of the maintenance and education (c) of the infant; and orders are frequently made, regulating the conduct of testamentary guardians and guardians appointed by the Court (d).

The marriage of a female testamentary guardian does not determine the guardianship (e). But in Jones v. Powell(f), it was said by Langdale, M. R., that, although the Court does not ordinarily interfere with a testamentary guardian, it has an undoubted control over any allowance directed to be paid to him; and if such a guardian, being a feme sole, marries, it may, in a proper case, direct inquiries.

The Court will not interfere unless it be clearly shewn to be for the infant's benefit (q).

Reciprocity between English and Scotch Courts.—Scotch testamentary tutors are not testamentary guardians, according to the statute (h). In cases relating to the care of infants, the benefit of the infant being the foundation of the jurisdiction and the test of its proper exercise, there ought on this subject to be a perfect reciprocity of action between the Courts of England and Scotland, although as to judicial jurisdiction the two countries may be to each other independent foreign countries (i).

Over Guardians appointed by the Court.—"Although the Court has power of interfering in certain cases with testamentary guardians, it proceeds on very different rules and principles from those which regulate its conduct when the discretion of appointing guardians devolves upon it in the first instance" (k). Thus, although it was doubtful prior to the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, whether the Court had power to remove a testamentary guardian, it never

- (a) Morgan v. Dillon, 9 Mod. 135;
 Dillon v. Lady Mount Cashel, 4 Bro.
 P. C. 306, Toml. edit.; Corbett v.
 Tottenham, 1 Ball & B. 59.
 - (b) Smith v. Bate, Dick. 631.
 - (c) Heysham v. H., 1 Cox, 179.
- (d) Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen.160; Spencer v. Chesterfield, Amb.
- 146; O'Keefe v. Casey, 1 Sch. & L. 106; Ex p. Ilchester, 7 V. 381.
- (e) Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen.
- 160; Dillon v. Lady Mount Cashel, 4

- Bro. P. C. 306, Toml. edit.
 - (f) 9 B. 345.
 - (g) Re Goode, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 256.
- (h) Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 Cl. & Fin. 42; Scott v. Bentley, 1 Kay & J. 281, 284; Stuart v. Bute, 9 H. L. Cas. 440.
 - (i) Stuart v. Bute, supra.
- (k) Per Lord Cottenham, Beattie v. Johnstone, 1 Ph. 31; Jones v. Powell, 9 B. 345.

hesitated to remove a guardian appointed by itself, if it was for the benefit of the infant to do so. Such a guardian cannot resign his office (a), but the infant may apply to have somebody else appointed if the guardian becomes unwilling to act (b). Applications as to guardianship and maintenance are made by summons (c), but an action is necessary to remove a legal guardian on the ground of misconduct, unless he consent (d).

In general, like the testamentary guardian, the guardian appointed by the Court will be entitled to the custody of the infant's person, but the Court, as in the principal case, will exercise its discretion either in ordering the ward to be delivered up to the guardian, or in permitting him to reside with the mother, or that she may have access to him (e). In Courtois v. Vincent (f), access to her children was allowed to the mother of illegitimate children, although a guardian was appointed by the Court.

Access will also be allowed to the friends of a deceased parent (g). The guardian will be allowed to regulate the mode and settle the place for the education of his ward, whose obedience will be enforced by the Court (h).

Where the guardians differ as to the mode of education, the Court will decide between them (i); and in the appointment of guardians by the Court, much weight will be given to the wishes of the deceased father (k), of which parol proof was received in Anon.(l), but rejected in Storke v. S.(m).

Although the father may have appointed a testamentary guardian, if he has by his will desired that some one else should have the custody of his children, his wishes as to the custody will be complied with (n).

- (a) Spencer v. Chesterfield, Amb. 146.
- (b) Spencer v. Chesterfield, supra; Anon., 2 Ves. Sen. 374; Exp. Champney, Dick. 350.
- (c) R. S. C. 1883, O. 55, r. 2 (12), r. 25; Seton, (1901) 997.
 - (d) Re McCullochs, 6 Ir. Eq. R. 293.
- (e) Ex p. the Earl of Ilchester, 7 V. 380; Wright v. Naylor, 5 Madd. 77; Talbot v. the Earl of Shrewsbury, 4 My. & C. 672, 683.
 - (f) Jac. 268.
 - (g) Hunter v. Macrae, Macphers. 112.

- (h) Hall v. H., 3 Atk. 721; Mitchel v. Duke of Manchester, Dick. 149; Tremain's Case, 1 Stra. 173.
- (i) Duke of Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. W. 702; and see Stuart v. Marquis of Bute, 9 H. L. Cas. 440.
- (k) Campbell v. Mackay, 2 My. & C. 34.
 - (l) 2 Ves. Sen. 56.
 - (m) 3 P. W. 51.
- (n) See Knott v. Cottee, 2 Ph. 192; Duke of Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. W. 706; see also Hartley v. Smith, 10 W. R. 763; reversing S. C., Ib. 750.

Where a female infant has arrived at years of discretion, the Court will consult her wishes as to which of her guardians she desires to reside with (a), and it has even allowed her at her option to remain in the custody of a person who was not a guardian, in preference to the legal guardian (b). But in such a case the Court would order the person so chosen to have the custody to enter into recognizances not to allow her to marry save by leave of the Court (c).

In general, the Court will not allow its wards to be taken out of its jurisdiction. And in *Mountstuart* v. M.(d), Lord Eldon is reported to have said, that the Court never makes an order for taking an infant out of the jurisdiction, and see Stuart v. The Marquis of Bute(e). And the father (f) and other guardians (g) have been restrained from removing their wards to a foreign country.

Exceptions, however, are sometimes made to the rule, and are more easily obtained than formerly (h), although Lord Cottenham has observed, that such exceptions are and ought to be very rare, and that, since he had held the Great Seal, he had had reason to lament that the rule had not been more strictly adhered to (i).

In such cases the Court will generally take security for the return of the ward, if a stay of some duration will be for its benefit, or for its proper education (k).

In an anonymous case (l), on the petition of the father of infant wards of the Court, who being appointed to a situation in the king's service, was about to reside abroad for several years, Lord Eldon, after much hesitation, ordered that he should be at liberty to take them abroad with him, undertaking to bring them, or such of them as should be living, back with him; and he was half-yearly to transmit, properly vouched, to be laid before the Court, the plan of tuition and education for each of the infants actually adopted and in practice at the time of such half-yearly returns, specifying particularly where and with whom they resided (m).

- (a) Storke v. S., 3 P. W. 50.
- (b) Bridget Hide's Case, 3 Salk. 178; and see Anon., 2 Ves. Sen. 374.
- (c) Bridget Hide's Case, 3 Salk. 178; and see Re Lyons, 22 L. T. 770.
 - (d) 6 V. 363.
 - (e) 9 H. L. Cas. 440.
 - (f) De Manneville v. De M., 10 V. 52.
- (g) Shaftsbury v. Hannam, Finch, 328; Newport v. Moore, Dick. 166.
- (h) Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 139; Dawson v. Jay, 3 De G. M. & G. 764.
- (i) Campbell v. Mackay, 2 My. & C. 32.
- (k) Jeffrys v. Vanteswarstwarth, Barn. Ch. Rep. 141, 144; Re Medley, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 339.
 - (l) Jac. 265 (n.).
- (m) And see Logan v. Fairlee, Jac. 193; Stephens v. James, 1 My. & K.

When the health of the ward imperatively required another climate the Court would allow a removal there (a); but when the ward's state of health did not require a permanent residence abroad, he was formerly allowed to remain there only so long as it would be beneficial to him (b).

It has, however, been recently held, that in order to make out a case for taking a ward out of the jurisdiction, it is not essential to make out a case of necessity, but only to shew to the Court that the step will be for the benefit of the ward, and that there is sufficient security that future orders will be obeyed (c). Probably a scheme of maintenance and education would be required (d).

The claudestine removal of a ward of Court from the custody of the person with whom such ward is residing, under the authority of the Court, is, in its nature, a criminal attempt (e). Thus in Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort (f), a member of the House of Commons who had carried off his infant daughter, a ward of the Court, from the house of the ladies under whose care she had been placed by the guardians appointed by the Court, and who, on being personally examined by the Court, admitted the fact, and refused to state the present residence of his daughter, was ordered to be committed to the Fleet, although he was not a party to the suit.

It is a contempt of the Court to remove an infant out of the jurisdiction, even when he has enlisted in the army, without the leave of the Court(g); but where it appeared to be beneficial to the infant he has been allowed to remain in the army (h).

As it is obviously impossible for the Court of Chancery, with the number of wards which it has under its care, to be aware of their conduct, it requires the guardians, from time to time, to give general information of what is taking place. If, for instance, a ward of the Court goes out of the jurisdiction, or from extravagant habits gets into difficulties, it becomes the duty of the guardians at once to

627; De Weever v. Rochport, 6 B. 391; Re Levinge, 6 B. 392 (n.); Re Daly, 6 B. 393 (n.); Hart v. Tribe, 19 B. 149; Lethem v. Hall, 7 Si. 141.

- (a) See Wyndham v. Ennismore, 1 Keen, 467.
 - (b) Campbell v. Mackay, 2 My. & C. 31.
- (c) See Re Callaghan, 28 C. D. 186; Re Montagu, 28 C. D. 82.
 - (d) See Jackson v. Hankey, cited as
- Anon., Jac. 265 (n.); Simpson (1909), 140; Campbell v. Mackay, 2 My. & Cr. 31, Re Clarke, 21 C. D., p. 830.
- (e) As to privilege, cf. Re Gent, 40
 C. D. 190; as to appeal, O'Shea v.
 O'S., 15 P. D., p. 62.
 - (f) 2 Russ. & My. 639.
- (g) Rochford v. Hackman, Kay, 308; Harrison v. Goodall, Ib. 310, note (a).
 - (h) Ib.

apply to the Court in Chambers, where such assistance will be afforded as will extricate the ward from his difficulties (a).

A solicitor is bound to give to the Court any information which may lead to the discovery of the residence of a ward of the Court, whose residence is being concealed from the Court, although such information may have been communicated to him by his client in the course of his professional employment. Therefore, where the mother of wards of the Court had absconded with the wards, her solicitor was ordered to produce the envelopes of letters which he had received from her as her solicitor, with the object of discovering her residence from the postmarks (b).

The Court may order the guardian to attend at Chambers with the infant, or the infant to attend alone (c), or may order the Sergeant-at-arms to bring the infant before the Court (d). Where the mother is the sole guardian of the heir to large estates, the sum allowed the mother for the upkeep of establishment and education of the heir ought to be such sum as prudent guardians would allow to her "as mother." To decide what is a reasonable sum all the circumstances of each case must be considered; the governing consideration being what is for the interest of the heir (e).

Whether the guardian of a minor heir is a relative or not, strict yearly accounts of the administration of the minor's property ought to be kept (e).

6. Custody.

Habeas Corpus.—Any person entitled to the legal (f) custody of a child may, subject as hereinafter appears, enforce such right by a writ of habeas corpus (g).

- (a) Kay v. Johnson, 21 B. 538.
- (b) Ramsbotham v. Senior, 8 Eq. 575; Burton v. Earl of Darnley, Ib. 576 (n.); and see Rosenberg v. Lindo, 48 L. T. 478.
- (c) Re Stedman, Seton (1901), 1047; Smith v. Gooch, Ib.
- (d) Wellesley v. W., Ib. 1048. Cf. G. v. L., (1891) 3 Ch. 126.
 - (e) Barnes v. Ross, (1896) A. C. 625.
- (f) Re Harper, (1895) 2 I. R. 571; as to what is legal custody, see Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., p. 331.
 - (g) See as to the older cases at law,

Rex v. Greenhill, 4 A. & E. 624; Re Hakewill, 12 C. B. 223; Reg. v. Clarke, 7 El. & Bl. 186; Reg. v. Howes, 3 El. & E. 332; Re Turner, 41 L. J. Q. B. 142; and as to more recent cases, Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. 317; Reg. v. Barnardo, (1891) 1 Q. B. 194; (1891) A. C. 388; Barnardo v. Ford, (1892) A. C. 328; Re Ethel Brown, 13 Q. B. D. 614; Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. 232; Thomasset v. T., (1894) P. 300. A Court of law would formerly deliver the child to the father although he were of a very bad character: Ex

It is the universal law of England, that if any person alleges that another is under illegal control by anybody, that person may move before any judge for a writ of habeas corpus, and thereupon the person, under whose supposed control or in whose custody the person is alleged to be illegally and without his consent, is brought before the Court (a). The Court will exercise this delicate jurisdiction according to its judicial discretion, considering what course is most for the welfare of the children and the family, and having regard to the opinions of the day, rather than to those of past times (b).

In proceedings under habeas corpus, all Divisions of the Supreme Court now administer the law alike (c); and by the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 10, all the Divisions of the High Court are enabled, even on habeas corpus, to regard something more than the strict rights of fathers and guardians, and the dominant consideration of the Court will be that upon which the Courts of Chancery have always acted—namely, the welfare of the infant (d). And following the practice of the Court of Chancery, the Courts, in determining what is for the welfare of an infant (e), will, if it be of any reasonable age, see the infant and ascertain its own views on the matter (f). And probably a child who had attained years of discretion (see p. 518, supra) would not be ordered into the custody of either parent against its will (g).

Hence, on an application by a father to any Division of the High

p. Skinner, 9 Moore, 278, or although circumstances existed under which the Court of Chancery would have held that he had forfeited his right to the custody: Reg. v. Isley, 5 A. & E. 441.

(a) See judgment of Brett, M. R., Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., p. 326; explained Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. 232.

(b) See Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., pp. 435, 436; cf. also Reg. v. Gyngall, infra; Re Agar-Ellis, supra, and judgment of Bowen, L. J., p. 336, and Ex p. Hopkins, 3 P. W. 151; Rex v. Greenhill, 4 A. & E., p. 643; Re Andrews, L. R. 8 Q. B. 153; Re Shanahan, 20 L. T. 183; Re Connor, 16 Ir. C. L. 112; Thomasset v. T., (1894) P., p. 298.

(c) See Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D., pp.

324 and 326; Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B., pp. 237, 248.

(d) See judgment of Lindley, L. J., in Thomasset v. T., (1894) P., p. 300; Smart v. S., (1892) A. C. 425; Re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch. 143; Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B., pp. 243 - 248; Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684; see now the Custody of Children Act, 1891, 54 Vict. c. 3, infra, 558.

(e) See Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., pp. 435, 436; Reg. v. Gyngall, supra, at p. 253; Re McGrath, supra, at p. 148.

(f) See Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B., p. 251, and the Act of 1891, infra, p. 558, s. 4.

(y) Per Lindley, L. J., Thomasset v.T., (1894) P., pp. 302, 303. Cf. Judkins v. J., (1897) P. 138 (C. A.).

Court to obtain the possession of his child by a writ of habeas corpus, no order will be made in his favour if there are reasons against his having the custody, which would heretofore have operated upon the Courts of equity in such a case: see Re Goldsworthy (a). There the affidavits of the mother and others, in answer to a rule for a habeas corpus by a father to remove his child (a boy of nine years of age) from the custody of the child's maternal grandfather, disclosing facts which shewed the applicant to be a person of intemperate and vicious life, and in the habit of using gross and disgusting language as well as personal violence to his wife, the Court of Queen's Bench Division declined to interfere, the present custody of the child being unobjectionable.

So in Re Ethel Brown (b), the father of a female child, aged nine, applied for a habeas corpus to obtain its custody. The Court being of opinion that the child was properly cared for by its mother, in whose custody it was, and that the father was an unreliable person, not fit to have the care of so young a child, and was without a fixed home, and that the marriage was not satisfactorily proved, declined in its discretion to interfere, and the decision was upheld on appeal. In Smart v. S. (c), the husband applied for the writ against his wife, who had the custody of the three children of the marriage, two of them (girls) being over twelve years of age, the third (a boy) being under that age. The father's legal rights were controlled as to the youngest child by a colonial statute framed on the principle of Talfourd's Act (d). The father was an habitual drunkard, and had made false and injurious charges of a gross character against his wife. She had ample means, the husband a narrow income only. On appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from the C. A. of Ontario, it was held, affirming the C. A. of Ontario, that under the circumstances disclosed it would be seriously prejudicial to the children to take them away from their mother in order to place them in the father's custody.

In Reg. v. Gyngall (e), the Court, on the ground that it was for the welfare of the infant, declined to order the custody of a female infant, aged fifteen, to be given to its mother, the legal guardian, although there had not been any misconduct on her part. The Court had an interview with the child. Where the application is to

⁽a) 2 Q. B. D. 75.

⁽b) 13 Q. B. D. 615.

⁽c) (1892) A. C. 425.

⁽d) 2 & 3 Viet. c. 54.

⁽e) (1893) 2 Q. B. 232.

take the child from the custody of either parent, a very strong case for the Court's interference would have to be made out (a).

In the case of an illegitimate child, the Court will consider the wishes of the mother, unless prejudicial to the welfare of the child (b). An appeal lies to the C. A. from an order of the Queen's Bench Division, directing the issue of a writ of habeas corpus to bring before the Court an infant in order to determine the custody and control of such infant (c).

Chancery Division, &c.—Independently of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Chancery has always exercised the power of the Crown as parens patriæ over infants, and its exercise of such jurisdiction has always been much more extensive than that possessed by Courts of law under the writ. "It is essentially a parental jurisdiction, and * * the main consideration to be acted upon in its exercise is the benefit or welfare of the child" (d), and the infants need not be wards of Court or have property (e).

In Exp. Hopkins (f), the petitioner, the father, had three daughters, the eldest of whom was thirteen. The three children lived in the house of their paternal uncle, who died leaving them large legacies. After their uncle's death the children continued to reside at the house with one of the executors. King, C., had an interview with the eldest child, and ascertained that she thought it her duty, under the circumstances, so to reside, as she thought her uncle had so intended. The petition was dismissed, with a direction that the parents should have access at all reasonable times.

In Re Agar-Ellis (g), the husband on his marriage promised his wife that the children should be brought up as Roman Catholics, but after the birth of the first child changed his mind and determined they should be brought up as Protestants. The mother insisted upon bringing them up as Roman Catholics. The father thereupon instituted in 1878 this action, making the infants wards of Court, and took out a summons therein for directions as to where and by whom the

- (a) Reg. v. Gyngall, supra, at p. 253; Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. 317.
- (b) Barnardo v. McHugh, (1891)
 A. C. 388; Ex p. Emerson, 11 T. L. R.
 218; Humphrys v. Polak, (1901) 2
 K. B. 385.
- (c) Barnardo v. McHugh, supra; Barnardo v. Ford, (1892) A. C. 326; Re Newton, (1896) 1 Ch. 740.
- (d) Per Kay, L. J., Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B., p. 248; Re Newton, supra; Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., pp. 435, 436.
- (e) Re McGrath, (1892) 2 Ch., p. 511; Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.
 - (f) 3 P. W. 151.
 - (g) 24 C. D. 317, and supra.

children should be educated. The mother in the same year (1878) presented a petition at the Rolls asking that they should be brought up as Roman Catholics and that she should not be deprived of their society. The summons and petition were heard together in 1878. The three girls, the issue of the marriage then living, being then of the respective ages of twelve, eleven, and nine, the C. A. declined to examine children of such tender years (a), and affirming the decision of Malins, V.-C., held that the father had the sole right to decide in what religion the children should be brought up, and restrained the mother from taking them to Roman Catholic places of worship. In consequence of this decision the father removed the children from the care of the mother and placed them with other persons, allowing the mother to visit them once a month, and requiring all correspondence between them to pass through his The second daughter, then aged sixteen, addressed a letter to Mr. Justice Fry begging to be allowed the free exercise of her religion, and to be permitted to live with her mother. Ultimately a petition was presented by the mother and her daughter, asking that she might be allowed to spend two months with her mother, that the mother should have free access to her, and that the communication between them by letter should be free, &c. Pearson, J., dismissed the petition on the ground that in the absence of any fault by the father, the Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with his legal right, and the C. A., after an elaborate consideration of the authorities, upheld his decision (b).

In Re McGrath (c), a Roman Catholic tailor married a wife of the same faith. There were five children, all baptised Roman Catholics, aged respectively, at the hearing of the appeal, a boy sixteen, three girls fifteen, thirteen, and eleven, and a boy of six. The elder boy during his father's life was sent to an industrial Protestant home. The girls were educated principally at Roman Catholic schools. After the father's death the mother, who professed herself a Protestant and who was in very poor circumstances, appointed, under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 (d), a Protestant lady who had befriended her as guardian of the girls and the youngest boy, and then died. The guardian placed the girls at a Protestant industrial home. A next friend of the infants took out a summons

⁽a) See Stourton v. S., 8 De G. M. Cf. Re Newton, supra, p. 542. & G. 760. (c) (1893) 1 Ch. 143.

⁽b) See Re Agar-Ellis, 24 C. D. 317.

⁽d) 49 & 50 Viet. c. 27, infra, p. 555.

under the Act and the Custody of Children Act, 1891 (infra, p. 558), asking that the guardian appointed by the mother might be removed and other guardians appointed, and for directions as to the religious education of the infants. The evidence shewed that the father had been absolutely indifferent in the matter of religion, and the eldest boy made an affidavit that he was and intended to remain a Protestant, and the eldest girl wished to remain where she was. North, J., dismissed the summons, being of opinion that it would not be for the welfare of the child to remove the guardian, and refused to give directions as to the religious education of the infants. The C. A. upheld his judgment, pointing out that it was now clear that the Court had jurisdiction to interfere with and remove the guardians of children who have no property, on proof of misconduct, or on its being shewn it was for the infants' welfare, although in such cases the jurisdiction is limited by the fact of there being no property out of which the Court can provide maintenance: that the jurisdiction may be invoked by any person as next friend of the infant, but that no next friend, no relation, no kind or charitable person, no co-religionist of the child, no priest or minister of any religion, has in such a case any right whatever beyond that of informing the Court as to what is wrong and asking the Court's assistance on behalf of the infant. The Court also pointed out the distinction between the present case and that of Hawksworth v. H. (a), where there was not the slightest trace of any indifference on the part of the father to the religious education of his child (b).

Powers of Divorce Court as to Custody, &c.—The jurisdiction of this Court as to the custody, maintenance, and education of the children of parents divorced or judicially separated depends upon the Divorce Acts (c), and the exercise of it upon the Judicature Act, 1873 (d), and this Court now has power to make orders for the custody, &c., of children up to the age of twenty-one years (e).

Enforcing Order as to Custody.—The order, if disobeyed, may be enforced by directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to take the infant into his custody (f).

⁽a) L. R. 6 Ch. 542.

⁽b) Cf. Re Newton, supra, p. 542; Re Clarke, 21 C. D. 821; Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.

⁽c) 20 & 21 Viet. c. 85, s. 35; 22 & 23 Viet. c. 61, s. 4.

⁽d) S. 25, and s.s. 10.

⁽e) Thomasset v. T., (1894) P. 295; Judkins v. J., (1897) P. 138 (C. A.).

⁽f) G. v. L., (1891) 3 Ch. 126; Seton (1901), Form 4, p. 1048.

7. Foreign Guardians and Guardians appointed for Foreign Infants.

The Courts will, if necessary, appoint guardians of an infant not domiciled and having no property in this country (a). "If there be a foreign child in England with guardians duly appointed in the child's own country, the Court of Chancery may, without any previous inquiry whether the appointment of other guardians in England is or is not necessary, and would or would not be beneficial to the child, make an order for the appointment of English guardians" (b). The status of guardian not being a status recognised by the law of this country, unless constituted in this country, it is not a matter of course to appoint the foreign guardian to be English guardian (c). Some one within the jurisdiction would generally be appointed, over whom the Court could exercise an effective control (d).

In dealing with guardians appointed by foreign Courts, the Courts will have regard to the principles of international law, and will recognise the proceedings of the regularly constituted tribunals of civilised communities. They will, therefore, carry out the orders of a foreign Court, provided they do not conflict with our own laws, and will remove guardians appointed here who do not carry out such orders; as, for instance, by changing the form of religious education given to the child (e).

For the same reason, the Court will not interfere with the discretion of the guardian who has been appointed by a foreign Court of competent jurisdiction, when he wishes to remove foreign infants from England in order to complete their education in their own country. But, nevertheless, the Court will not discharge an order by which guardians have been appointed over the children in this country, and will merely reserve to the foreign guardian the exclusive custody of the children to which he was entitled by order of the Court of his own country, and will on proper application allow the foreign guardian to remove them from the jurisdiction (f).

- (a) Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 Cl. &
 Fin. 42; Hope v. H., 4 De G. M. &
 G. 328; Re Willoughby, 30 C. D. 324.
- (b) Per Lord Campbell in Stuart v. Bute, 9 H. L. Cas. 440, 464; see also Nugent v. Vetzera, 2 Eq. 704; Seton (1901), Form 15, p. 1040.
 - (c) Stuart v. Bute, supra, p. 470.
- (d) Johnstone v. Beattie and Stuart v. Bute, supra; and see Exp. Watkins, 2 Ves. Sen. 470.
- (e) Di Savini v. Lousada, 18 W. R. 425; Re Bourgoise, 41 C. D. 310.
- (f) Nugent v. Vetzera, 2 Eq. 704;cf. Dawson v. Jay, 3 De G. M. & G. 764; Re Bourgoise, supra.

8. Powers under Statutes.

An Act to amend the Law as to the Custody of Infants. 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12.

- 1. From and after the passing of this Act it shall be lawful for the High Court of Chancery in England or in Ireland respectively, upon hearing the petition by her next friend of the mother of any infant or infants under sixteen years of age (a), to order that the petitioner shall have access to such infant or infants at such times and subject to such regulations as the Court shall deem proper, or to order that such infant or infants shall be delivered to the mother, and remain in or under her custody or control, or shall, if already in her custody or under her control, remain therein until such infant or infants shall attain such age, not exceeding sixteen, as the Court shall direct; and further, to order that such custody or control shall be subject to such regulations as regards access by the father or guardian of such infant or infants, and otherwise, as the said Court shall deem proper (b).
- 2. No agreement contained in any separation deed made between the father and mother of an infant or infants shall be held to be invalid by reason only of its providing that the father of such infant or infants shall give up the custody or control thereof to the mother (c): Provided always, that no Court shall enforce any such agreement if the Court shall be of opinion that it will not be for the benefit of the infant or infants to give effect thereto (d).

By the third section, Talfourd's Act, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54, is repealed.

The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886. 49 & 50 Vict. c. 27.

- 2. On the death of the father of an infant, and in case the father shall have died prior to the passing of this Act, then, from and after the passing of this Act, the mother, if surviving, shall be the guardian of such infant, either alone when no guardian has been appointed by the father, or jointly with any guardian appointed by the father. When no guardian has been appointed by the father, or if the guardian or guardians appointed by the father is or are dead or refuses or refuse to act, the Court may, if it shall think fit, from time
 - (a) See sect. 5 of following Act (1886).
- (b) In Re Taylor, 4 C. D., p. 159, Jessel, M. R., considers the principle which should guide the Court in the application of this Act. Cf. Re Elderton, 25 C. D. 220; Re Brown, 13 Q. B.
- D. 614; Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., p. 434.
- (c) See cases cited note (f), p. 520, supra, and Condon v. Vollum, 57 L. T. 154.
 - (d) Re Besant, 11 C. D. 508.

to time appoint a guardian or guardians to act jointly with the mother (a).

- 3. (1.) The mother of any infant may, by deed or will, appoint any person or persons to be guardian or guardians of such infant after the death of herself and the father of such infant (if such infant be then unmarried), and where guardians are appointed by both parents they shall act jointly (b).
 - (2.) The mother of any infant may, by deed or will, provisionally nominate some fit person or persons to act as guardian or guardians of such infant after her death jointly with the father of such infant, and the Court after her death, if it be shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the father is for any reason unfitted to be the sole guardian of his children, may confirm (c) the appointment of such guardian or guardians, who shall thereupon be authorised and empowered so to act as aforesaid, or make such other order in respect of the guardianship as the Court shall think right.
 - (8.) In the event of guardians being unable to agree upon a question affecting the welfare of an infant, any of them may apply to the Court for its direction, and the Court may make such order or orders regarding the matters in difference as it shall think proper.
- 4. Every guardian in England and Ireland under this Act shall have all such powers over the estate and the person, or over the estate (as the case may be), of an infant as any guardian appointed by will or otherwise now has in England under the Act 12 Car. 2, c. 24, or in Ireland under the Act of the Irish Parliament 14 & 15 Car. 2, c. 19, or otherwise.
 - 5. The Court (d) may, upon the application of the mother of any
- (a) The Act has revolutionised the rights of mothers as guardians, and the Court will only interfere with a mother's sole guardianship where it is shewn that, having regard to the real benefit of the infant, it ought to do so, Re X., X. v. Y., (1899) 1 Ch. 526. But it gives her merely the rights of a guardian, and she has no right to change the religious training sanctioned or adopted by the father in his life,
- Re Scanlan, 40 C. D. 200; Re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch. 143. See Re Magees, 31 L. R. Ir. 513, and note (e), p. 518, supra; Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.
 - (b) Re McGrath, supra.
- (c) Form 9, Seton (1901), p. 1037; Re G., (1892) 1 Ch. 292.
- (d) If the Divorce Court has seisin of the matter the application should be made to it, Manders v. M., 63 L. T. 627; Witt v. W., (1891) P. 163.

infant (who may apply without next friend), make such order as it may think fit regarding the custody of such infant and the right of access thereto of either parent, having regard to the welfare of the infant, and to the conduct of the parents, and to the wishes as well of the mother as of the father, and may alter, vary, or discharge such order on the application of either parent, or, after the death of either parent, of any guardian under this Act, and in every case may make such order respecting the costs of the mother and the liability of the father for the same or otherwise as to costs as it may think just (a).

- 6. In England and Ireland the High Court of Justice, in any division thereof, and in Scotland either division of the Court of Session, may, in their discretion, on being satisfied that it is for the welfare (b) of the infant, remove from his office any testamentary guardian, or any guardian appointed or acting by virtue of this Act, and may also, if they shall deem it to be for the welfare of the infant, appoint another guardian in place of the guardian so removed (c).
- 7. In any case where a decree for judicial separation, or a decree either nisi or absolute for divorce, shall be pronounced, the Court pronouncing such decree may thereby declare (d) the parent by reason of whose misconduct such decree is made to be a person unfit to have the custody of the children (if any) of the marriage; and, in such case, the parent so declared to be unfit shall not, upon the death of the other parent, be entitled as of right to the custody or guardianship of such children (e).

The remaining six sections provide (sect. 9) that the Court in England shall mean the High Court, or the County Court of the district in which the respondent resides, and make similar provision as to Scotland and Ireland. Sect. 10 provides for removals and appeals from County Courts. Sect. 11 provides that Rules shall be made, see Annual Practice, 1897, Vol. 2. Sect. 12 defines "tutors" in Scotland; and sect. 13 saves the jurisdiction of the Courts as to the appointment and removal of guardians.

⁽a) Re A. & B. Infants, (1897) 1 Ch. 786.

⁽b) Cf. Smart v. S., (1892) A. C., p. 436.

⁽c) Re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch. 143.

⁽d) Handford v. H., 63 L. T. 256; Webley v. W., 64 L. T. 839; Hitchings

v. H., 67 L. T. 530. Cf. Witt v. W., Manders v. M., supra.

⁽e) This power is in addition to that under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1859, Webley v. W., 64 L. T. 839; Hitchings v. H., 67 L. T. 530.

The Custody of Children Act, 1891. 54 Vict. c. 3.

1. Where the parent of a child applies to the High Court or the Court of Session for a writ or order for the production of the child, and the Court is of opinion that the parent has abandoned or deserted the child, or that he has otherwise so conducted himself that the Court should refuse to enforce his right to the custody of the child, the Court may in its discretion decline to issue the writ or make the order (a).

By sect. 2 the Court has power to order the parent to repay any costs properly incurred in bringing up the child.

- 3. Where a parent has—
 - (a) abandoned or deserted his child; or
 - (b) allowed his child to be brought up by another person at that person's expense, or by the guardians of a poor law union, for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to satisfy the Court that the parent was unmindful of his parental duties;

the Court shall not make an order for the delivery of the child to the parent, unless the parent has satisfied the Court that, having regard to the welfare of the child, he is a fit person to have the custody of the child.

- 4. Upon any application by the parent for the production or custody of a child, if the Court is of opinion that the parent ought not to have the custody of the child, and that the child is being brought up in a different religion to that in which the parent has a legal right to require that the child should be brought up, the Court shall have power to make such order as it may think fit to secure that the child be brought up in the religion in which the parent has a legal right to require that the child should be brought up. Nothing in this Act contained shall interfere with or affect the power of the Court to consult the wishes of the child in considering what order ought to be made, or diminish the right which any child now possesses to the exercise of its own free choice.
- 5. For the purposes of this Act the expression "parent" of a child includes any person at law liable to maintain such child or entitled to his custody, and "person" includes any school or institution.
 - "Liable to maintain."—There is no legal obligation on the part of
- (a) This Act gives the Court a judicial discretion to disregard the wishes of the parent. Cf. Reg. v.

Barnardo, (1891) 1 Q. B. 194; Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. 232; Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.

a father to maintain his child unless the neglect to do so bring him within the criminal law. Civilly there is no such obligation (a).

And the mother is not liable at common law (b), but she is under the Married Women's Property Act and other Acts (c).

- (a) See Bazeley v. Forder, L. R. 3 Q. B., p. 565; Simpson, Infants (1909), p. 152; and 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 7; 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 57, Lely's Statutes, tit. "Poor"; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, ibid., tit. "Bastardy"; Re Grey, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 684.
- (b) London School Board v. Wood 15 Q. B. D. 415.
- (c) See 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 21; as to both parents, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 37; 52 & 53 Vict. c. 56, Lely's Statutes, tit. "Poor."

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

SCOTT v. TYLER.

1787, 1788. 2 Bro. Ch. 431; Dick. 712.

Conditions in Restraint of Marriage. - Public Policy.

Legacy to a daughter, one moiety of which was to be paid to her at twenty-one, if then unmarried, and the other moiety at twenty-five, if then unmarried; but in case she married befo wenty-one, with the consent of her mother, to be settled upon her as mentioned in the will. The daughter married under twenty-one, without the consent of her mother: Held, that the legacy did not vest in the daughter upon the marriage, and that she never came under the description to which the gift of the legacy was attached.

RICHARD KEE (a), the putative father of the plaintiff Margaret Christiana Scott, by his will devised as follows:—" I will that my executors, hereinafter named, do, with all convenient speed after my decease, purchase the sum of 5,000l. South Sea Annuities, 1751, in their names, upon trust that they, or the survivors or survivor of them, do stand possessed thereof, and receive the dividends from time to time as the same shall grow due, and thereout pay and apply the sum of 60l. yearly, and every year, in and towards the maintenance and education of my grandson, Richard Dryer, till he shall arrive at the age of fifteen years; and if my said grandson should then choose to go to the university, from thenceforth to pay and apply 120l. per annum in and towards his said maintenance and education at the university; but if my said grandson shall not go to the university, I will that, out of the sum of 5,000l. and the dividends and savings arising thereon then made, a sum not exceeding 400l. be

(a) The statement of the case and arguments are taken from 2 Bro. Ch. 431; the judgment from Dick. 712. The statement, arguments, and judg-

ment have been abridged, and so much of them as relates to the power of an executor to pledge property has been omitted.

applied in placing out my said grandson to any trade, profession or employment he may, with the approbation of my executor, choose. And my will and meaning is, that the surplus dividends, if any, over and beside such allowances as aforesaid, from time to time be invested in the like South Sea Annuities, and that the said capital sum, with such surplus dividends, be transferred to my said grandson at his age of twenty-one years, if he shall be living, but if he shall die before that age, I give the said annuities between Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler, who now lives with me, and my god-daughter, Margaret Christiana Tyler, equally to be divided between them, share and share alike, but the share of my god-daughter not to be transferred to her till twenty-one. And if she shall die before her arrival at that age, I give her share to the said Elizabeth Tyler, for her own use and benefit; also I will that my executors hereinafter named, do, with all convenient speed after my decease, purchase the sum of 10,000l. South Sea Annuities, 1751, in their names, upon the trusts after mentioned, that is to say, upon trust that they and the survivor and survivors of them do stand possessed thereof, and out of the dividends pay or permit the said Elizabeth Tyler to take or receive yearly, and every year, as the same shall become payable, the sum of 100l. for the maintenance and education of my said god-daughter, Margaret Christiana Tyler, until her age of twenty-one years, which will be on the 18th of June, 1785, and add the surplus of such dividends from time to time to the said capital stock; and at her said age of twenty-one years, I will that one moiety of the said capital stock of 10,000l. and the savings thereof, be paid and transferred to my said god-daughter, in case she shall then be unmarried; and that, at her age of twenty-five years, if she shall then be unmarried, I will that the other moiety of the said 10,000l. be then transferred to her for her own use and benefit; but in case my said god-daughter shall marry before her said age of twenty-one years, with the consent of her said mother, Elizabeth Tyler, I will that one moiety of the said 10,000l., with the savings made, be settled on my said god-daughter, for her separate use, and her issue, in such manner as her said mother, Elizabeth Tyler, shall think proper, and the other moiety thereof, with the surplus dividends, disposed of, as she, my said god-daughter, shall think fit; but in case my said god-daughter shall depart this life before her arrival at the a e of twenty-five years, unmarried, then, and

in such case, I give the said 10,000l. to her said mother, Elizabeth Tyler, for her own use and benefit. I give, devise, and bequeath to my executors, and to their heirs, all my freehold messuages or tenements, with the appurtenances, in Denmark Court in the Strand, being Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, in trust that they and the survivor of them, and the heirs and assigns of such survivor, do from time to time receive the rents and profits thereof, and lay out the same in Government securities, to the use of my aforesaid god-daughter, Margaret Christiana Tyler, till her age of twenty-one years; and from and after her attaining that age, I give the said messuages, and the rents, issue, and profits received by my said executors in the mean time, to my said god-daughter, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for ever; but if my said god-daughter shall depart this life before she shall attain the age of twenty-one years, I give and devise the said messuages, or tenements and premises, to my said grandson, Richard Dryer, if living, his heirs and assigns; but if dead, I give and devise the same to the said Elizabeth Tyler, her heirs and assigns for ever." He then gave other dispositions not material to this case and appointed the aforesaid Elizabeth Tyler, George Shakespear the elder, Charles Mahew, and Philip Nind, his executors and trustees.

In 1774, James Cockburn left to the plaintiff Margaret Christiana Tyler a legacy of 100l., and made the defendant Tyler executrix, and Richard Kee died in September, 1776, without revoking his will. The plaintiff Samuel Scott, about the latter end of 1782, paid his addresses to the other plaintiff, Margaret Christiana, and by her consent made proposals to the defendant Elizabeth Tyler relative to a marriage with her daughter, offering to settle her own fortune, together with a reasonable part of his own, upon the marriage, which proposal was rejected by the defendant; but on the 17th of May, 1783, he married the other plaintiff, Margaret Christiana, without her mother's consent.

In 1786, Elizabeth Tyler became a bankrupt.

The original and supplemental bill prayed (amongst other things) that the right of Margaret Christiana to the 10,000l. South Sea Stock might be declared, and the same settled on the marriage.

The defendant Elizabeth Tyler by her answer denied that the marriage of the plaintiff was by her consent, and insisted, that,

for want of performance of that condition, the plaintiff Margaret Christiana had forfeited her legacy of 10,000l. South Sea Annuities, which had fallen into the residuary estate of the testator.

The case was argued on three days in Easter and three in Trinity Term, 1787.

Mr. Mansfield, for the plaintiffs.—Margaret Christiana Tyler, having married under her age of twenty-one, is entitled to the legacy of 10,000l. If she married under that age, a moiety was to be settled on the marriage, the other to be paid as she should direct. She, having married, is therefore become entitled to it. It is objected that she is not entitled, because her marriage with the other plaintiff was not with the consent of her mother, whose consent was made necessary by the testator's will. The doctrine of our law is, that wherever there is a personal legacy or a portion payable out of money only, and not out of land, and a condition is annexed of not marrying without consent, the clause restraining marriage is construed to be in terrorem only, and void; and it is immaterial whether the condition be precedent or subsequent. In this point our law follows the civil law, as far as personal property is concerned. He cited the cases mentioned below (a).

Mr. Scott (b), on the same side.—Independently of the clause containing the condition of marrying with consent, it may be argued, that the testator intended the legatee to have the 10,000l in every event except one; namely, that of her dying unmarried under the age of twenty-five years, which, by her marriage, is now become impossible. On the authorities, it is clear, that this being a personal legacy, the condition, as far as it requires the consent of Mrs. Tyler, is in terrorem only, and therefore void in law; and that, in fact, the condition, as far as it is legal, is complied with by the marriage. He cited the cases and authorities mentioned below (c).

- (a) Hervey v. Aston, Cas. t. Talb. 212, 1 Atk. 361, and Comyns' Rep. 726; Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330; Elton v. E., 1 Wils. 159.
 - (b) Afterwards Earl of Eldon.
- (c) Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052; Godolph. Orphan's Leg. b. 1, c. 15; Godolph. b. 3, c. 17; Swinburne, b. 4,

c. 12, p. 266; Wheeler v. Bingham, 1 Wils. 135; Piggott v. Morriss, Sel. Ch. Cas. 26, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 214; Underwood v. Morris, 2 Atk. 184; Semphill v. Bayly, Pr. Ch. 562; Garbut v. Hilton, 1 Atk. 381; Bellasis v. Ermine, 1 Ch. Cas. 22.

Mr. Alexander, on the same side.

Mr. Hardinge, for the defendant Elizabeth Tyler and her assignees.—(1.) One of the four alternative contingencies upon which the daughter's interest is to depend, and which alone can found her claim to the limitation of this entire sum for her benefit, is not accomplished. She has not "married before the age of twenty-one with her mother's consent." The alternative, respecting this marriage with consent, is not merely formal, nor is it by way of substitution for other alternatives, and with an equal benefit annexed, but substantially different, and with additional benefit. She is to attain the age of twenty-one—a mere contingency of time—or she is to attain it unmarried; or she is to attain the age of twenty-five before marriage; or she is to marry with her mother's consent under the age of twenty-one. Upon every one of these alternatives after the first, her state is improved. In the first event, she is to have certain freehold houses. In the second, she is to have an immediate 5,000l. In the third, she is to have an additional 5,000l. In the fourth, she is to have 10,000l. before the age of twenty-one; but 5,000l. is to be settled upon the marriage. The fourth contingency, interposing its earlier effects, saves the legatee from the restraint of the other stipulations, and by an act very much in her own power. The will does not compel her to be unmarried, or to wait for the age of twenty-five, or even that of twenty-one, before her marriage; for she is only to marry with her mother's consent before twenty-one, and the 10,000l. is from that instant her own.

- (2.) There is no condition respecting marriage after the age of twenty-five; and there is no condition requiring consent after the age of twenty-one. The contingency of time is definite, but coupled with a condition essential to its benefit, or indefinite, except as falling within a certain period, but so as to admit of being defined by the performance of a condition,—the marriage with consent. The will may be construed as if the words had been "when she has attained the age of twenty-five unmarried, or when she has married before twenty-one, with her mother's consent."
- (3.) There is no direct legacy to the daughter. The gift is to executors; and they are to pay at the several periods for her benefit.

- (4.) She has a sure provision if she arrives at the age of twentyone, married or unmarried, and married with or without consent.
- (5.) Upon failure of the other events described, there is a marked and clear limitation over to the mother. But it is argued, that, upon the failure of this event (i.e. of the marriage before twenty-one, with consent), no limitation over to the mother appears in the will; and it is true, that, in terms, no such limitation is to be found. But there is a limitation over of the whole 10,000l. directly to the mother, in the very next clause to this, upon the event of the daughter's death before twenty-five unmarried; and she, the mother, is residuary legatee.

Mr. Hargreave (a), for the assignees of Mrs. Tyler.—Concerning the 10,000*l*. claimed by Mr. and Mrs. Scott, which is a question of great importance, as it involves the general doctrine of the Court as to gifts on condition of marriage being merely in terrorem.

Under the will in question, Mr. and Mrs. Scott claim, in Mrs. Scott's right, the legacy of 10,000l. South Sea Annuities, and found their claim thus:—That, Mrs. Scott having married under twenty-one years of age, the material part of the contingency in Mr. Kee's will respecting the legacy has taken effect, and, therefore, that she is entitled to the Stock, with the accumulation of interest. Against this the assignees contend that she is not so entitled, because she has married without the consent of her mother.

The case has been argued on behalf of the plaintiffs in two ways:

—First, that Mrs. Scott's title has accrued within the contingencies under the will. Secondly and principally, that the condition in the will, as far as it requires marriage with consent of the mother, is a condition in terrorem only, and, as such, null and inoperative.

With respect to the first point, it is not much relied upon; the true answer to it will be to state the contingencies. The first contingency is, that upon her attaining her age of twenty-one, a moiety of the Stock shall be transferred to her, in case she should be then unmarried; the event is, that at twenty-one she was, and still is, married to Mr. Scott: this contingency, therefore, has not happened. The next contingency is her attaining twenty-five, and being then unmarried, when the remaining moiety is to be transferred; but to

⁽a) See Harg. Jur. Arg. vol. i. p. 22.

this there is a double answer,—she has not yet attained twenty-five, and she is married. The third contingency is, her marrying under twenty-one with the consent of her mother; but this contingency neither has happened nor ever can happen; for she married under twenty-one without consent, and has continued married till after her age of twenty-one. These are the only contingencies in the will, and are so framed that no one of them is complied with.

As to the second and great point in the cause, namely: that it is the rule of the Court, in cases of legacies of personal property, to consider conditions in restraint of marriage as merely in terrorem, unless where, upon the breach of the condition, the legacy is expressly devised over to a third person. That such a rule should ever have existed appears wonderful; and if the authorities were out of the case, the rule could not be supported.

The Roman law is the foundation of this rule, for it rejected such conditions as invalid; our Ecclesiastical Courts followed this rule, and when the Courts of equity assumed a concurrent jurisdiction over legacies, they held themselves bound to adopt the same rules (a).

Although it cannot be denied to be the law of the Court, yet the Court will not carry it an iota beyond its limits, and should resist its application to such a case as the present, on the following grounds, which the learned counsel argued very fully, namely:

That the doctrine is inapplicable where the condition of marriage is precedent; that the residuary devise in the present case is a sufficient devise over; that the doctrine ought to be confined to immediate and direct legacies, and not to include a trust engrafted upon them, under which latter denomination the legacy in question must be admitted to be.

Mr. Stratford, on the same side.

Mr. Mansfield, in reply.—The question is that made on the will, whether this gift to the plaintiff Mrs. Scott is, or is not, a simple gift of the money in one of two events, or whether she was, at all events, to have the money in case she married. The first gift in the will is

(a) Reference was here made to the Lex Papia Poppæa. See Heineccius in legem Papiam Poppæam, 4to, 1726, p. 94. And see an ample commentary on this chapter of the law in the same book, p. 298.

that to Dryer, of 5,000l., payable when he should attain the age of twenty-one; if he should die under that age, it was to be divided between the defendant Elizabeth and the plaintiff Margaret Christiana, and if the latter died under twenty-one, it was to go wholly to the defendant Elizabeth. Then comes the bequest upon which the question arises: he directs his executors to purchase 10,000l. South Sea Annuities, and gives a direct order that the interest (except the 100l. a year maintenance) should accumulate until the plaintiff should attain her age of twenty-one years, then the accumulation was to stop, and half of the Stock, and all the savings, were to be paid to her, and at twenty-five the other moiety was to be paid. Then comes the provision for her marrying under twenty-one, and the gift of the Stock over to the mother, in case she should die under twentyfive, unmarried. He then proceeds to give her the houses at twenty-one, and if she dies under that age he gives them to Dryer, and then to the River Lee Bonds, which he gives to the plaintiff at twenty-one, and if she dies under that age he gives them to the mother, the defendant Elizabeth. He afterwards gives several legacies, and gives the residue to the defendant Elizabeth Tyler. It is a mere blunder by which the legacy is made to vest at twentyfive; he understands and means that she shall have it at twenty-one, if married; but if married before twenty-one, with consent, he meant to accelerate it, and that she should not, in that case, wait till she attained twenty-one. The provisions as to twenty-one and twentyfive are a restraint of the precedent gift of the moiety and savings at twenty-one, at which age he gives her everything else—the houses, the River Lee Bonds, and the contingency in Dryer's legacy of 5,000l.

If this be the fair construction, there is no pretence to say the legacy is forfeited by the marriage. On the fair construction, therefore, of the will, according to the true intent of the testator, if she was married she was to have the whole at twenty-one, and the provision in restraint of marriage is as such in terrorem only.

If, however, the testator has expressed himself so imperfectly, that she is obliged to get rid of the objections which have been raised to the legacy, we must consider what has been said on the several points.

There is no distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent, except with respect to lands, or where there is a devise over; and in all other cases a condition in restraint of marriage is void. In reasoning, subsequent conditions ought justly to prevail as much as precedent ones: but the doctrine is established, and it is too late to correct it, at least with respect to subsequent conditions. It is contended, however, that the authorities are different as to precedent conditions; but the authorities put precedent conditions out of the way as much as subsequent ones. The doctrine is adopted from the civil law. They contend the civil law has been misunderstood, and that we are now to give it a new construction. But if there is any error in the manner in which the civil law has been construed, the time for correcting that error is past; the doctrine is now established too strongly to be moved; it has become the law of the Court, and the question only can arise, how it has been understood and adopted. It is of no avail to understand it better than those who adopted and established the rule have done. But, in fact, the civil law does not admit the distinction between precedent and subsequent conditions. What is the difference taken on the other side between these conditions? That precedent conditions are favoured and must prevail; that subsequent ones must be rigorously construed as to their validity, and may be dispensed with where compensation can be made. At law there is no distinction between conditions precedent or subsequent, if the subsequent condition is broken.

It has been endeavoured, on the other side, to bring in the devise over; and they have argued, that, being given to the plaintiff in three events, that in all others the legacy goes to Mrs. Tyler. A devise over exists only where there is a gift to one, if he marry or do any other act: with a gift, if he does not, to another person. A residuary bequest does not amount to a devise over. There is no devise over here, but what there is in every case where there is not an intestacy.

They contended, also, that here is an alternative provision. But the testator has said no such thing. The other gifts are without any reference to this legacy of 10,000l.: if the plaintiff had died under twenty-one, she would, according to their argument, have had nothing, for none of the other gifts vested before that time. There

is not the least ground to say that here is an alternative within the meaning of Gillet v. Wray, where one thing is given in one event and another in another event.

Another ground of argument has been that the restraint is only till twenty-one, though there is a passage in Swinburne, where a restraint to twenty is said to be good; it is only given as his opinion; and although the point might have occurred in two or three of the cases—as Amos v. Horner and Creagh v. Wilson, where the restraints were only temporary,—yet it was not insisted upon in those cases: and although the restraint in Underwood v. Morris was only till twenty-one, yet the condition was held void, and not a hint given that the circumstance of its being confined in point of time would make any difference.

It is argued, moreover, that here the restraint was given to a parent. In the civil law, the mother could not be considered as a parent. Is there any possible distinction to be taken between a parent and a guardian? The law makes no such distinction, and reason and common sense agree in this with the law. In *Hervey* v. Aston the consent first required was that of the mother; but no distinction was made on that ground.

The objection that this is a trust is also perfectly new. If there is any ground for this distinction, another case must be added to the exceptions upon this subject, that a condition in restraint of marriage annexed to a legacy given in trust for the legatee, will be good, though if the legacy be given immediately to the legatee, it will be void. And this is a distinction expected to be adopted in a Court which says, that trust estates follow the nature of legal estates. Although the Ecclesiastical Court has not in general a jurisdiction over trusts, it is by no means clear that that Court may not compel the executor to pay the legacy to the party actually entitled; and where the executor is himself the trustee, that Court may undoubtedly compel him to pay it, as he in that case only is what he is in all cases—a trustee for the legatee.

The cause stood over to the 20th of December, 1788, when it came on for judgment (a).

(a) This judgment is from 2 Dick. 712. Mr. Dickens states in a note, that Lord Thurlow having read his judgment,

which was written, gave it to him, and that the following was correctly copied from it.

LORD CHANCELLOR THURLOW.—This is a bill filed by Samuel Scott and Margaret Christiana his wife, against Elizabeth Tyler, the residuary legatee and executrix of Richard Kee, George Shakespear, Charles Mahew, and Philip Nind, executors and trustees named in the will of the same Richard Kee, and Richard Dryer, his heir-at-law.

The bill prays that the plaintiff Margaret Christiana's right may be established in a trust fund of 10,000l. South Sea Annuities, and that proper accounts may be directed accordingly.

For this purpose the bill states the will of Richard Kee, made on the 16th day of December, 1776, whereby he directs his executors to purchase 5,000l. South Sea Annuities, of the year 1751, in their own names, but in trust to pay 60l. per annum for the maintenance of Richard Dryer till his age of fifteen, and from thenceforward 120l. per annum, with liberty to raise 400l. to put him out in some trade or profession, the surplus profits to be invested in the like Annuities, and the whole to be transferred to him at twenty-one; but if he dies in the meantime, the whole is to be thereupon divided between the defendant Elizabeth Tyler and the plaintiff Margaret Christiana, the share of Margaret Christiana not to be transferred to her till her age of twenty-one, and if she dies sooner, her share is to go over to Elizabeth.

He also directs his executors to purchase the sum of 10,000l. in the like Annuities, in their own names, in trust to pay Elizabeth Tyler 100l. per annum for the maintenance of Margaret Christiana till her age of twenty-one, the surplus to be laid out in the meantime in the like Annuities; at her age of twenty-one, if then unmarried, one moiety is to be transferred to Margaret Christiana, for her own use and benefit; and at her age of twenty-five, if then unmarried, the remainder to be transferred in like manner.

If she marries with the consent of Elizabeth, before twenty-one, a moiety of the whole sum is to be settled to her separate use, and for her issue, according to the discretion of Elizabeth; the other moiety to be disposed of as Margaret Christiana shall think fit; if she dies unmarried, before her age of twenty-five, the whole is to go over to Elizabeth.

He also gives to the same trustees certain freeholds in Denmark Court, in trust to lay up the rents till Margaret Christiana shall

attain twenty-one, whereupon he gives both the estates and their produce to her absolutely; or if she dies sooner, to Richard Dryer, or if he be then dead, to Elizabeth Tyler.

He gives divers other legacies. All the rest of his estate, real and personal, he gives to Elizabeth Tyler, absolutely, whom he looks upon as a wife.

He died on the 3rd of November, 1776, leaving Elizabeth surviving, and Margaret Christiana, his natural daughter by her.

On the 17th of May, 1783, the plaintiff Samuel Scott clandestinely and against the will of Elizabeth, married Margaret Christiana, then an infant of eighteen years. Elizabeth objected to it as an improvident match, by reason of his inferior circumstances, his advanced age, and the family which he had by one of his former wives, and warned her daughter of the consequence.

And, as the plaintiff Samuel Scott states, by a deed of the 13th of May, 1783, he has covenanted to settle Margaret Christiana's fortune on her and her children, after his own death, if she or they should survive him.

The bill further states the will of James Cockburn, who died in October, 1774, leaving Elizabeth Tyler his executrix, and Margaret Christiana a legatee of 100l.

All the executors proved Richard Kee's will; Elizabeth Tyler alone acted.

Elizabeth Tyler forthwith transferred 5,000*l*. South Sea Annuities into the names of the trustees, which have been since transferred to Dryer, together with the accumulations, and that legacy has been duly discharged.

In August, 1777, she transferred 10,000*l*. South Sea Annuities into the names of herself and co-trustees, together with the further sum of 1,000*l*. of like Annuities, whereof she has constantly received the produce; she received, in like manner, the rents of the freehold houses and the interest of the securities on the River Lee.

She admits the legacy of 100l. to remain due, and that she had assets, but claims a debt of 900l. against the plaintiff Samuel Scott.

In March, 1786, Elizabeth Tyler became a bankrupt, a commission issued, and Sir Edward Vernon, Thomas Hankey, John Marr, and Malcolm Cockburn, were chosen assignees.

Upon this matter questions arise, whether, as the case stands,

the plaintiffs have any and what interest in the 10,000l. South Sea Annuities.

The testator makes four several bequests to his daughter, a contingent interest in the 5,000l. South Sea Annuities originally given to Dryer, the 10,000l. South Sea Annuities in question, the freehold tenements, and the Lee Bonds, all upon the event of her living till the age of twenty-one, married or unmarried. If she dies before twenty-one, the first, third, and fourth bequests take no place, and yet the interest of the fourth is to be paid to her separate use, notwithstanding her coverture during her infancy; but there is an event upon which the second bequest may take place before twenty-one, namely, if she marries before that age with the consent of her mother.

It is impossible not to suspect that the testator has failed o expressing his full intention concerning this bequest of the 10,000l. He gave it to the daughter on a double contingency,—her age, and being then unmarried; he seems to have meant it for the mother on the contrary event; but he has given it over also to her on a double contingency,—the death of the daughter before her age, and unmarried. This leaves a middle case,—the premature marriage of the daughter,—in which neither can claim under the form of this bequest. Again, he has provided for the anticipation of the daughter's title, by another double contingency; namely, marriage before twenty-one and with consent of the mother; but, in case of a marriage between twenty-one and twenty-five, with or without consent, half the legacy would remain undisposed of; which it can hardly be imagined he meant.

Some endeavours were used to infer, from the terms in which it was given to the mother, that, in all other events, it was meant for the daughter; it is more probable, that, in the case of the daughter's not becoming entitled, it was meant for the mother; but neither conjecture is sufficiently collected from the actual expression, by any admissible rules of interpretation.

The main argument for the plaintiff turned on this proposition, that one branch of the contingency upon which the legacy was given (or rather anticipated) implied a condition in restraint of marriage, which is merely void, and consequently the legacy became absolute.

In support of this position, innumerable decisions of this Court

were quoted; but the cases are so short, and the dicta so general, as to afford me no distinct view of the principle upon which the rule is laid down, or, consequently, of the extent of the rule, or of the nature of the exceptions to which its own principle makes it liable.

The earlier cases refer in general terms to the canon law, as the rule by which all legacies are to be governed. By that law undoubtedly all conditions which fall within the scope of this objection,—the restraint of marriage,—are reputed void, and, as they speak, pro non adjectis. But those cases go no way towards ascertaining the nature and extent of the objection.

Towards the latter end of the last and beginning of the present century, the matter is more loosely handled. The canon law is not referred to (professedly at least) as affording a distinct and positive rule for annulling the obnoxious conditions; on the contrary, they are treated as partaking of the force allowed them by the law of England. But in respect of their importing a restraint of marriage, they are treated at the same time as unfavourable, and contrary to the common weal and good order of society. It is reasoned that parental duty and affection are violated when a child is stripped of its just expectations; that such an intention is improbably imputed to a parent, particularly in those instances where there was no misalliance, as in marriage with the houses of Bellasis (a), Bertie (b), Cecil and Semphill (c), which the parent, had he been alive, would probably have approved. These ideas apply indifferently to bequests of land and of money, and were, in fact, so applied in one very remarkable case; nay, to avoid the supposed force of these obnoxious conditions, strained constructions were made upon doubtful signs of consent, and every mode of artificial reasoning was adopted to relax their rigour. This was thought more practicable by calling them conditions subsequent, although, if that had made such difference, they were, and indeed, must have been generally, conditions precedent, as being the terms on which the legacy was made to vest. At length it became a common phrase, that such conditions were only in terrorem. I do not find it was ever seriously supposed to have been the testator's intention to hold out the terror of that which

⁽a) Bellasis v. Ermine, 1 Ch. Ca. Ca. 129. 22. (c) Semphill v. Bayly, Pr. Ch. 562.

⁽b) Bertie v. Lord Falkland, 3 Ch.

he never meant should happen; but the Court disposed of such conditions so as to make them amount to no more.

On the other hand, some provision against improvident matches, especially during infancy, or to a certain age, could not be thought an unreasonable precaution for parents to entertain. The custom of London has been found reasonable, which forfeits the portion on the marriage of an infant orphan without consent (a). The Court of Chancery is in the constant habit of restraining and punishing such marriages; and the Legislature (b) has at length adopted the same idea, as far as it was thought general regulation could in sound policy go.

In this situation the matter was found about the middle of the present century, when doubts occurred which divided the sentiments of the first men of the age. The difficulty seems to have consisted principally in reconciling the cases, or rather the arguments, on which they proceeded. The better opinion, or at least, that which prevailed, was, that devises of land, with which the canon law never had any concern, should follow the rule of the common law; and that legacies of money, being of that sort, should follow the rule of the canon law.

Land devised, charges upon it, powers to be exercised over it, money legacies referring to such charges, money to be laid out in lands (though I do not find this yet resolved), follow the rule of the common law, and such trusts are to be executed by analogy to it.

Mere money legacies follow the rule of the canon law; and all trusts of that nature are to be executed with analogy to that.

But still, if I am not mistaken, the question remains unresolved, What is the nature and extent of that rule, as applied to conditions in restraint of marriage?

The canon law prevails in this country only so far as it hath been actually received, with such amplifications and limitations as time and occasion have introduced, and subject at all times to the municipal law. It is founded on the civil law; consequently, the tenets of that law also may serve to illustrate the received rules of the canon law.

By the civil law, the provision of a child was considered as a debt

of nature, of which the laws of civil society also exacted the payment, insomuch that a will was regarded as inofficious, which did not in some sort satisfy it.

By the positive institutions of that law, it was also provided, si quis cælibatus, vel viduitatis conditionem hæredi, legatariove injunxerit; hæres, legatariusve é conditione liberi sunto; neque eo minus delatam hæreditatem, legatumve, ex hac lege, consequantur (a).

In amplification of this law, it seems to have been well settled, in all times, that if, instead of creating a condition absolutely enjoining celibacy, or widowhood, the same be referred to the advice or discretion of another, particularly an interested person, it is deemed a fraud on the law, and treated accordingly; that is, the condition so imposed is holden for void.

Upon the same principle, in further amplification of the law, all distinction is abolished between precedent and subsequent conditions; for it would be an easy evasion of such a law, if a slight turn of the phrase were allowed to put it aside. It has rather, therefore, been construed, that the condition is performed by the marriage, which is the only lawful part of the condition, or by asking the consent; for that alone is a lawful condition; and for the rest, the condition not being lawful, is holden pro non adjectâ.

On the other hand, the ancient rule of the civil law has suffered much limitation in descending to us.

The case of widowhood is altogether excepted by the Novels (b); and injunctions to keep that state are made lawful conditions.

So is every condition which does not, directly or indirectly, import an absolute injunction to celibacy.

Therefore, an injunction to ask the consent (c), as I have said before, is a lawful condition, as not restraining marriage generally.

A condition not to marry a widow is no unlawful injunction, for the reason given before.

So, of an annuity to a widow during her widowhood (d).

- (a) Heineccius ad legum Papiam Poppæam, 1776, p. 294. And see the Commentary, p. 298.
 - (b) Novell. 22, c. 44.
- (c) Sutton v. Jewke, 2 Ch. R. 9; Creagh v. Wilson, 2 Vern. 572; Ashton v. A., Pr. Ch. 226; Chauncy v.

Graydon, 2 Atk. 616; Hemmings v. Munkley, 1 Bro. Ch. 304; Dashwood v. Bulkeley, 10 V. 230; Re Whiting's Settlement, (1905) 1 Ch. 96.

(d) Jordan v. Holkham, Amb. 209; Barton v. B., 2 Vern. 308.

A condition to marry, or not to marry, Titus or Mævia, is good, for this reason, that it implies no general restraint; besides, in the first case it seems to have a bounty to Titus or Mævia in view (a).

In like manner, the injunction which prescribes the due ceremonies, and the place of marriage, is a lawful condition, and is not understood as operating the general prohibition of marriage.

Still more is a condition good, which only limits the time to twenty-one (b), or any other reasonable age, provided this be not evasively used as a covered purpose to restrain marriage generally. And this must obtain still more forcibly where the *lex loci* implies the same restraint.

Nay, according to Godolphin, the use of a thing may be given during celibacy; for the purpose of intermediate maintenance will not be interpreted maliciously, to a charge of restraining marriage (c).

It seems also agreed on all hands, that when, on any condition, however restrictive of marriage, the legacy is given over to pious uses, the intention of the party shall be deemed to regard those uses, and not to have aimed at the objectionable purpose of restraining marriage (d).

As we receive the canon law, a bequest over, to any purpose, or person, shall be interpreted in the same manner, and make a conditional limitation.

It was made a question, formerly, what a legatee should take on her marriage, under a bequest of 200l. if she married, or 100l. if she did not. Some thought 300l., some 200l., some 100l. In our books we find it determined formerly, in the case of a greater legacy given upon marriage with consent, or after a certain age, and a less in the other events, that the greater legacy was not forfeited by marrying against the condition (e); but those decisions happened in the period alluded to before, when the worth of the alliance was thought a sufficient reason for a favourable interpretation, as it was called, of the condition; but Lord Cowper determined otherwise, on alternative bequests (f).

- (a) Jervoise v. Duke, 1 Vern. 19; Randal v. Payne, 1 Bro. Ch. 55.
 - (b) Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89.
- (c) See Webb v. Grace, 2 Ph. 701, reversing S. C. 15 Si. 384; Morley v. Rennoldson, 2 Ha. 570, 580.
- (d) Swinb. Part 4, sects. 12, 14.
- (e) Hicks v. Pendarvis, Freem. Ch. Rep. 41, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 212; Bellasis v. Ermine, 1 Ch. Ca. 22.
- (f) Creagh v. Wilson, 2 Vern. 572; Gillet v. Wray, 1 P. W. 284.

It is true that the foregoing limitations, which are detailed in Swinburne and Godolphin, are not found in our reports so expressly stated; but the cases did not call for such particularity, except those few alluded to before, which turned upon the looser doctrine of favourable interpretation, and that, which is not to be supported, of *Underwood v. Morris* (a), and which was determined by Mr. Justice Parker, sitting for the Lord Chancellor. It does not appear by any report that I have seen to have been closely considered; it is contrary to the canon and civil law, and apparently unreasonable, the restraint having been imposed only till twenty-one, and the marriage contracted improvidently at sixteen. I therefore agree with the late Lords Commissioners (b) in denying the authority.

Sir Dudley Rider, in arguing the case of Hervey v. Aston, expressly founds his argument on the perpetuation of the restraint; and Dr. Strahan, who argued on the same side, admits the qualification of time, place, and person, as given before.

The will before us contains a residuary bequest; but that has been repeatedly, and well enough determined, to leave the conditional legacy in statu quo (c); it only prevents that which has not been disposed of already, whatever be its amount, from falling by order of law to the executor or next-of-kin.

But the great vice of the argument in favour of the daughter lies here. It was not contended against the rules above mentioned, if the bequest had been to her at twenty-one or twenty-five, in case she was then unmarried, without more, that she could have claimed the legacy at any other time, or in any other case. But, because the mother was empowered to accelerate the gift by her consent to a proper marriage, and a proper settlement, it was thence argued, that it was indirectly putting an illegal constraint upon marriage. Now, if the first branch of the gift did not impose a direct restraint,

⁽a) 2 Atk. 184.

⁽b) See Hemmings v. Munkley, 1 Bro. Ch. 304; and see Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89; Knight v. Cameron, 14 V. 389; Clifford v. Beaumont, 4 Russ. 325.

⁽c) Semphill v. Bayly, Pr. Ch. 562; Paget v. Haywood, cited 1 Atk. 378, overruling Amos v. Horner, 1 Eq. Ca.

Abr. 112, pl. 9, but where there is an express direction that the forfeited legacy shall fall into the residue, see Wheeler v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 364; Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 108, overruling dictum in Reeves v. Herne, 5 Vin. Abr. 343, pl. 41; and see Ellis v. E., 1 Sch. & L. 1; Re Whiting's Settlement, (1905) 1 Ch. 96.

in contradiction of law, the relaxation of that condition certainly would not operate as an indirect restraint of the same nature.

I am therefore of opinion, that the daughter, having married at eighteen improvidently, so far as appears, and against the anxious prohibition of the mother, never came under the description to which the gift of the 10,000*l*. was attached.

It was therefore void, and a part of the residue; consequently, it belongs to the assignees of the mother, the defendants; and the bill must be dismissed, so far as it seeks to have that trust executed.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Testamentary gifts, p. 579.
- 3. Conditions precedent, p. 581.
- 4. Conditions subsequent, p. 583.
- 5. Limitations until marriage as distinguished from conditions, p. 587.
- 6. As to consent to marriage, p. 591.
- Contract in restraint of marriage or in fraud of marriage contract, p. 598.
- 8. As to conditions annexed to gifts for the purpose of effecting the separation of husband and wife, p. 602.

1. Generally.

Upon principles of public policy, conditions annexed to legacies, or contracts, operating unduly in restraint of marriage, as well as contracts entered into for the purpose of promoting marriage for reward, or in fraud of one of the parties to the marriage or their friends, are utterly null and void. This note deals with the subject of conditions in restraint of marriage. The refined distinctions as to the legality or illegality of these conditions, which have been made in the Ecclesiastical Courts and in Courts of Equity, apply only to personal legacies and money arising from the sale of lands directed to be sold by a valid testamentary trust (a). As to legacies out of real estate, they follow the rule that the common law prescribes and common sense supports, and conditions as to marriage annexed to them, not being otherwise illegal, are held binding. This distinction is said to have arisen from blind superstitious adherence of the ecclesiastical lawyers to the text of the civil law. Lord Loughborough, C., said, "They never reasoned, but only looked into the books and transferred the rule, without weighing the

(a) See J. rman, Wills (1893), p. 885; Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. 510, 516.

circumstances, as positive rules to guide them" (a). But the Courts of Equity have departed from the civil law in most important particulars, and have in fact made new rules applicable to legacies out of personal estate (b).

2. Testamentary Gifts.

By the common law, all conditions annexed to legacies generally prohibiting marriage (by which is meant a lawful marriage) (c), are void, as being "contrary to the common weal and good order of society:" per Lord Thurlow in the principal case, p. 573, supra (d).

So also conditions such as lead to a *probable* prohibition of marriage are void. Thus, where a legacy was given by a testator to his daughter, payable on her marriage or age of twenty-one, upon condition "that she shall not marry without consent, or shall not marry a man who shall not be seised of an estate in fee simple, or of freehold property of the clear yearly value of 500l.," the condition was held void, as being too general (e).

But all conditions which do not, directly or indirectly, import an absolute injunction to celibacy are valid. Thus, a condition to marry or not to marry any particular person (f); or a native of any particular country (g); or a person belonging to a particular class, as a domestic servant or a kinsman (h); or to a particular religion, as a Papist (i); or a person not professing the Jewish religion, or not born a Jew, though converted to Judaism (k); or a condition which prescribes the ceremonies of marriage, as those of the Quakers (l); or which prohibits marriage before twenty-one, or other reasonable age (m), even before twenty-eight (n), is not illegal.

- (a) Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89, 96, 3 R. R. 52.
 - (b) Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. pp. 513, 515.
 - (c) Re M'Loughlin, 1 L. R. Ir. 421.
- (d) Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C. 205, 244, 247, 261; Hervey v. Aston, Com. Rep. 726, 729; S. C., 1 Atk. 361, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 110, pl. 2, (n.) a.; Rishton v. Cobb, 9 Si. 615, 619, 5 My. & C. 145; Morley v. Rennoldson, 2 Ha. 570; Connelly v. C., 7 Moore, P. C. C. 438. As to real estate, see p. 583, infra, Note 4.
- (e) Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C. 205. And see Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052; Ellis v. E., 1 Sch. & L. 1.

- (f) Jarvis v. Duke, 1 Vern. 19; Randal v. Payne, 1 Bro. Ch. 55.
- (g) Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East, 170, but see W. v. B., 11 B. 621.
- (h) Jenner v. Turner, 16 C. D. 188; Chapman v. Perkins, (1905) A. C. 106.
- (i) Duggan v. Kelly, 10 Ir. Eq. R. 295.
- (k) Hodgson v. Halford, 11 C. D. 959.
 - (/) Haughton v. H., 1 Moll. 611.
- (m) Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89, 3 R. R. 52, infra, p. 582.
- (n) Younge v. Furse, 8 De G. M. & G. 756, infra, p. 583; and see p. 576, supra.

A condition, however, not to marry a man of a particular profession or calling, whether there be a limitation over or not, is illegal (a), upon the ground, it is presumed, that it leads to a probable prohibition of marriage (b); but it has been held that a condition in a will of real estate, that a devisee should not marry some person, being or ever having been a domestic servant, is valid (c).

Conditions offering an inducement, to husband or wife, to live separate are illegal; thus conditions decreasing an annuity of a wife if she lives again with her husband, or increasing a legacy to a husband if he separates from his wife, are invalid (d).

A parent, however, may make a provision for his daughter cease on her taking the veil, or becoming permanently connected with a convent. "The condition is conditio rei licitæ, and so the rules derived from conditions in restraint of marriage or otherwise against the liberty of the law, are inapplicable" (e). And it is clear that, according to our law, a gift until marriage or remarriage, and when the party marries or remarries then over, is good (f). But a woman cannot take under a gift until she remarries where her marriage with the testator is declared void ab initio in his lifetime (g).

A question has arisen where a testator makes a bequest to one whom he supposes a widow, under which she is to receive an annuity so long as she continues unmarried, whether she is entitled to a perpetual annuity, though at the date of the will she is married to a second husband. It was decided by Cottenham, L.C., in Rishton v. Cobb (h), that she was so entitled. But in Re Boddington, supra, Selborne, C., said he should have great difficulty in following that decision.

Conditions restraining marriage under the age of twenty-one or

- (a) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 110, pl. 2, (n.) a.
- (b) Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C 205, 265.
 - (c) Jenner v. Turner, 16 C. D. 188.
- (d) Bean v. Griffith, 1 Jur. (N. S.)
 1045; Cartwright v. C., 3 De G. M. & G. 982. Cp. Marlborough v. M., (1901)
 1 Ch. 165; and Re Hope Johnstone, (1904)
 1 Ch. 470.
- (e) Per Lord Cranworth, Dickson's Trusts, 1 Si. (N. S.), 37, 46; and see Clavering v. Ellison, 8 De G. M. & G. 662; 7 H. L. Cas. 707; Re Catt's Trusts, 2 Hem. & M. 52; Wainwright v. Miller,

- (1897) 2 Ch. 255.
- (f) Morley v. Rennoldson, p. 585, infra; Barton v. B., 2 Vern. 308; Jordan v. Holkham, Amb. 209; Lloyd v. L., 2 Si. (N. S.) 255, 263; Newton v. N., 2 J. & H. 356; and see Note 5, infra.
- (g) Re Boddington, 22 C. D. 597, 25 C. D. 685.
- (h) 5 My. & C. 145, affirming the decision of *Shadwell*, V.-C., 9 Si. 615; cf. *Re* Wagstaff, (1908) 1 Ch. 162; and Anderson v. Berkley, (1902) 1 Ch. 936.

other reasonable age, unless with the consent of parents, guardians, or executors (and with a gift over in the case of personalty), are valid (a).

But although such restraint may be valid, the efficiency of the condition imposed will depend, in a great measure, upon the nature of the property, and of the condition itself; for, as is laid down in the principal case, in construing conditions in restraint of marriage, annexed to a devise of lands, charges upon it, powers to be exercised over it, money legacies referring to such charges, and money to be laid out in land, a Court of Equity will follow the rule of the common law. If they are annexed to a mere personal legacy, it will follow the rules of the Ecclesiastical Court, derived from the civil law, except so far as they have been modified or departed from by its own decisions, although no substantial reason exists for such distinction (b).

There is a marked distinction, however, between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent; for where a condition is precedent, as the estate cannot commence until the condition is performed, the condition is beneficial, as creating an estate, and ought to be construed favourably. Where, however, a condition is subsequent, as it operates by way of destruction of an estate already in existence, and is of a penal nature, it ought to be construed strictly.

3. Conditions Precedent.

With regard to a devise of land (c), or of a portion to be raised out of land, or a legacy having reference, and given as an augmentation, to a portion to be raised from land (d), on condition of marrying with consent, it is clear that it will not take effect unless the condition be complied with, even although there be no gift over; for such condition is valid at common law (e).

- (a) Sutton v. Jewke, 2 Ch. R. 9; Creagh v. Wilson, 2 Vern. 573; Ashton v. A., Pr. Ch. 226; Chauncy v. Graydon, 2 Atk. 616; Stackpole v. Beaumont, p. 582, infra; Clifford v. Beaumont, 4 Russ. 325, overruling Hemmings v. Munkley, 1 Bro. Ch. 304; Dashwood v. Bulkeley, 10 V. 230; and see Clarke v. Parker, 19 V. 1, 12 R. R. 124; Beaumont v. Squire, 17 Q. B. 933; Re Whiting's Settlement, (1905) 1 Ch. 96.
- (b) Supra, p. 574; Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 89, 3 R. R. 52; Pearce v. Loman, 3 V. 139; Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. 510.
- (c) See p. 583, infra; Fry v. Porter,
 1 Ch. Ca. 138; Bertie v. Falkland, 3
 1 Ch. Ca. 129.
- (d) Reeves v. Herne, 5 Vin. Abr. 343, pl. 41; Hervey v. Aston, 1 Atk. 361; Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330.
- (e) Supra, p. 574; infra, p. 583, Pt. 4.

With respect to personalty, however, the cases are very difficult to reconcile (a); but there are certainly many cases which have been decided after great deliberation which show that where a personal legacy is bequeathed to a person upon marriage under twenty-one, or other reasonable period, with the consent of persons designated by the testator, the legacy will not vest unless the consent be first obtained; for the condition is precedent; and, as it imposes no other restraint upon the liberty of marriage than is imposed or allowed by the law and policy of the land, it is good, whether there be a limitation over or not (b).

In Stackpole v. Beaumont (c), the testator devised his real estates in remainder to the use of L. W., or such person, if any, with whom she should first intermarry, "if before twenty-one, then with the consent of his trustees, or the survivor of them," for their joint lives, and the life of the survivor, &c. Towards the end of his will, he gave to L. W. 10,000l., "payable and to be paid to her as follows: -5,000l. upon her marriage with such consent as aforesaid, and 5,000l. within two years next afterwards." L. W., while an infant, and a ward of the Court, eloped, and was married in Scotland without the consent of the trustees. Lord Rosslyn held, that she was not entitled to the legacy. "Confined to cases," said his Lordship, "where the restraint operates only up to the age, till which, by the law and policy of the country, consent is necessary, I have no difficulty to say there is no authority to lead the Court to pronounce a proposition so repugnant to that law, as that such a condition is invalid. In Scott v. Tyler (d), there is a very accurate, though not a very extended, opinion of Lord Thurlow (reported by Brown), which carries conviction along with it. The question is, not whether any forfeiture has been incurred, but whether the parties to whom the legacy is given have put themselves in a situation to answer that description of the person to take. There is no gift here but in the direction to pay; for I cannot stop in the middle of a sentence. He gives her 10,000l., that is, in effect, two sums of 5,000l., one payable upon her marriage with consent. has not married with consent. She has married without it. she claim the 5,000l. under the will? I do not see the great

⁽a) See Jarman (1893), p. 888.

⁽b) Hemmings v. Munkley, 1 Bro. Ch. 304, 1 Cox, 38; overruling Underwood v. Morris, 2 Atk. 184;

Scott v. Tyler, supra; Re Brownswill, 18 C. D. 61.

⁽c) 3 V. 89, 3 R. R. 52.

⁽d) 2 Bro. Ch. 431.

importance of the distinction upon a bequest over of the legacy. It is one of the points that occurred to Judges sitting here, to deliver them from the difficulty arising from the rule of the civil law adopted without seeing the ground and the reason of applying it to this country under different circumstances" (a).

So where there is another legacy or provision for the legatee in the event of marriage without consent (b). In both these instances the testator may be considered to have shown it to be his intention, by a gift over to another, in the first, and by a different gift to the legatee in the second case, that the condition should not be taken merely as in terrorem.

In Younge v. Furse (c), the Lords Justices, reversing Romilly, M.R., held that where a legacy or annuity is given by a parent to his daughter provided she does not marry before a certain age, as for instance the age of twenty-eight, she will not be entitled to the legacy or annuity if she marry before that age, even with the consent of her parent.

There is some doubt, with regard to a personal legacy, whether a condition precedent requiring consent generally, without reference to the age of the legatee, is valid, unless it be accompanied by a bequest over on marriage without consent, in which case it is clearly valid (d). But conditions in general restraint of marriage, though accompanied by a gift over, are invalid (e).

4. Conditions Subsequent.

As to devises of real estate, some cases suggest that when the object of the will is in general restraint of marriage, and for the promotion of celibacy, the Courts will hold such a condition to be contrary to public policy and void (f). There does not appear to

- (a) And see Clifford v. Beaumont, 4 Russ. 325; Knight v. Cameron, 14 V. 389; Re Nourse, (1899) 1 Ch. 63; but see Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330; 1 Wils. 130.
- (b) Creagh v. Wilson, 2 Vern. 572; Gillet v. Wray, 1 P. W. 284; cf. Holmes v. Lysaght, 2 Bro. P. C. 261; Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330. See Re Nourse, (1899) 1 Ch. 63, following Gillet v. Wray and distinguishing Reynish v. Martin.
- (c) 8 De G. M. & G. 756.
- (d) Malcolm v. O'Callaghan, 2 Madd. 349; Gardiner v. Slater, 25 B. 509.
- (e) Jarman (1893), 885, citing Morley v. Rennoldson, 2 Ha. 570; Lloyd v. L., 2 Si. (N. S.) 255; Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. 510.
- (f) See Perrin v. Lyon, 9 East, 170; Jones v. J., 1 Q. B. D. p. 282: Jarman (1893), pp. 885, 892; and an article in Law Quarterly Review, Jan. 1896, by Mr. T. Cyprian Williams.

be any authority distinctly showing that such a condition annexed to a devise of real estate is void, except, perhaps, the case of *Lloyd* v. *L.* (a).

A condition subsequent in restraint of marriage is void in the case of a tenancy in tail, because it is repugnant to that estate (b).

But in several early cases such conditions, in a devise of land, have apparently been assumed to be valid at common law (c), as when annexed to a portion charged on land (d), powers to be exercised over it (e), money legacies referring to such charges (f), money to be laid out in land (g); and it has been stated by Jessel, M.R., that in such cases a charge on land follows the rule of common law, as it is called, as distinguished from the rule of equity (h).

A later case shows that a devise to a person, either by a limitation over or condition made to cease on marriage, will not, if the Court can make out the object to be not to restrain marriage but to make a provision for the devisee during celibacy, be held to be invalid. Thus, in Jones v. J. (i), lands were devised by the testator to his sister M., her daughter E., and S., the daughter of D. Jones, "jointly during their lifetime": "if any or some of the before-mentioned parties named depart this life, his or her share or shares go to my sister, J., wife of J. D., together with her daughter M., during their lifetime." "Provided the said M., daughter of the said J., my sister, shall remain in her present state of single woman, otherwise if she shall alter her present state of single woman, and bind herself in wedlock, she is liable to lose her share of the said property immediately, and her share to be possessed and enjoyed by the other mentioned parties share and share alike." daughter of Jemima, having succeeded to a share of the land,

- (a) 2 Si. (N. S.) 255. There was a gift of a mixed fund and also of a copyhold, subject to a condition determining the gift in case of marriage and a gift over. The condition was held void both as to the mixed fund and also as to the copyhold. See also 18 Eq. p. 517.
- (b) Earl of Arundel's case, Jenk. 6 Cent. Ca. 26, p. 243; 3 Dyer, 342, b.
 - (c) Ib.

- (d) Pawlett v. P., 1 Vern. 204, 321;
 Harvey v. Aston, 1 Atk. 361; cf.
 Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330.
 - (e) Per Lord Thurlow, ante, p. 574.
 - (f) Ib.
 - (g) Per Lord Thurlow, ante, p. 574.
- (h) Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. p. 513, and p. 574, supra.
- (i) 1 Q. B. D. 279. See Webb v. Grace, p. 589, infra; Potter v. Richards, 24 L. J. Ch. 488.

married one Evans. It was held that the estate of Mary Evans in the land ceased on her marriage, for that the object of the testator appeared to be, not to restrain marriage, but to provide for Mary Evans while she was unmarried, and that the question whether the clause amounted to a limitation or condition was immaterial, as the authorities upon such a distinction did not apply to a devise of realty (a).

In the case of personalty, if a legacy is given subject to a condition in restraint of marriage which is general, and also subsequent, then the condition is altogether void, and the legatee retains the interest given to him, discharged of the condition, even although there be a limitation over. Thus in Morley v. Rennoldson (b), the testator bequeathed the residue of his personal estate to his daughter upon trust for her maintenance and support until she attained twenty-one or married with the consent of his trustees under that age; and upon her attaining such age or her marriage, for her separate use, with remainder to her children; and in case of her death without issue, he bequeathed the same to certain legatees in remainder. The testator, afterwards, by a codicil, declared that, in consequence of a nervous debility, his daughter was unfit for the control of herself, and his will was, that she should not marry; and in case of her marriage or death, he gave the property he had bequeathed to her over to the same legatees in remainder. It was held by Sir James Wigram, V.-C., that the restraint upon marriage being general, the condition was void, notwithstanding the limitation over. "I cannot do otherwise than hold," said his Honour, "that this is a conditional gift in general restraint of marriage, by which the testator seeks to cut down an interest which he had given by will; and, therefore, that I must hold this to be a void condition."

The result is the same where the property given, subject to a condition in general restraint of marriage, is a mixed fund arising from the proceeds of realty and personalty (c), or is income arising from such a mixed fund, and semble, if it be a legacy out of the proceeds of realty directed to be converted (d), or

⁽a) Consider lines 16-25 of the judgment, 1 Q. B. D. p. 282.

⁽b) 2 Ha. 570. This case was heard (1895) 1 Ch. 449, C. A., on a point left open by the V.-C.

⁽c) Lloyd v. L., 2 Si. (N. S.) 255.

⁽d) Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. 514, per Jessel, M.R.; Re Hart's Trusts, 3 De G. & J. 195 (proceeds of conversion of land).

where the property consists of real and personal estate, given together (a).

Where the condition in restraint of marriage is not general, but against marriage with a particular person (b), or restraining a widow of a testator from marrying again (c), in the absence of a gift over upon breach of the condition, it has been construed as in terrorem merely (d).

Where, however, there is a gift over on such a marriage, and even, it seems, where the gift to a widow is made to cease upon marriage, a condition subsequent against marriage, attached to a devise or bequest, is valid, not only when the legatee or devisee is the widow of the testator (e), but also when she is the widow of another person (f), and a gift over on the second marriage of a man will be valid (g).

Where a legacy is given to a woman absolutely, at a certain time, and there is a subsequent condition requiring consent to marriage, the condition will be construed as in terrorem, if there be no bequest over, although there be a diminished gift to the legatee in the alternative of her marrying without consent (h). And if the power of diminishing the legacy is delegated to another person, the condition will be considered as in terrorem merely, in the same manner as if the diminution of the legacy had been provided by the testator in his will (i).

Should, however, the legacy be limited over to another person on the marriage without consent, the condition will not be considered merely as *in terrorem*, but on breach of it, the gift over will take effect (k).

Different reasons have been assigned by different judges for the operation of a bequest over. Some have said that it afforded a clear

- (a) Duddy v. Gresham, 2 L. R. Ir. 442.
- (b) W. v. B., 11 B. 621; and see Poole v. Bott, 11 Ha. 33.
- (c) Marples v. Bainbridge, 1 Madd. 590; Barton v. B., 2 Vern. 308.
- (d) Cf. Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 108, infra, p. 587; Re Whiting's Settlement, (1905) 1 Ch. 96.
- (e) Tricker v. Kingsbury, 7 W. R.
 652; Craven v. Brady, L. R. 4 Ch.
 296; Dickson's Trusts, 1 Si. (N. S.) 37.
- (f) Charlton v. Coombes, 11 W. R. 1038; Newton v. Marsden, 2 J. & H.

- 356; Tricker v. Kingsbury, 7 W. R. 652; cf. Re Tredwell, (1891) 2 Ch. 640.
 - (g) Allen v. Jackson, 1 C. D. 399.
- (h) Garret v. Pritty, 2 Vern. 293, 3 Mer. 120 (n.). But see Re Nourse, (1899) 1 Ch. 63, distinguishing Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330.
- (i) Wheeler v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 367.
- (k) Stratton v. Grymes, 2 Vern.
 357; Barton v. B., 2 Vern. 308; Re
 Whiting's Settlement, (1905) 1 Ch. 96.

manifestation of the intention of the testator not to make the declaration of forfeiture merely in terrorem, which might otherwise have been presumed. Others have said, that it was the interest of the devisee over which made the difference; and that the clause ceased to be merely a condition of forfeiture, and became a conditional limitation, to which the Court was bound to give effect. Whatever might be the ground of decision, it was held that where the testator only declared that, in case of marriage without consent, the legatee should forfeit what had been before given, but did not say what should become of the legacy, such declaration would remain wholly inoperative (a).

It seems that the mere gift of a residue, as is laid down by Lord Thurlow, in the principal case, will not be considered as a bequest over, for it has been repeatedly determined that that will leave the legacy in statu quo, as it only prevents that which has not been disposed of already, whatever be its amount, from falling, by order of law, to the executor or next of kin (b). But there is a clear distinction between a mere residuary bequest, and a direction that a legacy should sink into and form part of the residue; for that is tantamount to a gift over to the persons participating in the residue (c).

5. Limitations until Marriage as Distinguished from Conditions.

"Although in some respects a condition and a limitation may have the same effect, yet in English law there is a great distinction between them" (d). The Court should first determine whether the particular words are words of limitation or constitute a condition, and then apply the law (e). The distinction does not apply to real estate (f).

Where property is limited to a person until marriage, and upon marriage then over, the limitation is good. "It is difficult," says Wigram, V.-C., "to understand how this could be otherwise: for in such a case there is nothing to give an interest beyond the marriage. If you suppose the case of a gift of a certain interest, and that

- (a) Per Grant, M.R. in Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 117.
- (b) Paget v. Haywood, cited 1 Atk.
 378; Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C.
 235, 252; overruling Amos v. Horner,
 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 112, pl. 9; see Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. 510.
 - (c) Wheeler v. Bingham, 3 Atk.
- 368; Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 108, 118; Stevenson v. Abington, 11 W. R. 935.
- (d) Per Cotton, L.J. in Re Moore, 39 C. D. p. 129.
- (e) See per Kay, J., Re Moore, 39 C.
 D. p. 119.
 - (f) See Jones v. J., p. 584, supra.

interest sought to be abridged by a condition, you may strike out the condition and leave the original gift in operation; but if the gift is until marriage, and no longer, there is nothing to carry the gift beyond the marriage" (a).

In Heath v. Lewis (b), a testator bequeathed an annuity to a single lady (if living and unmarried at the death of a prior annuitant) "during the term of her natural life, if she shall so long remain unmarried:" it was held by the Lord Justices to be a limitation as distinguished from a condition, and that the annuity ceased when the lady married. No gift over is required in the case of a limitation as distinguished from a condition.

In Re Moore (c), a testator directed his trustee to pay to his sister "M," "during such time as she may live apart from her husband, before my son attains twenty-one years, the sum of 2l. 10s. per week for her maintenance whilst so living apart from her husband." M. and her husband were married some years before the date of the will and never lived apart until some time after the death of the testator. The testator's son was living and an infant. Held on a full consideration of the cases that this was a limitation of weekly payments during a specified time, and not a legacy subject to a condition precedent or subsequent, and that the object of the limitation being to induce M. to live apart from her husband it was void (d).

A limitation over is valid not only in the case of the marriage of a widow (e), but also in the case of a widower (f).

A gift to an unmarried person cannot be construed to mean a gift to that person so long as he shall remain unmarried. If, therefore, a testator makes a bequest to his unmarried children and a child became entitled to participate in the bequest by filling the character of an unmarried child, such child will not lose that right by a subsequent marriage (g).

- (a) Morley v. Rennoldson, 2 Ha. 580. See also Jordan v. Holkham, Amb. 209; Barton v. B., 2 Vern, 308; Low v. Peers, C. J. Wilmot's Cases, 369; Bird v. Hunsdon, 2 Swans. 342; Marples v. Bainbridge, 1 Madd. 590; Evans v. Rosser, 2 Hem. & M. 190.
 - (b) 3 De G. M. & G. 954.
- (c) 39 C. D. 116; and see Re Hope Johnstone, (1904) 1 Ch. 470.
- (d) And see Webb v. Grace, 2 Ph. 701, infra, p. 589; Heath v. Lewis, 3
- De G. M. & G. 954; Evans v. Rosser, 2 Hem. & M. 190; Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Ha. 475; Brown v. Peck, 1 Eden, 140; Wren v. Bradley, 2 De G. & Sm. 49; which were considered in Re Moore; and see Potter v. Richards, 24 L. J. Ch. 488, and cf. Corbett v. C., 14 P. D. 9.
 - (e) Jordan v. Holkham, Amb. 209.
 - (f) Allen v. Jackson, 1 C. D. 399.
- (g) Jubber v. J., 9 Si. 503. See also Hall v. Robertson, 4 De G. M. & G. 781.

And where there is a contract to pay a certain sum until marriage, with a proviso that a smaller sum is to be paid afterwards, the limitation will hold good. Thus in Webb v. Grace (a), A. covenanted to pay to E. C. during her life, subject to the proviso thereinafter contained, an annuity of 40l., the proviso being that in case E. C. should at any time thereafter happen to marry, the annuity should thenceforth be reduced to 20l. only, which sum should, in such case, be paid and payable to E. C. from the time of her marriage for the remainder of her life. E. C. having married, Lord Cottenham, reversing the decision of Shadwell, V.-C. (b), held her only to be entitled to the annuity of 20l. "The question," said his Lordship, "turns upon the construction of the covenant; for there really cannot be any doubt as to the rule of law. The questions which have arisen as to conditions subsequent in restraint of marrying do not appear to There can be no doubt that marriage may be made the ground of a limitation ceasing or commencing. It is unnecessary to refer to authorities for this purpose: Richards v. Baker (c), Sheffield v. Orrery (d), Gordon v. Adolphus (e), were cited in the argument. If then, this grant is a grant of 40l. per annum until marriage, and, from that event happening, of 20l. per annum for life, there can be no doubt but that such a gift is lawful, and that, after marriage, there can be no demand for the 40l. per annum. The claim is grounded upon contract and obligation on the part of the grantor; the parties claiming must therefore prove that their claim is within the terms of the contract and obligation. . . . Is there, in the covenant, any contract or obligation to pay 40l. per annum after the marriage of E. C.? The argument in favour of the claim assumes that there is an unqualified grant of an annuity of 40l. per annum for life, and an attempt to defeat the gift by an illegal condition subsequent. This proposition, I think, fails in all its parts: for there is not any unqualified gift of an annuity of 40l. for life; the contract and obligation is, to pay to E. C. during her life, subject to the proviso hereinafter contained, an annuity of 40l. at certain times specified. The contract and obligation is not absolute and unqualified, but explained, qualified, and bound by the proviso, and must be construed precisely in the same manner as if the terms of the proviso had been introduced into and made part of the contract and obligation. It is, therefore, to pay 40l. per annum to her during so much

⁽a) 2 Ph. 701. See Jones v. J.,

p. 584, supra.

⁽b) 15 Si. 384.

⁽c) 2 Atk. 321.

⁽d) 3 Atk. 282.

⁽e) 3 Bro. P. C. 306, Toml. edit.

of her life as she shall remain unmarried, which brings the case within the unquestioned rule of law, as acted upon in the cases referred to. One of them, indeed,—Sheffield v. Orrery—is, upon this point, stronger than the present; for there was a gift for life, without any qualification in the terms of the grant, but a subsequent condition, giving the property over in the event of marriage; and Lord Hardwicke said, that the gift over was to take effect on the marriage. There is another way in which this may be viewed equally fatal to the claim. The contract and obligation is, to pay a certain sum at certain stipulated periods during the life of E. C.; but she is, by the proviso, at each of those periods to be qualified to receive it by the fact of not being married. Can she claim any of such payments, though disqualified by the fact of marriage? The condition, therefore, if there be one, is precedent and not subsequent "(a).

A limitation over on marriage, if the marriage be with the testator himself, will not take effect, at all events, if the will be republished after the marriage, as the limitation would then, it seems, have reference to a subsequent marriage. Thus in Cooper v. C. (b), a testator by his will, dated in 1841, devised lands to trustees upon trust for B. for life, "provided she does not marry, and from and after her decease or second marriage," for other persons. In 1847 the testator married B., and afterwards made a codicil to his will which had the effect of republishing it. It was held by Lord Chancellor Brady, that the devise to B. took effect notwithstanding her marriage to the testator (c).

Where the object of a devisor appears to be, not to restrain marriage, but to provide for a single woman while she is unmarried, a gift over upon her marriage will take effect, and the question as to whether the clause containing such gift amounts to a condition or a limitation is immaterial, inasmuch as such a distinction does not apply to a devise of realty (d).

A condition that trustees shall not pay over the shares of legatees without taking from them bonds that they will not intermarry or illegally cohabit with certain persons, will not be enforced (e).

(e) Poole v. Bott, 11 Ha. 33.

⁽a) Cf. Re Moore, supra, p. 588.

⁽b) 6 Ir. Ch. R. 217.

⁽c) See also Re Corkers Minors, 1 Ir. Jur. 316; West v. Kerr, 6 Ir. Jur. 141; M'Culloch v. M'C., 3 Gif. 606.

⁽d) Jones v. J., 1 Q. B. D. 279, and compare with the judgment of the M.R. in Bellairs v. B., 18 Eq. 510, at p. 517; but see supra, pp. 581 et seq.

6. As to Consent to Marriage.

In the case of a condition subsequent, a marriage in the lifetime of the father, with his consent, or even his subsequent approbation (a), is equivalent to a marriage after his death with the consent of trustees (b).

A condition in a will requiring the consent of trustees to marriage has been held not to be applicable to the second marriage of a daughter who had married between the date of the will and the death of the testator, and was a widow at his death (c).

A condition forfeiting a legacy in the event of the legatee marrying a certain person without the testator's written consent, has been limited to a marriage in the testator's lifetime (d).

Courts of equity will consider whether a substantial consent may not be inferred from the acts of the persons whose consent is required although no formal consent has been given. Thus where no particular mode is prescribed for trustees to give their consent, it may be presumed that they have given it where they have allowed courtship and marriage to take place without expressing their dissent (e), especially if from any fraudulent or corrupt motive they have withheld actual consent (f). And so where a long period has elapsed after the forfeiture and no objection has been taken, assent may be presumed (g). And in Strange v. Smith (h), although the written consent of the mother was made requisite, Lord Hardwicke held that the mother having made her first offer to the intended husband, received him at her house, encouraged his addresses to her daughter, and treated with him and his father about the settlement, had thereby given her consent (although it does not appear by the report that it was in writing); and that she could not withdraw it. Eldon, C., cites this case in Clarke v. Parker (i), but does not notice that the consent was required to be in writing. In Worthington v. Evans (k), a letter was written by the trustee the day

- (a) Wheeler v. Warner, 1 S. & S. 304, followed in Tweedale v. T., 7 C. D. 633.
- (b) See Clarke v. Berkeley, 2 Vern.
 720; Coffin v. Cooper, cited 1 V. & B.
 481; Parnell v. Lyon, 1 V. & B. 479;
 Coventry v. Higgins, 14 Si. 30; Violett v. Brookman, 5 W. R. 342.
- (c) Crommelin v. C., 3 V. 227; Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Bro. Ch. 128.
 - (d) Booth v. Meyer, 38 L. T. 125;

- Curran v. Corbet (1897), 1 Ir. R. 343.
- (e) Campbell v. Lord Netterville, cited 2 V. 530, 10 V. 243; D'Aguilar v. Drinkwater, 2 V. & B. 225.
 - (f) Mesgrett v. M., 2 Vern. 580.
- (g) Jarman (1893), p. 894, citing Re Birch, 17 B. 358.
 - (h) Amb. 263.
 - (i) 19 V. 1, 12 R. R. 124.
 - (k) 1 S. & S. 165.

before the wedding, and was held to be a sufficient consent in writing, and Leach, V.-C., said: "If there had not been such a letter, inasmuch as the formal consent in writing would have been executed by him, but for the accidental delay occasioned by the other trustee, and not from any change of purpose, the Court would have considered his consent to have been substantially given, according to the will; because he had expressed his full approbation of the marriage, and only did not sign it for a reason personal to himself" (a).

In *Pollock* v. *Croft* (b), there was a bequest of personal estate to A., provided she married with the consent of B., but if she married without such consent, then to C.; *Grant*, M.R., held that a general permission given by B. after A. attained twenty-one, to contract marriage as she might think fit, and subsequent approbation of a marriage contracted under such general permission without his knowledge, was a sufficient compliance with the requisition.

The Court will interfere where the refusal of consent by a trustee proceeds from any vicious, corrupt, or unreasonable cause (c). But even if the person who refuses his consent be the devisee over, he is not obliged to show his reason for dissent—it lies upon the party requiring assent to show that it has been unreasonably refused: "for the testator must know that he has made necessary the consent of a person who has an interest" (d).

And if a trustee, where consent to a marriage is required, refuse to interfere, either by consenting or objecting to a proposed match, the Court will direct a reference to inquire and state to the Court whether the marriage is a proper one (e).

If consent be once obtained, unless by fraud or misrepresentation (f), it cannot without a sufficient reason (g) be withdrawn, especially if the person so withdrawing his consent would derive a benefit from a marriage without consent (h).

- (a) And see Daley v. Desbouverie, 2 Atk. 273, followed in Clarke v. Parker, 19 V. 1, 24, and in Re Smith, 44 C. D. p. 659; D'Aguilar v. Drinkwater, 2 V. & B. 225; Re Brown, (1904) 1 Ch. 120.
- (b) 1 Mer. 181. See also Mercer v. Hall, 4 Bro. Ch. 228.
- (c) Dashwood v. Bulkeley, 10 V.
 245, 12 R. R. p. 128 (n.); Clarke v.
 Parker, 19 V. 18; Peyton v. Bury, 2
 P. W. 628.
- (d) Clarke v. Parker, 19 V. 22, 12 R. R. 124. See, however, the remarks of Lord *Hardwicke* in Hervey v. Aston, 1 Atk. 381; and of Lord *Mansfield* in Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052.
 - (e) Goldsmid v. G., G. Coop. 225.
 - (f) Dillon v. Harris, 4 Bligh, 321.
 - (g) Re Brown, (1904)1 Ch. 120.
- (h) Strange v. Smith, Amb. 263; Merry v. Ryves, 1 Eden, 1; Le Jeune v. Budd, 6 Si. 441.

A conditional consent may be withdrawn upon non-performance of the conditions (a).

When the consent of *all* the trustees is required, the consent of two, without the third being consulted, is insufficient, as there is a discretion in him as well as the others (b); but the consent of one of the executors or trustees who renounced or never acted, would according to the more recent authorities be unnecessary, the authority of consent being annexed to the office (c).

Where the condition has become impossible by all the persons dying whose consent was necessary before marriage, it is discharged (d).

But if some only of such persons survive, the consent of such survivors, although only a performance of the condition cy-près, will be sufficient. Thus where a legacy is given to a legatee on marriage upon a condition precedent requiring the consent of both parents of the legatee, the consent of the surviving parent will be deemed a sufficient compliance with the condition (e). A fortiori will this doctrine be applicable in the case of conditions subsequent. Thus where a legacy was bequeathed to a lady upon condition of her marrying with the consent of two persons who were also executors; on the death of one of them, the condition being subsequent and become impossible, she might marry without the consent of the survivor (f).

Where, however, the consent of a class of persons as guardians is required, whose temporary non-existence could be easily replaced by an application to the Court, a marriage during the non-existence of guardians and consequently without consent, will prevent the vesting of a legacy given upon their consent (q).

- (a) Dashwood v. Bulkeley, 10 V. 230; D'Aguilar v. Drinkwater, 2 V. & B. 225.
- (b) Clarke v. Parker, 19 V. 1, 12 R. R. 124.
- (c) See Clarke v. Parker, supra; Worthington v. Evans, 1 S. & S. 165; Boyce v. Corbally, Ll. & G., 102, in which case, Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16, contra, was cited; Ewing v. Addison, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1034; White v. M'Dermott, 7 Ir. R. C. L. 4; cf. Crawford v. Forshaw, (1891) 2 Ch. 261; Re Smith, (1904) 1 Ch. 139.
- (d) Per Lord Hardwicke in Graydon v. Hicks, 2 Atk. 16; Jones v. Suffolk, 1 Bro. Ch. 528; Aislabie v. Rice, 3 Madd. 256; Grant v. Dyer, 2 Dow, 93; see Re Greenwood, (1903) 1 Ch. 746.
- (c) Dawson v. Oliver-Massey, 2 C. D. 753. See also Green v. G., 2 Jo. & Lat. 529; Ewing v. Addison, 7 W. R. 23.
- (f) Peyton v. Bury, 2 P. W. 626; but see Jones v. Suffolk, 1 Bro. Ch. 529; Collett v. C., 35 B. 312.
 - (g) Re Brown's Will &c., 18 C. D. 61.

And the consent of a guardian appointed by the infant herself would not have been sufficient (a).

The same result was arrived at in the case of the marriage settlement of the father in which sums of money were held in trust for daughters who attained twenty-one or married with the consent of their parents or guardians (b).

The subsequent approbation of persons whose consent is necessary to a marriage, is not generally sufficient, because it cannot amount to a performance of a condition, or dispense with a breach of it (c).

In Burleton v. Humphrey (d), the marriage was to be with "the consent or approbation" of a trustee, who did not give his approbation until a month after the marriage: Hardwicke, C., distinguished between consent and approbation, and inclined to the opinion that the subsequent approbation would do. See, however, the remarks of Eldon, C. in Clarke v. Parker (e).

In Long v. Ricketts (f), the condition was that the party should not marry against the consent of the trustees: a marriage contracted without their knowledge, but with their subsequent approbation, was held a breach of the condition.

Where a legacy is to vest or be paid at a particular age, and then there is a clause of forfeiture on marriage without consent, such clause will be construed as having relation to a marriage under the specified age: and a marriage subsequent thereto without consent is no forfeiture (g). So if a bequest be made in trust for A. his heirs and executors when and as soon as he attained twenty-one, or married before that age with consent of guardians, but if he should not attain twenty-one or marry without such consent, then over, Grant, M.R., held that on attaining twenty-one, A. was absolutely entitled, although he had previously married without consent (h).

Where, however, there was a bequest to A. to be paid at twenty-one or marriage, but if A. died under twenty-one or married without consent of B. then over, and A. married under twenty-one

- (a) Re Brown's Will, &c., 18 C. D. 61.
 - (h) Th
- (c) Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330; Fry v. Porter, 1 Ch. Cas. 138; 1 Mod. 300.
 - (d) Amb. 286.
 - (e) 19 V. 21, 12 R. R. 124,
 - (f) 2 S. & S. 179.

- (g) Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 116;
 Osborn v. Brown, 5 V. 527; Knapp v.
 Noyes, Ambl. 662; Duggan v. Kelly,
 10 Ir. Eq. R. 473.
- (h) Austen v. Halsey, 13 V. 125; Knight v. Cameron, 14 V. 389; cf. Peyton v. Bury, 2 P. W. 626; Dawson v. Oliver-Massey, 2 C. D. 753, 760.

without consent, it was held by *Hardwicke*, C., that a forfeiture had taken place (a). In the former class of cases it will be observed that the legacy given on a condition precedent vests, if either of the two contingencies happen. On the other hand, in the latter class the legacy given on a condition subsequent determines if either of these happens.

The Court may relieve against forfeiture occasioned by the negligence of a trustee. Thus, in O'Callaghan v. Cooper (b), a trust term was limited to trustees, to raise out of real estate portions for daughters, to be paid on marriage upon condition that they should be married with consent of their mother, or, after her death, of the trustees, and that the husband should previously make a settlement. A marriage having taken place with the consent of the mother and the privity of the trustee, but by the neglect of the trustee, without any settlement, the Court, on a settlement being made, relieved against the forfeiture.

A testator's consent to a marriage to take place after his death, does not dispense with a condition of forfeiture annexed to a bequest in his will that the legatee shall forfeit the same in case he marry without the consent of persons named in the will (c). And where a bequest is until marriage, the consent of the testator to a marriage will not extend the bequest (d).

But where the testator has not made the consent of other persons requisite, the question may arise, when he has imposed any condition with respect either to the time of marriage, or against marriage with a particular person, how far by his own consent to the marriage he will be held to have dispensed with the condition, and it seems that where the condition is subsequent, the consent of the person who imposed the condition will remove the consequence of its non-performance. Thus, in Smith v. Cowdery (e), a testator bequathed his residuary personal estate unto his executors upon trust to pay and divide the same equally among his children Susannah, Mary, Ann, Fanny, and William, when they should respectively attain twenty-one, or on the day of marriage, the interest in the meantime to be applied for their maintenance, "except his daughter Mary, whose share the testator directed should be paid to her upon the day of her

⁽a) Chauncy v. Graydon, 2 Atk. 616.

⁽b) 5 V. 117.

⁽c) Lowry v. Patterson, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 372.

⁽d) Bullock v. Bennett, 7 De G. M. & G. 283; West v. Kerr, 6 Ir. Jur. 141; Cooper v. C., 6 Ir. Ch. R. 217.

⁽e) 2 S. & S. 358.

intermarriage with any other person excepting H. T., and the interest in the meantime to be applied for her maintenance; "and the testator directed that "in case his daughter Mary should at any time thereafter intermarry with H. T., then upon trust to pay and divide her share of the residue of his personal estate," unto and amongst his other children. The testator died on the 1st of June, 1795, but his daughter had during the testator's lifetime, and with his consent, married H. T. Leach, V.-C., held that Mary was entitled to her legacy. "The testator," said his Honour, "introduces a condition in his will to prevent the marriage of his daughter Mary with H. T. After the making of his will, his daughter married H. T. with his express consent and approbation; and the condition is thus dispensed with. In coming to this conclusion I follow the cases of Clarke v. Berkeley (a), Crommelin v. C. (b), and Parnell v. Lyon" (c).

But the consent of the testator will not dispense with a condition precedent, that is to say where the performance of the condition is necessary before any interest is taken by the intended legatee or devisee (d).

As to whether conditions requiring marriage with consent are broken by a first marriage without consent, so as to disable a legatee from taking upon a second marriage with consent, seems to be somewhat doubtful. In Stackpole v. Beaumont (e), where a legacy was given by a testator to his daughter, payable upon her marriage, if before twenty-one, with consent of trustees, the legatee having married before twenty-one, and without consent, Loughborough, C. held that the legacy was not then payable. Afterwards, having attained twenty-one, she married a second husband, and claimed the legacy, but Leach, M.R., thought himself bound by Lord Loughborough's decision from deciding in her favour (f). The point, however, raised before Leach, V.-C., was not decided by Loughborough, C., and Leach's, V.-C., judgment has been doubted (g). In Randal v. Payne (h), there was a bequest to J. and M., in case they married into certain families, and if they should not marry then over. Upon

- (a) 2 Vern. 729.
- (b) 3 V. 227.
- (c) 1 V. & B. 479; see Violett v. Brookman, 26 L. J. Ch. 308. Jarman (1893), p. 893 (n.).
- (d) Bullock v. Bennett, 7 De G. M.
 & G. 283; Younge v. Furse, 8 De G.
 M. & G. 756; West v. Kerr, 6 Ir. Jur.
- 141; Davis v. Angel, 31 B. 223.
 - (e) 3 V. 89, 3 R. R. 52.
- (f) Clifford v. Beaumont, 4 Russ. 325.
- (g) Beaumont v. Squire, 17 Q. B. 905; Davis v. Angel, 31 B. 223.
 - (h) 1 Bro. Ch. 55.

their marrying into other families Lord *Thurlow* (without suggesting that any forfeiture had thereby taken place) held that marriage with certain families being a condition precedent nothing could vest until it had taken place, and that they had their whole lives for the performance of the condition (a).

In Lowe v. Manners (b), however, a devise, subject to a similar condition, was held to be at once forfeited by marriage into another family. This case, however, is distinguishable from Randal v. Payne by the circumstance that, in Lowe v. Manners, from the day of marriage into another family each daughter was to be entitled to a fortune substituted for that given in the event of her husband having been one of the favoured families, thereby showing that the choice was only once tendered to her.

Where a condition against marriage was broken by a widow, who concealed her second marriage, her husband, who was aware of the condition, was held bound to refund the income which trustees had paid to her in ignorance of the marriage (c).

Persons will not be permitted to allow a long time to elapse without making any claim, and then to insist on a forfeiture and throw on the persons entitled the burden of proving that there has been none (d).

Ignorance of a condition annexed to a gift by will does not protect the devisee or legatee from the consequences of not complying with the condition (e), except where the devisee in such case is also heirat-law of the devisor, for it has been expressly decided that neither neglect nor refusal to comply with a condition will subject an heir-atlaw to the loss of an estate unless he has notice of the condition (f).

In Re Greenwood (g) a testator, who died in 1853, devised his real estate upon trust for his daughter for life, and after her death for her children; and if she should have no child he devised his real estate to N. in fee, on condition that in case the testator's wife should be then living she should have the use for the then remainder of her life of the testator's residence, and on further condition that N.

- (a) See Duddy v. Gresham, 2 L. R. Ir. 442.
 - (b) 5 B. & Ald. 917.
- (c) Charlton v. Coombes, 4 Gif. 382; cf. Preece v. Searle, 3 Jur. (N. S.)
- (d) Re Birch, 17 B. 358, in which case 28 years elapsed.
- (g) Porter v. Fry, Vent. 199; Re Hodges' Legacy, 16 Eq. 92; Astley v. Essex, 18 Eq. 290.
- (f) Doe d. Kenrick v. Beauclerk, 11
 East, 657, 667; Doe d. Taylor v. Crisp,
 8 A. & E. 778; Murphy v. Broder, 9
 Ir. R. C. L. 123.
 - (g) (1903) 1 Ch. 749.

should "take and use" the testator's name only, but subject to the payment of certain legacies which the testator bequeathed only if his daughter should have no child, and which should be payable at her death exclusively out of the estates devised to N. The testator's daughter and N. both survived the testator, but his wife was dead. The daughter, who was now in her fifty-ninth year, was married, but had had no children. N. died in her lifetime intestate. It was held upon the construction of the will that the condition requiring N. to take and use the testator's name was a condition subsequent, that is, a condition to operate only upon N. becoming entitled to the possession of the estate by the death of the daughter without children, and not before; and that as he had been prevented from performing it by the act of God, the estate would, on the death of the daughter without children, vest absolutely in his legal personal representative freed from the condition.

If a condition attached to a devise is capable of being construed either as a condition precedent or as a condition subsequent, the Court will prefer the latter construction.

7. Contract in Restraint of Marriage, or in Fraud of the Marriage Contract.

Certain agreements are treated as against public policy either as tending to impede freedom of consent and to introduce unfit and extraneous motives into the contracting of particular marriages, or as tending to hinder marriage in general (a).

But where a contract is divisible, one alternative which is valid will not be rendered invalid by another alternative which is void, as being in restraint of marriage. Thus in Robinson v. Ommanney (b), an unmarried woman, having a power of appointing a sum of money by will, made a will appointing it to a mortgagee and covenanted not to cancel, revoke, or annul the will. She afterwards became bankrupt, and obtained her discharge, and after her discharge, she revoked her will, and made another appointing the sum of money to another person. The C. A., affirming the decision of Kay, J. (c), held, that the covenant not to revoke the will was divisible, and was not wholly void, although in one alternative it was in restraint of marriage.

A contract to marry a particular person, when that person is not

(a) Pollock, Contracts (1902), p.

(b) 23 C. D. 285.

350; Baker v. White, 2 Vern. 215.

(c) 21 C. D. 780.

bound by corresponding obligation, will be cancelled: "it being contrary to the nature and design of marriage, which ought to proceed from a free choice, and not from any compulsion" (a).

A contract by which persons were mutually bound to marry each other has been held valid at law (b). But although the contract may have been mutual and valid at law a Court of Equity has relieved against it, if it was a fraud upon a parent or a person in loco parentis from whom expectations were entertained; thus, a bond given to her suitor by a daughter, the father having forbidden her to see or encourage him, was, on the application of the daughter, set aside after the death of her father on the ground that had the father known of the bond and that the daughter had not submitted to his opinion about the match, he might probably have made other provisions for his daughter in his will, and that the transaction was therefore a fraud upon the father. This decision was given although mutual bonds had been exchanged between the daughter and her suitor (c).

A covenant to pay a woman a sum of money as long as she continues sole and unmarried is not illegal (d).

In another respect our Courts have not followed the civil law, by which proxenetæ of the Roman Law, or matchmakers, were allowed to stipulate for a reward not exceeding a certain amount, for promoting marriages; for it has been held in equity, from a very early period, that all contracts or agreements for promoting marriages for reward (usually termed marriage brokage contracts) are utterly void (e).

The vice of such a consideration was afterwards pleadable at law (f).

And so far has the principle been carried, that Lord Redesdale declared a bond void which was given as a remuneration to the obligee for having assisted the obligor in effecting an elopement and marriage without the consent of the wife's friends, although it was given voluntarily after marriage, and without any previous agreement

- (a) Key v. Bradshaw, 2 Vern. 102;
 and see Woodhouse v. Shepley, 2 Atk.
 535; Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225;
 Cock v. Richards, 10 V. 429, 8 R. R.
 23; Hartley v. Rice, 10 East, 22.
- (b) See Cock v. Richards, 10 V. 438,439; and Atkins v. Farr, 1 Atk. 28;S. C., 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 247.
 - (c) Woodhouse v. Shepley, 2 Atk.

535.

- (1) Gibson v. Dickie, 3 M. & S. 463.
- (e) Roberts v. R., 3 P. W. 76; Heap v. Marris, 2 Q. B. D. 630; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 156; ante, p. 303; Law v. L., Cas. t. Talb. 142; Hall v. Thynne, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 89, pl. 3, 3 P. W. 76, 3 Lev. 414.
 - (f) Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 347.

for the same (a). Whether the contract be to procure for reward the marriage of X. with another specified person or to introduce to X. persons of the opposite sex with a view to a marriage between X. and one of them is immaterial, in each case the contract is illegal (b).

The fact of the match being an equal or proper one, will not render a marriage brokage contract valid (c); and such contract being contrary to public policy, is not capable of confirmation (d); and money paid pursuant to such contract has been recovered back in equity (e).

Upon the same principle, every contract by which a parent or guardian obtains any security for promoting or consenting to the marriage of his child or ward, is void (f). So, in Duke of Hamilton v. Lord Mohun (g), the mother being guardian, on the marriage of her daughter, insisted upon having from the intended husband a bond, in a penalty that he would give her a release of all accounts as guardian, within two years after the marriage. The bond was set aside, as the case was in the nature and within the reason of marriage brokage bonds, and there was no difference between giving a bond for procuring a marriage, and a bond to release part of what became due.

Upon similar grounds, all contracts upon a treaty for a marriage, tending to deceive or mislead one of the parties to it, or their relatives, will be held void. Thus a security given by a son without the privity of his parents, who provided for him on his marriage, to return part of the portion of his wife, is void (h). So where, upon a marriage, a settlement was agreed to be made of certain property, by relations on each side, and after the marriage one of the parties procured an underhand agreement from the husband to defeat the settlement, it was set aside, and the original agreement carried into effect (i).

So, where a man, on the treaty for the marriage of his sister, let

- (a) Williamson v. Gihon, 2 S. & L. 357, 362.
- (b) Hermann v. Charlesworth, (1905) 2 K. B. 123, (C. A.); reversing, (1905) 1 K. B. 24.
 - (c) Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves. Sen. 506.
- (d) Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves. Sen. 503, 506, 507; Roberts v. R., 3 P. W. 74, and Cox's note (1).
- (e) Smith v. Bruning, 2 Vern. 392; S. C., Goldsmith v. Bruning, 1 Eq. Ca.
- Abr. 89, pl. 4; Hermann v. Charlesworth, (1905) 2 K. B. 123.
- (f) Keat v. Allen, 2 Vern. 588; S. C., Pr. Ch. 267.
 - (g) 2 Vern. 652; Gilb. Eq. R. 297.
- (h) Turton v. Benson, 1 P. W. 496; and see Kemp v. Coleman, Salk. 156.
- (i) Peyton v. Bladwell, 1 Vern. 240; Stribblehill v. Brett, 2 Vern. 445; S. C., Pr. Ch. 165.

her have money, privately, in order that her portion might appear as large as was insisted on by the intended husband, and she gave a bond to her brother for the repayment of it, it was decreed to be delivered up (a). So, where a father, having, upon the marriage of his son, made a settlement of an annuity upon the wife in full for her jointure, and in lieu of dower, the son, privately, without the knowledge of his intended wife or her father, gave a bond to indemnify his father against the annuity or rent-charge, it was held void by Sir W. Grant, M.R., as a fraud upon the faith of the marriage contract (b).

Relief will be granted in such transactions, although the party to the marriage seeking it be particeps criminis; thus, in Redman v. R. (c), upon a treaty of marriage between A. and the daughter of B., B. would not consent to the marriage, because A. owed 200l. to C. A.'s brother thereupon gave his bond to secure the debt, and A.'s bond was cancelled; A., however, without the knowledge of B., but with the privity of his daughter, gave a counter-bond to his brother. Upon A.'s death, it was held, that the wife, though a party to the fraud, might set aside the bond; and the Lord Chancellor said, that if A. had been alive, and a party, he might also have been relieved.

The principle upon which this class of cases proceeds was much discussed in the case of Neville v. Wilkinson (d). There Mr. Neville, being about to marry, inquiry was made by the lady's father to what extent he was indebted. Wilkinson, who was applied to, at the desire of Neville concealed a demand which he had against him; after the marriage he attempted to recover it, and a bill was filed by Mr. Neville to restrain him. Lord Thurlow held, that Wilkinson, having made a misrepresentation, a Court of Equity must hold him to it; observing that the principle on which such cases had been decided was, "that faith in such contracts was so essential to the happiness both of the parents and children, that whoever treats fraudulently on such an occasion, shall not only not gain, but even lose by it" (e).

But equity will not interfere if another equally innocent person

H. L. C. 185, at p. 210; distinguished, Evans v. Wyatt, 31 B. at p. 222. And see Scott v. S., 1 Cox, 366; Shirley v. Ferrers, cited 11 V. 536; The Vauxhall Bridge Company v. The Earl of Spencer, Jac. 67.

⁽a) Gale v. Lindo, 1 Vern. 475; and see Lamlee v. Hanman, 2 Vern. 499.

⁽b) Palmer v. Neave, 11 V. 165.

⁽c) 1 Vern. 3:3.

⁽d) 1 Bro. Ch. 543.

⁽e) Approved, Jorden v. Money, 5

would thereby be injured. Thus, in Roberts v. R. (a), A. treated for the marriage of his son, and in the settlement on the son there was a power reserved to the father to jointure any wife whom he should marry in 2001, per annum, he paying, or securing the payment, of 1,000l. to the son. The father treating about marrying a second wife, the son, pursuant to an agreement with the second wife's relations, released the 1,000l., but at or soon after the marriage took a new bond from his father, without the privity of the second wife or her relations. Upon a bill being filed by the father, Sir Joseph Jekyll, M.R., refused to set aside the bond given to the son, observing, that, whatever arguments could be made use of in favour of the father's second wife or of the father, to prove that he ought to be discharged of the bond for payment of the 1,000l., the very same arguments might be urged on behalf of the son and his wife, to prove that it ought to be paid. Thus, supposing it to be a hardship upon the father's second wife that her husband should be forced to pay this 1,000l., in breach of the public and open agreement made by the son, was it not equally a hardship upon the son's wife, and as much a violation of the open and fair agreement made on her marriage, that the 1,000l. should not be paid upon the father's making a second jointure, the consequence of which would be, that, as the agreement on the son's marriage was first, it ought to have the preference? Qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (b).

As to settlements or contracts by a woman about to be married in fraud of marital rights, see Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, infra, and notes.

8. As to Conditions annexed to Gifts for the purpose of effecting the Separation of Husband and Wife.

Upon principles of public policy it has been held, that where bequests are made to married women upon condition of their living separate from their husbands, the condition is void, being considered pro non scripto, but the bequest will be good (c).

This principle is not applicable where the bequest is of such a nature as not to influence the conduct of the husband and wife, and the bequest to the husband or wife living apart from each other is

⁽a) 3 P. W. 65.

⁽b) See the remarks on this case in Lee v. Hayes, 17 Ir. C. L. R. 394.

⁽c) Tennant v. Brail, Toth. 141;

Brown v. Peck, 1 Eden, 140; Wren v. Bradley, 2 De G. & Sm. 49. As to a limitation to the same effect, see Re Moore, p. 587, supra.

to take effect immediately on the death of the testator. v. Dwarris (a): in that case a testatrix made a bequest of a moiety of her residuary personal estate to her nephew, provided and on the express condition that he should be residing with his then present wife, if she should be living at the time of the testatrix's decease, but in case they should not at that time be living together as man and wife, then (subject as aforesaid) she gave and bequeathed one half of such moiety of the said residue unto the wife absolutely and the other half part thereof to the husband. It was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.-C., that the bequest was good notwithstanding the rule which avoids gifts providing for a future separation. "The rule," said his Honour, "which avoids gifts providing for a future separation between husband and wife does not apply to a case like the present. Here the gift is by will, and merely provides for either contingency, namely, that of the husband and wife living together or separate at the moment when the will must take effect, namely, at the death of the testatrix. The bequest cannot influence their conduct, but takes effect immediately on the death, according to the then state of facts."

As to separations effected between husband and wife by their mutual consent, see the note to Stapilton v. S., post.

(a) Johns. 172.

JOHN WRIGHT HENNIKER WILSON, Esq.,
APPELLANT, r. MARY WRIGHT HENNIKER
WILSON (THE APPELLANT'S WIFE) AND OTHERS,
RESPONDENTS.

1848. 1 H. L. Cas. 538; 5 H. L. Cas. 40.

Husband and Wife. Articles of Separation. Specific Performance. Jurisdiction.

The Court of Chancery exercises only its ordinary jurisdiction in giving effect to articles of separation between husband and wife, so far as they regard an arrangement of property agreed upon.

The Court, in decreeing specific performance of such articles, does not inquire into the cause of the separation.

The stopping of a suit in the Ecclesiastical Court for nullity of marriage, on the ground of impotency of the husband, is a sufficient consideration to him for articles of separation; and so, it seems, is a covenant by a third party to pay his debts.

Semble, that the Court, after decreeing specific performance of the articles, may restrain the wife, as well as the husband, from proceeding in the suit for nullity (a).

This was an appeal against a decree for specific performance of articles of separation between the appellant and his wife, the respondent. They were married in April, 1839. Differences arose between them soon after the marriage, and continued until May, 1843, when Mrs. Wilson, by advice of her friends, went to reside at the house of Mr. Foster, her solicitor. On the 8th of that month the appellant was served with a citation from the Consistory Court of London, in a suit for nullity of marriage by reason of impotency. The appellant called next day on Mr. Foster, expressed his anxiety to stop the suit, and to enter into an amicable arrangement for a separation; and proposed to execute a proper deed for that purpose, and to give up the interests which he took in his

(a) 1 H. L. Cas. 556, 575, and infra, 615, 623.

wife's property under their marriage settlement, and in virtue of his marital rights, in consideration of an annuity of 1,500L

By the settlement executed previous to the marriage, a freehold estate in the county of Southampton, called Drayton Lodge, of the value of 2,000l. a year, to which Mrs. Wilson was entitled for her life, for her separate use, with remainder to her issue, under the will of Lady Frances Wilson, was secured to the same use, together with 3,000l. consols, part of her own funds; and a leasehold house and premises, called the Chelsea Park estate, which, with the land tax charged thereon, she had purchased some time before the marriage, were settled to the use of the appellant during their joint lives, and to her, for her life, if she survived him, with remainder of the term absolutely to the appellant, his executors and assigns. The rest of the respondent's property—consisting of freehold estates in the counties of York and Essex, worth together about 3,000l. a year, devised to her by Sir Henry Wilson, for her life, with remainder to her issue, with other remainders over; of a leasehold house in Grosvenor Place, in the county of Middlesex, bequeathed to her by the same will, and also of considerable sums of money in the public funds, in bank and on mortgage, and other personal estate of large amount,—was not included in the settlement, and therefore, after the solemnization of the marriage, belonged, as the settlement recited, to the appellant in his marital right (a).

The appellant was informed, on the 13th of May, that the terms of separation which he proposed to Mr. Foster would not be accepted, and that it was determined by Mrs. Wilson and her advisers to proceed with the suit in the Consistory Court. A notice to that effect was sent on the 25th of May to the appellant, who, on the next day, called again on Mr. Foster, and was informed that the libel in that suit would be filed on the 2nd of June then next ensuing, unless an arrangement was completed in the meantime. The appellant on the 26th of May again called on Mr. Foster, and with a view of preventing the suit, and the consequent publicity of the charge therein made, proposed (without prejudice) "to bind himself to enter into a deed of separation to be executed immediately, whereby Mrs. Wilson should be secured in the undisturbed enjoyment of Chelsea Park, with the furniture there, and at Drayton

also; Mrs. W. to receive the rents of the adjacent property at Chelsea, paying the ground rents; the rents of the property in Yorkshire and Essex to be placed under the control of Mrs. W., there being reserved to Mr. Wilson a certain sum annually, which he would prefer hearing suggested by Mrs. Wilson or her advisers. In considering this amount, it should be recollected that Mr. W. had, in pursuance of the agreement made before marriage, effected policies of insurance requiring annual payments to the amount of 600l." This memorandum was dated May 26th, 1843, and signed by Mr. W. H. Wilson.

Mr. Foster having submitted this proposal to Mrs. Wilson and her advisers, by their direction offered the appellant 1,000l. a year out of the property, on his entering into a deed to carry the proposal into effect. The appellant required 1,200l. a year, but finding after several discussions with Mr. Foster, on the 30th and 31st of May, that unless be accepted the annuity of 1,000l., the suit in the Consistory Court should proceed, he submitted to the terms proposed, and wrote and signed this memorandum: "The annual sum agreed upon on the part of Mrs. W. H. Wilson, to be paid to Mr. W. H. Wilson under the deed of separation, to be executed immediately, is 1,000l. The deed made to carry into effect the terms proposed in a memorandum dated the 26th of May, 1843, signed by Mr. H. Wilson, and to be a bar to suits; suit now pending to be withdrawn on the mutual execution of the agreement."

Articles of agreement for separation were immediately prepared, and the appellant—having before refused to appoint a solicitor, as being himself a barrister, and competent to conduct the negotiation—perused the draft and suggested alterations in it, and perused it again after it was finally settled on behalf of the respondent, and he assisted also in examining the engrossment.

The articles so prepared, dated the 1st of June, 1843, and made between the appellant of the first part, the respondent, his wife, of the second part, and Nathan Wetherell, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, and the said Mr. Foster, of the third part—after reciting that unhappy differences having arisen between the appellant and his wife, they had agreed to live separate, and to enter into the arrangements after-mentioned—witnessed that the appellant on the one part, and the said N. Wetherell and W. C. Foster on the other part, with the

privity and approbation of Mrs. Wilson, mutually covenanted and agreed to the effect following:—

First, That the appellant should at all times thereafter permit Mrs. Wilson to live separate and apart from him, &c.

Secondly, That the Chelsea Park estate, and the land tax thereon, comprised in the marriage settlement of Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, and thereby settled as before stated, and all such other estates (if any) as might be purchased or taken in exchange under the provisions thereof, should, from and after the 24th of June, 1843, be held by the trustees of the said settlement, in trust for Mrs. Wilson, for her separate use during the joint lives of herself and the appellant, to the intent that his life interest in the premises during the life of Mrs. Wilson might be superseded; but nevertheless without prejudice to his ultimate interests in the said premises expectant upon her decease.

Thirdly, That the estate in the county of Southampton, devised by Lady F. Wilson, and also the sum of 3,000*l*. consols, comprised in the marriage settlement, should remain subject to the trusts thereof.

Fourthly, That all other freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, to which Mrs. Wilson was, at the time of her marriage, or had since become, entitled under the wills of Sir Henry and Lady Wilson should after the said 24th of June, subject, as to such of these estates as were situate in the county of York, to the annuity of 1,000l. after-mentioned, be conveyed by the appellant to the trustees of the settlement, for the separate use of Mrs. Wilson, for the joint lives of her and the appellant.

Fifthly, That all the furniture in the mansion at Chelsea Park should be held and enjoyed by Mrs. Wilson during her life, for her separate use, and after her decease should belong to the appellant, his executors, &c.; and that all other goods and effects in the said mansion (except books belonging to the appellant) and all additions to be made thereto, and to the furniture, and all furniture, goods, and effects, in the mansion at Drayton Lodge, and all jewels, ornaments, wearing apparel, &c., belonging to Mrs. Wilson, and also all real and personal estate afterwards acquired by her, should belong absolutely to her for her separate use, with power to dispose of the same by deed, or will, &c.

Sixthly, That all rents, taxes, and other outgoings in respect of the Chelsea Park estate, and all expenses of repairs upon the same, should be paid by the appellant up to the same 24th of June.

Seventhly, That, if and so long as the appellant should duly observe and perform the said covenants and agreements, all the rents, taxes, and other outgoings in respect of the said several estates, and all expenses of repairs upon the same, should, after the 24th of June, be paid by Mrs. Wilson during her life, and "that he, the said John Wright Henniker Wilson, his heirs, executors, and administrators, and his and their estates and effects, should be indemnified therefrom, and from all the present debts and liabilities of the said John Wright Henniker Wilson, by the joint and several covenant of the said N. Wetherell and W. C. Foster."

Eighthly, That, if and so long as the appellant should duly observe and perform the covenants and agreements herein contained, a clear annuity of 1,000l., commencing from the 24th of June, should be paid to him by equal half-yearly portions, during the joint lives of himself and Mrs. Wilson, the said annuity to be charged on the freehold estates in the county of York, which belonged to Mrs. Wilson before her marriage.

Ninthly, That a proper deed or deeds for effectuating the objects of the articles should, with all convenient speed, be executed by all the parties to these presents, "such deed or deeds containing all such covenants and provisions as should be deemed expedient," to be settled on behalf of all parties by counsel; and that in case of any unnecessary delay in the execution of such deed or deeds by any of the parties, the other of them should be at liberty to make void these presents.

And lastly, That, upon the execution of these presents by the appellant, the proceedings instituted against him in the Ecclesiastical Court by Mrs. Wilson should be suspended, and upon the execution of the deed or deeds to be so prepared as aforesaid, should be put an end to and withdrawn, but nevertheless without prejudice to Mrs. Wilson's right to institute any other proceedings against him, in case he should make default in the performance of any of these covenants and agreements.

These articles were executed by all the parties to them, and the proceedings in the suit, in the Consistory Court, were suspended.

The appellant having, at first, interposed some delay in quitting Chelsea Park, in compliance with the articles, soon afterwards, in the course of a correspondence with Mr. Foster, objected to them altogether, on various grounds hereinafter mentioned.

In August, 1843, Mrs. Wilson, by her next friend, and Messrs. Wetherell and Foster, filed their bill against the appellant, stating, among other things, that they, with the view of carrying the said articles into effect, had caused a proper deed to be prepared as thereby provided; that a clerical error occurred in the copying of the original draft of the 7th article, which mentioned that the appellant should be indemnified against his own debts instead of his wife's, as was intended, and that they caused to be substituted in the said deed the usual covenant for indemnifying the appellant against the debts and liabilities of his wife. The bill prayed that, subject to the correction of the said error, the appellant might be decreed to execute the deed so prepared for carrying the articles into effect, according to their true intent and meaning.

The appellant, in his answer, stated the various grounds on which he objected to perform the articles: that they were procured from him by intimidation, duress, and surprise; that he agreed to them from an apprehension of degradation and ridicule, by the exhibition against him of a charge of impotency, which was false, as Mrs. Wilson well knew; that in making the proposals of the 26th and 31st of May, and in executing the articles, he acted not only without due advice, but also under mental incapacity to contract, arising from apprehension of publicity being given to the said calumnious charge, and that Mrs. Wilson and her advisers instituted the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court, and took advantage of his alarm and apprehension, to coerce him into the arrangement; that her sole object was to obtain from him some concessions of property which he acquired under the marriage articles, or his marital rights, for which purpose she had previously threatened him with a divorce upon equally false charges of adultery and cruelty; and the suit for nullity of the marriage by reason of impotency, was another contrivance and device resorted to by her for the same purpose, without any belief in the imputation. He also insisted that the articles differed materially, to his prejudice, from his said proposals, and the draft deed prepared for his execution by the respondents, was itself a deviation from the

articles, which did not contain any such clerical error as they alleged; that the suit instituted in the Consistory Court, although suspended, might still be prosecuted by Mrs. Wilson, notwithstanding the articles, so that he had no benefit or protection from the articles in that respect: but he repudiated such benefit, and stated that he would compel her to proceed in that suit, so as to give him an opportunity of refuting the false charge of impotency. He submitted that the articles, not being deliberately entered into by him, nor fairly, but fraudulently, obtained from him, were not binding on him; and as the respondents, Messrs. Wetherell and Foster, did not offer to perform their covenant, to pay his debts, exceeding 6,000l., the articles were without any consideration to him, inasmuch as the covenant which they proposed to insert in the deed to indemnify him against Mrs. Wilson's debts, was never desired or contemplated by him, knowing, from her habits, and possessed as she was of large property, that she would not incur debts.

The appellant's proctor took a proceeding in the Consistory Court, to compel Mrs. Wilson to file her libel there. Her proctor obtained time to do so, and then she and the other respondents filed a supplemental bill in Chancery for an injunction to restrain the appellant from taking further proceedings to compel her to continue the said suit, or to dismiss it; and such injunction was issued, but was discharged upon the appellant's answer being put in.

In May, 1844, the appellant filed a cross bill, stating the contents of his answers to the original and supplemental bills, and that he had consummated the marriage, and charging that Mrs. Wilson admitted his competency, and that her imputation of his impotency would appear to be unfounded if she would proceed to proofs in the suit in the Consistory Court, to which he endeavoured to compel her; but she avoided the prosecution thereof, well knowing that she could not succeed therein. The cross bill prayed that the articles might be declared void, and be delivered up to be cancelled.

Mrs. Wilson in her answer repeated her denial that the marriage was ever consummated, and added that, to the best of her belief, it was not consummated by reason of the impotency or physical inability of the appellant, owing to some mal-conformation, &c. And she denied that the suit in the Consistory Court was instituted for such purposes as were alleged in the cross bill, but bonâ fide to

obtain a sentence of nullity of marriage, to which she and her legal advisers, including eminent counsel and civilians, conceived her to be entitled; and she denied that she ever admitted to any person the appellant's competency.

Witnesses were examined in both causes, in the original cause by the respondents only, in the cross cause by both parties, and orders were made that the evidence taken in either cause might be read in the other.

The causes were heard by the Vice-Chancellor of England, in January and February, 1845, when his Honour rejected certain evidence proposed to be read on behalf of the appellant, declared, that, although the covenant, contained in the seventh article, to indemnify the appellant against his own debts, instead of his wife's, was an error committed by the conveyancer's clerk in copying the original draft of the articles, it could not be considered an error as between the appellant and the other parties; and as they had offered to covenant to indemnify him against his wife's debts, his Honour decreed that it be referred to the Master to settle a proper deed of conveyance for carrying into effect the articles of separation, and that he should insert therein a joint and several covenant by the respondents, Messrs. Wetherell and Foster, with the appellant, to indemnify him against all debts and liabilities of Mrs. Wilson which existed on the 1st of June, 1843, and all her subsequent and future debts and liabilities. [An order was made for the delivery up of the mansion at Chelsea Park by the appellant, and inquiries and accounts were directed. And it was ordered that an injunction should be awarded to restrain the appellant], until after execution of the said deed, from taking any proceedings in the suit instituted by Mrs. Wilson in the Consistory Court, for the purpose of compelling her to proceed therein, and from applying for any order of the said Court for the purpose of dismissing such suit, or otherwise putting an end to it, or whereby the respondents might be made liable for the costs [And that the bill, in the cross cause, be dismissed with thereof. costs.

The appeal was against the whole decree.

Sir Fitzroy Kelly and Mr. G. Turner (Mr. Busk and Mr. Henniker being with them), for the appellant.—This case presents

several points of great importance, never yet decided. The principal question is, whether a Court of equity, considering the nature and contents of the articles, and the circumstances under which their execution was obtained from the appellant, has jurisdiction, and ought to exercise it, to compel specific performance of them. * *

The articles executed, under surprise and misrepresentation, purport to be made between the appellant and wife, and Messrs. Wetherell and Foster, as trustees for her; they recite that Mr. and Mrs. Wilson had agreed to live separate; and the first article stipulates for such separation—which is contrary to the policy of the law and to moral duty: they contain no allegation of adultery or cruelty—which are the only justifiable grounds of separation, being those on which alone the spiritual Courts grant divorces, and on which the temporal Courts recognize articles of separation as beneficial private arrangements, resorted to for the purpose of avoiding public exposure; they contain no covenant, on the part of the trustees, to protect the husband against the wife's debts,without which Courts of equity have no jurisdiction to enforce the articles. The principal covenants are those by which Mr. Wilson gives up the property which he acquired by his marriage. And what is the consideration? Messrs. Wetherell and Foster covenant to indemnify him against his own debts; but their bill alleges that that is a clerical error, and prays it may be corrected by substituting a covenant to protect him against Mrs. Wilson's debts. The appellant never required or contemplated any such protection, knowing that she, with so large a property, and parsimonious habits, would not incur debts. The only consideration, therefore, for the appellant's resigning the enjoyment of at least 3,000l. a year, for a life annuity of 1,000l., was the suspension of the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court, which is no consideration at all, because Mrs. Wilson may, at any time, proceed with that suit, or institute another, notwithstanding the covenant of her trustees to stop it.

The most eminent equity Judges disapproved of separation deeds, and expressed their surprise how they came to be recognised by any Court. Lord Rosslyn, in Legard v. Johnson (a), says: "The common law will not entertain a suit upon contract by a wife against her

The Ecclesiastical Court has exclusive cognizance of the rights and duties arising from the state of marriage." [And see Head v. H. (a), Seeling v. Crawley (b), Angier v. A. (c).] Lord Eldon frequently declared his repugnance to such deeds. In Lord St. John v. Lady St. J. (d), he expresses strongly his dissent from the dicta that fell from judges in cases at law in favour of deeds of separation, which he considers to be contrary to the sacred nature of the contract of marriage, and to the policy of the law, that marriage should be indissoluble, except by the legislature: He further says that there could not be even a separation à mensâ et thoro except propter savitian aut adulterium, and that even where the parties, after such separation, came together again, there would be a complete end of it: And—after referring to deeds of separation, containing covenants by third persons to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts, on which the jurisdiction in equity was said to be founded, and which was exercised, for the first time, in Guth v. G. (e), of which he disapproves, as Lord Rosslyn did in Legard v. Johnson (f)—he says: "Lord Thurlow doubted whether covenants with such objects ought to be the foundation either of action or specific performance. That doubt has long since had place in my mind. If this were res integra, untouched by dictum or decision, I would not have permitted such a covenant to be the foundation of an action or a suit in this Court. But if dicta have followed dicta, or decision has followed decision, to the extent of settling the law, I cannot, upon any doubt of mine as to what ought originally to have been the decision, shake what is the settled law upon the subject. It is better that the case should go to the House of Lords than that the law should remain in this state upon a point connected with the very well-being of society." [And see The Earl of Westmeath v. The Countess of W.(g).

Sir William Grant says, in Worrall v. Jacob (h): "It is now settled that this Court will not carry into execution articles of separation between husband and wife. It recognizes no power in

⁽a) 3 Atk. 547.

⁽b) 2 Vern. 386.

⁽c) Pr. Ch. 496; S. C., Gilb. Eq. Rep. 152.

⁽d) 11 V. 529.

⁽e) 3 Bro. Ch. 614.

⁽f) 3 ∇ . 361.

⁽g) Jac. 135.

⁽h) 3 Mer. 268.

them to vary the rights and duties growing out of the marriage, or to effect at their pleasure a partial dissolution of it." * * *

Now, as that covenant by a third party for indemnifying the husband against the wife's debts, which was in some of the preceding decisions held sufficient (a), and in all held to be indispensable, to support separation deeds, does not find a place at all in these articles; and the want of it cannot, as Lord Eldon said, be supplied by a Court of equity; they contain no foundation for an action or suit in equity, and they are all directly within the principles laid down by Lords Thurlow and Rosslyn and Eldon, and by Sir W. Grant. The appellant, it is admitted, never desired any such covenant, and now resists the insertion of it in the articles; but he is not therefore precluded from insisting that without it the articles are void.

Reliance may perhaps be placed on the covenant to stop the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court—for which the appellant most anxiously stipulated—as a sufficient consideration for the articles. Can that covenant be enforced? Can the trustees or the Court of Chancery prevent Mrs. Wilson from proceeding in that suit? "That," says Lord Eldon, in Westmeath v. W., "leads to a most important question, whether deeds of this kind raise such an equity between husband and wife as to authorize the Court of Chancery to prevent them from proceeding in the Ecclesiastical Court; for unless it could be carried to that length, I cannot see how they can be supported "(b); his Lordship having before said (c), "it was a question whether such a covenant would be binding," and that "none of the cases touched it in decision or in principle."

Courts of equity, and of law also, most anxiously avoid interference with the Ecclesiastical Courts, whose exclusive province it is to entertain causes matrimonial, and grant separations. * * * They cited Durant v. D. (d), Beeby v. B. (e), Westmeath v. W. (f), Smith v. S. (g), Mortimer v. M. (h), Warrender v. W. (i). But neither they, no more than the temporal Courts, sanction any act

⁽a) See Seeling v. Crawley, Angier

v. A., supra.

⁽b) Jac. 139.

⁽c) p. 136.

⁽d) 1 Hag. Ec. 760.

⁽e) 1 Hag. Con. 142 (n.).

⁽f) 2 Hag. Ec. (Supp.) 115.

⁽g) 2 Hag. Ec. (Supp.) 44 (n.).

⁽h) 2 Hag. Con. 318.

⁽i) 2 Cl. & Fin. 488.

that would have the effect of preventing a return to cohabitation; on the contrary, they promote and enjoin it, where there does not appear to be adultery or cruelty enough to warrant a separation. And when the husband and wife do return to cohabitation, whether by voluntary reconciliation or by decree for restitution of conjugal rights, there is an end to the separation, and to all the covenants in the deed, and all things are restored to the state in which they were before the separation: Fletcher v. F. (a), St. John v. St. J. (b), Bateman v. The Countess of Ross (c), Westmeath v. W. (d). But how can things be restored in the present case, if this decree compelling the husband to convey property worth from 2,000l. to 3,000l. a year, for the benefit of the wife, be affirmed? Can reconciliation, putting an end to the separation, revest in the appellant that property, after it is conveyed away absolutely by force of this decree? The trustees may, by the wife's direction, have conveyed it away to strangers, before the reconciliation; and if not, the retention of it will operate as a premium to the wife to reject all overtures towards reconcilia-* The injunction in effect enjoins perpetual separation of the parties; because it prevents the husband from putting his wife to the proof of her charges, and from proceeding to negative them; after which he might graft on her libel his suit for restitution of conjugal rights; Clowes v. C. (e). If, independently of the injunction, Mrs. Wilson cannot be prevented from proceeding in the pending suit, or instituting any other in the Ecclesiastical Court, the articles, for which the trustees' covenant to put an end to the suit was the sole consideration, are void. The House will, therefore, have to decide the question, whether she can be prevented.

[Lord Cottenham.—Is there not jurisdiction in equity to prevent her, as Mr. Wilson has been prevented, by injunction, as consequential on the decree for specific performance? Courts of equity constantly restrain proceedings in the law Courts, without any conflict of jurisdiction, because the injunction affects the parties, and not the Courts.]

In such cases the equity Courts have a concurrent, or the sole,

⁽a) 2 Cox, 107.

⁽d) 2 Hag. Ec. (Supp.) 52.

⁽b) 11 V. 532 and 537.

⁽e) 1 Curt. 145.

⁽c) 1 Dow, 235.

jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but in causes matrimonial they have none, and no instance of their interference by injunction can be produced. There are strong observations applicable to this point—and to articles of separation generally—see Warrender v. W. (a), in this House. * * *

If Courts of equity will not interfere to stay a suit for divorce, or restitution of conjugal rights, will they stay a suit for nullity of marrriage? Assuming Mrs. Wilson's allegations, that she was defrauded into the state of marriage by an impotent person, to be true, will they compel her to forego the proper legal process to get rid of the false marriage? But, be the allegations true or be they false, no Court can prevent her from trying to establish them (b). * * *

[The learned counsel then proceeded to examine the Vice-Chancellor's judgment (c), and the cases there referred to, some of which they had already cited.] * * *

The third and last ground of objection to the decree is the dismissal of the cross bill, and rejection of evidence material to the appellant's case. * * *

Mr. Bethell and Mr. Lloyd, for the respondents.—The arguments for the appellant have stirred up questions of law which have been long considered as settled. Upon all general principles now established and recognised in numerous decisions, not only of the Courts of law and equity, but also of this House, these articles are not open to any of the objections raised against them. The agreement was not, as alleged, for a future or prospective separation; these parties had lived in a manner separate for a considerable time, though the actual separation is to be dated only from the day on which Mrs. Wilson took up her residence at the house of her solicitor, which, however, was prior to the execution of the articles. One can easily understand the feelings of delicacy which prevented her from making an earlier disclosure of the appellant's impotency. That charge was the ground of the suit in the Consistory Court, and the articles were founded on a compromise of that suit. appellant alleges in all his pleadings that the charge is false, but he does not swear that he consummated the marriage; he says in the

⁽a) 2 Cl. & Fin. 527.

St. John v. St. J., supra.

⁽b) See observations of Eldon, C., in

⁽c) 14 Si. 414.

cross bill that it was consummated, but Mrs. Wilson, in her answer, denies it, in the most solemn and circumstantial manner, and reasserts the charge of his inability to consummate it.

They then dealt with the various pretences set up by the appellant against the validity of the articles, alleging that they were obtained from him by "conspiracy and intimidation;" by "fraud and falsehood" as to the grounds of the suit; by the "influence of fear, and apprehension of publicity, and consequent ridicule and degradation;" by "surprise" and "under mental incapacity to contract, and want of professional advice." * * *

Then as to the appellant's objections to the legal validity of the The first was that all agreements for separation of husband and wife are contrary to public policy, to the policy of marriage, and to moral duty; and that to enforce them in equity or at law is an invasion of the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts; but the Judges, whose doubts and dicta were cited in support of this objection, gave effect to such agreements in some of the cases that were referred to. [They cited Legard v. Johnson (a), Fletcher v. F. (b), Worrall v. Jacob (c), Bateman v. The Countess of Ross (d), Tovey v. Lindsay (e). There is no case in which it has been said that a Court of equity is decreeing a separation of husband and wife, when it decrees performance of the husband's covenants in such deeds, over which it only exercises the same jurisdiction that it does on other executory agreements. There are, however, some classes of cases in which neither Courts of law nor equity will interfere in enforcing articles, as where they are made in contemplation of a future separation: Durant v. D. (f), Durant v. Titley (g), Westmeath v. W. (h), Hindley v. Westmeath (i); or in fraud of creditors; Hobbs v. Hull(k), Legard v. Johnson (l); or where an end is put to the separation by voluntary reconciliation, or decree of restitution of conjugal rights; Head v. H. (m), Fletcher v. F. (n). The present case does not fall within any of these classes.

- (a) 3 V. 352.
- (b) 2 Cox, 99.
- (c) 3 Mer. 268.
- (d) 1 Dow, 235.
- (e) Id. 117.
- $(f) 2 \cos, 207.$
- (g) 7 Price, 557.

- (h) Jac. 125.
- (i) 6 B. & C. 200.
- (k) 1 Cox, 445.
- (l) 3 V. 352.
- (1) 5 V. 302.
- (m) 3 Atk. 547.
- (n) 2 Cox, 99.

The next objection to these articles is, that as they contain no covenant to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts, they are void for want of consideration. The omission of that covenant has been shewn to be a clerical error; and the respondents offered to supply it in the deed intended to carry the articles into execution, which it is quite competent for them to do under the 9th article. Stephens v. Olive (a) was the first case in which any reliance was placed on such a covenant to support a deed of separation, but it does not follow that the absence of it would affect the validity of the articles; Guth v. G. (b), Fitzer v. F. (c), Cooke v. Wiggins (d), Innell v. Newman (e), Ross v. Willoughby (f), Wilson v. Musshett (g), Frampton v. F. (h), Hindley v. Westmeath (i). The objection ill becomes the appellant, who admits that he sets no value on such a covenant, and never contemplated it. He has, besides, by the clerical error, obtained a better consideration in the trustees' covenant to pay his own debts, which the decree upholds. He has also the consideration of 1,000l. a year, whereas, if the suit compromised by the articles had proceeded to a decree of nullity, he must give up, without any annuity, all the property which he acquired by the marriage. The stopping that suit was of itself a valuable and sufficient consideration: it was the only consideration, beyond the annuity, for which the appellant stipulated. Lord Hardwicke says, in Fitzer v. F. (k): "Considerations are not to be weighed in too nice scales." Where, however, there is a consideration for the husband's covenants, they will be enforced against him, even where there is no covenant, by a third party or trustee, to indemnify him, as appears in many cases from Angier v. A. (1), down to Clough v. Lambert (m).

Next comes the question whether a suit for nullity of marriage, on the ground of impotency, may be compromised by an agreement for separation. The objection attempted to be raised against such a compromise, upon the supposition that there is some principle of public policy to prevent it, is wholly untenable. No principle is

⁽a) 2 Bro. Ch. 90.

⁽b) 3 Bro. Ch. 614.

⁽c) 2 Atk. 512.

⁽d) 10 V. 191.

⁽e) 4 B. & A. 419.

⁽f) 10 Price, 22.

⁽g) 3 B. & Ad. 743.

⁽h) 4 B. 287.

⁽i) 6 B. & C. 200.

⁽k) 2 Atk. 514.

⁽l) Pr. Ch. 296.

⁽m) 10 Si. 174.

stated in support of the fancied distinction drawn between a suit of that sort and suits for divorce in the ordinary cases of adultery and cruelty which are constantly compromised by private agreements for separation. The temporal Courts, in enforcing the agreement, do not inquire into the cause of separation, nor whether the spiritual Courts would grant a divorce. They have no jurisdiction or machinery for conducting such an inquiry; all they inquire into is whether the deed or articles of separation be a valid agreement, and shew sufficient consideration for the covenants between the husband and third Deeds or articles of separation generally recite that the husband and wife, in consequence of unhappy differences, have agreed to separate, but they seldom disclose the nature or causes of those differences. Adultery and cruelty may be, and often are, the causes; but they are not essential to the validity of the agreement, and the supposition of their existence is excluded in many decided cases, in which other causes are expressly assigned. In Sanky v. Golding (a) the cause was "discord," and in Seeling v. Crawley it was "a quarrel." In Head v. H. (b) the wife's "infirmities" were the cause; in Fletcher v. F. (c), her "expensiveness." The cause is not mentioned in the reports of Guth v. G. (d), Stephens v. Olive (e), Compton v. Collinson (f), Jee v. Thurlow (g), Fitzer v. F. (h), Cooke v. Wiggins (i), or Frampton v. F. (k), but that it was not for adultery or cruelty appears clear enough. Whenever these or other justifiable causes of separation exist, and the articles show a valuable consideration for the husband's covenants, they will be enforced, even though there is no third party or trustee; Angier v. A. (l), Clough v. Lambert (m).

The injunction restraining the appellant from proceeding in his wife's suit, in the Ecclesiastical Court, is consequential on the decree for specific performance of the articles, one of which provided for the termination of that suit. It is contended that it has the effect of a sentence of perpetual separation, inasmuch as it prevents the

- (a) Carey, 124.
- (b) 3 Atk. 547.
- (c) 2 Cox, 99.
- (d) 3 Bro. Ch. 614.
- (e) 2 Bro. Ch. 90.
- (f) Id. 377.

- (g) 2 B. & C. 547.
- (h) 2 Atk. 511.
- (i) 10 V. 191.
- (k) 4 B. 287.
- (l) Pr. Ch. 497.
- (m) 10 Si. 174.

appellant from suing for restitution of conjugal rights, which, it is said in Fletcher v. F. (a), St. John v. St. J. (b), and Westmeath v. W. (c), a Court of equity has no power to do. The injunction does not go to that extent, although, if it did, there appears to be no reason for saying that the Court may not, on the application of the trustees, prevent the appellant from a breach of his contract, after a decree for specific performance. The injunction was not an invasion of the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court, but was intended to preserve the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over its own decree, and to prevent the appellant from defeating it, by resorting to another Court. In Hill v. Turner (d), Lord Hardwicke restrained a woman, who married a ward of Court clandestinely, from proceeding in the Ecclesiastical Court against the infant for restitution of conjugal rights, or against his guardian for alimony. In The Bishop of Winchester v. Paine (e), a party was restrained by injunction from obtaining probate of a will by fraud. This injunction had for its object to compel obedience to the decree; if that is not sustained, the injunction falls with it; but if it is sustained, the appellant has no reason for complaining of the injunction. * * * They then considered the rejection of the evidence by the Vice-Chancellor.

Sir F. Kelly, in reply. * *

The Lord Chancellor (f).—In this case the articles of separation are between the husband, of the first part, the wife of the second part, and two trustees of the third part, reciting that the husband and wife had agreed to live separate and apart. The agreement is between the husband on the one part, and the two trustees, with the privity and approbation of the wife, on the other part; and it provides, first, that the wife may live separate; secondly, that the husband shall give up, for the use of the wife, certain property belonging to her, but in which he had a life estate under the marriage settlement; thirdly, that certain other estates, not included in the marriage *settlement, should be enjoyed by the

- (a) 2 Cox, 99.
- (b) 11 V. 527.
- (c) Jac. 125; 1 Dow & Cl. 547.
- (d) 1 Atk. 515.
- (e) 11 V. 199 (sed quære, as to the point).

(f) The case was partly heard in 1846, by Lord Lyndhurst (then Chancellor), Lord Brougham, and Lord Cottenham. It was fully heard in 1847, by Lord Cottenham (then and in 1848 Chancellor) without any law lord.

wife for her separate use during their joint lives, subject to an annuity of 1,000*l*. a year to the husband; fourthly, it provides for securing to the wife certain jewels, furniture, and other articles, and securing to the husband 1,000*l*. per annum; then it provides for executing a proper deed to effect these objects: and, lastly, it provides for putting an end to a suit instituted by the wife for nullity of marriage, conditioned if the husband should keep this contract.

The decree against which the appeal has been presented, directed a specific performance of these articles, and the execution of a proper deed for that purpose, with the necessary inquiries and directions; and it restrained the husband from any proceeding to compel the wife to proceed in the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court, or to pay the costs; and it dismissed the husband's cross cause, and ordered him to pay the costs of both suits.

The appeal was attempted to be supported upon two grounds: first, on the ground that the articles had been obtained by intimidation and duress—this, I think, wholly failed, and the cross bill was properly dismissed, with costs;—and, secondly, because Courts of equity ought not to entertain jurisdiction for performance of articles of separation.

The second head gave rise to a very protracted and learned argument, in which very many cases were cited, but of which very few of the later date, seem to me necessary to be adverted to; for if those later cases, particularly some which have been decided in this House, have settled the law, all those which preceded them may be thrown aside.

It must be observed that the decree appealed from does not touch the question of separation, but only makes provision for a previous contract for that purpose; and enforces a contract respecting property growing out of such separation. If an agreement for the separation and living apart of a husband and wife be so contrary to public policy, and therefore illegal, as to make void all arrangements of property arising from it, then, in all cases, the only question would be, whether the arrangement of property was in consideration of or dependent on such illegal agreement. But what has this House decided upon the subject? In the very recent case of Jones v. Waite (a) the question was whether the execution of a deed

of separation was a sufficient consideration for the agreement in question there, or whether it was illegal and void. Chief Justice Tindal said: "My brothers and myself are of opinion that there is no illegality disclosed by this agreement; one part of the consideration for it is the execution of the deed of separation, which, as clearly appears from the declaration, was previously agreed upon and drawn up."

A case of Bateman v. The Countess of Ross (a) had previously (in 1813) occurred in this House, in which Lord Eldon and Lord Redesdale held an award good, which confirmed an arrangement of property "provided the husband and wife shall continue to live separate and apart;" Lord Eldon saying: "It was objected to the award that it assumed the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court in awarding a separation; but it did no such thing, it only assumed that there must be a separation, and provided accordingly." This case coming after that of St. John v. St. J. (b), takes off much from the weight of Lord Eldon's observations in that case.

In Westmeath v. W. (c) the objection was, that the deed provided for a future separation; and there Lord Eldon says: "I apprehend that any instrument which provides for a present separation, and which prospectively looks to the parties living together again, and then to a future separation, that such a deed, so far as it provides for that future separation, will never be carried into effect."

The authorities in this House are therefore against the appellant; and now a long train of authorities at law and in equity has proceeded upon the same ground, but I will only mention the case at law of Wilson v. Musshett (d). In Frampton v. F. (e), Lord Langdale considered the principle established; and the Vice-Chancellor has held the same in several cases, such as Clough v. Lambert (f), and Wellesley v. W. (g).

It was contended that there was no consideration for the deed because there was no indemnity against the wife's debts, but only against those then owing by the husband. That, under the circumstances, was probably a more valuable indemnity than the other

⁽a) 1 Dow, 235.

⁽b) 11 V. 528.

⁽c) 5 Bli. 367; 1 Dow & Cl. 519.

⁽d) 3 B. & Ad. 743.

⁽e) 4 B. 287.

⁽f) 10 Si. 174.

⁽g) Id. 256.

would have been; and there are other ample considerations for the One part of the consideration is the provision as to the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court. The stopping of those proceedings appears to have been an important object to Mr. Wilson—of the reason for which he was the best judge—and that alone was a sufficient consideration. In Bateman v. The Countess of Ross (a), there was a suit pending for a divorce. Why is not the compromise of such a suit to afford consideration for an agreement? Is it desirable that the parties should be compelled to bring such complaint in the Ecclesiastical Court to public discussion? answer applies to an argument, for which no authority was cited, that the Court will enforce such agreement only in cases in which the wife might have obtained alimony in an Ecclesiastical Court. How is a Court of equity to try that? and upon what principles can such a rule stand? If the consideration or fact of separation does not contaminate all that proceeds from it, the Court is only exercising its ordinary jurisdiction in giving effect to the arrangement of property agreed upon.

It was then said that the suit for nullity might end in a sentence for restitution of conjugal rights, and that the injunction was calculated to prevent that object. It only prevents an unjust use being made by the husband of the wife's proceedings, instituted for a very different purpose, and does not interfere with any proceeding that the husband may adopt. It was said that there was nothing to prevent the wife prosecuting that suit. This Court does not interfere by injunction, when there is no prospect of danger, and if it should arise, the question might be raised in another suit.

The documents rejected were, I think, inapplicable, and if produced, could not have had any effect, and were, I think, properly rejected.

I therefore advise your Lordships to affirm the whole of the decree, and to dismiss the appeal, with costs.

It was ordered accordingly. [See the decree, Seton (1901), Vol. II., 962.]

(a) 1 Dow, 235.

NOTES.

- 1. Contracts between husband and wife for separation.
- 2. Consideration, p. 629.
- 3. Breaches of contract in agreements for separation, p. 630.
- 4. Other points connected with agreements for separation, p. 636.
- 5. Contracts for future separation, p. 640.

1. Contracts between Husband and Wife for Separation.

"There was a time when an agreement for separation between husband and wife was considered contrary to public policy. That opinion was rendered untenable by the decision of the House of Lords in Wilson v. W., and since that decision it is clear that such an agreement cannot be said to be against public policy" (a). And it is in the highest degree desirable for the preservation of the peace and reputation of families that such agreements should be encouraged rather than that the parties should be forced to expose their matrimonial differences in a Court of justice (b).

The Chancery Division will therefore enforce the specific performance of contracts for *present* separation, if the contract be otherwise valid; that is, if it be made between persons capable of contracting, and upon good consideration (c), and specific performance of an agreement for a separation deed, if *complete*, will be enforced (d).

The general rule both at common law and in equity is that (apart from statute) there can be no contract between husband and wife. In addition to the exception that a wife can contract with her husband in respect of her separate estate, it was held, where the husband and wife were in litigation for divorce or separation and were both at arm's length, that the wife was capable of contracting for a compromise without the intervention of a trustee (e).

The exception was extended in Besant v. Wood (f), where it was held that a husband was entitled to specific performance of a contract by his wife that they should live apart; Jessel, M.R., in respect

- (a) Per *Lindley*, L.J., in McGregor v. M., 21 Q. B. D. 430.
- (b) Per Sir James Hannen, in Marshall v. M., 5 P. D., p. 23.
- (c) Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D. 605; Fry, Specific Performance (1903), p. 658; Seton (1901), p. 962
- (d) Hart v. H., 18 C. D. 670.
- (e) Vansittart v. V., 4 Kay & J. 62; Gibbs v. Harding, L. R. 5 Ch. 338; Bateman v. Ross, 1 Dow, 235; and see Cahill v. C., 8 A. C., p. 431, explained in Butler v. B., 16 Q. B. D., p. 378.
 - (f) 12 C. D. 622.

of a married woman's ability to contract herself out of her rights in the Divorce Court, was of opinion that if a married woman can compromise a suit after it has been instituted, by agreeing to live separate upon terms as regards maintenance of herself, custody of the children, and so forth, there was no reason why she should not have power to enter into such an agreement after the quarrel and before the litigation began; that, as a necessary corollary to the right to sue by herself, she must have the right to contract not to sue, and that therefore a woman can contract to live separate and apart from her husband (a).

In McGregor v. M. (b), (after the Married Women's Property Act, 1882), the plaintiff had applied to the police for protection against the defendant, her husband, and in June, 1886, she took out a summons for assault. The defendant thereupon took out a cross summons against the plaintiff. When the summonses were about to be heard negotiations took place between their respective solicitors, and it was thereupon agreed between plaintiff and defendant that they should live separate; that defendant, the husband, should pay plaintiff 1l. per week, and that she therewith should maintain herself and her children; that she should indemnify him against all debts contracted by her, and that the summonses should be withdrawn. On an action by the wife on the agreement it was held the action was maintainable. There was no intervention of a trustee for the wife; there was no matrimonial suit; there was no writing (c). The C. A. (d) held, that the agreement between the husband and wife was valid, as it fell within the exception to the general rule as to the incapacity of the husband and wife to contract with each other, such exception being that all proceedings which the husband and wife are capable of taking against each other may be compromised (e); that there was sufficient consideration to support it, namely, the withdrawal of the summons; that there being a valid consideration, there was no necessity for a trustee; and that section 4 of the Statute of Frauds did not apply.

Lindley, L.J., in the above case pointed out that the object of

⁽a) See Hart v. H., 18 C. D. 670; Gandy v. G., 7 P. D., p. 80; Rose v. R., 8 P. D. 100; Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. p. 431; Clark v. C., 10 P. D., pp. 193, 195; Butler v. B., 16 Q. B. D. 374; McGregor v. M., 21 Q. B. D., p. 431; Aldridge v. A., 13 P. D. 214.

⁽b) 21 Q. B. D. 424.

⁽c) See s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

⁽d) Brett, M.R., Lindley and Bowen, L.JJ.

⁽e) See judgment of Lindley, L.J., p. 430.

interposing a trustee in such cases was, that the contract between the husband and wife being primâ facie void, the trustee was interposed in order that his covenant to indemnify the husband might afford a consideration for the husband's promise, but that where there is a valid consideration as between husband and wife, there is no need of a trustee (a); and Bowen, L.J., was of opinion that, assuming the contract a valid one, there was no necessity for a trustee, and that the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, gives power to make such a contract without the intervention of a trustee (b).

A recital in a deed to which the wife is a party of an agreement to live separate is evidence of a contract by her to allow her husband to live separate from her, and after taking benefits under the deed she cannot be heard to say she had not so contracted, although there was no covenant by her, but only by her trustee (c).

The Court, moreover, will do its utmost to decree specific performance of such a complete agreement, when it has been partially performed, though it may be somewhat vague in its terms (d). Thus, in Hart v. H. (e), a suit having been instituted by a husband against his wife for a divorce on account of adultery, a compromise was signed by the husband and wife in these terms: "Petition and answer dismissed; deed of separation with usual covenants; costs of preparing deed to be borne by Mr. H.; Mr. H. to pay Mrs. H. for herself and child or children 150l. a year quarterly; Mrs. H. to maintain the child or children; Mr. H. to pay wife's costs. In case of difference in working out these terms, matter to be referred to Mr. W. and Dr. D." (the leading counsel on each side). It was held by Kay, J., that the agreement was not too vague, and being on the face of it complete, the arbitration clause could only come into force in case of difference between the parties, and did not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to settle the deed; and a decree was made for specific performance, the deed of separation to be settled in chambers in case the parties differed (e).

It is a principle of the Court that it will not compel specific performance of an agreement, e.g., to execute a deed of separation,

⁽a) 21 Q. B. D., p. 431.

⁽b) Ib., p. 432; Sweet v. S., (1895)
1 Q. B. 12; and see Hart v. H., 18
C. D., p. 684.

⁽c) Clark v. C., 10 P. D. 188, 195. Cf. Williams v. Baily, Eq. 731.

⁽d) See Wilson v. West Hartlepool Ry. Co., 2 De G. J. & S. 475. And in McGregor v. M., supra, the consideration was held to be executed.

⁽e) 18 C. D. 670.

unless it can execute the whole contract on both sides (a). So where there are any stipulations in an agreement for separation contrary to law or public policy, a Court of equity will not, even if it be made on sufficient consideration, separate one portion of it from the other. and decree specific performance of part, but will refuse to decree specific performance altogether. Thus, in Vansittart v. V. (b), by a memorandum of agreement made between a husband and his wife who was suing him for a divorce, it was agreed that a deed of separation should be executed, containing, among other provisions therein mentioned, provisions that two of their children should be placed entirely in the custody of the wife, and that none of the children should be sent to any school in Berkshire, or at a less sum than 60l. a year for each child, and that neither of the two eldest sons should be sent to any school without the written consent of both husband and wife, unless to certain specified places of education. It was held by the full Court of Appeal (affirming the decision of Sir W. Page Wood (c), that the provisions as to the children were contrary to public policy, as interfering with the due discharge of the father's duties with respect to them; and that on this ground, apart from all other objections, a decree for the execution of the deed of separation could not be made (d).

Now, however, by the Custody of Infants Act, s. 2 (e), it is provided that, "No agreement contained in any separation deed made between the father and mother of an infant or infants shall be held to be invalid by reason only of its providing that the father of such infant or infants shall give up the custody or control thereof to the mother: Provided always, that no Court shall enforce any such agreement if the Court shall be of opinion that it will not be for the benefit of the infant or infants to give effect thereto."

Since the coming into operation of this section, Vansittart v. V. and cases following it have ceased to be of authority. In Hart v. H. (f) there was an agreement for a separation deed, one term of which was that Mrs. H. was to maintain the child or children. Kay, J., referring to Vansittart v. V., supra, said that the Custody

Hamilton v. Hector, L. R. 6 Ch. 701.

⁽a) Fry, Specific Performance (1903), p. 355.

⁽b) 2 De G. & J. 249.

⁽c) 4 Kay & J. 62.

⁽d) See also Walrond v. W., John. 18; Hope v. H., 8 De G. M. & G. 731; Gibbs v. Harding, L. R. 5 Ch. 336;

⁽e) See 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12, s. 2, supra, p. 555; Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 10; Custody of Children Act, 1891, s. 3, p. 558, supra.

⁽f) 18 C. D., 670, at pp. 681 and 682.

of Infants Act had removed what otherwise might have been possibly a difficulty, and ordered specific performance of the contract (a).

But an agreement by a husband who is petitioner in a suit for the dissolution of his marriage on account of the adultery of his wife, to withdraw from the suit in consideration of a sum of money paid and to be secured by the co-respondent, has been held to be a fraud upon the Divorce Act (b), and void as against public policy (c).

Where, however, an agreement for separation has ceased to be executory, as where a separation deed has been executed (d), equity will enforce those of its stipulations which are in accordance with the law, although it may also contain others which are contrary to the law or public policy (e).

But if a wife induces her husband to execute a deed of separation, in contemplation by her of her renewal of an illicit intercourse, it would be fraudulent as against the husband, and the deed will be void(f); and so where the deed had been executed upon the faith of the false assurance by the wife that she has not committed adultery (g).

But where in a separation deed there is a covenant by which the husband undertakes to pay his wife an annuity without restricting his liability to such time as she shall be chaste, it is good and is not against public policy, and the covenant remains in force, and the annuity continues payable, although the wife afterwards commits adultery (h). But semble, that if the covenant had been inserted in the separation deed with the intent that the wife might be at liberty to commit adultery, the deed would have been void (i).

It was held in several early cases that a deed of separation was a good answer to a husband seeking by *habeas corpus* to obtain the person of his wife (k); and it would seem now clear that the husband cannot by *habeas corpus* obtain control of the person of his wife (l).

- (a) See Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D. 605; Hunt v. H., 28 C. D. 606; Jump v. J., 8 P. D. 159.
 - (b) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85.
- (c) Gipps v. Hume, 2 John. & H. 517. Cf. Brown v. Brine, 1 Ex. D. 5.
- (d) Fry, Specific Performance (1903), p. 15, s. 39.
- (e) Vansittart v. V., 2 De G. & J. 249, at p. 255; Walrond v. W., John. 18; Hamilton v. Hector, 13 Eq., p. 524; Fry, Specific Performance (1903), p. 362, s. 841. See as to these cases

- Custody of Infants Act, supra.
- (f) Evans v. Carrington, 2 De G. F. & J. 481.
 - (g) Brown v. B., 7 Eq. 185.
- (h) Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q. B. D. 792; Sweet v. S., (1895) 1 Q. B. 12.
- (i) Fearon v. Aylesford, per Cotton,
 L.J., on the authority of Evans v.
 Carrington, 2 De G. F. & J. 481.
- (k) See Rex v. Mead, 1 Burr. 542; Rex v. Winton, 5 T. R. 91.
- (l) See Reg. v. Leggatt, 18 Q. B. 781;cf. Reg. v. Jackson, (1891) 1 Q. B. 671.

2. Consideration.

At the present time it is clearly established that an agreement by the husband and wife to live apart is binding and enforceable upon the wife (a). An agreement by husband and wife to live apart is of necessity based upon consideration, and it becomes unnecessary to consider whether particular provisions contained in the deed do or do not amount to sufficient consideration. Thus in Re Weston (b) the separation deed contained a recital that the husband and wife had agreed to live apart. It was held that a covenant by the wife to live apart ought to be inferred from the recital, and that the husband's covenant to make certain provision for his wife was based upon valuable consideration. In the earlier cases some more definite consideration was deemed The following are instances of considerations held to be sufficient:—A covenant by the wife's trustees to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts (c), even when conditional upon an annuity which was covenanted to be secured being secured (d): a contract by a third party to pay the husband's debts (e): a contract by the wife's father that the husband and wife should live apart and that he (the father) should pay half the costs of the separation deed (f): a renunciation by the husband of his rights in the wife's property (g): an agreement between the husband and the wife's father that a deed of separation should contain all usual and proper clauses was held to be founded on good consideration, inasmuch as (inter alia) a covenant on the part of the father to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts would, under those words, be included in the deed as a proper and usual clause (h). As to agreements to compromise matrimonial suits, see Wilson v. W. (i), and as to an agreement to compromise any litigation as to the wife's rights, or, semble, any intention to litigate in respect of them, see McGregor v. M. (k).

- (a) E.g., Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D. 605; Clark v. C., 10 P. D. 188; Aldridge v. A., 13 P. D. 210; Sweet v. S., (1895) 1 Q. B. 12.
 - (b) (1900) 2 Ch. 164.
- (c) Stephens v. Olive, 2 Bro. Ch. 90; Westmeath v. W., Jac. 126, 141; Elworthy v. Bird, 2 S. & S. 372; Worrall v. Jacob, 3 Mer. 256; Logan v. Birkett, 1 My. & K. 220.
- (d) Wellesley v. W., 10 Si. 256.
- (e) Wilson v. W., supra.
- (f) Gibbs v. Harding, L. R. 5 Ch. 336.
- (g) Marshall v. M., 5 P. D., p. 23.
- (h) Gibbs v. Harding, supra.
- (i) Supra, and Hart v. H., 18 C. D., p. 685.
- (k) 21 Q. B. D. 424, judgments of the M.R. and *Lindley*, L.J., and Hobbs v. Hull, 1 Cox, 445.

An agreement by a wife who has property settled to her separate use without power of anticipation on a separation to indemnify her husband against debts, was held not to amount to valuable consideration, as a married woman has no power to contract so as to bind property of that description (a).

3. Breaches of Contract in Agreements for Separation.

The Ecclesiastical Courts considered a separation by private arrangement as an illegal contract, implying a dereliction of stipulated duties, which the parties were not at liberty to desert, and, consequently, entirely disregarded it as a bar to a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights (b).

But a Court of equity (before the passing of the Judicature Acts) would, where a valid contract for separation had been entered into between husband and wife, grant an injunction to restrain proceedings by either party in the Ecclesiastical Court for a restitution of conjugal rights (c).

And now as the Divorce Court is part of the High Court of Justice, and bound, like the other Divisions, to administer equity (d), the breach of a covenant in a separation deed will no longer be restrained by injunction in equity (e) if such a suit be instituted in the Divorce Court, but the breach should now be pleaded in that Court as an equitable defence in such proceedings (f).

And the Chancery Division will enforce a deed of separation, and will not be debarred from restraining a wife from commencing an action for restitution of conjugal rights by reason of trifling breaches of covenant on the husband's part (q).

The Court, moreover, will restrain a husband from personally molesting his wife (h), and a wife from personally molesting her

- (a) Walrond v. W., John. 18. Sed quere as to whether this case could now be supported on the ground above stated. The agreement could not be enforced against the property subject to restraint, but would otherwise be valid.
- (b) Mortimer v. M., 2 Hag. Con. 318; Westmeath v. W., 2 Hag. Ec. App. 115; King v. Samson, 3 Adams, 277.
- (c) Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 515; Wilson v. W., 1 H. L. Cas. 538, 556, 575;

- Hunt v. H., 4 De G. F. & J. 221; reversing the decision of *Romilly*, M.R., 31 B. 89.
- (d) See Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), s. 24.
- (e) See Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 5.
- (f) Marshall v. M., 5 P. D. 22; and see Kennedy v. K., (1907) P. 49.
- (g) Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D. 605,630; Hart v. H., 18 C. D. 670.
 - (h) Sanders v. Rodway, 16 B. 207.

husband (a), contrary to covenants contained in deeds of separation (b).

A wife by being party to a separation deed recognizes its recitals (c), and such recitals may be taken as evidence of a contract between the husband and wife, which may be an equitable defence to a petition by the wife for restitution of conjugal rights, although the covenants in the deed are not by the wife but by the trustees, for in such a case she cannot be heard to say there is no agreement by her (d).

And an agreement, although not by deed, will act as a bar, as in Aldridge v. A. (e), where a husband and wife agreed to separate, and that neither should make any claim against the other in law or equity. The husband afterwards presented a petition for a declaration of nullity. The wife set up the agreement, and the question of law was ordered to be decided first (f), with the result that the petition was dismissed.

The covenants in separation deeds are not reciprocal so that the observance of the one is a condition precedent, on the breach of which the other fails. They are independent covenants in the absence of express terms making them dependent. Thus, a breach of covenant not to molest is no answer to a breach of covenant to pay an annuity (g).

A suit by a wife for judicial separation is not of itself a breach of a covenant not to "molest or disturb" the husband (h), and neither adultery alone by the wife, nor adultery by her followed by the birth of a spurious child, is a breach of a covenant in a separation deed against molestation by the wife (i). But semble, adultery by the wife, followed by the birth of a spurious child whom she puts forward as the child of her husband, especially if this is done with intent to claim a title or property to which the legitimate offspring of her husband would be entitled, is evidence of a breach of a covenant against molestation by her (k).

- (a) Flower v. F., 20 W. R. 231.
- (b) Williams v. Baily, 2 Eq. 734;
 Kitchin v. K., 19 L. T. 674;
 Buckmaster v. B., L. R. 1 P. & D. 713.
- (c) Per Baggallay, L.J., in Clark v. C., 10 P. D. 192.
- (d) Clark v. C., supra. Cf. Williams v. Baily, 2 Eq. 731.
 - (e) 13 P. D. 210.
 - (f) R. S. C. 1883, O. 25, r. 2.

- (g) Fearon v. Aylesford, infra; Hart v. H., 18 C. D., p. 683.
- (h) Thomas v. Everard, 6 H. & N. 448. Cf. Hunt v. H., (1897) 2 Q. B. 547.
- (i) Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q. B. D.792; Sweet v. S., (1895) 1 Q. B.12.
 - (k) Fearon v. Aylesford, supra.

And a husband is not debarred from enforcing a deed of separation, and from obtaining an order restraining his wife from commencing an action for the restitution of conjugal rights by reason of trifling breaches of the covenants on his part. But he may so misconduct himself as to lose his right to insist upon her covenants not to institute matrimonial suits (a). In Besant v. Wood (b) the husband had covenanted in a separation deed to allow an infant child to reside with the wife, but had subsequently concurred, as next friend of the infant in a petition under the Infants' Custody Act (c), for the removal of the infant from the wife's custody, which had been ordered by the Court; and it was held by Jessel, M.R., that this was not a breach of the husband's covenant.

"The rule is clear that no rule of public policy, nor any other rule, prevents parties from agreeing that they will not found an application to the Court on past misconduct" (d).

In Gandy v. G. (e) there was a separation deed, by which, interalia, the wife agreed to take 250l. per annum for the support of herself and family, and not to commence or prosecute any suit to compel her husband to allow her more. The husband committed adultery and cruelty. The wife instituted a suit for judicial separation, obtained a decree, and applied for an increase of alimony contrary to the covenant. The husband set up the deed, and the C. A. held that the fact of adultery subsequent to the deed was not sufficient misconduct to deprive him of the benefit of the covenant, and that as the Court could not rectify the deed after a decree for separation, as it could have done after a dissolution (f), the deed was binding (g).

In Rose v. R. (h) a wife contracted with her husband that she would not in any suit enter into his conduct before the execution of the deed. She filed a petition for adultery and cruelty committed both before and after the deed. At the hearing the adultery was admitted, and the Court held that no cruelty had been committed since the

⁽a) Cf. Gandy v. G., 7 P. D., p. 80, and on appeal, p. 168, considered and explained in Bishop v. B., (1897) P. 138.

⁽b) 12 C. D. 605.

⁽c) 36 Vict. c. 12.

⁽d) Per Jeune, P., in Gooch v. G.,
(1893) P., at p. 106; Rowley v. R., L. R.
H. L. Sc. 63; Besant v. Wood,

supra; Rose v. R., 7 P. D. 225.

⁽e) 7 P. D. 77, 168, C. A.

⁽f) Morrall v. M., 6 P. D. 98; Clifford v. C., 9 P. D. 76.

⁽g) Cf. Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D.
605; Powell v. P., L. R. 3 P. & D.
56; Benyon v. B., L. R. 1 P. & D.
447; George v. G., L. R. 1 P. & D.
544.

⁽h) 7 P. D. 225; 8 P. D. 98, C. A.

deed. The Court granted a judicial separation founded on the adultery since the deed, but refused a dissolution, as the cruelty before the deed could not be gone into.

In Gooch v. G. (a) the parties had separated under a deed dated in 1886, which provided that no proceedings should be commenced or prosecuted by either party against the other in respect of any cause of complaint which then existed, or had arisen before the date of the deed. In 1890 the wife presented a petition for judicial separation on the ground of adultery in 1889 and 1890, whereupon the husband charged his wife with adultery in 1884. Both parties were found guilty. Held, that such words did not prevent the husband from setting up his wife's adultery as a defence. "The parties cannot by stipulation produce any higher effect than they can by condonation, or impose upon the Court the necessity of granting a judicial separation, notwithstanding the adultery of the petitioner. They may contract themselves out of their rights, but they cannot contract the Court out of its duty "(b). It was, however, said that if the agreement had been framed as in Rose v. R. (c), the result might have been different (d).

In Dowling v. D. (e), a husband having been guilty of cruelty, he and his wife separated upon the terms of a deed by which they agreed that neither party should take proceedings against the other for dissolution of marriage or judicial separation on the ground of previous misconduct, but that the deed should be void in case the marriage should be dissolved or a judicial separation granted on the ground of subsequent misconduct by either. The husband afterwards committed adultery. He did not plead the deed in answer to his wife's petition. The Court, distinguishing Rose v. R. (f), granted a decree nisi for the dissolution of the marriage (e).

In Newsome v. N. (g) a wife, for valuable consideration, agreed not to take proceedings against her husband on account of his incestuous adultery, "provided he remained true to her in love and duty." Upon his subsequently committing adultery, it was held that the agreement, by the terms of it, was no longer binding, and

- (a) (1893) P. 99.
- (b) Ib., pp. 106, 107.
- (c) 7 P. D. 225; 8 P. D. 98.
- (d) And see Rowley v. R., L. R. 1
 H. L. Sc. 63; Besant v. Wood, 12
 C. D. 605; Gandy v. G., 7 P. D. 77,
- 168; Rose v. R., supra; Dowling v.
- D., (1898) P. 228.
 - (e) (1898) P. 228.
 - (f) 8 P. D. 100.
 - (g) L. R. 2 P. & D. 306.

that she might proceed against him on the ground of the incestuous adultery. Semble, that, in the absence of the proviso, he might have set up the agreement as a defence to the suit founded on the incestuous adultery before the agreement (a).

The discovery of misconduct not contemplated in the separation deed, committed by one of the principal parties to the deed previous to its execution, may prevent its being set up as a bar to proceedings in Court, contrary to a covenant therein contained. Thus, where there was a deed of separation, whereby a wife agreed to accept certain sums as a provision for her support, and not to sue her husband for any further maintenance, but subsequently having discovered that he had been guilty of incestuous adultery, obtained a decree for dissolution of the marriage, it was held that notwithstanding the deed she was entitled to the usual order for permanent maintenance. "When she [the wife] has established that her husband has been guilty of incestuous adultery, a state of things arises not in contemplation when the deed was executed, the wife is not restrained by the deed. Circumstances now justify her in bringing a suit for dissolution of marriage, and she is entitled to all the incidents of that suit, and amongst them to an allowance based on her husband's income "(b).

Improper conduct, also, by one of the parties, subsequent to the execution of the separation deed, may prevent such party setting it up against the other. Thus, if, after the deed of separation has been executed and acted upon, the husband institutes a suit against the wife, based on an unfounded charge, which compels her to make known, in self-defence, her own grounds of complaint against him, the foundation of the arrangement between them is removed, and the consideration fails upon which it was entered into, and in such case the wife is remitted to her original position, and will be allowed, notwithstanding the provisions of the separation deed, to claim the fullest redress to which before its execution she was entitled (c).

In Tress v. T. (d) a wife covenanted in a separation deed that she would not take any steps to compel her husband to cohabit with

- (a) See Rowley v. R., L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 63; Morrall v. M., infra.
- (b) Per Sir J. Hannen in Morrall
 v. M., 6 P. D. 98, at p. 100; cf.
 Newsome v. N., supra, 633; Gandy v.
 G., 7 P. D., p. 175, C. A., supra,
 p. 632; Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q. B.
- D. 792, C. A.; Bishop v. B., (1897)P. 138.
- (c) See Brown v. B., L. R. 3 P. & D. 202; cf. Gooch v. G., (1893) P. 99, supra, p. 633.
- (d) 12 P. D. 128; but see Kennedy v. K., (1907) P. 49.

her. The husband covenanted to pay her an annuity. This he paid for a short time and then made default. She sued for restitution of conjugal rights. He did not appear. Held, the covenant of the wife was, under the circumstances, no bar. In *Moore* v. M. (a) the parties separated under a deed which contained no covenant not to sue. The husband petitioned for divorce on the ground of adultery, which failed, and the wife in her answer asked for separation; the husband did not set up the deed, and a decree for judicial separation was made.

Where a deed of separation does in fact give a licence to commit adultery, it amounts to connivance, and would be a complete bar to the suit (b).

Where a husband, by a separation deed to which he, the trustees, and his wife, were the only parties, covenanted to pay the trustees an annual sum for the use of his wife, and for the expenses of maintaining and educating his daughters, it was held by the C. A. that neither of the daughters by her next friend, without the trustees, could bring an action to enforce the covenant; but leave to amend was given, and upon the trustees refusing to be joined and to sue the husband, the Court held the wife might do so (c).

"Dum casta" Clause.—In Gandy v. G. (d) it was held at the trial, that a deed of separation must be construed as an agreement, amongst other things, that the parties shall live apart in chastity, and that the subsequent adultery of the husband deprived him of the right to have the restraining provisions of the deed enforced. But, on appeal, it was held that this is not so unless the misconduct is so gross, so entirely different from that which the parties were providing for when they entered into the deed, as to entitle one of them to disregard the bargain (e). So a covenant by the husband in a separation deed to pay his wife an annuity, without restricting his liability to such a time as she shall be chaste, is good, and continues in force although the wife afterwards commits adultery (f). So where an agreement to separate provided for the execution of a deed of separation which was to contain the "usual covenants,"

- (a) 12 P. D. 194.
- (b) Thomas v. T., 2 Sw. & Tr. 113; Gandy v. G., 7 P. D. 168.
 - (c) Gandy v. G., 30 C. D. 57.
 - (d) 7 P. D. 77.
 - (e) See judgment of Cotton, L.J., in

Gandy v. G., 7 P. D., pp. 174, 175.

(f) See judgment of Brett, M.R., in Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q. B. D., p. 799; and of Cotton, L.J., p. 808; Sweet v. S., (1895) 1 Q. B. 12.

Kay, J., held that these words did not include the "dum casta" clause (a).

4. Other Points connected with Separation Agreements, &c.

Debts arising on voluntary bonds or covenants are provable in bankruptcy, and will be paid, pari passu, with other debts (b).

Resumption of cohabitation and reconciliation put an end to separation deeds, and all the effects of separation (c); provided that on the true construction of the deed it appears that its provisions were only intended to take effect as long as separation lasted (d). Where the deed, going beyond the immediate purposes of a separation deed, makes provision for the children of the marriage after the death of the wife, the trusts in favour of the children are unaffected by resumption of cohabitation (e).

Where a separation deed is made in anticipation of a separation which never takes place, the consideration having failed, the deed is wholly void, and the Court will not treat it as a voluntary deed, but will direct it to be cancelled (f).

But mere reconciliation, such as communication by letters, without cohabitation (g), or merely living together under the same roof, without reconciliation, as where it is shown that the parties conducted themselves with the greatest animosity towards each other, will not have the effect of putting an end to the deed (h).

There is nothing illegal in continuing trusts for payment of money to the wife in the event of reconciliation (i).

- (a) Hart v. H., 18 C. D., pp. 692—697; Bradley v. B., 51 L. J. P. & M. 87.
- (b) See Bankruptcy Act, 1883, ss. 37, 40(4), 125, and Re Whitaker, (1901) 1 Ch. 9; Re Batey, 14 C. D. 579. Cf. Linton v. L., 15 Q. B. D. 239. And as to claims of creditors against a voluntary separation deed, see Fitzer v. F., 2 Atk. 511; Clough v. Lambert, 10 Si. 174; as to purchasers, Court v. Foster, 1 John. & H. 30; as to valuable consideration, see note "Consideration," supra, p. 629.
- (c) Bateman v. Countess of Ross, 1 Dow, 245; Westmeath v. Salisbury, 5 Bli. N. S. 339.
 - (d) See judgment of Bowen, L.J., in

- Nicol v. N., 31 C. D., p. 529. Cf. Haddon v. H., 18 Q. B. D. 778, 56 L. J. M. C. 69.
- (e) Ruffles v. Alston, 19 Eq. 539;Re Spark's Trusts, (1904) 1 Ch. 451.
- (f) Bindley v. Mulloney, 7 Eq. 343; see also Westmeath v. Salisbury, 5 Bli. N. S. 339.
- (g) Slatter v. S., 1 Y. & C. Ex.C. 28; Frampton v. F., 4 B. 287.
 - (h) Bateman v. Ross, 1 Dow, 235.
- (i) Nicholls v. Danvers, 2 Vern. 671; Wilson v. Mushett, 3 B. & Ad. 743; Bateman v. Ross, 1 Dow, 235; Byrne v. Carew, 13 Ir. Eq. R. 1; Crouch v. Waller, 4 De G. & J. 302; Randle v. Gould, 8 El. & Bl. 457.

And if a husband after a separation contracts to continue the payment of an annuity to his wife to which she was entitled under a separation deed, in case she would return to and cohabit with him, he will be bound to pay it, even where the contract was merely by parol (a).

The adultery of the wife will not prevent her taking proceedings under the deed or contract for separation (b). The husband is liable under his covenants whether he commits adultery or not, and he would be so liable even if the wife had committed adultery (c). And a plea of the wife's adultery (d), of a divorce a mensa et thoro (e), or a dissolution of marriage (f), on account of adultery, will be held no defence to an action by trustees for arrears of separate maintenance under a covenant in a separation deed (g), unless the covenant by unmistakable words limits his liability to the period during which the marriage relation continues (h).

Dissolution of Marriage.—In the case of dissolution of marriage, the Court has conferred upon it the right to vary both ante-nuptial settlements and post-nuptial settlements, including deeds of separation, and to deal with them in any way which may be thought just and expedient (i). And in such cases the Court has an absolute discretion as to the amount of the allowance to be made to the parties respectively under all the circumstances, and having regard to the conduct of the parties respectively. In Clifford v. C. (k) the husband, by a separation deed, covenanted to pay 52l. per annum to a trustee for the benefit of the wife. She committed adultery and the marriage was dissolved. The husband did not pay the annuity, being under the impression that the dissolution put an end to the The wife became chargeable to the parish, and a question arose with the guardians. The husband applied to vary or set aside the deed. Butt, J., refused to vary the deed, treating the case as one of alimony. The C. A., having regard to the conduct of the

- (a) Webster v. W., 4 De G. M. & G. 437. Cf. McGregor v. M., 21 Q. B. D. 424.
- (b) Seagrave v. S., 13 V. 443, 9 R. R. 203; Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q. B. D. 792.
- (c) Gandy v. G., 7 P. D. pp. 171, 172; considered and explained in Bishop v. B., (1897) P. 138.
 - (d) Baynon v. Batley, 8 Bing. 256.
 - (e) Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B. & C. 547.

- (f) Goslin v. Clark, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 681; Clifford v. C., 9 P. D. 76, infra.
- (g) See Charlesworth v. Holt, L. R. 9 Ex. 38.
 - (h) Ib. 41, per Bramwell, B.
- (i) See 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 5; 41 Vict. c. 19, s. 3; Hodgson Roberts v. H. R. and Whitaker, (1906) P. 142; Morrissey v. M., (1905) P. 90.
 - (k) 9 P. D. 76, C. A.

wife, especially in making charges against the husband in the suit for dissolution which she did not attempt to support, reduced the allowance to one-half (a).

And the Court has exercised this right where, in consequence of gross misconduct of the husband, discovered after the execution of a separation deed, the wife has subsequently obtained a dissolution of the marriage. In Morrall v. M. (b), a wife, by a deed of separation. agreed to accept certain sums as a provision for her support, and not to sue her husband for any further maintenance. Subsequently, having discovered that he had been guilty of incestuous adultery, she obtained a decree for the dissolution of the marriage. It was held that, notwithstanding the deed, she was entitled to the usual order for permanent maintenance (c). In exercising the discretionary jurisdiction to vary settlements after a dissolution of marriage. regard must be had to the conduct of both parties, and not of one party only, and also to the interests of public morality. where a marriage had been dissolved at the suit of the husband, who himself admitted misconduct, the Court declined to vary the wife's settlement in his favour (d). Nor can the jurisdiction be exercised retrospectively; as by directing the trustees of the wife's settlement to recoup to the husband accumulations of past income received by her under the trusts of his settlement (d). And a wife's protected life interest is not an interest which the Court can control under s. 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1859, though the existence of such an interest may be taken into consideration by the Court when making an order for variation of settlements (d).

In Day v. D. (e), commenting on but following Noel v. N. (f), it was held that where under a marriage settlement a wife has power to resettle settled property in the event of surviving her husband and marrying again, and, having been divorced, has married the co-respondent during her husband's lifetime, the Court may make an order preventing any resettlement on any husband married, or children born, during the husband's lifetime.

⁽a) See Boynton v. B., 2 Sw. & Tr. 275; Gladstone v. G., 1 P. D. 442; Maudslay v. M., 2 P. D. 256; Wigney v. W., 7 P. D. 177; Robertson v. R., 8 P. D. 94; Jump v. J., 8 P. D. 159; Ponsonby v. P., 9 P. D. 58; Noel v. N., 10 P. D. 179.

⁽b) 6 P. D. 98.

⁽c) And see Jump v. J., 8 P. D. 159; Clifford v. C., 9 P. D. 76; Bishop v. B., (1897) P. 138.

⁽d) Constantinidi v. C. and Lance (1905) P. 253.

⁽e) 78 L T. 358.

⁽f) 10 P. D. 179.

Judicial Separation.—But in the case of judicial separation (a), there being no such power, any deed executed remains binding. In Gandy v. G. (b) a husband committed adultery, and disputes arose between him and his wife, which led to his committing acts of legal cruelty. A separation deed was then executed, by which he agreed to allow her 250l. a year, and to maintain the two youngest children, who were not to be in her custody; and she covenanted not to take any proceedings to compel her husband to allow her a larger amount of alimony. Subsequently the husband again committed adultery, and the wife obtained a decree for judicial separation and an order that she should have the custody of the two youngest children. The husband had, since the date of the separation deed, become wealthy, and the wife applied for an inquiry as to his means with the view of obtaining increased alimony. It was held by the C. A., that increased alimony could not be ordered, for since the Court had not, as in the case of a decree for dissolution of marriage, power to alter the separation deed, the covenant by the wife not to sue for increased alimony was binding on her, and must have effect given to it, the husband not having been guilty of such misconduct as under the circumstances of the case would disentitle him to claim the benefit of the deed (c).

But the wife would not be bound by the provisions of such a separation deed, if, although she had trustees, she had not herself unequivocally asserted her rights under it (d). But if there is an agreement by her, of which a recital in the deed may furnish evidence, and she has accepted benefits thereunder, then she will be bound, although she herself has not covenanted, but only her trustee (e).

The existence of a separation deed, none of the provisions of which had been acted upon, was held to be no ground for refusing relief to the wife on account of the desertion of the husband some time after the execution of the deed (f).

After a separation by private arrangement of the parties, a husband and wife still retain their relative positions which formerly could only

(a) As to which, see Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85); 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 144; 29 & 30 Vict. c. 32; 41 Vict. c. 19; and the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 68).

- (b) 7 P. D. 182.
- (c) See Morrall v. M., supra; Bishop v. B., (1897) P. 138.
 - (d) Williams v. Baily, 2 Eq. 731.
 - (e) Clark v. C., 10 P. D., p. 195.
 - (f) Cock v. C., 13 W. R. 188.

be dissolved by Parliament (a), and now by proceedings under the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act (b); the husband will, consequently, be liable for his wife's debts, unless he provides for her maintenance by an adequate allowance, and it is regularly paid; in which case he will have a good defence to an action brought against him for goods supplied to his wife (c).

An ordinary deed of separation does not amount to a licence to commit future adultery (d). Hence, it was no bar to an action for damages by the husband for the seduction of his wife (e); nor will it, in the absence of express stipulation to that effect, prevent a wife from claiming her share of her husband's personal estate under the Statute of Distributions (f).

5. Contracts for Future Separation.

All agreements providing for future separation are void, as contrary to public policy (g). However, in *Rodney* v. *Chambers* (h), a covenant to allow maintenance in case the separation took place with the *approbation of trustees*, was held valid (i).

And a separation deed providing for immediate separation may, if not acted upon, be held void (k) if it is not something more than a mere separation deed (l).

In Re Moore (m), testator directed his trustees to pay to his sister during such time as she may live apart from her husband, before his son attained twenty-one, the sum of 2l. 10s. per week.

- (a) Marshall v. Rutton, 8 T. R. 545.
- (b) 20 & 21 Viet. c. 85.
- (c) Hodkinson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70; Hindley v. Westmeath, 6 B. & C. 200; Mizen v. Pick, 3 M. & W. 481; Reeve v. Conyngham, 2 C. & K. 444.
- (d) Sullivan v. S., 2 Adams, 299, at p. 303.
- (e) Chambers v. Caulfield, 6 East, 244.
- (f) Slatter v. S., 1 Y. & C. Ex. C. 28.
- (g) Westmeath v. W., 1 Dow & Cl. 519; Westmeath v. Salisbury, 5 Bli. (N. S.) 339; and see Durant v. Titley, 7 Price, 577; Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 My. & C. 229; and see Cocksedge v. C., 5 Ha. 397; Cartwright
- v. C., 3 De G. M. & G. 982; Byrne v. Carew, 13 Ir. Eq. R. 1; H. v. W., 3 Kay & J. 382; Merryweather v. Jones, 4 Gif. 499; Procter v. Robinson, 14 W. R. 381. Contrast with these cases, Marlborough v. M., (1901) 1 Ch. 165.
 - (h) 2 East, 297.
- (i) And see Gawden v. Draper, 2 Vent. 217; Chambers v. Caulfield, 6 East, 244; Soilleux v. Herbst, 2 Bos. & Pul. 444; Bateman v. Ross, 1 Dow, 235.
- (k) Westmeath v. Salisbury, supra; Bindley v. Mulloney, 7 Eq. 343.
- (l) Ruffles v. Alston, 19 Eq. 539; Nicol v. N., 31 C. D., p. 529.
 - (m) 39 C. D. 116.

The sister was then living, and until after the testator's death was living with her husband, but subsequently they separated. *Held*, the object of the gift was to promote separation, and therefore void.

In Re Hope Johnstone (a), by a post-nuptial settlement the husband assigned leaseholds to trustees upon trust to pay the rents to his wife for life, or so long as she should continue the cohabiting wife or the widow of the settlor, for her separate use, and upon the determination of the trust in favour of the wife the husband took an interest in the settled property. Some years after the date of the settlement the husband and wife separated by mutual consent, and they had not since cohabited. Held, distinguishing Cartwright v. C. (b) and H. v. W. (c), that the restriction of the wife's enjoyment of the rents to the period of cohabitation was not void as against the policy of the law, and that the trust in her favour determined upon her ceasing to live with her husband.

See on the construction of a separation deed Re Gilling (d).

- (a) (1904) 1 Ch. 470.
- (b) 3 De G. M. & G. 982.
- (c) 3 K. & J. 382.
- (d) 74 L. J. Ch. 335.

COUNTESS OF STRATHMORE v. BOWES (a).

1789. 1 V. 22; 1 R. R. 76.

Fraud on Marital Rights.

A woman, pending a treaty of marriage with A., settled all her property to her separate use, with his approbation; a few days after, B., by a stratagem, induced her to marry him, the day after she first thought of it: B. had no notice of the settlement. The settlement was established, and a deed of revocation obtained by duress set aside.

The burthens, to which a husband is liable, are a consideration for his marital rights, upon which, therefore, fraud may be committed.

Conveyance by a woman under any circumstances, and even the moment before marriage, is good, *primā facie*: is bad only if fraudulent, as where it is made pending the treaty, without notice to the intended husband.

LADY STRATHMORE, being seised and possessed of great property, both real and personal, pending a treaty of marriage with Mr. Grey, conveyed all her real, and assigned all her personal estate to trustees for her sole and separate use, notwithstanding any future coverture. This settlement was prepared with the approbation of Grey. A few days after the execution, hearing that Mr. Bowes had fought a duel on her account with the editor of a newspaper, who had traduced her character, she determined to marry him, and the marriage took place the next day. Bowes had no notice of the settlement. There were two bills: an original bill by Lady Strathmore, to set aside a deed revoking the settlement, as having been obtained by duress: and a cross bill by Mr. Bowes, to set aside the settlement, as against the rights of marriage, and a fraud upon him, and to establish the deed of revocation. An issue was directed to try, whether the deed of revocation had been obtained by duress; and the verdict in the Common Pleas was against the deed. cause coming on upon the equity reserved, Mr. Justice Buller, sitting

⁽a) S. C., on the first hearing, 2 on appeal, 6 Bro. P. C. 427, Toml. Bro. Ch. 345; 2 Cox, 28, affirmed, edit.

for the Lord Chancellor, decreed in favour of Lady Strathmore, and dismissed the cross bill with costs. It came on again, upon the petition of Mr. Bowes, for a rehearing, and reversal of that decree so far as it dismissed the cross bill.

Mr. Richards, for Mr. Bowes.—The question is whether this settlement, made before marriage, is valid or not, as being in derogation of the common rights of marriage. A wife, by the marriage contract, becomes extinct, from the nature of it, for several civil purposes with regard to which she merges in the husband. He becomes liable to all her debts, and answerable for all her acts that do not amount to felony; and even for that, if committed in his presence; because her mind is supposed to be under his coercion. In order to enable him to answer this, he has by the law all her property. It is absurd to say, the wife shall by her own act deprive the husband of what the law has given him. * *

Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Hardinge, Mr. Law, and Mr. King, for Lady Strathmore.—Lady Strathmore is in possession by a deed to trustees, giving her own property to her use. It was done in contemplation of marriage with another person; therefore not fraudulent as to Mr. Bowes, unless any deed by a feme sole, by which she disposes of her property, shall be construed to be fraudulent if not communicated to any future husband. Want of communication is the only circumstance that can be alleged; but that is very different from concealment, for which there can be no pretence here. * * * It is enough for us to say, Mr. Bowes was not cheated.

LORD CHANCELLOR THURLOW.—The mere question seems to be, what is the true foundation for setting aside an instrument primâ facie good? Can less be imputed to it than fraud? Or can it be void upon the notion of general policy, as has been urged for Mr. Bowes? If not, must not fraud be imputed? and, if so, will the circumstances of its being made in contemplation of marriage affect it with fraud? Suppose a relation had given 10,000l. for her sole and separate use; if she had represented it as her own absolutely, so that, upon a marriage, it would have gone to her

husband, this Court would have compelled the trustees to give to the husband, but not otherwise (a); nor is there any difference between a fortune so circumstanced by an act of her own, or of the donor. Consider what will be the effect of this void deed of revocation? If he had joined with her to revoke that settlement and appoint new uses, he could not have rescinded that afterwards; because he had affirmed the deed by acting upon it. If he had acted honestly upon it, as in the case I have put, he could not have set that aside; his counsel are to show that he may, because he has acted dishonestly upon it, which at present I think rather a vain attempt.

I never had a doubt about this case. If it is to be considered upon the ground of its being against a rule of judicial policy, the arguments for Mr. Bowes would have had great weight. The law conveys the marital rights to the husband, because it charges him with all the burthens, which are the consideration he pays for them; therefore, it is a right upon which fraud may be committed. Out of this right arises a rule of law that the husband shall not be cheated on account of his consideration.

A case of this kind came before me a few days ago (b). A woman adult, about to marry an infant, made a settlement, in contemplation of that marriage, in which he joined, though an infant, for the purpose of expressing his consent. As it was upon fair consideration, and no fraud to draw him in as an infant, I thought the circumstance of its being fair would bind him, though, as an infant, not capable of consenting; according to which I held the settlement good, as she was capable of conveying; and as it was a public and open transaction, with the consent of the family, and consequently no fraud, though his being privy to it would not have concluded him from any rights as being an infant.

A conveyance by a wife, whatsoever may be the circumstances, and even the moment before the marriage, is primâ facie good, and becomes bad only upon the imputation of fraud. If a woman, during the course of a treaty of marriage with her, makes without notice to the intended husband, a conveyance of any part of her property, I should set it aside, though good primâ facie, because affected with that fraud.

⁽a) See Ashton v. M'Dougall, 5 B. (b) Slocombe v. Glubb, 2 Bro. Ch. 66.

As to the morality of the transaction, I shall say nothing to that. They seem to have been pretty well matched. Marriage in general seems to have been Lady Strathmore's object: she was disposed to marry anybody, but not to part with her fortune. This settlement is to be considered as the effect of a lucid interval, and if there can be reason in madness, by doing this she discovered a spark of understanding.

The question which arises upon all the cases is, whether the evidence is sufficient to raise fraud. Even if there had been a fraud upon Grey, I would not have permitted Bowes to come here to complain of it. But there was no fraud, even upon Grey, for it was with his consent; and so I cannot distinguish it from a good limitation to her separate use. Being about to marry Grey, she made this settlement with his knowledge; and the imputation of fraud is, that having suddenly changed her mind and married Mr. Bowes, in the hurry of that improvident transaction she did not communicate it to him; but there was no time, and could be no fraud, which consists of a number of circumstances. It is impossible for a man marrying in the manner Bowes did, to come into equity and talk of fraud. Therefore, the decree must be affirmed, with costs; but let him have all just allowances as to what he paid when in receipt of the profits, and as to the annuities, which are declared not to be disturbed by the decree.

NOTES.

The doctrine of fraud on marital rights has, having regard to the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, lost much of its importance. Mr. Vaizey, in his work on Settlements, says (a): "In the old sense, therefore, of the husband being deprived of something to which, as a husband, he would have a right, if the wife had not before marriage executed a conveyance, fraud on marital right does not appear to be any longer possible,... but the necessity of the most abundant good faith in such a contract as that of a settlement made on a marriage is so obvious and cogent that it would be rash to conclude that the Act has wholly deprived of effect the doctrine here considered."

The rule upon which the Courts acted in setting aside a settlement made by a woman of her own property previous to marriage,

⁽a) Vaizey, Settlements, vol. ii., pp. 1581, 1585, 1586.

in violation or fraud of the marital rights of her intended husband, is well laid down by Lord Thurlow. "A conveyance by a wife, whatsoever may be the circumstances, and even the moment before the marriage, is primâ facie good, and becomes bad only upon the imputation of fraud. If a woman, during the course of a treaty of marriage with her, makes, without notice to the intended husband, a conveyance of any part of her property, I should set it aside, though good primâ facie, because affected with that fraud."

The concurrence of two circumstances, pendency of a marriage treaty and ignorance on the part of the intended husband, ordinarily sufficed to invalidate a settlement, but fraud will depend on the particular circumstances of each case (a).

The actual decision, however, does not come within this principle; for it will be observed, the settlement was made by Lady Strathmore with the consent of Grey, her then intended husband, and not during the course of a treaty of marriage with Bowes, whom she afterwards married, and it was, therefore, not a fraud upon him. It was necessary, therefore, for a person impeaching a settlement on the ground of this species of fraud, to prove that, at the time of its execution, he was the then intended husband, otherwise it would not be set aside (b), and the husband only and not his representatives could complain (c).

It is clearly settled, that if a woman, during a treaty for marriage, hold herself out to her intended husband as entitled to property, which will become his upon the marriage, and then makes a settlement of it without his knowledge or concurrence, actual fraud would be imputed to her, and the settlement would be set aside in a Court of equity (d). It was observed by Buller, J., that "Fraud consists in falsely holding out that a woman has an estate unfettered, and that the husband will be of course entitled to it. No case has yet established, that all conveyances by a wife before marriage are void merely because not communicated to the husband." And again, "It is necessary to show other facts, and that the husband is actually deceived and misled; and the bare concealment is not sufficient" (e). These dicta, however, can scarcely be supported,

⁽a) See Vaizey, Settlements, vol. ii.,p. 1583.

⁽b) England v. Downs, 2 B. 522; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 V. 194, 2 R. R.

⁽c) Vaizey, Settlements, vol. ii., p.

^{1585;} Grazebrook v. Percival, 14 Jur. 1103.

⁽d) England v. Downs, supra; see also Howard v. Hooker, 2 Ch. R. 81; Carleton v. Dorset, 2 Cox, 33.

⁽e) 2 Cox, 29, 30.

although there have been some cases in which, under peculiar circumstances, it has been held that a bare concealment by a woman from her intended husband, of a gift or a settlement of part of her property made during the treaty for a marriage, was not sufficient evidence of fraud, so as to render the settlement void as against the husband (a).

However, in Goddard v. Snow (b), a woman ten months before marriage, but after the commencement of that intimate acquaintance with her future husband which ended in marriage, made a settlement of a sum of money which he did not know her to be possessed The marriage took place, she concealing from him both her right to the money and the existence of the settlement. Ten years afterwards she died, and after her death the husband filed a bill to have the money paid to him. It was argued, on behalf of the defendants, that, as the husband did not know of the existence of the sum of money, and was therefore not induced to contract the marriage on the notion that it would be subject to his marital rights, no fraud, such as the authorities held to be necessary, had been committed; that there was, at the utmost, only concealment, and that concealment alone was not sufficient to avoid a settlement confessedly valid at law. Gifford, M. R., however, held that the settlement was void against the husband, as a fraud upon his marital rights (c).

It has been supposed that a settlement by a widow upon her children by a former marriage, even if made during the treaty for a second marriage, without the knowledge of her intended husband, is valid, because the object of the settlement, it has been said, is meritorious. Hunt v. Matthews (d), and King v. Cotton (e), have been cited as supporting the proposition; it appears, however, by an extract from the decree in Raithby's edition of Vernon, that the husband, in Hunt v. Matthews, consented to the settlement being made by his intended wife upon her children by a former marriage; and in King v. Cotton, the settlement was made by Lady Cotton upon the children of a former marriage, previous to her entering upon a treaty for a second marriage. And see England v. Downs, supra.

⁽a) See Thomas v. Williams, Mos. 177.

⁽b) 1 Russ. 485.

⁽c) See St. George v. Wake, 1 My. & K. 622, where Lord Brougham says, that the principle was carried further in Goddard v. Snow than in any other

case; see also Downes v. Jennings, 32 B. 290; Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 De G. J. & S. 433; Chambers v. Crabbe, 34 B. 457.

⁽d) 1 Vern. 408.

⁽e) 2 P. W. 674.

The fact that the husband was ignorant that his wife had any property, or that she has practised no actual deception upon him, would not, it seems, be sufficient to prevent the Court from setting aside a settlement made in fraud of the marital right. See Taylor v. Pugh (a), in which case, however, Wigram, V.-C., decided against the husband upon other grounds.

But a gift or settlement, by a woman, of her property, during the treaty for marriage, would not be set aside, if the husband knew of the gift or settlement before the marriage (b), even though the husband be a minor (c).

The seduction by a man of his intended wife might be a reason why the Court should not set aside a settlement made by her before marriage. Thus, in Taylor v. Pugh (d), where a man had induced his intended wife to cohabit with him previously to marriage, Wigram, V.-C., refused to set aside a settlement of her property, although executed without his knowledge, during the treaty for the marriage, because her husband, before the marriage, had put it out of the power of the wife effectually to make any stipulation for the settlement of her property, by his conduct towards her (e).

The concurrence of the husband in making a settlement would preclude him from taking any objections to it; but not, it seems, if he be a minor (f). The case of Slocombe v. Glubb, reported in 2 Bro. Ch. 545, and referred to in the principal case, was, according to Selborne, C., decided against the husband, who had concurred in the settlement while a minor upon the ground "that as he had taken a benefit under the settlement, he could not reject it in part and accept it in part (g).

In a case in 1863, a settlement made by a woman of her personal property after her engagement to be married, was set aside at the suit of the husband, although he was told before the marriage that she had executed a settlement affecting her property, it appearing that neither she nor her husband was

⁽a) 1 Ha. 608.

⁽b) St. George v. Wake, 1 My. &
K. 610; Ashton v. M'Dougall, 5 B.
56; Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De G. & Sm.
472.

⁽c) Slocombe v. Glubb, 2 Bro. Ch. 545; Wrigley v. Swainson, 3 De G. Sm. 458.

⁽d) 1 Ha. 608.

⁽e) But see Downes v. Jennings, 32 B. 290.

⁽f) Nelson v. Stocker, 4 De G. & J. 458.

⁽g) Kingsman v. K., 6 Q. B. D., p. 125

accurately informed of the nature and effect of the trusts of the settlement (a).

If a husband acquiesced in, or confirmed, a settlement, he would

not afterwards be allowed to dispute it (b).

But in *Downes* v. *Jennings* (c), it was held that delay in instituting a suit for two and a half years after the discovery by the husband of the settlement did not operate as a bar.

If a woman gave a security to a volunteer, prior to marriage, without the consent of the intended husband, it might be set aside

by him(d).

But where a woman, about to marry, gave a bond for valuable consideration, although without her intended husband's knowledge, it was held that the husband could not be relieved against it. But concealment of such securities or debts is not to be encouraged (e).

Fraud on Intended Wife.—It has been stated that a conveyance in trust privately made by the husband on the eve of marriage, for the purpose of barring dower, would be decreed fraudulent, as being designed to deprive the wife of the provision given her by the common law (f). But Mr. Vaizey points out that this equity, as regards the husband, rests upon the peculiar right which a man had in his wife's property, and that a wife has no similar equity (g).

For a decree setting aside a settlement as a fraud on marital rights, and declaring the trusts of a new settlement, see Seton

(1901), p. 2344.

(a) Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 4 Gif. 159;1 De G. J. & S. 433.

(b) St. George v. Wake, 1 My. & K. 610; Maber v. Hobbs, 2 Y. & C. Ex. C. 317, 2 B. 535.

(c) 32 B. 290, 523.

(d) Lance v. Norman, 2 Ch. R.

(e) Blanchet v. Foster, 2 Ves. Sen.264 Llewellin v. Cobbold, 1 Sm. & G.

376.

(f) Lex Præt. 267; 1 Bright, H. & W. 356; and see Drury v. D., Wilmot's Opinions, 177; 4 Bro. Ch. 506,

(y) Vaizey, Settlements, vol. ii., p. 1587; and see Swannock v. Lyford, Co. Litt. 108, (n.) 1; Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. W. 700; 1 Bright, H. & W. 357; McKeogh v. M., Ir. R. 4 Eq. 346.

ELIBANK v. MONTOLIEU.

1799, 1801. 5 V. 737; 5 R. R. 151.

Wife's Equity to a Settlement.

Upon the bill of a married woman, entitled to a share of the personal estate as one of the next of kin of the intestate, against her husband and the administrator, the latter claiming to retain towards satisfaction of a debt by bond from the plaintiff's husband to him, it was declared he was not entitled to retain: but that the plaintiff's share was subject to a further provision in favour of her and her children, the settlement on her marriage being inadequate to the fortune she then possessed; and it was referred to the Master to see a proper settlement made on her and her children, regard being had to the extent of her fortune and the settlement already made upon her.

In 1795, Lady Cranstown died intestate, possessed of large personal property, leaving two brothers and two sisters her next of kin. Lewis Montolieu, one of her brothers, took out letters of administration to her.

The bill was filed by Lady Elibank, one of the sisters, against her husband Lord Elibank, and against Montolieu, praying an account of the plaintiff's share, and that it may be settled on her and her family.

The defendant Montolieu, by his answer, claimed to retain Lady Elibank's share towards satisfaction of the debt due to him from Lord Elibank by two bonds—one dated the 31st of May, 1783, for 12,217l. 9s. 9d.; the other, dated the 14th November, 1794, for 1,000l.—upon the ground of the provision made for the plaintiff by the settlement previous to her marriage with the defendant Lord Elibank, in 1776. By that settlement, the sums of 12,000l. and 5,000l. New South Sea Annuities were settled in trust for Lord Elibank for life; and after his decease, for Lady Elibank for life as a jointure, and in lieu of dower or thirds; and after the decease of both, in trust for the children. The sum of 4,000l. New South Sea

Elibank v. Montolieu.

Annuities was settled in trust for her separate use for life; and after her death, for her children; and 2,000*l*. 5*l*. per cent. Bank Annuities for her separate use for life; and after her death, for her children, as she should by will appoint. All these sums were her property before marriage. The settlement also gave her some contingent interests.

In the entail of Lord Elibank's estate, a power was reserved to charge 200l. a year jointure, and 50l. a year to each of his younger children, not exceeding in the whole 200l. a year, under a condition, that the estate should be chargeable with only one jointure at a time; and that, if the power of charging for children had been exercised by a preceding heir in tail, the heir in possession should not charge for his younger children. The defendant Lord Elibank, by his answer, stated that a former Lord Elibank did charge to the full extent of that power.

The Solicitor-General, Mr. Grant, and Mr. Alexander, for the plaintiff.—The plaintiff desires an account of the personal estate of Lady Cranstown, and that a provision may be made for her. defendant Montolieu insists that is not to be done, because he is a creditor of her husband; contending that this case is out of the usual rule upon which the Court acts for a wife; and that there is no necessity to come to this Court, the fortune not being in Court nor * * * But suppose the husband under the control of the Court. could sue at law, this defendant could not make this defence, that he will not pay, but will keep this fund in satisfaction of the husband's debt to him; for it is clear, at law, a creditor of the husband cannot set off the husband's debt against the demand of the husband and wife, and being entitled in her right he must sue with her. Still less should he be permitted to retain in equity upon that ground; for, where he is permitted to avail himself of the legal right, the right must be clear.

The Attorney-General, Mr. Mansfield, and Mr. W. Agar, for the defendant Montolieu.—The objection to the form of the suit would merely occasion delay; and a bill would be filed in their joint names.

There is no case in which the Court has decreed against a trustee who had paid the husband without suit that the wife had an equity to charge the trustee. * * * All the instances are, where the

Elibank v. Montolieu.

person has refused to pay, unless compelled by a Court of equity. That gives the jurisdiction; and none can be produced, where the executor has been prevented from paying to the husband, if he chose to do so; or where, having paid to the husband, he has been charged as upon a breach of duty by reason of that payment, and made to refund.

This case is certainly new, in the circumstance that the husband is debtor to the other defendant; but if he could have paid the husband, and the Court would not have made him refund, there can be no difference from his retaining against the husband. Suppose Lord Elibank had sued, and the equity of the wife, having a very large provision, was out of the question, this Court would never compel the administrator to pay that share to his debtor, unless the latter would allow the debt. This Court goes infinitely beyond Courts of law, as to set-off. It would be strange to permit the wife to intervene against the administrator retaining, where she could not intervene to prevent his paying her husband, and the husband paying his debt out of that. * * * There is no instance of a bill, by the wife against her husband, to have the property settled to her separate use; which is the object of this bill. This property. though subject to the equity of the wife, is the property of the husband.

The Solicitor-General, in reply.—The rule is clear, that, wherever the husband becomes entitled to sue in right of his wife, she must consent that he shall have it, or he is under the necessity of making a settlement, unless the Master is of opinion that the settlement already made by the husband is such as to answer all the purposes of the wife. * * *

LORD CHANCELLOR LOUGHBOROUGH (a).—I wish to consider this case.

Feb. 19th, 1801.

LORD CHANCELLOR LOUGHBOROUGH.—The only difficulty I had in this cause was upon the form of the suit; whether a married woman by her next friend could be the plaintiff in this Court.

(a) Afterwards Earl of Rosslyn.

Elibank v. Montolieu.

With respect to the point made by the answer of Montolieu, that he had a right to retain against the debt of the husband, being possessed of the fund as administrator, and the wife being one of the next of kin, I am very clearly of opinion the defendant had no right to retain. The administrator is trustee for the next of kin: the plaintiff being one of them, if she has any equity against her husband with regard to this money, that equity will clearly bar any right of retainer he can set up to the property of which he became administrator.

With respect to the only difficulty I had upon the point of form, if she is entitled, and there is no way of asserting her right against her husband, except by a bill, that objection, I think, does not weigh much. If the defendant Montolieu had done what would have been the natural thing and the right thing, and what he certainly would have done but for his own interest, he would have been the plaintiff, desiring the Court to dispose of the fund, and for her benefit, to protect her interest in it. Then, upon all the circumstances, it is very clear, if it had come before the Court, it would have been matter of course to have pronounced upon her equity upon the bill of the administrator, praying that the money in his hands might be properly disposed of; and I would not have suffered this money to be paid to Lord Elibank without making a provision for her, for the provision upon her marriage was clearly not adequate to her fortune; and it is clear that provision was made upon the expectation, that, by circumstances to occur in his family, there would be an opportunity to do better for her at a future period. The difficulty was, that it was very unusual in point of form—the bill coming on the part of the wife, instead of the husband.

Declare, that the defendant Montolieu is not entitled to retain, in satisfaction of the debt due from the defendant Lord Elibank to him, but that the distributive share of Lady Cranstown's fortune, accruing to the plaintiff, as one of her next of kin, is subject to a farther provision in favour of the plaintiff and her children, the settlement made upon her marriage being inadequate to the fortune she then possessed. Refer it to the Master to take the accounts, and to see a proper settlement made upon the plaintiff and her children, regard being had to the extent of her fortune and the settlement already made upon her.

MURRAY v. LORD ELIBANK.

1804. 10 V. 84; 7 R. R. 346.

Wife's Equity to a Settlement.

Children have a right to a provision out of the property of their mother, under a decree directing a settlement by the husband on her and her children, notwithstanding her death before the report, but the mother may waive her equity to a settlement, and so defeat the right of the children at any time before the completion of the settlement.

Previously to a bill a trustee for a *feme covert* may pay her personal property, or the rents and profits of her real estate, to her husband; not after bill filed.

Demurrer to the bill of the children was overruled.

The bill was filed by the infant children of Lord Elibank, stating the proceedings in the cause Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, and the decree, directing the Master to approve a proper settlement to be made by the defendant Lord Elibank on the plaintiff, Lady Elibank his wife, and her children by him, regard being had to the extent of her fortune and the settlement already made upon her by Lord Elibank.

The bill farther stated, that before any report Lady Elibank died intestate; and prayed that it may be declared, that the plaintiffs and the defendant Alexander Murray, another child of Lord and Lady Elibank, have, under the decree of the 19th February, 1801, a right to have a provision made for them out of the said one-fourth of the personal estate of Lady Cranstoun: and that it may be referred to the Master to approve of a proper settlement to be made by the defendant Lord Elibank upon the plaintiffs and the defendant Alexander Murray, being all the children; regard being had to the extent of the fortune of Lady Elibank, and the settlement already made by Lord Elibank.

To this bill the defendant Montolieu put in a demurrer.

Mr. Alexander and Mr. Cooke, in support of the bill.— * * *

Here is a decree, establishing this right of the children in the life of the wife, and the settlement is to be considered as made at the date of the decree, and in the nature of an agreement sanctioned by the Court, giving the husband the fortune upon terms. In Martin v. Mitchell, the case before Lord Thurlow in 1779, the Court, after the death of the wife before a settlement, carried the proposal into execution against an assignment to a creditor. They also cited Rowe v. Jackson (a) and Hearle v. Greenbank (b).

Mr. Richards and Mr. W. Agar, in support of the demurrer.—

* * In Macaulay v. Philips (c), it was held, that the decree gave no interest to the husband, but it survived to the wife; and Lord Alvanley says, if she died, notwithstanding his proposal, he would have been entitled. * * *

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—There are two points upon this demurrer; one of form, the other upon the merits. If the wife has this equity for a provision for herself and her children up to the moment of the completion, it is competent to her to give it to her husband. A great variety of proceedings have occurred, in which the Master has stated, that, with reference to the point of settlement, the party had waived it; and I apprehend, it will be found that she may, between the period of the order and her death, waive the benefit of that order (d). The question then is, if between the date of the order and her death, she does not, by some authoritative proceeding, express an alteration of her mind, whether that order is to stand for the benefit of the children. The two decisions that have been mentioned are strong authorities for that. Let an inquiry be made into the circumstances of those cases; and, as to the latter, whether the assignees of the husband were heard or not.

July 30th, 1804.

Mr. Alexander, for the plaintiffs, stated the case of Martin v. Mitchell, from the Register's book, in which the motion before Lord

⁽a) Dick. 604.

⁽d) See Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Madd.

⁽b) 3 Atk. 695.

^{466.}

⁽c) 4 V. 15.

Thurlow, in 1779, was made. In 1777, a decree was made for an account, and that what should be found due to Hannah Fearns should be paid into Court, to her separate account, with the usual direction for a settlement. The sum of 3,000l. was, by the report, stated to be due, and was carried over. After her death, in 1779, the motion referred to in Rowe v. Jackson, to pay that sum to the husband, was made, and refused; and an order was made, directing the husband to go before the Master, and execute the order for a proposal. That proposal was carried into effect, by petition, at the Rolls; and, under another order, in 1803, stating all the proceedings, the children were paid. * *

LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON.—The question is, what is the effect of such an order, as constituting a right in the issue to a provision, if the wife dies without any act done after the date of that order. If this case had been antecedent to the period when the manuscript case to which Mr. Madocks alluded was decided, it would have been very difficult, consistently with what the Court does with the wife's property, to say there was such a right as is now asserted, upon a proceeding that went no farther than an order to lay a proposal before the Master. The husband, where he can, is entitled to lay hold of his wife's property, and this Court will not interfere. Previously to a bill, a trustee, who has the wife's property, real or personal, may pay the rents and profits, and may hand over the personal estate to the husband. Lord Alvanley, in Macaulay v. Philips, has laid down, that, after a bill filed, the trustee cannot exercise his discretion upon that; that the bill makes the Court the trustee, and takes away his right of dealing with the property, as he had it previously. I have heard that otherwise stated in this Court, at the Bar, at least. But that case is the last; and I think contains very wholesome doctrine upon that point. I should have supposed, a decree made in the cause proceeded upon the right or equity in the wife at the filing of the bill; for decrees are only declarations of the Court upon the rights of the parties when they begin to sue. wife is entitled to call for a declaration, that she then had a right to a provision for herself and her children; and yet it is clear, after such a bill filed, she might come into Court and consent to her husband's having the fund entirely under his dominion. If she does not, the

Court, by the decree, orders a proposal to be made for a settlement upon the wife and issue.

It has been truly observed, that this doctrine is a mere creature of the Court, founded altogether in its practice. The case of Macaulay v. Philips proves, what I should have had no doubt upon, that notwithstanding that order for a proposal, if either party died while it rested merely in proposal, that would not affect the right by survivorship as between the husband and wife. There were no children in that case, certainly. It is not unfrequent, where the Master makes his report after a decree, for him to state, that the parties had declined to lay a proposal for a settlement before him. That has occurred since I have sat here; but, when at the Bar, I was frequently concerned in this final arrangement, that, notwithstanding such order by the original decree, upon further directions the wife came consenting that the fund should be taken out of Court, and was permitted to do so. If, therefore, the issue have a right against the father, it is dependent altogether upon the will of the mother. There is, perhaps, some difficulty in making all the principles of the Court upon this subject consistent with the notion of such right in the children; but it is not for me to reconcile all these principles, if there is practice sufficient to establish a given course as to that. In Rowe v. Jackson (and I can, from my own memory, confirm both accounts of that case), upon an application, where it was necessary to consider whether, the wife never having expressed any change of opinion between the period of the order for a proposal and her death, that order gave the children any right, Mr. Madocks stated, that it was not according to the practice, after that order, to permit the husband to avail himself of the death of the wife to take the fund, leaving the children unprovided. His authority, always considerable, is in that instance peculiarly to be regarded, as he referred to another case, in which Lord Thurlow was satisfied that such was the rule, and acted upon it. But it does not rest there; for in a subsequent case it is clear from the Register's books that Mr. Mansfield, after the death of the wife, moved that a sum of money should be paid to the husband; and Lord Thurlow refused that application, upon the ground that the order for a proposal on behalf of the children was an obstacle. That was followed by what Lord Alvanley did upon a petition; whether regularly or not, will not shake the doctrine, considering what had

been done before. In that instance, Lord Alvanley would not deliver out that small sum, little more than 300l., until satisfied that there was some provision for the children.

Taking all this together, however numerous the difficulties upon it, it is too much for me to say, upon the argument of a demurrer, all that has been done in the cases referred to, is to go for nothing, because it is difficult to say, ab ante, it should be done, and that I am to set up a different course of practice. I agree also with Mr. Alexander, as to the dictum of Lord Alvanley in Macaulay v. Philips, which construction is necessary to make him consistent; and attention being given to the circumstance that there were no children, there is no inconsistency in that case. The principle must be, that the wife obtained a judgment for the children, liable to be waived, if she thought proper; otherwise, to be left standing for their benefit at her death.

Next, as to the form: if the children have acquired a right by the judgment in the former suit, it is subsequent to the institution of the proceeding in that suit; and unless they can apply by petition, under the liberty to apply, I do not see how they can, except by supplemental bill.

The demurrer, therefore, ought to be overruled. If, upon the hearing of the cause, this should turn out to be wrong, it is infinitely better that it should go to the House of Lords upon a full hearing.

Demurrer overruled.

Subsequently in 1809, this cause came for hearing before *Grant*, M. R., and the plaintiffs were held clearly entitled. The case is reported in 13 V. p. 1, and 14 V. p. 496.

WIFE'S EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT.

Murray v. Lord Elibank.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Duty of trustees, p. 661.
- 3. Property subject to the equity, p. 661.
- 4. Rights of children, p. 666.
- 5. As to the amount to be settled, p. 668.
- 6. As to the settlement, p. 670.
- 7. Waiver of settlement, p. 674.
- 8. Where the equity is barred or does not arise, p. 678
- 9. Against whom the equity is binding, p. 681.

1. Generally.

From a very early period the Court of Chancery recognised in certain cases a wife's equity to a settlement out of property which the husband was entitled to receive "jure mariti." This equity is now superseded to a great extent by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, which excludes the husband's rights where the marriage took place after 31st Dec., 1882. It is only applicable now in cases in which the marriage happened before 1883 (a) and the property accrued before that date (b).

By common law, on marriage, the husband became entitled to receive the rents of the wife's real estates during their joint lives, and he became absolutely entitled to all her chattels personal in possession, and to her choses in action, as debts by obligation, contract, or otherwise, if he reduced them into possession; or, if he did not, as administrator of his wife, if he survived her; and he became also entitled to her chattels real, with full power to alien them, though if he died before his wife, without having reduced into possession her choses in action, or without having aliened her chattels real, they would survive to the wife (c).

The jurisdiction to compel the husband, or those claiming under him, to make a settlement upon the wife, was first assumed where it was necessary for the husband to apply to the Court, as in cases in which a trustee declined to pay, &c., the wife's possessory interest

Bacon, (1907) 1 Ch. 475.

⁽a) Vaizey, Settlements, p. 271; Lewin (1904), p. 943; Seton (1901), p. 949.

⁽b) See Reid v. R., 31 C. D. 402; Re

⁽c) See Langham v. Nenny, 3 V.,p. 469; Fleet v. Perrins, L. R. 4Q. B. 500.

to the husband, and the Court, acting upon the maxim, that he who seeks equity must do equity, withheld its aid until an adequate settlement was made upon the wife (a).

But since the decision of Elibank v. Montolieu, the wife has been permitted actively to assert her equity as a plaintiff in a suit (b); or if there be already an existing suit, by petition therein (c) at any time before the husband has actually reduced his wife's equitable property into possession (d).

The right is an obligation which the Court fastens not on the property, but upon the right to receive it (e).

Judicature Act, 1873.—The Supreme Court "is now not a Court of law or a Court of equity, but a Court of complete jurisdiction, and if there is any variance between what a Court of law and a Court of equity would have done, the rule of the Court of equity must now prevail," per Earl Cairns in Pugh v. Heath(f), and all the Courts are to recognise and take notice of all equities (g). But the distinction between legal and equitable interests is not abolished (h). The question may therefore arise whether a woman is entitled to claim an equity to a settlement out of a legal chose in action (i), and it seems it would be answered in the affirmative (k). As the equity first arose upon the husband's coming to a Court of equity for assistance, which the Court withheld until a provision for the wife was secured (1), it would seem that the Supreme Court will now, as the equitable rule is to prevail, recognise and give effect to this equity whether the subject-matter of the action be legal or equitable. As to the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy, that Court is now part of the Supreme Court (m). As to its former jurisdiction with regard to this equity, see Ex p. Norton(n) and Ex p. Coysegame(o).

- (a) Bosvil v. Brander, 1 P. W. 459; and see Story (1892), p. 957; Lewin (1904), p. 930; Seton (1901), p. 949; Vaizey, Settlements, p. 271.
- (b) Duncombe v. Greenacre, 28 B. 472; Re Briant, infra.
- (c) Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62; Scott v. Spashett, 3 Mac. & G. 599.
- (d) And see Newenham v. Pemberton, 1 De G. & Sm. 644, and the remarks thereon in Re Potter, 7 Eq. 487; and Re Briant, 39 C. D. p. 476; Re Howard, 13 R. 233, following Re Briant, supra.

- (e) Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Ha. 432.
- (f) 7 A. C., p. 237; Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 11.
 - (g) Ibid., s. 24, sub-ss. 1, 2, 4 and 11.
- (h) Joseph v. Lyons, 15 Q. B. D. 280.
 - (i) See Ruffles v. Alston, 19 Eq. 539.
- (k) Per North, J., Fowke v. Dray-cott, 29 C. D., p. 1003, infra, p. 662.
 - (l) Ward v. W., 14 C. D. 508.
 - (m) Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 93,
 - (n) 8 De G. M. & G. 258.
 - (o) 1 Atk. 192.

2. Duty of Trustees.

A trustee is always justified in refusing to pay over, even at her request, the wife's fund to the husband, thereby enabling him to reduce it into possession; and in thus insisting on affording her an opportunity of asserting her equity to a settlement (a). Where a trustee has reason to believe that the husband and wife have agreed to settle a sum of money in his hands, and especially if the wife does not distinctly express a wish that a payment is to be made to her husband, he would be justified in paying the money into Court (b).

Where a trustee paid into Court, under the Trustee Relief Act, a fund to which a married woman was absolutely entitled, he was held entitled to his costs as between solicitor and client (c). And probably unless his conduct has been capricious or vexatious he would now generally get his costs in cases where the equity might be claimed (d).

The trustee may join in a settlement of the wife's funds, and, with the consent of the husband, he may transfer them to the trustees of an existing settlement, and such a settlement will be as valid as if directed to be made by the Court (e). As to the liability of trustees for acts after action commenced, see infra, p. 678.

3. Property subject to the Equity.

The wife's equity includes all unsettled property to which she is entitled, whether vested in her in interest before or after marriage (f), and she has the same equity out of property in which she has a life interest, as out of that in which she has an absolute interest (g).

Where the property of the wife is equitable (or legal?) (h) the husband or his assignees will only obtain it upon the terms of making a settlement upon the wife and her children, if she require one to be made (i). Where an equitable estate in fee descended on a married woman, the Court, by virtue of her equity to a settlement, has settled

- (a) Re Swan, 2 Hem. & M. 34; Elibank v. Montolieu, supra.
- (b) Re Bendyshe, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 727. See the Trustee Act, 1893, s. 42.
- (c) Re Swan, supra, not followed in Re Roberts, W. N. (69) 88; 17 W. R. 639.
- (d) See Daniell's Chancery Practice (1901), p. 1808.
 - (e) Montefiore v. Behrens, 1 Eq.
- 171; Re Roberts' T., 38 L. J. Ch. 708. (f) Williams, Exors; (1905) 1156,
- (n).
- (g) Taunton v. Morris, 11 C. D. 779.
- (h) See now (n.) "Judicature Act, &c.," supra, p. 660, and Fowke v. Draycott, infra, p. 662.
- (i) Milner v. Colmer, 2 P. W. 639; Elibank v. Montolieu, supra.

the estate on her during her life, but has refused to interfere with the possible estate by curtesy of the husband (a).

And even before the Judicature Act where the property, though in its nature legal, became, from collateral circumstances, the subject of a suit in equity, apparently the wife's equity to a settlement would have attached (b).

In Fowke v. Draycott (c) F., a woman married in 1858, who was entitled to a share in an estate in fee, in 1882 conveyed this estate, under the 91st section of the Fines and Recoveries Act, to A. in fee, her husband not joining. In 1883 her husband, F., commenced an action against A., his wife, and others claiming to be entitled to the rents and profits of her share. North, J., held his common law right to the rents during the coverture was not affected by his wife's alienation, but that she asserting her equity, he was bound, whether the estate was legal or equitable (d), to provide for her out of the rents, and the whole were settled upon her.

Whatever may be the right of a married woman to have a provision made for her out of the income of an estate of which she is equitable tenant in tail, it is not according to the course of the Court, or indeed in its power, to order a settlement to be made of the estate or land to be purchased with money of which the married woman is equitable tenant in tail. For it is clear that the equity to a settlement attaches upon what the husband takes in right of the wife (e), and not upon what the wife takes in her own right, and the estate tail being in the wife, the Court has no power to order a settlement of it to be made, or to render such a settlement, if made, binding and effectual against the wife (f). Where copyhold property descended in fee upon a married woman, subject to a covenant entered into by a former owner upon his marriage to surrender it to certain uses, under which, had the surrender been made, the married woman would have been legal tenant in tail, it was held that she had no equity to a settlement out of property so circumstanced (g).

- (a) Smith v. Matthews, 3 De G. F. & J. 139.
- (b) Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 My. & C. 97; as to which see the remarks of Westbury, C., in Gleaves v. Paine, 1 De G. J. & S. 87; Bonfield v. Hassell, 32 B. 217; Barnes v. Robinson, 11 W. R. 276; cf. Re Briant, 39 C. D. p. 476; Re Howard, 13 R. 233, following Re Briant, supra.
- (c) 29 C. D. 996, 1003.
- (d) See (n.) "Judicature Act, 1873," supra, p. 660.
- (e) See Ward v. W., 14 C. D. 507; (n.) "Tenancy by entireties," infra, p. 680.
- (f) Life Association, &c. v. Siddal, 3 De G. F. & J. 271, 276.
- (y) Re Cumming, 2 De G. F. & J. 376.

And it is clear that she has no equity to a settlement as against the assignees for value of her husband's interest in land of which she is seised for an estate of inheritance in fee (a). Where, however, a sum of money, being rent of real estate (not, as it seems, equitable) to which a husband was entitled jure mariti, was paid into Court by an agent, Shadwell, V.-C., upon the authority of Sturgis v. Champneys (b), held that the assignee of the husband (who was insolvent) was not entitled to it, without a settlement upon the wife (c).

A wife will also be entitled to a settlement out of her trust term in land, not only as against her husband, but also against his assignee for valuable consideration. Thus, in Hanson v. Keating (d), where a husband and wife assigned, by way of mortgage, the equitable interest of the husband in right of his wife in a term of years, the mortgagee filed his bill against the husband and wife, and the trustee of the legal estate, for a foreclosure and assignment of the term; it was held by Wigram, V.-C., upon the authority of Sturgis v. Champneys (e), contrary to his own opinion, that the wife was entitled to a provision for her life, by way of settlement, out of the mortgaged premises.

The estate of a feme covert tenant in tail in possession, subject to a term to secure a jointure, has been held to be equitable during the continuance of the term, for the purpose of entitling her to a settlement on a bill filed by her (f).

As against Mortgagees and Assignees (see also Note 7).—Although the Court might allow the wife the income of her property, it by no means follows, when the property out of which she claims a settlement is in the hands of a mortgagee, that he will be allowed by the Court, as against the assignees of the husband, what he may have paid to the wife, out of the income of the property. Thus in Clark v. Cook (g), a husband and wife, by deed acknowledged, demised freeholds of the wife to a mortgagee by way of trust, the trusts being to apply the rents and profits in payment of certain premiums of insurance, and of the interest on the mortgage debt, and then in reduction of the principal, until it should be paid off. The husband

(b) Supra, p. 662 (b).

supra.

(d) 4 Ha. 1.

(e) Supra, p. 662 (b).

(f) See Wortham v. Pemberton, 1 De G. & Sm. 644, and (n.) "Judicature Act, 1873," supra, p. 660.

(g) 3 De G. & Sm. 333.

⁽a) Durham v. Crackles, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 1174; Life Association, &c. v. Siddal, supra; Newenham v. Pemberton, 17 L. J. Ch. 991.

⁽c) Freeman v. Fairlie, 11 Jur. 447; and see Life Association, &c. v. Siddal,

took the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors Act. It was held by Knight-Bruce, V.-C., in a suit for redemption, instituted by the assignee of the husband against the mortgagee, that the latter was chargeable with the surplus rents which he allowed to the insolvent's wife for her maintenance. "I cannot help suspecting," said his Honour, "that the wife might have had all that has been paid to her if a proper application had been made to the Court. It is a hard and peculiar case, and there must be no costs on either side."

Where, however, a person entitled, jure mariti, to the legal interest in leaseholds, mortgages them, the wife has no equity to a settlement thereout, as against the mortgagee seeking foreclosure or sale (a), but if the proviso for redemption in such a case is on the repayment by the husband (who has become insolvent), and his wife, of the sum advanced, the power to redeem must be given to her as well as the insolvent assignee (b).

A wife is entitled to a settlement out of a life interest in (equitable) property to which her husband is entitled in her right, as against his assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency, for the general assignee of the husband is in exactly the same position as the husband himself, and as against him there can be no distinction between corpus and income, see $Taunton \ v. \ Morris (c)$, where the C. A. gave the whole income to the assignee (d). The wife is also entitled to a settlement or maintenance out of her (equitable (e)) life interest, when she is deserted by her husband (f). But she is not entitled to a settlement out of a life interest when she is living with and is maintained by her husband, who is neither bankrupt nor insolvent (g). Nor to a settlement out of property in which she has an (equitable) life interest, as against a person to whom her husband has assigned it for value previous to his insolvency

- (a) Hatchell v. Eggleso, 1 Ir. Ch.
- (b) Hill v. Edmonds, 5 De G. & Sm. 603; Durham v. Crackles, 11 W. R. 138.
- (c) 11 C. D. 780. See infra? (n.) "Life interest of wife," p. 680.
- (d) And see Lamb v Milnes, 5 V. 517; Brown v. Clark, 3 V. 166; Jacobs v. Amyatt, 1 Madd. 376 (n.); Squires v. Ashford, 23 B. 132; Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 My. & C. 97; Koeber v.
- Sturgis, 22 B. 588; Barnes v. Robinson, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 245; Wace, Bankruptcy (1904), p. 213.
- (e) See (n.) "Judicature Act, 1873," supra, p. 660.
- (f) Gilchrist v. Cator, 1 De G. & Sm. 188, p. 150, and cases cited p. 669, infra.
- (g) Vaughan v. Buck, 13 Si. 404, sed vide Wilkinson v. Charlesworth, Marsack v. Lyster, 10 B. 324.

or his desertion of her (a): Secus, if her interest is absolute (b). In Tidd v. Lister (c), it was held by Turner, V.-C., after a very careful examination of the authorities, that a married woman whose husband did not maintain her, was not entitled, as against a particular assignee of the husband, to a settlement, or maintenance out of the income of the real and personal estate to which she was entitled in equity for her life, and his decision was on appeal reluctantly affirmed by Cranworth, C. (d). Even in the case of the wife's estate of inheritance, the husband's assignment by way of mortgage has prevailed to the extent of his life interest (e). And the husband's assignment for value, when maintaining his wife, of income to which he becomes entitled in her right, will be effectual to deprive her of her equity to a settlement as against the assignee for value, though the interest of the wife at the time of the assignment was reversionary (f). A wife is entitled to a settlement out of property to which she becomes entitled before, as well as out of what she becomes entitled to after marriage (g).

Reversionary property.—The Court, however, cannot order a settlement to be made of the reversionary personal property of a married woman. The reason for this is, that the right to the settlement is an obligation which the Court fastens, not upon the property, but upon the right to receive it, and if the right attaches at all, it must attach with all its incidents, one of which is, that the wife waiving it, must waive it (see Note 7) by her consent in Court, which she cannot do in the case of reversionary personal property (h); the question as to whether a wife is entitled to a settlement can only be decided when the reversionary property falls into possession (i).

(a) Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149; but see Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 My. & C. 37, the assignment could not be operative apart from Malins' Act beyond the joint lives of the husband and wife; and cf. Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175 (where the wife's life interest was determinable on the husband's death); Harley v. H., 10 Ha. 325; Re Godfrey's Trusts, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 531; Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175.

(b) Scott v. Spashett, 3 Mac. & G. 589.

(c) 10 Ha. 140.

- (d) 3 De G. M. & G. 857, 870; see also Durham v. Crackles, 11 W. R. 138; Re Duffy's T., 28 B. 386; but see Taunton v. Morris, 11 C. D. 780; Re Dixon's T., 48 L. J. Ch. 592.
- (e) Durham v. Crackles, 11 W. R. 138.

(f)*Life Association, &c. v. Siddal, 3 De G. F. & J. 271; Re Carr's T., 12 Eq. 609.

- (g) Barrow v. B., 18 B. 529.
- (h) Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Ha. 432, 434.
 - (i) Ibid., and see Taylor v. Austen,

4. Rights of Children.

When a woman insists upon her equity to a settlement, out of property to which she is absolutely entitled, and not out of a mere *life* interest, it will always be extended to her children, although she has no children at the time, and a reference will be directed to ascertain what is a proper settlement to be made upon her and her children (a); and the children of a former marriage were provided for (b).

The equity is strictly personal to the wife. If she dies before asserting her right, her children cannot insist upon a settlement (c). For all the cases concur in showing that children have no right to a settlement "independent of contract or decree" (d).

The wife, therefore, may, at any time before the settlement is actually completed, waive her right to it, and thus defeat the interests of her children (e); but when she has entered into a contract, or has obtained a decree for a settlement, the interests of the children will not be defeated if she die without waiving it. Thus in Lloyd v. Williams (f), the wife of a bankrupt being entitled to a legacy, she claimed her right to a settlement out of it, and an agreement was thereupon entered into between the assignees and the executor, whereby, in consideration of a sum to be paid to the assignees, a settlement was to be made upon the wife and her children. The bankrupt obtained his certificate in the lifetime of his wife, who died before any settlement was made in pursuance of the agreement, leaving an only daughter. Plumer, V.-C., held, that the death of the mother did not disappoint the claim of the But if no mention is made of the children of the marriage, the omission, if it has been long acquiesced in, will not be supplied (h). But where the steps taken in a suit are such as to bind the husband to allow a settlement, the children after the death

- 1 Dr. 459, 464; but see now Malins' Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57); Roberts v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch. 335; and the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 5.
- (a) Johnson v. J., 1 J. & W. 472; Re Grant, 14 W. R. 191.
- (b) Conington v. Gilliat, 25 W. R. 69.
 - (c) Scriven v. Tapley, 2 Eden, 337.
 - (d) Per Plumer, V.-C., in Lloyd v.

Williams, 1 Madd. 467; and see Roberts v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch. 348.

- (e) Hodgens v. H., 11 Bli. (N. S.) 104; Murray v. Elibank, supra.
 - (f) 1 Madd. 450.
- (y) See Elibank v. Montolieu, and Murray v. Elibank, supra; and see Rowe v. Jackson, Dick. 604; Groves v. Perkins, 6 Si. 584.
 - (h) Johnson v. J., 1 J. & W. 479.

of the mother may insist upon one, although she may not have been bound like her husband. Thus in Lloyd v. Mason (a) a married woman entitled to a legacy appeared by her counsel at the hearing of the cause, and claimed her equity to a settlement out of the fund. The legacy was directed to be carried to the separate account of the husband and wife. The husband was a bankrupt, and his assignee sold his interest in the legacy. The solicitors for the purchaser, and for the wife, agreed to refer the claim of the wife to their counsel; and the counsel determined that she was entitled to a settlement of a moiety, subject to the costs. Before any further steps were taken, the wife died, leaving children. It was held by Wigram, V.-C., that the husband, and those claiming under him, were, by the steps which had been taken, bound to allow a settlement of part of the fund upon the wife and children; and that, upon the death of the wife, the children were entitled to the portion which would have been settled.

But it has been decided that if a married woman died without having obtained a decree for a settlement, her children, even although she may have filed her bill claiming a settlement, would have no right to file a supplemental bill to enforce one (b).

The right of the children has, moreover, been defeated by the divorce of the mother after she had been declared on petition entitled to a settlement out of her fund in Court to the separate account of herself and her husband, and she was held to be entitled to payment of the fund as a feme sole (c).

Waiver.—(See Note 7, infra, p. 674.) Although the husband, in the event of his wife's death, is bound by a contract or decree for a settlement, yet the wife can, at any time before it is actually made, waive her equity to a settlement (d).

But if the wife, upon the bankruptcy of her husband, established her equity to a settlement, as against the assignees, she will not be allowed afterwards to waive it in favour of her husband, so as to defeat the rights of her children, though she might do so in favour of the assignees (e).

- (a) 5 Ha. 149.
- (b) Wallace v. Auldjo, 1 De G. J. & S. 643; and see De la Garde v. Lempriere, 6 B. 344; Baker v. Bayldon, 8 Ha. 210, overruling Steinmetz v. Halthin, 1 G. & J. 64.
 - (c) Heath v. Lewis, 13 W. R. 129.
- (d) Fenner v. Taylor, 2 Russ. & M. 190; Baldwin v. B., 5 De G. & Sm. 319; Lovett v. L., John. 118; Druitt v. Willens, 23 L. R. Ir. 436.
- (e) Barker v. Lea, 6 Madd. 330; Whittem v. Sawyer, 1 B. 593.

5. As to the Amount to be Settled.

In the absence of special circumstances, one-half will be settled (a). But "there is no doubt that the rule of the Court . . . was in former times supposed to be, that the fund should be equally divided between the wife and children on the one hand, and the husband on the other. It is equally clear that in modern times that rule has been considerably relaxed, and that as regards the shares in which the fund should be divided, considerable latitude has been assumed by the Court . . . so as to admit of the discretion of the Court being exercised in each individual case" (b). And the discretion will not be interfered with except some facts have been excluded, or some principle violated (c).

Settlement of whole.—The Court will not settle the whole fund unless (1) the husband is insolvent or unable to support the wife, or (2) has been guilty of gross misconduct (d). The whole fund or income has been settled in the following cases:—

In cases of insolvency or inability to maintain.—Where the husband had taken the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors Act; when the husband has become bankrupt (e) and has already received a considerable fortune from his wife (f); or where he is insolvent and has made no settlement on her (g), even as against a purchaser for value from the assignees of the husband (h); or as against his own assignee for value (i); except in the case of a particular assignee for value of a life interest of the wife (k), or of the accumulated arrears of past income of her real or personal property (l). There will also be a stronger disposition to settle the whole fund upon the wife when

- (a) Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch.,p. 522; L. R. 4 Ch. 407.
- (b) Per Cairns, L. J., Re Suggitt's Trusts, L. R. 3 Ch. 215, 217; Taunton v. Morris, 11 C. D. 779; Roberts v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch. 339.
- (c) Per Bowen, L. J., Roberts v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch., p. 345.
- (d) Re Suggitt's Trusts, supra; Reid v. R., 33 C. D. 220.
- (e) Brett v. Greenwell, 3 Y. & C., Ex. C. 230.
- (f) Gardner v. Marshall, 14 Si. 575; Re Merryman's T., 10 W R. 334; Smith v. S., 3 Gif. 121, 263, (1895)

- W. N. 4; Re Howard, 13 R. 233, following Re Briant, 39 C. D. 471.
- (g) Taunton v. Morris, 11 C. D.
 779; Francis v. Brooking, 19 B. 347;
 Scott v. Spashett, 3 Mac. & G. 599;
 Re Cordwell's Estate, 20 Eq. 644.
 - (h) Ibid.
- (i) Marshall v. Fowler, 16 B. 249; Re Welchman, 1 Gif. 31; Duncombe v. Greenacre, 29 B. 578; Scott v. Spashett, supra.
- (k) Tidd v. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 857; see note (c), supra, p. 665.
- (l) Newman v. Wilson, 31 B. 34; Re Carr's T., 12 Eq. 609.

it is small and barely sufficient for a provision for the wife and children (a).

By a decree of judicial separation, the wife's choses in action not reduced into possession at the date of the decree become, under the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act (b), her absolute property as if she were a feme sole. Where, therefore, a wife instituted a suit to enforce her equity to a settlement of a trust fund, and while the suit was pending she obtained a decree of judicial separation from her husband on the ground of cruelty, Romilly, M. R., ordered the fund to be paid to her, and refused the husband his costs (c). Although the circumstances of the husband and wife may be such as would justify the Court, as between them, in settling the whole fund, yet the conduct of the wife may have been such, as regards an intended assignee of the fund, as to make the Court hesitate as to whether, against such assignee, she should have anything settled (d).

In cases of misconduct on part of the Husband.—Adultery of husband (e); where he has deserted or behaved cruelly to his wife, and does not afford her the means of support (f); living apart from wife, without contribution, the amount being too small to divide (g); disregarding order for restitution of conjugal rights, and refusing to live with wife (h).

Other Proportions.—Three-fourths were settled in the following cases: Desertion and insufficient provision (i); negotiations between parties whereby assignees have been put to great expense (k); two-thirds where the husband was bankrupt, but contributed earnings (l).

- (a) Re Kincaid's T., 16 Jur. 106; 1
 Drew. 326; Re Hooper's T., 6 W. R.
 824. See judgment of Kay, L. J.,
 Roberts v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch.,
 p. 346; but see judgment of Cairns,
 L. J., in Re Suggitt's Trusts, supra.
 - (b) 20 & 21 Viet. c. 85, s. 25.
- (c) Johnson v. Lander, 7 Eq. 228; Re Coward, &c., 20 Eq. 179.
- (d) See judgment of Kay, L. J., in Roberts v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch. p. 346.
- (e) Barrow v. B., 5 De G. M. & G. 782.
- (f) Dunkley v. D., 2 De G. M. & G. 390; Re Cutler, 14 B. 220; Gilchrist v. Cator, 1 De G. & Sm. 188; Gent v. Harris, 10 Ha. 383; Layton

- v. L., 1 Sm. & G. 179; Re Disney, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 206; Koeber v. Sturgis, 22 B. 588; Re Ford, 32 B. 621; Boxall v. B., 27 C. D. 220.
- (g) Fowke v. Draycott, 29 C. D., p. 1003.
 - (h) Reid v. R., 33 C. D. 220.
 - (i) Coster v. C., 9 Si. 597.
- (k) Walker v. Drury, 17 B. 482;
 Vaughan v. Buck, 1 Si. (N. S.) 284;
 Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 520,
 L. R. 4 Ch. 407; Re Briant, 39 C. D. 471 (5007. out of about 7001.)
- (l) Re Suggitt's Trusts, L. R. 3 Ch. 215; Re Callow's T., 55 L. T. 154; see also Walsh v. Wason, L. R. 8 Ch. 482; Seton (1901), p. 954.

6. As to the Settlement.

A wife is as much entitled to a settlement out of a small fund as out of a large one, although it be so small that her consent might not be required for payment to the husband by reason of its smallness (a). In the absence of special circumstances, the income of a personal fund will be given to the wife to her separate use for life, without power of anticipation (b), and subject thereto upon trust for the children. whether by present or future husband, or any one or more of them. in such shares if more than one, and in such manner as the wife and husband shall during their joint lives by deed, with or without power of revocation, jointly appoint, and in default of such appointment, &c., then as the wife, if she survive her husband, shall appoint, and in default of appointment and so far, &c., then to her children of the present or any future marriage, who being sons shall attain twentyone, or being daughters shall attain that age or marry (c); and if there should be no such children, then, in the absence of special circumstances, the Court will not defeat the legal right of the husband but give the fund to him whether he survives his wife or not (d), or, his particular assignee for value (e), or general assignees (f), absolutely (q). There will also in general be inserted the usual powers of maintenance, accumulation and advancement (h), except where the fund is under the control of the Court, when they are unnecessary (i).

Where the husband assents to the whole of the fund belonging to the wife being settled, in the absence of special circumstances, such

- (a) Re Cutler, 14 B. 220; Re Kincaid's T., 1 Drew. 326. See (n.) "Small Fund," p. 672.
- (b) Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 4 Ch. 407.
- (c) See Beales v. Brown, Seton (1901), F. 9, p. 943; Re Briant, 39 C. D., p. 482, where the power to appoint was limited to the wife by will; Croxton v. May, 9 Eq. 408, 409; Gent v. Harris, 10 Ha. 383, 384; Re Gowan, 17 C. D. 778.
- (d) Walsh v. Wason, L. R. 8 Ch. 482, and cases there cited; and see the decree, Seton (1901) F. 8, p. 941.
- (e) Carter v. Taggart, 1 De G. M. & G. 286; and see Form of Order,

- 5 De G. & Sm. 55; Re Tubb's E., 8 W. R. 270; Ward v. Yates, 1 Dr. & Sm. 80.
- (f) Ex p. Pugh, 1 Dr. 202; Gent v. Harris, 10 Ha. 383, 384.
- (g) Spirett v. Willows, supra; and see the form in Walsh v. Wason, supra, where the trust in default of children becoming entitled is for the incumbrancers of the husband according to their priorities and subject thereto, in trust for the husband; cf. Re Howard, (1895) W. N. 4, 13 R. 233, following Re Briant, 39 C. D. 471.
 - (h) Croxton v. May, 9 Eq. 404.
- (i) Smithers v. Green, Seton (1901), FF. 8 and 11, pp. 941, 945.

as bankruptcy, misconduct, or desertion on the part of the husband, the proper form of settlement in such a case is to the wife for her separate use without power of anticipation for life, remainder to the husband during his life, or until he becomes bankrupt or attempts to alien or incumber, remainder to such of the children of the wife by her present or future husband as being sons shall attain twenty-one, or being daughters shall attain that age or marry with consent of guardians, if more children than one as tenants in common, and in default of children attaining a vested interest, in trust for the husband absolutely (a).

Where the wife's real property had been mortgaged by herself and her husband, in a suit by the wife for a settlement of the equity of redemption, and for redemption as against the mortgagee and foreclosure against her husband and his assignees who had disclaimed; the decree made was, "that upon the plaintiff redeeming the mortgaged premises, the same be settled (the defendant W., the husband, by his counsel consenting) upon trust for the plaintiff for her separate use during her life, with remainder to her children as she shall by deed duly executed, or by her last will appoint, and in default of appointment in trust for her children equally; and in case the plaintiff shall die without leaving any children, then in trust for the plaintiff and her heirs absolutely (such settlement or re-conveyance to be approved by the judge); but in default of the plaintiff redeeming the mortgaged premises as aforesaid, let the plaintiff's bill be dismissed as against P. (the mortgagee) with costs, to be taxed, &c., and paid by B. the next friend of the plaintiff" (b).

Where an intestate's equitable estate in fee had descended on a married woman, there was a declaration that it ought to be settled in trust for her during her life for her separate use free from anticipation—as to a business then being carried on, with remainder to her children; as to the freehold house and farm during her life only (so as not to interfere with her husband's possible tenancy by the curtesy) with a direction that all proper and necessary deeds and instruments for the purpose of carrying into effect the above declaration and decree should be settled by the judge; the costs of all parties of and incident to the preparation, approval and execution thereof to be raised and paid out of the property to be comprised therein (c).

⁽a) Smithers v. Green, Seton (1901), S. 87, 98; Seton (1901), p. 921. F. 11, p. 945. (c) Smith v. Matthews, 3 De G. F. &

⁽b) Gleaves v. Paine, 1 De G. J. & J. 139; Seton (1901), p. 949.

In Roberts v. Cooper (a) a husband and wife in very poor circumstances had assigned two reversionary interests of the wife to a purchaser for 170l., the deed being acknowledged by the wife; as a matter of fact the interests were not within Malins' Act and the assignment was ineffectual in law. One interest, 500l., was paid into Court and carried to a separate account. The assignees applied for payment to them, the wife set up her equity. It appeared that the other interest, value about 500l., had been received by the husband and wife, and that the wife had received benefit from the purchase money. The C. A., with the assignces' consent, settled a moiety, and settled it in such a manner that the wife should receive yearly a sum out of income and capital, and that in default of children the fund should go to the assignee (b).

Where there is a fund in Court, to a share of which a married woman is entitled in actual possession, the Court in an action by her may order a settlement in favour of her or her children although the fund is not distributable until further consideration, and although her share has not been ascertained (c).

Small Fund.—In order to avoid the expense of a settlement where the fund is small, it will be ordered to be brought into Court (d), if not there already, and the Court will direct the dividends to be paid to the wife for her separate use for life, and either declare the trusts after her death (e), or give liberty to the persons entitled at her death to apply (f).

Refusal to execute Settlement.—If a person ordered by the Court to execute an instrument neglects or refuses to do so the Court can nominate a person to execute it (g).

Post-nuptial Settlement.—It is clear that where the Court directs a settlement to be made upon the wife, "the Court will support it as a good settlement, for valuable consideration" (h); and if after

- (a) (1891) 2 Ch. 335.
- (b) Seton (1901), F. 12, p. 947; and see Boxall v. B., 27 C. D. 220.
- (c) Re Robinson's S. E., 12 C. D. 188.
- (d) Bagshaw v. Winter, 5 De G. & Sm. 468.
- (e) Ibid.; and see Guy v. Pearkes, 18 V. 195, a case of desertion referred to in Re Suggitt's Trusts, L. R. 3 Ch., p. 219; Re Ford, 32 B. 621; Watson v. Marshall, 17 B. 363; Walker v.
- Drury, 17 B. 484; Wright v. King, 18 B. 461.
- (f) Re Cutler, 14 B. 220, 222; and see Smithers v. Green, Seton (1901), p. 946. And see the case of a lunatic husband not so found, Steed v. Calley, 2 My. & K. 52.
- (g) See Judicature Act, 1884, s. 14; Seton (1901), F. 2, p. 429.
- (h) See Wheeler v. Caryl, Amb. 121; Simson v. Jones, 2 Russ. & M. 365.

marriage, the wife being entitled to a portion which the husband cannot touch without the aid of the Court, and the trustees will not pay it without a settlement, if the husband does agree to it, and do that which the Court would decree, it is a good settlement as against his creditors (a). So a legacy due to a married woman may, with the consent of her husband, be paid to the trustees of a settlement already in existence, upon trusts under which the life interest of the husband is determinable on alienation or incumbrance thereof (b).

Even if trustees in possession of the property of a married woman should, on the mere request of her husband, transfer it to new trustees upon trust for her separate use, such trust will be good as against his creditors (c). But if the husband has once reduced into possession the equitable choses in action of his wife, any subsequent settlement of them would not be valid as against his creditors (d).

In Re Holland (e), by a post-nuptial settlement dated in 1873, to which the testamentary guardians of the wife, then an infant, were parties, after a recital that previously to the marriage the husband agreed to make such settlement of his wife's fortune as was thereinafter contained, it was witnessed that the husband, being entitled in right of his wife to a reversionary interest in personalty, subject to the contingency of his predeceasing her without reducing it into possession, covenanted that on the fund falling into possession he and his wife would assign it to the trustees on the usual trusts for the wife, husband and issue of the marriage, the husband's interest being determinable on bankruptcy. The husband was not indebted at the time, nor was he contemplating embarking in trade. In 1877 the wife died. In 1898 the husband was adjudicated bankrupt. In 1899 the fund fell into possession. There was issue of the marriage. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the settlement was good against the trustee in bankruptcy, on the grounds (1) that there was no evidence of its having been made with intent to defeat creditors so as to render it void under the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, and no such intent ought, in the circumstances, to be inferred; and (2) that the deed was not voluntary, but taken as a whole constituted such a note or memorandum of the recited parol

⁽a) Wheeler v. Caryl, Amb. 121, 122; Moor v. Rycault, Pr. Ch. 22.

⁽b) See Montefiore v. Behrens, 1 Eq. 171; Middlecome v. Marlow, 2 Atk. 519; Re Wray's T., 16 Jur. 1126.

⁽c) Ryland v. Smith, 1 My. & C. 53.

⁽d) Ryland v. Smith, 1 My. & C. 53; Wall v. Tomlinson, 16 V. 413, and Glaister v. Hewer, 8 V. 207.

⁽e) (1902) 2 Ch. 360; Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew. 1, approved.

ante-nuptial contract in consideration of marriage as satisfied the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 4; and enabled the contract to be enforced both against the settlor who signed it and against his trustee in bankruptcy, the recital of the contract being admissible in evidence as against the trustee setting up the statute. But whether the husband's life interest passed to the trustee in bankruptcy, quære (a).

7. Waiver of Settlement.

By Consent of Wife.—If a woman wish to waive her equity to a settlement, her consent to her husband having her property must be formally taken upon her examination in Court (b). Where, however, a married woman, upon being examined, expressed a wish that part of the fund to which she should be entitled should be retained in Court, and the income paid to her with liberty for her to apply for payment of the capital at a future period, if she desired it, the Court made the order to carry out her wish (c). In general, if the wife is abroad, her consent to payment of the fund to her husband must be taken by commission issuing from the Court (d), or from a competent Court abroad (e). In order that the examination may be such that the free and unbiased wishes of the wife may be ascertained, neither her husband nor his solicitor nor any persons connected with him ought to be present (f), and the examination cannot be dispensed with, by reason of her wishes having been ascertained by the trustees (q).

The Court cannot, in the absence of fraud or compulsion on the part of the husband, refuse to take the wife's consent (h), and it was so held even when it appeared that the wife, a ward of Court, married the day after she came of age (i).

The consent of a married woman will not be taken until the amount

- (a) Re Holland (1902) 2 Ch. 360; Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew. 1; approved.
- (b) Beaumont v. Carter, 32 B. 586. Where the fund is small, see infra, p. 677.
- (c) Re Craddock's T., W. N. 1875, p. 187.
- (d) Gibbons v. Kibbey, 10 W. R. 55; Ireland v. Trinbaith, 14 W. R. 275.
- (e) Campbell v. French, 3 V. 323, 4 R. R., p. 5; but see Minet v. Hyde,

- 2 Bro. Ch. 663; and Bourdillon v. Adair, 3 Bro. Ch. 237; and the order given, Seton (1901), F. 4, p. 928.
 - (f) Re Bendyshe, 3 Jur. (N.S.) 727.
 - (g) Re Swan, 2 Hem. & M. 34.
- (h) Willats v. Cay, 2 Atk. 67; Wright v. Rutter, 2 V. 673, 3 R. R. 24; Longbottom v. Pearce, 3 De G. & J. 545, and Biddles v. Jackson, ibid.,
- (i) White v. Herrick, L. R. 4 Ch. 345.

of the fund is ascertained (a); except perhaps where it is only liable to diminution by the deduction of unascertained costs, the taxation of which has been directed (b); in which case her consent refers to the residue of the fund after such payment (c).

The consent will not be binding if made under a mistake. Thus, where she consented to her husband receiving the whole fund, being ignorant that the effect of his previous insolvency (of which the Court was not informed) would be to give it to his assignees, the Court ordered the whole fund to be settled, for it is the duty of the Court to explain to a married woman what she gets and loses by her consent (d).

The Court has power to postpone for a time the transfer to the husband, notwithstanding the consent (e), and she may retract at any time before the transfer has been completed (f).

Where the wife waives her equity to a settlement, and consents to her husband having her property, an affidavit must be made by the husband and wife, either that there was no settlement upon their marriage, or if there be a settlement, it should be produced, and an affidavit made by the husband and wife that there was no other settlement, and the Court must be satisfied on the certificate of counsel, or by inspection, which is now the usual practice (g), that the settlement itself does not affect the property which the wife consents to her husband having (h). The affidavit of the wife alone has been allowed where the husband is residing permanently abroad (i) or refuses to make an affidavit (k). And where the husband and wife are both resident abroad, the Court has accepted as evidence that there was no settlement on their marriage an affidavit by a solicitor disclosing facts which made it unlikely that there was a settlement, and stating positively that he had been told by the lady and her husband that there was none (l).

Even where it is proposed to pay the fund to the wife, with the husband's consent, on her separate receipt, or to her trustees, her

- (a) Edmunds v. Townshend, 1 Anst. 93; Jernegan v. Baxter, 6 Madd. 32; Sperling v. Rochfort, 8 V. 180; Godber v. Laurie, 10 Price, 152; Moss v. Dunlop, 8 W. R. 39.
 - (b) Packer v. P., 1 Coll. Ch. R. 92.
- (c) Musgrove v. Flood, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 1086.
 - (d) Watson v. Marshall, 17 B. 363.
 - (e) Wright v. Rutter, supra; Pen-

- fold v. Mould, 4 Eq. 565.
- (f) Penfold v. Mould, supra.
 - (g) Seton (1901), p. 932.
- (h) Britten v. B., 9 B. 143, and note; Rose v. Rolls, 1 B. 270.
- (i) Wilkinson v. Schneider, 9 Eq. 423; Elliott v. Remington, 9 Si. 502.
 - (k) Anon., 3 Jur. (N. S.) 839.
 - (1) Woodward v. Pratt, 16 Eq. 127.

examination will not be dispensed with (a), unless the wife is entitled to the fund to her separate use, in which case her examination and consent are unnecessary (b), and on her petition payment would be made on her receipt alone. An affidavit, however, that there is no settlement thereof must be produced (c). In one case, however, a transfer of such a fund was made into the joint names of the husband and wife without her examination and consent, on their joint petition (d). And in another case, her consent to the transfer of a fund in Court, her separate property, to her husband, was required, though she had joined him in a petition for the purpose (e).

And payment will be made to a married woman suing as a feme sole under a protection order of her share in an administration suit, upon her affidavit, that the separation continues, and that there was no settlement nor agreement for a settlement (f).

Where the wife is domiciled in a foreign state, upon proof that by the laws of such state her husband would be entitled to the whole of the property, without making any provision for her, the consent of the wife will not be required by the Court, and the fund will be ordered to be paid to the husband, without his being required to make any settlement upon her (g); or if, under similar circumstances, the property of the wife was money to arise from the sale of land, the husband (not being an alien) electing to take it in an unconverted state might have a conveyance of it to himself in fee (h), and semble an alien might now do so under the Naturalization Act, 1870 (i).

But where the lady is a ward of the Court, although by the law of the country where her husband is domiciled she has no equity to a settlement, the Court will not part with funds belonging to her unless satisfied that a proper provision has been made upon her (k). The Court, however, has a discretion in such a matter: thus where

- (a) Mawe v. Heaviside, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 817; Gibbons v. Kibbey, 10 W. R. 55.
 - (b) Macq. H. & W. 304.
 - (c) Anon., 3 Jur. (N. S.) 839.
 - (d) Re Crump, 34 B. 576.
 - (e) Wordsworth v. Dayrell, 4 W. R. 89.
 - (f) Ewart v. Chubb, 20 Eq. 454.
- (g) Sawer v. Shute, 1 Anst. 63; Campbell v. French, 3 V. 323;
- Anstruther v. Adair, 2 My. & K. 513; Re Molyneux, 5 Ir. Ch. R. 346; M'Cormick v. Garnett, 5 De G. M. & G. 278; Re Letts' T., 7 L. R. Ir. 132; Re Marsland, 55 L. J. Ch. 581.
- (h) Hitchcock v. Clendinen, 12 B. 534.
- (i) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14, amended by 33 & 34 Vict. c. 102; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 39.
 - (k) Re Tweedale's Set., John. 109.

the infant was not and never had been domiciled here, and the only circumstance rendering it possible to treat her as a ward of Court was the fact that money had been paid to her account in the Court of Chancery, the Court ordered the money to be paid to her husband, a domiciled Frenchman (a).

The proof of the law in foreign states in such cases being one of fact, it will not be decided by authority, but by the evidence in each case (b).

Where the fund is under 200l. or 10l. a year, or is likely to be reduced below that sum by costs, it may be ordinarily paid to the husband without the consent of the wife being taken by examination, but under special circumstances, as, for instance, where she married the day after she came of age, the Court insisted upon her separate examination (c). But before payment it must be shown that it is not in settlement (d). An affidavit of no settlement has also been dispensed with where the fund was only 10l. (c); and where the husband consents to payment to his wife on her own separate receipt, her separate examination where the sum does not exceed 500l. will be dispensed with (f). In Ireland, it seems money in Court belonging to the wife, not exceeding 100l., may be paid to her husband without her consent (g).

The wife, although her consent may not be requisite before payment, is as much entitled to a settlement out of a small as out of a large sum (h).

Except in some cases under Malins' Act (i), a married woman cannot waive her right to take her reversionary personal property by survivorship (k), whether it might possibly vest in possession during the coverture, or could only vest after the husband's death (l).

- (a) Brown v. Collins, 25 C. D. 56; and see Hope v. H., 4 De G. M. & G. 328, 345.
- (b) Cf. M. Cormick v. Garnett, 5 De G. M. & G. 278; Re Todd, 19 B. 582.
 - (c) White v. Herrick, L. R. 4 Ch. 345.
- (d) Elworthy v. Wickstead, 1 J. & W. 69; Hedges v. Clarke, 1 De G. & Sm. 354; Roberts v. Collett, 1 Sm. & G. 138; Wallace v. Greenwood, 16 C. D. 362.
 - (e) Veal v. V., 4 Eq. 115.
 - (f) Re Morton's Estate, W. N.

- (1874) 181; Andrewes v. Tyrrell, 29 Sol. Jo. 622; Seton (1901), p. 933.
- (g) Re Surridge's T., 17 Ir. Ch. R. 163.
- (h) Re Cutler, 14 B. 220; Re Kincaid's T., 1 Drew. 326.
 - (i) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57.
- (k) Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Ha. 432, 434; Re Godfrey's T., 1 Ir. R. Eq. 531; Whittle v. Henning, 2 Ph. 731.
- (1) Box v. B., 2 Con. & Law. 605; Box v. Jackson, Dru. Cas. t. Sugd. 42, where all the authorities on the subject are reviewed.

Nor would the Court allow the interest of the wife to be accelerated, to enable her to dispose of it as if in possession (a).

8. Where the Equity is barred, or does not arise.

Reduction into possession by Husband.—The actual reduction into possession by the husband of the rents and profits of his wife, or of any fund belonging to her, or of her choses in action will defeat the wife's right to a settlement thereout; and, as laid down by Lord Eldon, in the principal case, "previously to a bill, a trustee, who has the wife's property, real or personal, may pay the rents and profits, and may hand over the personal estate to the husband, but not if the bill has been filed; and if the husband, or those claiming under him, can obtain the property of the wife by an action at law, equity will not by injunction prevent them from doing so" (b). But after a writ has been issued, trustees cannot safely make any payments to the husband (c), and cannot be advised to act without first consulting the Court (d). With regard to the latter part of the above citation, injunctions were formerly granted to restrain the husband from proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Courts for a legacy due to his wife until he had agreed to make provision for her (e). As to what constitutes reduction into possession, see Hornsby v. Lee (f).

Adequate Settlement.—The equity will be barred by an adequate settlement having been made upon her, but not by an inadequate settlement, unless it be by an express stipulation before marriage (g). And in a case where an adequate settlement had been made upon the wife, the husband was held to be entitled to the whole fund, although he was living apart from his wife, they having

- (a) Whittle v. Henning, 2 Ph. 731; Cresswell v. Dewell, 4 Gif. 460; Re Davenport, (1895) 1 Ch. 361; Carson, R. P. S. (1902), p. 334; see note to Hornsby v. Lee, supra; Lewin, (1904)
- (b) See Milner v. Wilmer, 2 P. W. 641; Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 420; Allday v. Fletcher, 1 De G. & J. 82; Re Swan, 2 Hem. & M. 34, 37; Hornsby v. Lee, post.
- (c) Macaulay v. Philips, 4 V. 18; De la Garde v. Lempriere, 6 B. 344, 347.

- (d) Lewin (1904), pp. 929 et seq.
- (e) Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 420; Gardner v. Walker, 1 Stra. 503; and see (n.) "Judicature Act, 1873," supra, p. 631.
- (f) Supra; Donnelly v. Foss, 7 L. R. Ir. 439; Re Barber, 11 C. D. 442; Widgery v. Tepper, 7 C. D. 423; Rogers v. Bolton, 8 L. R. Ir. 69.
- (g) Salwey v. S., Amb. 692; Garforth v. Bradley, 2 Ves. Sen. 675; Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 520, L. R. 4 Ch. 407.

separated by mutual consent and agreement, and no blame being imputed to one party more than the other (a). And it is not essential that the settlement shall have been made by the husband (b).

The wife's equity to a settlement, moreover, may be excluded by an exception of the particular fund or property from the husband's covenant in her marriage settlement to settle future acquired property (c).

If the settlement is inadequate, the Court may direct a further settlement (d). If it is illusory, her equity will not be barred (e).

Fraud of Wife.—The Court will not allow the equity to be made an instrument of fraud (f). So where a woman at the time of her marriage owes more than the whole amount of her property, she will have no equity to a settlement out of it as against the assignees of her husband, in whose bankruptcy her debts are proved (g). But if the value of her property exceeds the amount of the debts she owed before marriage, she may be held entitled to a settlement out of the property after provision has been made for payment of the debts (h).

A married woman may, by fraud, as, for instance, in holding out to a purchaser for value, that an assignment made after marriage was made before, preclude herself from claiming her equity to a settlement, as against the purchaser (i).

Adultery of Wife.—If the wife be living in adultery, apart from her husband, she cannot, except under very peculiar circumstances (k), insist upon her equity to a settlement (l); but even then it seems the husband will not be allowed to receive the whole of her property, while he does not maintain her. See Ball v. Montgomery (m), in which case the Court ordered the future dividends of a settled fund to be paid into Court, subject to further order; observing that the wife's delinquency was a good ground for not

- (a) Re Erskine's T., 1 Kay & J. 302; Spicer v. S., 24 B. 365; Aquilar v. A., 5 Madd. 414.
- (b) Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 8 Ch. 338.
 - (c) Brooke v. Hickes, 12 W. R. 703.
- (d) Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 V. 98; and see Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 520, L. R. 4 Ch. 407.
 - (e) Irwin v. I., 5 Ir. Eq. R. 373.
 - (f) Re Lush's T., L. R. 4 Ch. 591.

- (g) Bonner v. B., 17 B. 86.
- (h) Barnard v. Ford, L. R. 4 Ch. 247; Miller v. Campbell, W. N. (1871), p. 210.
- (i) Ne Lush's T., L. R. 4 Ch. 591; Barrow v. Manning, W. N. (1878), p. 122; Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 437; and see Roberts v. Cooper, (1891) 2 Ch. 335.
 - (k) Re Lewin's T., 20 B. 378.
 - (l) Carr v. Eastabrooke, 4 V. 146.
 - (m) 2 V. 191, 2 R. R. 197.

paying it to her, but was not a ground for letting the husband receive the whole of the property, which, being hers originally, was intended to be his, partly to support her. Secus, where the husband has by contract an interest in her property during their joint lives, and her misconduct obliges him to separate (a). Where both husband and wife are living in adultery, it has been held that the wife may claim a settlement (b). But mere living apart from her husband is no bar (c).

A female ward of Court, married without its consent, will not be barred from her claim to a settlement, although she should be living in adultery (d).

Foreign Domicil of Husband.—The equity does not arise where the domicil of the husband is foreign, and his country does not recognise such a right (e).

Reversionary Property.—The equity only arises when the fund is ready for reduction into possession, and does not arise where the fund is reversionary (f).

Tenancy by Entireties.—The equity arises where the husband has to get the assistance of the Court to get the benefit of his wife's property. Therefore, where husband and wife took by "entireties," the property not being hers, but her husband's, the equity did not arise (g). And the M. W. P. Act, 1882, has not, practically, affected this rule, for where subsequently to that statute land is conveyed to husband and wife jointly they take not as tenants by entireties, but jointly, the wife's share being her separate estate under the Act (h). Thus, although the rights of the husband and wife are altered, interse, the equity does not arise, for there is no wife's property which the husband can claim.

Life interest of Wife.—It has been before stated, p. 664, that although a married woman, as against the assignees of her husband

- (a) See Duncan v. Campbell, 12 Si. 616.
 - (b) Greedy v. Lavender, 13 B. 62.
 - (c) Eedes v. E., 11 Si. 569.
- (d) Ball v. Coutts, 1 V. & B. 302, 304; Re Anne Walker, L. & G. t. Sugd. 299.
- (e) Supra, p. 676, note (g); Campbell v. French, 3 V. 321; 4 R. R. 5; Anstruther v. Adair, 2 My. & K. 513; Re Marsland, 34 W. R. 540, Manx domicil. But where the lady is a ward
- of Court, see ReTweedale's Set., John. 109; Brown v. Collins, supra, p. 677.
- (f) Supra, p. 665; Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Ha. 432; Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1.
- (g) Atcheson v. A., 11 B. 485; Wardv. W., 14 C. D. 507; Re Bryan, ibid.,p. 519.
- (h) Thornley v. T., (1893) 2 Ch. 229; and see Re March, 27 C. D. 166; Re Jupp, 39 C. D. 148. Cf. Re Dixon, 42 C. D. 306.

in bankruptcy or insolvency, is entitled to have a settlement or maintenance out of her equitable property, in which she has only a life interest, she, nevertheless, cannot claim either, as against the legal right of her husband, not being bankrupt or insolvent, although he may be in difficulties, for the husband is entitled to the wife's income as long as he maintains her to the best of his ability, and they are living together (a). Nor can she claim a settlement or maintenance out of the income of her equitable property, as against the particular assignee for value of her husband, although subsequently to the assignment he may become bankrupt or insolvent, or desert and leave her utterly destitute (b). But if the husband deserts the wife, leaving her unprovided for, the Court will allow her past and future maintenance out of the income of her life interest in equitable property, not specifically assigned by the husband for value (c).

9. Against whom the equity is binding.

The equity of a wife to a settlement is binding not only upon her husband, but also upon all persons claiming generally from or under him as executor, his trustees in bankruptcy, or under a general assignment for the payment of his debts (d). It is also binding upon a purchaser from the husband for valuable consideration (e), subject to the somewhat anomalous exception in the case of an equitable life interest of the wife which has been already noticed (f).

The wife's equity to a settlement is moreover paramount to the right which an executor or administrator has to set off a debt due to the estate from a husband, against any legacy under the will or share under the intestacy to which his wife is entitled, unless, perhaps, when he is indebted as executor. Thus in Re Briant (g), by a will of a person who died in 1877, a share of residue was settled on his daughter Mrs. S., subject to deduction of any debt due from her. She had married before the date of the will but without any settlement. S. her husband was indebted to the testator 750l. and

- (a) Vaughan v. Buck, 13 Si. 404.
- (b) Tidd v. Lister, ante, p. 664.
- (c) Wright v. Morley, 11 V. 12, 23,
 8 R. R. 69; Gilchrist v. Cator, 1 De
 G. & Sm. 188; Coster v. C., 1 Keen,
 199.
- (d) See supra, pp. 663, 665. Williams' Exors. (1905), p. 1160.
- (e) Macaulay v. Philips, 4 V. 19; see also Scott v. Spashett, 3 Mac. & G. 599; Marshall v. Gibbons, 4 Ir. Ch. R. 276.
 - (f) See Tidd v. Lister, supra, p. 664.
 (g) 39 C. D. 471; Re Howard, 13

R. 233, following Re Briant, supra.

was in very poor circumstances. The question was raised on originating summons whether the trustees could retain or set off the debt against the share of Mrs. S. in the residue. Kay, J., held that as against the right of the husband the executors might retain or set off the debt, but that the wife's equity if asserted was prior to this right, and he settled 500l. out of the fund, the balance to be set off against the husband's debt (a).

(a) Following Carr v. Taylor, 10 V. 574, 8 R. R. 40, and questioning Knight v. K., 18 Eq. 487; and see Ex p. Blagden, 19 V. 464; Ex p. O'Ferrall, 1 G. & J. 347; M'Mahon v.

Burchell, 5 Ha. 325; Reeve r. Rocher, 1 De G. & Sm. 626; Lee r. Egremont, 5 De G. & Sm. 348; M'Cormick r. Garnett, 2 Sm. & Gif. 37; Re Cordwell's E., 20 Eq. 644.

HULME v. TENANT.

1778. Reported 1 Bro. Ch. 16.

Wife's Separate Property.

Bond of a feme covert jointly with her husband, shall bind her separate property.

A bill was filed by the obligee of a bond, to secure 180l. entered into by the defendants, husband and wife, against the husband, wife, and her surviving trustee, to recover the sums secured out of the wife's separate estate.

Upon the marriage, the estates of the wife had been conveyed to trustees; one part, consisting of freehold and leasehold lands, in trust to receive and pay the rents and profits to the wife for her separate use, and to convey the estate itself to such use as she, by her last will in writing, or by deed or writing under her hand and seal, executed in the presence of two witnesses, should appoint; in default of appointment, to the use and behoof of her heirs and assigns; other parts to be sold, and out of the produce, 1,000l. to be laid out according to the directions of the wife, the interest and profits to be paid to her, and the principal to her, or her order, by note or writing under her hand; and for want of such appointment, to her executors, administrators, and assigns.

This 1,000*l*. had been raised, and the whole, or the greatest part applied, so that the question in the cause was with respect to the remedy against the other estate.

In 1769, the husband borrowed of the plaintiff, Mrs. Hulme, 50l. upon his and his wife's bond. In 1770, having occasion for a further sum, the wife herself applied to the plaintiff, and borrowed 130l., paid the interest due upon the former sum of 50l., and [the husband and wife] gave a new bond for the 180l.

The cause had been heard before Lord Bathurst, who dismissed the bill. It came on now to be re-heard.

Mr. Mansfield opened for the plaintiff.

Mr. Attorney-General (Wedderburn) and Mr. Selwyn for the defendants.

LORD CHANCELLOR THURLOW.—My doubt arises principally upon the form of the relief, rather than the principles upon which the bill is brought; it is a bill brought by the obligee upon a joint bond by husband and wife for 180l. to recover that sum out of the separate property of the wife. It is brought against the wife, the husband, and the trustees, for attaining the most extensive and perfect relief which the situation of her separate property will enable her or her trustees to afford.

The question is, what sort of execution this Court will award against that separate property? It is created by deed, and is real estate conveyed to trustees, as to a considerable part of it, in trust to receive and pay the rents to the wife, and to convey the estates themselves according to the appointment of the wife, by her last will and testament in writing, or by deed or writing under her hand and seal, executed in the presence of two or more witnesses; and, for want of such declaration or appointment, to the use and behoof of the wife, her heirs and assigns; as to other parts, in trust, to be sold, and out of the produce of the sale, 1,000l. to be retained by the trustees, to be laid out according to the directions of the wife, the profits to be paid to her, and the principal to her or her order, by note or writing under her hand; and, for want of such appointment, to her executors, administrators, and assigns.

The rule laid down in Peacock v. Monk (a) that a feme covert, acting with respect to her separate property, is competent to act in all respects as if she was a feme sole, is the proper rule, and necessary to support the decisions on this subject. The consequence was that, in Allen v. Papworth (b), where a bill was brought by husband and wife for an account, the wife, together with her husband, submitting that the profits of her separate estate should be applied to pay the husband's debts, she was bound by that submission, and the profits of her separate estate were by decree directed to be so applied. In Grigby v. Cox (c), where the wife had contracted to sell her separate estate, being authorised by settlement to dispose of it, the Court

bound her, as a person equally competent as if sole, to a specific performance of that contract: I take it, therefore, it is impossible to say but that a feme covert is competent to act as a feme sole, with respect to her separate property, where settled to her separate use.

But the question here goes a little beyond that; it is not only how far she may act upon her separate property: I have no doubt about that; but the question is, how far her general personal engagement shall be executed out of her separate property. If she had by instrument contracted that this or that portion of her separate estate should be disposed of in this or that way, I think she and her trustees might have been decreed to make that disposition; but if she enters into an engagement, which would make a feme sole liable to the whole extent of the contract as to her person, &c., in every respect, it is clear such general engagement, entered into by a feme covert, will not bind her as such. It is not like the case of an infant, who is incapable of acting; but in respect to a feme covert, determined cases seem to go thus far, that the general engagement of the wife shall operate upon her personal property, shall apply to the rents and profits of her real estate, and that her trustees shall be obliged to apply personal estate, and rents and profits when they arise, to the satisfaction of such general engagement; but this Court has not used any direct process against the separate estate of the wife, and the manner of coming at the separate property of the wife has been by decree to bind the trustees, as to personal estate in their hands, or rents and profits, according to the exigencies of justice, or of the engagement of the wife, to be carried into execution. I know of no case which has gone further than that. Suppose the wife to have power, by settlement, to dispose of her real estate to any uses she shall think fit, yet the trustees must make the formal instrument, without which the estate cannot pass. I know of no case where the general engagement of the wife has been carried to the extent of decreeing that the trustees of her real estate shall make conveyance of that real estate, and by sale, mortgage, or otherwise, raise the money to satisfy that general engagement on the part of the wife. It may be difficult to give relief here without doing something of that kind, because that part of the real estate which was to be sold has been sold, and the money has been applied, with the direction of the wife, by the hand of the trustee, who consequently is no longer

liable as to that sum; so that so far as the 1,000l., it seems out of the reach of this Court, the trustee alleging that the money is paid, or not remaining in his hands.—[Mr. Ambler.—Only part paid over.]—I believe there is no instance of a personal decree against a feme covert, for payment of any sum whatever. Though her separate personal property is liable, yet the decree is to fetch forth her separate estate, and make it liable to her engagement. No lease found in the hands of the trustee is now before the Court; we cannot come at it. As a bond it is void, otherwise an extent might have gone.

July 28th, 1778.

Lord Chancellor Thurlow. — I have no doubt about this principle, that, if a Court of equity says a feme covert may have a separate estate, the Court will bind her to the whole extent as to making that estate liable to her own engagements; as, for instance, for payment of debts, &c. But, although the remedy here is more extensive than in a Court of law, I do not find the Court has ever ordered a power to be executed; it has industriously stopped short of so doing, and has only given a remedy by stopping the fund, where the power was executed; therefore, I cannot order the feme covert to execute her power, but I am exceedingly clear that the leasehold estate will be liable.

It stood referred to the Master (a) to take an account of the rents and profits of the leasehold estates; but before any report, the parties came to a compromise, upon the defendant Frances paying the principal sum borrowed, with interest, without any costs.

NOTES.

- 1. Separate estate independent of statute.
 - (a) Generally, p. 687.
 - (b) What words are sufficient to create a separate use, p. 691.
 - (c) What words are not sufficient, p. 694.
 - (d) Separate estate by implication, p. 695.
- (a) See order made by *Thurlow*, C., in note to Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De extracted from the Registrar's Book G. F. & J., p. 502.

WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY.

Hulme v. Tenant.

- 2. Statutory extension of the doctrine of separate estate.
 - (a) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, ss. 21, 25, 26, 45, p. 696.
 - (b) The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, ss. 1, 7, 8, p. 700.
 - (c) The Married Women's Property Act, 1882, ss. 1, (1), (2), (5), 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, &c., p. 702.
 - (d) The Married Women's Property Act, 1893, ss. 1, 2, 3, p. 711.
 - (e) The Married Women's Property Act, 1907, p. 713.
- 3. Wife's power of disposition over property given or settled to her separate use absolutely, p. 714.
- Liability of corpus of married woman's property when she has a life interest with a power, p. 719.
- 5. (a) Liability of separate estate for a general engagement, apart from Statute, p. 722.
 - (b) Liability for contract under Acts of 1882 and 1893, p. 725.
 - (c) Liability for breach of trust, fraud and tort, p. 726.
- 6. Form of judgment against married woman, p. 728.
- 7. Of gifts by the wife to the husband of the income or corpus of her separate estate, p. 730.
- Loans by wife to husband and exoneration of wife's separate estate, p. 733.
- 9. Wife's ante-nuptial debts and liabilities, p. 736.
- 10. Liability and devolution of separate estate after death, p. 742.
- 11. Savings and arrears of separate estate, p. 746.
- 12. Protection and recovery of separate property, p. 748.
- 13. Restraint upon anticipation or alienation, p. 749.
- Marriage settlements and s. 19 of the Act of 1882 and s. 2 of the Act of 1907,
 p. 757.
- Duration and extent of separate use and of restraint on anticipation, p. 759.
- 16. Married woman trustee, p. 768.
- 17. Pin-money, p. 769.
- 18. Paraphernalia, p. 770.

1. Separate Estate independent of Statute.

Generally.—"That at law (a) a feme covert cannot in any way be sued, even for necessaries, is certain. Bind herself, or her husband, by specialty, she cannot; and, although living with him, and not allowed necessaries, or apart from him, whether on an insufficient allowance or an unpaid allowance, she may so far bind him that those who furnish her with articles of subsistence may sue him; yet, even in respect of these, she herself is free from all suit. This is her position of disability, or immunity at law; and this is now clearly settled. Her separate existence is not contemplated; it is merged by the coverture in that of her husband; and she is no more recognised than is the cestui que trust or the mortgagor, the

(a) Per Brougham, C., in Murray v. Barlee, 4 My. & K. 220, 222.

legal estate, which is the only interest the law recognises, being in others. But in equity the case is wholly different. Her separate existence, both as regards her liabilities and her rights, is here abundantly acknowledged; not, indeed, that her person can be made liable, but her property may, and it may be reached through a suit instituted against herself and trustees."

"In former years . . . Judges of what used to be called the Common Law Courts of this realm delighted in applying rigidly and strictly a series of rules and maxims which their predecessors had delighted themselves in devising, although they did not always commend themselves to the apprehension of the million. those maxims was one by which a married woman was held incapable of taking a gift either from her husband or a stranger . . . But the Court of Chancery (a very great Court in its day, although it has now ceased to exist) invented that blessed word and thing 'the separate use of a married woman '" (a). And in order to prevent any undue exercise of marital influence detrimental to its enjoyment, Courts of equity have also in comparatively recent times allowed the introduction of a restraint upon her anticipation or alienation of property so settled—the separate use and the restraint upon anticipation or alienation being both co-extensive with her coverture. And this equitable doctrine of separate use has been extended by the various statutes hereinafter referred to.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is now transferred to the High Court of Justice (b), all equitable rights are to be recognised by all the Courts, and where there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law, the former are to prevail (c).

Any person may, either before, after, or during her coverture, give or settle property to the separate use of a woman.

And her husband may contract (as is frequently the case in marriage settlements), that either his own or his wife's property, or part of it, shall be held, usually by trustees, for her separate use.

A parol agreement, however, before marriage, that particular chattels of the wife shall be possessed by her to her separate use, is not binding upon the husbard, unless the agreement be acted upon by the chattels being placed under the dominion of a trustee, and treated as separate property, for in such case the agreement may

⁽a) Per James, L. J., Ashworth v. (c) Ibid., s. 24, s.s. 2, 4; s. 25, s.s. Outram, 5 C. D., p. 941.

⁽b) Judicature Act, 1873, s. 16.

be made effectual (a). In Ex p. Whitehead (b), by a parol antenuptial settlement it was agreed between the persons about to marry that a sum of money standing to the future wife's credit on deposit at her bankers in her maiden name should be retained by her for her separate use, and after the marriage the money was allowed by the husband to remain in his wife's former name, and he allowed her to draw cheques upon it; the C. A. held that the inference was that the husband gave the money to the wife, and that he became her trustee, and that it was unnecessary to consider the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, upon which the case had turned in the Court below (c).

If real or personal property be given to, or settled upon a married woman for her separate use, without the interposition of trustees, still in equity the intention of the testator or settlor will be effectuated, and the wife's interest protected by the conversion of the husband into a trustee for her (d).

A husband may also give property to trustees, or make himself a trustee for the separate use of his wife. But in order to constitute a gift between husband and wife, there must be a clear and irrevocable gift to a trustee for the wife, or some clear and distinct act by the husband, by which he has divested himself of his property or engaged to hold it as a trustee for his wife (e), a mere imperfect gift as distinguished from and not amounting to a declaration of trust, not being sufficient for the purpose (f).

In Re Whittaker (g) it was held that in the absence of proof of an unequivocal, complete, and final intention on the part of a husband to constitute himself trustee for his wife, the Court would not after his death, upon her uncorroborated statement that her husband expressly authorised her to carry on a farm on her own account which she had rented before marriage, and to treat the proceeds as

⁽a) Simmons v. S., 6 Ha. 352; Cooper v. Wormald, 27 B. 266. Cf. Re Holland, (1902) 2 Ch. 360.

⁽b) 14 Q. B. D. 419.

⁽c) And see Re Wood, 61 L. T. 197.

⁽d) Parker v. Brooke, 9 V. 583, 7 R. R. 299; Rich v. Cockell, 9 V. 369, 7 R. R. 227; per James, L.J., Ashworth v. Outram, 5 C. D., p. 941; Ex p. Sibeth, 14 Q. B. D. 417; and see Wassell v. Leggatt, (1896) 1 Ch. 554.

⁽e) Mews v. M., 15 B. 529; Parker

v. Lechmere, 12 C. D. 286; Cowper's Case, cited Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393; Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swans. 92; Ashworth v. Outram, 5 C. D. 923; Lovell v. Newton, 4 C. P. D. 7.

⁽f) Re Breton's Estate, 17 C. D. 416; Milroy v. Lord, 4 De G. F. & J. 264; and see note to Ellison v. E., ante; and Mallott v. Wilson, (1903) 2 Ch. 494.

⁽g) 21 C. D. 657.

her separate property, admit her claim as against his estate to the proceeds of the farm which were invested by him during his lifetime. It is submitted that the rule as to corroborative evidence in cases of claims against the estates of deceased persons was incorrectly stated in this case (a), and that in view of later decisions it is no longer of authority (b). The Court will now act on the uncorroborated evidence of a claimant if satisfied of its truth.

Under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, s. 50, freehold land or a thing in action may now be conveyed by a husband to his wife, and by a wife to her husband, alone or jointly with another person.

And the fee simple of a wife may be affected by a trust for her separate use in three ways: (1) by conveyance to a trustee, or a declaration of trust before marriage, with the husband's consent; (2) by an agreement between the intended husband and wife before marriage; (3) by an acknowledged assurance by a wife after marriage.

But the agreement (2) to affect the fee simple must be in writing and signed by the wife as well as the husband, for if it is signed by the husband alone, it is, owing to the Statute of Frauds, sect. 7, invalid as a declaration of trust for the separate use of the fee simple, a husband having in his wife's land only an estate for the joint lives of himself and his wife with a possible estate by the curtesy (c). A mere renunciation by an intended husband of his marital rights in his wife's real property is not sufficient to clothe her with a testamentary power thereover, or to constitute a valid declaration of trust of the fee; consequently in such case, upon the death of the wife without issue during her husband's lifetime, her heir-at-law, and not her devisee, will be entitled to the land of which she is seised in fee simple (c).

A wife will have the benefit of any outlay by her husband upon real estate settled to her separate use. If, for instance, he builds houses upon it with his own money, the houses so built will become the wife's, and her interest in them will be to her separate use (d).

(a) Ibid., at p. 665.

(b) Re Garnett, 31 C. D., per Brett, M.R., at p. 9; per Sir J. Hannen, Re Hodgson, 31 C. D., at p. 183, which cases, disapproving of Re Finch, 23 C. D., p. 271 (in which the rule was

stated with less stringency than in Re Whittaker), were followed in Rawlinson v. Scholes, 79 L. T. 350.

(c) Dye v. D., 13 Q. B. D. 147.

(d) Barrack v. M'Culloch, 3 Kay & J. 119, 120; Grant v. G., 34 B. 623.

What Words are sufficient to Create a Separate Use.—No particular form of words is necessary in order to vest property in a married woman to her separate use (a). It has been held that the marital rights of the husband will be defeated if there is a gift or settlement of property to his wife or her trustees for her "separate use" (b); "sole and separate use" (c); or "for her own use and at her own disposal"(d); "for her sole use and disposal"(e); "for her own use, independent of her husband "(f); "for her own use and benefit, independent of any other person "(g); "for her livelihood"(h); a bequest to a married woman "for her absolute use and benefit" (i); or, "that she should receive and enjoy the issue and profits" (k); a direction that "the interests and profits be paid to her, and the principal to her, or to her order by note in writing under her hand "(l); or, "her receipt to be a sufficient discharge" (m); or where trustees are directed to apply the income of a fund in their discretion, and without being answerable to any one "for the maintenance and support of a married woman "(n); or, "to be delivered to her on demand "(o); or where the husband "is to have no control "(p).

In the case, however, of Gilbert v. Lewis (q), it was held by Westbury, C., that a devise to a widow "for her sole use and benefit" without the intervention of trustees did not give her a separate estate. It may now be considered to be established by that case, followed by Lewis v. Matthews (r), and by Massy v. Rowen (s), that the word "sole" in a will has not a fixed technical meaning

- (a) Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 180; Re Peacock's T., 10 C. D. 490.
- (b) Massy v. Rowen, L. R. 4 H. L. 294, 299, 300.
- (c) Parker v. Brooke, 9 V. 583, 7 R. R. 299; Archer v. Rorke, 7 Ir. Eq. R. 478; and see Hulme v. Tenant, supra.
- (d) Pritchard v. Ames, 1 T. & R. 222.
 - (e) Bland v. Dawes, 17 C. D. 794.
 - (f) Wagstaffe v. Smith, 9 V. 520.
- (g) Margetts v. Barringer, 7 Si. 482; Glover v. Hall, 16 Si. 568.
- (h) Darley v. D., 3 Atk. 399; Cape v. C., 2 Y. & C. Ex. C. 543; but see Lee v. Prieaux, 3 Bro. Ch. 383;

- Wardle v. Claxton, 9 Si. 324.
 - (i) Negus v. Jones, 1 C. & E. 52.
 - (k) Tyrrell v. Hope, 2 Atk. 558.
 - (l) Hulme v. Tenant, supra.
- (m) Lee v. Prieaux, 3 Bro. Ch. 381; Stanton v. Hall, supra; Re Molyneux's Estate, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 411; Re Lorimer, 12 B. 521; Surman v. Wharton, (1891) 1 Q. B. 491.
- (n) Austin v. A., 4 C. D. 233; Re Peacock's T., 10 C. D. 490.
 - (o) Dixon v. Olmius, 1 Cox, 414.
- (p) Edwards v. Jones, 14 W. R. 815.
 - (q) 1 De G. J. & S. 38.
 - (r) 2 Eq. 177.
 - (s) L. R. 4 H. L. 288.

like the word "separate," and will not of itself exclude the marital right (a). For although the primary and grammatical meaning of the word "sole" does signify exclusion, the real question to be solved is, exclusion of whom? When the woman is unmarried, and the instrument does not in terms, or from the circumstances, point this expression to a future coverture, the exclusion is now settled to be of others in general, and, therefore, not to apply with the required particularity to an after-taken husband. But if the woman is married, the exclusion most natural to occur to the mind of the donor, aware of her coverture, is that of the husband; and he can be excluded only by holding the property to be to the separate use of the wife (b). So a settlement for the "sole use, benefit, and disposition" of a lady about to marry (c); a beguest to a lady about to marry, "for her own sole use and benefit absolutely" (d); and a bequest in a will by the words "solely and entirely for her own use and benefit for life," to a married woman (e), gave to them separate estates. And a bequest to an unmarried woman, "for her own sole use and benefit" absolutely, has been held to give her a separate estate, because the testator, in another clause in his will, showed he contemplated there a future marriage of the lady, though in the beguest itself there was no reference of any kind to that event (f). And the interposition of trustees may give to such words as "sole benefit" the same technical meaning as the word "separate" (g).

And words apparently confining the operation of the separate use clause to members of a class married at the death of the testator, may, by the context, be extended so as to include those married subsequently. Thus, where a testatrix directed "that the legacies and shares of such of my nieces as are married shall be to their separate use, free from the debts and control of any husband; and that my trustees shall have power to give effect to this my intent," Shadwell, V.-C., held that the testatrix had used the words in a

- (a) See also Green v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; Farrow v. Smith, W. N. (77) 21; Re Amies, W. N. (80) 16.
- (b) Hartford v. Power, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 212.
- (c) Ex p. Ray, 1 Madd. 199, 207; and see Arthur v. A., 11 Ir. Eq. R. 511.
 - (d) Re Tarsey's Trust, 1 Eq. 561.
- (e) Inglefield v. Coghlan, 2 Coll. Ch. R. 247; Re Amies, W. N. (80) 16;

Bland v. Dawes, 17 C. D. 794; and see Green v. Britten, 1 De G. J. & S. 649; Hartford v. Power, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 204.

(f) See also Ex p. Killick, 3 Mont. D. & De G. 480; Re Tarsey, 1 Eq. 561.

(g) Adamson v. Armitage, 19 V.
416; Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. &
S. 38; but cf. Massy v. Rowen, L. R.
4 H. L. 288.

future sense, and that she intended those of her nieces who married after her death, as well as those who were married at that time, should take to their separate use (a). Where a testator, after giving his residuary property to two nieces, added, "I confine my said legacies hereinbefore mentioned, to be given to my nieces and their children, without comprehending their husbands, unless they, my said nieces or either of them, should die without issue," Romilly, M.R., was of opinion that the only way to give effect to these words was to give the residue between the nieces equally for their separate use for life, and after their deaths to their children, and if they had no children, then to the nieces absolutely (b).

Where a testatrix devised a freehold estate to trustees for the use and benefit of her daughter, who was to receive the rents and profits from the tenants herself, while she lived, whether married or single, and she also directed that no sale or mortgage should be made of the estate or the rents arising from it during the life of her daughter, it was held by the C. A. that the devise amounted to a gift to the separate use of the daughter without power of anticipation inasmuch as the expressions therein used were inconsistent with any interference on the part of the husband (c). An indefinite bequest of the interest of a fund to a woman to her separate use, will give to her the *capital* also to her separate use (d). So a bequest of a sum of money to a married woman for her own use, nevertheless during her life, the executors were to invest the sum and to pay the dividends during her life to her separate use, independent of any husband, was held to give her an absolute and not merely a life interest (e). .

In Troutbeck v. Boughey (f) a testator gave all his real and personal estate to trustees in trust for his wife for life, and after her decease for his daughter absolutely; and he directed that the principal moneys, rents, issues, profits, interest, dividends and proceeds which his wife and daughter, or either of them, should be entitled to under his will, should be paid into their own proper hands as the same became due, and not by way of anticipation; and

- (a) Re Bayliss's T., 17 Si. 178.
- (b) Dawson v. Bourne, 16 B. 29.
- (c) Goulder v. Camm, 1 De G. F. & J. 146.
- (d) Humphrey v. H., 1 Si. (N. S.)
 - (e) Gurney v. Goggs, 25 B. 334.
- (f) $\hat{2}$ Eq. 534; and see Re Bown, 27 C. D. 411; Johnson v. J., 35 C. D., p.

349; Re Grey's Sett., 34 C. D. 712; Re Tippett, &c., 37 C. D. 444; and Re

Fearon, 45 W. R. 232, in which case Re Bown, supra, was followed.

should be for the separate use and benefit of his wife and daughter; and for which moneys, rents, issues, profits, interest, dividends, or proceeds, the receipt alone of his wife and daughter, whether covert or sole, should be an effectual discharge to his trustees, Kindersley, V.-C., on the ground that the words in italics were inapplicable to the corpus of real estate, held that the corpus of the real estate was not given to the separate use of the testator's daughter.

Although generally a married woman's separate estate is given to her for life only, she may have an absolute interest in personal property, or any ordinary estate in real estate, such as an estate in fee simple (a) or fee tail (b) settled to her separate use; and where property is settled to a married woman's separate use for life with power to dispose of it by deed or will, and in default to her, her executors and administrators, it is, in effect, her separate property absolutely (c).

What Words are not sufficient.—It has been held that no separate use has been created where there is a mere direction "to pay to a married woman and her assigns" (d); or there is a gift "to her use" (e); "to her own use and benefit" (f); to her "absolute use" (g); unless the context requires the words "absolute use" to be construed as "separate use" (h); or when a payment is directed to be made "into her own proper hands, to and for her own use and benefit" (i); into her proper hands "to her own proper use and benefit" (k); or when property is "to be under her sole control" (k) or where there is a devise without the intervention of trustees, "for her sole use and benefit" (m); or a direction to

- (a) Taylor v. Meads, 4 De G. J. & S. 597, 607.
- (b) Cooper v. Macdonald, 7 C. D. 288.
- (c) The London Chartered Bank of Australia v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 572. See Note 4, infra, p. 719.
- (d) Dakins v. Berisford, 1 Ch. Ca. 194; Lumb v. Milnes, 5 V. 517.
- (e) Jacobs v. Amyatt, 1 Madd. 376, (n.).
- (f) Johnes v. Lockhart, cited 3 Bro.
 Ch. 383, (n.); Wills v. Sayers, 4 Madd.
 409; Roberts v. Spicer, 5 Madd. 491;
 Kensington v. Dollond, 2 My. & K.
 184; Beales v. Spencer, 2 Y. & C. C. C.

- 651; Taylor v. Stainton, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 634.
- (g) Rycroft v. Christy, 3 B. 238; but see Negus v. Jones, 1 C. & E. 52.
- (h) Shewell v. Dwarris, John. 172; Re Turner, 66 L. T. 758.
- (i) Tyler v. Lake, 2 Russ. & My. 183.
- (k) Blacklow v. Laws, 2 Ha. 49; but see Hartley v. Hurle, 5 V. 545; Negus v. Jones, 1 C. & E. 52.
- (l) Massey v. Parker, 2 My. & K.
- (m) Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 De G. J. &
 S. 38; Lewis v. Matthews, 2 Eq. 177;
 Massy v. Rowen, L. B. 4 H. L. 288.

transfer "to own use and benefit" (a). So, a bequest to a woman and her assigns for her life, "for her and their own absolute use and benefit," does not confer upon her a separate estate" (b). And a bequest by will to the testator's wife for life of the income of property, "to be expended by her as she might think fit and proper and agreeable to her free will and pleasure," has been held not to give her a separate use in the same (c).

Separate Estate by Implication.—Where under a trust deed for providing pensions (amongst other objects) for the widows of clerks in the East India Company's service, there was a provision that the pension should be paid "to provide a comfortable maintenance" for the widows, and that it "should not be disposed of or incumbered either directly or indirectly," it was held that a widow of a clerk was, as against a second husband, entitled to her pension to her separate use (d).

Where a husband in taking proceedings with reference to property of his wife's makes her a defendant, he thereby admits that the property is her separate estate (e). But a separate use will not be inferred merely from a restraint on anticipation (f).

Where a precatory trust has been created by will in favour of "children" *simpliciter*, the trustee may, in executing the trust, limit the shares of the daughters to their separate use (g).

Equitable Assets.—The separate property of a married woman is "equitable assets," and her creditors are paid thereout pari passu(h); there is therefore no right of retainer in her executor (i).

Arrangements or Agreements between Husband and Wife.—
If a husband either expressly or impliedly agrees that his wife shall carry on a business for her own benefit separately from and independently of him, which is always a question dependent on the facts of each case, then the trade becomes her separate property,

- (a) Darey v. Croft, 9 Ir. Ch. R. 19, 31.
 - (b) Rycroft v. Christy, 3 B. 238.
- (c) Re Graham's T., 20 W. R. 289.
- (d) Re Peacock's T., 10 C. D. 490.
- (e) Earl v. Ferris, 19 B. 67; Re Martin, W. N. (84) 164; Baker v. Newton, 2 B. 112.
 - (f) Stogdon v. Lee, (1891) 1 Q. B.

- 661; but see Re Lumley, (1896) 2 Ch. 690.
- (g) Willis v. Kymer, 7 C. D. 181.
- (h) Owens v. Dickenson, Cr. & Ph. 48; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G. F. & J. 494; London Chartered Bank v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 572, 594.
- (i) Re Poole's Estate, 6 C. D. 739; but quære whether this is so under Married Women's Property Act, 1882.

and everything that is incident to and connected with the trade becomes part of that separate trade, and the husband is, if and so far as it is necessary, a trustee of everything which was devoted to that trade of which he allowed the wife to be the separate owner (a). And it is immaterial whether the business were one which the wife had before marriage or one which she had established after the marriage with the consent of her husband (b), or which she had established before and carried on after (c), or that the business was one carried on formerly by the husband before he became incapacitated, as for instance by habitual drunkenness and delirium tremens, from carrying it on (d). If the permission by the husband to his wife to carry on business be given before marriage, it will not only be obligatory upon the husband, but also upon his creditors; if it be given after marriage, it will be binding as between him and her but not as against his creditors (e).

Where a husband and wife agree to live separate and not to interfere with any property which each may subsequently acquire, the subsequently acquired property of the wife will be considered as her separate estate (f).

Statutory Extension of the Doctrine of Separate Estate. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, ss. 21, 25, 26, 45 (g).

S. 21: "A wife deserted by her husband may at any time after such desertion, if resident within the metropolitan district, apply to a police magistrate, or, if resident in the country, to justices in petty sessions, or in either case to the Court for an order to protect any money or property she may acquire by her own lawful industry, and property which she may become possessed of, after such desertion, against her husband or his creditors, or any person claiming under him; and such magistrate or justices, or Court, if satisfied of the fact of such desertion, and that the same was without reasonable cause, and that the wife is maintaining herself by her own industry

- (a) Ashworth v. Outram, 5 C. D. 923; Pearse v. P., 22 W. R. 69; Slanning v. Style, 3 P. W. 334.
 - (b) Ashworth v. Outram, supra.
 - (c) Re Dearmer, 53 L. T. 505.
 - (d) Lovell v. Newton, 4 C. P. D. 7.
- (e) See Ashworth v. Outram, 5 C. D., pp. 932, 933, per Malins, V.-C. See Married Women's Property Act,
- 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 1, 2, 3, 4, and $Ex\ p$. Whitehead, 14 Q. B. D. 419, cited supra, p. 689.
- (f) Haddon v. Fladgate, 1 Sw. & Tr. 48; and as to joint accounts, &c., between husband and wife, see Re Young, 28 C. D. 705.
- (g) See also Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895.

or property, may make and give to the wife an order protecting her earnings and property acquired since the commencement of such desertion, from her husband and all creditors and persons claiming under him, and such earnings and property shall belong to the wife as if she were a feme sole. Provided always, that every such order, if made by a police magistrate or justices at petty sessions, shall within ten days after the making thereof, be entered with the registrar of the County Court within whose jurisdiction the wife is resident; and that it shall be lawful for the husband, and any creditor or other person claiming under him, to apply to the Court, or to the magistrate or justices by whom such order was made, for the discharge thereof: provided also, that if the husband or any creditor of, or person claiming under the husband shall seize or continue to hold any property of the wife after notice of any such order, he shall be liable, at the suit of the wife (which she is hereby empowered to bring), to restore the specific property, and also for a sum equal to double the value of the property so seized or held after such notice as aforesaid: if any such order of protection be made, the wife shall during the continuance thereof be and be deemed to have been, during such desertion of her, in the like position in all respects, with regard to property and contracts, and suing and being sued, as she would be under this Act if she obtained a decree of judicial separation."

An order of protection obtained by a married woman who has been deserted by her husband does not protect property acquired by immoral practices, as by her living in adultery, and keeping a brothel (a).

It has been held that a married woman who has been deserted by her husband, and has obtained an order for protection, is entitled to sue in tort, as for instance for a libel (b).

As to what constitutes desertion on the part of the husband, see $Ex\ p.\ Aldridge\ (c).$

S. 25: "In every case of a judicial separation the wife shall from the date of the sentence, and whilst the separation shall continue,

317.

Q. B. 147; see now Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 2. Women's (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act, 1886; Bradshaw v. B., (1897) P. 24, under Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, s. 4; and Synge v. S., (1901) P.

 ⁽a) Mason v. Mitchell, 3 H. & C. 528.
 (b) Ramsden v. Brearley, L. R. 10

⁽c) 1 Sw. & Tr. 88; Reg. v. Leresche, (1891) 2 Q. B. 418, under Married

be considered as a feme sole with respect to property of every description which she may acquire, or which may come to or devolve upon her; and such property may be disposed of by her in all respects as a feme sole, and on her decease, the same shall in case she shall die intestate, go as the same would have gone if her husband had been then dead; provided, that if any such wife should again cohabit with her husband, all such property as she may be entitled to when such cohabitation shall take place, shall be held to her separate use, subject however to any agreement in writing made between herself and her husband whilst separate "(a).

This section applies only to property which she may acquire or which may come to or devolve upon her after the decree of separation or desertion, and not to property to which she was entitled in possession at the date of the decree (b). So, where a woman had an equitable life interest for her sole and separate use without power of anticipation, and having obtained a protection order under sect. 21, supra, subsequently mortgaged her interest and covenanted to pay the mortgage debt and judgment went against her as a *feme sole* in an action on the covenant, it was held a receiver of her life interest could not be appointed (c).

S. 26: "In every case of a judicial separation, the wife shall whilst so separated, be considered as a feme sole for the purposes of contract, and wrongs and injuries, and suing and being sued in any civil proceeding; and her husband shall not be liable in respect of any engagement or contract she may have entered into, or for any wrongful act or omission by her, or for any costs she may incur as plaintiff or defendant; provided, that where upon any such judicial separation alimony has been decreed or ordered to be paid to the wife, and the same shall not be duly paid by the husband, he shall be liable for necessaries supplied for her use . . ." (d).

The section absolutely puts an end to the right of a wife who has obtained a decree for judicial separation to pledge her husband's credit or to contract on his behalf during the continuance of the judicial separation, except where alimony has been decreed and has not been duly paid (e).

- (a) Re Insole, 1 Eq. 470; Cooke v. Fuller, 26 B. 99; Re Coward, 20 Eq. 179; Dawes v. Creyke, 30 C. D. 500; Davenport v. Marshall, (1902) 1 Ch. 82.
 - (b) Waite v. Morland, 38 C. D.
- 135, C. A.; Cooke v. Fuller, supra, distinguished.
- (c) Hill v. Cooper, (1893) 2 Q. B. 85.
- (d) See Hill v. Cooper, supra.
- (e) Re Wingfield and Blew, (1904) 2 Ch. 665.

The words "the husband shall not be liable in respect of any engagement or contract she may have entered into "are governed by the preceding part of the section, which provides that he wife "whilst so separated" shall be considered a feme sole for the purposes of contract, and are limited to engagements and contracts entered into by the wife during the period of separation, and consequently the husband's liability remains for contracts entered into before the separation (a). The pronouncement of a decree for separation puts the wife for all civil purposes in the same position as if her husband were dead during all the time the decree is in force; accordingly, where the husband had for conformity been joined as co-defendant with his wife in an action for fraud, and a decree for separation was pronounced after action was commenced but before judgment, it was held that the husband was entitled to be discharged from the action (b).

See also s. 45, by which the Court may, on pronouncing a sentence of divorce or judicial separation for the adultery of the wife, order a settlement to be made of property to which the wife is entitled in possession or reversion for the benefit of the innocent party and of the children (c).

This Act was amended by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, which gives jurisdiction to the judge ordinary to grant protecting orders (d), and extends the provisions of both Acts to property of which the wife obtaining such order has or shall become entitled as executrix, administratrix, or trustee, and to property to which she is entitled in remainder or reversion at the date of the desertion or decree (e). The protecting order, which must state the time at which the desertion commenced (f), is to be deemed valid until reversed (g), and persons or corporations making payments under orders afterwards reversed are to be protected and indemnified (h).

Where a wife has obtained a protecting order, which, it seems, is drawn up in general terms (i), she may obtain payment to herself of

- (a) Re Wingfield and Blew, (1904) 2 Ch. 665.
- (b) Cuenod v. Leslie, (1909) 1 K. B. 880.
- (c) See Milne v. M., L. R. 2 P. & D. 295; Sykes v. S., L. R. 2 P. & D. 163; Davidson v. Wood, 11 W. R. 561; and see Michell v. M., (1891) P. 208.
 - (d) Sect. 6. See as to the Act of
- 1895, infra, p. 700.
 - (e) Sects. 7 and 8.
 - (£) Sect. 9.
- (g) Sect. 8. See Re Whittingham's Trusts, 12 W. R. 776; Nicholson v. Drury, &c., 7 C. D. 48
 - (h) Sect. 10.
 - (i) Mullineux v. M., 6 W. R. 356.

money in Court (a), or in the hands of trustees (b), although it is given to her separate use, without power of anticipation (c).

And when she is executrix and residuary legatee, or even, it seems, when executrix alone, she could under this Act, after obtaining a protecting order, transfer stock standing in the name of her testator in the books of the Bank of England, and receive dividends as if she were a *feme sole* (d).

The protecting order will have a retrospective effect extending back to the commencement of the desertion (e); on its discharge the property of the married woman becomes subject to the rights of her husband (f).

Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895.

S. 5 (a) enacts: "A provision that the applicant be no longer bound to cohabit with her husband (which provision while in force shall have the effect in all respects of a decree of judicial separation on the ground of cruelty)."

The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, ss. 1, 7, 8.

This Act passed 9th August, 1870, was amended in 1874, and remained in force to the 31st December, 1882, when, with the amending Act, it was repealed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 22, that section providing that acts done and rights and liabilities acquired under the Acts of 1870 and 1874 should not be affected by the repeal.

- S. 1: "The wages and earnings of any married woman acquired or gained by her after the passing of this Act [9th August, 1870], in any employment, occupation, or trade in which she is engaged, or which she carries on separately from her husband, and also any money or property so acquired by her through the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill, and all investments of such wages, earnings, money, or property, shall be deemed and taken to be property held and settled to her separate use, independent of any husband to whom she may be married, and her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for such wages, earnings, money, and property."
- (a) Re Kingsley's T., 26 B. 84; Re Rainsdon's T., 4 Drew. 446.
- (b) Cooke v. Fuller, 26 B. 99; but see Waite v. Morland, supra, as to this case.
 - (c) Ibid.

- (d) Bathe v. The Bank of England, 4 Kay & J. 564.
- (e) In the Goods of Ann Elliott, L. R. 2 P. & D. 274.
- (f) Per Turner, L.J., in Rudge v. Weedon, 4 De G. & J. 223.

The property, capital, stock and effects, embarked and employed in an employment, at the time of the marriage, and wages and earnings made therefrom, are protected hereby (a). As to carrying on business separately, see (n). "Arrangements and agreements," &c. (b).

S. 7: "Where any woman married after the passing of this Act shall during her marriage become entitled to any personal property as next of kin, or one of the next of kin of an intestate, or to any sum of money not exceeding 200l. under any deed or will, such property shall, subject and without prejudice to the trusts of any settlement affecting the same, belong to the woman for her separate use, and her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for the same."

The limit of 200l. fixed by section 7 applied only to money coming to the married woman "by deed or will" and not to personal estate to which she might have become entitled as next of kin of an intestate (c). As to "become entitled," see Lane v. Oakes (d). A married woman entitled to a sum of stock under this section could not transfer it without the concurrence of her husband unless the provisions of section 3 had been complied with (e).

S. 8: "Where any freehold, copyhold, or customaryhold property shall descend upon any woman married after the passing of this Act, as heiress or co-heiress of an intestate, the rents and profits of such property shall, subject and without prejudice to the trusts of any settlement affecting the same, belong to such woman for her separate use, and her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for the same." The words "rents and profits" do not give the wife the fee simple (f), nor does this section enable a woman married after the passing of the Act (9th August, 1870) to pass by an unacknowledged deed the fee simple of real estate descended upon her (g).

Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10: Under these sections certain investments in Government annuities, savings banks, public stocks and funds, incorporated or joint stock companies, industrial, provident, friendly, benefit building or loan societies, might be made, and policies effected for the separate use of a married woman, subject to

- (a) Ashworth v. Outram, 5 C. D.,
 p. 940. So also property purchased therewith, Weldon v. De Bathe, 14
 Q. B. D. 339.
 - (b) P. 695, supra.
 - (c) See Re Voss, 13 C. D. 505.
 - (d) 22 W. R. 709.

- (e) Howard v. Bank of England, 19 Eq. 295.
- (f) Re Bacon, (1907) 1 Ch. at p. 481; cf. Johnson v. J., infra, at p. 347, observing on Re Voss, supra.
 - (g) Johnson v. J., 35 C. D. 345.

certain provisions against the use of the moneys of the husband without his consent (ss. 2, 3, 4, 5), or in fraud of the creditors of her husband (s. 6).

Generally as to policies effected under section 10, and the appointment of trustees thereunder on the death of the husband, see *infra*, p. 709, and the cases cited in note (a). In Re Parker's Policies (b) a husband effected a policy on his life in accordance with s. 10 of the Act of 1870 under which the policy moneys were made payable to his widow and children as he should by deed appoint. His wife died, he married again, and by deed he appointed in favour of his second wife if she should survive him and become his widow. His second wife and children of both marriages survived him. It was held that an after taken wife was within the Act of 1870, the same rule applying as under s. 11 of the Act of 1882.

The Married Women's Property Act, 1882.

This Act came into operation on the 1st January, 1883. It repealed the M. W. P. Act, 1870, and the Amendment Act, 1874, with the usual savings. The Act, save sections 2, 13, 14, applies to women married before the Act as well as after. The principal sections of it relating to separate estate are here set out, and others are referred to infra.

S. 1 (1): "A married woman shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, be capable of acquiring, holding and disposing by will or otherwise, of any real or personal property as her separate property, in the same manner as if she were a *feme sole*, without the intervention of any trustee."

This subsection is to be construed with subsections 2 and 5 (c). It only applies to a disposition by a married woman during coverture (d). The Act was not intended to alter any rights except those of husband and wife *inter se* (e). It alters the whole law as laid down in Pike v. Fitzgibbon (f). It does not touch the devolution of property on an intestacy (g). It does not take away the "personal" liability

- (a) Re Mellor, 7 C. D. 200; Re Adam's Policy, &c., 23 C. D. -525; Re Soutar's Policy, 26 C. D. 236; Re Turnbull, (1897) 2 Ch. 415; and Re Kuyper's Policy, (1899) 1 Ch. 38.
 - (b) (1906) 1 Ch. 526, and see infra, 709.
 - (c) Re Cuno, 43 C. D. 12.

- (d) Re Price, 28 C. D. 709.
- (e) See Re March, 27 C. D. 170; Re Jupp, 39 C. D. 148; Re Dixon, 42 C. D. 306.
- (f) 14 C. D. 837, per *Lindley*, L.J.; Cox v. Bennett, (1891) 1 Ch., p. 622.
- (g) Re Lambert, 39 C. D. 626; Hope v. H., (1892) 2 Ch., p. 342. See further

of a married woman upon a contract made by her before marriage (a). As to her property, it puts her in the position of a man (b); and see below, Note 3, "Wife's power of disposition," &c., p. 714.

S. 1 (2): "A married woman shall be capable of entering into and rendering herself liable in respect of and to the extent of her separate property on any contract, and of suing (c) and being sued, either in contract or in tort, or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, or be made a party to any action or other legal proceeding brought by or taken against her; and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such action or proceeding shall be her separate property, and any damages or costs recovered against her in any such action or proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property (d), and not otherwise." See below, Note 3, "Wife's power of disposition," &c., p. 714.

See further as to this section, Note 5, p. 722.

Subsections 3 and 4 are repealed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1893.

S. 1 (5): "Every married woman carrying on a trade (e) separately (f) from her husband shall, in respect of her separate property, be subject to the bankruptcy laws in the same way as if she were a feme sole." A married woman possessed of separate estate but not carrying on a trade separately from her husband is not subject to the operation of the bankruptcy laws, and cannot commit an act of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 4 (g). A bankruptcy notice under section 4, subsection 2, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, cannot be issued against a married woman trading separately, against whom a creditor has recovered judgment, in the form in Scott v. Morley (h); nor can a receiving order be made against her on the ground of non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice founded upon a judgment obtained against her in the firm's name (j). In Re

generally Re Price, 28 C. D. 709; Re Lambert, 39 C. D. 626; Smart v. Tranter, 43 C. D. 587; Surman v. Wharton, (1891) 1 Q. B. 491.

- (a) Robinson, King & Co. v. Lynes, (1894) 2 Q. B. 577.
- (b) Re Davenport, (1895) 1 Ch., p. 366.
- (c) Hamilton v. Long, (1903) 2 Ir. R. 407.
 - (d) Goatley v. Jones, (1909) 1 Ch.

557.

- (e) Re Long, (1905) 2 Ir. R. 343.
- (f) Re Simon, (1909) 1 K. B. 201, distinguishing Re a Debtor, (1898) 2 Q. B. 576.
 - (g) Re Gardiner, 20 Q. B. D. 249.
- (h) 20 Q. B. D. 120; Re Lynes, (1893) 2 Q. B. 113.
- (j) Re Handford & Co., (1899) 1 Q. B. 566.

Armstrong, Ex. p. Boyd (a), A. had carried on trade separately. She had settled (in 1881), before marriage, real estate in trust to pay the rents and profits to herself for life, for her separate use, without restraint, and after her decease upon trust for such persons as she should by deed or will appoint. Notwithstanding the wording of s. 19 of the Act, p. 756, infra, the trustee was held entitled to her life estate. Where a married woman entitled to separate estate with a restraint on anticipation, trades separately from her husband and becomes bankrupt, her separate estate, subject to the restraint on anticipation, vests in her trustee in bankruptcy, and, on the death of her husband in her lifetime, is assets for her creditors. In such a case the restraint on anticipation is in the nature of an incumbrance which is removed by the death of the husband (b). Separate property over which she has only a power of appointment, and which would go to another in default, does not go to the trustee (c).

S. 2: Every woman who marries after the commencement of this Act [i.e. on or after 1st January, 1883] shall be entitled to have and to hold as her separate property and to dispose of in manner aforesaid all real and personal property which shall belong to her at the time of marriage, or shall be acquired by or devolve upon her after marriage, including any wages, earnings, money, and property gained or acquired by her in any employment, trade, or occupation, in which she is engaged, or which she carries on separately from her husband, or by the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill.

See below, Note 3, "Wife's power of disposition," &c., p. 714.

A woman married since 1st January, 1883, need not be examined separately (d). Nor where she is married before that date, but the property in question is acquired after (e).

This section adds the incident of separate use to any property which the woman has at the time of her marriage, although coming to her under a settlement (f). A female tenant in fee marrying after 1st January, 1883, can dispose of the land without the concurrence of her husband and without deed acknowledged (g). As to separate trade see Note. "Arrangements between husband and wife" (h). If

- (a) 21 Q. B. D. 264.
- (b) Re Wheeler, (1899) 2 Ch. 717.
- (c) Re Armstrong, Ex p. Gilchrist, 17 Q. B. D. 521.
 - (d) Riddell v. Errington, 26 C.D. 220.
 - (e) Re Harris, 28 C. D. 171; Re
- Bett, (1897) 2 Ch. 65.
- (f) Re Onslow, 39 C. D. 622; Re
- Davenport, (1895) 1 Ch. 361.
- (g) Re Drummond, (1891) 1 Ch.
- 524.
- (h) Supra, p. 695.

she trades separately it will be presumed she has separate property (a).

S. 3: See p. 735, infra. S. 4: see p. 722, infra.

S. 5: "Every woman married before the commencement of this Act shall be entitled to have and to hold and to dispose of in manner aforesaid as her separate property all real and personal property, her title to which, whether vested or contingent, and whether in possession, reversion, or remainder, shall accrue after the commencement of this Act, including any wages, earnings, money, and property so gained or acquired by her as aforesaid" (b).

If a woman married before the Act acquires before its commencement a title, whether vested or contingent, in reversion or remainder to any property, such property does not, on falling into possession after the Act, become her separate estate by this section (c), nor a fortiori will it become her separate property by a change in its character, as by conversion from realty into personalty under a Thus in Reid v. R. (e) trustees were by deed dated 1874 directed to pay the interest of a sum to A. for her life, and after her death to B., a woman married in 1871. After A.'s death in 1883 B. asked for a declaration that she was entitled to the fund to her separate use; it was held not to be her separate estate. But in a gift before the Act to next of kin ascertained after the Act, the section applies; for a "spes successionis" is not a "title" (f). The wife has a separate right to damages awarded to her in an action in which her husband was plaintiff with her (g): and her will made before the Act will pass separate estate acquired under the Act(h).

S. 6: "All deposits in any post-office or other savings bank, or in any other bank, all annuities granted by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt or by any other person, and all sums forming part of the public stocks or funds, or of any other stocks or funds transferable in the books of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, or of any other bank, which at the commencement of this Act are standing in the sole name of a married woman, and all shares, stocks, debentures, debenture stock, or other

⁽a) Eddowes v. Argentine, &c., 63 L. T. 364.

⁽b) Re Williams, 76 L. T. 150.

⁽c) Reid v. R., 31 C. D. 402.

⁽d) Re Bacon, (1907) 1 Ch. 475.

⁽e) Supra.

⁽f) Re Parsons, 45 C. D. 51.

⁽g) Beasley v. Roney, (1891) 1 Q. B. 509.

⁽h) Re Bowen, (1892) 2 Ch. 291;

cf. Re Cuno, 43 C. D. 12.

⁽e) Supra. W. & T.— VOL. I.

interests of or in any corporation, company, or public body, municipal, commercial, or otherwise, or of or in any industrial, provident, friendly, benefit, building, or loan society, which at the commencement of this Act (on the 1st January, 1883) are standing in her name, shall be deemed, unless and until the contrary be shown, to be the separate property of such married woman; and the fact that any such deposit, annuity, sum forming part of the public stocks or funds, or of any other stocks or funds transferable in the books of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, or of any other bank, share, stock, debenture, debenture stock, or other interest as aforesaid, is standing in the sole name of a married woman, shall be sufficient primâ facie evidence that she is beneficially entitled thereto for her separate use, so as to authorise and empower her to receive or transfer the same, and to receive the dividends, interest, and profits thereof, without the concurrence of her husband, and to indemnify the Postmaster-General, the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, the Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland, and all directors, managers, and trustees of every such bank, corporation, company, public body, or society as aforesaid, in respect thereof."

S. 7: "All sums forming part of the public stocks or funds, or of any other stocks or funds transferable in the books of the Bank of England or of any other bank, and all such deposits and annuities respectively as are mentioned in the last preceding section, and all shares, stock, debentures, debenture stock, and other interests of or in any such corporation, company, public body, or society as aforesaid which after the commencement of this Act (on or after the 1st January, 1883) shall be allotted to or placed, registered, or transferred in or into or made to stand in the sole name of any married woman shall be deemed, unless and until the contrary be shown, to be her separate property, in respect of which so far as any liability may be incident thereto her separate estate shall alone be liable, whether the same shall be so expressed in the document whereby her title to the same is created or certified, or in the books or register wherein her title is entered or recorded, or not. Provided always, that nothing in this Act shall require or authorise any corporation or joint stock company to admit any married woman to be a holder of any shares or stock therein to which any liability may be incident, contrary to the provisions of any Act of Parliament, charter, bye-

law, articles of association, or deed of settlement regulating such corporation or company."

S. 8: "All the provisions hereinbefore contained as to deposits in any post-office or other savings bank, or in any other bank, annuities granted by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt or by any other person, sums forming part of the public stocks or funds, or of any other stocks or funds transferable in the books of the Bank of England or of any other bank, shares, stock, debentures, debenture stock, or other interests of or in any such corporation, company, public body, or society as aforesaid respectively, which at the commencement of this Act (on 1st January 1883) shall be standing in the sole name of a married woman, or which, after that time, shall be allotted to, or placed, registered, or transferred to or into, or made to stand in, the sole name of a married woman, shall respectively extend and apply, so far as relates to the estate, right, title, or interest of the married woman, to any of the particulars aforesaid which, at the commencement of this Act (on the 1st of January, 1883) or at any time afterwards, shall be standing in, or shall be allotted to, placed, registered, or transferred to or into, or made to stand in, the name of any married woman jointly with any persons or person other than her husband."

S. 9: "It shall not be necessary for the husband of any married woman, in respect of her interest, to join in the transfer of any such annuity or deposit as aforesaid, or any sum forming part of the public stocks or funds, or of any other stocks or funds transferable as aforesaid, or of any share, stock, debenture, debenture stock, or other benefit, right, claim, or other interest of or in any such corporation, company, public body, or society as aforesaid, which is now or shall at any time hereafter be standing in the sole name of any married woman, or in the joint names of such married woman and any other person or persons not being her husband."

By section 10 it is provided that if any investment such as aforesaid have been made by a married woman by means of moneys of her husband, without his consent, the Court may, upon an application under sect. 17 of this Act, order such investment, and the dividends thereof, to be transferred and paid respectively to the husband.

Section 11 enacts as follows: "A married woman may by virtue of the power of making contracts hereinbefore contained effect a policy

upon her own life or the life of her husband for her separate use and the same and all benefit thereof shall enure accordingly."

"A policy of assurance effected by any man on his own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of his wife, or of his children, or of his wife and children, or any of them, or by any woman on her own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of her husband, or of her children, or of her husband and children, or any of them, shall create a trust in favour of the objects therein named, and the moneys payable under any such policy shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the insured, or be subject to his or her debts: Provided, that if it shall be proved that the policy was effected and the premiums paid with intent to defraud the creditors of the insured, they shall be entitled to receive, out of the moneys payable under the policy, a sum equal to the premiums The insured may by the policy, or by any memorandum under his or her hand, appoint a trustee or trustees of the moneys payable under the policy, and from time to time appoint a new trustee or new trustees thereof, and may make provision for the appointment of a new trustee or new trustees thereof, and for the investment of the moneys payable under any such policy. In default of any such appointment of a trustee, such policy, immediately on its being effected, shall vest in the insured and his or her legal personal representatives, in trust for the purposes aforesaid. If, at the time of the death of the insured, or at any time afterwards, there shall be no trustee, or it shall be expedient to appoint a new trustee or new trustees, a trustee or trustees or a new trustee or new trustees may be appointed by any Court having jurisdiction under the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1850, or the Acts amending and extending the The receipt of a trustee or trustees duly appointed, or, in default of any such appointment, or in default of notice to the insurance office, the receipt of the legal personal representative of the insured shall be a discharge to the office for the sum secured by the policy, or for the value thereof, in whole or in part" (a).

(a) For convenience, s. 10 of the Act of 1870 is printed here:—"A married woman may effect a policy of insurance upon her own life or the life of her husband for her separate use, and the same and all benefit thereof, if expressed on the face of it to be so effected, shall enure accord-

ingly, and the contract in such policy shall be as valid as if made with an unmarried woman.

"A policy of insurance effected by any married man on his own life, and expressed upon the face of it to be for the benefit of his wife or of his wife and children, or any of them, shall

The wording of this section differs in some material respects from the wording of section 10 of the Act of 1870, which is repealed as to policies effected after 1882. A policy under section 11 can be effected by an unmarried man or woman.

Section 10 expressly excludes a husband effecting a policy under the Act from exercising any control over the policy; he cannot assign it even to a trustee. He was given the power to appoint trustees of the policy moneys, and in default of his doing so, trustees had to be appointed by the Court (a). Under section 11 where the objects of the trust fail, as by predecease of the wife or children of the insured person, the policy becomes the property of the insured person (b).

Under section 10 the objects of the trust and their interests are to be according to the interests expressed in the policy. The Act "refers to the policy for the expression of what is the benefit intended" (c). The words "therein named" are the only words in section 11 defining the objects and their interests (d). In this respect, however, the two sections have received a similar construction (e).

The policy is clearly the governing instrument under section 10 (f), and it would seem that it is within the power of the insured to insert such trust for the benefit of the spouse and the children as the insured may desire.

Under a policy for the benefit of the wife and children subject to

enure and be deemed a trust for the benefit of his wife for her separate use, and of his children, or any of them, according to the interest so expressed, and shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains, be subject to the control of the husband or to his creditors, or form part of his estate. When the sum secured by the policy becomes payable, or at any time previously, a trustee thereof may be appointed by the Court of Chancery in England or in Ireland according as the policy of insurance was effected in England or in Ireland, or in England by the judge of the County Court of the district, or in Ireland by the chairman of the Civil Bill Court of the division of the county, in which the insurance office

is situated, and the receipt of such trustee shall be a good discharge to the office. If it shall be proved that the policy was effected and premiums paid by the husband with intent to defraud his creditors, they shall be entitled to receive out of the sum secured an amount equal to the premiums so paid."

- (a) See the sections contrasted in Re Turnbull, (1897) 2 Ch. 416.
- (b) Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund, &c., (1892) 1 Q. B. 147.
- (c) Per North, J., in Re Seyton, 34 C. D. 514.
- (d) Re Browne, (1903) 1 Ch. 188.
- (e) See Re Parker's Policies, (1906)1 Ch. 526.
 - (f) Re Griffiths, (1903) 1 Ch. 739.

the provisions of the policy, the wife and children take equally as joint tenants (a).

Under a policy for the benefit of wife and children, a wife married after the decease of the wife of the insured living at the date of the insurance is (in the absence of expression of intention to the contrary in the policy (b)) entitled to share with the children of both marriages or either of them (c). A policy effected by husband and wife, in favour of the survivor, is a valid insurance of the wife's own life within section 11 (d).

S. 12, see p. 748, infra; s. 13, see p. 739, infra; s. 14, see p. 740, infra; s. 15, see p. 742, infra; s. 16 (e), see p. 742, infra; s. 17, see p. 742, infra; s. 18, see p. 768, infra; s. 19, see p. 756, infra.

Sections 20 and 21 provide that a married woman, having separate property, is to be liable to the parish for the maintenance of her husband, and of her children, and grandchildren, but so that her husband shall not be relieved from any liability imposed upon him by law to maintain her children or grandchildren (f). During the lunacy of her husband a wife has an authority of necessity to pledge his credit for necessaries (g), and this though she has separate estate (h); but her authority is no higher than in any other case of necessity, and consequently, if a sufficient allowance has been made her, she cannot bind her husband (i). In Davidson v. Wood, supra, it was apparently considered that a married woman with a lunatic husband need not pledge her separate estate, but is entitled to bind her husband's estate: $sed\ qu$. (k).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1908, a married woman having separate property is made subject to all such liability for the maintenance of her parent or parents as a *feme sole* is subject to for the support of her parent or parents.

- (a) Re Seyton, supra, not following a dictum in Re Adam's Policy, 23
 C. D. 525; Re Davies, (1892) 1 Ch. 90.
 - (b) Re Griffiths, supra.
- (c) Re Browne, sect. 11, supra; Re Parker's Policies, (1906) 1 Ch. 526, sect. 10.
- (d) Griffiths v. Fleming, (1909) 1 K. B. 805.
- (e) Amended by M. W. P. Act, 1884.
 - (f) See Peters v. Cowie, 2 Q. B. D.

- 131; Coleman v. Overseers, &c., 6 Q. B. D. 615.
- (g) Read v. Legard, 6 Exch. 636; Davidson v. Wood, 1 De G. J. & S. 465.
 - (h) Davidson v. Wood, supra.
- (i) Richardson v. Du Bois, L. R.5 Q. B. 51.
- (k) See, e.g., Morel v. Earl of Westmoreland, (1903) 1 K. B. 64; (1904) A. C. 11.

Section 22 repeals with the usual savings the M. W. Property Acts of 1870 and 1874.

S. 23: See p. 746, infra.

S. 24 provides that the word contract shall include the acceptance of any trust, as to which see infra, p. 768, and the provisions of the Act as to married women are to apply to breaches of trust by them before and after marriage, and the word property is to include things in action.

The Married Women's Property Act, 1893.

By this Act, which passed on the 5th December, 1893, it is enacted:

- S. 1. "Every contract hereafter entered into by a married woman otherwise than as agent,
 - (a) shall be deemed to be a contract entered into by her with respect to and to bind her separate property whether she is or is not in fact possessed of or entitled to any separate property at the time when she enters into such contract;
 - (b) shall bind all separate property which she may at that time or thereafter be possessed of or entitled to; and
 - (c) shall also be enforceable by process of law against all property which she may thereafter while discovert be possessed of or entitled to (a);

Provided that nothing in this section contained shall render available to satisfy any liability or obligation arising out of such contract any separate property which at that time or thereafter she is restrained from anticipating "(b).

The main object of the section was to get rid of the inconvenient results of the strained construction put upon section 1, sub-s. 2, of the Act of 1882 (see infra, p. 725) by the decision in *Palliser* v. *Gurney* (c) and the cases following that decision, especially *Leak* v. *Driffield* (d).

The section only applies to a contract made by a married woman for the first time after the Act; an acknowledgment of a pre-existing debt is not within the section (e). It is a question of fact whether (a) This removes the difficulty coverture.

- (a) This removes the difficulty caused by the decision in Pelton v. Harrison, (1891) 2 Q. B. 422, that property acquired after coverture ceased could not be made liable for debts incurred during coverture unless it were separate estate under a fresh
- (b) Barnett v. Howard, (1900) 2
 Q. B. 784; Brown v. Dimbleby, (1904)
 1 K. B. 28.
 - (c) 19 Q. B. D. 519.
 - (d) 24 Q. B. D. 98; see below, p 726.
 - (e) Re Wheeler, (1901) 2 Ch. 66.

a married woman contracts as agent or not; if she has express authority to act as her husband's agent, then whether the other contracting party does or does not know whether she is married or not is immaterial, and she is not bound under the Act (a).

S. 2. "In any action or proceeding now or hereafter instituted by a woman or by a next friend on her behalf, the Court before which such action or proceeding is pending shall have jurisdiction by judgment or order from time to time to order payment of the costs of the opposite party out of property which is subject to a restraint on anticipation, and may enforce such payment by the appointment of a receiver and the sale of the property or otherwise as may be just" (b).

"Action . . instituted."—This does not apply to an order made before the Act came into operation; nor does it include motions or appeals by the defendant (c). It means some action or proceeding in the nature of an action initiated by a married woman (d). It applies to an action commenced before and pending at the date of passing of the Act (e). The presentation of a petition in an action by a married woman is not a "proceeding instituted" within the section (f), nor is the lodging of a "careat" in a probate suit (g). But a counterclaim is an action or proceeding within it (h), and so is a summons for leave to intervene in a pending probate action for the purpose of asserting an independent interest in the subjectmatter (i); or an application by a married woman for a new trial in an action commenced by her (k). In Nunn & Co. v. Tyson (l)it was held that a written claim to goods or chattels taken in execution under process served by a married woman on the sheriff or high bailiff of the County Court is a "proceeding instituted" within the section. And the section applies to an action brought by husband and wife, but in which the wife is the real plaintiff (m).

- (a) Paquin v. Beauclerk, (1906) A. C. 148; cf. Morel v. Earl of Westmoreland, (1904) A. C. 11.
- (b) See (n.) "Restraint on Anticipation," infra, p. 749.
- (c) Hood-Barrs v. Catheart, (1894) 3 Ch. 376.
- (d) Hood-Barrs v. Catheart, (1897)
 A. C. 177; Gordon v. G., (1904)
 P. 163.
- (e) Re Godfrey, 71 L. T. 568; 72 L. T. 8.

- (f) Hollington v. Dear, W. N. (95)
- (g) Moran v. Place, (1896) P. 214.
- (h) Hood-Barrs v. Catheart, (1895)
 1 Q. B. 873; Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1897)
 A. C. 177.
 - (i) Crickitt v. C., (1902) P. 177.
- (k) Dresel v. Ellis, (1905) 1 K. B. 574.
 - (l) (1901) 2 K. B. 487.
- (m) Huntly (Marchioness) v. Gaskell, (1905) 2 Ch. 656.

S. 3. "Section twenty-four of the Wills Act, 1837, shall apply to the will of a married woman made during coverture, whether she is or is not possessed of or entitled to any separate property at the time of making it, and such will shall not require to be re-executed or republished after the death of her husband."

In Re Price (a) it was held that the will of a married woman taking effect under section 1, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1882, would not, unless republished after she became discovert, dispose of property acquired after the termination of coverture. This section removes the difficulties caused by that decision, and applies to every will of a married woman dying after the Act, at whatever date the will was executed (b).

S. 4. "Subsections (3) and (4) of section 1 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, are hereby repealed."

By section 6 the Act is not to apply to Scotland.

The Married Women's Property Act, 1907.

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1907, it is enacted as follows:—

- S. 1. "(1) A married woman is able, without her husband, to dispose of, or to join in disposing of, real or personal property held by her solely or jointly with any other person as trustee or personal representative in like manner as if she were a feme sole."
- "(2) This section operates to render valid and confirm all such dispositions made after the thirty-first day of December one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, but, where any title or right has been acquired through or with the concurrence of the husband before the commencement of this Act, that title or right shall prevail over any title or right which would otherwise be rendered valid by this section" (c).
- S. 2. "(1) Notwithstanding section nineteen of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, a settlement or agreement for a settlement made after the commencement of this Act by the husband or intended husband, whether before or after marriage, respecting the property of any woman he may marry or have married, shall not be

⁽a) 28 C. D. 709, following Noble v. Willock, L. R. 7 H. L. 580; and see Re Cuno, 43 C. D. 12; Re

Smith, 45 C. D. 632. (b) Re Wylie, (1895) 2 Ch. 116.

⁽c) See infra, p. 717.

valid unless it is executed by her if she is of full age, or confirmed by her after she attains full age "(a).

- "(2) But if she dies an infant any covenant or disposition by her husband contained in the settlement or agreement shall bind or pass any interest in any property of hers to which he may become entitled on her death and which he could have bound or disposed of if this Act had not been passed."
- "(3) Nothing in this section shall render invalid any settlement or agreement for a settlement made or to be made under the provisions of the Infants Settlement Act, 1855."
- S. 3. "(1) Where a married woman would, if single, be the protector of a settlement in respect of a prior estate, which is by virtue of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, made her separate property, then she alone shall, in respect of that estate, be the protector of the settlement."
- "(2) This section applies to disentailing assurances and surrenders made after the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, and as well before as after the commencement of this Act."
- S. 4. "(1) This Act may be cited as the Married Women's Property Act. 1907.
- "(2) This Act shall come into operation on the first day of January one thousand nine hundred and eight.
 - "(3) This Act shall not extend to Scotland.
- "(4) This Act shall be construed with the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882, 1884, and 1893, and those Acts and this Act may be cited together as the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 to 1907."

3. Wife's Power of Disposition over her Separate Estate.

A feme covert acting in respect of her equitable or statutory separate estate unrestrained from anticipation, is competent to act in all respects as if she were a feme sole (b).

Personal Estate.—Personal property is to be enjoyed with all its incidents; and, as the jus disponendi is one of them, a feme covert can by the general law, independently of any statute, and although there is no express power of disposition given to her, dispose of personal property settled upon her for her separate use, either by

- (a) See Note 14, p. 757, infra. and Re Bowen, (1892) 2 Ch., p. 294.
- (b) See Hulme v. Tenant, supra,

acts inter vivos, or by will (a). Her power extends to interests in reversion as well as those in possession (b), and Malins' Act has no application to alienations of such interests. In a series of Irish cases it was held that a married woman could not dispose of a contingent interest in realty or personalty given to her for her separate use so long as the interest remained contingent (c). These cases are, it is submitted, inconsistent with the principle recognised in the English cases cited in the last note, and would not be followed here. A will made before 1882, by a married woman then having capacity to make a will, passes separate estate acquired under the Act of 1882, and this without re-execution (d). A feme covert entitled to a power of appointment by will and (see the judgment) to separate estate, made her will in 1872. In 1884 she became entitled as next of kin and under the Act of 1882 to a sum of money as separate estate. She died in 1885, leaving her husband. Held, the will passed the sum which came to her in 1884 (e).

An English woman who has married a foreigner, and therefore acquired his domicil (the settlement being made in and to be construed by the law of England), can dispose entirely by will of personalty settled to her separate use, although according to the law of her husband's domicil she could only do so partially (f). A married woman can dispose by will of personal estate, where the income is given to her separate use for life, and after her death the capital is given to her, her executors, administrators, and assigns for her separate use (g).

- (a) Fettiplace v. Gorges, 1 V. 46,
 1 R. R. 79; Rich v. Cockell, 9 V.
 369, 7 R. R. 227; Sturgis v. Corp, 13
 V. 190, 9 R. R. 169; Noble v. Willock,
 L. R. 7 H. L. 580; Re Price, 28 C. D.
 709; Re Cuno, 43 C. D. 12; Re
 Bowen, (1892) 2 Ch. 291.
- (b) Sturgis v. Corp, supra; Stamford, &c., Bank v. Ball, 4 De G. F. & J. 310; cf. Re Williams, 76 L. T. 150. Where the trust for separate use applied to future coverture only (as in the declaration of the trusts of policy moneys payable on the death of the husband) the married woman could not, applying the rule in Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 17 C. D. 454, bind such separate estate by her contract during her then coverture (King v. Lucas, 23
- C. D. 723). Quære whether this case can have any application after the Act of 1893.
- (c) Mara v. Manning, 2 Jo. & Lat. 311; see per Lord St. Leonards, p. 318 (personalty); followed in Bestall v. Bunbury, 13 Ir. Ch. R. 318 and 549 (realty); Keays v. Lane, 3 Ir. R. Eq. 1; Re Smallman, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 249; and see these cases discussed in Crawley, Law of Husband and Wife, pp. 88 and 89.
- (d) Re Bowen, (1892) 2 Ch. 291; and see now Married Women's Property Act, 1893, s. 3, p. 713, supra.
- (e) Ibid., and see Charlemont v. Spencer, 11 L. R. Ir. 347.
 - (f) Re Hernando, 27 C. D. 284.
 - (g) Bishop v. Wall, 3 C. D. 194, 197.

And where a husband covenanted to pay immediately after his death 10,000l, to his wife, her executors, administrators, and assigns for her sole and absolute use and disposal, it was held that the wife, who died in the lifetime of her husband, had power to dispose of the 10,000l, by her will (a).

Apart from statute however, where the separate use was confined to a *life interest*, her power of disposition by deed or will would not extend beyond that estate, even though she were entitled to the reversion, as for instance if a fund belonging to a married woman were settled upon trust for her "absolutely" and "during her life for her separate use" (b).

Accumulations of separate estate made by a married woman during coverture pass by her will. Prior to the Married Women's Property Act, 1893, those made during widowhood would not so pass (c).

Where a married woman making a will had property settled to her separate use satisfying the words of her will, it was held not to be made in execution of a special power to which she did not refer (d). Secus, where the will of a married woman having a general power would, if not held to be in execution of it, be inoperative (e). But since the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, women married before the 1st January, 1883, can dispose by will of property their title to which accrues after the 31st December, 1882, and women married since that date, of all their property (f).

Real Estate.—Over lands which are her separate estate, a married woman has the same power of disposition by deed or will as if she were a feme sole, so far as relates to the equitable or beneficial interest therein. In Taylor v. Meads (g), Westbury, C. said: "* It is of the essence of the separate use that the married woman shall be independent of and free from the control and interference of her husband. With respect to separate property, the feme covert is by the form of trust released and freed from the fetters and disability of coverture, and invested with the rights and powers of a person who is sui juris." In this case the married woman had the equitable fee, the legal estate being vested in trustees (h).

- (a) Baker v. Ker, 11 L. R. Ir. 3.
- (b) See Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 B.496; Troutbeck v. Boughey, 2 Eq. 534;cf. Re Davenport, (1895) 1 Ch. 361.
 - (c) Re Wilson, 26 W. R. 848.
- (d) Evans v. E., 23 B. 1; Lovell v. Knight, 3 Si. 275; Lemprière v. Valpy,
- 9 Si. 447.
- (e) Shelford v. Acland, 23 B. 10. See since the Wills Act, A.-G. v. Wilkinson, 2 Eq. 816. See Part 4, infra.
 - (f) Re Bowen, (1892) 2 Ch. 291.
 - (g) 4 De G. J. & S. 597, at p. 603.
 - (h) See also Baggett v. Meux, 1 Ph.

In a subsequent case it was held that a married woman, to whom the legal fee of real estate had been devised to her separate use, without the intervention of trustees, might dispose of the equitable fee by her will during coverture in the same way as if she were a feme sole (a). But the legal estate, if vested in the wife, was considered to remain subject to the ordinary legal incidents, and therefore the husband and wife must both be conveying parties, and the deed must be acknowledged by her to pass the legal estate, unless it be vested in the wife to such uses as she shall appoint; in which case by a conveyance operating as an appointment she can convey alone by deed unacknowledged (b). But with respect to property coming to her under the Act of 1882, she will be able to dispose of realty so coming to her without the concurrence of her husband and without deed acknowledged (c), and this power of disposition is extended by the Married Women's Property Act, 1907, s. 1, to trust estates, to which the provisions of the Act of 1882 had been held not to apply (d). Also by the general law of contract married women could bind their separate estate (e).

A married woman may demise land settled to her separate use, and her lessee will be protected against the intrusion of the owner of the legal estate (f). Before the Act of 1882 a woman equitable tenant in tail of freehold estates to her separate use could with the concurrence of her husband bar the estate tail, acquire the fee simple, and by her will defeat his estate by curtesy (g), although she might be restrained from the alienation of the rents and profits (h). Where either the woman was married or the estate tail acquired after

627; Atcheson v. Le Mann, 33 L. T. 302; Adams v. Gamble, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 102.

(a) Hull v. Waterhouse, 13 W. R.
 666; Pride v. Bubb, L. R. 7 Ch. 64;
 Cooper v. Macdonald, 7 C. D. 288;
 Allen v. Walker, L. R. 5 Ex. 187.

(b) Goodeve's R. P., (1906) p. 70; and see Johnson v. J., 35 C. D. 345.

(c) Re Drummond, &c., (1891) 1 Ch., p. 524.

(d) Re Harkness and Allsopp's Contract, (1896) 2 Ch. 358, a decision distinguished in Re Brooke and Fremlin's Contract, (1898) 1 Ch. 647, as not being applicable to the case of a

married woman who is a mortgagee and not a trustee; and see *Re* West and Hardy's Contract, (1904) 1 Ch. 145.

(e) See infra, p. 722, and Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 and 1893, supra.

(f) Allen v. Walker, L. R. 5 Ex. 187.

(g) Cooper v. Macdonald, 7 C. D. 288. In this case the husband had during the coverture been made a bankrupt, but had obtained his discharge before concurring in barring the entail.

(h) Ibid.; and cf. Re Jakeman's T., 23 C. D. 344 and 350.

1882 no acknowledgment or concurrence by her husband is necessary (a).

Where she had power to appoint realty, her general devise passed the estate subject to the power (b).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, ss. 2 and 5, every woman married after the year 1882, and every married woman, as to property accrued after the 31st December, 1882, is in the position of a feme sole, and can dispose by will of property, or can convey it without any acknowledgment under the Fines and Recoveries Act, without the concurrence of her husband, and without separate examination (c).

By the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, s. 65 (2) (i), "a married woman with the concurrence of her husband, unless she is entitled for her separate use, whether with restraint on anticipation or not, and then without his concurrence" may enlarge the residue of a long term to which she is entitled into a fee simple.

By the Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 61 (2), "where a married woman who, if she had not been a married woman, would have been a tenant for life, or would have had the powers of a tenant for life under the foregoing provisions of this Act, is entitled for her separate use, or is entitled under any statute, passed or to be passed, for her separate property, or as a feme sole (d), then she, without her husband, shall have the powers of a tenant for life under this Act(e). (3) Where she is entitled otherwise than as aforesaid, then she and her husband together shall have the powers of a tenant for life under this Act. (4) The provisions of this Act referring to a tenant for life, and a settlement and settled land shall extend to the married woman without her husband, or to her and her husband together, as the case may require, and to the instrument under which her estate or interest arises, and to the land therein comprised. (5) The married woman may execute, make, and do all deeds, instruments, and things necessary or proper for giving effect to the provisions of this section. (6) A restraint on anticipation in the settlement shall not prevent the exercise by her of any power under this Act" (e).

- (a) Re Drummond and Davie, (1891) 1 Ch. 531.
- (b) Curteis v. Kenrick, 3 M. & W. 461. Cf. Re Roper, 39 C. D. 482; Re De Burgh-Lawson, 41 C. D. 568.
- (c) Ss. 2 and 5, supra, pp. 704, 705; Riddell v. Errington, 26 C. D. 220.
 - (d) As, e.g., under Matrimonial

Causes Act, 1857, s. 25, or 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 8, supra, pp. 696 to 699; and see Waite v. Morland, 38 C. D. 135; Re Whittingham, 12 W. R. 775.

(e) Bates v. Kesterton, (1896) 1 Ch. 159 (a married woman absolutely entitled except for restraint is not within the section).

4 Liability of Corpus of Married Woman's Property when she has a Life Interest with a Power.

A. Apart from the Married Women's Property Act, 1882.

The separate estates of married women being generally bound by their engagements, it has next become a question how far these engagements affect the corpus, where the married woman has a limited interest only, such for instance, as an estate for life with a power of appointment. The question may be considered under three heads: (i.) Where the power of appointment is general, by deed or writing or by will. (ii.) Where it has been by will only, and the power has been exercised. (iii.) Where there has been a limitation in default of appointment, and the power has not been exercised (a). regard to the first class of cases, where property is limited to a married woman, to her separate use for life, with remainder as she should, notwithstanding her coverture, by deed or will appoint, and a fortiori where there is a remainder to her executors or administrators, it will be treated as an absolute gift to the sole and separate use of the married woman, and consequently will be liable to her general engagements and debts (b). In the London Chartered Bank, &c. v. Lemprière (c), a widow settled on her second marriage certain property for her separate use for life, with remainder as she should by deed or will appoint, with remainder in default to her executors and administrators. This was held to be an absolute settlement for her sole and separate use, and such a form of gift, without restraint on anticipation, vests in her, in equity, the entire corpus for all purposes (d). See also the principal case, supra, which, in one respect, is a strong one, as there was no gift over in the event of the wife's dying in her husband's lifetime (e). In Re Armstrong, $Ex\ p$. Gilchrist (f), real estate was settled by a woman before her marriage to her separate use for life, without restraint, remainder as she should by deed or will appoint and in default to her children in fee. She traded, became bankrupt, and the trustee

infra.

⁽a) Per Turner, L.J., in Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G. F. & J. 513, cited by James, L.J., in The London Chartered Bank, &c. v. Lemprière, infra, L. R. 4 P. C., p. 592.

 ⁽b) See Allen v. Papworth, 1 Ves.
 Sen. 163; Heatley v. Thomas, 15 V.
 596, 10 R. R. 122; and see note (c),

⁽c) L. R. 4 P. C. 572, overruling Shattock v. S., 2 Eq. 182, but see remarks of Kay, J., Re Roper, 39 C. D., p. 489; and Re Hastings, 35 C. D. 94.

⁽d) Ibid., L. R. 4 P. C., p. 595.

⁽e) Ibid., L. R. 4 P. C., p. 595.

⁽f) 17 Q. B. D. 167, 521, C. A.

in bankruptcy required her to execute her power in his favour. The Court of Appeal, overruling the Divisional Court, held, that such a power was not "property" under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, s.s. 5, and that she could not be compelled to exercise it; also, that although equity has given effect to the contracts of a married woman out of property over which she has a general power of appointment, where the remainder in default is limited to her executors and administrators, yet it has never done this in her lifetime, or where there is a gift over in default to others (a).

And there is no distinction between a case where the life estate precedes the power and where it follows it (b).

In cases falling under the second head, where the power of appointment is by will only, and has been exercised but not for creditors, the authorities do not appear to be consistent. Thus, although where a man having a general power of appointment over property by will, which, in default of appointment, goes to others, by exercising his appointment renders the appointed property assets for payment of his debts (c), it has been held that if a married woman exercised such a power, although having a life estate to her separate use, the appointed property would not be applicable to the payment of debts which she may have contracted as a feme sole (d). In commenting on this class of cases, Turner, L.J., says:—"In the case of Norton v. Turvill (e), and in Sockett v. Wray(f), the exercise of the power by the will of the married woman seems to have been held to let in a bond-creditor against the appointees under the will; and in Hughes v. Wells (g), I seem to have intimated that this might be the effect of the exercise of the power, as in other cases of the exercise of the general power of appointment by will, and certainly not upon the ground that power is property," and after commenting upon Vaughan v. Vanderstegen (h), and Heatley v. Thomas (i), concludes that this point may be considered open (k).

- (a) See Re Roper, infra.
- (b) See Mayd v. Field, 3 C. D. 587, 593; commented upon in Re Roper, 39 C. D. 490.
- (c) Jenney v. Andrews, 6 Madd. 264; Re Guedella, (1905) 2 Ch. 331.
- (d) Vaughan v. Vanderstegen, 2 Drew. 165, 363; and see Heatley v. Thomas, 15 V. 596, 10 R. R. 122; Hobday v. Peters, 28 B. 354, 356;

Blatchford v. Woolley, 2 Dr. & Sm. 204.

- (e) 2 P. W. 144, explained in Re Hastings, 35 C. D., p. 99.
 - (f) 4 Bro. Ch. 483.
 - (g) 9 Ha. 749.
- (h) 2 Drew. 165.
 - (i) 15 V. 596, 10 R. R. 122.
- (k) Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G.F. & J. 513,

But in Re Parkin (a), Stirling, J., held that property appointed by will by a woman married in 1867 under a general power was assets for the payment of her ante-nuptial debts.

In $Re\ Harrey$'s $Estate\ (b)$, property was settled on a married woman for life to her separate use, remainder as she should by will appoint; she appointed, and it was held that the appointed property was liable to the payment of her debts as if it were her separate estate, following The London Chartered Bank, &c. v. Lemprière, but not Vaughan v. Vanderstegen.

In Re Roper (c), Mrs. R. was entitled for her separate use, without restraint, to a policy of insurance and some furniture; she also had a general power of appointment by will over 12,400l. In 1881 she became surety with her husband for the payment of a debt, and assigned her interest in her separate estate to secure such debt and covenanted to pay the interest. She died in 1887 in the lifetime of her husband, having appointed the 12,400l. to her infant daughter at twenty-one or marriage. The question arose, whether the property appointed by her will was liable to satisfy her covenant. Kay, J., after reviewing the cases, held, that the case was not within the Married Women's Property Act, 1882; and also, that the exercise by will of this general power could not make the appointed fund (12,400l.), which never was her separate estate, liable; and, applying the principle of Pike v. Fitzgibbon (d), even if it could be said to have become her separate property by the appointment, yet this could only be so at her death, which took place long after the engagements were entered into, and therefore the appointed property could not be liable.

With regard to the cases falling under the third head, viz., where there has been a limitation in default of appointment and the power has not been exercised, it has been laid down "that there cannot be any reasonable doubt that the debts and engagements of a married woman cannot prevail against the parties entitled in default of appointment, and the case of Nail v. Punter (e) impliedly decides that point "(f).

⁽a) (1892) 3 Ch. 510, 521; Fleming v. Buchanan, 3 De G. M. & G. 976.

⁽b) 13 C. D. 216; and see also Hodges v. H., 20 C. D. 749; Re Lady Hastings, 35 C. D. 95; Re De Burgh Lawson, 41 C. D. 568.

⁽c) 39 C. D. 482.

W. & T .- VOL. I.

⁽d) 17 C. D. 454.

⁽e) 5 Si. 599; and see Re Parkin, (1892) 3 Ch. p. 518.

⁽f) Per $\bar{T}urner$, L.J., Johnson v. Gallagher, cited in the London Chartered Bank, &c. v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C., p. 592.

B. By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 4.

By this section it is enacted that "the execution of a general power by will of a married woman shall have the effect of making the property appointed liable for her debts and other liabilities in the same manner as her separate estate is made liable under this Act." The section only applies to cases where under statute the separate estate of the married woman if she were alive could be made liable for the debt or liability sought to be enforced against the property appointed (a). Accordingly, where in 1891 a married woman having then no separate estate in respect of which she could be supposed to have contracted entered into a covenant, it was held that the covenant did not constitute a contract damages for the breach of which could be recovered out of a fund appointed by her will in exercise of a general power (b). The section has no application to liabilities incurred under contracts made before 1883 by women then married (c), save that a debt or liability incurred before 1883 by a married woman then in the position of a feme sole by force of a protection order is enforceable against property appointed by her under a general power created after the date of the protection order (d). The appointed fund is liable for ante-nuptial debts (e).

A married woman may now by deed unacknowledged release her power over any property (f).

- (A) Liability of Separate Estate for a General Engagement apart from Statute. (B) Liability for Contract under Acts of 1882 and 1893. (C) Liability for Breach of Trust Fraud, and Tort.
- A. Liability of Separate Estate for a General Engagement apart from Statute.

The law under this heading is now of little if any practical importance; cases which now arise will almost always be governed by the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 and 1893, but the note is retained as illustrating the development of the contractual power of the married woman.

"I think that in order to bind the separate estate by a general

- (a) Re Fieldwick, (1909) 1 Ch. 1; overruling Re Ann, (1894) 1 Ch. 549.
- (b) Re Fieldwick, supra; but see now the Act of 1893.
 - (c) Re Roper, 39 C. D. 482.
 - (d) Re Hughes, (1898) 1 Ch. 529.
- (e) Re Parkin, (1892) 3 Ch. 510.
- (f) Re Chisholm, (1901) 2 Ch. 82; Re Onslow, 39 C. D. 622; Re Davenport, (1895) 1 Ch. 361; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, s. 52.

engagement, it should appear that the engagement was made with reference to and upon the faith and credit of that estate; and whether that was so or not, is a question to be judged by the Court upon all the circumstances," per Turner, L.J., in Johnson v. Gallagher (a). "When a woman has property settled to her separate use, she may bind that property without distinctly stating that she intends to do so. She may enter into a bond, bill, promissory note or other obligation, which, considering her state as a married woman, could only be satisfied by means of her separate estate; and therefore, the inference is conclusive, that there was an intention, and a clear one, on her part, that her separate estate, which would be the only means of satisfying the obligation into which she entered, should be bound "(b).

The following has been laid down by a very accurate and learned judge, as the principle upon which the Courts acted (previous to recent legislation on the subject), viz. that—"If a married woman, having separate property, enters into a pecuniary engagement, whether by ordering goods or otherwise, which (if she were a feme sole) would constitute her a debtor, and in entering into such engagement she purports to contract, not for her husband, but for herself, and on the credit of her separate estate, and it was so intended by her, and so understood by the person with whom she is contracting, that constitutes an obligation for which the person with whom she contracts has the right to make her separate estate liable; and the question whether the obligation was contracted in such manner must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. It clearly is not necessary that the contract should be in writing (c), because it is now admitted that if a married woman enters into a verbal contract, expressly (or impliedly) making her separate estate liable, such contract would bind it; nor is it necessary that there should be any express reference made to the fact of there being such separate estate, for a bond or promissory note given by a married woman, without any mention of her separate estate, has long been held sufficient to make her separate estate liable. If the circumstances are such as to lead to the conclusion that she was contracting,

(a) 3 De G. F. & J. 513, cited London Chartered Bank, &c. v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C., p. 590; Murray v. Barlee, 3 My. & K. 209; Pollock, Contract, (1902) p. 687; Wainford v. Heyl, 20 Eq. 321.

(b) Per Langdale, M.R., in Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 B., p. 323, followed in

Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G. F. & J., p. 515; Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 274; London Chartered Bank, &c., v. Lemprière, supra.

(c) See Murray v. Barlee, 3 My. & K. 209; Owens v. Dickenson, Cr. & Ph. 53.

not for her husband, but for herself, in respect of her separate estate, that separate estate will be liable to satisfy the obligation "(a).

As the "engagement" of a married woman differs from a contract, not in the nature of the transaction itself, but in making only the separate estate the debtor, it follows that in all that relates to the transaction itself, the ordinary rules and limitations of contract A verbal engagement, therefore, will not bind the separate property of a married woman in a case where, had she been a feme sole, a writing would have been required; as if a feme covert were to undertake verbally to pay the debt of a stranger or of her husband (c). A separate estate in realty cannot, by reason of the Statute of Frauds, be rendered liable to satisfy the general engagements of a married woman not in writing even if her personalty can (d). And the Statutes of Limitation are also applicable, by analogy, for "the Courts have created an imaginary creature, namely, a married woman with the powers of a feme sole, and it is, in my opinion, properly and duly following the analogy of the Statute of Limitations to say that if the Court can allow her to contract in the same way as a feme sole, the statute must run against her contracts as if she were a feme sole" (e).

As the general engagements of a feme covert are binding upon her separate estate, on the ground only of her intention that they should be a charge upon it, therefore, when it is not her intention to contract a personal debt, or to charge a gross sum upon her separate estate, the Court cannot raise an implied assumpsit to charge it in opposition to her intention (f). For the doctrine of appointment is long exploded, and the "engagement" (g) does not create any lien or charge (h), and the separate estate of a married woman is now made liable simply by a process of equitable execution (i). Such "engagements" give rise to no personal remedy against the wife (at

- (a) Per Kindersley, V.-C., in Mrs. Matthewman's Case, 3 Eq. 787.
- (b) Pollock on Contract, (1902) pp. 685 to 691.
- (c) See Re Sykes's T., 2 John. & H. 415.
- (d) Burke v. Tuite, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 467; see also Shattock v. S., supra, commented on in Re Roper, 39 C. D., p. 489; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G. F. & J., p. 514.
 - (e) Per Cotton, L.J., Re Hastings,

- 35 C. D., p. 105.
- (f) Williams v. Bolton, 2 V. 138, 4R. R. 21; Jones v. Harris, 9 V. 486,R. R. 282.
- (g) See Pollock on Contract, (1902) p. 688.
- (h) Johnson v. Gallagher, supra; Re Hastings, supra, p. 97; Re Roper, 39 C. D., p. 491.
- (i) Re Roper, supra, p. 491; Re Peace and Waller, 24 C. D., p. 407.

any rate before the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, as to which see infra, p. 726); but only against such part of her separate property unrestrained from anticipation as was in existence at the date of such engagement, and had not been disposed of by her at the date of the judgment recovered (a).

So where a married woman received from the trustee rents of an estate to which she claimed to be entitled as her separate property, but it turned out that she was not entitled, the Court refused to give relief to the real owner against her other separate estate (b).

Some Cases in which her "Engagements" have been enforced.— Her separate estate has been made liable in the following instances: On her bond (e); on her covenant (d); in a suit by her husband for money paid on her behalf and money lent (e); on bill of exchange (f); on her promissory note (g); on her contract to purchase (h); on an agreement to pay rent (i); on an agreement to take a house, and taking possession (k); on retainer of solicitor (l); for costs of suit improperly instituted against husband (m).

B. Liability for Contract under Acts of 1882 and 1893.

The Acts give her a general contractual capacity to enter into any contracts effectual as against her separate estate unrestrained from anticipation (n). Under the Act of 1882, if she has separate estate at

- (a) Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 17 C. D. 454; Collett v. Dickenson, 11 C. D. 687.
- (b) Wright v. Chard, 1 De G. F. & J. 567; and see Whittaker v. Kershaw, 45 C. D. 320.
- (c) Norton v. Turvill, 2 P. W. 144, explained in Re Hastings, 35 C. D., p. 99; Hulme v. Tenant, supra; La Touche v. L., 3 H. & C. 576; Heatley v. Thomas, 16 V. 596, 10 R. R. 122.
- (d) Mayd v. Field, 3 C. D. 587, commented upon, Re Roper, 39 C. D. 490; Re Hughes, (1898) 1 Ch. 529.
 - (e) Butler v. B., 16 Q. B. 374.
- (f) Owen v. Homan, 4 H. L. Cas. 997; McHenry v. Davies, 10 Eq. 88, as to which see Pollock on Contract, (1902) p. 690.
 - (g) Davies v. Jenkins, 6 C. D. 728.
 - (h) Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 274.

- (i) Master v. Fuller, 4 Bro. Ch. 19.
- (k) Gaston v. Frankum, 2 De G. & Sm. 561.
- (l) Murray v. Barlee, 3 My. & K. 210; cf. Callow v. Howle, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; Wright v. Chard, 4 Dr. 702; Re Pugh, 17 B. 336; and see Re Peace and Waller, 24 C. D. 405.
- (m) M. r. C., L. R. 2 P. & D. 414;
 for her present liability for costs, see
 M. W. P. A. 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 2, and
 M. W. P. A. 1893, s. 2, supra, p. 712.
- (n) Act of 1882, s. 1, sub-s. 2, and Act of 1893, s. 1; s. 4 of Act of 1893 repeals sub-ss. 3 and 4 of the Act of 1882; and see generally Whittaker v. Kershaw, 45 C. D. 320; Hoare v. Niblett, (1891) 1 Q. B. 781; Butler v. B., 16 Q. B. D. 374; Sweet v. S, (1895) 1 Q. B. 12.

the date of the contract (a) with respect to which she could reasonably be deemed to have contracted (b), her contract will bind it; if she breaks her contract, any separate estate which she has since acquired, and which she has at the time when judgment is recovered against her, will be liable for her breach (a). Those, therefore, who assert the existence of a contract binding the married woman under the Act of 1882 must first show the existence of separate property at the time of making the contract, for otherwise there would be no power to contract (c). A contract under the Acts does not create a personal liability in a married woman, but only a proprietary liability (d), that is, the judgment under this Act is to be executed against her property, not against her person, and cannot make her liable to penal consequences (e). Under this Act a contract is only presumed to be made against separate estate, unless the contrary shall appear, and, if the separate estate is inalienable, the contrary does appear (f), and there is no such thing as separate property of an unmarried woman or widow (g). By the Act of 1893, s. 1 (a) (h), the law has been changed, and the married woman's free separate estate at the date of judgment in an action on a contract is bound whether she has separate property at the time she enters into the contract or not. The section expressly preserves from liability any separate property which at that time or thereafter she is restrained from anticipating (i).

C. Married Woman's Liability for Breach of Trust, Fraud, and Tort.

The separate estate of a married woman could not, as a general rule, be made liable for breaches of trust or tort committed by her. "The principle," said Jessel, M.R., in Wainford v.

- (a) Re Shakespear, 30 C. D., p. 171; Palliser v. Gurney, 19 Q. B. D. 519; Stogdon v. Lee, (1891) 1 Q. B. 661; Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, (1894) 2 Q. B. 559.
- (b) Leak v. Driffield, 24 Q. B. D.
 98; Braunstein v. Lewis, (1892) 65
 L. T. 449.
- (c) Palliser v. Gurney, 19 Q. B. D.,p. 521; but see now Married Women's Property Act, 1893, s. 1, post.
 - (d) Scott v. Morley, 20 Q. B. D., p.

- 128; Re Turnbull, (1900) 1 Ch. 180.
- (e) Holtby v. Hodgson, 24 Q. B. D.
- 105; Re Beauchamp, (1904) 1 K. B. 572.
- (f) Harrison v. H., 13 P. D., p. 185.
- (g) Beckett v. Tasker, 19 Q. B. D.
 7; Pelton v. Harrison, (1891) 2 Q. B.,
 p. 425.
- (h) Supra, p. 711.
- (i) See supra, p. 711, and infra, p. 749.

Heyl (a), "as I have always understood it, is this: a married woman is liable—or rather her separate estate is liable (for there is no personal liability as far as she is concerned)—to make good all contracts which are made by her with express reference to the separate estate, or which from the nature of the contract itself must be intended to be so referred; but she is not liable even for general contracts which from their nature cannot be so referred; a fortiori she is not liable for general torts, but her husband is liable." But where she was an actual actor in a breach of trust affecting property subject to the trusts of an instrument under which she took a separate interest, then her separate estate under that instrument which was not restrained from anticipation might be affected and charged (b), and similarly it might be affected by her fraud (c).

But a married woman can now be sued in respect of any thing in respect of which a man could be sued (d), and is consequently liable to the extent of her separate estate for breaches of trust, fraud, and tort. Under section 18 of the Act of 1882 the married woman trustee can sue and be sued as a feme sole; by section 24 the word "contract" includes "the acceptance of any trust or of the office of executrix or administratrix," and the provisions of the Act as to liabilities of married women are extended to liabilities arising by reason of any breach of trust or devastavit (e). The married woman may now be sued apart from her husband for any tort committed by her (section 1, sub-s. 2, of the Act of 1882), and her husband cannot sue for any tort committed against her separate estate (f). The Act has not, however, removed the common law liability of a husband for torts committed by his wife (g).

(a) 20 Eq. 321; and see Davies v. Stanford, 61 L. T. 234.

(b) Sawyer v. S., 28 C. D. 595; Crosby v. Church, 3 B. 485; Pemberton v. McGill, 1 Dr. & Sm. 266; Clive v. Carew, 1 J. & H. 199; Mara v. Manning, 2 Jo. & Lat. 311; as to the liability of arrears of restrained separate estate, see Pemberton v. McGill, supra, discussed in Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) A. C., per Lord Herschell, at p. 180; and see Trustee Act, 1893, s. 45 (1), printed below, p. 766, under which the interest of a beneficiary restrained from anticipation instigating

a breach of trust may be impounded to indemnify the trustee.

(c) See Wainford v. Heyl, supra; Sharpe v. Foy, L. R. 4 Ch. 35; Re Lush, L. R. 4 Ch. 591.

(d) Whittaker v. Kershaw, 45 C. D.,
p. 329; Butler v. B., 16 Q. B. D. 375.
(e) See Re Turnbull, (1900) 1 Ch. 180,

infra, p. 728.

(f) Ruston v. Sherras, 44 Sol. Jo. 11. (y) Seroka v. Kattenburg, 17 Q. B. D. 177; Earle v. Kingscote, (1900) 2 Ch. 585; Cuenod v. Leslie, (1909) 1 K. B. 880; and see Re Beauchamp, (1904) 1 K. B. 572.

6. Form of Judgment against Married Woman.

The form of judgment under the Act of 1882 was settled in Scott v. Morley (a). It is as follows: Adjudged that the plaintiff recover against the defendant (a married woman) l. and l. costs to be taxed, "such sum and costs to be payable out of her separate property and not otherwise; and let execution hereon be limited to the separate property of the said . . . not subject to any restriction against anticipation unless by reason of section 19 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the property shall be liable to such execution notwithstanding such restraint" (b). The judgment against the married woman on a contract under the Act is a judgment against her, but enforceable only against her separate estate (c).

Under a judgment such as the above, recovered in an action brought strictly under sub-s. 2 of section 1 of this Act a married woman cannot be committed on a judgment summons under the Debtors Act, 1869, s. 5 (d). But this does not apply to judgments which may be recovered against a woman at common law, for the Act does not alter the legal liability of a married woman (e). And so in Re Turnbull (f) it was held, explaining and distinguishing Scott v. Morley, that where a married woman administratrix is ordered to pay into Court money belonging to the estate of the intestate and shown by her account of the intestate's personal estate to be in her possession, in the absence of any evidence that she has committed a devastavit, the order should be in the common form and should not be restricted to payment out of her separate estate; and if she fails to comply with the order the Court has jurisdiction to make an order

(a) 20 Q. B. D. 120. In 1896 this form of judgment, which had served as a pattern, was abbreviated by direction of the Court of Appeal with reference to an unreported Chancery case (Savage v. S.: see L. Q. R., July, 1905, p. 242) as follows:—

Adjudged that the plaintiff recover against the defendant (married woman)

l. and costs, such sum and costs to be payable out of her separate property and not otherwise. The Scott v. Morley form is, however, adhered to. See Yearly Practice (1909), pp. 158, 159, and article in

L. Q. R., July, 1905, p. 242.

- (b) See as to words "unless by reason . . ." Jay v. Robinson, 25 Q. B. D. 467; and for form of judgment on ante-nuptial debt of a married woman, Birmingham Excelsior, &c., v. Lane, (1904) 1 K. B. 35.
- (c) Holtby v. Hodgson, 24 Q. B. D., per Lindley, L.J., at p. 108; but cf. Re Turnbull, (1900) 1 Ch., at p. 184.
 - (d) Scott v. Morley, supra.
- (e) See Scott v. Morley, 20 Q. B. D., pp. 125, 127.
 - (f) (1900) 1 Ch. 180,

for attachment against her. But, semble, if the object of the order had been not for the better securing of the fund, but to compel the married woman to make good a loss occasioned by her devastavit, the order should have been made in the form prescribed in Scott v. Morley (a), and she would not have been liable to attachment for non-compliance with it. A judgment debt against a married woman, enforceable only against property to her separate use which she is not restrained from anticipating, is a "judgment" within the meaning of Order 45, r. 1, R.S.C., enabling the judgment creditor to institute garnishee proceedings for the purpose of attaching a debt owing to or accruing to such married woman (b). The judgment may be enforced against her separate estate not subject to restraint on anticipation by the appointment of a receiver (c). Judgment cannot be enforced against property subject to a restraint on anticipation, nor against arrears of income of property subject to such restraint which accrue due after the date of the judgment (d), but it is enforceable against arrears accrued due at or before the date of the judgment (e). The removal of the restraint by the death of the husband subsequent to the judgment does not make the property subject thereto liable to process (f). The word "thereafter" in the proviso to section 1 of the Act of 1893 prevents execution against property subject to restraint at the date of a judgment obtained after the coverture has ceased through death or divorce (g), and judgment against a widow on a contract made by her during coverture under the Act of 1882 was limited in a like manner, and had to follow the Scott v. Morley form (h). In Barnett v. Howard (i) it was held that arrears of income accrued due to the defendant after her divorce from property subject to restraint during coverture could not be attached. Though this decision was approved in Brown v. Dimbleby (k), where the question was as to the liability of

- (a) Supra.
- (b) Holtby v. Hodgson, 24 Q. B. D.103; and see Aylesford v. G. W. Ry.Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 626.
- (c) Re Peace and Waller, 24 C. D. 407; Perks v. Mylrea, W. N., (1884) 64; Hill v. Roberts, (1893) 2 Q. B. 85.
- (d) Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, (1894)
 2 Q. B. 559; Whiteley v. Edwards, (1896)
 2 Q. B. 48; Bolitho v. Gidley, (1905)
 A. C. 99.
 - (e) Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896)

- A. C. 174; but see Barnett v. Howard, infra.
- (f) Pelton v. Harrison, (1891) 2 Q. B. 422; supra, p. 711, note (a).
- (g) Barnett v. Howard, (1900) 2
 Q. B. 784; Brown v. Dimbleby, (1904)
 1 K. B. 28.
- (h) Softlaw v. Welch, (1899) 2 Q. B.419.
 - (i) Supra.
 - (k) Supra.

future income to attachment, it is submitted that, though of authority on the construction of the proviso in section 1 of the Act of 1893, the actual decision that arrears accrued due at the date of judgment are not liable to attachment is incorrect (a).

7. Of Gifts by the Wife to the Husband of the Income or Corpus of her Separate Estate.

Where property is settled to the separate use of a married woman without any restraint upon anticipation, she can deal with the income or corpus as she pleases, and may make a gift thereof to her husband or anyone else (b). There is no real difference between capital and income except in degree. In every case where money of the wife comes to the husband, whether from capital or income, the question is whether a gift was intended or not, per Romer, L.J. (c). To establish the gift in either case, and so prevent the presumption of a resulting trust, clear evidence that the wife gave or assented to the payment or transfer to her husband is necessary; in each case the onus is on the husband to establish the gift (c), though where the husband and wife are living in amity a gift of the income of a fund may be inferred, though a gift of the capital is not inferred (d). Where, however, there is no evidence of the wife's having assented to or acquiesced in the receipt of her income by her husband she will be entitled to reimbursement out of his estate (e), and without knowledge assent must not be presumed (f).

Income.—"There is no doctrine, I suppose, better settled than this, that when husband and wife are living together, the wife's separate income received by the husband with her permission, to be inferred merely from conduct and circumstances cannot be recalled: Caton v. Rideout," per Lord Macnaghten in Hood-Barrs v. Heriot (g).

Where a married woman living with her husband in Scotland was entitled for her separate use to the income of a fund, which stood

- (a) See Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, Bolitho v. Gidley, supra.
- (b) Caton v. Rideout, 1 Mac. & G. 599, 601; Dixon v. D., 9 C. D. 587, 590; Lewin, (1904) pp. 947 and 952; Vaizey, Settlements, p. 787; Re Dixon, (1900) 2 Ch. 561.
- (c) Mercier v. M., (1903) 2 Ch. 98, at p. 100, commenting upon Alex-

ander v. Barnhill, 21 L. R. Ir. 511.

- (d) See, e.g., Re Flamank, 40 C. D. 461.
- (e) Parker v. Brooke, 9 V. 583, 7 R. R. 299; Moore v. M., 1 Atk. 272; Dixon v. D., 9 C. D. 587; Wassell v. Leggatt, (1896) 1 Ch. 554.
 - (f) Dixon v. D., 9 C. D., p. 592,
 - (g) (1896) A. C., at p. 184,

in the names of trustees of whom her husband was one, and payments of income were at first lodged in a bank to the credit of the wife's separate account, and then to an account in the names of husband and wife, but for many years before the husband's death and when he had become sole trustee, the income was paid into his own banking account and mixed with his own funds, the House of Lords inferred from these circumstances a complete gift (a). To displace the rule it is not sufficient to show that the separate income has accumulated in the husband's hands and remains unspent (b), or that the husband is himself a trustee of the income (c), or that the wife is restrained from anticipation (d).

The rule that the arrears of the wife's separate estate cannot be recovered as against the husband, being founded on the presumption that it has been applied to the maintenance of the wife or to the general purposes of the family, with the assent of the wife, does not, it seems, apply where there is a receiver over the property liable to pay it, nor has it any application against a purchaser for valuable consideration (e).

In some cases, however, the husband has been obliged to account for one year's receipts; but the authorities are divided, and the better opinion seems to be, that the wife can recover nothing (f).

In Re Dixon (g), the husband of a woman entitled to a life interest restrained from anticipation in a fund under their marriage settlement, borrowed in 1852 a sum of money from the trustees on the security of his bond in a penal sum conditioned for repayment to the trustees of the loan with interest thereon at 4 per cent. The husband and wife lived in amity for more than twenty years after that date; on her death in 1876 the husband became entitled to the income of

- (a) Edward v. Cheyne, 13 A. C. 384, 398; Rowley v. Unwin, infra; cf. Mercier v. M., supra.
- (b) Beresford v. Armagh, 13 Si. 643.
- (c) Caton v. Rideout, supra; Re Dixon, supra.
- (d) Rowley v. Unwin, 2 Kay & J. 138, cited (1896) A. C., p. 185; see 13 A. C., p. 398, Howard v. Digby, 2 Cl. & Fin. 643 (pin-money), and the comments thereon, Sugden, Property, 162; Payne v. Little, 26 B. 1.
- (e) Foss v. F., 15 Ir. Ch. R. 215; followed, Tugnell v. O'Donoghue, (1897) Ir. R. 360, 368.
- (f) See Lewin, (1904) p. 976; and see Lord Cottenham's judgment in Caton v. Rideout, 1 Mac. & G. 599; the cases cited in note to Ex p. Elder, 2 Madd. 286; Alexander v. Barnhill, 21 L. R. Ir. 511; and the note in Vaizey on Settlements, pp. 788−792.
- (g) (1900) 2 Ch. 561; and see Amos v. Smith, 1 H. & C. 234.

the fund for his life. On his death in 1896, the question arose whether recovery of the sum borrowed by him was barred by the Statute of Limitations before the death of the wife. It was held (apart from the fact that the husband was in the position of an express trustee) that as the husband and wife were living in amity, the principle of Caton v. Ridcout, supra, applied; that she being restrained from anticipation must be deemed to have assented in her husband's retaining the interest as it fell due; and that in consequence it was as though she had received the interest and given it to him, and, time not running during the coverture, the sum was recoverable from the husband's estate.

Where the consent of the wife to her husband receiving the income of her separate estate could not be presumed, on account of her lunacy, an allowance was made to the husband of a proper sum, for what he had expended in her support (a). Where there is no gift of the income, and land is purchased therewith in the name of the husband, there is a resulting trust for the wife which may be established by parol evidence after her death (b).

Corpus.—With regard to the corpus of her separate estate, a married woman may give her husband the same interest therein as she can to any other person (c), chattels settled to her separate use passing by manual delivery (d); and if she authorises money to which she is entitled to her separate use to be paid to him, she cannot recall it (e). But the onus lies on him of proving that it was so intended, otherwise he will be a trustee for her. In Rich v. Cockell (f) a trustee of stock bequeathed to the separate use of a married woman, transferred it to her husband. The husband failing to prove clearly that his wife intended to give him the stock, he was held by Lord Eldon to be a trustee thereof for her. "As at the time the legacy was given," said his Lordship, "it was for the separate use of the wife, and it continued so until transferred to the husband, that transfer could not destroy the separate trust, unless clear evidence is produced by the husband, that it was intended, with her assent, to destroy it. If the evidence is short of that, as it is perfectly settled that a husband may in this Court be a trustee for the separate use of his wife, he would be precisely in

⁽a) A.-G. v. Parnther, 3 Bro. Ch. 441.

⁽b) Mercier v. M., (1903) 2 Ch. 98.

⁽c) Gardner v. G., 1 Gif. 126.

⁽d) Farington v. Parker, 4 Eq. 116.

⁽e) Caton v. Rideout, 1 Mac. & G. 599, 601; and see Lynn v. Ashton, 1 Russ. & M. 190; Re Dixon, (1900) 2 Ch. 561.

⁽f) 9 V. 369, 7 R. R. 227.

the same situation as to the beneficial interest as the person who made the transfer. Therefore he is a trustee "(a).

When the husband has received, with the consent of his wife, the capital or savings of her separate property, but it is also shown that he received them for her use, he is of course liable to an account (b). And the separate estate or the savings of the wife from separate estate, not given by her to the husband, may be followed, if invested in his name in real estate (c); and in this respect there is no distinction between capital not given and income not given (d). A wife may by her acts, without any express gift, show that it was her intention that her husband should have her separate property without liability to account. Where for instance the husband has employed it with the knowledge and consent of his wife, in his business and for the expenditure of his family, a gift thereof from the wife will, in absence of an agreement to the contrary, be presumed (e). But semble there must not only be an intention on the part of the wife to give, but an acceptance by the husband of the gift (f). When the husband has received the wife's property otherwise than as a gift, she can prove as a creditor against his estate in an administration suit (g).

8. Loans by Wife to Husband and Exoneration of Wife's Separate Estate.

At common law no contract could be made between husband and wife (h); in equity the wife could contract with her husband in respect of her separate estate and, suing by her next friend, enforce contracts so made (i). It is quite clear that if money, part of her separate estate, be handed over by her to her husband, on a contract of loan, the wife may sue her husband upon that contract (k). Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the wife has in respect

- (a) Re Flamank, 40 C. D. 461; Re Blake, 60 L. T. 664. See Wassell v. Leggatt, supra; Mercier v. M., (1903) 2 Ch. 98; M'Ardle v. Gaughran, (1903) 1 Ir. R. 106.
- (b) Darkin v. D., 17 B. 578; Green v. Carlill, 4 C. D. 882; Carnegie v. C., 22 W. R. 595.
- (c) See Darkin v. D., supra; Rowe v. R., 2 De G. & Sm., 294; Barrack v. M'Culloch, 3 Kay & J. 110; Scales v. Baker, 28 B. 91; and see and consider H ghcs v. Wells, 9 Ha. 749;

- Mercier v. M., (1903) 2 Ch. 98.
- (d) See Mercier v. M., (1903) 2 Ch. 98.
- (e) Gardner v. G., 1 Gif. 126; but see Paget v. P., (1898) 1 Ch. 470.
 - (f) See Re Blake, 60 L. T. 663.
- \checkmark (y) Woodward v. W., 3 De G. J. & S. 672; and see Re Blake, supra.
 - (h) Pollock, Contract, (1902) p. 80.
- (i) See per Cotton, L.J., Butler v.B., 16 Q. B. D., at p. 378.
- (k) Per Lord Westbury, Woodward v. W., 3 Pe G. J. & S., at p. 674.

of her separate estate full capacity to enter into contracts with her husband (a).

Despite the wife's common law incapacity to contract with her husband (b), it was from an early date recognized in equity (c) that where the wife's freehold estates, though not held to her separate use, had been mortgaged or charged to raise money which had been applied in the payment of her husband's debts, she or those entitled under her could require the husband or his real or personal representatives to exonerate her estate from the mortgage or charge. The principle so established was also applied to mortgages and charges of her separate estate. The nature and limits of this right of the wife to exoneration were recently examined by the Court of Appeal in Paget v. P. (d) and the doctrine stated as follows: "The authorities bearing upon the subject, beginning with Huntington v. H. (e) and coming down to Hudson v. Carmichael (f), show that if a married woman charges her property with money for the purpose of paying her husband's debts, and the money raised by her is so applied, she is primâ facie regarded in equity, and as between herself and him, as lending him and not giving him the money raised on her property and as entitled to have her property exonerated by him from the charge she has created "(g).

Whether the wife was to be regarded as a creditor standing in the place of the creditor whose claim had been discharged with her moneys or as a surety who had discharged his principal's liability was doubtful (h). Her rights are now regarded as arising from implied contract, and accordingly all the circumstances surrounding the transaction must be looked to to determine whether the presumption against the husband is raised, or, if raised, rebutted (i).

The presumption only arises where property actually vested in the wife is mortgaged or charged, and so the doctrine does not apply where she with her husband mortgage under a power overriding

- (a) See Butler v. B., 14 Q. B. D. 831, affirmed 16 Q. B. D. 374.
- (b) See Lord Westbury, Scholefield v. Lockwood, 4 De G. J. & S., at p. 27.
- (c) Huntington v. H., (1702) 2 Vern. 437; and see Vol. II. of the 6th ed. of this work. The reader is referred to the note in that edition for a full statement of the law upon this matter.
 - (d) (1898) 1 Ch. 470; cf. Re Shaw,

- 94 L. T. 93.
 - (e) Supra.(f) Kay, 613.
- (g) Paget v. P., supra, judgment of the Court delivered by *Lindley*, M. R., at p. 474.
- (h) See, e.g., Scholefield v. Lockwood, supra.
- (i) Paget v. P., supra, citing Clinton v. Hooper, 1 V. 173, 3 Bro. C. C. 201.

her interest (a); neither has it any application when the moneys are raised wholly or partially to discharge liabilities incurred by her, whether before or after marriage, or where the intertion of the husband and wife in raising the moneys would be defeated if she became his creditor (b). Her equity was always held to avail against volunteers claiming through her husband (c). Where the property mortgaged was her separate estate it would seem that she is to be treated as an ordinary creditor, though where the property mortgaged was her freehold estate the older authorities postponed her in administration to simple contract creditors (d).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 3, "any money or other estate of the wife lent or entrusted by her to her husband for the purpose of any trade or business carried on by him, or otherwise, shall be treated as assets of her husband's estate in case of his bankruptcy, under reservation of the wife's claim to a dividend as a creditor for the amount or value of such money or other estate after, but not before, all claims of other creditors of the husband for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied." The words "other estate" are not merely words ejusdem generis with the words "any money," and have been held to include furniture (e). The section has no application where the money is lent for purposes unconnected with the husband's business (f), nor where the wife of a trader, being surety for advances made to him by a bank for purposes of his business, pays off the bank and so becomes a creditor of her husband (g); in these cases she can prove in competition with his creditors.

The words "or otherwise" do not cut down the limitation imposed by the words immediately preceding them. What their meaning is is doubtful: quære whether they have any meaning? (h). Apparently the onus of showing that the loan was unconnected with the trade or business of the husband does not lie on the wife proving for the loan in her husband's bankruptcy (i).

- (a) Scholefield v. Lockwood, supra.
- (b) Paget v. P., supra.
- (c) Huntington v. H., supra; Tate v. Austen, 1 P. W. 264.
- (d) See the question discussed in Hudson v. Carmichael, supra.
- (e) Re Donaldson, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 310.
- (f) Re Clark, (1898) 2 Q. B. 330, approving Re Tidswell, 56 L. J. Q. B.

- 548.
 - (g) Re Cronmire, (1901) 1 K. B. 480.
- (h) Re Clark, supra, commenting on Alexander v. Barnhill, 21 L. R. Ir. 511.
- (i) Re Cronmire, supra, at p. 485; see Re Genese, 16 Q. B. D. 700, explained by Vaughan Williams, L.J., Re Cronmire, supra, at p. 485.

Where the wife is administratrix of her husband she can retain the amount of a debt falling within this section (a), but where she is proving as a creditor in the administration by the Court of her deceased husband's insolvent estate the section prevents her proving in competition with other creditors (b).

9. Wife's Ante-nuptial Debts and Liabilities.

"At common law the husband was liable for his wife's ante-nuptial debts to the whole extent of his property, whether he knew of their existence or not, and whether he obtained any property from his wife or not, but he could not be sued alone for such debts if his wife were alive, and he could not be sued at all for them after her death" (c). At common law as regarded a contract made by a woman before her marriage, but which was not sued upon till after marriage, she and her husband were sued together, and if it was proved that the contract on which the action was brought had been made by the wife before marriage, the judgment went against both husband and wife, and the execution followed the judgment. At common law a married woman was liable to be taken under a capias ad satisfaciendum upon a judgment recovered after her marriage against her and her husband, in respect of her contract made before marriage (d), and the Act of 1882 does not alter the legal liability of a woman on ante-nuptial contracts (e), and where she was liable to be taken in execution she can now be summoned under the Debtors Act, 1869, s. 5, which is a substitute (f) for the old process of capias (g). If no action were brought during the coverture and the wife survived, she remained just as liable for the debt as she was before marriage (h). But if an action were brought and

- (a) Re May, 45 C. D. 499; followed
 in Re Ambler, (1905) 1 Ch. 697; cf.
 Mackintosh v. Pogose, (1895) 1 Ch. 505.
 - (b) Re Leng, (1895) 1 Ch. 652.
- (c) Per Lindley, L.J., Beck v. Pierce, 23 Q. B. D. 320; cited Re Parkin, (1892) 3 Ch. 519; and see Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & L. 263; Chubb v. Stretch, 9 Eq., p. 559; Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. W. 409; Bell v. Stocker, 10 Q. B. D., p. 130.
- (d) See judgment of Esher, M.R., in Scott v. Morley, 20 Q. B. D., p. 124.
 - (e) Robinson King, etc. v. Lynes,

- (1894) 2 Q. B. 577.
- (f) See judgment of Bowen, L.J., in Scott v. Morley, supra, pp. 127 et
- (g) See generally judgment of Lindley, L.J., in Beck v. Pierce, 23 Q. B. D., p. 320; Sparkes v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 1; Evans v. Chester, 2 M. & W. 847; Larkin v. Marshall, 4 Exch. 806; Edwards v. Martyn, 17 Q. B. 693, 700; Ivens v. Butler, 26 L. J. Q. B. 145; Nagle v. O'Donnell, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 79.
 - (h) Chubb v. Stretch, supra.

judgment recovered against the husband and wife during the coverture, and the husband became bankrupt and obtained his discharge, the liability of the husband and the wife for the wife's debt was gone at law (a), but the wife's separate estate still remained liable in equity to satisfy her debts (b). And her husband, as her administrator, was subject to all her ante-nuptial liabilities to the extent of her property in his hands in that capacity (c).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, s. 12, it was enacted that "a husband shall not by reason of any marriage which shall take place after this Act has come into operation (9th August, 1870), be liable for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage (d), but the wife shall be liable to be sued for, and any property belonging to her for her separate use shall be liable to satisfy such debts as if she had continued unmarried."

As to what are debts contracted before marriage, see $Re\ Hedgely\ (d)$. This section extends to property settled to the separate use of a married woman, without power of anticipation (e).

By the Married Women's Property Act (1870) Amendment Act, 1874, s. 1, the Legislature, not considering it right that the property which a woman had at the time of her marriage should pass to her husband, and that he should not be liable for her debts contracted before marriage, enacted that "so much of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, as enacts that a husband shall not be liable for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage is repealed so far as respects marriages which shall take place after the passing of this Act [30th July, 1874], and a husband and wife married after the passing of this Act may be jointly sued for any such debt." This Act relates to marriages which took place after the 30th July, 1874, and before the 1st January, 1883, when the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, came into operation.

By section 2, the husband, in such action, and in any action brought for damages sustained by reason of any tort committed by the wife before marriage, or by reason of the breach of any contract made by the wife before marriage, was to be liable for the debt or

⁽a) Lockwood v. Salter, 5 B. & Ad. 303; Miles v. Williams, 1 P. W. 249, 257.

⁽b) Chubb v. Stretch, supra; and see the judgment, Seton (1901), p. 896.

⁽c) Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & L. 243, 261.

⁽d) 32 C.D. 379.

⁽e) Sanger v. S., 11 Eq. 470; Seton (1901), p. 496; London, &c., Bank v. Bogle, 7 C. D. 773; Re Hedgely, 34 C. D. 379; Axford v. Reid, 22 Q. B. D. 548.

damages respectively to the extent only of the assets hereinafter specified, and in addition to any other plea or pleas may plead that he was not liable to pay the debt or damages in respect of any such assets as hereinafter specified; or confessing his liability to some amount, that he was not liable beyond what he so confessed; and if no such plea was pleaded the husband should be deemed to have confessed his liability so far as assets were concerned. But he is not liable to be sued after her death (a). It is sufficient in an action hereunder to allege that the husband is liable for the debt (b).

By section 3, if it was not found in such action that the husband was liable in respect of any such assets, he should have judgment for his costs of defence, whatever the result of the action might be against the wife (c).

By section 4, when a husband and wife were sued jointly, if by confession or otherwise it appeared that the husband was liable for the debt or damages recovered, or any part thereof, the judgment to the extent of the amount for which the husband is liable shall be a joint judgment against the husband and wife; and as to the residue, if any, of such debt or damages, the judgment shall be a separate judgment against the wife.

By section 5, the assets in respect of and to the extent of which the husband shall in any such action be liable, are as follows:—

- (1) The value of the personal estate in possession of the wife, which shall have vested in the husband:
- (2) The value of the choses in action of the wife which the husband shall have reduced into possession, or which with reasonable diligence he might have reduced into possession:
- (3) The value of the chattels real of the wife which shall have vested in the husband and the wife:
- (4) The value of the rents and profits of the real estate of the wife which the husband shall have received, or with reasonable diligence might have received:
- (5) The value of the husband's estate or interest in any property, real or personal, which the wife in contemplation of her marriage with him shall have transferred to him, or to any other person:
- (6) The value of any property, real or personal, which the wife in contemplation of her marriage with the husband shall, with his

(b) Matthews v. Whittle, 13 C. D. v. Bogle, 7 C. D. 773. 811

⁽a) Bell v. Stocker, 10 Q. B. D. 130. (c) See London Provincial, &c., Bank

consent, have transferred to any person with the view of defeating or delaying her existing creditors.

And there is a proviso to section 5 that where the husband after marriage pays any debt of his wife, or has a judgment bonâ fide recovered against him in any such action as is in this Act mentioned, then to the extent of such payment or judgment the husband shall not in any subsequent action be liable (a).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, which repeals, with the usual saving, the Acts of 1870 and 1874 (see section 22), it is enacted by section 13, that "a woman after her marriage shall continue to be liable in respect and to the extent of her separate property for all debts contracted, and all contracts entered into or wrongs committed by her before her marriage, including any sums for which she may be liable as a contributory, either before or after she has been placed on the list of contributories, under and by virtue of the Acts relating to joint-stock companies; and she may be sued for any such debt and for any liability in damages or otherwise under any such contract, or in respect of any such wrong; and all sums recovered against her in respect thereof, or for any costs relating thereto, shall be payable out of her separate property; and as between her and her husband, unless there be any contract between them to the contrary, her separate property shall be deemed to be primarily liable for all such debts, contracts, or wrongs, and for all damages or costs recovered in respect thereof: Provided always, that nothing in this Act shall operate to increase or diminish the liability of any woman married before the commencement of this Act, for any such debt, contract, or wrong, as aforesaid, except as to any separate property to which she may become entitled by virtue of this Act, and to which she would not have been entitled for her separate use under the Acts hereby repealed or otherwise, if this Act had not passed."

This section is wider than section 1, sub-section 2 (supra, p. 703), and under it a personal judgment can be made against a married woman and her separate property taken in execution (b). In Jay v. Robinson (c), judgment was recovered substantially in the form in Scott v. Morley, supra, against a married woman for a debt contracted during her marriage. She subsequently obtained a decree

⁽a) See Turner v. Caulfield, 7 L. R. Ir. 347; and London, &c., Bank v. Bogle; Axford v. Reid, &c., cited supra, note (e), p. 737.

⁽b) Robinson, King, & Co. v. Lynes, (1894) 2 Q. B. 577; 38 Sol. Jo. 666.

⁽c) 25 Q. B. D. 467.

absolute for a dissolution, and married again, and thereupon settled property belonging to her, to her separate use without power of anticipation: Held, that the debt was contracted "before her marriage," within this section and section 19 of the same Act, and that the restriction on anticipation was of no validity, and a receiver was appointed, and an injunction granted restraining her from dealing with her separate estate. The word "debt" in both these sections comprehends both common law debts contracted by a married woman when single, and debts contracted in respect of her separate estate during a previous marriage (a), although there may be no personal liability under the Debtors Act. But a judgment against a married woman in respect of a debt contracted by her before marriage cannot be enforced by way of equitable execution against her separate property subject to a restriction against anticipation where the restriction is not contained in a settlement, or agreement for a settlement, of her own property made or entered into by herself (b). A husband cannot maintain any action against his wife for money lent to her, or for money paid to her before their marriage at her request, secus, for money, &c., lent or paid after their marriage (c).

By section 14, "a husband shall be liable for the debts of his wife contracted and for all contracts entered into and wrongs committed by her, before marriage, including any liabilities to which she may be so subject under the Acts relating to joint-stock companies as aforesaid, to the extent of all property whatsoever, belonging to his wife which he shall have acquired or become entitled to from or through his wife, after deducting therefrom any payments made by him, and any sums for which judgment may have been bona fide recovered against him in any proceeding at law, in respect of any such debts, contracts, or wrongs for or in respect of which his wife was liable before her marriage as aforesaid, but he shall not be liable for the same any further or otherwise; and any Court in which a husband shall be sued for any such debt shall have power to direct any inquiry or proceedings which it may think proper for the purpose of ascertaining the nature, amount, or value of such property: Provided always, that nothing in this Act contained shall operate to increase or diminish the liability of any husband married before the

16 Q. B. D. 374 (C. A.). See also Hallett v. Hastings, 35 C. D. 94; Reck v. Pierce, 23 Q. B. D. 316.

⁽a) Per Fry, L.J., ibid., p. 474.

⁽b) Birmingham Excelsion Money Society v. Lane, (1904) 1 K. B. 35.

⁽c) Butler v. B., 14 Q. B. D. 831;

commencement of this Act for or in respect of any such debt or other liability of his wife as aforesaid."

As to her liabilities to joint-stock companies, the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, s. 128, enacts that: "(1) The husband of a female contributory married before the date of the commencement of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 . . . shall during the continuance of the marriage be liable as respects any liability attaching to any shares acquired by her before that date to contribute to the assets of the company the same sum as she would have been liable to contribute if she had not married, and he shall be a contributory accordingly. (2) Subject as aforesaid nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882." Before the Act of 1882 a married woman could become a shareholder in her own right in respect of her separate estate and could be put on the list of contributories (a), but the husband could likewise be made a contributory unless the company had accepted the exclusive liability of the wife (b). Where a married woman acquires shares after the Act of 1882, her separate estate is alone liable; where she had acquired the shares before marriage, her husband is liable to the extent mentioned in section 14, supra, p. 740 (c).

This section (14, supra, p. 740) and the following section are in relief of the husband, but there is no section relieving him from liability for wrongs done by his wife after marriage, and the plaintiff may sue the wife for such wrongs alone or with her husband (d). In Beck v. Pierce (e), a solicitor sued a married woman for costs incurred before marriage, and recovered judgment, which, as she had no separate estate, remained unsatisfied. An action was then brought against the husband, who had acquired from her property exceeding in value the amount claimed. Held, that since the Act he can be sued alone, the judgment against the wife being no bar to the action, since the liability of the husband and wife was not joint and the rule in King v. Hoare (f) and Kendall v. Hamilton (g) had consequently no application. A portion of the sum claimed had

⁽a) Mrs. Matthewman's Case, 3 Eq. 781

⁽b) Luard's Case, 1 De G. F. & J.533; London, Bombay, &c., Bank, 18C. D. 581.

⁽c) See the law stated in Buckley on Companies, 9th ed., pp. 68, 69, and 298.

⁽d) Seroka v. Kattenburg, 17 Q. B.
D. 177; Earle v. Kingscote, (1900) 2
Ch. 585. See Cuenod v. Leslie, (1909)
1 K. B. 880.

⁽e) 23 Q. B. D. 316.

⁽f) 13 M. & W. 494.

⁽g) 4 A. C. 504.

become due from the wife more than six years before the action against the husband was commenced, and to this the Statute of Limitations was held a bar.

By section 15, a husband and wife may be jointly sued in respect of any such debt or other liability (whether by contract or for any wrong) contracted or incurred by the wife before marriage as aforesaid, if the plaintiff in the action shall seek to establish his claim, either wholly or in part, against both of them; and if in any such action, or in any action brought in respect of any such debt or liability against the husband alone, it is not found that the husband is liable in respect of any property of the wife so acquired by him or to which he shall have become so entitled as aforesaid, he shall have judgment for his costs of defence, whatever may be the result of the action against the wife if jointly sued with him; and in any such action against husband and wife jointly, if it appears that the husband is liable for the debt or damages recovered, or any part thereof, the judgment to the extent of the amount for which the husband is liable shall be a joint judgment against the husband personally and against the wife as to her separate property; and as to the residue, if any, of such debt and damages, the judgment shall be a separate judgment against the wife as to her separate property only (a).

By section 16 "a wife doing any act with respect to any property of her husband, which, if done by the husband with respect to property of the wife, would make the husband liable to criminal proceedings by the wife under this Act, shall in like manner be liable to criminal proceedings by her husband" (b).

Questions, moreover, between husband and wife as to property are to be decided in a summary way, section 17. If there is no action pending the application will be by originating summons under O. 54, r. 4F (9) (c). But section 17 does not take away a wife's right to bring an action against her husband to recover her property detained by him(d).

10. Liability and Devolution of Separate Estate after Death.

Probate.—The present practice of the Probate Court is not to grant probate of the will of a married woman to the executors in respect

- (a) See Beck v. Pierce, supra; Robinson, King & Co. v. Lynes, (1894) 2 K. B. 577; Birmingham Excelsion Money Society v. Lane, (1904) 1 K. B. 35.
- (b) See Married Women's Property Act, 1884, s. 1.
- (c) See D. C. F., 1244, F. 2359.
- (d) Larner v. L. (1905) 2 K. B. 539.

of such personal estate as she had power to dispose of by will, and to grant letters of administration "cæterorum" to the husband, which was the old practice, but to grant to the executors probate in general terms, and not to grant any administration to the husband. So, without entering into the question whether there was property which she could not dispose of, and which would go to the husband, it grants general probate (a). But the granting of probate to the executors does not recognize the right of the testatrix to dispose by will of the beneficial interest in all the property which the executors get in by virtue of the probate: Smart v. Tranter (b), in which case a married woman entitled to choses in action, but to no separate estate nor any property which she could dispose of by will, made a will by which she appointed executors, and gave all her property away from her husband, and probate in general form was granted to the executors, who were held to be trustees of the beneficial interest in the choses in action for the husband (c).

If her executors have died in her lifetime, administration cum testamento annexo will be granted to the nominees of the residuary legatees and not to her husband (d).

On the death of a married woman before the Act of 1882 the quality of separate property ceased as to property of which she had not disposed. "The separate use, if I may say so, is exhausted when the wife has died without making a disposition. She enjoyed the income during her life, and she has not thought fit to exercise that which was an incident of her separate estate, the right of disposing of her property. Why should equity interfere further with the devolution of the estate?": per Jessel, M.R., in Cooper v. Macdonald(e). The separate estate ceasing to exist save in so far as was necessary to satisfy the claims of creditors against it, the husband became entitled to the subject-matter jure mariti. Accordingly, the undisposed of separate estate consisting of chattels real or personal in possession (f) of a feme covert (unaffected by legislation) not required

⁽a) In the Goods of Price, 12 P. D. 137; Williams, Exors. (1905), p. 46.

⁽b) 43 C. D., pp. 591, 593; Re Lambert, infra.

⁽c) And see In the Goods of Price, 12 P. D. 137; Re Lambert, 39 C. D. 626; Surman v. Wharton, (1891) 1 Q. B. 491, infra, p. 745.

⁽d) In the Goods of Pine, L. R. 1 P. & D. 388; and see In the Goods of Fraser, 2 P. D. 183.

⁽e) 7 C. D. at p. 296; and see Proudley v. Fielder, 2 My. & K. 57; Molony v. Kennedy, 10 Si. 254.

⁽f) See Re Bellamy, 25 C. D. 620; Williams, Exors. (1905), p. 654, note (r)

to meet her debts and engagements, unless settled (a), went to her husband jure mariti (b). So also he became entitled on the death of his wife to her equitable interest in chattels settled to her separate use (c).

Choses in action, settled to the separate use of a married woman, on her death belonged to her husband on taking out administration to her (d), subject to her ante-nuptial liabilities and debts (e).

Her creditors might commence an action for payment of their debts out of her separate estate (f); and even before Hinde Palmer's Act(g), her specialty debts would not have priority over her simple contract debts, but both would be paid $pari\ passu(h)$.

It has been held that the earnings of a married woman, under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, being equitable assets, her executor has no right to retain in full his own debt thereout (i); but see the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, s.s. 2, s. 23, and the judgment of Stirling, J., in Hope v. H. (k), as to the effect of the words in the Act "as if she were a feme sole."

In other respects, if she left a will, her estate would be administered according to the ordinary rules in creditors' suits, specific legacies being paid before general legacies (l).

The principles governing the devolution of separate estate before the Act have been applied to the devolution of separate estate under that Act. Where undisposed of by her will, the husband's rights under section 25 of the Statute of Frauds to take her personal estate beneficially and to administer remain unaffected. In Re Lambert (m), Agnes L. married R. L. in 1867, made her will in 1887 appointing executors, and died in that year, leaving R. L. and three children her surviving. She was entitled to a power of appointment, by deed

- (α) Re Rosenthal's Settlement, 6W. R. 139.
- (b) Molony v. Kennedy, 10 Si. 254; Tugman v. Hopkins, 4 M. & Gr. 389; Drury v. Scott, 4 Y. & C. 264; Bird v. Peagram, 13 C. B. 639.
- (c) Archer v. Lavender, Ir. R. 9 Eq. 220; Re Bellamy, 25 C. D. 620; Surman v. Wharton, infra.
- (d) Proudley v. Fielder, 2 My. & K. 57; Musters v. Wright, 2 De G. & Sm. 777.
- (e) See Humphrey v. Bullen, 1 Atk. 458; and Re Lambert, 39 C. D. 631,

cited infra.

- (f) Owens v. Dickenson, Cr. & Ph. 48; Gregory v. Lockyer, 6 Madd. 90; Surman v. Wharton, infra, p. 745.
 - (g) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46.
- (h) Owens v. Dickenson, supra; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G. F. & J. 502; Seton, (1901) p. 1423.
 - (i) Re Poole's Estate, 6 C. D. 730.
 - (k) (1892) 2 Ch. 342.
- (l) Owens v. Dickenson, Cr. & Ph. 56 followed in Re Poole's Estate, supra.
 - (m) 39 C. D. 626.

or will, over certain funds; to certain separate estate accrued prior to 1882, and which included the savings of income of such estate at her bank, which savings had accrued since 1882. By her will, she exercised her power in favour of R. L. and the children, but made no further disposition of her property. Probate was granted in general terms to the executors named. On summons under O. 55, r. 3, to have it determined who was entitled to the personal estate undisposed of, Stirling, J., held that the separate use is exhausted when the wife dies without disposing, and the right of the husband to the undisposed of personalty accrues just as if the separate use had never existed. That the title to the undisposed of separate estate vested in the husband on the death of the wife, and that the executors were trustees for him, and not for the next of kin of the wife. That the Act (Married Women's Property Act, 1882) simply gives married women power to acquire, hold, and dispose of property as if they were femes sole, but does not affect the devolution of property. Whether his title to leaseholds of his wife is complete without taking out letters of administration to her is doubtful.

In Surman v. Wharton (a), a widow who had leaseholds subject to a mortgage settled to her separate use, married W. in 1881. After Jan., 1883, she borrowed money of Surman. She died intestate in 1889. Her husband, without taking out administration, entered into possession of the leaseholds. Surman brought an action against him to recover the money. Held, that where a woman dies entitled to leasehold in possession, that and her other chattel interests pass to the husband "jure mariti," and there is no need of administration. But by force of section 1, s.s. 3, and section 23 of the Act (1882), although he takes in his own right, he also takes as her legal personal representative and subject to her contracts, to the extent of such separate estate. In this case it will be observed that the marriage was before 1883 and the property belonged to her before that date (b).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 23, it is provided that, "For the purposes of this Act, the legal personal representative of any married woman shall in respect of her separate estate have the same rights and liabilities and be subject to the same jurisdiction as she would be if she were living." A husband, therefore, takes property which belonged to his wife as her separate estate, and which she has not disposed of, "jure mariti," and becomes by

⁽a) (1891) 1 Q. B. 491.

ancing and Settled Land Acts, 9th ed.,

⁽b) See Wolstenholme's Convey-

this section her legal personal representative, and is subject to her liabilities, &c., to the extent of such estate (a). A direction in her will that her debts shall be paid makes all the property of which she could dispose, including arrears of an annuity subject to restraint on anticipation, assets for payment of all liabilities of her separate estate, including damages for breach of covenant by her personal representatives (b); and quære whether the same result would not have followed without any direction to pay debts (c).

Real Estate.—There is no indication in the Act of 1882 of any intention to exclude a husband's rights in cases of intestacy (d). Therefore the undisposed of real estate of a married woman settled to her separate use, of which she is seised in fee, descends to her heir subject to her husband's right as tenant by the curtesy (e); and an estate tail of the wife, subject also to the husband's tenancy by the curtesy, will descend to the heir in tail (f). If, however, the wife disposes of an estate in fee settled to her separate use, either by deed or will, the husband's estate by the curtesy will be thereby defeated (g).

And lands purchased by a married woman out of the savings of her separate estate would, before the Act of 1882, upon her death without having disposed of the same, descend upon her heir-at-law or customary heir according to the tenure of the lands respectively (h).

11. Savings and Arrears of Separate Estate.

In equity savings of a married woman arising from the income of property settled to her separate use are held (apart from statute) to be $prim\hat{a}$ facie her separate property, and she has the same power over them as over property settled to her separate use (i). And the savings arising from her separate property were held liable for her

- (a) Surman v. Wharton, (1891) 1
 Q. B. 491; Re M'Myn, 33 C. D. 575;
 Smart v. Tranter, 43 C. D. 587.
 - (b) Sprange v. Lee, (1908) 1 Ch. 424.
 - (c) Ibid., per Neville, J., at p. 432.
- (d) This applies to realty and personalty, Hope v. H., (1892) 2 Ch. 336; Re Lambert, 39 C. D. 626.
 - (e) Hope v. H., supra.
 - (f) Cooper v. Macdonald, 7 C. D. 288.

- (g) Cooper v. Macdonald, supra; Re Jakeman's Trusts, 23 C. D., p. 350.
- (h) Steward v. Blakeway, L. R. 4 Ch. 603.
- (i) Fettiplace v. Gorges, 1 V. 46, 1 R. R. 79; Cecil v. Juxon, 1 Atk. 278; Muggeridge v. Stanton, 1 De G. F. & J. 107; Askew v. Rooth, 17 Eq. 426; Fitzgibbon v. Pike, 6 L. R. Ir. 487.

contracts in the same manner as property settled to her separate use (a).

The savings arising from property in the hands of trustees, settled to the separate use of a married woman without power of anticipation, will not, it seems, be liable to the restraint against anticipation, if she simply transferred such savings to the trustees without showing any intention that such savings were to be held upon the same trusts as the funds from which they were derived (b).

If a married woman lays out the savings of goods settled to her separate use in the purchase of property, or in investments in lands or houses, such property will primâ facie belong to her to her

separate use (c).

But savings of the wife out of money given to her by her husband for household purposes, dress, or the like, and applied by her in making investments in her own name, will belong to her husband (d). In Brooke v. B. (e), under very exceptional circumstances, it was held that moneys remitted from India to a wife for her support and maintenance during a long period of separation must be considered as the wife's separate estate, and that savings made thereout by the wife were not recoverable by the husband.

But it has been held that the savings out of an allowance paid to the wife of a lunatic living apart from her husband for her separate maintenance, under an order in lunacy, are her separate property, although the order does not expressly state that the allowance is for

her separate use (f).

Arrears of separate estate in the hands of trustees due at the time of a second marriage will be considered as retaining their original

character (g).

Where the judgment against a married woman is in the form given supra, p. 727, if she is restrained from anticipation, such restraint does not apply to income accrued due at or before the date of the judgment, and against such income the judgment can be enforced (h).

(a) Butler v. Cumpston, 7 Eq. 16; and see the Married Women's Property Act, 1893, s. 1 (c), supra.

(b) Butler v. Cumpston, supra.

- (c) Fitzgibbon v. Pike, 6 L. R. Ir. 487; Steward v. Blakeway, 6 Eq. 479. Cf. Weldon v. De Bathe, 14 Q. B. D., p. 342.
- (d) Barrack v. M'Culloch, 3 Kay & J. 114; Mews v. M., 15 B. 529; Nel-
- son v. Booth, 5 W. R. 722; Birkett v. B., 98 L. T. 540, 24 T. L. R. 284.
- (e) 25 B. 342, discussed in Birkett v. B., supra; and see Messenger v. Clarke, 5 Exch. 388.
 - (f) In the Goods of Tharp, 3 P. D. 76.
- (g) Ashton v. M'Dougall, 5 B. 56;cf. Spicer v. Dawson, 5 W. R. 481.
- (h) Loftus v. Heriot, (1895) 2 Q. B. 212, which went to the House of Lords

12. Protection and Recovery of Separate Property.

Where property was settled to the separate use of a married woman, she would be protected in the enjoyment of it by Courts of equity; and her husband would, if necessary, be restrained by injunction from interfering with it (a).

And the protection of the Court will be equally granted where the property is settled under a trust for sale, and the proceeds are to be invested, and the dividends paid to the wife for her life for her separate use (b). But although it is clear that the Court can interfere to protect property, as, for instance, a house in which a married woman resides settled to her separate use, against the interference of her husband, if he wishes to deal with it as his property, and to deprive the wife of her property therein (c), it is a matter of some doubt whether she is entitled to exclude her husband from such place, and from exercising his right as a husband when he is not seeking to interfere with her proprietary rights (d).

Upon the same principle the creditors of the husband will be restrained from interfering with the separate property of the wife (e).

Where a married woman to whom a sum of money was payable for her separate use, received a cheque from the Accountant-General, and handed it over to her solicitor, who accompanied her, the solicitor was, on motion, ordered to pay the balance to his client; and it was held that the onus being upon the solicitor to show cause for not paying it at once, he could not set up a voluntary agreement to pay a debt due to him from her husband out of it (f). But where a husband had exercised his legal right by assigning to a purchaser for value without notice, his wife's separate property, she had no remedy against the purchaser (g).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 12, it is enacted

under the name of Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) A. C. 174, overruling on this point the reasoning in Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, (1894) 2 Q. B. 559; but see as to cases falling within the proviso to s. 1 of the Act of 1893, Barnett v. Howard, (1900) 2 Q. B. 784; discussed, supra, p. 729.

(a) Green v. G., 5 Ha. 400 (n.); Taylor v. Meads, 34 L. J. Ch. 203; Allen v. Walker, L. R. 5 Ex. 187, 190; Wood v. W., 19 W. R. 1049.

- (b) Symonds v. Hallett, 24 C. D. 346, 350.
 - (c) Symonds v. Hallett, supra.
- (d) See Weldon v. De Bathe, 14 Q. B. D., p. 345; Gaynor v. G., (1901) 1 Ir. R. 217.
- (e) Newlands v. Paynter, 4 My. & C. 408.
- (f) Mawhood v. Milbanke, 15 B. 36.
- (g) Dawson v. Prince, 2 De G. & J. 41.

that, "Every woman, whether married before or after this Act, shall have in her own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the same civil remedies, and also (subject, as regards her husband, to the proviso hereinafter contained) the same remedies and redress by way of criminal proceedings, for the protection and security of her own separate property, as if such property belonged to her as a feme sole, but, except as aforesaid, no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other for a tort. In any indictment or other proceeding under this section it shall be sufficient to allege such property to be her property; and in any proceeding under this section a husband or wife shall be competent to give evidence against each other, any statute or rule of law to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided always, that no criminal proceedings shall be taken by any wife against her husband by virtue of this Act while they are living together, as to or concerning any property claimed by her, nor while they are living apart, as to or concerning any act done by the husband while they were living together, concerning property claimed by the wife, unless such property shall have been wrongfully taken by the husband when leaving or deserting, or about to leave or desert, his wife "(a).

A married woman can now alone sue a person for trespass in having entered a house which is her separate property against her will, although he did so with the authority of her husband, for the purpose of examining her as to her sanity, and though he did not do any injury to her house (b). Proceedings can only be taken hereunder by a wife against her husband for protection and security of her separate estate, not for personal libel (c) or malicious prosecution (d). See as to the proviso (e).

13. Restraint upon Anticipation or Alienation.

When once it was established that the separate property of a married woman must be so far enjoyed by her as a feme sole, as to bring with it all the incidents of property, and that she might therefore dispose of it as a feme sole, it was found that, to secure her the desired protection against the influence and control of her husband,

⁽a) Reg. v. Streeter, (1900) 2 Q. B. 601; R. v. James, (1902) 1 K. B. 540; Larner v. L. (1905) 2 K. B. 539.

⁽b) Weldon v. De Bathe, 14 Q. B. D. 344.

[&]amp;c., 16 Q. B. D. 772.

⁽d) Tinkley v. T. 24 T. L. R. 691.

⁽e) Lemon v. Simmons, 36 W. R. 350.

⁽c) Reg. v. Lord Mayor of London,

it was necessary to insert in settlements and wills a clause restraining the wife from anticipating or alienating her separate property. This clause was first inserted in Miss Watson's settlement, by the advice of Lord Thurlow, who was a trustee (a). It is an anomaly introduced by the Court of Chancery for the protection of the married woman against her own acts and her own weakness, and she cannot override it by doing any act or suffering any default, and the jurisdiction of the Court over it is measured by the married woman's own power (b). It can only exist in respect of a married woman's separate estate equitable or statutory (c); though it can be annexed to property given to her and becoming her separate estate under the Act of 1882 without the use of the words declaring a separate use (d), and it is valid whether the subject-matter be real or personal estate, or whether her interest therein be in fee or for life only (c).

Where a woman is seised of an equitable estate tail to her separate use, a clause restraining her alienation of the rents during her life will not prevent her from barring the entail and acquiring the fee under the Fines and Recoveries Act (e). But she cannot under that Act by deed acknowledged dispose of an interest in land, if restrained from anticipation (f). As to her power to enlarge a long term, see Conveyancing, &c., Act, 1881, s. 65 (2) (i.), p. 718, supra.

The restraint may be attached to corpus or income of real or personal estate, whether the separate estate is for life or in fee (g). With regard to the question as to whether such a clause is effectual to prevent a married woman from requiring the payment or transfer of property given absolutely to her subject thereto, the test is whether upon the whole document the intention is or is not shown that the trustees should retain the property and pay the income to the woman (h). In $Re\ Bown\ (i)$ the testatrix directed her trustees to raise and invest 4,500l. upon trust for R. $Bown\$ for life and after his death as to 1,500l. part thereof in trust for and to pay (k) the same

- (a) Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. Ch. 347;
 Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 487;
 Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) A. C.,
 pp. 178, 183.
- (b) See judgment, Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, (1894) 2 Q. B., at p. 566.
- (c) Baggett v: Meux, 1 Ph. 627; approved by C. A. in Stogdon v. Lee, (1891) 1 Q. B. 661; Re Sykes' Trusts, 2 John. & H. 415.
 - (d) Re Lumley, (1896) 2 Ch. 690;

following Hood-Barrs v. Catheart, (1894) 2 Q. B. 559.

- (e) Cooper v. Macdonald, 7 C. D. 288.
 - (f) Baggett v. Meux, 1 Ph. 627.
 - (g) Baggett v. Meux, 1 Ph. 627.
 - (h) Lewin, (1904) p. 987.
- (i) 27 C. D. 411; see Re Bankes, (1902) 2 Ch. 333.
- (k) See Re Tippett & Newbould's Cont., 37 C. D., p. 448,

to B. O'Halloran for her sole and separate use, and it was declared that the interest which any female might take under the will should be for her sole and separate use, and without power to anticipate the same and for which her receipt alone should be a sufficient discharge. It was held by the C. A. upon the terms of the will that the married woman was entitled to the fund, and that the restraint on anticipation was only applicable during the interval between the death of the testatrix and the death of R. Bown, the tenant for life, and the distinction, taken in some cases (a), that where there is a gift of an income-bearing fund the restraint on anticipation is effectual, but that it is not effectual if it is a sum of cash, was disapproved of. "In my opinion," said Cotton, L.J., "the question depends upon the intention of the testator declared in his will: has he declared an intention that the money should be paid (b) to her (a married woman) or that the income should be paid to her from time to time? It is not enough that it should be an income-bearing fund, but the intention of the testator must be shown that the married woman is to have the enjoyment of it, in the way of income. In that case the words restraining anticipation must have their effect given to them That is the true rule, which does not turn on the accident as to how the money is invested at the death of the testator, or at any other time. If the testator shows that the married woman is to enjoy the gift not as a mere money fund, but as an annuity, that is a strong intimation of his intention that he means the restraint on anticipation to apply not only to the income but also to the capital" (c).

As to arrears of income, it was laid down for the first time in *Hood-Barrs* v. *Cathcart*(*d*), that it was not competent for a married woman, entitled for her separate use without power of anticipation, to dispose of income accrued due unless and until it reached her own hands or her agents. But the House of Lords after an examination of the cases held that this proposition could not be supported, and that if the income has *actually accrued due*, the clause against anticipation is no longer applicable (*e*).

⁽a) Re Croughton, 8 C. D. 460; Re Clarke, 21 C. D. 748.

⁽b) See Re Tippett & Newbould's Cont., 37 C. D., p. 448; Re Fearon, 45 W. R. 232; (1896) W. N. 175.

⁽c) See Re Ellis, 17 Eq. 409; Re Spencer, 30 C. D. 183; Re Currey, 32 C. D. 361; Re Grey, 34 C. D. 712;

Re Tippett & Newbould's Cont., 37 C. D. 444 (C. A.), distinguishing Re Bown, supra; Re Wood, 61 L. T. 197; Re Fearon, supra.

⁽d) (1894) 2 Q. B. 559. See judgment of Lord *Macnaghten*, Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) A. C., p. 181.

⁽e) Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, supra.

Although interest for many purposes is treated as accruing due de die in diem, a married woman upon whom the fund out of which it proceeds is settled to her separate use without power of anticipation, cannot effectually assign an apportioned part of the interest up to the date of the assignment (a). If income has accrued due to a married woman at or before the date of a judgment against her, although it has not been actually paid to her, it is free from any restraint on anticipation and is liable to be taken in execution by a judgment creditor (b).

If the income has not accrued due at or before the date of the judgment, it remains subject to the restraint and cannot be taken in execution (c).

Although ordinarily the income of property, settled to the separate use of a married woman, is liable to make good a loss occasioned by her own breach of trust in making away with other property under the trust, if there be a clause against anticipation, future income during coverture would not be so liable, but arrears would be so (d).

There is no equity to apply income which a married woman is restrained from anticipating to make good the consequences of her fraud (e). And the result is the same where the wife joins with her husband in fraudulently concealing from a mortgagee the restraint against alienation (f). Neither can her separate estate restrained from anticipation be bound by estoppel. In $Bateman\ v.\ Faber\ (g)$ a married woman, by deed poll, admitted (contrary to fact) that her life interest restrained against anticipation in certain property had determined and released all her interest therein in favour of her husband. On the faith of that deed a creditor of the husband

- (a) Re Brettle, 2 De G. J. & S. 79; Jollands v. Burdett, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 349.
- (b) Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) A. C. 174; but see Barnett v. Howard, (1900) 2 Q. B. 784; Brown v. Dimbleby, (1904) 1 K. B., 28; discussed p. 729, supra.
- (c) Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, (1894)
 2 Q. B. 559; Whiteley v. Edwards,
 (1896)
 2 Q. B. 48; Bolitho v. Gidley,
 (1905) A. C. 98.
- (d) Pemberton v. M'Gill, 1 Dr. & Sm. 266. See the remarks of Her-

- schell, C., upon this case in Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) A. C., p. 180; Whiteley v. Edwards, (1896) 2 Q. B. 48, supra.
- (e) Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483; Arnold v. Woodhams, 16 Eq. 29.
- (f) Stanley v. S., 7 C. D. 589; Cahill v. C., 8 A. C. 420; but see Lord Blackburn's comment on Stanley v. S., at p. 437, and cf. Bateman (Lady) v. Faber, (1897) 2 Ch. 223; (1898) 1 Ch. 144, see per Chitty, L.J., at p. 151, and Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, (1894) 2 Q. B., at p. 564.
 - (g) Supra, note (f).

reduced the rate of interest on a loan previously made to the husband, and arrangements were made for payment on terms beneficial to the husband. The wife subsequently claimed to receive the income for her life. It was held that neither by estoppel nor admission could she by her own act get rid of the protection given to her by the restraint on anticipation, and that she was entitled to receive the income for her life.

The clause against anticipation, when annexed to a gift to an Englishwoman whose husband is domiciled abroad, is valid, and it cannot be dispensed with, even although by the law of the country where the husband is domiciled it is inoperative, because a change of domicile does not prevent an English citizen from taking property according to the form allowed by the law of England (a).

What Words will restrain Alienation.—The words used by Lord Thurlow in Miss Watson's settlement (b) were "and not by anticipation" (c). The usual words restraining alienation by a woman, are that she "shall not have power to dispose thereof (i.e., the funds settled to her separate use) by way of anticipation" (d). As in the case of the separate use, no particular form of words is necessary to restrain alienation, and the so-called restraint on anticipation is a restraint upon alienation (e). Where, therefore, there was a declaration that the receipt of the wife, or any person to whom she should appoint the income of property, after the same should become due, should be a valid discharge, it was held that she was restrained from alienation (f). So also when the receipt of the married woman to trustees for rents bequeathed to her separate use for life was to be given as the same should become due from time to time(g). So where property is given to the separate use of a married woman "not to be sold or mortgaged" (h), or where it is given to her sole, separate, and inalienable use (i), she will take with a restraint upon alienation.

- (a) Peillon v. Brooking, 25 B. 218.
- (b) See supra, p. 750.
- (c) See Parkes v. White, 11 V., at p. 221; Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer., at p. 487; and cf. Sockett v. Wray, 4 Bro. C. C. 483.
- (d) And see Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, infra, at p. 569; Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) A. C. p. 178.
- (e) Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart (No. 2), & Spring v. Pride, 4 De G. J. & S. 395. (1894) 2 Q. B., p. 569; Re Lavender's

Policy, (1898) 1 Ir. R. 175.

- (f) Field v. Evans, 15 Si. 375; Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 597; Estate of H. H. Molyneux, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 411.
- (q) Re Smith, 51 L. T. 501; Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G. M. & G. 597.
 - (h) Steedman v. Poole, 6 Ha. 193.
 - (i) D'Oechsner v. Scott, 24 B. 239;

Where, according to a form at one time not unusual amongst conveyancers, the income of a fund was payable to such persons as a married woman should by writing, but not by way of anticipation, appoint, and in default of appointment there was a gift of it to her separate use, it was held by Shadwell, V.-C., that since the clause restraining anticipation was not expressly extended to the gift as well as to the power, she might execute a valid assignment of the income (a), but this case was reversed on appeal (b). In Baggett v. Meux (c), a testator devised real estate to his daughter, a married woman, in fee, but with a declaration that she should not sell, charge, mortgage, or incumber it, followed by another declaration, that she should take it for her own sole and separate use and benefit and disposal, and have the sole management thereof, independent of her husband, and free from his control or intermeddling. It was held that the restraining clause was not void, inasmuch as it must be taken in connection, as well with the succeeding as the preceding words; and, therefore, that a security, by way of equitable mortgage, executed by the husband and wife to a party who had notice of the wife's title under the will, was void as against the wife. This decision, which was affirmed (d), must be considered as overruling Medley v. Horton (e).

It is not at all necessary that negative words should be introduced in the receipt clause, to complete the restraint upon alienation, for the clause must be construed to relate to the income, subject to such restraints as are imposed by the former part of the settlement (f).

The restraint upon alienation will not be effectual unless it be clear. Thus, where there was a direction to pay dividends to such persons and in such manner and form as the wife should, from time to time during her life, notwithstanding her coverture, by any note or writing under her hands appoint, and in default of appointment into her proper hands for her separate use, and, after her death, to her husband; upon a bill being filed by the husband and wife, it was held there was no restraint upon alienation by the wife, and a transfer of the fund was, with the consent of the wife, made to the

⁽a) Brown v. Bamford, 11 Si. 127; 12 Si. 616.

 ⁽b) 1 Ph. 620; and see Harnett v.
 Macdougall, 8 B. 187; Moore v. M.,
 1 Coll. Ch. R. 54.

⁽c) 1 Coll. Ch. R. 138.

⁽d) 1 Ph. 627.

⁽e) 14 Si. 222; see also Goulder v. Camm, 1 De G. F. & J. 146.

⁽f) See Harrop v. Howard, 3 Ha. 624; Brown v. Bamford, 1 Ph. 626.

husband (a). In the case of Hovey v. Blakeman (b), where there was a trust to pay rents, dividends, and profits, "into the respective proper hands of the testator's two sisters, so long as they should live, the same to be to their separate use," Grant, M.R., thought, as it was expressed, that an absolute property was not intended to be given to them, so as to give a power of disposition; that it was a personal bequest to them, to be paid into their respective proper hands, without a power of disposition. The authority, however, of Hovey v. Blakeman is at least doubtful, if it is not to be considered as overruled; for, where expressions giving the wife a right to receive property "with her own hands," or, "with her own hands from time to time," or where equivalent expressions are made use of, they are, to use the words of Lord Eldon, only an unfolding of all that is implied in a gift to the separate use" (c).

So where a testator, having bequeathed a sum of stock in trust for the separate use of his wife for her life, directed that it "should remain during her life and be, under the orders of the trustees, made a duly administered provision for her, and the interest of it to be given to her, on her personal appearance and receipt," by the banker the trustee might appoint; it was held by Cranworth, V.-C., that the wife was not prohibited from alienating her interest in the stock (d).

And although a bequest of stock for a married woman, for her separate use for life, and after her decease, for her appointees, directs that, "in case any appointment should be made by deed, the same should not come into operation until after her death," the married woman is not thereby restrained from anticipation, nor prevented from appointing the fund by an irrevocable deed (e). The mere expression of a wish that property devised to a female should not be sold or disposed of has been held insufficient to create a restraint on anticipation (f).

- (a) Clarke v. Pistor, cited 3 Bro. Ch. 568; Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. Ch. 340; Brown v. Like, 14 V. 302; Sturgis v. Corp, 13 V. 190, 9 R. R. 169.
 - (b) 9 V. 524.
- (c) See Parkes v. White, 11 V. 222; Acton v. White, 1 S. & S. 429; Rose v. Sharrod, 11 W. R. 356.
- (d) Re Ross's Trust, 1 Si. (N. S.)
 196; see also Wagstaffe v. Smith, 9
 V. 520, 524. See and consider Scott v. Davis, 4 My. & C. 87, 89.
- (e) Alexander v. Young, 6 Ha. 393; Hastie v. H., 2 C. D. 304.
- (f) Re Hutchings to Burt, 59 L. T.490. Cf. Re Lavender's Policy, (18981 Ir. R. 175.

As to the insertion of a clause against anticipation in the case of executory trusts, see the cases cited below (a).

Where a person having power to appoint among a class not born at the date of the instrument creating the power, as for instance the children of a marriage, makes an appointment to the separate use of a married daughter, with a clause against anticipation, invalid as a breach of the rule against perpetuities, the Court, in order to prevent the execution of the power from being defeated, will reject the clause in restraint of anticipation (b). And if a similar appointment be made to an unmarried daughter, who afterwards marries, the marriage will not operate as an adoption of the trusts of the fund so as to establish the validity of the clause restraining anticipation (c). So where a bequest was made to persons in esse for life, with remainder to their unborn children, with a general direction that female children should take for their "separate and unalienable use," it was held, that such restriction was too remote and void (d). The language, however, of the direction may be such as by implication to confine the restriction to tenants for life: in which case it would be valid (e). The restraint, however, would be valid as not offending against the rule relating to perpetuities if the daughter had been in existence at the date of the instrument creating the power (f). And a restraint on anticipation, imposed by a general clause in a will upon all the shares of daughters of the testator's children, is good as to the shares of those members of the class who are born in the testator's lifetime though void as to the shares of those born afterwards (g).

Section 19 of the Act of 1882 enacts that "nothing in this Act contained shall interfere with or affect any settlement or agreement for a settlement made or to be made, whether before or after

- (a) Teasdale v. Braithwaite, 5 C. D. 630; and see Hastie v. H., 2 C. D. 304; and Re Dunnill, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 322, 326; Dowd v. D., (1898) 1 Ir. R. 244, 251.
- (b) Fry v. Capper, Kay, 163; Re Michael's Trusts, 46 L. J. Chr. 651; Re Cunningham's Settlement, 11 Eq. 324; Re Teague's Settlement, 10 Eq. 564; Shute v. Hogge, 58 L. T. 546; Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 C. D. 494.
- (c) Re Teague's Settlement, supra; Re Ridley, 11 C. D. 645.

- (d) Armitage v. Coates, 35 B. 1.
- (e) Ibid.
- (f) Wilson v. W., 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1076; Herbert v. Webster, 15 C. D. 610; and see Re Cunningham's Settlement, supra.
- (g) Re Ferneley's Trusts, (1902) 1 Ch. 543, Re Game, (1907) 1 Ch. 276, following Herbert v. Webster, supra, and not following Re Michael, 46 L. J. Ch. 651, and Re Ridley, 11 C. D. 645.

marriage, respecting the property of any married woman, or shall interfere with, or render inoperative any restriction against anticipation at present attached or to be hereafter attached to the enjoyment of any property or income by a woman under any settlement, agreement for a settlement, will or other instrument. But no restriction against anticipation contained in any settlement or agreement for a settlement of a woman's own property to be made or entered into by herself shall have any validity against debts contracted by her before marriage, and no settlement shall have any greater force or validity against creditors of such woman than a like settlement or agreement for a settlement made or entered into by a man would have against his creditors" (a). The whole of the latter part of this section applies only to settlements made after the coming into operation of the Act(b).

In Hemingway v. Braithwait (c) a post-nuptial settlement made by an infant married woman in 1884 (under the provisions of the Infants Settlement Act) under which she took a life estate restrained from anticipation, was held binding as against a post-nuptial creditor under a debt incurred in 1884, apparently upon the ground that it fell within the first part of the section and did not come within the latter.

"Before marriage."—Means before the existing marriage. So where a married woman contracted a debt and judgment was recovered against her in 1886, and she afterwards obtained a decree absolute and married again, and her property was settled to her separate use without power of anticipation: Held, the restraint was void and her property was liable (d), but judgment on an antenuptial debt is not enforceable against separate property subject to restraint where the settlement was not made by the married woman (e).

14. Marriage Settlements and sect. 19 of the Act of 1882 and sect. 2 of the Act of 1907.

Whatever interest in property a married woman takes after the Act of 1882 is here as statutory separate estate, and it is now impossible to convey property to her in such a way that she and

- (a) As to the first branch of this section see below, s. 11, p. 758.
- (b) Beckett v. Tasker, 19 Q. B. D. 7, p. 12.
 - (c) 61 L. T. 224.
 - (d) Jay v. Robinson, 25 Q. B. D.

(e) Birmingham Excelsior, &c. v. Lane, (1904) 1 K. B. 35; cf. Axford v. Reid, 22 Q. B. D. 548, a case under the M. W. P. A., 1870.

her husband shall be in the same position in regard to it that they were in at common law or in equity prior to the Act(a). The first part of sect. 19 was apparently inserted not only to preserve unimpaired existing settlements, but also to secure as full an operation to future settlements as could have been obtained at the date of the passing of the Act. That part received, however, a very wide interpretation. The words "interfere with or affect" were construed as meaning "invalidate or render inoperative," and it was said that the second clause of sect. 19 showed that interfering with a settlement meant something different from affecting an estate created by it (b).

In referring to this section, Mr. Justice Stirling said in Re Onslow (c), "It seems to follow that the effect of the settlement will be determined just as it was before the Act, and no one, who, under the old law, could have taken any interest is to be deprived of such interest, but where these principles have been applied and it has been ascertained that a married woman takes an interest, the incidents attached by the Act to the property of married women apply."

In that case, by a settlement on marriage in 1878, the reversion in personal estate had been limited in the usual way if the wife should survive, for her, her executors, administrators, and assigns. She survived and married again after the Act without a settlement. A question arose whether the separate use were attached to the reversion by the Act, so that she could dispose of it. The Court held that she could. In this case the settlement in question was not made on the existing marriage, but the judge did not treat this as material.

On this construction any covenant contained in a marriage settlement which would have bound the property, had the Act of 1882 never been passed, continues to bind the property despite the Act.

Thus in cases where settlements dated before 1883 contained covenants to settle the wife's after-acquired property, excepting property settled to her separate use, it has been held that property to which she became entitled after the Act did not come within the exception in the covenant of property settled to her separate use, as

90; Re Williams, 76 L. T. 150.

⁽a) See Re Onslow, 39 C. D. 622; Re Lumley (1896) 2 Ch. 690, 694; Re Davenport, (1895) 1 Ch. 361; Re Williams, 76 L. T. 150.

⁽b) Re Armstrong, 21 Q. B. D. 264,

per Lindley, L.J., pp. 270 et seq. (c) 39 C. D. 625; and see Re Stonor, 24 C. D. 195; Re Whitaker, 34 C. D. 227; Hancock v. H., 38 C. D.

that would have been to interfere with the settlement and so contrary to sect. 19 (a), and this even though the covenant were by the husband alone (b).

The above stated principle of construction was fully applied to assignments and covenants by the husband alone. Thus, in Stevens v. Trevor Garrick (c), a lady, an infant, by settlement made in 1890 in contemplation of marriage joined with her husband in assigning a sum of 1,000l. to which she was entitled. Subsequently on attaining twenty-one she disaffirmed the settlement; it was held that sect. 19 prevented the separate use attaching under sect. 2, and consequently the assignment by the husband was effectual (d). Again, in Buckland v. B. (e) it was held that an agreement by an intended husband with the trustees of his infant intended wife's marriage settlement that property then in the hands of the trustees should be settled bound the property, since it would have bound the property had the Act of 1882 not been passed.

The law has been changed by sect. 2 of the Act of 1907, printed at length above, p. 713. The first part of sect. 19 is left unrepealed, but a settlement, or agreement for settlement, by the husband or intended husband alone, respecting the woman's property, is not valid unless she execute it, if of full age, or confirm it after she attains full age, but if she dies under age a settlement or agreement by her husband will bind property to which he becomes entitled which would have been bound if the Act of 1907 had not been passed. It may be observed that this Act by no means removes all the difficulties caused by the construction which has been put upon s. 19; it merely prevents the husband's acts alone from binding the wife's property.

15. Duration and Extent of Separate Use and of Restraint on Anticipation, and when the latter can be dispensed with.

As the separate use, and the restraint upon alienation, which is a modification of it, are creatures of equity called into existence merely for the purpose of securing to the wife the enjoyment of her own property free from marital rights and influence, they exist only when they are necessary for that purpose; thus, property given to the

- (a) Re Stonor, 24 C. D. 625; Re Whitaker, 34 C. D. 227.
- (b) Re Onslow, supra; cf. Re Davenport, supra; Re Stonor, 24 C. D. 195; Re Whitaker, 34 C. D. 227; Hancock
- v. H., 38 C. D. 90.
- (c) (1893) 2 Ch. 307.
- (d) And see Hancock v. H., 38 C. D. 78 and 90.
 - (e) (1900) 2 Ch. 534.

separate use of a woman, although subject to restraint upon anticipation, may be aliened by her at any time when she is discovert (a); that is to say, when she is a feme sole before marriage (b), or when she is a widow after her husband's death (c), or after she has obtained a decree for judicial separation (d), or divorce (e); and it is now clearly settled, by the leading case of Tullett v. Armstrong, that although the separate estate, whether modified by restraint or not, is suspended while a woman is discovert, it is capable of arising upon the happening of any marriage, e.g., the marriage of a divorced woman (f).

In that case, Langdale, M.R., laid down the following rules deduced from the authorities:—"That property given to a woman for her separate use, independent of any husband, may, under the authority of this Court, be enjoyed by her during her coverture as her separate estate, although the property originally, or at any subsequent period or periods of time, became vested in her when discovert."

"That, in respect of such separate estate, she is, by the Court, considered as a feme sole, although covert. Her faculties as such. and the nature and extent of them, are to be collected from the terms in which the gift is made to her, and will be supported by this Court for her protection. The words 'independent of a husband,' whether expressed or implied in the terms of the gift, mean no more than that this Court will not permit the marital power of the husband to be used, in contravention of the enjoyment of the property, according to the terms of the gift. If the gift be made for her sole and separate use, without more, she has, during the coverture, an alienable estate independent of her husband. If the gift be made to her sole and separate use, without power to alienate, she has, during coverture, the present enjoyment of an unalienable estate independent of her husband. In either of these cases she has, when discovert, a power of alienation; the restraint is annexed to the separate estate only (g), and the separate estate has its existence only during coverture; whilst the woman is discovert, the separate estate,

- (a) Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 B. 1; affirmed 4 My. & C. 377.
- (b) Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ.
 & M. 197; Brown v. Pocock, 2 My. &
 K. 189; Massey v. Parker, id. 174.
 - (c) Jones v. Salter, 2 Russ. & M. 208.
 - (d) Munt v. Glynes, 20 W. R. 823
- see Waite v. Morland, 38 C. D. 135, (C. A.).
- (e) See judgment of Lindley, L.J., Watkins v. W., (1896) P., p. 228.
- (f) 1 B. 1, affir. 4 My. & C. 377; Shafto v. Butler, 40 L. J. Ch. 308.
 - (g) See Re Lumley, p. 750, supra,

whether modified by restraint or not, is suspended, and has no operation though it is capable of arising upon the happening of a marriage. The restriction cannot be considered distinctly from the separate estate, of which it is only a modification. * * * If there be no separate estate, there can be no such restriction as that which is now under consideration. The separate estate may, and often does exist, without the restriction, but the restriction has no independent existence; when found, it is as a modification of the separate estate, and inseparable from it "(a).

As to when the restraint on anticipation ceases with respect to income payable to a married woman, see note 6 "Form of Judgment, &c," supra.

A trust for the separate use of a woman may be confined to a particular coverture (b).

Where, however, the words show that the separate use is intended to last during the whole *life* of the wife, the separate use, together with the restraint against anticipation, if any, will, unless destroyed by the married woman while discovert, not only have been in effect during the past, but will also revive during any subsequent coverture (c). And see Stogdon v. Lee (d), where an annuity was to be paid by trustees during the joint lives of the husband and his wife to her separate use without power of anticipation, and it was held that the separate use continued only during the joint lives of the husband and wife.

Inasmuch as a woman has, when discovert, full power over property settled to her separate use, though coupled with a restraint against alienation, the question sometimes arises whether the woman has not by her acts acquired the property unrestricted and unfettered by any trust or restraint, so that neither attach upon her marriage as they would do in the absence of such acts. For instance, when stock has been given to trustees for the separate use of a woman, and she afterwards, when discovert, has called upon the trustees to sell the stock, and received from them the proceeds of the sale, the trust for her separate use is clearly at an end (e). A woman, moreover,

- (a) See Baggett v. Meux, 1 Coll.
 Ch. R. 138; Stogdon v. Lee, (1891) 1
 Q. B., p. 670; Re Gaffee, 1 Mac. & G. 541; Scarborough v. Borman, 4 My.
 & C. 378; Hawkes v. Hubback, 11
 Eq. 5.
 - (b) Moore v. Morris, 4 Drew. 33;

Shafto v. Butler, 19 W. R. 595.

- (c) Hawkes v. Hubback, 11 Eq. 5; Re Gaffee, 1 Mac. & G. 541; Re Molyneux, 6 Ir. R. Eq. 411.
 - (d) (1891) 1 Q. B. 661 (C. A.).
- (e) Per Wood, V.-C., in Wright v. W., 2 John. & H. 655; see also Mayd

when discovert, has a right to call upon trustees for a transfer to her of property settled to her separate use, though it be without power of anticipation $\bullet(a)$.

The question is more difficult when property has been left to the separate use of a woman without the intervention of trustees. The authorities before the Act of 1882, however, appear to decide that when a woman, having property so given to her, allows it to remain in statu quo, in the same form of investment in which it was given to her, then on her subsequent marriage her husband must be considered as adopting the property in the state in which it was left, and subject to the trusts which while in that state had been impressed upon it; and the husband, moreover, will be converted into a trustee for the wife (b).

But if the woman, being sui juris and discovert, deals with the property so left to her, by selling, and spending part of the proceeds and converting the rest into property of a different kind, the trust will be at an end: see Wright v. W. (c); there stock in the public funds was bequeathed to a woman for her separate use, without power of anticipation, but without the intervention of any trustee, and she afterwards being discovert and sui juris sold the stock and spent a portion of the proceeds, and invested the rest in shares of a joint-stock bank and Canada bonds. It was held that by so doing she determined the trust for her separate use. The mere circumstance of its being possible to trace the proceeds of the sale, cannot enable the Court, where once the cestui que trust, being discovert and sui juris, has converted the property from its original form, and has dealt with it as absolute owner, to treat the property into which the proceeds of the sale can be so traced as still subject to a trust for her separate use (d).

There is no distinction between a clause restraining anticipation and a clause restraining alienation, and therefore the share of a married woman in residuary real and personal estate given to her by will for her separate use without power of anticipation, is not bound by her covenant to settle after-acquired property (e). But if she becomes entitled to property to her separate use, without any

v. Field, 3 C. D. 587, but see the comments of Kay, J., on this case in Re Roper, 39 C. D., p. 490.

⁽a) Buttanshaw v. Martin, John. 89.

⁽b) Newlands v. Paynter, 4 My. &

C. 408.

⁽c) 2 John. & H. 647.

⁽d) Ibid.

⁽e) Re Currey, 32 C. D. 361.

restraint upon alienation, she may be compelled to bring such property into settlement according to her covenant or agreement (a). And in Re Bankes (b) it was held, distinguishing Re Currey (c), that, where a legacy was left to a woman payable on the determination of a prior life interest, with a declaration that moneys payable to any female during any coverture should be paid to her for her separate use when and as the same should become due and payable, and so that she should not have power to deprive herself of the benefit thereof by anticipation, the legatee was at the date of payment entitled to have the legacy paid to her, but that it was bound by her covenant to settle after-acquired property contained in an ante-nuptial settlement executed before the death of the testator. And where a marriage settlement settled a fund for the separate use of the wife with restraint on anticipation, and contained a covenant by the wife (then an infant) to settle future property, the C. A., reversing Kay, J., held that she could not be compelled to elect between after-acquired property and her interest in the settled fund, but was entitled to retain both (d). A covenant in general terms to settle after-acquired property does not include a life interest or an annuity, in the absence of any indication in the settlement of a specific intention to include such interests (e).

If a covenant to settle after-acquired property in which the wife joins contains an exception of such as should be "otherwise settled," property coming by will to the wife to her separate use free from the debts, contracts, or engagements of her husband will be excluded from the operation of the covenant (f). Although a married woman under the Act of 1882 takes property given to her by a will coming into operation after the commencement of the Act, as separate property, it will fall within a contract in a settlement to settle after-acquired property of the wife, although property settled and limited to her separate use and disposal is thereby excepted (g).

Where there was attached to the separate use of a married woman

⁽a) Campbell v. Bainbridge, 6 Eq. 269; Butcher v. B., 14 B. 222; Re Allnutt, 22 C. D. 275; Scholfield v. Spooner, 26 C. D. 94.

⁽b) (1902) 2 Ch. 333.

⁽c) 32 C. D. 361.

⁽d) Re Vardon, 31 C. D. 275.

⁽e) Re Dowling, (1904) 1 Ch. 441.

⁽f) Kane v. K., 16 C. D. 207. Lloyd v. Prichard, (1908) 1 Ch. 265.

⁽g) Re Stonor's Trusts, 24 C. D. 195;
Re Whitaker, 34 C. D. 227; Re Garnett, 33 C. D. 300; Re Onslow, 39
C. D. 622; Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 19.

a clause against anticipation, the Court had formerly no power to release it from that restraint, even in cases where it would manifestly be for her benefit to do so (a). It is contrary to the principles of the Courts to allow a woman by her own conduct to discharge herself from the restraint (b). The Court therefore refuses to allow a sequestration to issue although the married woman is in contempt (c), and the Court has no power to order a settlement of her property subject to restraint, on her refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights (d). If, however, an estate was settled to the separate use of a married woman without power of anticipation but subject to prior equities, such, for instance, as raising the costs of a suit, the Court could direct a sale of the estate (e).

It seems that the clause restraining a married woman from anticipation does not exempt her from the ordinary consequences of lapse of time and acquiescence (f), and that she can bind herself by a compromise with her trustees as to the amount of the sum settled to her separate use (g). But her separate estate restrained cannot be bound by estoppel (h).

Statutory Powers in Court of dispensing with the Restraint.

The Legislature has in certain cases, either dispensed with, or enabled the Court to dispense with, the restraint against anticipation.

- (I.) Settled Estates Act, 1877, s. 50.—Where a married woman applies to the Court, or consents to an application to the Court, under this section, she must first be examined apart from her husband, touching her knowledge of the nature and effect of the application, and it must be ascertained that she freely desires to make or consent to such application; and such examination shall
- (α) Robinson v. Wheelwright, 21 B.214; affirmed on appeal, 6 De G. M.
- & G. 535; Smith v. Lucas, 18 C. D.
- 531; Gaskell's Trusts, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 780; Kenrick v. Wood, 9 Eq. 333.
 - (b) Re Glanvill, 31 C. D. 532.
 - (c) Hyde v. H., 13 P. D. 166.
- (d) Michell v. M., (1891) P. 208; see Hood-Barrs v. Catheart (Nos. 1 & 2), (1894) 2 Q. B. 559, where all these
- cases are considered.
- (e) Fleming v. Armstrong. 34 B. 109.
- (f) Derbishire v. Home, 3 De G. M. & G. 80; Davies v. Hodgson, 25 B. 186.
 - (g) Wilton v. Hill, 25 L. J. Ch. 156.
- (h) Bateman (Lady) v. Faber, (1898)
- 1 Ch. 144, see supra, p. 752.

be made, whether the hereditaments which are the subject of the application shall be settled in trust for the separate use of such married woman, independently of her husband, or not; and no clause, or provision in any settlement restraining anticipation shall prevent the Court from exercising, if it shall think fit, any of the powers given by this Act (a).

- (II.) Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, s. 39.—By this section it is enacted that:—
- (1.) "Notwithstanding that a married woman is restrained from anticipation the Court may, if it thinks fit, where it appears to the Court to be for her benefit, by judgment or order, with her consent, bind her interest in any property."
- (2.) "This section applies only to judgments or orders made after the commencement of this Act, i.e. 1 Jan., 1882."

The Court has only power to remove the restraint with respect to some particular disposition and not to remove it generally (b). The principles on which the Court will grant or refuse such an application were discussed by Chitty, J., in the case of Re Pollard's Settlement (c). The Court has first to consider whether it will be for her benefit (d), and the power is exercised with extreme caution, and only where a very strong case for its exercise is made out (e). In Re Blundell (f) it was held by the Court of Appeal that mere increase of income was not a sufficient "benefit" to the married woman to justify the Court in removing the restraint so as to enable her to effect a change of investment from Court securities into others of a speculative nature, even though sanctioned by the settlement. In Hodges v. H.(g) foreign creditors of the wife (domiciled abroad) pressed her for payment of her debts, and, it being clear that on her death funds in Court would be assets for the payment of her debts, the Court directed that a portion of the funds should be paid out to her. The restraint has been released to enable married women absolutely entitled to convey, the purchase-money being

- (a) See Carson, R. P. S., p. 645.
- (b) Re Warren, 49 L. T. 696 (C. A.).
- (c) (1896) 1 Ch. 901; affirmed (1896) 2 Ch. 552; Paget v. P., (1898) 1 Ch.
 - (d) Re Little, 40 C. D. 424 (C. A.).
- (e) Re Little, 40 C. D., p. 424; and see Tamplin v. Miller, 30 W.
- R. 422; Re Jordan, 55 L. J. Ch. 330.
 - (f) (1901) 2 Ch. 221.
- (y) 20 C. D. 749; and see Re Little,
 36 C. D. 701; Sedgwick v. Thomas, 48
 L. T. 100; Re Currey, 56 L. T. 80,
 enable leases to be granted.

paid to the trustees (a). In $Re\ Milner(b)$ the restraint was removed until further order, to allow income to be applied in payment of policies and interest. In this case and $Re\ C.$'s Settlement(c) the husband got considerable benefit. In $Re\ Jordan(d)$ the order was refused, as it might have caused a forfeiture of the woman's interest, and so in $Re\ Little(e)$, as it would have enabled her to obtain a personal benefit by the release of a limited power of appointment among her children (f).

An application under the section should in general be made by summons in chambers, and not by petition (g), and the consent of the married woman need not always be taken by a separate examination (h), and *semble* the trustees of the settlement need not be served (i).

It may here be noted that a restraint on anticipation contained in the settlement does not prevent the exercise by a married woman tenant for life under the Settled Land Act, 1882, of any power under that Act (k).

- (III.) Trustee Act, 1893, s. 45 (l).—This section enacts that:—
- (1.) "Where a trustee commits a breach of trust at the instigation or request or with the consent in writing of a beneficiary, the High Court may, if it thinks fit, and notwithstanding that the beneficiary may be a married woman entitled for her separate use and restrained from anticipation, make such order as to the Court seems just, for impounding all or any part of the interest of the beneficiary in the trust estate by way of indemnity to the trustee or person claiming through him."
- (2.) "This section shall apply to breaches of trust committed as well before as after the passing of this Act, but shall not apply so as to prejudice any question in an action or other proceeding which was pending on the twenty-fourth day of December one thousand
- (a) ReTippettand Newbould, 37 C.D. 444; Bates v. Kesterton, (1896) 1 Ch. 159, 165.
 - (b) (1891) 3 Ch. 547.
 - (c) 56 L. J. Ch. 556.
 - (d) 54 L. T. 127.
 - (e) 40 C. D. 418.
- (f) And see Carson, R. P. S., p. 586; Seton (1901), Forms of Orders, pp. 905—908.
 - (g) Re Lillwall's Settlement, 30

- W. R. 343; but see *Re* Blundell, (1901) 2 Ch. 221.
- (h) Re Currey, 56 L. T. 80; see Hodges v. H., supra.
- (i) Re Little, 36 C. D. 701; but in practice the Court frequently directs they should be served.
 - (k) Sect. 61, sub-s. 6, S. L. A. 1882.
- (l) Replacing sect. 6 of the Trustee Act, 1888.

eight hundred and eighty-eight, and is pending at the commencement of this Act."

The general effect of this section and of sect. 6 of the Trustee Act, 1888, which this section replaces, was considered by the Court of Appeal in Fletcher v. Collis (a), and is dealt with infra (b). The powers of the Court to indemnify trustees are extended, but the previously existing rights and remedies of trustees are not curtailed (c). The law is not altered save by giving greater power to the Court(d). The principles which governed the grant of relief before the statutory change apply to the extended relief which can now be given. The Court, as a condition to assisting the trustee by allowing him to retain or charge a married woman's separate estate, required him to show that the charge or retainer was created by her with full knowledge of all the circumstances (e). Acquiescence in or approval of the breach of trust was not sufficient ground for charging a married woman's separate estate (f). These principles are applicable where relief is asked for under this section, and were given effect to in Bolton v. Curre (g), where it was sought to impound a life interest restrained from anticipation. In that case Romer, J., said, "In my judgment it is the duty of a trustee to protect a married woman against herself when she, as a beneficiary restrained from anticipation, asks him to commit a breach of trust. And I do not think that a trustee ought to be allowed to deliberately commit a breach of trust at the request or with the consent of such a beneficiary in the hope and expectation that the Court will afterwards assist him by removing the restraint on anticipation and give him a security for the breach of trust which at the time he had no right to look to "(h).

- (IV.) In cases within the Married Women's Property Act, 1893, s. 2, the Court can order payment of costs out of property subject to restraint (i).
 - (a) (1905) 2 Ch. 24.
- (b) Vol. II. in note to Townley v. Sherborne.
 - (c) Fletcher v. Collis (a), supra.
- (d) Bolton v. Curre, (1895) 1 Ch. 544, at p. 549.
- (e) Sawyer v. S., 28 C. D. 595, at p. 603.
 - (f) Ibid., p. 605.
- (g) (1895) 1 Ch. 544; Ricketts v. R., 64 L. T. 263; but cf. Griffith v. Hughes, (1892) 3 Ch. 105; and see Re

Holt, (1897) 2 Ch. 525; Molyneux v. Fletcher, (1898) 1 Q. B. 648.

(h) Bolton v. Curre, supra, at p. 551.
(i) See Married Women's Property Act, 1893, s. 2, supra, p. 712; Dresel v. Ellis, (1905) 1 K. B. 574; and compare Gordon v. G., (1904) P. 163, and Nunn v. Tyson, (1901) 2 K. B. 487; and as to married woman suing by next friend under the Act of 1882 before the Act of 1893, see Re Glanvill, 31 C. D. 532.

16. Married Woman Trustee.

. As to a married woman becoming a trustee, sect. 24 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, provides that the word "contract" in the Act shall include the acceptance of any trust, or the office of executrix or administratrix, and protects the husband from liability unless he has acted or intermeddled; and sect. 18 enables a married woman who is an executrix or administratrix to act in such office as if she were a "feme sole." See as to the law before the Act, Lewin on Trusts (a) and cases there cited; and judgment of Cotton, L.J., in Bahin v. Hughes (b); and as to a married woman being administratrix or executrix before the Act, see Williams on Executors (c). As regards the law since the Act, it seems to have been generally assumed that it enables any woman to accept the office of trustee or administratrix and act without the concurrence of her husband whether she had separate estate or not. So in $Re\ Ayres\ (d)$ it was held that it is not now necessary for the husband to join in the administration bond, and in Re Hawksworth (e), where it appears that money was to be paid to a married woman either as executrix or as trustee, Chitty, J., said that the words "on her separate receipt" were not necessary since the Act. No question was raised in these cases whether or not it was necessary that the married woman should have separate estate at the time of accepting a trust without her husband's concurrence, as in cases of contract, and the doubt, if any real doubt existed, seems for the future to be removed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1893.

The 18th sect. of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, gives express power to a married woman to transfer certain stocks and funds vested in her as an executrix or trustee, and sect. 16 of the Trustee Act, 1893, replacing sect. 6 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, enacts that "when any freehold or copyhold hereditament shall be vested in a married woman as a bare trustee she may convey or surrender the same as if she were a feme sole." In Re Harkness, &c., Contract (f), North, J., held that a married woman could not convey the legal estate in real estate vested in her as trustee without a deed acknowledged with the concurrence of her husband. But

(f) (1896) 2 Ch. 358; and see Re Brooke and Fremlin, &c., (1898) 1

Ch. 647; Re West and Hardy, &c.,

(1904) 1 Ch. 145.

⁽a) (1903) 32.

⁽b) 31 C. D. 390.

⁽c) Vol. i. (1905), p. 160.

⁽d) 8 P. D. 168.

W. N. (1887), p. 113.

the law has been altered by the Married Women's Property Act, 1907, s. 1 (a).

17. Pin-Money.

It was said in the leading case of *Howard* v. *Digby* (b), that no definition of pin-money was to be found in the books upon which reliance could be placed; that the line which divided it from the separate property of the wife could not be traced with any distinctness, or in a way on which dependence could be placed.

Pin-money, however, may be described with sufficient accuracy to be an allowance settled upon the wife before marriage for the wife's expenditure on her person; it is to meet her personal expenses, and to deck her person suitably to her husband's dignity, that is to say, suitably to the rank and station of his wife (c). Gifts or gratuitous payments may from time to time be made by the husband for the same purposes (d).

When so settled, her savings thereout will be protected as her separate property, against her husband and those claiming under him. But when not so settled, her savings will be assets, for the payment of her husband's debts, in the hands of his executor (e).

It has been held that where the wife permits her pin-money to run in arrear, she cannot, on the death of her husband, claim arrears for more than one year prior to his death; for the very object of the allowance of pin-money being to enable the wife to deck her person suitably to her husband's rank without having recourse to him continually for small sums of money, excludes the supposition that she may accumulate her pin-money while her husband pays her bills (f).

Where, however, a wife from time to time demanded the arrears of her pin-money from her husband, and he promised that she should have it at last, it was held by Hardwicke, C., that she was entitled to all the arrears due at her husband's death (g). On the other hand it has been held that where a husband has paid for all the wife's apparel, and provided for all her private expenses, she cannot, it seems, at any rate where there is no evidence that she ever demanded her pin-money, claim for any arrears at the death of her

- (a) See the section printed at p. 713, supra.
- (b) 8 Bli. N. R. 224 at p. 259; 2 Cl. & Fin. 634.
 - (c) 8 Bli. N. R. p. 268.
- (d) 2 Bright, H. & W. 288; Roper, H. & W., 2nd ed., 132.
 - w. & T .-- vol. I.

- (e) Williams, Exors., vol. i. (1905), p. 672, citing Willson v. Pack, Pr. Ch. 583.
- (f) Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. Sen. 190; Howard v. Digby, 8 Bli. N. R. 224, at p. 267.
 - (g) Ridout v. Lewis, 1 Atk. 269.

husband (a). And even where the wife has been a lunatic, if the husband has maintained her in a manner befitting her rank and station, providing all those things for her for which her pin-money was set apart, neither she nor a fortiori her personal representatives can claim any arrears of pin-money (b).

The personal representatives of the wife cannot go back for a year or even any part of a year, for the arrears of pin-money, for the allowance of pin-money has relation only to the *personal* dress and expenses of the wife (c).

18. Paraphernalia (d).

The right to paraphernalia (e) was a common law limitation in favour of a widow of the rights of the personal representatives of her deceased husband. A married woman during her coverture could own no personal chattels; whatever chattels she acquired by whatever title passed to her husband. A gift to her by her husband even of articles of personal use and ornament gave her no title; her husband could not divest himself of his ownership in her favour. At his death, however, she could claim certain chattels as her paraphernalia against his representatives. Paraphernalia consisted of apparel and ornaments actually used by the wife or appropriated to her use during the coverture with her husband's consent.

Her title apparently depended upon her actual user with the consent of her husband, and her enjoyment might have come from the act of her husband or a stranger (f).

Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, a gift by a husband to his wife of ornaments or wearing apparel in the absence of an express agreement between them vests the property in her

- (a) Powell v. Hankey, 2 P. W. 84; Thomas v. Bennet, 2 P. W. 341; Fowler v. F., 3 P. W. 355.
- (b) Howard v. Digby, 8 Bli. N. R. 224; 2 Cl. & Fin. 634; Jodrell v. J., 9 B. 45; and see Vaizey, Settlements (1887), pp. 788, 792.
- (c) Howard v. Digby, 8 Bli. N. R. 245.
- (d) The law as to paraphernalia has recently been discussed in the Court of Appeal in Masson Templier & Co. v. De Fries, (1909) 2 K. B. 831, disapproving of the dicta of Jeune, P. in Tasker v. T., (1895) P. pp. 5 & 6, and

it appears doubtful whether the right of paraphernalia can ever be claimed where the marriage took place after 1882. The majority of the Court of Appeal, Cozens Hardy, M. R., and Kennedy, L. J., declined however to express any opinion whether a widow could or could not claim paraphernalia. A note upon this subject is accordingly retained.

- (e) See the judgment of Farwell, L. J. in Masson Templier v. De Fries, supra, in which the nature and basis of the right are discussed fully.
 - (f) See e.g., Jervoise v. J., 17 B. 566.

Hulme v. Tenant.

absolutely as her separate estate and no question of paraphernalia can possibly arise (a). Where the right to paraphernalia exists (b) the following rules apply.

The wife has no power to dispose of her paraphernalia during her husband's life (c). The husband, however, may by act inter vivos during the life of his wife, dispose of her paraphernalia either by sale or gift (d). He cannot, however, dispose of them by will (e), but if he does so and confers other benefits upon the wife by his will, she will be put to her election between her paraphernalia and the benefits she may take under the will (f). The paraphernalia of the wife are liable to the debts of the husband (g). In the administration of assets, however, the widow's claim to her paraphernalia is preferred to general legacies (h). As to marshalling, see note to Aldrich v. Cooper, supra.

Where, however, a husband only pledges the wife's paraphernalia and dies leaving a sufficient estate to redeem the pledge and pay all his debts, she is entitled to have it redeemed out of his personal estate even to the prejudice of legatees (i).

The widow may bar her right to paraphernalia by settlement (k), and if her husband bequeaths to her her paraphernalia for life, and she dies without claiming them as paraphernalia, she will, it seems, be presumed to have elected to take them under the will, and her executor or administrator will not be entitled to them (l).

Old family jewels of the husband, though worn by the wife, do not constitute part of her paraphernalia, unless she has acquired them by gift from her husband with that intention (m). See p. 772, infra.

It must be borne in mind that where articles such as ordinarily

- (a) See Masson Templier v. De Fries, supra.
- (b) It appears that the reasons given by Farwell, L. J., in Masson Templier v. De Fries are conclusive against the existence of the right in any case in which the rights of the husband and wife to the chattels in question were during the coverture regulated by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, but that the right may exist where chattels came into a wife's use before 1883.
- (c) 1 Bright, H. & W. 287.
 (d) 1 P. W. 730; Wilcox v. Gore,
 11 Vin. Abr. 180, Pl. 19; Northey v.
 N., 2 Atk. 78; Seymour v. Tresilian,

- 3 Atk. 358, 359.
- (e) Seymour v. Tresilian, supra; but see Hastings v. Douglass, Cro. Car. 344.
- (f) Churchill v. Small, 2 Kenyon Rep., part 2, p. 6.
- (g) Campion v. Cotton, 17 V. 273; Ridout v. The Earl of Plymouth, 2 Atk. 104.
- (h) Tipping v. T., 1 P. W. 730; Snelson v. Corbet, 3 Atk. 369.
- (i) Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393.
 - (k) Cholmely v. C., 2 Vern. 83.
 - (1) Clarges v. Albemarle, 2 Vern. 247.
- (m) Jervoise v. J., 17 B. 566; Laing v. Walker, 64 L. T. 527.

Hulme v. Tenant.

constitute paraphernalia are given to the wife, either before or after marriage, by a relative or friend, they were even before the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, considered as given to her separate use, in which case, as we have before seen, she may dispose of them as a feme sole and they will not be liable to the debts or disposition of her husband. Thus, in the leading case of Graham v. Londonderry (a), the question in the cause between Mr. Graham and Lord Londonderry was, whether Lady Londonderry, then the wife of the plaintiff, but originally the wife of the then late Lord Londonderry, was entitled in her own right, or as paraphernalia, to particular jewels thereafter mentioned. First, as to diamonds given to her by Governor Pitt, her husband's father, and which were a present to her on the marriage with his son, Hardwicke, C., said, "This Court of latter years has considered such a present as a gift to the separate use of the wife, and I am of opinion she is entitled in her own right." The next question was as to four diamonds set about the picture of the late Regent of France. Lord Londonderry returned from France, and delivered this picture to Lady Londonderry, and said at the same time it was a present sent to her by the Regent of France. With respect to this, his Lordship said, "If this be a present from the Regent of France, it falls under the same rule, for being a present from a stranger during the coverture, it must be construed as a gift to her separate use, though I do not think it so clear a case as the others "(b).

Gifts also from the husband to the wife may be made to her separate use, where they are made to her absolutely and not merely to be worn as ornaments to her person only. See Graham v. Londonderry, supra, where Lord Hardwicke says, "I have indeed admitted a husband may make such gifts, but where he expressly gives anything to a wife to be worn as ornaments of her person only, they are to be considered as mere paraphernalia, and it would be of bad consequence to consider them as otherwise: for if they were looked upon as a gift to her separate use, she might dispose of them absolutely, which would be contrary to his intention "(c). Under the present law the question would be whether the wife became owner free from any obligation, or whether her rights were controlled by agreement with her husband (d).

⁽a) 3 Atk. 393.

⁽b) See also Lucas v. L., 1 Atk. 270; Brinckman v. B., 3 Atk. 394, cited. Sed vide Jervoise v. J., 17 B.

⁽c) See Grant v. G., 34 B. 623; 13

W. R. 1057; Re Breton's Estate, 17 C. D. 416.

⁽d) See Masson Templier v. De Fries, supra.

JURISDICTION.

EARL OF OXFORD'S CASE (a).

13 Jac. 1. 1 Ch. Rep. 1.

Jurisdiction of Equity as to Proceedings at Law:

Principles on which equity restrains proceedings under a judgment obtained at law.

Magdalen College, 39 Hen. 8, seised in fee of the Rectory of Christ's Church, and the Covent Garden, without Aldgate, London, containing seven acres, demised them for seventy-two years rendering 40l. per annum for the rectory, and 9l. for the garden. And 17 Eliz. (fifty years of the said lease being expired), the Queen, at the suit of the said College, licensed them to alien, which they did, and then received for the rectory 25l. per annum, and 15l. for the garden. It being her Majesty's intent that the College should be advanced greatly in profit, by having the Rectory to them and their successors, discharged of the lease for years, which in present was worth to them but 50l. per annum, the utmost rent; the same was accordingly performed by a conveyance to her Majesty, and by her Majesty to Spinola and the Rectory, from Spinola to the College; after which, Spinola and the Earl of Oxford, his assignee, and his under tenants have built upon the Garden one hundred and thirty houses, and therein bestowed 10,000l., which assignee and his under tenants have bonds and security given for the enjoyment thereof, to the sum of 20,000l.

Note.—The College is hereby advanced 1,700l. more than they should have been if the former lease had continued, which is not yet expired.

This conveyance having been in peace forty years, and thus advanced by the purchasers from a thing of little value to a great

(a) S. C., Toth. 126 (edit. 1823), nom. Comes Oxon v. Neeth.

and considerable one; and it being a general case wherein persons of all degrees and callings have made purchases, they resting secure on its passing through the Crown, the greatest protection.

The present Master of the College having by undue means obtained possession of one of the one hundred and thirty houses, whereof one Castillion was lessee, who, being secure of his title both in law and equity, sealed a lease thereof for three years to one Warren, who thereupon brought an ejectment against one John Smith, for trial of the title in B. R. Wherein a special verdict was had; and while that depended in argument the lease ended, and so no possession could be awarded for the plaintiff nor fruit had of his suit.

Yet he proceeded to have the opinion of the Judges to know the law (which was a voluntary act of his), to the intent, if the law were with him, he might begin a new suit at law, and spare to proceed in equity, and if the law were against him, that then he might proceed in Chancery. And the judges of that Court having delivered their opinions against his title, before any judgment entered upon the roll, the Earl and Mr. Wood, for themselves and their lessees, preferred their bill in Chancery; and then judgment (i.e., in the action in the King's Bench) was entered, quod querens nil capiat per billam (a).

To which bill in Chancery the defendant put in a plea and demurrer, alleging the conveyance to be void by the statute of 13 Eliz., and that they evicted one house, parcel of the premises, by judgment at law; which plea and demurrer were referred by order to Sir John Tindal and Mr. Woolridge, who reported that they thought it fit the cause should proceed to hearing, notwithstanding the plea and demurrer; and afterwards, in default of an answer, an attachment was awarded against the defendants, whereupon they were attached, and a cepi corpus returned, and by order of the 22nd of October, 13 Jac. 1, they were committed to the Fleet for their contempts in refusing to answer; and do now stand bound over to answer their contempts, they still refusing to answer.

And now this term it was argued, that the defendants thus standing in contempt, &c., may be sequestered until answer.

[LORD CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE]—1. The law of God speaks for the plaintiff, Deut. xxviii.

⁽a) See Magdalen College case, 11 Co. 66, b.

- 2. And equity and good conscience speak wholly for him.
- 3. Nor does the law of the land speak against him. But that and equity ought to join hand in hand in moderating and restraining all extremities and hardships.

By the law of God, he that builds a house ought to dwell in it; and he that plants a vineyard ought to gather the grapes thereof; and it was a curse upon the wicked, that they should build houses and not dwell in them, and plant vineyards and not gather the grapes thereof. Deut. xxviii. 30.

And yet here in this case, such is the conscience of the doctor, the defendant, that he would have the houses, gardens, and orchards, which he neither built nor planted; but the Chancellors have always corrected such corrupt consciences, and caused them to render quid pro quo; for the common law itself will admit no contract to be good without quid pro quo, or land to pass without a valuable consideration; and therefore equity must see that a proportionable satisfaction be made in this case.

As in the case of *Peterson* v. *Hickman*, the husband made a lease of the wife's land, and the lessee being ignorant of the defeasible title, built upon the land, and was at great charge therein; the husband died, and the wife avoided the lease at law, but was compelled in equity to yield a recompense for the building and bettering of the land. For it was so much the more worth unto her: and wheresoever one hath a benefit, the law will compel him to give a recompense, as if *cestui que use* sell the land to one that hath no notice of the use, and dieth; by reason that he had the benefit of the sale, his executors were ordered to answer the value of the land out of his estate, as appeareth by a judgment roll of 34 Hen. 6.

And his Lordship, the plaintiff in this case, only desires to be satisfied of the true value of the new building and planting since the conveyance, and convenient allowance for the purchase.

And equity speaks as the law of God speaks; but you would silence equity.

First. Because you have a judgment at law.

Secondly. Because that judgment is upon a statute law.

To which I answer,—

First. As a right of law cannot die, no more can equity in

chancery die; and, therefore, nullus recedat a Cancellariâ sine remedio (a). Therefore, the Chancery is always open; and although the term be adjourned, the Chancery is not; for conscience and equity are always ready to render to every one their due (b). The Chancery is only removable at the will of the King and Chancellor; and by 27 Ed. 3, 15, the Chancellor must give account to none, but only to the King and Parliament.

The cause why there is a Chancery is, for that men's actions are so divers and infinite, that it is impossible to make any general law which may aptly meet with every particular act, and not fail in some circumstances.

The office of the Chancellor is to correct men's consciences for frauds, breach of trusts, wrongs, and oppressions, of what nature soever they be, and to soften and mollify the extremity of the law, which is called *summum jus*.

And for the judgment, &c., law and equity are distinct, both in their Courts, their judges, and the rules of justice; and yet they both aim at one and the same end, which is to do right; as Justice and Mercy differ in their effects and operations, yet both join in the manifestation of God's glory.

But in this case, upon the matter there is no judgment, but only a discontinuance of the suit, which gives no possession; and although to prosecute law and equity together be a vexation, yet voluntarily to attempt the law in a doubtful case, and after to resort to equity, is neither strange nor unreasonable.

But take it as a judgment to all intents, then I answer, that in this case there is no opposition to the judgment, neither will the truth or justice of the judgment be examined in this Court, nor any circumstance depending thereupon, but the same is justified and approved; and therefore a judgment is no let to examine it in equity, so as all the truth of the judgment, &c., be examined.

No possession is established by the King's writ, after that any judgment is sought to be impeached; for when the plaintiff, by his lessee seeking relief at the common law, is barred, then is his time to seek relief in Chancery when the common law is against him; Doctor and Student, fol. 16. A serjeant is sworn to give counsel according to law,—that is, according to the law of God, the law of

reason, and the law of the land; and upon both the laws of God and reason is granted that rule, viz., To do as one would be done unto.

And, therefore, where one is bound in an obligation to pay money, payeth it, and takes no acquittance, by the common law he shall be compelled to pay the money again. But when it appeareth that the plaintiff will recover at law, the serjeant may advise the defendant to take a subpœna in Chancery, notwithstanding his oath.

So 1 Hen. 7, 14, if he deliver an acquittance without seal, or the money is paid within a short time after the day, or if he lose the acquittance, if judgment be had in any of these cases, the party may resort to equity (a).

Also, after judgment in those cases, if the party have a release, he may have an $audit\hat{a}$ querel \hat{a} , which is a Latin bill in equity, if the other party's conscience be so large as to demand a double satisfaction. So, if the statute be entered into by duress or menace, though the party be in execution, yet he may avoid it by duress of imprisonment (b); and yet it is a judgment upon record; and so of a judgment by a confession and satisfaction, acknowledged by a letter of attorney, which is lost or cannot be produced.

And in the case of Harning v. Castor (c), in B. R. on an auditâ querelâ brought per opinionem curiæ, if a judgment be given upon an usurious contract, and it is part of the agreement to have a judgment, the defendant may avoid such judgment by an auditâ querelâ, or by a scire facias, brought upon the same.

So, if a judgment be had against an infant by covin, as if an infant be inveigled to be bail for one in any Court at Westminster, he may have an $audit\hat{a}$ querel \hat{a} to avoid the same (d). So, if judgment be had by covin or collusion against an executor, to defraud the creditors, if it be pleaded in bar. The covin and collusion may be averred at law by replication, and the judgment frustrated thereby (e); and note, every outlawry is a judgment, yet the party may have remedy in conscience against him that caused him to be outlawed without just cause (f).

- (a) 22 Ed. 4; & 7 Hen. 7, 11.
- (b) 15 Ed. 4; Fitz. Nat. Brev. 104,
- L. 5, Ed. 4, Auditâ Querelâ, 27.
 - (c) Mich., 3 Jac.
 - (d) Trin., 7 Jac., Markham v.

Turner, and 8 Hen. 6, 10.

- (e) 3 Hen. 6, 36.
- (f) Doctor and Student, lib. 2, cap.21; 21 Hen. 7, 7; 9 Hen. 6, 20.

So, if one neglect to enrol his deed of bargain and sale, being his only assurance, as in *Jacques and Huntley's Case*, in this Court, 13° Junij, 1599, and the bargainor brings an *ejectione firmæ* against him, and hath judgment, the bargainee may resort to Chancery, and there be relieved, if not for the land, yet for the money paid.

And in Morgan and Parry's Case (a), a woman had an estate in a house for her life, dispunishable of waste, and yet she was enjoined not to commit waste in the house, contrary to the case of Lewis Bowles, (b): (quere, if not because of the prejudice to him in remainder?)

By all which cases it appeareth, that when a judgment is obtained by oppression, wrong, and a hard conscience, the Chancellor will frustrate and set it aside, not for any error or defect in the judgment, but for the hard conscience of the party; and that, in such cases, the Judges also play the Chancellors; and that these are not within the statute (c); which is, that after a judgment given in the Court of our Sovereign Lord the King, the parties and their heirs shall be in peace until the judgment be undone by attaint or error.

But, secondly, it is objected, that this is a judgment upon a statute law.

To which I answer, It has ever been the endeavour of all Parliaments to meet with the corrupt consciences of men as much as might be, and to supply the defects of the law therein; and if this cause were exhibited to the Parliament, it would soon be ordered and determined by equity; and the Lord Chancellor is, by his place under his Majesty, to supply that power until it may be had, in all matters of meum and tuum, between party and party; and the Lord Chancellor doth not except to the statute or the law (judgment) upon the statute, but taketh himself bound to obey that statute, according to 8 Ed. 4; and the judgment thereupon may be just; and the College, in this case, may have a good title in law, and the judgment yet standeth in force.

It seemeth, by the Lord Coke's report, in Dr. Bonham's Case (d), that statutes are not so sacred as that the equity of them may not be

⁽a) Pasch., 27 Eliz.

⁽c) 4 Hen. 4, cap. 23.

⁽b) 11 Co. 79; 1 Roll. Rep. 177; Raym. 284.

⁽d) 8 Co. 118.

examined. For he saith, that in many cases, the common law hath such a prerogative as that it can control Acts of Parliament, and adjudge them void; as, if they are against common right or reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed; and for that he vouches, 8 Ed. 3, 30; 33 Ed. 3, Cessavit, 41, 42; Nat. Brev. 209; Plowd. 110; 27 Hen. 6, Annuity, 41; 21 Eliz. Rot. 303. And yet our books are, that the acts and statutes of Parliament ought to be reversed by Parliament (only), and not otherwise (a), and, upon that reason, the Lord Chancellors, since the device of the action to be brought by Parsons upon the statute of 2 Ed. 6, have enjoined the stay thereof.

And the Judges themselves do play the Chancellors' parts upon statutes, making construction of them according to equity, varying from the rules and grounds of law, and enlarging them *pro bono publico*, against the letter and intent of the makers, whereof our books have many hundreds of cases (b). Will you, then, have equity suppressed in all cases wherein a judgment at law, or upon a statute, is had?

The use of the Chancery has been in all ages to examine equity in all cases, saving against the King's prerogative (c); then you must have a special statute to except the Chancellor. For general statutes do extend to all the particular usages of the great Courts at Westminster, especially of the Chancery, and especially for matters of equity.

In Chancery upon a recognizance, a capias may be awarded, and the proceedings of that Court shall close up the mouths of the Judges of the common law, notwithstanding the statute of Magna Charta, chap. 29: "Quod nullus liber homo capiatur aut imprisonetur nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terræ." And so it was adjudged in Clement Parson's Case, 21 Eliz. in the Exchequer, which you may see in 8 Co. 142; and 25 Eliz., in Martin and Bye's Case, and in 7° Jac. in Com. Banco, Higham's Case, and Kilway's Case, vouched to be adjudged, 9 Co. 29, vide Doctor and Student, 306 a; and every Court at Westminster ought to take notice of the

⁽a) Bro. tit. "Error," 65, &c.; and 7 Hen. 6, 28; 21 Ed. 4, 46; 29 Ed. 3,

⁴² Ed. 3, 6, &c.
(c) As 35 Hen. 6, 27; 11 Hen. 4,
16; and Doctor and Student, lib. 2,

⁽b) 15 Hen. 7, and 14 Hen. 7, 14;

cap. 5, 16.

usages and customs of the rest of the Courts at Westminster, which are as a law to those Courts, and of which the common law takes notice (a).

The statute of 5 Eliz. c. 9, of Perjury, directeth how perjury shall be punished, saving the authority of the Star Chamber; yet, for perjury, committed in Chancery, either in an affidavit or an answer, &c., if such perjury appear to the Chancellor, the party may be punished according to his direction.

Also, no Exchequer man hath privilege against a subpæna, for matters between party and party, where the King's interest cometh not in question (b), and yet their privilege hath several statutes that give strength thereunto; but the use and precedents of the Chancery are not altered by those laws.

And if a statute staple be extended, which by the statute is a judgment of itself, and the execution thereof is directed by the statute; yet it hath been usual in all ages to moderate the hard consciences of the conusees, and if they have been satisfied with their costs and damages, after the rate of the full value of the land, the land hath been discharged by a decree of equity.

Thirdly, The law of the land speaks not against this.

For, by 2 Ed. 4, 15, the Chancellor sits in Chancery according to an absolute and uncontrollable power, and is to judge according to that which is alleged and proved; but the Judges of the common law are to judge according to a strict and ordinary (or limited) power.

As 7 Hen. 7, fol. 10: A. had lands extended to him in ancient demesne upon a statute merchant. B. purchased the lands, and had a recovery by sufferance in the Court of ancient demesne, with voucher, and entered, and ousted A. A. brought a subpœna, and it was holden, that A. could not falsify the recovery at law, and therefore he should be restored to the possession by the Chancery, for he had not any remedy by the common law. Where note, That notwithstanding a double judgment, yet the Judges directed them to the Chancery.

And the statute of 4 Hen. 4, chap. 23, was never made nor intended to restrain the power of the Chancery, in matters of equity,

⁽a) 2 Co. 53, 65, 503-4; 11 Ed. 4, 2. win et al

⁽b) 20 Eliz., Cutts contrà Peter Good-

but to restrain the Chancellor and the Judges of the common law, only in matters merely determinable by law, in legal proceedings, and not in equitable; and that they should be constant and certain in their own judgments, and not play fast and loose. For by 37 Hen. 6, 13, and divers other authorities, no writ of error or attaint lieth when the suit is by subpæna, and the party only seeks to equity for the equity of his cause.

And, therefore, judgments by default, confession, &c., and not by verdict, are not within this law, so as to bind the Judges on their legal proceedings (a). In debt, upon an obligation against A., B., C., and D. judgment by default is had against A. and B., C. demurs, and D. pleads to issue; and, by the opinion of the Judges, a supersedeas was awarded, et hoc causâ conscientiæ, for that the judgment was by default.

In the next place, it is considerable how far the statute of 27 Ed. 3, cap. 1, doth extend, to check the power of the Chancery in this case. Now, the proper exposition of this statute is from those statutes that were the foundation thereof, and whereupon the statute was built, it not being introductive of new law, but declarative antiqui juris.

The precedent statutes which do explain this statute are 35 Ed. 1, made at Carlisle; 4 Ed. 3, c. 6, in confirmation thereof; 25 Ed. 3, cap. 22 (b), and 25 Ed. 3, cap. 1, "Of provisors of benefices" (c); these being in time before 27 Ed. 3 (d), and 38 Ed. 3 (e), which comes after, and recites the statute of 25 Ed. 3, and this statute of 27 Ed. 3, and confirms them, with additions for further remedies, they being all linked together in one chain; which is further apparent by the recitals in the law, and by the preamble thereof, which doth manifest the minds of the law-makers, and do naturally explain the laws, that they do all extend to ecclesiastical jurisdiction and conusance, and not to temporal; and the same is more apparent by other subsequent laws in several kings' reigns following.

But for the temporal Courts, and the support of their judgments, there are only two statutes, viz., Westminster, 2, cap. 5, and 4 Hen. 4, cap. 23, which are already answered (f).

- (a) 5 Ed. 4, 38.
- (b) This statute is quoted in the Statutes at Large as 25 Ed. 3, St. 5, cap. 22.
- (c) 25 Ed. 3, St. 4.
- (d) 27 Ed. 3, St. 1, cap. 1.
- (e) 38 Ed. 3, St. 2.
- (f) Vide the argument, for the

NOTES.

- 1. Generally
- 2. Modern legislation as to Supreme Court of Judicature, p. 783.
- 3. Powers of the High Court, p. 785.
- 4. Power to restrain proceedings in foreign Courts, p. 793.
- 5. Power to restrain applications for Acts of Parliament, p. 798.

1. Generally.

In the principal case, the facts are not clearly stated, but from the report of the proceedings at law (a), it appears that the jury found a special verdict setting out the facts. The conveyance to the Queen was conditional on the conveyance of the premises by her to Spinola (through whom the plaintiff derived his title) before a certain date, which condition had been duly performed. In the reign of James I. the College entered one of the houses, built on the land conveyed, and leased it to the defendant. The questions arising in the proceedings at law were, first, was the conveyance, which was not in accordance with the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, valid on the ground that the statute did not apply to the Crown; and, secondly, if the statute did apply, then was the conveyance made valid by the statute, 18 Eliz. c. 2, confirming all grants, &c., made to the Crown within the seven years preceding. The case was argued on the special verdict but not decided, as the plaintiff's lessor (the plaintiff in Chancery), on ascertaining that the Judges were of opinion that the Crown was bound by 13 Eliz. c. 10, and that 18 Eliz. c. 2, did not apply to the conveyance, preferred to take the proceedings in Chancery. After he had done so, judgment by default was entered for the defendants in the proceedings at law, and the defendants in the Chancery suit set up this judgment as a plea and demurrer.

In this case Lord *Ellesmere* examines the principles upon which equity formerly entertained jurisdiction to grant injunctions to stay proceedings at law. This subject is interesting historically, as having been the cause of a warm contention between Lord *Ellesmere* and Lord Chief Justice *Coke* (b).

Equity never affected to examine or overrule a judgment at law, but prevented a party from making an unjust use of it such as

authority and jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, at the end of 1 Ch. Rep., where these two statutes are explained.

(a) 11 Rep., 66, b.

(b) Hallam Const. Hist. i., 372 et seq., and The Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery Vindicated, 1 Ch. Rep., Append. I.; Cary, 163.

Courts of law, could they have taken cognisance of the equitable circumstances, would not have permitted; for, as observed by the Lord Chancellor with reference to the principal case, "in that case there was no opposition to the judgment, neither would the truth or justice of the judgment be examined in the Court, nor any circumstance depending thereon; but the same was justified and approved, and therefore a judgment was no let to examine it in equity, so as all the truth of the judgment be not examined." And when, after citing various cases, he concludes "that when a judgment is obtained by oppression, wrong, and a bad conscience, the Chancellor will frustrate and set it aside, not for any error or defect in the judgment, but for the hard conscience of the party," he evidently means only that a party would be prevented from taking advantage of it if it was inequitable that he should do so.

Lord Ellesmere, in the principal case, has noticed certain instances in which the Court had interfered to stay proceedings at law, on account of some equity of which the plaintiff in equity could not take advantage at law; and Mr. Eden, in his work upon Injunctions, has included under the different heads of Accident, Mistake, Fraud, Accounts, Illegal and Immoral Contracts, Penalties and Forfeitures, Breaches of Covenants, Administration of Assets, Marshalling of Securities and Suretyship (most of which subjects are noticed in this work), the different cases in which a Court of equity would by injunction stay proceedings at law (a).

2. Modern Legislation as to the Supreme Court of Judicature.

An attempt to confer equitable jurisdiction upon Courts of common law was made by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854(b), under which, by section 83, equitable pleas and replications might be made use of at law; but a narrow construction was put upon that Act by the Judges of the Courts of common law, who held that no equitable plea was good unless it disclosed facts which would entitle the defendant to a perpetual and unconditional injunction in equity (c).

By the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (d), and subsequent Acts and Orders, the Court of Chancery, the Courts of

(b) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125.

Miner's Co., 17 C. B. 561; Wake v. Harrop, 6 H. & N. 768, 1 H. & C. 202.

(d) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, ss. 3, 4, 16, 19.

⁽a) See Eden on Injunctions, and Joyce on Injunctions.

⁽c) Mines Royal Societies v. Magnay, 10 Exch. 489; Wood v. Copper

Common Law, the Court of Probate, the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and Admiralty have been united and consolidated into one Supreme Court of Judicature in England, consisting of two permanent divisions, "His Majesty's High Court of Justice" and "His Majesty's Court of Appeal." The High Court of Justice now consists of three divisions, namely, the Chancery Division, the King's Bench Division, and the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division. By section 24 of the last mentioned Act, in every civil cause or matter commenced in the High Court of Justice, law and equity are to be administered by the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal respectively, according to the rules in the Act mentioned.

By sub-sections 1-4 of section 24, all equitable estates, titles, rights, duties, and liabilities, are to be recognized by all the said Courts, and equitable defences are to have the same effect given to them as the Court of Chancery gave to them (a).

And by sub-section 5, it is enacted that "No cause or proceeding at any time pending in the High Court of Justice, or before the Court of Appeal, shall be restrained by prohibition or injunction; but every matter of equity in which an injunction against the prosecution of any such cause or proceeding might have been obtained, if this Act had not passed, either unconditionally or on any terms or conditions, may be relied on by way of defence thereto: Provided always, that nothing in this Act contained shall disable either of the said Courts from directing a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending before it if it shall think fit; and any person, whether a party or not to any such cause or matter, who would have been entitled, if this Act had not passed, to apply to any Court to restrain the prosecution thereof, or who may be entitled to enforce, by attachment or otherwise, any judgment, decree, rule, or order contrary to which all or any part of the proceedings in such cause or matter may have been taken, shall be at liberty to apply to the said Courts respectively, by motion in a summary way, for a stay of proceedings in such cause or matter, either generally, or so far as may be necessary for the purposes of justice; and the Court shall thereupon make such order as shall be just." See infra, p. 788.

And by the 25th section, sub-section 11, it is enacted that "Generally in all matters not hereinbefore particularly mentioned, in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity



⁽a) But the distinction between legal Joseph v. Lyons, 15 Q. B. D. at p. and equitable rights is not abolished. 285.

and the rules of the common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail" (a).

And under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (b), "From and after the commencement of the Act (c), the London Bankruptcy Court shall be united and form part of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and the jurisdiction of the London Bankruptcy Court shall be transferred to the High Court."

3. Powers of the High Court.

It results from the above-mentioned legislation (d), that an injunction to restrain proceedings pending in one Division of the High Court can no longer be granted by another Division (e), but a "stay of proceedings" takes its place: see infra, p. 788.

But although the Court cannot restrain an action pending in another Division it may grant an injunction to restrain a person from *instituting* proceedings, and this was done by *Jessel*, M. R., in *Besant* v. *Wood* (f).

The Court has also restrained a person from presenting a petition for winding up a company (g), and from advertising a petition presented $mal\hat{a}$ fide (h).

A Judge of the Chancery Division cannot restrain a sheriff from the selling of goods taken in execution under a judgment of another Division (i).

The jurisdiction of the Chancery Division to restrain proceedings in Courts not forming part of the Supreme Court of Judicature is not taken away. For instance, if there were some grounds which rendered it inequitable for a person to take proceedings in the Lord Mayor's Court (k), there does not appear to be any reason why, upon a proper case being made, the Chancery Division, or any other

- (a) Semble, the provisions of this section would appear from the context to relate to matters of substantive law, not of mere practice: La Grange v. McAndrew, 4 Q. B. D. p. 211.
 - (b) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 93.
 - (c) 1 Jan. 1884 (by s. 3).
- (d) Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, s.s. 5.
- (e) Garbutt v. Fawcus, 1 C. D. 155; Wright v. Redgrave, 11 C. D. 24.
- (f) 12 C. D. 605; and see per Kay, J., in Hart v. H., 18 C. D. at p. 680; Re Maidstone Palace, etc.,

- (1909) 2 Ch. 283 (injunction restraining action against receiver).
- (g) Cercle Restaurant Castiglioni Co. v. Lavery, 18 C. D. 555; New Travellers' Chambers v. Cheese, 70 L. T. 271.
- (h) Re A. Company, (1894) 2 Ch. 349.
- (i) Wright v. Redgrave, 11 C. D. 24; cf. Powell v. Jewesbury, 9 C. D. 39; Crowle v. Russell, 4 C. P. D. 186.
- (k) Cotesworth v. Stephens, 4 Ha.
 185; cf. Furnival v. Bogle, 4 Russ. 142;
 Sieveking v. Behrens, 2 My. & C. 581.

50

w. & T.—vol. 1.

Division of the High Court (a) should not restrain proceedings in such Court.

So in "The Teresa" (b), it was held that a Judge of the Admiralty Division had power in a salvage action to issue an injunction to restrain proceedings in the Liverpool Court of Passage. And in Hedley v. Bates (c), as explained in the judgment of the M. R. in Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles (d), an injunction was granted to restrain proceedings before magistrates, where it appeared they had no jurisdiction and a prohibition might have been granted. In Dyke v. Stephens (e), an infant plaintiff in an action in the Chancery side moved for an injunction to restrain an action in the Palatine Court to which he was not a party. Pearson, J., only allowed the plaintiff in the Palatine Court to proceed with his action on undertaking to submit to certain terms. But where, previously to the administration order in a creditor's action in the High Court, another creditor had obtained judgment in a County Court against the defendant, a sole executrix, the Court refused to restrain him pursuing his remedy against the executrix personally (f).

By the Judicature Act of 1873, s. 25, s.s. 8, a mandamus or injunction may be granted in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to be "just and convenient," but it has been held that this section has not enlarged the jurisdiction of the Court so as to enable it to grant an injunction where before the Act it could not have done so (g).

This sub-section must be read with the restriction imposed by the sub-section 5 above referred to, prohibiting injunctions to restrain actions in other Divisions: see *supra*, p. 784.

The transfer of causes in any action or actions from one Division to another of the High Court is provided for by the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 36, by the Judicature Act, 1875, s. 11, and by R. S. C., 1883, O. 49.

By r. 5 of this Order it is provided "that when an order has

- (a) See further the notes on this section in the Annual Practice, (1909) ii., p. 476; cf. Ex p. Ditton, 1 C. D. 557
 - (b) 71 L. T. 342.
 - (c) 13 C. D. 498.
- (d) 20 C. D. 196. Cf. Grand Junction Waterworks v. Hampton Urban Council (No. 1), (1898) 2 Ch. 331.
 - (e) W. N. (1885) 177.

- (f) Re Womersley, 29 C. D. 557.
- (g) N. L. R. Co. v. G. N. R., 11
 Q. B. D. 30; L. & B. R. Co. v. Cross, 31
 C. D. 354; cf. Kitts v. Moore, (1895)
 1 Q. B. 253; A.-G. v. Ashbourne
 Recreation Co., (1903) 1 Ch. 101;
 Devonport Corporation v. Tozer, (1902)
 2 Ch. 182; Annual Practice, (1909)
 i., 698.

been made by any judge of the Chancery Division for the winding up of any company (a), or for the administration of the assets of any testator or intestate, the judge in whose Court such winding up or administration shall be pending shall have power, without any further consent, to order the transfer to such judge of any cause or matter pending in any other Court or Division brought or continued by or against such company, or by or against the executors or administrators of the testator or intestate whose assets are being so administered, as the case may be."

Where a question raised in an action in one Division can be more conveniently determined in another Division—as, for instance, a question of specific performance raised in an action not brought in the Chancery Division—a transfer thereto may be made: Hillman v. Mayhew (b), followed by the Court of Appeal, consisting of Jessel, M. R., Mellish, L. J., and Baggallay, L. J., in Holloway v. York (c).

But a defendant sued in the King's Bench Division will not become entitled to have the action transferred to the Chancery Division merely by putting in a counterclaim for the specific performance of some contract relating to land between himself and the plaintiff (d).

The Court, however, will take notice of an equitable right to specific performance appearing incidentally in the course of an ejectment action, though there be no counterclaim for such performance (e).

So where the defendant in an action in one of the Divisions of the High Court other than the Chancery Division relies on an equity—as, for instance, to have a deed set aside as part of his defence—

- (a) Company business is at present assigned to Eady and Neville, JJ., Annual Practice, (1909) i., 692.
 - (b) 1 Ex. D. 132.
- (c) 2 Ex. D. 333, reversing the Exchequer Division. See also London Land Co. v. Harris, 13 Q. B. D. 540; Johnson v. Moffat, W. N. (1876) 21; Holmes v. Hervey, 25 W. R. 80. For the transfer of actions to the Commercial Court, see Baerlein v. Chartered Mercantile Bank, (1895) 2 Ch. 488; Barry v. Peruvian Corporation, (1896) 1 Q. B. at p. 209.
- (d) Story v. Waddle, 4 Q. B. D. 289; Standard Discount Co. v. Barton, 37 L. T. 581; and see as to transfer, Cannot v. Morgan, 1 C. D. 1; Humphreys v. Edwards, 45 L. J. Ch. 112; Hawkins v. Morgan, 49 L. J. Q. B. 618; Ladd v. Puleston, 31 W. R. 539, 802; 52 L. J. Ch. 816; China Transpacific Steamship Co. v. Marine Insurance Co., W. N. (1881), p. 89; Re Timms, 47 L. J. Ch. 831.
- (e) Jud. Act, 1873, s. 24, s.s. 4; and see Williams v. Snowden, W. N. (1880) 124.

the Division in which the action is brought must give effect to the equity so far as it is incidental to the purposes of the defence (a).

A transfer from the Chancery to the King's Bench Division will not be ordered merely because the action is one which ought to be tried by a jury, or is for damages only (b).

The fact that an action is brought by the Attorney-General at the relation of private individuals does not operate as an exercise of the Crown's prerogative to select the tribunal by which the action is to be tried, and consequently the discretion of the Court as to transfer is not interfered with (c).

The transfer does not alter the ground of action or the principles

on which it is to be decided (d). Sub-section 5 of section 24 of the Judicature Act, 1873 (e), enacts that a "stay of proceedings" may be directed in cases where before the Act persons might have been entitled to apply for an injunction

to restrain proceedings.

It, therefore, is still material to consider the cases in which such injunctions were granted. Application to stay proceedings must be made in the Court in which the proceedings are pending (f).

In administration actions a decree in a creditor's suit, on behalf of himself and all the other creditors, is a judgment for the benefit of all the creditors, and all powers of preference of the executor or administrator between creditors of equal degree cease to exist (g). All proceedings at law by any of them, whether the action were for an ascertained debt or for unascertained damages, as upon a breach of covenant, would after the decree have been restrained by injunction (h), but not until a decree was obtained, although a bill were

- (a) Mostyn v. The West Mostyn Coal and Iron Co., Limited, 1 C. P. D. 145; Breslauer v. Barwick, 24 W. R. 901.
- (b) Cannot v. Morgan, 1 C. D. 1; Holmes v. Hervey, 25 W. R. 80; and see Annual Practice, (1909) i., 688, O. 49; Seton, 1901 ed., vol. 1, pp. 825-830.
 - (c) A.-G. v. Wilson, 83 L. T. 646.
- (d) Noble v. Edwardes, 5 C. D. at p. 393; The Gertrude, 15 P. D. at p. 109.
- (e) Vide supra, p. 784. See Annual Practice, (1909) ii., 474; Re Stubbs, 8 C. D. 154; Cottrell v. Briggs, 32 Sol.
 - (f) Garbutt v. Fawcus, 1 C. D. 155.

- (g) Jones v. Jukes, 2 V. 517; Mitchelson v. Piper, 8 Si. 64; Irby v. I., 24 B. 525.
- (h) Morrice v. Bank of England, Cas. t. Talb. 217, 3 Swans. appendix at p. 573, 2 Bro. P. C. 465, Toml. edit.; Kenyon v. Worthington, Dick. 668; Brooks v. Reynolds, 1 Bro. Ch. 183, see note in 3 Swans. at p. 542; Paxton v. Douglas, 8 V. 520; Perry v. Phelips, 10 V. 34; Drewry v. Thacker, 3 Swans. 529, 541; Clarke v. Ormonde, Jac. 108, 123; Rouse v. Jones, 1 Ph. 462; Vernon v. Thellusson, 1 Ph. 466; Belmore v. B., 12 Ir. Eq. R. 493.

filed (a), nor unless a decree gave a present right to go in and prove debts (b).

So, where, before an administration decree, the creditor of a deceased person had obtained judgment against the executrix of the deceased, and a garnishee order nisi against a debtor to the estate, the Court, after decree, refused to restrain proceedings on the garnishee order (c).

As a charging order, when made absolute, operated from the making of the order nisi, proceedings on a charging order, obtained before a decree for administration but made absolute after the decree, would not be restrained (d).

Where, however, a creditor obtained a judgment against the executor, and on the same day a decree was made for the administration of the estate, it was held that it ought to be considered that the judgment and decree were obtained at the same moment, and that the judgment creditor could only come in pari passu with the other creditors (e).

A creditor, who has before a decree for administration actually obtained a judgment, though it be unregistered (f), will, as against an executor, have priority in the administration of assets over the debts of all other creditors having debts of equal rank with that for which judgment was recovered (g); because, although by the statute 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46 (h), the distinction between specialty and simple contract debts in the administration of assets is abolished, it has not altered the rule that a creditor, who obtains judgment in legal proceedings against the legal personal representative, is, though the judgment be not registered, entitled to be paid in priority over all other creditors (i).

There may also be an administration in bankruptcy of the estate of a person dying insolvent under section 125, sub-section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which enacts "that any creditor of a deceased debtor whose debt would have been sufficient to support a

- (a) Rush v. Higgs, 4 V. 638; Teague
 v. Richards, 11 Si. 46; Vincent
 v. Godson, 3 De G. & Sm. 717;
 Marriage v. Skiggs, 4 De G. & J. 4;
 cf. Nokes v. Gandy, 17 Eq. 297.
- (b) Ranken v. Harwood, 5 Ha. 215, 223; cf. Lee v. Park, 1 Keen, 714.
 - (c) Fowler v. Roberts, 2 Gif. 226.
- (d) Haly v. Barry, L. R. 3 Ch. 452; cf. Re Printing, &c., Co., 8 C. D. 535; Stewart v. Rhodes, (1900) 1 Ch. 386.
- (e) Parker v. Ringham, 33 B. 535.
- (f) Jennings v. Rigby, 33 B. 198; Gaunt v. Taylor, 3 Man. & Gr. 886; as to costs see Re Griffith, (1904) 1 Ch. 807.
- (g) Dolland v. Johnson, 2 Sm. & G. 301.
 - (h) Hinde Palmer's Act.
- (i) Re Williams' Estate, 15 Eq. 270; Re Stubbs' Estate, 8 C. D. 154.

bankruptcy petition against such debtor had he been alive, may present to the Court, a petition in the prescribed form praying for an order for the administration of the estate of the deceased debtor according to the law of bankruptcy "(a). And if proceedings are pending in the Chancery Division a power of transfer is given to the Chancery Division, but the power is discretionary (b).

After a decree or order on summons for the administration of an estate, a legatee would be restrained from proceeding to recover a legacy, and that notwithstanding the legatee submitted to take a judgment against the executor de propriis bonis, alleging a devastavit (c), but the legatee would be entitled to his costs down to the time of his being served with notice of the administration.

If a creditor continued proceedings at law after a notice of a decree for administration he could be ordered to pay the costs of a motion to restrain him from further proceedings, but he would be allowed to set them off against the costs of the proceedings incurred prior to the notice (d).

When an estate is administered and the residue is paid over under an order of the Court, the executor will be protected and a creditor will not afterwards be allowed to sue him at law (e).

After an estate has been fully administered in the Court, an executor will not be permitted without the leave of the Court to prosecute an action to recover part of the testator's property from a party to the suit (f); on the principle that an action, in which the same points are raised as have already been raised in another action, will be stayed except as to points not so raised (g).

The principles upon which a creditor was restrained from proceeding at law after a decree for administration were held not

- (a) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 125 (1); Bankruptey Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 71, s. 21.
- (b) Bankruptey Act, 1883, s. 125 (4); Bankruptey Act, 1890, s. 21 (2); Re Weaver, 29 C. D. 236; Re Baker, 44 C. D. 262; Re Briggs, 7 T. L. R. 572; Re York, 36 C. D. 233; Senhouse v. Mawson, 52 L. T. 745; Re Kenward, 94 L. T. 277.
- (c) Ratcliff v. Winch, 16 B. 576; but see Powell v. P., 12 Ir. Eq. R. 501; Molyneux v. Scott, 3 Ir. Ch. R. 291.

- (d) Gardner v. Garrett, 20 B. 469; Beauchamp v. Huntley, Jac. 546.
- (e) Dean v. Allen, 20 B. 1; Bennett v. Lytton, 2 John. & H. 155; Micklethwaite v. Winstanley, 34 L. J. Ch. 281, 13 W. R. 210; Dodson v. Samuell, 29 L. J. Ch. 335; Molran v. Broughton, (1900) P. 56; see also Lord St. Leonards' Acts, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38.
- (f) Oldfield v. Cobbett, 5 B. 132, 6 B. 515; cf. Frank v. Basnett, 2 My. & K. 618.
 - (g) Re Aird, 26 W. R. 441.

applicable to the case of a creditor in bankruptcy proceeding in a foreign country against a bankrupt having real estate there after a fiat of bankruptcy in this country (a).

Foreign creditors, moreover, will not be restrained from obtaining payment out of the English assets until English creditors are paid in full (b); but where a person died domiciled in Ireland leaving property in Ireland and England, and the same executors in both countries, it was held by *Kindersley*, V.-C., that an Irish judgment had priority over English simple contract creditors against Irish property remitted to and being administered in England by the executors (c).

Ordinarily, after a winding-up order has been obtained against a company, a creditor cannot proceed against the company (d), and in such case the mere fact of the creditor having given indulgence to the company without binding himself not to sue is not a sufficient reason for the Court allowing him to continue proceedings (e).

A person who is prejudiced by the conduct of a receiver appointed in an action by way of equitable execution ought not, without leave of the Court, to commence a fresh action to restrain the proceedings of the receiver (f). The Court has also an inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings which are an abuse of its process (g). The Court has also power to stay proceedings in frivolous and vexatious actions (h).

For the distinction between the rule laid down for staying proceedings when they are all taken in this country, and where one or more of the actions is or are in a foreign country, see p. 794, post.

The Court, moreover, will not allow a company, or directors of a company, to be sued by a multitude of shareholders in a multitude

- (a) Pennell v. Roy, 3 De G. M. & G. 126.
- (b) Re Brett, 29 L. J. Ch. 296.
- (c) Cook v. Gregson, 2 Dr. 286.
- (d) Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, s. 140; and see Re London Suburban Bank, 19 W. R. 950; Re Artistic Colour Printing Co., 14 C. D. 502; Re General Service, &c., Stores, (1891) 1 Ch. 496, and Ex p. Reynolds, 15 Q. B. D. 169; as to executors, see Re Great Ship Co., 4 De G. J. & S. 63; Re Printing, &c., Co., 8 C. D. 535; Re Hill Pottery Co.,
- 1 Eq. 649.
- (e) Re Vron Colliery Co., 20 C. D. 442, throwing doubts on Ex p. Railway Steel and Plant Co., 8 C. D. 183, and Re Richards & Co., 11 C. D. 676.
 - (f) Searle v. Choat, 25 C. D. 723.
- (g) Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley,
 10 A. C. 210; Chaffers v. Goldsmid,
 (1894) 1 Q. B. 186; Re Norton's
 Settlement, (1908) 1 Ch. 471.
- (h) O. 25, r. 4; Woods v. Lyttleton, 25 T. L. R. 665; for other Orders giving power to stay, see O. 26, r. 4; O. 34, r. 2; O. 48A, r. 2, and O. 7, r. 1.

of separate actions, each of which is instituted on behalf of all the shareholders, for the same act or alleged breach of trust, and therefore the Court has power to stop all but one of the actions, if they are all for the same thing (a).

It sometimes happens that the Court allows one action to proceed for one purpose, and another for another purpose—that is, that the Court excises from one action so much of the relief as can properly be attributed to an earlier plaintiff, and allows the second or third action to go on for the additional relief; but all that can only be discussed in the presence of all parties (b).

Where numerous actions (in one case as many as seventy-eight) are brought by different plaintiffs against the same defendants, for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in respect of the same company, in all of which actions the same question substantially is raised, in some way or other provision will be made, by the consent of the parties, for the trial of the real question between the parties in a single action to be fixed upon as a test action (c).

The Court, under the rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, O. 49, r. 8, adopts the old practice at common law, but nevertheless the Court can consolidate actions at the instance of plaintiffs (d). But in such cases the Court may, under its general jurisdiction, enlarge the time for taking the next step in several of the series of actions, till one of them has been tried as a test action (e).

The jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy to stay proceedings in other Courts is now exercised under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which in section 10, sub-section 2, enacts that "The Court may at any time after the presentation of a bankruptcy petition stay any action, execution, or other legal process against the property or person of the debtor; and any Court in which proceedings are pending against a debtor may, on proof that a bankruptcy petition has been presented by or against the debtor, either stay the proceedings or allow them to continue on such terms as it may think

- (a) M'Henry v. Lewis, 22 C. D. 404. See also Commissioners of Sewers v. Gellatly, 3 C. D. 610; Cox v. Mitchell, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 55. For the practice in such cases as those above referred to, and the conduct of "test" actions, see Annual Practice, (1909) O. 49, r. 8, vol. i., p. 694, and cases there cited.
 - (b) M'Henry v. Lewis, 22 C. D. at
- p. 404.
- (c) Amos v. Chadwick, 9 C. D. 459; Bennett v. Lord Bury, 5 C. P. D. 339.
- (d) Martin v. M., (1897) 1 Q. B.
- (e) Amos v. Chadwick, supra; Holden v. Silkstone Co., 30 W. R. 98; Colledge v. Pike, 56 L. T. 124; as to appeal, see Briton, &c., Life Assurance Co. v. Jones, 60 L. T. 637.

just." Where the proceedings to be stayed are in a Division of the High Court, the application to stay is properly made to that Division (a).

The general rule is that the Court will not restrain proceedings in an action to which the discharge in bankruptcy of the debtor would be no defence (b). But pending the bankruptcy execution will not issue on the judgment (c). The exercise of the power is in all cases discretionary (d), but the Court will not restrain a secured creditor from exercising his legal remedies (e). A committal for non-payment of rates is a punitive proceeding and consequently will not be restrained (f). But a sequestration may be (g).

Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, by section 92 the jurisdiction of the London Bankruptcy Court was transferred to the Supreme Court, while under section 100 the County Courts sitting in Bankruptcy have the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, and it has been held that neither the London Bankruptcy Court nor the County Court sitting in Bankruptcy has power to restrain proceedings in the High Court (h). As to applications to the High Court to stay proceedings under the section, see Sharp v. McHenry (a).

4. Power to restrain Proceedings in Foreign Courts.

The High Court may still restrain a person within its jurisdiction from taking proceedings in Courts out of its jurisdiction, as in foreign countries (properly so called), our colonies, or Ireland or Scotland. It interferes, however, not upon any pretension to control or overrule the decisions of such Courts or to examine judicial and administrative acts abroad, but it acts in personam, from the fact of the party on whom the order is made being within

- (a) Sharp v. McHenry, 55 L. T. 747; see also $Ex\ p$. Hirst, 11 C. D. 278; $Ex\ p$. Bayly, 15 C. D. 223; $Ex\ p$. Harper, 4 T. L. R. 65.
- (b) Ex p. Coker, Re Blake, L. R. 10 Ch. 652.
- (c) Cobham v. Dalton, L. R. 10 Ch. 655.
- (d) Ex p. Mills, L. R. 6 Ch. 594.
- (e) Ex p. Hirst, Re Wherly, 11 C. D. 278; Re Evelyn, (1894) 2 Q. B. 302; as to actions abroad see Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, 10 C. D. 681; see also
- Ex p. Birmingham Gas Co., 11 Eq. 615 (distress).
- (f) Re Edgcombe, (1902) 2 K. B. 403.
- (g) Re Pollard, (1903) 2 K. B. 41.
- (h) Ex p. Reynolds, 15 Q. B. D. 169; Re Richardson & Cook, 86 L. T. 690; as to the powers of Courts under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, see Ex p. Ditton, 1 C. D. 557, and the cases quoted in Ex p. Reynolds, 15 Q. B. D. 169.

the power of the Court, and that the questions to be determined are such as ought to be adjudicated upon in this country (a).

. When a person sues another for the same matter in two Courts in this country, such a proceeding is primâ facie vexatious, and the Court will generally, as of course, put the plaintiff to his election, and stay one of the suits (b); and the same principle applies when one of the actions is in the Courts in Scotland or Ireland or any other part of the British Dominions. But if one of the actions is in a foreign country where there are different forms of procedure and different remedies, there is no such presumption, and the burden lies upon the person seeking to restrain proceedings abroad to shew that they are vexatious (c). "The general principle is that the Court can and will interfere whenever there is vexation and oppression to prevent the administration of justice being perverted for an unjust end" (d). Where there are two such actions, the Courts in this country will act in one of three ways—put the party so suing to his election, or, without allowing him to elect, stay all proceedings in this country, or stay all proceedings in the foreign country. The last way is an injunction acting on the party affected and may be inoperative (e). The mere co-existence of suits, as stated above, is not vexatious, and consequently the defendant in an English action, in which no decree has been made, will not be prevented from commencing, against the plaintiff in the English action, an action abroad (f).

Where, pending a litigation here, in which complete relief may be had, a party to the suit institutes proceedings abroad, the Court of

(a) Love v. Baker, 1 Ch. Ca. 67, 2 Freem 125; Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104; Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 V. 170, 182; Beauchamp v. Huntley, Jac. 546; Bushby v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297; Kennedy v. Cassillis, 2 Swans. 313; Bunbury v. B., 1 B. 318; Breadalbane v. The Marquis of Chandos, 2 My. & C. 711, at p. 732; Venning v. Loyd, 1 De G. F. & J. 193; London, &c., Bank v. Strutton, 18 W. R. 107; Ex p. Tait, 13 Eq. 511; Armstrong v. A., (1892) P. 98.

(b) M'Henry v. Lewis, 22 C. D. 397; Walsh v. Bishop of Lincoln, L. R. 4 Ad. & E. 242; see also Mutrie v. Binney, 35 C. D. 614; Jopson v. James, 77 L. J. Ch. 824.

(c) M'Henry v. Lewis, supra; Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt, 23 C. D. 225; Baird v. Prescott, 6 T. L. R. 231; Logan v. Bank of Scotland (No. 2), (1906) 1 K. B. 141; Egbert v. Short, (1907) 2 Ch. 205; Re Norton's Settlement, (1908) 1 Ch. 471.

(d) Per Bowen, L. J., in M'Henry v. Lewis, 22 C. D. at p. 408; cf. Ewing v. Orr-Ewing, 10 A. C. 453, and Logan v. Bank of Scotland (No. 2), (1906) 1 K. B. at pp. 149-151.

(e) Per Baggallay, L. J., in The Christiansburg, 10 P. D. 141, at p. 152.

(f) Hyman v. Helm, 24 C. D. 531; and see per North, J., in Mutrie v. Binney, 35 C. D., at p. 628.

Chancery in general considers the act as a vexatious harassing of the opposite party, and restrains the foreign proceedings (a). But when a foreigner seeks no assistance from the Courts of this country it will require a strong case to restrain him, when domiciled in another country, from proceeding to obtain payment of debts according to the law of that country (b).

In Hope v. Carnegie (c), a decree was made in England for the administration of the estate of a testator entitled to real and personal estate in England and the Netherlands. Subsequently a defendant, one of his children, instituted proceedings in the Netherlands for the administration both of his real and personal estate in that country. It was held by Turner, L. J., affirming the decision of Stuart, V.-C., that this defendant ought to be restrained from continuing the pending proceedings in the Netherlands, and from commencing any other proceedings in respect of the testator's personal estate in the Netherlands or elsewhere. Knight-Bruce, L. J., thought that the defendant ought to have been left at liberty to carry on the pending proceedings in the Netherlands as to the real estate, if she could do so without proceeding as to the personal estate.

With regard to the jurisdiction and practice in actions in England for administration of the real and personal estate of a testator who had property within and without the jurisdiction, see Ewing v. Orr-Ewing (d), and cases cited, post, pp. 818 et seq.

The rule, which prevents a creditor from proceeding with an action for the recovery of his debt after a decree in an administration suit, is applicable to the case of a creditor proceeding in a foreign Court, and will render him liable to the costs of an application to restrain him after he has received due notice of the judgment (e).

Where, however, the Court may not be able to do complete justice in a case—as, for instance, where some of the defendants are domiciled and have real property in a country out of the jurisdiction—the

- (a) Per Lord Cranworth, C., 5 H. L. Cas., p. 437; and see Harrison v. Gurney, 2 J. & W. 563; Beckford v. Kemble, 1 S. & S. 7; Wedderburn v. W., 4 My. & C. 585.
- (b) The Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. Cas. 416; Vardopulo v. V. 25, T. L. R. 518; The Hagen, (1908) P. 189.
- (c) L. R. 1 Ch. 320; and see as to giving leave to take proceedings

abroad, Batthyany v. Walford, 33 C. D. 624, 36 C. D. 269; Wedderburn v. W., 4 My. & C. 585.

(d) 9 A. C. 34; 10 A. C. 453, post, p. 818.

(e) Graham v. Maxwell, 1 Mac. & G. 71; see per Lord St. Leonards, C., 5 H. L. Cas., p. 455; Beauchamp v. Lord Huntley, Jac. 546; Re Low, (1894) 1 Ch. 157.

Court may, after a decree, allow proceedings to be taken in such country, the effect of which would be to obtain security for the demand which they might re-establish by the suit in this country (a)

And upon the same principle the foreign suit has been kept on foot as accessory to the English suit, and as the means of affecting property which the English Court could not touch (b).

And where, after obtaining a decree for payment of a demand, the plaintiff takes proceedings in another country for the same demand, in the expectation of obtaining more than the Court here held him to be entitled to, such proceedings will be restrained, and he will be ordered, on receiving payment of what the Court adjudged him to be entitled to, to give up and surrender the securities which he held for such demand (c), for upon them, according to the judgment, nothing remains due.

Even though no decree has been obtained in this country, yet if a suit instituted abroad appears ill-calculated to answer the ends of justice, the Court of Chancery has restrained the foreign action, imposing, however, terms which it has considered reasonable for protecting the party who was suing abroad (d).

So when there was no question as to the foreign litigation being or not being necessary, or being or not being likely to be so effectual as litigation in this country, still if a person within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was instituting proceedings in a foreign Court, the instituting of which was contrary to good conscience, the Court, on a bill filed here, restrained the prosecution of such foreign suit just as if it had been a suit in this country (e).

But where its interposition would give an unfair advantage to foreign over British creditors, the Court has refused to restrain creditors being British subjects from suing on bonds given to release a ship, which they had proceeded against in Louisiana, although they knew that by the law of that State the rights of the mortgagee, contrary to the comity of nations, would be disregarded (f).

- (a) Wedderburn v. W., 4 My. & C. 585.
 - (b) Beckford v. Kemble, 1 S. & S. 7.
- (c) Booth v. Leycester, 3 My. & C. 459.
- (d) See per Lord Cranworth, C., 5 H. L. Cas. 438; Baillie v. B., 5 Eq. 175; Cood v. C., 33 B. 314; and see

Armstrong v. A., (1892) P. 99.

- (e) Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104; and see London, &c., Bank v. Strutton, 18 W. R. 107.
- (f) Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter, 4 Eq. 62, affirmed on appeal, L. R. 3 Ch. 479; Re Maudslay, Sons and Field, (1900) 1 Ch. 602.

And where the matter may be more conveniently litigated in the

foreign Court, equity will not interfere (a).

So where an incumbrancer on immovable property, situate in a foreign country, has instituted proceedings in that country for the purpose of enforcing his rights, he will not be restrained by injunction from prosecuting such proceedings, even though the mortgagor is a company in the course of winding up in this country—at all events if the party seeking to restrain the incumbrancer can appear before the foreign tribunal and have his rights finally settled (b); and the proceedings in our own Courts for the same matter will be stayed pending the result of the litigation in the foreign Court (c).

Again where there is a suit by the same plaintiff as in the English Court pending in a foreign Court, which can afford a complete remedy, the proceedings in the English Court may be suspended, and the plaintiff in the English proceedings put to his election in which

Court he will proceed (d).

And where a plaintiff has commenced an action in a foreign Court, as for instance the Irish Admiralty Court, he will not be allowed to proceed with the English until he has abandoned the foreign action (e).

The Court will refuse an injunction if it would be ineffectual. Thus when a person sought to be restrained is not within the jurisdiction, it has been held that the Court will refuse the application for want of power (f); Lord Cranworth, in The Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (g), said, that property within the jurisdiction would enable an injunction to be made effectual against the owner out of it, but it does not appear that this would be treated in England as ground for jurisdiction; but, on an application to restrain an act within the jurisdiction, it has been treated as material (h).

In a case where judgment had been given for the administration of

- (a) Jones v. Geddes, 1 Ph. 724; Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Molleson, 1 A. C. 780; Venning v. Loyd, 1 De G. F. & J. 193.
- (b) Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, 10 C. D. 681.
- (c) Elliott v. Minto, 6 Madd. 16; Venning v. Loyd, supra (a); The Peshawur, 8 P. D. 33; cf. Transatlantic Co. v. Pietroni, John. 604.
- (d) Pieters v. Thompson, G. Coop. 94; The Mali Ivo, L. R. 2 A. & E. 356; see also Von Eckhardstein v.

- V. E., 23 T. L. R. 539, 593; The Mannheim, (1897) P. 13.
- (e) The Catterina Chiazzare, 1 P. D. 368; The Delta, 25 W. R., at p. 49.
- (f) Per Jessel, M. R., Re International Pulp, &c., Co., 3 C. D., at p. 599; per Chitty, J., Re North Cafolina Estate Co., 5 T. L. R. 328; per Bacon, V.-C., in Re Chapman, 15 Eq., at p. 77.
 - (g) 5 H. L. C., at p. 442.
- (h) Re Burland's Trade Mark, 41 C. D. 542.

an estate it was held that the Court had no power to restrain a foreign creditor, even when he had carried in a claim against the estate (which he afterwards withdrew), from proceeding in a foreign Court against the administrator (a).

Mere hardship or inconvenience is not sufficient to justify interference with proceedings taken in a foreign Court(b); and where a foreigner has appeared to an action in an English Court, the Court has a discretion as to restraining him from litigating the same subjectmatter in the Courts of his own country (c).

Moreover, before the Court interposes upon an interlocutory application to stay proceedings in a suit by reason of a decree or judgment in a foreign country, it must be satisfied that the foreign decree or judgment does justice and covers the whole subject of the suit and that effectual relief can be obtained in the foreign country (d).

The result of the authorities is that, if the circumstances are such as would make it the duty of the Court to restrain a party from instituting proceedings in this country, they will also warrant it in restraining proceedings in a foreign Court. But though the authorities will justify such a course, yet they will not, it seems, make it the duty of the Court so to act, if from any cause it appears likely to be more conducive to substantial justice that the foreign proceedings should take their own course (e).

The Courts cannot interfere where relief is sought in consequence of errors and irregularities in the decree of a colonial equitable Court, as an appeal lies from that Court to the appellate jurisdiction in this kingdom (f).

5, Power to restrain Applications for Acts of Parliament.

It has been laid down by many eminent Judges that the Court of Chancery acting in personam had power in a proper case to grant an

- (a) Re Boyse, 15 C. D. 591; and see Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. Cas. 416, supra; see Seton, (1901) pp. 736-739.
 - (b) Fletcher v. Rodgers, 27 W. R. 97.
- (c) Dawkins v. Simonetti, 29 Ws R. 228; and see Re Boyse, supra; M'Henry v. Lewis, 22 C. D. 397; Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt, 23 C. D. 225; Baird v. Prescott, 6 T. L. R. 231; Armstrong v. A.,
- (1892) P. 98.
- (d) Ostell v. Lepage, 2 De G. M. & G. 892; Kennedy v. Cassillis, 2 Swans. 313; Wilson v. Ferrand, 13 Eq. 362.
- (e) See per Cranworth, C., in The Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, supra; and see Hope v. Carnegie, L. R. 1 Ch. 320.
- (f) See Henderson v.H., 3 Ha. 100; and Mutrie v. Binney, 35 C. D. 614.

injunction against a party applying to Parliament for a private Act, or an Act respecting property (a); but no such injunction has, it seems, yet been granted, nor has any judge yet ventured to say in what particular case such an injunction will be granted. A leading case upon this subject is that of *Heathcote* v. The North Staffordshire Railway Co. (b). An injunction has been granted restraining a company from proceeding with a scheme which required Parliamentary sanction to become operative (c).

Upon the same principle, in the absence of any equity, the Court will not restrain an application in a proper case to the legislature of a foreign country (d).

If, however, it is unlawful and in fact a breach of trust to apply the funds of a company in an application to Parliament for powers to extend the business of the company beyond the objects for which it was constituted, the Court will interfere by injunction at the suit of any of the shareholders to restrain such application (e).

- (a) See now Jud. Act, 1873, s. 25, s.s. 8; Annual Practice, (1909) vol. i., p. 699.
- (b) 2 M. & G. 100; see also A.-G. v.
 Man. & Leeds Ry. Co., 1 Rly. Cas.
 430; Lancaster & Carlisle Ry. Co. v.
 N. W. Ry. Co., 2 Kay & J. 293; Steele v. N. M. Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 237; Re
 L. C. & D. Ry. Arrangement Act, Ex p. Hartridge, L. R. 5 Ch. 671, 682.
- (c) Telford v. The Met. Board of Works, 13 Eq. 574; 20 W. R. 481.

- (d) See Bill v. The Sierra Nevada, &c., Co., 1 De G. F. & J. 177.
- (e) Simpson v. Denison, 10 Ha. 51; G. W. Ry. Co. v. Rushout, 5 De G. & Sm. 290; Cunliff v. Manchester, &c., Canal Co., 2 Russ. & My. 480 (n.); Ward v. The Society of Attornies, 1 Coll. 370; Hunt v. The Shrewsbury, &c., Ry. Co., 13 B. 1. But see Ware v. The Grand Junction Waterworks Co., 2 Russ. & My. 470; Vance v. East Lancs. Ry. Co., 3 Kay & J. 50.

PENN v. LORD BALTIMORE.

1750. 1 Ves. Sen. 444 (see also Ridg. Ca. t. Hardw. 332).

Power of Court of Equity over Property out of its Jurisdiction by a Decree in Personam.

Specific performance decreed of articles executed in England, concerning boundaries of two provinces in America.

THE bill was founded on articles entered into between the plaintiffs and defendant, 10th May, 1732, which articles recited several matters as introductory to the stipulation between the parties, and particularly letters patent, granted 20th June, 2 Car. 1, by which the district, property, and Government of Maryland, under certain restrictions, is granted to the defendant's ancestor, his heirs and assigns; farther, reciting charters or letters patent in 1681, by which the province of Pennsylvania is granted to Mr. William Penn and his heirs; and stating a title to the plaintiffs, derived from James, Duke of York, to the three lower counties, by two feoffments, both bearing date 24th August, 1682. The articles recite that several controversies had been between the parties, concerning the boundaries and limits of these two provinces and three lower counties; and make a particular provision for settling them, by drawing part of a circle about the town of Newcastle; and a line to ascertain the boundaries between Maryland and the three lower counties; and a provision in what manner that circle and line should run and be drawn; and that commissioners should do it in a certain limited time, the final time for which was on or before the 25th December, 1733. There was, beside, a provision in the articles, that if there should be a want of a quorum of commissioners meeting at any time, the party by default of whose commissioners the articles could not be carried into execution, should forfeit the penalty of 5,000l. to the other party; and a provision for making conveyances of the several parts from one to the other in these boundaries, and for enjoyment of the tenants and land-holders.

The bill was for a specific performance and execution of the articles; what else was in the cause, came by way of argument to support, or objection to impeach, this relief prayed.

When the cause came on before, it was ordered to stand over, that the Attorney-General should be made a party (a); who now left it to the Court to make a decree, so as not to prejudice the right of the Crown.

The first objection for defendant was, that this Court has not jurisdiction nor ought to take cognizance of it, for that the jurisdiction is in the King in Council.

Second objection, that, if there is not an absolute defect of jurisdiction in this Court, yet, being a proprietary government and a feudary seigniory held of the Crown, who has the sovereign dominion, the parties have no power to vary or settle the boundaries, by their own act; for such agreement to settle boundaries, and to convey in consequence, amounts to an alienation, which these lords proprietors cannot do. But supposing they may alien entirely, they cannot alien a parcel, as that is dismembering, for which there is a rule in the feudal books concerning feuda indivisibilia.

Thirdly, this agreement ought not to be carried into execution by this Court, as it affects the estates, rights, and privileges of the planters, tenants, and inhabitants within the district, and the tenure and law by which they live, without their consent.

Fourthly, supposing all this answered, yet this agreement is not proper to be established, from the general nature and circumstances. First, as it is merely voluntary, and the Court never decrees specifically without a consideration; secondly, as the time for performance is lapsed; thirdly, that these articles are in nature of submission to arbitration, which cannot be supplied by interposition and act of this Court; fourthly, that defendant was imposed on or surprised in making this agreement; fifthly, that, if there was no imposition or fraud, defendant grossly mistook his original right, and, under that mistake and ignorance, the articles were founded and framed; sixthly, the agreement in some material parts is so uncertain that it cannot be decreed with certainty according to the intent of the parties, for that no centre is fixed,

without which it is impossible to make a circle; nor is it sufficiently described, whether it should be a circle with a radius of twelve -miles, or only a periphery of twelve miles; seventhly, there is a covenant for mutual conveyances, whereas the plaintiffs have no estates in the lower counties, so as to make an effectual conveyance to defendant; and an agreement must be decreed entirely, or not at all. On the plaintiffs' own shewing, the legal estate and property is in the Crown; so that, at most, they have but an equitable right, in which the Crown is trustee; and then, this Court cannot decree a conveyance. In Reeve v. Attorney-General, 1741, lands were devised to a wife, and, after her death, to be sold, and the money to be divided among the plaintiffs. The testator died without heirs, so that the legal interest in the estate descended to the Crown, but with a trust to be sold. On a bill to have the will established, and to hold against the Crown, or the lands sold, his Lordship dismissed the bill, and said, where the Crown was trustee, the Court has no jurisdiction to decree a conveyance, but they must go to a petition of right; eighthly, this Court cannot make an effectual decree in the cause, nor enforce the execution of their own judgment.

LORD CHANCELLOR [HARDWICKE]. I directed this cause to stand over for judgment, not so much from any doubt of what was the justice of the case, as by reason of the nature of it, the great consequence and importance, and the great labour and ability of the argument on both sides, it being for the determination of the right and boundaries of two great provincial governments and three counties; of a nature worthy the judicature of a Roman senate rather than of a single judge; and my consolation is, that, if I should err in my judgment, there is a judicature, equal in dignity to a Roman senate, that will correct it.

It is unnecessary to state the case on all the particular circumstances of evidence, which will fall in more naturally, and very intelligibly, under the particular points arising in the case.

The relief prayed must be admitted to be the common and ordinary equity dispensed by this Court, the specific performance of agreements being one of the great heads of the Court, and the most useful one, and better than damages at law, so far as relates to the thing in specie, and more useful in a case of this nature than in

most others, because no damages in an action of covenant could be at all adequate to what is intended by the parties, and to the utility to arise from this agreement, viz., the settling and fixing these boundaries in peace, to prevent the disorder and mischief which; in remote countries distant from the seat of government, are most likely to happen and most mischievous. Therefore, the remedy prayed by a specific performance is more necessary here than in other cases, provided it is proper in other respects; and the relief sought must prevail, unless sufficient objections are shewn by defendant, who has made many and various for that purpose.

First, the point of jurisdiction ought in order to be considered, and, though it comes late, I am not unwilling to consider it. To be sure, a plea to the jurisdiction must be offered in the first instance, and put in *primo die*; and answering submits to the jurisdiction, much more when there is a proceeding to hearing on the merits, which could be conclusive at common law; yet a Court of equity, which can exercise a more liberal discretion than common law Courts, if a plain defect of jurisdiction appears at the hearing, will no more make a decree than where a plain want of equity appears.

It is certain that the original jurisdiction, in cases of this kind relating to boundaries between provinces, the dominion, and proprietary government, is in the King and Council; and it is rightly compared to the cases of the ancient commotes and lordships marches in Wales; in which, if a dispute is between private parties, it must be tried in the commotes or lordships; but in those disputes, where neither has jurisdiction over the other, it must be tried by the King and Council; and the King is to judge, though he might be a party, this question often arising between the Crown and one lord proprietor of a province in America. So, in the case of the marches, it must be determined in the King's Court, who is never considered as partial in these cases, it being the judgment of his Judges in B. R. and Chancery. So, where before the King and Council, the King is to judge, and is no more to be presumed partial in one case than in the other. This Court, therefore, has no original jurisdiction on the direct question of the original right of the boundaries; and this bill does not stand in need of that. It is founded on articles executed in England under seal, for mutual considerations, which gives jurisdiction to the King's Courts, both of law and in equity

whatever be the subject matter. An action of covenant could be brought in B. R. or C. B., if either side committed a breach; so might there be for the 5,000l. penalty, without going to the Council.

There are several cases wherein collaterally, and by reason of the contract of the parties, matters out of the jurisdiction of the Court originally, will be brought within it. Suppose an order by the King and Council in a cause wherein the King and Council had original jurisdiction, and the parties enter into an agreement under hand and seal for performance thereof,—a bill must be in this Court for a specific performance, and, perhaps, it will appear this is almost literally that case. The reason is, because none but a Court of equity can decree that. The King in Council is the proper judge of the original right; and if the agreement was fairly entered into and signed, the King in Council might look on that, and allow it as evidence of the original right; but if that agreement is disputed, it is impossible for the King in Council to decree it as an agreement. The Court cannot decree in personam in England, unless in certain criminal matters, being restrained therefrom by statute (a) and, therefore, the Lords of the Council have remitted this matter very properly to be determined in another place, on the foot of the contract. The conscience of the party was bound by this agreement; and, being within the jurisdiction of this Court, which acts in personam, the Court may properly decree it as an agreement, if a foundation for it. To go a step farther, as this Court collaterally, and in consequence of the agreement, judges concerning matters not originally in its jurisdiction, it would decree a performance of articles of agreement to perform a sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court, just as the Court of law would maintain an action for damages in breach of covenant.

As to the second objection: If it was so, it would be very unfortunate; for suits and controversies might be, for that reason, endless; and this has subsisted above seventy years. This objection is insisted on at the bar, and not by the answer. The subordinate proprietors may agree how they may hold their rights between themselves; and, if a proper suit is before the King in Council, on the original right of these boundaries, the proprietors might

proceed therein without making any other parties except themselves, In this respect also, it is properly compared to the case of lordships marches, and to counties palatine. When the marches subsisted, there might be a suit in B. R. concerning their boundaries; and the lord of each march in question need be the only party. If a matter of equity arose, either of the lordships marches might have sued in equity to settle, because this is the King's Court of general jurisdiction as to matters of equity; and an agreement between the parties relative to these boundaries, if proper in other respects, to carry it into a specific performance, is a matter of equity. The Court might, indeed, by reason of their tenure, require the Attorney-General to be made a party, to know if he had anything to object, but then, might hold plea of the cause. Suppose both counties palatine were in subjects' hands (as both have been formerly), and subsisted so, and a question had arisen concerning the boundaries of these two counties palatine, and the respective Earls Palatine had entered into articles concerning these boundaries, this Court would have held plea of such articles as well as concerning the boundaries of the manors, seigniories, and honours: for these are honours, only a franchise of a higher nature. To say that such a settlement of boundaries amounts to an alienation is not the true idea of it; for, if fairly made, without collusion (which cannot be presumed), the boundaries so settled are to be presumed to be true and ancient limits. But suppose it savours in some degree of an alienation, why ought it not to be? There is no occasion to determine that, nor will I; but it is a new notion, that the lords proprietors of these provinces may not alien to natural-This is no opinion; but the grants themselves born subjects. are framed so as to be most open to alienation; being grants to them and their heirs, to be held in common socage, not in capite of the Crown, but as Windsor Castle is. What rule of law is there, that lands or a franchise granted to be held in common socage, not in capite, but as a particular honour or manor, cannot be aliened without license? All the objections concerning knights' service or capite lands, are out of the case, and the Act 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, s. 16, supposes the proprietors may alien to a natural-born subject. The first words of the clause there are, "that they and their assigns may be restrained from alienating without license," which

supposes that it was assigned, and this appears in the case of As to the not alienating a parcel, the rule cited out of the feudists is not applicable, those books treating of different tenures; but I admit neither of these proprietors could dismember their provinces, so as to alter the nature of the thing granted, and thereby bind the Crown, of whom they held; for the tenure and services would still remain on the whole, and the Crown might demand the whole services from either. It is, therefore, something like the case of the office of high constable of England, held by tenure of grand serieanty; which was very extraordinary, to hold the manors by tenure of such an office. In Keil 170, and Dy. 215 (a), the Judges reported their opinion to King Henry VIII., that the tenure was not extinct by the division, but that the King had a right to insist on the performance of that office from the Duke of Buckingham, by reason of his moiety; but this exacting the performance of the service from either subject is at the King's pleasure to do or not. This is an instance, that, in honours and tenures of this kind, the King cannot be prejudiced by any alienation, division, or severance between the parties; and if material services are reserved on the grant (though here it is by fealty only, in lieu of all), the entire services might be exacted from either, not being apportionable. But the settling limits is not a dismembering, and if a license to do this was necessary from the Crown, in law and policy, it sufficiently appears there was such; for it appears by Orders of Council made in 1685 and 1709, the Crown has not only recommended, but ordered, this division to be made, so far as respects the three lower counties, as to which there is no dismembering; for the dividing line is thereby exactly the same; indeed, the circle is not within these Orders; but as to that no difficulty can arise.

As to the third objection: The tenure of the planters, &c., remains just the same as before, and is preserved by this agreement. The proprietors could not prejudice them by their agreement; but if they could, care is taken by the agreement to preserve them. The King of England is still their sovereign and supreme lord; both charters require the law of the respective provinces should be conformable to the law of England, as near as could be. Consider

⁽a) Keilway, 170 b, 171; Dyer, 285 b, and see 1 Inst. 106, 149, 165.

to what this objection goes: in lower instances, in the case of manors and honours in England, which have different customs and bye-laws frequently, yet, though different, the boundaries of these manors may be settled in suits between the lords of these manors, without making the tenants parties; or may be settled by agreement, which this Court will decree, without making the tenants parties, though in case of fraud, collusion, or prejudice to the tenants, they will not be bound; but notwithstanding, it is binding on the parties, and to be established as to them. Suppose two bordering manors had been granted out in tail in recompense of services, the reversion in fee to the Crown; in a suit between the lords concerning the boundaries, it is not necessary to make the King or tenants parties to this suit. Indeed, the Crown would not be bound by that agreement or decree; but it is still binding between the parties. But in this case the same final answer occurs that does under the other objection, viz., that if there is no fraud or collusion, it must be presumed to be the true limits, being made between parties in an adversary interest, each concerned to preserve his own limits, and no pecuniary or other compensation pretended. And (abstracted from the general question of want of jurisdiction) suppose either party insisted there was such a breach of the proviso here as incurred the penalty, and brought debt in B. R. for that penalty, and the defendant there brought a bill here to be relieved (which probably would have been done), the Court must have relieved against the penalty, on performance of the articles; judging on the terms of the relief, and dispensing with the point of time, the Court could not have avoided it. Then how does this case differ? For it will not be pretended the King in Council would have had plea in that case; it must have come into the King's Courts of equity, which must have judged of the manner of performing that agreement.

The next head of objection is taken from the general nature and circumstances of the agreement.

First, it is true, the Court never decrees specifically without a consideration: but this is not without consideration; for though nothing valuable is given on the face of the articles as a consideration, the settling boundaries, and peace and quiet, is a mutual consideration on each side, and in all cases makes a consideration to

support a suit in this Court for performance of the agreement for settling the boundaries (a).

The objection of the time for performance being lapsed may be answered; for it is the business of this Court to relieve against lapse of time in performance of an agreement, and especially where the non-performance has not arisen by default of the party seeking to have a specific performance, as it plainly does not here.

Next, these articles are not like submission to arbitration. In those cases generally the time is conditional so as determination be made by such a day; here the line and circle are agreed on by distinct, independent covenants, and that they shall form the boundaries of these tracts of land; this, therefore, is a particular, certain, specific contract of the parties, that these shall be the boundaries; nothing left to the judgment of the commissioners, who are merely ministerial, to run the line, &c., according to the agreement, and set the marks. Therefore, it is not like an award, but is an agreement, which this Court will see pursued.

As to any imposition or surprise, the evidence is clearly contrary thereto. It would be unnecessary to enter into the particulars of that evidence; but it appears, the agreement was originally proposed by the defendant himself; he himself produced the map or plan afterwards annexed to the articles; he himself reduced the heads of it into writing, and was very well assisted in making it: and farther, that there was a great length of time taken for consideration and reducing it to form. But there is something greatly supporting this evidence, viz., the defect of evidence on the part of the defendant, which amounts to stronger negative evidence than if it was by witnesses; for it was in his own power to have shown it, if otherwise. Then, am I to presume he was imposed on, in a plan, too, sent to himself by his own agents? As to the plan itself, it was in his own power: with regard to the original of these minutes of the agreement, wrote by himself, though ordered by the Court to be produced, they are not produced; which negative evidence supports the evidence of the fairness of carrying on this agreement on the part of the plaintiffs.

⁽a) And see Stapilton v. S., p. 234, ante.

I admit, that, though no imposition or fraud, yet a plain mistake contrary to the intent would be a ground not to decree specific performance. But consider the evidence thereof; the defendant and his ancestors were conversant in this dispute about fifty years before this agreement was entered into, and had all opportunities; therefore, no ignorance, want of information, or mistake, are to be presumed; and in cases of this kind, after an agreement, and plain mistake contrary to intent of parties not shewn, it is not necessary for the Court to resort to the original rights of the parties; it is sufficient if doubtful. To consider the points in dispute; and first, upon the defendant's charter, in which it is insisted the whole 40th degree of North latitude is included, and if so, that it is not to be limited by any recital in the preamble. There is great foundation to say, the computations of latitude at the time of the grant vary much from what they are at present; and that they were set much lower anciently than what they are now, as appears by Mr. Smith's book, which is of reputation; but I do not rely on that, for the fact is certainly so. But whatever that was, does it take it in by the description? It comes to the question, whether the usque ad is inclusive or exclusive; therefore, however described, the same question remains. But there is another argument used by the plaintiffs to restrain the defendant's charter from taking in the whole 40th degree, viz., the recital of it; for the plaintiffs say, the information given to the Crown by Lord Baltimore was, that this part was land uncultivated and possessed by barbarians, whereas it was not so, but possessed by Dutch and Swedes; and therefore the King was deceived in his grant. There is considerable evidence that Dutch and Swedes were settled on the east part of that country, but this is said to be no deceit on the Crown; for though some stragglers were settled there, yet if not recognised by the Crown, that is not a settlement. I am of a different opinion; for in these countries it has been always taken, that that European country which has first set up marks of possession has gained the right, though not formed into a regular colony; and that is very reasonable on the arguments on which they proceeded. Then, will not that affect the grant? If the fact was so, that would be as great deceit on the Crown, in notion of law, as any other matter arising from the information of the party, because such grants tend to involve the Crown in wars and disputes with other nations; nor can there

be a greater deceit than a misrepresentation tending to such a consequence, which would be a ground to repeal the letters patent by seire facias. Next consider the dispute on Penn's charter, which grants to him all that tract of land in America, from twelve miles distance from Newcastle to the 43rd degree of North latitude, &c., under which the plaintiffs do not pretend a title to the three lower counties, which relate to the two feoffments in 1682. Upon the charter it is clear, by the proof, that the true situation of Cape Henlopen is as it is marked in the plan, and not where Cape Cornelius is, as the defendant insists, which would leave out great part of what was intended to be included in the grant; and there is strong evidence of seisin and possession by Penn of that spot of Cape Henlopen, and all acts of ownership. But the result of all the evidence, taking it in the most favourable light for the defendant, amounts to make the boundaries of these counties and rights of the parties doubtful. Senex, who was a good geographer, says that the degrees of latitude cannot be computed with the exactness of two or three miles; and another geographer says that, with the best instruments, it is impossible to fix the degrees of latitude without the uncertainty of seventeen miles, which is near the whole extent between the two capes. It is therefore doubtful, and the most proper case for an agreement, which being entered into, the parties could not resort back to the original rights between them; for if so, no agreements can stand, whereas an agreement entered into fairly and without surprise ought to be encouraged by a Court of justice.

The objection of uncertainty arises principally on the question concerning the circle of twelve miles to be drawn about Newcastle; it was insisted on in the answer, and greatly relied on in America, but is the clearest part of the cause. As to the centre, it is said that Newcastle is a long town, and therefore, it not being fixed by the articles, it is impossible that the Court can decree it; but there is no difficulty in it: the centre of a circle must be a mathematical point (otherwise it is indefinite), and no town can be so. I take all these sort of expressions and such agreements to imply a negative: to be a circle at such a distance from Newcastle, and no part to be farther. Then it must be no farther distant from any part of Newcastle. Thus, to fix a centre, the middle of Newcastle, as near as can be computed, must be found, and a circle described round that town,

which is the fairest way, for otherwise it might be fourteen miles in some parts of it, if it is a long town. Then what must be the extent of the circle? It is given up at the bar, though not in the answer. It cannot be twelve miles distant from Newcastle, unless it has a semidiameter of twelve miles; but there is one argument decisive, without entering into nice mathematical questions: the line to be the dividing-line, and to be drawn north from Henlopen, was either to be a tangent or intersecting from that circle; and if the radius was to be of two miles only, it would neither touch nor intersect it, but go wide. There is no difference as to the place or running of the line from south to north, though there is as to the cape from which it is to commence.

As to the seventh head of this objection, it is truly said, that agreements must be decreed entire, or not at all. As to the plaintiff's estate and possession, this must concern only the three lower counties, which plainly passed by the feoffment. I will lay aside the question of estoppel, which is a nice consideration; for the Duke of York, being then in nature of a common person, was in a condition to be estopped by a proper instrument. In 1683 the Duke of York takes a new grant from the Crown, and, having granted before, was bound to make further assurance; for the improvements made by Penn were a foundation to support a bill in equity for further assurance. The Duke of York, therefore, while a subject, was to be considered as a trustee, why not afterwards as a royal trustee? I will not decree that in this Court, nor is it necessary, but it is a notion established in Courts of revenue by modern decisions, that the King may be a royal trustee; and if the person from whom the King takes by descent was a trustee, there may be grounds in equity to support that; and if King James II., after coming to the Crown, was a royal trustee, his successors take the legal estate under the same equity; and it is sufficient for the plaintiffs if they have an equitable estate. Then, consider this in point of possession of the Penns, the proof of which is very clear: they have been permitted to appoint governors of these lower counties, which have been approved by the Crown, according to the statute of King William. Indeed, all the acts of possession are with a salvo jure to the Crown: but the evidence for the defendant amounts to this: not of a real possession or enjoyment, but of attempts to take possession, sometimes by force, sometimes by

inciting people to come there; otherwise, why should Lord Baltimore grant here for half what he granted in other places? Which shews plainly it was an invitation to get settlers there under their title. Now I am of opinion that full and actual possession is sufficient title to maintain a suit for settling boundaries (a); a strict title is never entered into in cases of this kind, neither ought it. But what ends this point of want of title to convey is, that no part of the lower counties is left to be conveyed by the plaintiffs to the defendant; so that, nothing being to pass by the plaintiffs, it is not material whether they have title to convey or not. But now, in cases of this kind, of two great territories held of the Crown, I will say, once for all, that long possession and enjoyment, peopling and cultivating countries, is one of the best evidences of title to lands, or district of lands in America that can be; and so have I thought in all cases since I have served the Crown; for the great beneficial advantage arising to the Crown from settling, &c., is, that the navigation and the commerce of this country is thereby improved. Those persons, therefore, who make these settlements, ought to be protected in the possession, as far as law and equity can; and both these proprietors appear to have great merit with regard to the Crown and the public; for these two provinces have been improved in private families to a great degree, to the advantage of their mother country; this regards the three lower counties, the strength of which is vastly on the side of the plaintiffs.

As to the Court's not enforcing the execution of their judgment, if they could not at all, I agree it would be vain to make a decree; and that the Court cannot enforce their own decree in rem in the present case. But that is not an objection against making a decree in the cause; for the strict primary decree in this Court, as a Court of equity, is in personam, long before it was settled whether this Court could issue to put into possession in a suit of lands in England, which was first begun and settled in the time of James I., but ever since done by injunction or writ of assistant [sic] (b) to the sheriff; but the Court cannot to this day, as to lands in Ireland or the plantations. In Lord King's time, in the case of Richardson v. Hamilton, Attorney-General of Pennsylvania, which was a suit of land and a

⁽a) Wake v. Conyers, ante, p. 181. Dove v. D., Dick. 617.

⁽b) As to writ of assistance, see

house in the town of Philadelphia, the Court made a decree, though it could not be enforced in rem. In the case of Lord Anglesey, of land lying in Ireland, I decreed for distinguishing and settling the parts of the estate, though impossible to enforce that decree in rem; but the party being in England, I could enforce it by process of contempt in personam and sequestration, which is the proper jurisdiction of this Court. And, indeed, in the present case, if the parties want more to be done, they must resort to another jurisdiction; and it looks, by the order in 1735, as if that was in view, liberty being thereby given to resort to that Board.

This opens a way to that part of the case relating to the Crown. The Attorney-General acts a very impartial part; and I shall express in the fullest words, that this decree is entirely without prejudice to any prerogative, right, or interest in the Crown. I will go farther, that, as I do not know how far that interest of the Crown may be, I will reserve liberty for either party to apply to this Court, if by any act or right of the Crown execution of this shall be obstructed; for the Court is at liberty to suspend its decree if a difficulty to perform it is shewn; and I will reserve further directions as between the parties, as to that matter, so de novo arising. Judgments have been at law with a salvo jure of the Crown; as in Rastal and Coke's Entries, in the title of Intrusion and Quo Warranto, which, particularly in the cases of lands relating to intrusion, is very analogous to the present.

I am of opinion, therefore, to decree a specific performance of this agreement, without prejudice to any right, &c., of the Crown.

His Lordship, having directed that the plaintiffs and defendant should quietly hold according to the articles, altered that; for it would be improper to have a decree in this Court for quiet enjoyment of lands in America; which would occasion continual applications to this Court for contempts, &c., and that it ought to be the proper jurisdiction.

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NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Necessity for some equity to give jurisdiction, p. 815.
 - 3. The lex situs must be considered, p. 823.

1. Generally.

In the British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique (a) it was decided by the House of Lords that the rules of procedure under the Judicature Acts abolishing local venue (b) have given no new jurisdiction with respect to "local" actions relating to land abroad, and that apart from cases of contract or equity such as that in the principal case, the English Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain any local action relating to land abroad, such as an action for damages for trespass. Lord Herschell explained (c) the distinction between transitory and "local" actions to be "those in which the facts relied on as the foundation of the plaintiff's case have no necessary connection with the particular locality and those in which there is such a connection." The jurisdiction, therefore, of the High Court remains in substance the same as that of the old Court of Chancery when the principal case was decided, and Lord Hardwicke there lays down the principle that equity, as it acts primarily in personam, and not merely in rem, may, where a person against whom relief is sought is within the jurisdiction, make a decree upon the ground of a contract or some equity subsisting between the parties respecting immovables situated out of the jurisdiction; but while he enforces the right of the Court in proper cases to act in personam, he recognises the principle that the lex situs must be resorted to in order to put the plaintiff into possession. It was said by Wright, J. (d): "Courts of equity have, from the time of Lord Hardwicke's decision in Penn v. Lord Baltimore, exercised jurisdiction in personam with respect to foreign land against persons locally within the jurisdiction of the English Court in cases of contract, fraud, and trust, enforcing their jurisdiction by writs of ne exeat regno during the hearing (e), and by sequestration, commitment, or other personal process after decree."

- (a) (1893) A. C. 602; see also Black Point Syndicate v. Eastern Concessions, 79 L. T. 658.
 - (b) R. S. C., O. 36, r. 1.
 - (c) (1893) A. C. at p. 618.
 - (d) British South Africa Co. v. Com-

panhia de Moçambique, (1892) 2 Q. B. 358, at p. 364; (1893) A. C. 602; and see Deschamps v. Miller, (1908) 1 Ch. 856.

(e) Ib., p. 363.

The exercise of this jurisdiction is therefore subject to certain limitations: First, there must be some equity against the defendant affecting the land in local actions. As regards mere personal or transitory actions, the Courts of common law have entertained them where a defendant is within the jurisdiction, although the cause of action arose out of the jurisdiction, on the ground, as stated by Wright, J. (a), quoting De Grey, C. J., that "personal injuries are of a transitory nature and sequentur forum rei."

The second limitation is, that as the Court can only enforce its order indirectly in manner above stated in order to put the plaintiff in possession, the jurisdiction of the *lex situs* must be invoked.

The third limitation, which seems to follow as a corollary to the second, is, that though the Court, in deciding on the equity, acts on its own rules, it will not enforce a judgment where it is illegal or impossible, according to the *lex situs*, to give the plaintiffs possession (b).

2. Necessity for some Equity to give Jurisdiction.

Lord Hardwicke, in the principal case (c), says, "This Court therefore has no original jurisdiction on the direct question of the original right of the boundaries, and this bill does not stand in need of that. It is founded on articles executed in England under seal, for mutual considerations, which gives jurisdiction to the King's Courts, both of law and in equity, whatever be the subject-matter." In examining the cases in which the jurisdiction has been exercised, it will be found that, with the exception of some few old cases which have been overruled, the jurisdiction was entertained on the ground of some contract or equity between the parties (d).

Thus, in Lord Cranstown v. Johnston (e), a creditor having obtained a judgment in one of the West Indian Islands (St. Christopher's) against his debtor, then absent from the island, and having purchased his debtor's real estate situate there, on his own execution, was ordered to reconvey to the debtor on payment of the debt, costs of the proceedings in St. Christopher's, and interest. Arden, M. R., after referring to the cases of Archer v. Preston (f),

- (a) Ib., p. 363.
- (b) See the cases, post, p. 823.
- (c) Supra, p. 803.
- (d) Norris v. Chambres, 29 B. 246;
 3 De G. F. & J. 583; Deschamps v.
 Miller, (1908) 1 Ch. 856. See Westlake, International Law (1905), 210—
- 213; Dicey's Conflict of Laws (1908), p. 201 et seq.; Foote, Private International Jurisprudence (1904), 184—200.
 - (e) 3 V. 170.
 - (f) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr., p. 133, pl. 3.

Arglasse v. Muschamp (a), Kildare v. Eustace (b), says (c): "Those cases clearly shew, that with regard to any contract made, or equity between persons in this country respecting lands in a foreign country, particularly in the British dominions, this Court will hold the same jurisdiction as if they were situated in England." Lord Hardwicke lays down the same doctrine in Foster v. Vassall (d). There is no distinction between lands in a colony or a foreign country with respect to the exercise of this jurisdiction (e).

Specific Performance.—At a very early date specific performance of a contract for sale of lands out of the jurisdiction was enforced. Thus, in Archer v. Preston (f), a contract was entered into for the sale of land in Ireland, and the defendant, who refused to carry out the contract, coming over to England, a bill was filed against him in Chancery and a ne exeat regno granted, and when he departed for Ireland without answering, he was sent for by special order and made to answer for the contempt. In the principal case, a contract respecting the settlement of boundaries out of the jurisdiction was enforced.

In the Black Point Syndicate, Ltd. v. Eastern Concessions, Ltd.(g), the defendants granted a lease of the mining rights in lands in Milos to the plaintiffs, and, in consequence of certain claims paramount to the defendants' title, the plaintiffs refused to pay the royalties due, whereupon the defendants took possession of the mines. On an application for an interlocutory injunction, restraining the defendants from keeping possession, Stirling, J., refused to grant it under the circumstances, holding that the relief asked for was specific performance of an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment of lands abroad (h).

Foreclosure and Redemption.—So bills have been entertained for the foreclosure or redemption of mortgages of property out of the jurisdiction. First, as regards foreclosure of mortgages, see Toller v. Carteret (i), where a bill was filed by the mortgagee for foreclosure of the Island of Sark; see also Paget v. Ede (k), where foreclosure

- (a) 1 Vern. 75.
- (b) 1 Vern. 419.
- (c) At p. 182; see per Lord *Herschell*, (1893) A. C. at p. 626.
 - (d) 3 Atk. at p. 589.
- (e) Angus v. A., West temp. Hardwicke, 23.
 - (f) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr., p. 133, pl. 3;
- Jackson v. Petrie, 10 V. 164; and see Duder v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor, (1902) 2 Ch. 132.
 - (g) 79 L. T. 658; 15 T. L. R. 117.
- (h) See Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. at p. 455.
 - (i) 2 Vern. 494.
 - (k) 18 Eq. 118.

was decreed of lands in the West Indies, the Judge treating the case of foreclosure as merely extinguishing a right to redeem and enforcing a personal contract (a).

As to redemption of mortgages, in *Beckford* v. *Kemble* (b), the Court had granted a decree for redemption, of a mortgage of West India lands. Then the defendants commenced foreclosure proceedings in the Court of the Colony; the Court here granted an injunction to restrain the defendants from foreclosing in the foreign Courts, holding that the plaintiff had a clear equity to be protected against a double account, all parties being in England at the time.

Fraud.—In cases of constructive trust, where lands abroad have been acquired by fraud, the transaction has been set aside, and the defendant ordered to execute the necessary reconveyances (c).

Waste.—And a tenant in common of lands abroad, resident here, was held liable to an account for waste committed (d), and also for an account of rents and profits (e).

Partnership and Companies.—So likewise on a bill filed by one of the parties in England, a decree has been made for winding up a partnership in Hayti, and taking accounts of agency transactions between the partnership and a Liverpool firm (f).

The residence and domicile of an incorporated company are determined by the situation of its principal place of business. The jurisdiction of the Courts of one country over companies domiciled in another country appears to depend on the answer to the question whether these companies are, through their property or their agents, amenable to the process of the Courts in which the companies are sued (q).

A joint stock company formed in India, and incorporated by registration under Indian law, and having its principal place of business in India, with an agent and a branch office in England, may be wound up under the Companies Act, 1862 (h).

- (a) See per *Kay*, J., in *Re* Hawthorne, 23 C. D. at p. 748.
- (b) 1 Si. & St. 7; Bent v. Young, 9 Si. 180, at p. 190. And see Westlake, International Law, (1905) pp. 213, 214.
- (c) Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern.
 75; Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 V.
 170, supra, p. 815; Jackson v. Petrie,
 10 V. 164.
- (d) Carteret v. Petty, 2 Swans. 323 (n); cf. Batthyany v. Walford, 33

- C. D. 624; 36 C. D. 269.
- (e) Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543; see Westlake, (1905) at pp. 213, 215.
- (f) Maunder v. Lloyd, 2 John. & H. 718; Hendrich v. Wood, 9 W. R. 588.
- (g) See Lindley, Companies, (1902) 1221, Trust case; Westlake, (1905) pp. 358, et seg.
- (h) Re Commercial Bank of India, 6 Eq. 517; Re Matheson Bros., Ld., 27 C. D. 225.

A company which has not a registered office in England, but has carried on business here (a) may be wound up under the Companies. (Consolidation) Act, 1908.

. It has been decided that the registrar is not bound to refuse registration of a company formed by foreigners residing abroad and in many respects a foreign company (b).

Receivers have been appointed (c), not only in foreign countries such as Brazil (d), but also in our colonies, e.g., West Indies (Bunbury v. B.)(e), and in Ireland (f).

Administration.—As regards administration of estates, in Ewing v. Orr-Ewing (g) a testator domiciled in Scotland, and possessed of a large personal and some heritable property in Scotland, and of a comparatively small personal property in England, by will made in Scotch form, appointed several persons to be executors and trustees, some of whom resided in England, and some in Scotland. The trustees obtained a confirmation of the will in Scotland, and the confirmation was sealed by the English Court of Probate, under 21 & 22 Vict. c. 50. An infant, resident in England, brought by his next friend an action here to administer the estate, and the writ was served upon some of the trustees in England, and (under an order) upon the Scotch trustees in Scotland. The trustees appeared without protest, and took no steps to discharge the order, but obtained an order of reference to inquire whether the further prosecution of the action would be for the benefit of the infant plaintiff, upon which an order (not appealed from) was made for the further prosecution of the action. The trustees removed all the English personalty into Scotland before the action came on for trial. It was held by the House of Lords, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal (h), that the English Court had jurisdiction to administer the trusts of the will as to the whole of the estate, both

⁽a) See Re Mercantile Bank of Australia, (1892) 2 Ch. 204, under Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890.

⁽b) Re General Company for the Promotion of Land Credit, L. R. 5 Ch. 363, affirmed, Princess of Reuss v. Bos, L. R. 5 H. L. 176.

⁽c) See Seton 1901, vol. i., pp. 774,775, 810-814; Re Maudslay, (1900)1 Ch. 602.

⁽d) Sheppard v. Oxenford, 1 Kay & J 500; cf. Duder v. Amsterdamsch.

[&]amp;c., (1902) 2 Ch. 132.

⁽e) 1 B. at p. 336.

⁽f) Houlditch v. Lord Donegal, 8 Bli. (N. S.) 301, at p. 343; and see The Mercantile, &c. Trust Co. v. River Plate, &c. Co., (1892) 2 Ch. 303, and p. 824, infra.

⁽g) 9 A. C. 34, disapproving the dicta of Lord Westbury in Enohin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. Ca. 1, at p. 13; and see Lewin (1904), pp. 48-50.

⁽h) Reported 22 C. D. 456.

Scotch and English; and that as no proceedings were pending in a Scotch Court (if such were possible), by which the interests of the infant plaintiff could have been equally protected, the jurisdiction. was not discretionary, but that the decree was as a matter of course (a).

If English trustees, having in their hands English trust funds, were found within the jurisdiction of the Scottish Courts, those Courts, on the same principle, might compel them to do their duty (b). In this case Lord Selborne says: "But by the mere fact of taking out probate, executors who are also trustees, accept the trusts of the will as well as the office of legal personal representatives; and the acceptance of those trusts extends to the whole property, which under the terms of the will is the subject of the trust, real as well as personal, although the real estate cannot be, and part of the personal estate may not be, within the jurisdiction of the Court of Probate."

"It would be contrary to the nature of such trusts as those of the residuary estate in the present case to attempt to execute them by piecemeal, with reference to the different species and local situation of the several constituent parts of the estate which the testator has aggregated together "(c).

The above case of Ewing v. Orr-Ewing was heard in the House of Lords in November, 1883. Before this an action having the same title had been commenced in Scotland by four of the residuary legatees, and a decree made by the Court of Session declaring (interalia) that the trustees were bound to administer the estate in Scotland subject to the Scotch Courts alone.

This Scotch case came before the House of Lords on May 1, 1885, reported nom. Ewing v. Orr-Ewing (d). The House of Lords reversed the decree of the Scotch Court so far as it declared that the trust could not be administered except in Scotland, but on the ground of convenience affirmed the decision that the trusts should be executed in the Scotch case.

"The proposition that the Courts of that country only in which a testator dies domiciled can administer his personal estate is without any authority except certain dicta of Lord Westbury in

v. Douglas, 3 Paton App. Cas. 503, (a) See also Stirling-Maxwell v. Cartwright, 11 C. D. 523; Johnstone 510. v. Beattie, 10 Cl. & Fin. 42, 84.

⁽b) Per Selborne, C., in Ewing v. Orr-Ewing, supra, at p. 41, citing Ferguson

⁽c) Ib. at pp. 39, 40.

⁽d) 10 A. C. 453.

Enohin v. Wylie (a), with which the other Lords, who decided that case, did not agree "(b).

In Ewing v. Orr-Ewing (c), and Stirling-Maxwell v. Cartwright (d), it, was treated as obligatory on the Court to administer the trusts of the will as to the whole estate both Scotch and English, at any rate where no proceedings were pending in the forum loci in which relief could be obtained. The difficulty, however, where the exercise of such jurisdiction would be inconvenient, as was the case in Ewing v. Orr-Ewing, is now removed by R. S. C. 1883, O. 55, r. 10, which is as follows:—

"It shall not be obligatory on the Court or Judge to pronounce or make a judgment or order, whether on summons, or otherwise, for the administration of any trust or of the estate of any deceased person, if the questions between the parties can be properly determined without such judgment or order" (e).

And consequently a party interested is only entitled now to an administration judgment when there are questions which can only be properly determined in an administration action. The Court has power to order a limited administration only, that is, to direct particular accounts and enquiries. General administration is now only granted in cases of necessity (f).

With respect to trusts of land abroad, if the Court does entertain any action the lex loci must be regarded, and in cases where the lex loci did not recognise trusts, and there was no equity against the donee other than his acceptance of the trust, which had been declared, the rights given by the lex loci have been held to override the trust. Thus in the interesting case, as to Lord Nelson's will, of Nelson v. Bridport (g), Lord Nelson by his will attempted to create successive limitations of his estate of Bronté, in Sicily, by imposing a trust on his brother and the trustees to whom it was devised. It was held that his brother as one of the trustees of the will was

- (a) 10 H. L. Cas. 1.
- (b) Per Selborne, C., 9 A. C. at p. 39; and see 10 A. C., p. 502; and see further as to administration actions involving questions relating to land abroad and liberty to bring actions abroad, Batthyany v. Walford, 33 C. D. 624, 36 C. D. 269; Hope v. Carnegie, supra, p. 795, L. R. 1 Ch. 320; Re Piercy, (1895) 1 Ch. 83.
 - (c) 9 A. C. 34.

- (d) 11 C. D. 523.
- (e) Ann. Pract. 1908, i., 777.
- (f) Re Blake, 29 C. D. 913. See also Re Wilson, 28 C. D. 457; Re Gyhon, 29 C. D. 834; and Re Doetch, W. N. (96) 82.
- (g) 8 B. 547; and see Glover v. Strothoff, 2 Bro. C. C. 33; Godfray v. G., 12 Jur. (N. S.) 397; Re Piercy, (1895) 1 Ch. 83; and Lewin on Trusts, (1904) p. 50.

bound to do all that he could to perform the trusts so far as the law of Sicily allowed him to do so, and would be answerable to the Court for any wilful neglect or violation of duty, but that as the lex loci only recognised absolute ownership, he, on admission, according to the lex loci, was absolute owner free from the trusts.

The old case of Earl of Kildare v. Eustace (a), is sometimes referred to, but it does not go very far; the jurisdiction as far as it was entertained was based on the obsolete doctrine that Judges in England were the proper expounders of the law of Ireland.

In Martin v. M. (b), an application was made to an English Court to establish a settlement, which had been made in English form, of a moiety of a plantation in Demerara, the wife's property. The husband and wife had subsequently given to persons, with notice of the English settlement, a mortgage of the lands duly executed according to the lex loci. It appeared that by that law the settlement was a nullity, and the mortgagee's title notwithstanding the notice, was good. The application was on this ground refused, the Court observing that the equity of the wife was therefore not to be attached to the estate but to the person of the husband. It would seem that the Court would have exercised its jurisdiction in personam against the husband, had it been invited, to make him give compensation for the loss to the trust.

In Harrison v. Gurney (c), a decree had been made in 1816 for an execution of trusts of a creditor's deed, including lands in Ireland, of which lands a receiver had been appointed, and an injunction was granted by Lord Eldon to restrain the trustees from proceeding in Ireland for execution of trusts of the same deed.

In Clarke v. Ormonde (d), bills were entertained for execution of the trusts of a will including real and personal estate in Ireland, and a creditor's action for administration of the estate. A receiver was appointed of the estates in Ireland.

Money trusts for charities.—It has been said that the Courts will not administer the trusts of a charity abroad, but the Court will entertain an action with respect to such trusts so far as to secure the fund, and give directions to the trustees. In Provost of Edinburgh v. Aubrey (e), there was a bequest of personal estate on charitable trusts to be administered out of the jurisdiction.

- (a) 1 Vern. 419.
- (b) 2 Russ. & M. 507.
- (c) 2 J. & W. 563.
- (d) Jac. 108; and see Jenny v.

M'Intosh, 33 C. D. 595; Duder v.

Amsterdamsch, (1902) 2 Ch. 132.

(e) Amb. 236.

Lord Hardwicke said he could not give any directions as to the distribution of money belonging to another jurisdiction. The decree declared that the trust ought to be carried into execution except as to the power to lay out the property in lands in England, and that the property should be transferred to such person, etc., as the provost should appoint. See also Attorney-General v. Lepine (a) Minet v. Vulliamy (b), Emery v. Hill (c).

In Attorney-General v. Sturge (d), there was a gift of personal estate for the purpose of a school at Genoa. The M. R. said that he had "no doubt that the Attorney-General has jurisdiction to institute proceedings to secure a legacy given for charitable purposes by a subject of the Crown, whether in or out of this country, but not to see a foreign charity administered. Unless the testatrix has so directed, the Court itself has not the means of administering a charity abroad. It appears to me, therefore, I ought to direct the money to be paid in such manner as will secure the intentions of the testatrix respecting the school being carried into effect, as directed by her will, unless it is controlled or modified by the law of the country."

Ultimately a reference was directed to chambers, and the Chief Clerk certified that the fund ought to be carried to an account to be intituled "The account of the legacy," &c., "for the support of a school at Genoa;" and that the dividends should from time to time be paid to the Chaplain of Genoa, &c., and that he should transmit accounts to the Judge. And on further consideration the scheme was ordered to be carried into effect.

In Re Fraser(e), where the trusts were for the benefit of the blind in Inverness-shire, liberty was given to the Attorney-General to apply to the Scotch Court for settlement of a scheme.

Trusts where lex loci will recognise them.—The result of the cases appears to be that in an action for administration, so far as necessary for the purpose of administration and payment of creditors, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction in personam against executors and trustees within the jurisdiction so far as regards all property within or out of the jurisdiction which can be made available by the lex loci, but that, where the trust is to be administered out of the jurisdiction,

⁽a) 2 Sw. 181.

W. N. 161.

⁽b) 1 Russ. 113 (n).

⁽e) 22 C. D. 827; see also Forbes v.

⁽c) Id., 112.

F., 18 B. 552.

⁽d) 19 B. 597, and see Re Geck, (1893)

the Court will, on the ground of convenience, allow or direct the trust to be executed by the Court within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or the trust is to be administered.

Refusal to Exercise Jurisdiction.—In Norris v. Chambres (a), a claim for lien on mines in Prussia for an equitable money demand was refused because there was no privity of contract or obligation existing between the plaintiff and defendant. The M. R. says (b), "In examining them" (the cases) "I find that in all of them there is a privity existing between the plaintiffs and defendants, they have entered into some contract, or some personal obligation has been incurred from one to the other."

So the Court will not direct an issue to try the validity of a will of lands out of the jurisdiction (c). The Court has also refused to entertain a suit for partition of lands out of the jurisdiction (d).

In Re Hawthorne (e), Kay, J., refused to entertain jurisdiction in a dispute between two persons with respect to lands in Saxony, on the ground that there was no contract or equity between the parties but merely a question of title.

3. The Lex Situs must be Considered.

Though the Court makes no decree as to the possession of the land in a foreign country, but only a decree in personam against the defendant (see ante, p. 814), yet the Court has regard to the law of the foreign country to see if it be possible that the decree would be obeyed (f).

In Ex p. Pollard (g), where the Court compelled a defendant to give effect to an equitable mortgage on lands in Scotland, the Scotch law not recognising such a charge, but there being nothing in the law or circumstances to prevent the defendant carrying out the decree, Lord Cottenham, in his judgment (h), said: "If the law of the country where the land is situate should not permit or not enable the defendant to do what the Court would otherwise think right to decree, it would be useless and unjust to direct him to do the act;

- (a) 29 B. 246; 3 De G. F. & J. 583.
- (b) 29 B. 254; see, too, Matthaei v. Galitzin, 18 Eq. 340.
 - (c) Pike v. Hoare, 2 Eden, 182.
- (d) Cartwright v. Pettus, 2 Ch. Ca. 214.
- (e) 23 C. D. 748; B. S. A. Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique, (1893)

A. C. 602; see also Matthaei v. Galitzin,
18 Eq. 340; Whitaker v. Forbes, L. R.
10 C. P. 583, 1 C. P. D. 51; Reiner v.
Salisbury, 2 C. D. 378.

- (f) See the cases p. 820, et seq.
- (g) Mont. & Ch. 239.
- (h) At p. 250.

but when there is no such impediment, the Courts of this country, in the exercise of their jurisdiction over contracts made here, or in administering equities between parties residing here, act upon their own rules, and are not influenced by any consideration of what the effects of such contracts might be in the country where the lands are situate, or of the manner in which the Courts of such countries might deal with such equities. . . . In giving effect to the security, I act upon the well-known rules of equity in this country, and do not violate or interfere with any law or rule of property in Scotland, as I only order to be done what the parties may by that law lawfully perform."

In other cases relief has been refused because a title had been acquired by third persons, under the *lex loci*, which prevented the defendant from carrying out the order.

In Norton v. Florence, &c., Co. (a), an English company, having house property at Florence, raised money on bonds expressed to be binding on "all their estate." Subsequently, by a mortgage in Italian form registered in Florence, the same company mortgaged the Florence property to a bank, which had notice of the bonds. The bank took proceedings in Florence to realise their security. It was held that the bonds did not create a charge (b); and, secondly, if they did create a charge, as, according to the lex loci, it did not bind the property, the bank, notwithstanding notice, took the title free from the bonds.

In The Mercantile Investment and General Trust Co. v. River Plate Trust, Loan and Agency Co. (c), land in Mexico was assigned by an American company to the defendants, an English company, expressly subject to a charge for debentures of the American company. The defendant company, by registration in Mexico, obtained a title, by the lex loci, free from a charge for the debentures. North, J., held that there was jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for the debenture holders, but refused it as under the circumstances useless.

In Waterhouse v. Stansfield (d), relief was refused to the plaintiff

⁽a) 7 C. D. 332.

⁽b) But in Re Florence, &c. Co., Ex p. Moor, 10 C. D. 530, the case was overruled so far as it decided that the bonds did not create a charge; and see Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, 10 C. D. 681.

⁽c) (1892) 2 Ch. 303.

⁽d) 9 Ha. 234, 10 Ha. 254; and see Hicks v. Powell, L. R. 4 Ch. 741, (where it was held that a deed void under the Indian Registration Acts, and not to be received as evidence there, could not be sued upon in England); Re Maudslay, Sons and Field, (1900) 1 Ch. 602.

in respect of an assignment, by way of security of the assignee's interest, under a contract for the purchase of land in Demerara, to secure monies lent. The V.-C. (a) says: "When the law of a foreign country places a restraint upon the alienation of the property of a debtor situated in such country, an equity arising here on a contract entered into in respect of such property cannot be enforced against the lex loci rei sitæ."

If the *lex loci* is merely silent, and no further title has been acquired by a third person, the Court will not refuse a decree (b).

Parties out of the jurisdiction may be served abroad, but this does not extend the jurisdiction of the Court in granting relief (c). But the alteration of the rules of procedure (d) may enable the Courts to deal with land abroad in cases where the alteration does not extend the jurisdiction, but only enables the old jurisdiction to be exercised where formerly it could not, merely by reason of defects in the previous rules (e).

The cases of restraining actions abroad are distinguishable from those of restraining some act within the jurisdiction by a person resident abroad—e.g., restraining a libel being published in England, for in such case an injunction may be granted, and enforced if the defendant comes into England (f), or where a primâ facie case is made out of infringement of a patent within the jurisdiction (g), or a trade mark (h), or cases within Order XLVIIIA, or the former order, as to suing a firm carrying on business within the jurisdiction (i).

It has been held that the Courts in England cannot authorise service of a writ out of the jurisdiction except in cases provided for by the R. S. C. (k), and that these form a complete code on the

- (a) 10 Ha. 259.
- (b) Ex p. Pollard, Mont. & Ch. 239;
 cf. Bank of Africa, Ltd. v. Cohen, (1909)
 2 Ch. 129; Scott v. Nesbitt, 14 V. 438;
 Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 V. 170.
- (c) Cookney v. Anderson, 31 B. 452;Edwards v. Warden, L. R. 9 Ch. 495.
 - (d) Cf. O. XI., r. 1, R. S. C.
- (e) Duder v. Amsterdamsch Trustees, Kantoor, (1902) 2 Ch. 132.
- (f) Tozier v. Hawkins, 15 Q. B. D. 680; and see De Bernales v. N. Y. Herald, (1893) 2 Q. B. 97 (n).
- (g) Badische, &c. v. Henry Johnson & Co., (1896) 1 Ch. 25.

- (h) Re Burland's Trade Mark, 41 C. D. 542.
- (i) De Bernales v. N. Y. Herald,
 (1893) 2 Q. B. 97 (n).; St. Gobain, &c.
 v. Hoyermann, &c., (1893) 2 Q. B. 96;
 and as to Order XLVIIIA. Worcester
 Bank v. Firbank, (1894) 1 Q. B. 784;
 MacIver v. Burns, (1895) 2 Ch. 632.
- (k) Re Eager, 22 C. D. 86; Re Busfield, 32 C. D. 123, see p. 132; Re Anglo-Africa, &c. Co., 32 C. D. 350; Re Wendt, 22 Q. B. D. 733; and see Re Cliff, (1895) 2 Ch. 25, and R. S. C., (1883), O. 11, and cases in Annual Practice (1908), i., 162.

subject; and see the general rules as to jurisdiction in transitory or personal actions against persons out of the jurisdiction laid down by Lord Selborne in Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah, &c. (a).

*The jurisdiction of the Court, ordinarily enforced in personam, cannot be exercised where the defendant occupies such a position as to be exempt from such jurisdiction—e.g., a foreign sovereign or government. It cannot enforce the contracts of a foreign government, even against the property of such government in England (b), nor interfere with the acts of a foreign sovereign done in derogation of his contract (c).

see Larivière v. Morgan, L. R. 7 Ch. 550. (a) (1894) A. C. 670, see pp. 684, (c) Gladstone v. The Ottoman Bank, 1 Hem. & M. 505. (b) Smith v. Weguelin, 8 Eq. 198;

Twycross v. Dreyfus, 5 C. D. 605; but

LEGACIES.

ASHBURNER v. MACGUIRE.

1784, 1786. 2 Bro. Ch. 108.

Specific Legacy-Ademption.

A legacy of the interest and principal of a bond is specific, and is partially adeemed by the testator having received part of the debt by dividends declared after the bankruptcy of the debtor. A legacy of "my 1,0001. East India Stock," is specific, and is adeemed in toto by the testator's selling the stock.

WILLIAM MACGUIRE, by his will, dated 27th September, 1778, bequeathed (inter alia) as follows:—

"Item, I bequeath to my sister Jane Ashburner, the interest arising from her husband William Ashburner's bond to me for principal, 3,500l. sterling during her life, independent of her present or any future husband, amounting to 175l. sterling per annum. Item, I bequeath the principal of the said bond, on the decease of my said sister Jane Ashburner, to her four daughters, Elizabeth, Anne, Sarah, and Sophia, to be equally divided among them or the survivors of them. Item, I bequeath to Mr. William Beawes, now at school with the Rev. Mr. Everett, at Felstead, in Essex my capital stock of 1,000l. in the India Company's Stock, with the dividend thereon arising, which dividend is to pay for his education and maintenance till he is qualified for holy orders, and then the capital to be laid out in the purchase of a living for him in the church. This stock is to be continued or disposed of, at the discretion of my executors."

William Ashburner, the debtor, became a bankrupt in February, 1780. In March the testator proved this debt under the commission, and, 16th May, 1781, received a dividend thereon of 4s. 3d. in the pound.

The testator died 12th July, 1781. Since his death, another dividend of 2s. 9d. had been made to the bankrupt's creditors.

The testator, at the time of making his will, was possessed of 1,000l. East India Stock, and no more, but sold out the whole of it before his death. Beawes, the legatee of this stock, was a natural child of the testator.

The bill was brought by Mrs. Ashburner, her four daughters, and Beawes, to have the whole sum of 3,500l. secured for Mrs. Ashburner and her daughters, and to have such part of it as is due out of the estate of Ashburner the bankrupt paid by his assignee, and the residue paid by the personal estate of the testator out of his general effects; and that the personal representative of the testator might also purchase with the testator's personal estate 1,000l. East India Stock, and transfer the same for the use of the plaintiff Beawes, as directed by the will. The defendants, the administratrix and residuary legatees, insisted that the plaintiffs, the Ashburners, were entitled only to what remained due to the testator at the time of his death out of the estate of the bankrupt; and that the legacy of East India Stock to Beawes was adeemed by the testator's disposing of it in his lifetime.

The cause was heard before the Lord Chancellor in 1784, and on the 18th of July, 1786, he gave judgment.

Lord Chancellor Thurlow, after stating the case, said—The claim of Mrs. Ashburner and her daughters depended on two questions:

First, whether the bond was given as a specific legacy; which depends on this, whether the manner in which the sum is mentioned, turns it to a pecuniary legacy, or, as the civilians call it, a demonstrative legacy, that is, a legacy in its nature a general legacy, but where a particular fund is pointed out to satisfy it; or whether it be what they call a legatum nominis or legatum debiti.

The second question is, whether the legacy, supposing it to be specific, is adeemed, so far as the testator has received dividends, in respect of the debt, or, as the bankrupt's estate, may be insufficient to pay the residue.

I will take the second point first; for this is clearly a specific legacy, according to all the definitions. Wherever a debt, or a part of a

debt, is the subject bequeathed, it is a legatum nominis, or legatum debiti. I shall not stand long upon that point.

With respect to the second point, as to the ademption, one maxim has gained so much ground as to have been a governing rule, and has been recognised by Lord Talbot and Lord Hardwicke. It is, that where a debt is bequeathed, and is afterwards extinguished by the act or concurrence of the testator, as by demand or suit, the legacy is adeemed, but if paid in without suit or demand, there is no intention to adeem; and there are innumerable authorities that a legacy of a debt is not adeemed by a voluntary payment. Lord Camden, in The Attorney-General v. Parkin (a), expressly exploded this distinction; so did Lord Macclesfield (b). I am inclined to adopt their opinions, because I can find no ground for the distinction but a passage in Swinb. sect. 20, p. 7 (c). But I doubt if the authors cited by him support him. Godolphin (d), referring to the same books, states the rule differently; and so have other writers.

By the civil law, it was competent for a man, after he had changed the subject-matter of a specific legacy, to declare, by his conduct, that such a change was no ademption. The case put is of a gold chain, which the testator, after having bequeathed it by his will, converts into a cup; the legacy is not adeemed, because the cup might be restored to its former shape.

This has not been adopted by our law. There is no ground to say, that, after a legacy is extinguished, a man, by his conduct, may revive it. It is contrary to common sense, as appears by the instance put. The gold chain may have been given as a legacy, because it had been long in the testator's family. If it be afterwards converted into a gold cup, the reason for giving it ceased.

There is an exception, or limitation to this rule, where the testator alters the form, so as to alter the specification of the subject; as by making wool into cloth, or a piece of cloth into a garment; there the legacy is adeemed, because the subject-matter cannot be restored to its former state.

This distinction is intelligible, in an action where the thing sued for cannot be recovered in specie; but it is not intelligible when applied

⁽a) Amb. 566.

⁽c) Page 548, 6th edit.

⁽b) Lord Thomond v. Earl of Suffolk, 1 P. W. 461.

⁽d) Orphan's Leg., 4th edit. 434

to a legacy; and, what is more material, never was adopted by our law.

As to legacies of debts, according to the civil law, where the testator had sued for, but had not recovered, or had got judgment, but not execution, or had actually recovered the debt, but had set the money apart for the legatee, or, by words, declared he did not intend to revoke the legacy; in none of these cases was the legacy adeemed. But there is no authority in the civil law for the distinction between a debt being paid without demand, and in consequence of a demand.

Besides, although it can be ascertained where a suit was commenced for a debt, it may be extremely difficult to ascertain whether any demand has been made. If the testator receive payment of the debt, the legacy is gone, unless it appear from the manner of his disposing of the money afterwards, that he means to preserve it for the legatee. Lord Camden in The Attorney-General v. Parkin, held there was no distinction between voluntary payment and payment on a demand, and that in both cases the legacy was extinguished; he added, that where the sum is specified in the bequest, it is a general legacy, as I shall mention on the other point. But the distinction between, I bequeath (a) the 500l. due on a bond from A. B., and I bequeath the bond from A. B., is very slender; and so admitted to be by his Lordship.

In the civil law there is a distinction taken between a demonstrative legacy, where the testator gives a general legacy, but points out the fund to satisfy it, and a specific legacy, where he bequeaths a particular thing.

On the first point, I am clear this is a specific legacy. If the fortune of the testator had failed, so as not to satisfy all the pecuniary legacies, and the question had been, whether this legacy should have been contributive to the pecuniary legacies, I believe no man in the profession would have doubted.

When the testator made his will, 3,500l. was due to him from William Ashburner, by bond; he meant to relinquish that bond for the benefit of the family; not by way of release to the husband, but

⁽a) This distinction is recognised by Lord Hardwicke in Ellis v. Walker,

Amb. 310, and by Lord Camden in

by way of settlement; and that this debt, whether it turned out ill or well, should go to the family: the interest to his sister for her life, the principal among her daughters. In this case, the bequest must be considered as specific, although the sum be mentioned; for I cannot agree to Lord Camden's distinction.

As to the legacy of East India Stock to the plaintiff Beawes, there is no case to countenance his claim. The testator says, "I give my capital stock to," &c.; the pronoun my has been relied on, in many cases, in deciding the legacy to be specific.

The testator, after making his will, sold his stock, which made it as if it had never existed; the legacy is adeemed, according to all the cases.

In questions upon legacies of debts, the cases have crept beyond the original principle, which was the distinction between demonstrative and specific legacies, and recourse has been had to the animus adimendi, which has nothing in common with the other principle.

In Pettiward v. P. (a), the Court was of opinion, from all the circumstances, that the testator intended to give a legacy of 2,000l., although the debts pointed out for the payment of it amounted only to 1,700l.; and, therefore, decreed the deficiency to be made good out of the general assets. In Pawlet's Case (b), the legacy was held to be a pure legacy, or a legacy in numeratis, and not legatum nominis; and although the debt was paid to the testator, the legacy was decreed. In Lord Castleton v. Lord Fanshaw (c), a legacy of a debt was held to be specific, although the sum was named.

In Orme v. Smith (d), the payment was voluntary; and from thence was inferred an argument, that there was no animus adimendi (e).

In Lord Thomond v. Earl of Suffolk (f), Lord Macclesfield disapproved of the distinction between a debt recovered by suit, or paid in voluntarily. A definition of a specific legacy is given by Lord Macclesfield, in Hinton v. Pinke (g), and the advantages and disadvantages, as between a specific and pecuniary legacy, are mentioned; and, among other instances, that the legatee of a debt, which is lost

⁽a) Rep. t. Finch, 152.

⁽b) Raym. 335.

⁽c) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 298.

⁽d) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 302; Gilb. Rep. 82; and 2 Vern. 681.

⁽e) See as to the intention of the testator, Domat. tom. 2, p. 186. Vide Coleman v. C., 2 V. 640.

⁽f) 1 P. W. 461.

⁽g) 1 P. W. 539.

by the insolvency of the debtor, shall have no contribution from the other legatees. In Crockat v. C. (a), the testator bequeathed the sum of 550l., which was then in Mr. Ellis's hand; the testator, before making his will, had placed that sum in the hands of Mr. Ellis, and had got his note for it. He had also, before making his will, drawn several bills on Ellis, which had reduced the sum to 430l. It was held, by the Master of the Rolls, that as the drafts were all made before the will, and as the note for the full sum was still standing out, the testator should be considered as renouncing the payments, and that he meant to give the whole 550l. as a legacy.

I take it to be clear, if a testator gives a cup, which is in pawn, it is a full gift, and the executor must redeem.

In Ford v. Fleming (b), Lord King held, that calling in the debt was no ademption, supposing himself bound by the passage in Swinburne, and Pawlet's Case (c). How he could be bound by those cases I cannot conceive. This case determines nothing. Lawson v. Stitch(d) was also cited; the question arose on a deficiency. The case (e) at the Rolls, cited 1 Atk. 508, is nonsense, and has often been denied. The question upon the legacy of the stock has been determined uniformly (f). Avelyn v. Ward (g) is contrary to many cases determined before, and to one by Lord Hardwicke himself, viz., Purse v. Snaplin (h).

Lord Camden, in The Attorney-General v. Parkin (i), decided one point, and left the other open. Parkin, in his will, recites that he had certain mortgages, to the amount of £——, and bonds to the amount of £——. He gives all these, by such enumeration, to Pembroke College, Cambridge. To his sisters, who were next of kin, he gave annuities, and declared they should have nothing more under his will. Several sums were afterwards called in, or paid before the testator's death. Lord Camden determined, that the sisters were not disappointed by the declaration, that they should have nothing

- (a) 2 P. W. 164.
- (b) 2 P. W. 469, and 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 302.
 - (c) Raym. 335.
 - (d) 1 Atk. 507.
- (e) Phillips v. Cary; and see Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 103.
- (f) Ashton v. A., Cas. t. Talb. 152,
- and 3 P. W. 384; Partridge v. P., Cas. t. Talb. 226; Purse v. Snaplin, 1 Atk. 414, does not tell at all to the purpose.
 - (g) 1 Ves. Sen. 420.
- (h) S. C. nom. Pierce v. Snaveling. 1 Ves. Sen. 425.
 - (i) Amb. 566.

but the annuities; he held the legacy to the College was not adeemed as to the sums paid in, upon the ground that the sum was named, which he at the same time admitted to be slight. The testator certainly meant to give everything to the College, except the annuities; but the bequest is in the strictest form of a specific legacy.

In (a) Cartwright v. C., 18th July, 1775, before Lord Bathurst, the bequest was, "I give 1,400l. for which I have sold my estate this day," &c. The testator afterwards received the whole money, paid it to his banker, and drew out of his hands 1,100l. of that money. Lord Bathurst held this to be a legacy of quantity, and that the receiving was no ademption, on the authority of The Attorney-General v. Parkin; but it is questionable whether that case supports that determination.

In the case before me, the testator plainly intended that his sister, Sarah Ashburner, and her children, should have the debt, owing to him by her husband, secured as a provision for them.

My decree will be, that the bond be delivered up to the wife and children, that they may receive the dividend not received by the testator, and whatsoever may hereafter be payable out of the bankrupt's estate in respect of that debt.

The legacy to Beawes is gone, and the bill must be wholly dismissed as to that claim.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally, p. 834.
- 2. Legacies of (a) Money, p. 836.
 - (β) Debts, p 837.
 - (γ) Stock, Government securities, &c., p. 838.
 - (δ) Personal chattels, p. 842.
- 3. Specific bequest for life of consumable articles, p. 842.
- 4. Legacies connected with realty, p. 843.
- 5. Annuities, p. 845.
- Whether bequests contained in a residuary clause are specific or general.
 Bequest of a residue when specific, p. 853.
- 7. Effect of the Wills Act upon specific bequests, p. 854.
- 8. Legatee's right of selection, p. 860.
- 9. Gifts to be applied (1) for particular object, or (2) at discretion for benefit of legatee, p. 860.
- (a) Stated in the Appendix to Mr. Wooddeson's 3rd vol. of Views of the Laws of England.
 - w. & T.—VOL. I.

10. Ademption of legacies, p. 864.

11. Nature and incidents of specific legacies, p. 873.

12. Apportionment Act, 1870, p. 879.

13. How far parol evidence admissible to determine whether legacies are specific or not, p. 881.

14. Abatement of legacies, p. 882.

15. To whom legacies are to be paid, p. 889.

16. Appropriation of legacies payable in future, p. 891.

- 17. (A) Time of payment of legacies and interest, p. 893; (B) Contingent legacies and income, p. 899; (C) Maintenance under statute, p. 901;
 (D) Rate of interest, p. 903; (E) Annuities, p. 904; (F) Duties, p. 905.
- Recovery of legacy and arrears of interest; Statutes of Limitation; express trusts, p. 907.

1. Generally.

Legacies are usually said to be of two different kinds, general or specific; a third, however, may be added, in some degree partaking of the properties of the two former,—a demonstrative legacy.

A legacy is general where it does not amount to a bequest of any particular thing or money, distinguished from all others of the same kind. Thus, if a testator gives A. a diamond ring, or a horse, or 1,000l. stock, or 1,000l., not referring to any particular diamond ring, horse, stock, or money, as distinguished from others, these legacies will be general.

And where a legacy is otherwise general, the mere exception therefrom of something specifically described, will not make the gift more specific in the proper sense of the term than it would be if there were no such exception (a).

It may be here mentioned that general pecuniary legacies are bequests of personal property, "described in a general manner" within the meaning of the 27th section of the Wills Act (b) where no particular fund is indicated for payment, and they will therefore be payable out of personal estate, which the testator has power to appoint in any manner he may think proper, where there are no assets of which the testator was possessed as his own personal estate sufficient to pay the legacies (c).

A legacy is specific, legatum nominis vel debition when it is a

- (a) Robertson v. Broadbent, 8 A. C. 812, 817.
 - (b) 1 Vict. c. 26.
- (c) Hawthorn v. Shedden, 3 Sm. & G. 293; and see Spooner's Trust, 2 Si.

(N. S.) 129; Wilday v. Bar. nett, 6 Eq. 193; Re Wilkinson, L. R. 4 (Ch. 587; and see Williams v. W., (19040) 1 Ch 152.

bequest of a particular thing, or sum of money, or debt, as distinguished from all others of the same kind. Thus, if a testator gives B. "my diamond ring," "my black horse," "my 1,000l. stock," or "1,000l. contained in a particular bag," "or owing to me by C.;" or "the diamond ring, black horse, &c., which I shall be possessed of at the time of my death," in these and like instances the legacies are specific. See the definition of a specific legacy by Jessel, M.R., in Bothamley v. Sherson (a).

Where a bequest of particular articles is followed by a gift of the residue, the bequest of such articles, although the testator has prefixed "my," will not be specific, but residuary (b).

The result is the same where a general gift of personalty is followed by an enumeration of particular articles (c). And the fact that a specific legacy is given, or a specific part of personalty is excepted, out of a general legacy, does not make a gift of that residue specific (d).

A demonstrative legacy, as Lord *Thurlow* observes in the principal case, "is in its nature a general legacy, but there is a particular fund pointed out to satisfy it." Thus, if a testator bequeaths 1,000*l*. out of his Reduced Bank Three per Cents., the legacy will not be specific, but demonstrative.

Though often a matter of much difficulty, it is of much importance accurately to distinguish these legacies one from the other, because, as will be hereafter more fully shown, general or pecuniary legacies (in the absence of a contrary intention) are only payable out of the personal estate not specifically bequeathed, and unless charged upon it are not payable out of the real estate, and if the fund for their payment be insufficient they must abate inter se pro rata (e); but with regard to specific legacies they will not, upon a deficiency of general assets to pay debts, be obliged to abate, until after the general legacies have been exhausted; but, at the same time, a

- (a) 20 Eq. 304, 308, 309.
- (b) Fielding v. Preston, 1 De G. & J. 438; and see Dummer v. Pitcher, 2 My. & K. 262; Chapman v. C., 4
 C. D. 800; Bothamley v. Sherson, supra; Hodgson v. Jex, 2 C. D. 122; Re Green, 40 C. D. 610.
- (c) Fairer v. Park, 3 C. D. 309; King v. George, 4 C. D. 435, 5 C. D. 627; Re Tootal's Estate, 2 C. D. 628; Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101; Re Fleetwood, 15 C. D. 594; sed vide

Bethune v. Kennedy, 1 My. & C. 114; Mills v. Brown, 21 B. 1; Clarke v. Butler, 1 Mer. 304; Hill v. H., 11 Jur. (N. S.) 806; Langdale v. Esmonde, 4 Ir. R. Eq. 576; Fitzwilliams v. Kelly, 10 Ha. 266.

- (d) Re Ovey, 20 C. D. 676, on appeal sub nom. Robertson v. Broadbent, 8
 A. C. 812; Bothamley v. Sherson, supra.
- (e) Robertson v. Broadbent, 8 A. C. 815.

specially given be adeemed (a) by the testator either aliening or changing it into a different species of property, he will not be entitled to claim anything by way of compensation out of the general personal estate. But with regard to a demonstrative legacy it is so far of the nature of a specific legacy, that it will not abate with the general legacies until after the fund out of which it is payable is exhausted, and so far of the nature of a general legacy, that it will not be liable to ademption by the alienation or non-existence of the property pointed out as the primary means of paying it (b). Where the assets not specifically bequeathed are insufficient to pay debts, specific and demonstrative legacies abate rateably (bb). The Court is inclined not to construe a legacy as specific, unless clearly so intended (c).

2. Legacies of

- (a) Money. (b) Debts. (c) Stock, &c. (d) Personal Chattels.
- (a) Legacies of Money.—A bequest of a sum of money in such a bag (d); or in the hands of a certain person (e); or invested in a certain named investment (f); or even of "all my monies" (g) is specific. So where one partner bequeathed to the other 2,000l, which appeared to be due to him on the last settlement upon certain trusts, if he did not draw it out of the trade before he died, Lord Hardwicke held that it was a specific legacy (h). But a bequest of money for a ring (i), or to purchase Government securities (k), or lands (l), or of an annuity to be purchased out of or charged on the personal estate (m), or of so much money "to be paid
 - (a) See Note 10, infra.
- (b) Mullins v. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 204; Williams v. Hughes, 24 B. 474; Paget v. Huish, 1 Hem. & M. 663; Jones v. Southall, 32 B. 31; Bevan v. A.-G., 4 Gif. 361; Vickers v. Pound, 6 H. L. Cas. 885; Disney v. Crosse, 2 Eq. 593; Hodges v. Grant, 4 Eq. 140.
 - (bb) Re Turner, (1908) 1 Ir. R. 274.
- (c) Kirby v. Potter, 4 V. 752; Innes v. Johnson, 4 V. 568; Webster v. Hale, 8 V. 413; Dickin v. Edwards, 4 Ha. 276; Sayer v. S., 7 Ha. 382; Williams v. Hughes, 24 B. 474, 478.
 - (d) Lawson v. Stitch, 1 Atk. 507.
 - (e) Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P. W. 539;

- Crockat v. C., 2 P. W. 165; Pulsford v. Hunter, 3 Bro. Ch. 416.
- (f) Re Slater, (1907) 1 Ch. 665.
- (g) Manning v. Purcell, 2 Sm. & G. 284, 7 De G. M. & G. 55; Larner v. L., 26 L. J. Ch. 668.
 - (h) Ellis v. Walker, Amb. 310.
 - (i) Apreece v. A., 1 V. & B. 364.
- (k) Lawson v. Stitch, 1 Atk. 507; Gibbons v. Hills, Dick. 324; Edwards v. Hall, 11 Ha. 23.
 - (l) Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P. W. 539.
- (m) Alton v. Medlicot, cited 2 Ves. Sen. 417, S. C. 3 Atk. 694; Hume v. Edwards, 3 Atk. 693; Creed v. C., 11 Cl. & Fin. 508.

in cash" (a) is a general legacy. So, "in Kirkpatrick v. K. (b), before Lord Kenyon when Master of the Rolls, legacies were given to persons in India, and legacies to persons in England, to be respectively paid out of the effects in the respective countries, that was held to be only a direction as to the payment, not to make them specific." So, a gift of a legacy, with a direction that it shall be paid as soon as the testator's property in India shall be realised in England, will not make it specific, nor would it fail although the assets had been remitted to England in the lifetime of the testator (c).

(β) Legacies of Debts.—A debt may be specifically bequeathed, either by a gift of the security, as "my East India Bonds" (d), "my note of 500l." (e), "my navy bills" (f); or by a gift of the sum owing upon a particular security, as a bequest of "the money due on an interest note given by A." (g), or "due on A.'s bond" (g), "the money now owing to me from A." (g); "or the interest of 7,000g, security on mortgage of an estate belonging to A." (g). Forgiveness of a debt is a specific legacy of the sum owed and forgiven (g).

A bequest of a debt is specific, though it is made to several persons in certain shares and proportions, and it is none the less specific in consequence of a life interest being given in it (l). Thus, in the principal case, where the testator bequeathed to his sister "the interest arising from her husband's bond, due to me, for principal 3,500l. sterling," for life, for her separate use, amounting to 175l. sterling per annum, and on the decease of his sister, the principal of the said bond to her four daughters, to be equally divided among them, Lord Thurlow held, that the bond was specifically

- (a) Richards v. R., 9 Price, 226.
- (b) Cited in Roberts v. Pocock, 4 V. 158.
- (c) Sadler v. Turner, 8 V. 617, 624; Raymond v. Brodbelt, 5 V. 199; sed vide Chester v. Urwick, 23 B. 402.
- (d) Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. Sen. 562, 563.
- (e) Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. Sen. 623.
- (f) Pitt v. Camelford, 3 Bro. Ch. 160.
- (g) Fryer v. Morris, 9 V 360; seealso Ford v. Fleming, 2 P. W. 469;
- Chaworth v. Beech, 4 V. 555; Smith v. Pybus, 9 V. 566; Gillaume v. Adderley, 15 V. 384; Davies v. Morgan, 1 B. 405; Sparrow v. Josselyn, 16 B. 135; Nelson v. Carter, 5 Si. 530 Harrison v. Jackson, 7 C. D. 339.
 - (h) Davies v. Morgan, supra.
 - (i) Ellis v. Walker, Amb. 309.
- (18) Gardner v. Hatton, 6 Si. 93; cf. Sidebotham v. Watson, 11 Ha. 170; Le Grice v. Finch, 3 Mer. 50; Harrison v. Jackson, supra.
 - (l) Re Wedmore, (1907) 2 Ch. 277.

given: and this decision has been approved of and followed in Chaworth v. Beech (a). So a gift of a part or residue of a debt is specific (b).

If a testator gives a sum out of a debt to one person and the residue to another, the legacies are specific, but if he says, "I give a legacy of a particular sum to A. and desire it to be paid out of a debt due to me," the legacy is demonstrative, as the testator merely points to a fund out of which it is to be paid (c). And a bequest of 10,000l. sterling "being my share of the capital now engaged in the banking business," was held by Romilly, M.R., to be a demonstrative legacy (d). So legacies given "out of the capital employed in the business" (e).

- (γ) Legacies of Stock, Government Securities, &c.—Stock, or Government securities, may be specifically bequeathed, where the specific thing or corpus is, as in the principal case, described as "my" stock. So a legacy "of my stock," or "in my stock," or "part of my stock," is a specific gift of an aliquot part of stock (f). So a bequest of "my shares in a particular company" (g), or of "all the stock which I have in the Three per Cents., being, or about 5,000l.," is specific (h); and a bequest "of the interest of the whole of my property in the public funds," was held a specific legacy of 700l. Three per Cent. Reduced Annuities, the only property in the public funds which the testator had (i). So a bequest "of the interest of 4,500l, money in the funds" has been held a specific bequest of 4,000l. consols in the names of trustees for the testatrix (k). And a bequest of "2,000l long annuities standing in my name" has
- (a) Supra, and Innes v. Johnson, 4 V. 568; Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox, 180; sed vide Coleman v. C., 2 V. 639; Duncan v. D., 27 B. 386.
- (b) Ford v. Fleming, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr.
 302, pl. 3, 2 P. W. 469; Nelson v.
 Carter, 5 Si. 530; and see Oliver v.
 O., 11 Eq. 506.
- (c) Duncan v. D., 27 B. 392; and Campbell v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; Vickers v. Pound, 6 H. L. Cas. 885.
 - (d) Sparrow v. Josselyn, 16 B. 135.
 - (e) Bevan v. A.-G., 4 Gif. 365.
- (f) Per Lord Alvanley in Kirby v. Potter, 4 V. 750; and see Hosking v. Nicholls, 1 Y. & C. C. 478;

- Mullins v. Smith, I Dr. & Sm. 210; Oliver v. O., 11 Eq. 506; Re Sayer, 50 L. T. 616.
- (g) Miller v. Little, 2 B. 259; Measure v. Carleton, 30 B. 538; Kermode v. Macdonald, 1 Eq. 457; L. R. 3 Ch. 584.
- (h) Humphreys v. H., 2 Cox, 184; and see Cockran v. C., 14 Si. 248; Bothamley v. Sherson, 20 Eq. 304.
 - (i) Hayes v. H., 1 Keen, 97.
- (k) Page v. Young, 19 Eq. 501; and see Vincent v. Newcombe, Young, 599; Kampf v. Jones, 2 Keen, 756; Shuttleworth v. Greaves, 4 My. & C. 35.

been held to be specific, though the testator might only have had a much smaller sum (a).

A bequest, moreover, of all the stock a testator may be possessed of at his death will be specific (b). So a gift "to M. of the sum of 42,000 new three per cent., more or less, at the time of my death," was held specific; to L. the sum of 42,000 Russian five per cent. stock," was not specific (c).

But a legacy of 10,000*l*. consols "now standing in my name" has been held not to be specific, where the context showed that the testator meant to use the words as designating the value of 10,000*l*. consols and not the sum itself(*d*). And the bequest of the testator's "funded" property has been held not to be sufficiently specific to carry a sum of stock which the testator had purchased in the joint names of himself and his wife, so as to raise a case of election, although the testator had no other stock, and his property exclusive of the stock in the names of himself and his wife was not sufficient to pay his legacies (*e*).

The mere possession, by the testator, at the date of his will, of stock or annuities of an amount equal to or greater than the bequest, where it was made merely in general terms, as of stocks or annuities (f), or of money in particular funds (g), or of India bonds (h), 500 Egyptian Nine per Cent. bonds (i), or 50 shares in the York Union Banking Company (k), would not, unless it appeared clearly to be the testator's intention to refer to the identical stock, annuities, bonds, or shares, of which he was possessed, be considered as specific.

And a mere direction to transfer a certain amount of stock, or to pay it as soon as possible, will not make the legacy specific (l).

- (a) Gordon v. Duff, 28 B. 519; 3 De G. F. & J. 662.
- (b) Fontaine v. Tyler, 9 Price, 94; Queen's College v. Sutton, 12 Si. 521; Stephenson v. Dowson, 3 B. 342; Bothamley v. Sherson, 20 Eq. 304.
 - (c) Re Tyler, 65 L. T. 367.
 - (d) Auther v. A., 13 Si. 422.
- (e) Dummer v. Pitcher, 5 Si. 35; 2 My. & K. 262.
- (f) Partridge v. P., Cas. t. Talbot,
 226; Simmons v. Vallance, 4 Bro. Ch.
 345; Webster v. Hale, 8 V. 410; Wilson v. Brownsmith, 9 V. 180; Hayes v. H.,

- 1 Keen, 97; Johnson v. J., 14 Si. 313.
- (g) Purse v. Snaplin, 1 Atk. 414; Bronsdon v. Winter, Amb. 57; Bishop of Peterborough v. Mortlock, 1 Bro. Ch. 565; Sibley v. Perry, 7 V. 522, 529, 530; Webster v. Hale, 8 V. 410; but see Re Slater, (1907) 1 Ch. 665.
- (h) Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. Sen. 562, 563.
 - (i) Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101.
- (k) Re Gray, 36 C. D. 205; Re Gillins, (1909) 1 Ch. 345.
- (l) Sibley v. Perry, 7 V. 523; Webster v. Hale, 8 V. 410.

Although stock be given in general terms, if the testator directs a sale for the benefit of the legatee, the legacy will be specific; for that direction would not have been given if the testator intended the stock to be purchased out of his general personal estate (a).

And where a testator has given legacies of stock, a gift of the rest, or remainder of the stock "standing in my name," will show that the first legacies were specific (b).

Other expressions may show that the testator intended to give some things in existence at the time, and therefore to give specific legacies; where, for instance, there is a bequest of "4,000l. capital stock in the Three per Cent. Consolidated Bank Annuities, or in whatsoever of the Government funds the same should be found invested"(c); or refers to "present state of investment (d); or if the will directs that if the testator should not have sufficient stock standing in his name to meet the legacies of stock before given, the executors should purchase sufficient to make up the deficiency (e). The fact that the gift of stock not being in round numbers, is precisely the same amount as that which the testator has standing in his name, formerly added weight to the argument that the gift is specific (f).

Where a married woman, who has a power of appointment over a fund invested in Government stock, by her will gives legacies of specified sums thereof in terms as "100l. of such trust fund," such legacies will be specific; and if the legacies given thereout do not exhaust the fund, a residuary gift thereof will also be specific (g); but if the property is to be converted into money and out of the produce the legacies are to be provided they are general (h).

A legacy of a part of a specific fund is specific (i).

A bequest of a specific fund to be sold and divided in definite shares among several persons is specific (k): as are also bequests of

- (a) Ashton v. A., Cas. t. Talbot, 152,3 P. W. 384.
- (b) Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. Sen. 562; Simmons v. Vallance, 4 Bro. Ch. 345; Millard v. Bailey, 1 Eq. 378.
- (c) Hosking v. Nicholls, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 478.
- (d) Re Nottage, No. 2, (1895) ,2 Ch. 657.
- (e) Townsend v. Martin, 7 Ha. 471; Queen's College v. Sutton, 12 Si. 521; Fontaine v. Tyler, 9 Price, 94.
 - (f) Jeffreys v. J., 3 Atk. 120; and

- see Robinson v. Addison, 2 B. 515.
- (g) Davies v. Fowler, 16 Eq. 308;and see Re Young, 52 L. T. 754;Walker v. Laxton, 1 Y. & J. 557.
- (h) Tatham v. Drummond, 2 Hem. &M. 262; Davies v. Fowler, supra.
- (i) Ford v. Fleming, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr.
 302, pl. 3; 2 P. W. 469; Nelson v.
 Carter, 5 Si. 530; Oliver v. O., 11 Eq.
 506; Re Sayer, 53 L. J. Ch. 832; 50
 L. T. 616.
 - (k) Re Jefferys' Trusts, 2 Eq. 68.

parts of money to be received under a policy (a), or of parts of the proceeds of a sale of land (b). Somewhat fine distinctions have been taken. It has been held where there is a legacy of "stock out of stock" (c), or of money out of a specific fund as a bond debt (d), it will be specific, being the gift of part of a specific fund (e), and on the other hand that where there is a bequest not of part of certain stock or of stock out of stock (in which case the legacy, as before shown, is specific as being part of a specific fund), but of money out of stock, "as of 1,000l. out of my Reduced Stock," then the legacy will not be specific, but demonstrative (f).

So where a certain sum is given, and the fund in which it is invested and out of which it is to be paid is described or pointed out merely, the legacy will be demonstrative (g).

But the *intention*, which always governs in these cases, may show that so much of the *identical* stock was intended, in which case the legacy will be specific. Thus, where a testator directed A. to pay to certain persons "four hundred pounds out of seven now lying in the Three per Cent. Consolidated," the legacy was held to be specific (h).

Where a testator makes a specific bequest, for instance, of stock which he accurately describes, that stock only, and not stock of a different denomination, will pass, though the amount be less than what he states it to be (i); but if he had at the date of his will no such stock as that which he mentions in his will, other stock nearly answering the description might pass (k).

- (a) Walpole v. Apthorp, 4 Eq. 37.
- (b) Page v. Leapingwell, 18 V. 463; Newbold v. Roadknight, 1 Russ. & My. 677.
- (c) Morley v. Bird, 3 V. 629; Hosking v. Nicholls, supra.
- (d) Badrick v. Stevens, 3 Bro. Ch. 431.
- (e) Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. Sen. 623; Mullins v. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 204.
- (f) Kirby v. Potter, 4 V. 748; Deane v. Test, 9 V. 146, 152; Rogers v. Clarke, C. P. Coop. 376; and see Jones v. Southall, 32 B. 31; Hosking v. Nicholls, supra, Mullins v. Smith, supra.
 - (g) Raymond v. Brodbelt, 5 V.

- 199; Gillaume v. Adderley, supra; Sparrow v. Josselyn, supra; Thomas v. T., 3 Ir. Ch. R. 399; and see Mytton v. M., 19 Eq. 30, explained in Re Pratt, (1894) 1 Ch. 491; Lambert v. L., 11 V. 607.
- (h) Morley v. Bird, 3 V. 629; see also Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. Sen. 623; Townsend v. Martin, 7 Ha. 471; and see Re Pratt, (1894) 1 Ch. 491, in which the cases on this point are reviewed.
- (i) Gilliat v. G., 28 B. 481; and see cases cited in the note, ibid., p. 484; Slingsby v. Grainger, 7 H. L. Cas. 273; Ridge v. Newton, 2 Dr. & W. 239.
- (k) Door v. Geary, 1 Ves. Sen. 255; Dobson v. Waterman, 3 V. 308 (n.);

As to the admissibility of evidence and words to determine whether legacies are specific, see post, Note 13.

(8) Legacies of Personal Chattels.—A bequest of a brooch which I received as a present from A. B. (a), my horse named Castor (b), as many of my horses as will amount to 800l. (c), any stock of trade of wines and spirituous liquors which I shall be possessed of at the time of my death (d), all the books in my chambers (e), will be specific, and can only be satisfied by a delivery in specie.

But where a person having many chattels of the same kind bequeaths them in such terms as not to show that any particular chattel was intended, and so that the bequest will be satisfied by something of the same species as that mentioned, the legacy will not be specific. Thus, if A., having many brooches or horses, bequeath "a brooch" or "a horse," in these and such cases the bequests will not be specific, but general (f).

A gift of my grey horse will pass a black horse, which is not strictly grey, if it be found to have been the testator's intention that it should pass by that description (g). But if the testator has no horse, the executor is not to buy a grey horse (h).

Things ordered by and made for the testator will pass under his will, although not delivered or paid for until after his death (i).

3. Specific Bequest for Life of Consumable Articles.

A gift for life, if specific, of things "quæ ipso usu consumuntur," is a gift of the property, and there cannot be a limitation over after a life interest in such article (k). Thus it was laid down by Knight-Bruce, V.-C., that a gift of "wine, spirits, and hay," to a woman so long as she should be living unmarried, is a gift of the absolute interest (l). The result is that such legacy will lapse on the death of the first taker during the life of the testator (m). The

MacKinley v. Sison, 8 Si. 561; King v. Wright, 14 Si. 400; Penticost v. Ley, 2 J. & W. 207; Gallini v. Noble, 3 Mer. 691; Quennell v. Turner, 13 B. 240; Trinder v. T., 1 Eq. 695; Re Nottage, (1895) 2 Ch. 657; Flood v. F., (1902) 1 Ir. R. 538.

- (a) Touchstone, 433.
- (b) Ibid.
- (c) Richards v. R., 9 Price, 219.
- (d) Stewart v. Denton, 4 Dong. 219.
- (e) Green v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch.

- 129 (n.).
- (f) Roper on Legacies, vol. i., p. 93, 4th ed.
 - (g) Evans v. Tripp, 6 Madd. 92.
 - (h) Ibid.
 - (i) Field v. Peckett (No. 2), 29 B. 573.
 - (k) Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190.
- (l) Andrew v. A., 1 Coll. 690, 691, 692; Twining v. Powell, 2 Coll. 262; Re Hall's Will, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 974.
 - (m) Andrew v. A., supra.

gift, however, may of course be limited so as to apply only to such as the legatee may require (a).

But the gift, it seems, will not as a rule be absolute of consumable articles constituting the testator's stock in trade, as for instance, that of a wine merchant (b).

The same result has been arrived at with regard to farming stock (c). Hatherley, C., when Vice-Chancellor, arrived at the same conclusion in Groves v. Wright (d), with respect to a gift of farming stock and implements of husbandry for life; but the ground his Lordship proceeded on was, that farming stock and implements of husbandry were not things que ipso usu consumuntur.

Stuart, V.-C., however, in Bryant v. Easterson (e), held that a legatee for life of farming stock, consisting, among other things, of growing crops, oxen, sheep, pigs, and horses, took such stock absolutely as things quæ ipso usu consumuntur, and that they did not, therefore, go to the legatees in remainder. This case, however, appears to be opposed to the modern current of authorities.

But even if stock in trade be given to a person for life, he will take absolutely, and consequently a gift over thereof will be void, if by the terms of the will the legatee is not to be liable to account for any diminution or depreciation (f).

Where a man's wearing apparel was given to his widow for life, with remainder over, it was held by Page-Wood, V.-C., that the wearing apparel did not vest in the widow absolutely as things quæ ipso usu consumuntur, and that the sale thereof, and the payment of the income to the widow for her life, was reasonable (g).

So if consumable articles are included in a residuary bequest for life, they must be sold, and the interest only enjoyed by the tenant for life (h).

4. Legacies connected with Realty.

Every devise of land, even in the form of a general residuary devise, is specific (i). • And a devise of land upon trust to sell and divide amongst certain persons makes them specific legatees (k).

- (a) Re Colyer, 55 L. T. 344.
- (b) Phillips v. Beal, 32 B. 25.
- (c) Cockayne v. Harrison, 13 Eq.
 432; Myers v. Washbrook, (1901) 1
 Q. B. 360.
 - (d) 2 Kay & J. 347.
 - (e) 5 Jur. (N. S.) 166, 7 W. R. 298.
 - (f) Breton v. Mockett, 9 C. D. 95.
 - (g) Re Hall's Will, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 974.
- (h) Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 195; and see notes to Howe v. Lord Dartmouth, ante.
- (i) See Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136.
- (k) Page v. Leapingwell, 18 V. 463; 11 R. R. 234.

This has been held to be the case where there is a direction to pay to an individual a definite sum out of the proceeds of the sale and the residue to others; thus, in a devise upon trust to sell, and out of the proceeds to pay A. 3,000l., and the residue to others, the sum so given was held to be substantially a portion of the real estate, and not a gift with a collateral charge, and the testator having sold the estate in his lifetime, the legacy was held to be adeemed (a).

So in Page v. Leapingwell (b), the testator devised an estate in trust to sell, but not for less than 10,000l., and pay several sums amounting to 7,800l., and the overplus moneys arising from the sale to A.: Grant, M.R., held that it was a specific legacy of 10,000l., and the sale producing less, the other legatees were obliged to abate with A., and that two charitable legacies given out of the fund were void, and fell into the general residue of the testator's estate.

A gift of a rent out of land or a term of years is specific (c). So also every bequest of a lease for years of land (d), or of tithes (e), is specific.

But if a mere annual sum or a legacy is given, payable out of a term or real estate, or merely charged thereon, that will not be a specific but a demonstrative legacy, and effect will be given to it out of the general assets although the particular security intended by the testator happens to fail (f). The question to be considered is whether there is a bequest of an annuity or a gift of the income of a fund to be set apart (g).

Where there is a trust to raise a sum of money out of land, and

- (a) Newbold v. Roadknight, 1 Russ. & My. 677.
- (b) Supra, distinguished in Re Tunno, 45 C. D. 66; see also Williams v. Hughes, 24 B, 474; Walpole v. Apthorp, 4 Eq. 37.
- (c) Long v. Short, 1 P. W. 403; and Creed v. C., 11 Cl. & Fin. 508, per Lord Cottenham; and see Patching v. Barnett, 51 L. J. Ch. 74, at p. 78. So far as relates to the apportionment between real and personal estate in Long v. Short, see this discussed in Re Saunders-Davies, 34 C. D. 482; Re Bawden, (1894) 1 Ch. 693, and ante in note to Ancaster v. Mayer.
- (d) Long v. Short, 1 P. W. 403.
- (e) Rudstone v. Anderson, 2 Ves. Sen. 418; Hone v. Medcraft, 1 Bro. Ch. 261.
- (f) Savile v. Blacket, 1 P. W. 778; Fowler v. Willoughby, 2 S. & S. 354; Mann v. Copland, 2 Madd. 223; Livesay v. Redfern, 2 Y. & C. Ex. C. 90; Willox v. Rhodes, 2 Russ. 452; Colvile v. Middleton, 3 B. 570; Creed v. C., 11 Cl. & Fin. 510; Severs v. S., 1 Sm. & Gif. 400; Paget v. Huish, 1 Hem. & M. 663.
- (g) See Carmichael v. Gee, 5 A. C. 588.

a bequest is then made of the same, it will be a specific legacy, and not payable out of the personal estate (a). So also where the only gift is in the direction to pay the legacy out of a particular fund, as land, the land alone is liable, and if it fails, the legacy fails also, as it will be specific (b). But the mere fact in such case that the personalty is given after the payment of legacies will not make the gift of a sum out of the proceeds of sale of realty demonstrative (c).

A gift, however, of real and personal estate on trust to pay the legacies thereafter given, with a subsequent gift of the proceeds of sale of realty, has been held to be demonstrative (d).

5. Annuities.

Generally speaking, gifts of Annuities by will are legacies (e).

And in general, in the construction of a will, annuities will be comprised within the word "legacies" (f), unless there is something in the will to show that the testator himself distinguished between them (g). It is sometimes important to consider this when the question arises whether under the word "legacies," annuities are charged upon land, or are bequeathed free from the payment of legacy duty.

Again, where legacies are directed to be paid out of real estate, an annuity, being a legacy, will also be charged on the same fund (h).

An annuity when given with words of inheritance devolves as realty (i); but not being within the statute $De\ Donis$ it cannot be entailed; a devise therefore of a personal annuity to A. and the heirs of his body will give A. a fee simple conditional (k). If, although the annuity be perpetual, words of inheritance are not used, it is personal estate though charged upon real as well as personal estate (l). And where the gift was to the six children of the testator or their heirs, and one of the six predeceased the testator, it was held that the next of kin of that child took (m).

- (a) Welby v. Rockcliffe, 1 Russ. & My. 571; Dickin v. Edwards, 4 Ha. 273.
 - (b) Spurway v. Glynn, 9 V. 483, 485.
 - (c) Rickets v. Ladley, 3 Russ. 418.(d) Hodges v. Grant, 4 Eq. 140;
- (d) Hodges v. Grant, 4 Eq. 140; and see Williams v. Hughes, 24 B. 474.
 - (e) Ward v. Grey, 26 B. 491.
- (f) Duke of Bolton v. Williams, 4 Bro. Ch. 430; Sibley v. Perry, 7 V. 534; Swift v. Nash, 2 Keen, 20.
- (g) Cornfield v. Wyndham, 2 Coll. 184; Bromley v. Wright, 7 Ha. 334; Gaskin v. Rogers, 2 Eq. 284.
- (h) Mullins v. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 204, 211.
- (i) Turner v. T., Amb. 782; Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves. Sen. 179.
 - (k) Ibid.
 - (1) Taylor v. Martindale, 12 Si. 158.
 - (m) Parsons v. P., 8 Eq. 260.

6. Duration of Annuities.

The question often arises, whether an annuity is perpetual or whether it is for life only. The answer depends upon the intention of the testator.

If an annuity is given simpliciter, that is, to one generally, a life interest only passes (a).

Where an annuity is given for the maintenance and education of children, as it is obvious that it was meant to be for their personal enjoyment and benefit, it will be held not to be meant to be continued beyond their lives (b), and will not ordinarily be confined to minority (c).

A bequest of 30l. a-year to A. together with her children B., C., and D., and for their joint maintenance, was held to be a bequest of an annuity to the mother and her children as joint-tenants for the life of the longest liver of them (d).

If an annuity be given to one for life, and after his death to another simply (e), or to one for life with power to him to give it after his death to another or to several others or the survivors or survivor (f), unless there are some other circumstances to vary the construction, the subsequent takers, as well as the first annuitant, will take for life only (g).

The gift of an annuity for a term or pur autre vie to an annuitant, is a gift to him and his personal representatives during the term or the life of the cestui que vie (h).

But the will may show that it was the intention of the testator that the annuity should be perpetual. Thus, "where a testator speaks of an annuity which he gives to a person for life, as if it were in existence after the death of such person, irrespective of any words added for the purpose of continuing its existence for the benefit of

- (a) Yates v. Maddan, 3 Mac. & G. 532; Potter v. Baker, 13 B. 273; Blight v. Hartnoll, 19 C. D. 294; Re Morgan, (1893) 3 Ch. 222.
- (b) Wilkins v. Joddrell, 13 C. D. 564, 570; see also Soames v. Martin, 10 Si. 287.
 - (c) Ibid.
- (d) Wilson v. Maddison, 2 Y. & C.C. C. 372; and see Re Booth, (1894) 2Ch. 282.
- (e) Potter v. Baker, 15 B. 492, and Blight v. Hartnoll, 19 C. D. 294; over-

- ruling Evans v. Walker, 3 C. D. 211.
- (f) Blewitt v. Roberts, Cr. & Ph.
 274; Yates v. Maddan, 3 Mac. & G.
 532; Sullivan v. Galbraith, 4 Ir. R.
 Eq. 582.
- (g) See Barden v. Meagher, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 250, per *Walsh*, M.R.; Lett v. Randall, 3 Sm. & G. 83; 2 De G. F. & J. 388.
- (h) Re Ord, 12 C. D. 22, 25. See also Savery v. Dyer, Amb. 139, Dick. 162; Hill v. Ratte 2 John. & H. 634, 639.

any other person, there the annuity given indefinitely to such other person is a perpetual annuity "(a).

A gift by will, even since the Wills Act (b), of an annuity without words of limitation, but which by the same will is charged on real estate, is not a devise of a perpetual annuity or rent-charge, but is a gift of an annuity for life as it would have been before the Wills Act (c).

"Where, however, an annuity is directed to be provided out of the proceeds of property, or out of property generally, if an annuity is to be brought into existence by the application of property, and that annuity is given to a party generally, he will take the property appropriated to purchase the annuity, and therefore the annuity in perpetuity if purchased" (d); d fortiori if there are other circumstances which show the testator intended that the annuities were to be perpetual (e).

The gift of the produce of a fund, whether particular or reversionary, without limit as to time, is a gift of the fund itself (f). So a gift of rents passes the fee (g).

And a gift of an annuity as part of the income of a particular fund, has been held to amount to a gift of so much of the fund itself (h).

In Bent v. Cullen (i), the rule was applied to a gift of an annuity out of the income of the testator's personal property; but as to this, Lindley, L.J., in Re Morgan (k), says: "I cannot help thinking that in Bent v. Cullen the L. C., Lord Hatherley, did for

- (a) Per Truro, C., Yates v. Maddan, 3 Mac. & G. 540; Drew v. Barry, 7 Ir. R. Eq. 413; Mansergh v. Campbell, 25 B. 544; 3 De G. & J. 232. And see Robinson v. Hunt, 4 B. 450; and Hedges v. Harpur, 3 De. G. & J. 129; Warren v. Wright, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 401; Barden v. Meagher, supra.
 - (b) 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 28.
 - (c) Nichols v. Hawkes, 10 Ha. 342.
- (d) Per Lord St. Leonards, C.; Kerr v. The Middlesex Hospital, 2 De G. M. & G. 583; Stokes v. Heron, 12 Cl. & Fin. 161; Potter v. Baker, 13 B. 273, 15 B. 489; Pawson v. P., 19 B. 146; Hill v. Rattey, 2 John. & H. 634; Ross v. Borer, ibid. 469; Timins v. Stackhouse, 27 B. 434; Bent v. Cullen, L. R. 6 Ch. 235; observed on in Re
- Morgan, (1893) 3 Ch. 222; Hicks v. Ross, 14 Eq. 141; See also Evans v. Walker, 3 C. D. 211; overruled by Blight v. Hartnoll, 19 C. D. 294.
- (e) Wakeham v. Merrick, 37 L. J. Ch. 45.
- (f) Yates v. Maddan, 3 Mac. & G.
 540; Stokes v. Heron, 12 Cl. & Fin.
 161; Hill v. Rattey, 2 John. & H.
 634; Engelhardt v. E., 26 W. R. 853.
- (g) Doe d. Goldin v. Lakeman, 2 B.& Ad. 30; Re Martin, W. N. (1892)120.
- (h) Rawlings v. Jennings, 13 V. 39; Bignold v. Giles, 4 Drew. 343; Courtenay v. Gallagher, 5 Ir. Ch. R. 154, 356; Potter v. Baker, 13 B. 273, 15 B. 489,
 - (i) L. R. 6 Ch. 235.
 - (k) (1893) 3 Ch. 228.

a moment fail to observe the difference between giving a person a portion of the income of a fund and something payable out of it."

Directions to purchase annuities in the British funds (a), or in Government securities (b), have been held gifts of perpetual annuities.

A devise *simpliciter* of all the testator's property on trust to pay an annuity, or a charge of an annuity on property devised in fee simple, will not sufficiently show the intention of the testator that the annuity should be perpetual (c).

And a mere direction that an annuity is to be paid out of the testator's "general effects" (d), or out of a particular fund (e), will not render the annuity perpetual, for it cannot be construed as an absolute gift of so much of the effects or fund necessary to purchase the annuity.

But other words in the will may show an intention that the annuity should be perpetual. If, for instance, there is a direction in the will that the annuity is to cease if the legatee dies without issue, if it is directed not to be sold until after the death of the legatee (f), if the annuity is given over in certain events in fee, or a power of appointing the annuity is given to the legatee, in such terms as would authorise the gift of a perpetual annuity (g), strong internal evidence is afforded of an intention to give a perpetual annuity. Again, if a duty is imposed on the annuitant, which is not performed when the annuitant dies, the annuity continues for the further period necessary (h).

If the Court once infers from the will that the testator intended to give a sum certain per annum in perpetuity, the absence of any direction as to the particular part of the testator's property to be segregated or appropriated to meet it is immaterial, as the Court will take care that a sufficient part of the testator's property is set apart for that purpose (i).

- (a) Kerr v. The Middesex Hospital, 2 De G. M. & G. 576.
- (b) Ross v. Borer, 2 John. & H. 469; but see Re Groves' Trusts, 1 Gif. 74; Banks v. Braithwaite, 32 L. J. Ch. 198, 11 W. R. 298; and Re Taber's Estate, 30 W. R. 883; 46 L. T. 305; Re Lord Strathcona and Campbell, W. N. (1893) 90.
- (c) Mansergh v. Campbell, 3 De G. & J. 237; Sullivan v. Galbraith, 4 Ir. R. Eq. 582; Blight v. Hartnoll, supra.

- (d) Innes v. Mitchell, 6 V. 464.
- (e) Wilson v. Maddison, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 372; and see Re Morgan, supra.
- (f) Hedges v. Harpur, 3 De G. & J. 129; Pawson v. P., 19 B. 146.
- (g) Robinson v. Hunt, 4 B. 450; Warren v. Wright, 12 Ir. R. Ch. 401.
 - (h) Re Yates, (1901) 2 Ch. 438.
- (i) Stokes v. Heron, 12 Cl. & Fin. 161; Hill v. Rattey, 2 John. & H. 634, 644; but see the remarks of Lord Campbell, C., in Lett v. Randall, 2 De G. F. & J. 392, 393.

Charged on Corpus or Payable out of Income.

Whether an annuity is chargeable upon the corpus of a fund or is payable only out of the income is a question of intention to be determined on the words of the will (a).

Where there is a direct legacy of an annuity, charged on the general estate, the annuitant is entitled to have that made good, not only out of the income, but out of the capital, unless there are words sufficient to cut down the claim of the person to the income only, nor can the residuary legatee take anything until all the legacies (in which annuities are included) have been provided for (b).

And it is immaterial that an annuity fund directed to fall into the residue, on the death of the annuitant, goes not to the residuary legatees, but to other persons (c).

Where a testator directs a sufficient sum to be set apart in order to produce an annuity, which sum is afterwards to fall into residue, if he does not leave sufficient assets (d), or the sum set apart is originally insufficient (e), or becomes so in consequence of a reduction of interest of the Government funds set apart for its payment, the annuitant will be entitled to be paid out of the corpus. The question being one between the annuitant and the residuary legatee (f).

But the corpus will not be liable, where the annuity is to be paid out of the interest of a given fund, with a gift over of the surplus income during the lifetime of the annuitant (g), unless the gift over is expressed to be the subject to the annuity (h).

Where, however, an annuity is given out of the rents or profits, dividends or interest of the testator's estate, and the capital given

- a) Re Bigge, (1907) 1 Ch. 714.
- (b) Carmichael v. Gee, 5 A. C.
 588, affirming Gee v. Mahood, 11
 C. D. 891, 897, reversing S. C., 9
 C. D. 151.
- (c) Wright v. Callender, 2 De G. M. & G. 652.
- (d) Wright v. Callender, supra; and see Miner v. Baldwin, 1 Sm. & G. 522; Re Cottrell, (1910) 1 Ch. 403.
- (e) Bright v. Larcher, 3 De G. & J. 148; and see Perkins v. Cooke, 2 J. & H. 393.
- (f) See also May v. Bennett, 1 Russ. 370; Mills v. Drewitt, 20 B. 632; Percy v. P., 35 B. 295; Carmichael v. Gee, 5 A. C. 588; and R_{ℓ} Taylor, 53 L. J. Ch. 1161; 50 L. T. 717.
- (g) Stelfox v. Sugden, John. 234; Sheppard v. S., 32 B. 194; Darbon v. Rickards, 14 Si. 537; and for cases where arrears were held to be a continuing charge on income though not on corpus, see infra, pp. 850, 851.

(h) Birch v. Sherratt, L. R. 2 Ch. 644; and see Re Boden, (1907) 1 Ch. 132.

over "after payment of," or "subject to the payment of" the annuity, the corpus will be liable (a).

Where there is a mere direction to set apart a sum of money for payment out of the interest or dividends, with a gift over, as the annuitant is simply a tenant for life with remainder over, he is not entitled to come upon the corpus to make up any deficiency in the sum set to meet the annuity (b). In this class of cases in effect there is not a gift to an annuitant of a sum specifically mentioned, but it is a direction to set apart a capital sum, and what is given, and what the person to whom the income is to be paid takes, is the income of that capital sum which accrues during his life, and nothing else (c).

And where the testator shows an intention that the fund out of which the annuity is payable should be preserved whole during the life of the annuitant, and at his death go over to another person, then the corpus is not liable to make up the deficiency of the income of the fund to pay the annuity. Thus, where a testator devised certain real estates to trustees in trust to receive the rents and profits, and thereout to pay to his wife the clear annuity of 200l. during her life, and from and immediately after the decease of his wife, upon trust to convey the estates to his three sisters. It was held by Lord Cottenham, C. (d), that the annuity was a charge only on the rents which accrued during the life of the widow, and not on the corpus (e).

Where an annuitant acquiesced in a reduced payment during her whole life without asserting her right to be paid the full annuity by resorting to the corpus, and stood by allowing dealings to take place on the faith that the corpus was not liable to diminution, it

(a) See Birch v. Sherratt, L. R. 2 Ch. 644; Re Mason, 8 C. D. 411; Phillips v. Gutteridge, 3 De G. & J. 531; Stamper v. Pickering, 9 Si. 176; Ex p. Wilkinson, 3 De G. & Sm. 633; Playfair v. Cooper, 17 B. 187; Percy v. P., 35 B. 295; Re Howarth, (1909) 2 Ch. 19; Perkins v. Cooke, 2 J. & H. 393; and see Carter v. Salt, 1 Ir. R. Eq. 97; Bell v. B., 6 Ir. R. Eq. 239; Wormald v. Muzeen, 50 L. J. Ch. 776; (1881) W. N., p. 83.

(b) Baker v. B., 6 H. L. Cas. 616; see A.-G. v. Poulden, 3 Ha. 555; Miller v. Huddlestone, 3 Mac. & G. 513; Michell v. Wilton, 20 Eq. 269.

(c) Per Sir G. Jessel, M.R., in Re Mason, 8 C. D. 411.

(d) Foster v. Smith, 1 Ph. 629, applied in Re Boden, (1907) 1 Ch. 132.

(e) See also Earle v. Bellingham, 24 B. 445; Addecott v. A., 29 B. 460; Baker v. B., 6 H. L. Cas. 616; Tarbottom v. Earle, 11 W. R. 680; Sheppard v. S., 32 B. 194; Forbes v. Richardson, 11 Ha. 354; Darbon v. Rickards, 14 Si. 537; Re Kelly, 9 Ir. Ch. R. 103; Taylor v. T., 17 Eq. 324; Michell v. Wilton, 20 Eq. 269.

was held that her representatives could not enforce a claim to any arrears of the annuity (a).

Where an annuity is charged upon real (b) or personal (c) property, the corpus is ordinarily liable for the arrears (d), even although there be a subsequent declaration in the will that the annuity is to abate in favour of another annuity in the event of the income of the property being insufficient to pay both (e). Secus, where there is a trust to pay the annuities out of the growing profits (f).

The statement that where there is a general and indefinite trust to receive rents and profits for the payment of an annuity, it amounts to an indefinite charge of the annuity on the corpus, which will consequently be payable out of it, is too general to be of practical value. The words of each will must be followed (g). Where an annuity is charged on corpus, there is a discretionary equitable jurisdiction to order a sale or mortgage to raise arrears (h).

An annuity may, according to the construction of a will, be held to be after the death of the annuitant a continuing charge upon rents and profits, until the arrears of the annuity are paid, but not a charge upon the corpus (i).

Where the bequest of an annuity is accompanied with a direction to set apart a fund to secure it, the annuitant is not entitled as against residuary legatees to have the capitalised value of the annuity paid to him (k), but he is so entitled where the contest is between himself and pecuniary legatees (l).

A specific sum to be spent in the purchase of an annuity, whether the annuity be in possession or reversion, will however vest in the annuitant (m), and under a general direction for purchase, the

- (a) Upton v. Vanner, 1 Dr. & Sm. 594.
- (b) Picard v. Mitchell, 14 B. 103; Byam v. Sutton, 19 B. 556; Howarth v. Rothwell, 30 B. 516; and see cases cited, ibid., p. 519 (n).
 - (c) Gordon v. Bowden, 6 Madd. 342.
 - (d) Swallow v. S., 1 B. 432 (n).
 - (e) Pearson v. Helliwell, 18 Eq. 411.
- (f) Philipps v. P., 8 B. 193; Miller v. Huddlestone, 3 Mac. & G. 513, 530; Hindle v. Taylor, 20 B. 109; Addecott v. A., 29 B. 460; Salvin v. Weston, 14 W. R. 757.
- (g) Phillips v. Gutteridge, 4 De G. & J. 531; see Re Boden, supra.
- (h) Re Tucker, (1893) 2 Ch. 323; and see Hambro v. H., (1894) 2 Ch. 564;

- Blackburne v. Hope Edwardes, (1901) 1 Ch. 419.
- (i) See Booth v. Coulton, L. R. 5 Ch. 684; Re Boden, (1907) 1 Ch. 132; Re Bigge, (1907) 1 Ch. 714; Re Howarth, (1909) 1 Ch. 485, varied (1909) 2 Ch. 19; Philipps v. P., 8 B. 193; Forbes v. Richardson, 11 Ha. 354; Phillips v. Gutteridge, 4 De G. & J. 531; Salvin v. Weston, 14 W. R. 757; Taylor v. T., 17 Eq. 324; Re Mason, 8 C. D. 414.
- (k) Wright v. Callender, 2 De G. M. & G. 652; and see Miner v. Baldwin, 1 Sm. & G. 522.
 - (l) Re Cottrell, (1910) 1 Ch. 402.
 - (m) Yates v. Compton, 2 P. W. 309;

annuitant is entitled to receive the money necessary (a), although there be a declaration in the will that he shall not be allowed to receive the value (b), or there be a discretionary trust to apply the annuity for the benefit of the annuitant in case of incapacity (c), or though the annuitant died before the annuity was to be purchased (d).

On a simple gift of legacies and annuities abating, donees may claim apportioned values of annuities (e). Contra where a fund is to be set aside and fall into residue (f), or the annuity is subject to determination (g); and see post, Note 14. A direction that an annuity should cease on alienation, or that the value is not to be paid to the donee, is (except in the case of a married woman) inoperative if there is no gift over (h). Where there is a gift over in case of bankruptcy or alienation, it is difficult to reconcile the cases.

It would, however, seem that where there is a bequest under which the annuitant is entitled to have an annuity purchased in his own name or the capitalised value of the annuity, a gift over or direction that the annuity is to sink into residue in the event of bankruptcy or alienation is inoperative (i). On the other hand, where the annuity is under the terms of the bequest to be vested in trustees upon trust for the benefit of the annuitant, then a direction that on alienation or bankruptcy the annuity is to cease or fall into residue or go over is operative (k). Where the bequest falls under

Barnes v. Rowley, 3 V. 305; Bayley v. Bishop, 9 V. 6; Palmer v. Craufurd, 3 Swans. 482.

- (a) Dawson v. Hearn, 1 Russ. & M. 606; Re Robbins, (1907) 2 Ch. 8; and see Ford v. Batley, 17 B. 303; Yates v. Y., 28 B. 637; Palmer v. Craufurd, 3 Swans. 482, 488; Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197; Day v. D., 1 Drew. 569.
- (b) Stokes v. Cheek, 28 B. 620; Re Mabbett, (1891) 1 Ch. 714.
 - (c) Re Browne's Will, 27 B. 324.
- (d) Re Robbins, supra, Re Brunning, (1909) 1 Ch. 277.
- (e) Wroughton v. Colquhoun, 1 De G. & Sm. 357; Carr v. Ingleby, ib., p. 362(n.); Long v. Hughes, ib., p. 364 (n.); Innes v. Mitchell, 1 Ph. 710; Heath v. Nugent, 29 B. 227; Re Ross, (1900) 1 Ch. 163; and as to the mode of valuation, Potts v. Smith, 8 Eq. 683; Dewes v. Newington, 52 L. T. 512; Re Wil-

kins, 27 C. D. 703; Re Metcalfe, (1903) 2 Ch. 424; infra, p. 888.

- (f) Wright v. Callender, 2 De G. M. & G. 652; and see Re Grant, 52 L. J. Ch. 552; Miner v. Baldwin, 1 Sm. & G. 522.
- (g) Carr v. Ingleby, supra; not followed in Re Sinclair, (1897) 1 Ch. 921; Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Gif. 321; Hatton v. May, 3 C. D. 148.
- (h) See per Kekewigh, J., in Re Mabbett, (1891) 1 Ch. 707; and see the older cases, Day v. D., 1 Drew. 569; Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197; Re Browne's Will, 27 B. 324.
- (i) Hunt-Foulston v. Furber, 3 C.
 D. 285; and see Re Mabbett, (1891)
 1 Ch. 707; cf. Re Dugdale, 38 C. D. 176.
- (k) Power v. Hayne, 8 Eq. 262;
 Hatton v. May, 3 C. D. 148; Re Draper,
 57 L. J. Ch. 942, in which cases Day v.
 D. 1 Drew. 569, 22 L. J. Ch. 878,
 was not followed.

the former head and the annuitant survives the testator but dies before the annuity is purchased, his personal representatives will be entitled to the money to be laid out, but where it falls under the latter head they will not be so entitled (a).

But in a case where there was a bequest by will of annuities charged on land, and subject thereto a devise on trust for sale, and a discretionary power given by codicil to purchase Government annuities for the annuitants, it was held that the legal personal representative of an annuitant who died after a contract for sale by the trustees, but before completion of the sale, was not entitled to the sum that would have been spent in purchasing his annuity, but that the representatives of an annuitant who died after completion were so entitled (b).

And where there is a discretionary trust to purchase an annuity, advances to the legatee from time to time may be made by the trustees. Thus where a bequest was made of a share of a residue upon trust to pay the income to A. for life, with a proviso that it should be lawful for the trustees, if they should think it desirable, to purchase with such share for the benefit of A. an irredeemable annuity. No annuity was purchased, but the acting trustee paid A. sums out of the capital of the shares. The power was held well exercised, and the remaindermen on the death of C. only entitled to so much of the share as was undisposed of (c).

Where a testator has entered into a covenant to pay an annuity, the annuitant is not entitled to have the estate or a portion of it sold for the purpose of obtaining payment of the value of the annuity in a gross sum (d). Apparently the burden of such an annuity is borne as between the tenant for life if a residue and the remaindermen proportionally to the respective values of their interests at the testator's death. The authorities are conflicting (e).

6.—Whether Bequests contained in a Residuary Clause are Specific or General. Bequest of a Residue when Specific.

A bequest of personalty in a residuary clause, even though comprised in the same sentence with a general devise of realty (which is

- (a) Barnes v. Rowley, 3 V. 305; Palmer v. Craufurd, 3 Swans. 482; Power v. Hayne, 8 Eq. 262.
 - (b) Re Mabbett, (1891) 1 Ch. 707.
 - (c) Messeena v. Carr, 9 Eq. 260.
 - (d) Yates v. Y., 28 B. 637.
- (e) See Yates v. Y., supra, Re Dawson, (1906) 2 Ch. 211; Re Perkins, (1907) 2 Ch. 596; Re Thompson, (1908)

. N.195; Re Poyser, (1910) W.N.189; sed vide Re Bacon, (1693) 62 L. J. Ch. 445; Re Henry, (1907) 1 Ch. 30.

specific) is ordinarily a general and not a specific legacy (a), and, as we have before seen, it is not the less general because it is either preceded or followed by an enumeration of some of the particular articles of which it may consist, ante p. 835. Where a part of a general residuary bequest is affected by a trust, created by the testator in a non-testamentary instrument assented to by the legatee that part is to be deemed as if bequeathed specifically for purposes of administration (b).

If, however, the bequest be restricted to property in a particular locality it will be specific. Thus, if a testator bequeaths "all the residue of my personal estate in the island of Jamaica" (c), in a particular county (d), or room (e), or at a particular place (f), the legacy will be specific. A fortiori, where there is a gift of plate, linen, and furniture in a particular house, or which shall be therein at the time of the testator's decease (g).

The question, whether a bequest contained in a residuary clause is specific or general, is of much importance where the attempt is made to shift the primary liability of the personalty upon realty (h): and where the personal estate comprised in such clause consists of property of a wasting nature, as long annuities and leaseholds, and is given to persons in succession, see *Howe* v. *Earl of Dartmouth*, ante (p. 68).

7. Effect of the Wills Act upon Specific Bequests.

Previous to the Wills Act (i), a bequest of "my stock," "my shares," or "the black horses I now have," would be specific, and would pass only such stocks, shares, or black horses as the testator possessed at the time when he made his will, the time of the making of the will in absence of a contrary intention expressed by the testator, being the time for ascertaining the extent of the specific bequest (k).

Where, however, even previous to the Wills Act, bequests were made rendering the time for the ascertainment of the legacies the time of the death of the testator, they were nevertheless specific.

- (a) Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 V. 138; ante, p. 68.
 - (b) Re Maddock, (1902) 2 Ch. 220.
- (c) Nisbett v. Murray, 5 V. -149; Robinson v. Webb, 17 B. 260.
 - (d) Moore v. M., 1 Bro. Ch. 127.
- (e) Green v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.).
- (f) Sayer v. S., 2 Vern. 688, S. C., Pr. Ch. 392.
- (g) Gayre v. G., 2 Vern. 538; Shaftsbury v. S., ibid., 747; Land v. Devaynes, 4 Bro. Ch. 537; and see Re Stamford (Earl), 22 T. L. R. 632.
- (h) See Ancaster v. Mayer, ante, p. 1.
 - (i) 1 Vict. c. 26.
- (k) Kirby v. Potter, 4 V. 748; Humphreys v. H., 2 Cox, 184; Miller v. Little, 2 B. 259.

Thus a bequest of "any stock-in-trade of wines and spirituous liquors which I shall be possessed of at the time of my death" (a), of "all the horses which I may have in my stable at the time of my death" (b) were specific. In one case of a legacy of stock ascertainable at death it was held that such legacy was not specific since it was incapable of ademption (c). This case, however, must be considered as overruled, and contrary to the whole current of authorities, and, as observed by Jessel, M.R., "A specific legacy cannot be subject to ademption when the time of the death is the time for the ascertainment; for a man does not live after his own death, and therefore there is no period at which ademption can taken place" (d).

The question has been frequently raised, how far the Wills Act has affected specific bequests.

Now by the Wills Act it is enacted "that every will shall be construed with reference to the real and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will" (sect. 24). The cases upon this subject are very fully discussed in the important case of Bothamley v. Sherson (supra). There a testator, by will in 1869, made a bequest of all "my shares of stock in the Midland Railway Company" to trustees upon certain trusts. Jessel, M.R., held that it was a specific legacy. "No doubt," said his lordship, "one class of specific bequests is affected by the Act, namely, the class of specific bequests described as generic, that is, a specific bequest which points to a class of objects given by the testator, and which from their nature would not naturally be referable to the date of the instrument. A good illustration of this class of bequests is a gift 'of my household There are very few persons not in articulo mortis who would not expect that some articles of household furniture would wear out, or be broken, or otherwise be parted with, and be replaced by other articles of a similar kind. It would not be natural to assume that a man giving that kind of legacy intended to restrict it to the property of that description which he had at the date of the will. It had been held in Goodlad v. Burnett (e), and in some other cases to which reference has been made, that in cases of that description the new law brings down the specific bequest to the date

⁽a) Stewart v. Denton, 4 Doug. 219.

⁽b) Fontaine v. Tyler, 9 Price, 98; and see Stephenson v. Dowson, 3 B. 342.

⁽d) Bothamley v. Sherson, 20 Eq. 309, 310.

d see Stephenson v. Dowson, 3 B. 342. (e) 1 K. & J. 341; see Re Gillins, (1909) (c) Parrott v. Worsfold, 1 J. & W. 594. 1 Ch. 345; Re M'Afee, (1909) 1 Ir. R. 124.

of the death; in other words, the new law makes a specific bequest of 'my furniture,' to mean not 'the furniture which belongs to me at the time of making this my will,' but 'the furniture which shall belong to me at the time of my death.' Legacies expressed in both ways were specific before the Wills Act, and they equally remain specific now. On this point there is an authority with which I entirely agree, but which would be binding upon me even if I did not agree with it" (a).

There a testator, after reciting that his son was "now indebted" to him in various sums of money in respect of advances, and that he was desirous that his son should be released from the said several sums, and that the securities held in respect thereof should be given up to him, bequeathed to his son all the aforesaid several moneys, with the securities then in the testator's custody relating thereto, and also released him from all claims in respect of the aforesaid moneys, and "all other moneys due from him to the testator." By a codicil the testator released the son from another specified debt for moneys misappropriated by the son. It was held by the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Malins, V.-C. (c), that the will must be construed as speaking from the death of the testator, and that the son was released from the repayment of money advanced to him by the testator, between the date of his codicil and of his death.

So in a bequest of "all my ready money, bank and other shares, freehold property * * * and any other property I may now possess," it was held by Lord *Romilly*, M.R., that personal estate acquired subsequently to the date of the will passed by the bequest (d).

Secus, if the words referring to present possession or title are an essential part of the description. Thus in $Re\ Champion\ (e)$, the will devised lands "now in my own occupation;" by codicil testator confirmed his will; lands purchased between date of will and codicil were held to pass. So in $Cole\ v.\ Scott\ (f)$, the testator gave "all the estates of which I am now seised or possessed;" and used the word "now" in other parts of the will, clearly alluding to the time

(a) See also Lady Langdale v. Briggs, 8 De G. M. & G. 391; Trinder v. T., 1 Eq. 695; Morrice v. Aylmer, L. R. 16 Ch. 148; Douglas v. D., Kay, 400; Moore v. Madden, 2 Ir. R. Eq. 511; Beahan v. B., 3 Ir. R. Eq. 427; Ferguson v. F., 6 Ir. R. Eq. 199; Corbet v. C., 7 Ir. R. Eq. 456; Castle v. Fox, 11 Eq. 542;

Re Earl's Trust, 4 K. & J. 673; Re Ord, 9 C. D. 667, 12 C. D. 22; and Re Champion, (1893) 1 Ch. 101.

- (b) 7 C. D. 428.
- (c) Reported 6 C. D. 122.
- (d) Wagstaff v. W., 8 Eq. 229.
- (e) (1893) 1 Ch. 101.
- (f) 1 M. & G. 518.

at which he was making his will; it was held that he had indicated a contrary intention so as to prevent after-acquired estates passing, and it was laid down that the effect of the Wills Act is to extend to real estate the same rule of construction as to the time from which the will is to be construed as speaking as that which before the Act was applied where the gift was of personalty. So a devise of "my Quendon Hall estates" was confined to estates answering the description at the date of the will (a). In Re Bridger (b), Davey, L.J., said, "If the words describe a particular property which the testator had at the date of his will, that and that alone will pass. To this effect also was the decision of this Court in Re Portal and Lamb (c), where the Court differed from Kay, J., in the Court below, not on the law but on the construction of the language. But where the specific gift is generic, as 'all my lands in the parish of Dale,' it will by force of the Wills Act pass all the testator's lands in that parish at the time of his death."

But where there is a bequest of a distinct and specific thing, and not of a genus, there is a sufficient indication of a "contrary intention" to exclude the operation of the rule established by the 24th section of the Wills Act, and to limit the operation of the will to the state of things existing at the date of the will.

Hence, if a testator, after bequeathing a specific thing, as stock, or a horse, or a picture, were to sell it, the legacy being thereby adeemed, nothing would pass to the legatee, although the testator before his death purchased similar stock, a horse or a picture of the same kind (d). Thus a testator being at the time possessed of 1,000l. "guaranteed stock" in the North British Railway, bequeathed to his son "my one thousand North British Railway Preference Shares." After making his will, he sold his North British guaranteed stock, and died possessed of shares and stock in the North British Railway, acquired by several successive purchases, exceeding the amount bequeathed to his son. It was held by Wood, V.-C., that the bequest, being of a specific thing, which had been adeemed, and was not in the testator's possession at the time of his death, a contrary intention, so as to exclude the operation of 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 24, sufficiently appeared upon the will, and that the son was not entitled to have his legacy satisfied out of the North British Railway shares and stocks in the testator's possession at the time of his

⁽a) Webb v. Byng, 1 K. & J. 580.

⁽b) (1894) 1 Ch. 302.

 $^{1~\}mathrm{Ch}.~345$; and see p. 839, supra.

⁽d) Re Gibson, 2 Eq. 669.

⁽c) 30 C. D. 50, see Re Gillins, (1909)

death. "Suppose," said his Honour, "a man to have, at the date of his will, a picture of the Holy Family, by some inferior artist, and to give by his will 'my Holy Family.' He afterwards disposes of this picture, and subsequently acquires by purchase or gift a very much better one, on the same subject, painted by an eminent artist. Would it not be a monstrous construction to hold, that the picture existing in the testator's possession at the time of his death would pass? When there is a clearly indicated intention upon the face of the will, to give the single specific thing and nothing else, it would be a very narrow construction of the words of section 24 of the Wills Act, to hold that you must sweep in everything to which the words might be held to apply, without the slightest reference to the state of things existing at the date of the will. It is true that the testator had not at the date of his will 1,000 shares, but 1,000 guaranteed stock. But he had nothing else to which the words of the will could be applied, and no one could doubt that this stock was the thing pointed out by the will. After the date of his will he sold this 1,000l. stock, and purchased not uno ictu, but bit by bit a number of other shares or stock. This bit-by-bit purchase would not come within the reasoning of Lord Hardwicke in Avelyn v. Ward (a), as being a substitution of one entire fund for another. On the contrary, it was rather like the purchase of some totally different article * * * I adhere to my view, that where there is a distinct reference to a distinct and specific thing, and not to a genus, there is sufficient indication of 'a contrary intention,' to exclude the operation of the rule established by the 24th section of the Wills Act, and limit the operation of the will to the state of things existing at the date of the will. In this case, the testator, at the time of his death had not this specific stock in any shape. He had parted with it, and acquired by subsequent purchase a much larger number of shares. subsequent purchases were not in any shape a replacing of the original fund, and there is nothing to lead the Court to suppose that, having once adeemed the specific bequest, the testator had replaced the identical thing. He has distinctly referred to one thing in his will, which was no longer in existence at the time of his death: that thing, and that only, can be considered as the subject of the bequest. I must, therefore, hold that the claim of the son to have his legacy satisfied out of the New Guaranteed North British Stock existing at the testator's death, fails "(b).

⁽a) 1 Ves. Sen. 420. K. 12; Sidney v. S., 17 Eq. 65, sed (b) See also Pattison v. P., 1 My. & vide Castle v. Fox, 11 Eq. 542; see

In Castle v. Fox (a), Malins, V.-C., says: "Suppose a testator has a house in Grosvenor Square, and he says in his will, 'I give my house in Grosvenor Square,' then suppose he sells the house he had at the date of his will and buys another in Grosvenor Square, my opinion is, and I have not a doubt about it, that under that general description, 'my house in Grosvenor Square,' the house would pass. The Legislature says: 'I must read the will as if it were made immediately before the death of the testator.' Doing that, I find he has a house in Grosvenor Square, and that must necessarily pass." But these dicta are inconsistent with the decisions in Re Gibson (supra), Cole v. Scott (supra), and in Re Portal & Lamb (b). In the latter case the Court of Appeal held that the words of the section did not prevent the Court from giving effect to what appeared to be the meaning of the devise in the will. There the question arose between specific and residuary devisees. The testator devised to G. for life his cottage, and all his land at S., and made a residuary devise of his other real estate. At the date of his will he was possessed of a cottage and 22 acres of rough land at S. subsequently purchased a large house and other land at S. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the cottage and 22 acres of rough land passed by the specific devise, the large house and other land at S. under the residuary devise. Lindley, L.J., further said: "Section 24 of the Wills Act, which provides that a will shall speak as to the real and personal estate comprised in it from the day of the testator's death, leaves open the question whether a particular property passes by the specific or the residuary devise."

But nothing will pass as a specific legacy, unless the testator has actually acquired it before the time of his death. Thus, if a testator, who has made a specific bequest of all the money in the public funds of which he may die possessed, gives instructions to his broker to purchase stock, but no stock is purchased until after the death of the testator, it will not pass by his will, even though the broker may in his books have given him credit for the stock (c); but if the broker had entered into a contract for the purchase of the stock before the testator's death, the vendor would be held a trustee of the stock for the testator, and it would consequently pass by his will (d). The result would be the same where the broker was the owner of the stock, and gave the owner credit for the amount in

also per Kay, J., in Re Gray, 36 C. D.,

p. 205; see at p. 207.

⁽a) 11 Eq. 542.

⁽b) 30 C. D. 50, see p. 857, supra.

⁽c) Thomas v. T., 27 B. 537.

⁽d) Thomas v. T., 27 B. 541.

his books (a). And see as to the effect of sect. 23, post, p. 871; and as to property subject to a power of appointment, post, pp. 871 et seq.

8. Legatee's Right of Selection.

If a testator bequeaths to a legatee a given number of articles, forming part of a stock of articles of the same description; as, for instance, if he has twenty horses in his stable, and bequeaths six of them, or if he has three houses in a street, and he devises two of them, the legatee has the right of selection (b).

Upon the same principle, if a testator has shares in an undertaking, part of which are fully paid up, and part partially paid up, and he bequeaths a certain number of them specifically, the specific legatee has the option of selecting those shares that are fully paid up, even although the shares are given to trustees in trust for the legatee (c). But this right of selection does not exist where the will shews that the testator intended to give some particular property to the legatee, for the selection by the testator is incompatible with the right of selection in the legatee (d).

A gift to a legatee of such parts of property of a particular kind, as for instance plate, as he may signify his intention to possess, in effect amounts to a gift of the whole, for it has been said that, following the words of the will literally, the legatee might take the whole of the plate with the exception of one article probably of no value, and then the maxim $de\ minimis\ would\ apply\ (e)$.

9. Gifts to be applied (1) for Particular Object, or (2) at Discretion for Benefit of Legatee.

As regards gifts to trustees, either (1) to apply in a particular mode directed by the testator for the benefit of the legatee, or (2) with discretionary power to apply for the benefit of the legatee, if no other person is interested, it has been frequently held the legatee or

- (a) Ellis v. Eden, 25 B. 482.
- (b) Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. 435; Richards v. R., 9 Price, 226; Kennedy v. K., 10 Ha. 438; Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 My. & K. 571; Duckmanton v. D., 5 H. & N. 219, 29 L. J. Ex. 132; Tapley v. Eagleton, 12 C. D. 683; Asten v. A., infra; Re Cheadle, infra.
 - (c) Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll.
- 435; and see Millard v. Bailey, 1 Eq. 378.
- (d) Asten v. A., (1894) 3 Ch. 260; Re Cheadle, (1900) 2 Ch. 620.
- (e) Arthur v. Mackinnon, 11 C. D. 385; approved C. A. in Re Sharland, W. N., (1896) 62, 74 L. T. 664, distinguishing Kennedy v. K., 10 Ha. 438.

his assigns can claim the property free from the discretion or restrictions. As to (1): The rule has thus been stated (a): "There is no doubt that if the main object of the gift is to benefit the person who is to take, and no other person is interested in the bequest, in such a case, if the gift cannot be applied to the purposes specified, or if the legatee prefers to have it otherwise applied, he has the option of saying that, although the testator has expressly desired that the benefit should be conferred in a particular form, and he does not like to take it in that manner, he may ask the Court to give him the property absolutely. On the other hand, if there is another purpose distinctly and clearly expressed, independent of the object of benefiting the legatee and beyond the mere intimation of a wish as to the mode in which the benefit shall be conferred there, it is settled the principle does not apply." The question in every case is, therefore, which is the dominant object, the benefit of the legatee, or the manner of benefiting him mentioned in the bequest?

This test has been applied in a variety of cases and the legatee held entitled, e.g., where the legacy is for the apprenticeship of an infant, and the infant dies before he is of competent age to be put out (b), or to put an infant into holy orders and he becomes a lunatic (c), or to purchase a commission or promotion for the legatee and this becomes impossible, impracticable, or undesirable (d), or to pay off a mortgage which is foreclosed (e). So also where the interest of a fund was bequeathed to pay the rents due on specifically bequeathed leaseholds, and the leaseholds being a damnosa hereditas were sold by order of the Court, the legatees of the leaseholds were held entitled to the interest of the fund (f). Similarly where very wide discretionary powers over a fund are given to trustees in favour of some person, the inference has been drawn that the person was entitled absolutely to the fund, though the discretion be not exercised or the death of the person in question makes the exercise of the discretion impossible (g).

On the other hand, the power may be held to be in effect merely one of advancement, and the beneficiary can claim nothing unless

- (a) Per Wood, V.-C., in Re Skinner's Trusts, 1 John & H. 102.
 - (b) Barlow v. Grant, 1 Vern. 255.
 - (c) Barton v. Cooke, 5 V. 461.
- (d) Lecke v. Lord Kilmorey, T. &R. 207; Palmer v. Flower, 13 Eq. 250.
 - (e) Lockhart v. Hardy, 9 B. 379.
 - (f) Lonsdale (Earl) v. Berchtoldt
- (Countess), 3 K. & J. 185; and see Strathmore v. Vane, (1896) 1 Ch. 507; Mexborough (Earl of) v. Savile, 88 L. T. 131.
- (g) Gude v. Worthington, 3 De G. & Sm. 389; Gough v. Bult, 16 Si. 45; cf. Re Stanger, 60 L. J. Ch. 326; Re Johnston, (1894) 3 Ch. 204.

the power is exercised (a), though the Court will, if necessary, enquire as to whether the occasion for its exercise has arisen (b).

The same principle applies to a direction for accumulation of income or for deferring payment of a legacy after twenty-one (c).

As to (2), where a discretionary power is vested in trustees to apply for the benefit of a legatee, no other person being interested, nor power given to withhold part of the fund.

In such case it is clear that the discretion may be determined by the legatee or his aliences. Thus where there was a trust of a sum to be invested for the benefit of a son of the testator on attaining 21, and applied as the trustees in their discretion might think fit, it was held that the son was absolutely entitled to the legacy free from the discretionary power of the trustees (d). And if the legatee becomes bankrupt the property subject to the trust will pass to his trustee in bankruptcy (e).

Different considerations apply where the modern form of discretionary trust is employed and trustees are empowered to apply the capital or income of a fund for the benefit of a number of persons at their discretion. The leading modern authority upon this point is $Re\ Coleman(f)$, where there was a direction to trustees to apply income "in and towards the maintenance, education, and advancement" of the children in such manner as they should deem most expedient until the youngest of the children attained 21. There being four children, it was held that the assignee of one of them, J. S. Coleman, was entitled to nothing except what the trustees chose in their discretion to pay. Cotton, L.J., says(g): "This is not a void attempt to make shares given to children inalienable, so as to exclude their creditors; it is a power to the trustees to give to each child what they think fit; and if they cannot altogether exclude a a child who has become bankrupt or assigned his interest, they can

⁽a) Re Ward's Trusts, L. R. 7 Ch. 727, distinguishing Palmer v. Flower, supra.

⁽b) Lewis v. L., 1 Cox, 162; Robinson v. Cleator, 15 V. 526.

⁽c) Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. & Ph. 240; Gosling v. G., John. 272; Wharton v. Masterman, (1895) A. C. 186, and cases there cited; and see Re Travis, (1900) 2 Ch. 541.

⁽d) Re Johnston, (1894) 3 Ch. 208.

⁽e) Green v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; Younghusband v. Gisborne, 1 Coll. 400; Piercy v. Roberts, 1 My. & K. 4; Snowdon v. Dales, 6 Si. 524; Godden v. Crowhurst, 10 Si. 642; but see Re Bullock, 39 W. R. 472; 64 L. T. 736; 60 L. J. Ch. 341; and cf. Re Fitzgerald, (1904) 1 Ch. 573.

⁽f) 39 C. D. 443; Godden v. Crowhurst, 10 Si. 642.

⁽g) 39 C. D. at p. 451.

allot to him as little as they think desirable. Then does the assignment include every benefit which the trustees give to J. S. Coleman out of the income? I think not. If the trustees were to pay an hotel keeper to give him a dinner he would get nothing but the right to eat a dinner, and that is not property which could pass by assignment or bankruptcy. But if they pay or deliver money or goods to him, or appropriate money or goods to be paid or delivered to him, the money or goods would pass by the assignment."

In the earlier cases the principle now recognised in Re Coleman, supra, was not fully applied, and the assignee in bankruptcy where there was a trust for the benefit of the bankrupt, his wife and children, was held entitled to so much of the income as was not on enquiry found to be necessary for the support of the wife and children of the bankrupt (a).

It is questionable how far these cases are reconcilable with the decision in *Re Coleman*, supra, but in all cases of this nature the question turns on whether the receipt of any benefit by the cestui que trust is subject to the discretion of the trustee. If it is so subject, then he has no interest which he can assign or which will pass to the trustee in his bankruptcy, but income or property handed over to him by the trustees will, if it is property passing on bankruptcy, pass to his trustee in bankruptcy if in excess of the amount required for his support (b).

Where the trustees have discretion to pay or apply the whole or any "part" of the income for the benefit of the legatee it has been held that the receiver in bankruptcy of the legatee could claim nothing from them (c).

Where the discretionary trust takes effect, the difficult practical question consequently arises:—What may the trustees do for any object of the discretionary trust who has become bankrupt or alienated his interest (d)?

In Re Neil (e), there was a trust to apply the whole or any part of income or accumulations for the support, maintenance, or education, or otherwise for the benefit of a son, his wife, and children, as the trustees in their discretion should think fit.

- (a) Kearsley v. Woodcock, 3 Ha. 185; Page v. Way, 3 B. 20; Wallace v. Anderson, 16 B. 533; and see Rippon v. Norton, 2 B. 63, disapproved in Re Coleman, 39 C. D. at p. 448.
 - (b) Re Ashby, Ex p. Wreford,
- (1892) 1 Q. B. at p. 877.
- (c) Reg. v. Judge of County Court, &c., 20 Q. B. D. 167.
- (d) See per Cotton, L.J., in Re Coleman, supra.
 - (e) 62 L. T. 649.

The son assigned his interest, and after notice of the assignment the trustees continued to make payment to the son, and it was held by Kekewich, J., that money paid to him or any person on his behalf, excluding the special case put by Cotton, L.J., in $Re\ Coleman$ (supra) was necessarily part of his beneficial interest and that the trustees were liable to repay such amount to the assignee (a). Presumably until intervention by the trustee in bankruptcy the receipt of the beneficiary would be a sufficient discharge against the trustee in bankruptcy (b).

10. Ademption of Legacies.

The term ademption is used in two entirely distinct senses.

- (1) As employed with reference to general legacies it is used where the claims of the legace to the legacy are in equity deemed to be barred by a portion subsequently given him by the testator. It only applies where the testator stands in loco parentis to the legatee and rests upon a presumed intention that the portion was given in satisfaction of the legacy.
- (2) As employed with reference to specific legacies it denotes the fact that a specific legacy is as a general rule extinguished by its subject-matter ceasing to exist or losing its identity by being converted into a new form.

Thus a legacy of specific chatfels will be adeemed upon their total loss or destruction during the life of, or at the same time as the death of, the testator, even though they may have been insured, and their value recovered from the insurers, for the insurance money will vest in the executors as part of the residuary estate (c).

The mere republication of a will (d), or the confirmation of a will by a codicil, will not revive a legacy adeemed in the interval (e).

Ademption here is in no way dependent upon the intention of the testator upon the existence of an animus adimendi; it is a legal consequence of the change in identity of the subject-matter (f).

- (a) And cf. Re Ashby, (1892) 1 Q. B. 872.
- (b) See Wace on Bankruptcy, p. 188; and see Re Bullock, 39 W. R. 472; 64 L. T. 736; 60 L. J. Ch. 341, discussed at length in the previous edition of this work, Vol. I., p. 818; and cf. Re Fitzgerald, (1904) 1 Ch. 573.
- (c) See Durrant v. Friend, 5 De G. & Sm. 343
- (d) Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. Sen. 626; Monck v. M., 1 Ball. & B. 300.
- (e) Cowper v. Mantell, 22 B. 223; and see Montague v. M., 15 B. 565; Sidney v. S., 17 Eq. 65, 68; Hopwood v. H., 7 H. L. Cas. 728.
- (f) Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox, 180; Re Slater, (1907) 1 Ch. £65 at p 671.

When the change is, however, caused by the illegal or unauthorised acts of third persons there will be no ademption. Thus where stock specifically bequeathed has been transferred by fraud or practice, on purpose to disappoint the legacy; or by tortious act, unknown to the testator (a), or without his consent (b), or if he die before the authority given to his agents to transfer be carried into effect (c)—in all these cases there will be no ademption.

Where a person, after making by his will specific bequests, becomes insane, and other persons without authority dispose of the things so bequeathed, the question arises whether they will be thereby adeemed.

As a general rule, the unauthorised acts of parties will not effect a conversion so as to disappoint the specific legatees of a person who became insane after making his will (d).

Where personal property, specifically bequeathed by a person who afterwards became a lunatic, was sold under an order of the Court of Chancery in Lunacy, which did not preserve the rights of the legatees, it was held that the bequest was adeemed (e).

The following are some of the more important classes of cases in which the question of ademption arises in practice.

Specific Legacies of Goods in a particular House or Place.

Here, if the goods are removed during the life of the testator from the house or place named, whether the legacy is or is not adeemed would now seem to depend upon whether the mention of the house or place is simply for the identification of the goods bequeathed, or whether the enjoyment of the goods is connected with the user of the house. In the former case removal will not cause ademption (f), in the latter case, if the removal is permanent and authorised by the testator there will be ademption. If the bequest is of certain goods which shall be in a certain place at the testator's decease, permanent removal will again adeem the legacy (g).

- (a) Shaftesbury v. S., 2 Vern. 747, 748, (n.) 2; Domvile v. Taylor, 32 B. 604.
 - (b) Basan v. Brandon, 8 Si. 171.
- (c) Basan v. Brandon, 8 Si. 171; Harrison v. Asher, 2 De G. & Sm. 436.
- (d) See Taylor v. T., 10 Ha. 475; Jenkins v. Jones, 2 Eq. 323; Re Larking, 37 C. D. 310; and see and cf. Browne v. Groombridge, 4 Madd. 495.
 - (e) See Jones v. Green, 5 Eq. 555;
- observed upon in Re Freer, 22 C. D. 622, qu. whether such a sale would now adeem, see Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 123; and cf. Re Wood, (1894) 2 Ch. 577.
- (f) Cunningham v. Ross, 2 Cas. temp. Lee. 272; Norris v. N., 2 Coll. C. C. 719; Norreys v. Franks, 9 Ir. R. Eq. 18; see Re Dennis, 24 T. L. R.
- (g) Shaftesbury v. S., 2 Vern. 747; Heseltine v. H., 3 Madd.

A mere temporary or accidental removal may not amount to an ademption. Thus, in Land v. Devaynes (a), a testator gave all his plate and linen in his house in S. (with the lease) to his wife. He had but one set of plate and linen, which was usually removed, with the family, from house to house. The plate happened to be at B., the country house, at his death, yet it passed to the wife.

So likewise, under a bequest of household furniture, pictures, and books, which might be at the testator's decease in, upon, or about his mansion, it has been held, that pictures removed from the mansion, and in the hands of a picture-cleaner to be cleaned, and books sent to be repaired, passed, but articles purchased for the mansion, and not sent home at the testator's decease did not pass (b).

So ademption has been held not to take place by the removal for safe custody of jewellery (c) or plate to a banker's (d); or of furniture and other articles to a warehouse (e).

So it seems that ademption will not take place if the goods are removed on account of a fire. "They should be considered," says Lord Hardwicke, "as being in the testator's house at his death, and the legacy is not defeated by that accident" (f).

A distinction has been taken by Lord Hardwicke between a legacy of goods on board a ship and in a house, although he knew of no case of the kind; he thought that the bequest of goods on board a ship must be supposed to be made with consideration of the several contingencies and accidents they were liable to (g).

Specific Legacies of Debts.

If a *debt*, specifically bequeathed, be received by the testator, whether it is paid voluntarily or under compulsion, it will be adeemed, for there exists nothing for the will to operate upon (h), and a partial receipt of a debt will, as was held by Lord *Thurlow*, in the principal case, only be an ademption *pro tanto* (i).

276; Colleton v. Garth, 6 Si. 19; Spencer v. S., 21 B. 548; Blagrave v. Coore, 27 B. 138; and see Green v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129 (n.).

- (a) 4 Bro. Ch. 537.
- (b) Lord Brooke v. Earl of Warwick,
 2 De G. & Sm. 425.
 - (c) Re Johnston, 26 C. D. 538, 551.
 - (d) Domvile v. Taylor, 32 B. 604.
 - (e) Ibid.
 - (f) Chapman v. Hart, 1 Ves. Sen.

271.

- (g) Chapman v. Hart, supra.
- (h) Rider v. Wager, 2 P. W. 329,
 330, 331; Birch v. Baker, Mos. 373;
 Badrick v. Stevens, 3 Bro. Ch. 431;
 Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox, 180; Fryer v.
 Morris, 9 V. 360; Aston v. Wood, 43
 L. J. Ch. 715; Harrison v. Jackson, 7
 C. D. 339.
- (i) Jones v. Southall, 32 B. 31; Makeown v. Ardagh, 10 Ir. R. Eq.

So a bequest of policies effected upon the life of another person by the testator will be adeemed, by his receipt of the sums insured upon the death of such person, although the sums so received may have been invested on securities in existence at the testator's death (a).

So a specific bequest of a debt due on mortgage will be adeemed by the receipt thereof, although the money may have been reinvested in a mortgage not paid off at the time of the testator's death (b).

And it has been held to be immaterial that the testator, after receiving the mortgage debt, has placed the amount to his separate account at a banker's, and has put the pass book, in which the account was credited, into the hands of the specific legatee of the debt (c).

It has been held that a specific legacy of a debt to the debtor will be adeemed by its payment, although the debtor may have incurred a fresh debt to the testator at the time of his death (d). Forgiveness of a debt is a specific legacy of the amount of the debt (e).

On a release by will to the debtor of the interest due on a specific debt up to the death of the testator it was held a specific legacy of the interest on that debt; and adeemed by payment, although interest be due upon a new debt owing to the testator at the time of his death (f). But in *Everett* v. E, (g), after a recital that a son was "now indebted," a release from the said moneys and "all other moneys due from him" was held to speak from the testator's death, and release debts accrued since the will and a codicil.

When a share to which the testator is entitled under the will of another, is paid to the testator or his trustees after the date of his will, it seems that if the testator describes the share in such a manner as to shew that he intends the gift of a particular fund under the will, on a receipt of the share the gift will be adeemed (h). Where, however,

- 445; cf. Toole v_{\bullet} Hamilton, (1901) 1 Ir. R. 383.
- (a) Barker v. Rayner, 5 Madd. 208;2 Russ. 122.
- (b) See Gardner v. Hatton, 6 Si. 93; Phillips v. Turner, 17 B. 194; Sidebotham v. Watson, 11 Ha. 170; Gale v. G., 21 B. 349; Jones v. Southall, 32 B. 31.
 - (c) Re Bridle, 4 C. P. D. 336.
- (d) See Smallman v. Goolden, 1 Cox, 329, applied in Sidney v. S., 17
- Eq. 67; Everett v. E., 7 C. D. 428, where James, L. J., at p. 432, observes that Smallman v. Goolden was decided before the Wills Act.
 - (e) Re Wedmore, (1907) 2 Ch. 277.
 - (f) Sidney v. S., 17 Eq. 65.
 - (g) 7 C. D. 428.
- (h) Harrison v. Jackson, 7 C. D. 339;
 Manton v. Tabois, 30 C. D. 92; and cf.
 Le Grice v. Finch, 3 Mer. 50; and
 Clark v. Browne, 2 Sm. & G. 524.

the construction to be put upon the will is that it amounts to a bequest of personal estate derived from the testator's interest under the will of another, in whatever form it may exist, if it be distinguishable no question of ademption arises, by reason of the testator receiving the share, and if he invests it and keeps it distinguishable from the rest of his property the legacy will take effect (a).

Specific Legacy of Stock, etc.

Where, as in the principal case, stock specifically bequeathed, has subsequently been either wholly or partially sold out by the testator, the legacy will be adeemed either wholly or pro tanto (b).

So where stock is standing in the name of a trustee at the time a testator makes a specific bequest of it, but is afterwards transferred to and sold out by him, and cannot be traced, being spent or mixed with his other moneys, the legacy will be adeemed (c); but where a testator makes a specific bequest of such stock, it will not be adeemed by a transfer after the date of the will, into his own name (c).

Where stock specifically bequeathed is sold and the same or a less amount of the same stock is subsequently purchased by the testator the legacy adeemed by the sale will not be revived by the purchase, for ademption does not depend upon the testator's intention. The question will be, Is the identical stock bequeathed by the testator in existence? And if that question is answered, as in such case it must be, in the negative, the legacy is adeemed (d).

Where, however, the thing specifically given has been changed in name and form only, and is in existence substantially the same, though in a different shape, at the time of the testator's death (e), it will not be considered as adeemed by such a nominal change. Thus, if stock is converted into a different species by Act of Parliament (f), or is merely transferred from the names of trustees into the name of

- (a) See Morgan v. Thomas, 6 C. D.
 176; see Moore v. M., 29 B. 496; Lee v. L., infra; Re Kenyons Estate, 56
 L. T. 626; cf. Toole v. Hamilton, (1901) 1 Ir. R. 383.
- (b) See Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. Sen. 562; Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. Sen. 623; Humphreys v. H., 2 Cox, 184; Birch v. Baker, Mos. 373.
 - (c) Lee v. L., 27 L. J. Ch. 824.
 - (d) Re Gibson, 2 Eq. 669; Pattison
- v. P., 1 My. & K. 12; Harrison v. Jackson, 7 C. D. 339; Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101; and see Re Lane, infra.
- (e) See per *Turner*, V.-C., in Oakes v. O., 9 Ha. 666, at p. 672.
- (f) Partridge v. P., supra; Bronsdon v. Winter, Amb. 57, 59; but see Re Slater, (1907) 1 Ch. 665, and infra, p. 869.

the testator (a), or is transferred out of the name of the testator under an order in lunacy (b), it will not be adeemed.

Upon this principle, where a testator had bequeathed all his. Great Western Railway shares, and all other the railway shares. which he might be possessed of at the time of his decease: it was held by Turner, V.-C., firstly, that the bequest was not adeemed, in consequence of the Great Western shares which the testator had at the date of his will having been converted, by a resolution of the company under the authority of an Act of Parliament, into consolidated stock, and, secondly, that consolidated stock in the same company, purchased by the testator after the date of his will, did not pass under the beguest of the Great Western Railway shares to the legatee (c). On the other hand, a legacy of the interest arising from money invested in (inter alia) stock of the Lambeth Waterworks Company was held adeemed where between the date of the will and the testator's death the undertaking of the Lambeth Waterworks Company was acquired by the Metropolitan Water Board under an Act of Parliament, and a sum of Metropolitan Water Board Stock had been issued to the testator as compensation for the stock held by him at the date of his will in the Lambeth Waterworks Company (d). The principle in Oakes v. O., supra, did not apply, for there was "an absolute annihilation or extinction of the interests in the Lambeth Waterworks Company, and a compensation awarded in the shape of an allotment of different stock in a different concern on a different footing altogether "(e).

So also where a testator having certain debentures at the date of his will, thereby gave them upon certain trusts, and after the date of the will exercised an option given to him by the company who had issued the debentures, and converted them into the *debenture stock* of the same company, it was held that the debenture stock did not pass by the will (f).

If a partner, under articles providing for the renewal of the partnership, specifically bequeath his share of the profits (naming the amount), and upon the expiration of the old, new articles are entered

by Morrice v. Aylmer, L. R. 7 H. L. 717; L. R. 10 Ch. 148.

⁽a) Dingwell v. Askew, 1 Cox, 427; Clough v. C., 3 My. & K. 296; Jones v. Southall, 32 B. 31; Lee v. L., 27 L. J. Ch. 824.

⁽b) Re Wood, (1894) 2 Ch. 577.

⁽c) Oakes v. O., supra, but this case is overruled on the second point

⁽d) Re Slater, (1907) 1 Ch. 665.

⁽e) Per Sir J. Gorell Parnes, P., ibid., at p. 675.

⁽f) Re Lane, 14 C. D. 856.

into, by which his share in the profits is altered, the legacy will not be adeemed. See *Backwell* v. *Child* (a), where Lord *Hardwicke* observed, "that, where a person in trade makes a provision out of his share for his family, and afterwards renews the partnership, by which, perhaps, his interest is varied, yet it is not a revocation; if it were, it would occasion great confusion."

Leaseholds.

Where the words of a specific bequest refer expressly to the leasehold interest which the testator then has in certain property, the legacy will be adeemed, if the testator subsequently surrender the lease in terms bequeathed, and take a new lease of the same property (b), unless perhaps the testator is merely a cestui que trust of the lease, the legal estate therein being vested in a trustee (c). Neither sect. 23 nor sect. 24 of the Wills Act, 1837, appears to affect the law as to the ademption of such bequests (d).

If the testator assigns or enters into a valid contract for the sale of the leasehold interest thus specifically bequeathed, the legacy will of course be adeemed (e).

So, where after a testator has bequeathed leaseholds, he has been served by a railway company with notice to treat for the purchase, which has been followed by a valuation of the surveyors, as that will amount to a valid contract to sell the leaseholds to the railway company, the bequest will be adeemed. The legatee, however, will be entitled to the rents of the leaseholds accruing due between the death of the testator and the completion of the purchase by the company (f).

So also the bequest of an annuity charged upon leaseholds is adeemed by an assignment upon trust of the leaseholds, though the testator reserve a power to appoint a similar annuity, and a subsequent confirmation of the will by codicil will not revive the annuity (g).

But as a testator may undoubtedly dispose of the future, as well as his present interest in a chattel real, it is a question of intention

- (a) Amb. 260; and see *Re* Russell, 19 C. D. 432.
- (b) Abney v. Miller, 2 Atk. 593; Rudstone v. Anderson, 2 Ves. Sen. 418; Hone v. Medcraft, 1 Bro. Ch. 261; Slatter v. Noton, 16 V. 197.
- (c) Carte v. C., 3 Atk. 174; S. C., Amb. 28; Ridgw. Ca. t. Hard. 210;

Slatter v. Noton, 16 V. 200.

- (d) Blake v. B., 15 C. D. 487.
- (e) Strode v. Lady Falkland, 2 Vern. 621; Yardley v. Holland, 20 Eq. 428.
 - (f) Watts v. W., 17 Eq. 217.
 - (g) Cowper v. Mantell, 22 B. 223.

what the subject of disposition is—whether only the interest which he had at the time of executing the will, or all the interest, though subsequently acquired, which he might have at his death in the leasehold premises; that intention is to be collected from the words used by the testator to express it (a).

If for instance a testator leaves "all the term and interest which I shall have to come in land held by me under a lease from A." (b), or where the old lease contains a covenant for renewal by the lessor, and the lessee bequeaths "all my right and interest under or by virtue of the lease" (c), any future interest will pass, and a partition has been held not to amount to an ademption or revocation of a previous devise of a share thereof (d). Similar rules apply to the bequest of an under lease (e).

Section 23 of the Wills Act, 1837, enacts "that no conveyance or other act, made or done subsequently to the execution of a will of or relating to any real or personal estate therein comprised, except an act by which such will shall be revoked as aforesaid, shall prevent the operation of the will with respect to such estate or interest in such real or personal estate as the testator shall have power to dispose of by will at the time of his death" (f).

It has been held that under these clauses where a testator has made a specific bequest of leaseholds, showing that he intended to describe the property and to give to the legatee any interest that he might have therein, the legacy will not be adeemed by the subsequent purchase of the fee by the testator, which, in the absence of a contrary intention expressed in the will, will pass to the legatee (g).

Powers.

Where property subject to a power of appointment has been changed after the date of a will exercising the power of appointment,

- (a) Per Lor[♠] Eldon, in Slatter v. Noton, 16 V. 198. And see Colegrave v. Manby, 6 Madd. 84.
- (b) James v. Dean, 11 V. 383, 389, 15 V. 236; Abney v. Miller, 2 Atk. 593; Colegrave v. Manby, 6 Madd. 84.
 - (c) 1 Rop. Leg. 311, 313, 3rd ed.
 - (d) Woodhouse v. Okill, 8 Si. 115.
 - (e) Porter v. Smith, 16 Si. 251.
- (f) See on construction of this section, Carson, R. P. Statutes, 2nd
- ed., p. 465; Moor v. Raisbeck, 12 Si. 139; Blake v. B., 15 C. D. 487; Re Clowes, (1893) 1 Ch. 214.
- (g) See Struthers v. S., 5 W. R. (V.-C. K.) 809; Miles v. M., 1 Eq. 462; Cox v. Bennett, 6 Eq. 422; Wedgwood v. Denton, 12 Eq. 290; Saxton v. S., 13 C. D. 359; sed vide Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sm. 722; questioned by Lord St. Leonards in his Real Property Statutes, p. 365; and see Theobald on Wills, 7th ed., p. 170.

the question may arise whether there has been a failure through ademption. The question whether the power has been exercised is one of construction, whether the power is general or special. If the testator has used words showing his intention that the property into whatever form it may be changed shall pass, then there is no ademption, but if he has specifically described the property, then only property answering that description will pass (a).

Where a testator, having given a general legacy, by a subsequent instrument makes it specific, the ademption of the specific legacy without more, will not set up the general legacy (b).

A demonstrative legacy is not liable to ademption, although the fund out of which it is payable be not in existence at the death of the testator; the primary object is the gift of the legacy; the fund out of which it is payable is merely of secondary consideration. "Thus," as observed by Lord Macclesfield, "if a legacy was given to J. S., to be paid out of such a particular debt, and there should not appear to be any such debt, or the fund fail, still the legacy ought to be paid, and the failing of the modus appointed for payment should not defeat the legacy itself" (c).

Where, however, a testator shows it to be his intention that a legatee is to be paid out of a particular fund only, upon its failure he will have no claim upon the general assets (d).

In Kermode v. Macdonald (e) where a specific legacy of 300l. of particular investments, and a pecuniary legacy of 200l. were given, followed by a direction if the personal estate were insufficient for legacies, the deficiency should be made up out of real estate and by a codicil, all the personal estate was given to another person; it was held that the specific legacy was adeemed, but that the pecuniary legacy remained a charge on the real estate. Cairns, L. C., referred to the principles in Sheddon v. Goodrich (f).

- (a) Beddington v. Baumann, (1903) A. C. 13; affirming Re Moses, (1902) 1 Ch. 100 (C. A.); Re Dowsett, (1901) 1 Ch. 398; and see Gale v. G., 21 B. 349; Blake v. B., 15 C. D. 481; Collinson v. C., 24 B. 269; Re Johnstone's Settlement, 14 C. D. 162.
 - (b) Hertford v. Lowther, 7 B. 107.
- (c) Savile v. Blacket, 1 P. W. 777—779; and see Ellis v. Walker, Amb. 310; Chaworth v. Beech, 4 V. 565; Gillaume v. Adderley, 15 V. 384;
- Smith v. Fitzgerald, 3. V. & B. 5; Mann v. Copland, 2 Madd. 223; Fowler v. Willoughby, 2 S. & S. 354; Willox v. Rhodes, 2 Russ. 452; Campbell v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; Creed v. C., 11 Cl. & Fin. 509; Williams v. Hughes, 24 B. 474.
- (d) Coard v. Holderness, 22 B. 391; and see Bristow v. B., 5 B. 289.
- (e) L. R. 3 Ch. 584, 1 Fq. 457. And see Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 V. 501.
 - (f) 8 V. 501.

11. Nature and Incidents of Specific Legacies.

Exoneration from Liabilities.

A specific legacy, as is laid down in the principal case, will not be adeemed by the testator pledging or pawning it, and the legatee will be entitled to have it redeemed by the executor; or if he fail to perform that duty, the legatee is entitled to compensation out of the general assets (a).

And it is immaterial whether the testator pledged the subject of the specific legacy for his own debt or for the debt of somebody else (b); or whether it was liable, as in the case of wine on board ship, to freight duties and insurance, which became payable on report of the ship in the testator's lifetime (c), as in both cases the legatee will be entitled to have the charge existing at the testator's death paid out of the personal estate, or to compensation.

Where a testator pledges for many more times than it is worth, a thing which he afterwards specifically bequeaths, in that case the executor would have no right to apply the personal estate in redemption, but the legatee will be entitled to compensation out of the testator's general personal estate (d).

But a specific legatee is not entitled to have the legacy redeemed or freed from the charge when the testator is supposed to give the thing as it is, and the charge upon it is really not in strictness an incumbrance, but something incident to the nature of the thing (e), as in the case of liabilities arising on covenants contained in leases or through calls being made on shares partly paid up.

Liability of Specific Legatee of Leaseholds.

The principle underlying the cases may be stated as follows: The obligation of completing the testator's interest in the lease-hold falls upon the testator's general estate, but liabilities arising under the lease after the testator's death must be discharged by the legatee (f). Thus all obligations antecedent and preparatory to the complete establishment of the relation of tenant and landlord must

- (a) Knight v. Davis, 3 My. & K. 361; Ellis v. Eden, 25 B. 482; Bothamley v. Sherson, 20 Eq. 304,
 - (b) Bothamley v. Sherson, supra.
 - (c) Stewart v. Denton, 4 Doug. 219.
 - (d) See Bothamley v. Sherson, supra.
- (e) Re Rearce, (1909) 1 Ch. 819 (uplæep of a yacht specifically bequeathed).
- (f) Armstrong v. Burnet, 20 B. 424; and see Lord *Macnaghten's* statement and criticism of the cases in Eccles v. Mills, (1898) A. C. at p. 373.

be borne by the general estate (a), as must also all fines and liabilities under covenants which had arisen before or existed at the date of the testator's death (b).

On the other hand following the maxim qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus (c), liabilities under covenants to pay rent, to repair, etc., arising after the testator's death must be borne by the specific legatee (d).

Considerable difficulty has arisen in recent times in applying the principle above stated through the construction put upon the decision in Re Courtier (e). In that case the testator bequeathed the residue of his estate which included leasehold houses held on repairing leases, upon trust for his wife for life and after her death for sale—the proceeds to be divided among four persons. widow kept up the houses in the state they were in at the testator's death, but on the remaindermen requiring her so to do, she refused to put the houses in such a state of repair as would satisfy the covenants. It was held by the C. A. that the widow tenant for life was under no liability to the remaindermen to comply with the covenants. Kekewich, J. (assuming that he was bound to do so by Re Courtier, supra), held that an equitable tenant for life under a will of leaseholds was not bound to perform covenants, execute repairs, etc., but that the cost fell upon the income of the residuary estate (f). This view was dissented from by Stirling, J. (g). The cases were considered by North, J., in Re Betty (h), where it was held that an equitable tenant for life of leaseholds was bound as between himself and the testator's general estate to perform the tenant's continuing liabilities under the lease.

It is submitted that Re Courtier, supra, has no bearing upon the question of liability as between a tenant for life of specifically bequeathed leaseholds and the residuary estate, but merely gives

- (a) Marshall v. Holloway, 5 Si. 196, as explained in Armstrong v. Burnet, supra, and Eccles v. Mills, supra; Fitzwilliams v. Kelly, 10 Ha. 266.
- (b) Fitzwilliams v. Kelly, supra; Re Betty, (1899) 1 Ch. 821.
- (c) Kingham v. K., (1897) 1 Ir. R. 170.
- (d) Ledger v. Stanton, 2 J. & H. 687; Hawkins v. H., 13 C. D. 470, see per Jessel, M. R., at p. 473.
- (e) 34 C. D. 136; see Re Parry and Hopkins, (1900) 1 Ch. 160.
 - (f) Re Baring, (1893) 1 Ch. 61.
 - (g) Re Redding, (1897) 1 Ch. 876.
- (h) (1899) 1 Ch. 821; followed by Kekewich, J., in Re Gjers, (1899) 2 Ch. 54; and see Parry v. Hopkins, (1900) 1 Ch. 160. Re Baring, supra, and Re Tomlinson, (1898) 1 Ch. 232, can no longer be considered of authority.

effect to the well-established principle as to the liability inter se of a tenant for life and remaindermen (a).

Where a testator bequeaths a policy of assurance on the life of another to persons in succession, it seems that the proper mode of paying the premiums would be to raise them by way of charge upon the policy, so that those who would eventually become entitled to the benefit of the policy, would bear the burden to the extent of their respective interests (b).

Liability for Calls on Shares.

In Armstrong v. Burnet (c), Romilly, M. R., dealing with the liability to pay calls, after reviewing the cases, stated the law in the following terms: "that where the interest of the testator in the subject-matter which he professes to bequeath, is complete, or where it is so treated and considered by him and by all persons unconnected with it, as in the case of a share in an insurance company, then the future calls fall on the legatee and not on the general personal estate; but where further payments are required to make perfect the interest which the testator professes specifically to bequeath, then the general personal estate is applicable for that purpose."

Where shares not fully paid up are specifically bequeathed, the question whether the specific legatee or the residuary estate is liable to the future calls, depends on the fact whether the calls are actually made before the testator's death; for calls made after death the specific legatee is liable (d).

Where shares which form part of a residue bequeathed as one entire fund in trust for one for life are specifially bequeathed over on the death of the tenant for life, it has been held that the specific legatees are not liable for calls made during the life of the tenant for life, but that the calls are payable out of residue (e).

- (a) See Re Parry and Hopkins, (1900)
 1 Ch. 160; Williams, Executors, 10th
 ed., p. 1357, n. (m); Kingham v. K.,
 (1897)
 1 Ir. R. 170; cf. Re Thomas,
 (1900)
 1 Ch. 319.
- (b) Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 C. D. 101, 120.
- (c) 20 B. 424, 437; and see Marshall v. Hölloway, 5 Si. 196; Wright v. Warren, 4 De G. & Sm. 367; Barry v. Harding, 1 Jo. & Lat. 475; Fitz-
- williams v. Kelly, 10 Ha. 266. See these cases discussed in Eccles v. Mills, (1898) A. C. at p. 373.
- (d) Armstrong v. Burnet, supra; Addams v. Ferick, 26 B. 384; Day v. D., 1 Dr. & Sm. 261. The cases Blount v. Hipkins, 7 Si. 43; Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. 435; Clive v. C., Kay, 600, must be considered overruled; see Re Box, infra.
 - (e) Re Box, 1 Hem. & M. 552.

Right to Subject-Matter and Profits.

Where executors improperly detain a specific legacy, the legates will not be allowed to suffer from its depreciation. Suppose, for instance, a horse were bequeathed to A., and the executors were to keep the horse until he were worn out, and then offer him to A., he would not be obliged to take him, as he would be entitled to the value of the horse from the time when the horse was used for any purpose, just in the same way as, if the horse had been sold and the price applied in payment of debts, the legates would have been entitled to the value with interest from the moment it was used for any other purpose (a).

Upon the same principle, where a debt due on a promissory note was specifically bequeathed, and the executors, thinking that the legacy was a pecuniary one, instead of delivering the promissory note to the legatee, called in the debt, and the money was paid into Court, and invested in the purchase of stock, which afterwards became depreciated in value, Lord Alvanley held that the legatee was entitled to the sum due upon the note at the time it was paid into Court, with interest at 4l. per cent. from that time. "The legatee," said his Lordship, "had a right to the specific legacy. If the assets did not want it, she had a right to have it delivered up. She was not bound to lay it out in the funds: if she had done so, she would have a right to the rise, and be liable to the fall. Instead of that, the executors insisting it should not go out of Court, it was paid in and laid out in stock. It is no more than the case that was put in argument of a legacy of a horse, which the executors refused to let go, lest there should be a deficiency of assets, and having used and worked the horse a considerable time afterwards offered to return him; the legatee then may insist upon the value" (b).

So, if the bequest were of specific stock, and it happened to be sold out by the executor, when there was no necessity for the sale to pay debts, the equity of the legatee is to have the stock replaced according to its value at the end of a year next after the testator's death, since the fund, if not sold, ought then to have been transferred to the legatee (c).

Since the specific legacy is regarded as set apart at the testator's death all interest and income arising therefrom after that date goes to the legate (d). On the same principle it was held to be right and

⁽a) Chaworth v. Beech, 4 V. 563.

⁽b) Ibid. 567.

⁽c) Morley v. Bird, 3 V. 629.

⁽d) Saunder's Case, 5 Rep. 12a.

fair that the specific legatee should be charged with the costs of the upkeep, care, and preservation of a yacht specifically bequeathed from the time of death until the executors assented (a).

Thus the gift of "the amount of a bond I hold" will carry the interest accrued due thereon during the life of the testator (b); but the interest will not pass where the gift is confined to the principal, as where the testator gives 800l., due upon a bond (c).

Moreover as a general rule, not only interest or dividends but also bonuses which accrue due after the death of a testator, upon shares specifically bequeathed by him, belong to the specific legatee (d); even although they may arise in consequence of the fraudulent retention of moneys which would have increased the dividends of any former owner, whether he be the testator or any person taking from him (e).

But where a dividend or bonus on shares has been declared during the life of the testator, it will not pass to the specific legatee, although payable after the death of the testator (f).

Upon the same principle, the profits of a partnership made during a conventional period, which was wholly included in the testator's lifetime, will be considered to be capital belonging to the testator's estate, although these profits were not ascertained till some time after his death (g).

But where the dividends, although earned during the testator's life, are not declared until after his death, they will be considered as income (h).

So, likewise, the profits of a partnership, though principally earned during the testator's life, will be considered as income, if the conventional period at which such profits are to be ascertained terminates after the testator's death (i).

The rule in Bouch v. Sproule (k) is "When a testator or settlor

- (a) Re Pearce, (1909) 1 Ch. 819.
- (b) Harcourt v. Morgan, 2 Keen,
- (c) Roberts v. Kuffin, 2 Atk. 112; Hawley v. Cutts, Freem. 24, Hov.
- (d) Maclaren v. Stainton, 3 De G. F. & J. 202, reversing S. C., 27 B. 460; Re Marten, (1901) 1 Ch. 370.
- (e) See the cases on interest in detail, infra; Maclaren v. Stainton, supra. And see Edmondson v. Cros-

- thwaite, 34 B. 30; The Carron Co. v. Hunter, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 362.
- (f) Lock v. Venables, 27 B. 598; De Gendre v. Kent, 4 Eq. 283.
- (g) Browne v. Collins, 12 Eq. 586, 593. And see Ibbotson v. Elam, 1 Eq. 188, 35 B. 594.
 - (h) Bates v. Mackinley, 31 B. 280.
- (i) Ibbotson v. Elam, 1 Eq. 188; Browne v. Collins, 12 Eq. 586; Gow v. Forster, 26 C. D. 672.
 - (k) 12 A. C. 385, at p. 397.

directs or permits the subject of his disposition to remain as shares or stocks in a company which has the power either of distributing its profits as dividend or of converting them into capital, and the company validly exercises this power, such exercise of its power is binding on all persons interested under the testator or settlor in the shares, and consequently what is paid by the company as dividend goes to the tenant for life, and what is paid by the company to the shareholder as capital, or appropriated as an increase of the capital stock in the concern, enures to the benefit of all who are interested in the capital "(a).

The tenant for life is accordingly entitled to all payments out of profits made by the company unless they have been validly capitalized by the company by resolution or otherwise (b).

Where trustees who are shareholders are given an option between taking profits as dividends or as new shares, it is a question of fact whether the company intended to capitalize the profits or distribute them as dividends. If the company had the latter intention and new shares are taken by the trustees, the tenant for life will be entitled only to so much of the value of the new shares as represents the dividend applied in taking them up, the balance being treated as capital (c).

After a company has gone into liquidation the power to declare a dividend is gone and the surplus assets must be distributed as capital (d).

Where the company has no power to increase its capital but has actually employed profits which have accumulated as part of its working capital and then proceeds to distribute the whole or part of such profits among the members, sums so distributed are capital and not income (e).

Where a dividend is declared upon shares during the life of a tenant for life, his representatives will be entitled to it, although it is not paid until after his death, unless the will or settlement provides that in such case it shall be paid to someone else (f).

- (a) See Re Hopkins' Trusts, 18 Eq. 697; Re Malam, (1894) 3 Ch. 578; Re Barton's Trusts, 5 Eq. 238; Re Alsbury, 45 C. D. 237; Re Paget, 9 T. L. R. 88.
- (b) Re Piercey, (1907) 1 Ch. 289, at p. 294.
- (c) Re Malam (1894) 3 Ch. 578; Re Northage, 60 L. J. Ch. 488; Re Tindal,
- 9 T. L. R. 24; and see Rowley v. Unwin, 2 K. & J. 138; Re Anson, (1907) 2 Ch. 424.
 - (d) Re Armitage, (1893) 3 Ch. 337.
- (e) See Bouch v. Sproule, 12 A. C. 385, at pp. 393, 397.
- (f) Wright v. Tuckett, 1 J. & H. 266.

12. Apportionment Act, 1870.

Ordinarily the income arising from personalty specifically bequeathed as well as property comprised in a residuary gift is apportionable under the Apportionment Act, 1870 (a), as between the specific legatee and the estate of the testator (b).

The Act has been held to apply to a will executed before the Act, and confirmed by a codicil executed after the passing of the Act (c).

It has also been held applicable to the will of a testator who died before the Act came into operation (d). A tenant for life, however, may first of all get all the benefit of the old law before the Apportionment Act, 1870, and his estate may afterwards get the benefit of the new law under the Act. Lawrence v. L.(e). There a testator who died before the Apportionment Act, 1870, came into operation, gave the income of his residuary estate which included railway preference and ordinary stock to his wife for life, with remainder to his nephews. The widow claimed under the old law, and received the entire dividends upon the railway stock which were declared. and became receivable after the testator's death. On the death of the widow the residuary legatees claimed the whole of the railway dividends becoming payable after the death of the widow; it was held that the executors of the widow were entitled, under the new law, to an apportioned part of the dividends up to her death.

The word "dividends" in the Apportionment Act, 1870, includes payments by way of bonus, or surplus profits to the shareholders of a public company, even though such payments may be only occasional, and not strictly periodical (f).

Where, however, a testator by a will made before the passing of the Act bequeathed the dividends and income eo nomine of his share and interest in a company to one for life, with remainder to another absolutely, it was held by the C. A. in Chancery, affirming the decision of Romilly, M. R. (g), that the

- (a) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35, ss. 2, 5.
- (b) Pollock v. P., 18 Eq. 329, explaining Whitehead v. W., 16 Eq. 528; and see A.-G. v. Daly, 8 Ir. R. Eq. 595; Capron v. C., 17 Eq. 288.
- (c) Constable v. C., 48 L. J. Ch. 621; Hasluck v. Pedley, 19 Eq. 271; Roseingrave v. Burke, 7 Ir. R. Eq.

187.

- (d) Re Cline's Estate, 18 Eq. 213; Patching v. Barnett, 28 W. R. 886; and see Jones v. Ogle, L. R. 8 Ch. 192.
 - (e) 26 C. D. 795.
 - (f) Re Griffith, 12 C. D. 655.
 - (g) 14 Eq. 419.

bequest included the whole dividends, irrespective of any apportionment (a).

The Apportionment Act of 1870 does not, it seems, apply to a bequest of shares in a mere private partnership, which, although it may pay what are called dividends, are in reality payments of an entirely different nature, and do not proceed upon the basis of a fixed income recurring from time to time (b). The words "trading or other public companies" in section 5 of the Apportionment Act, 1870, include any public company (c), but not a private partnership (d); but it is not essential that it should be an incorporated company (e).

The Apportionment Act will be applicable, not only as between tenant for life and remainderman, but also when in certain events an absolute interest is cut down to a life interest (f).

In Re Clarke (g) a testator after the Apportionment Act, 1870, bequeathed a considerable sum to trustees, such sum to carry interest at four and a half per cent. until the same should be paid and appropriated, upon trust with the consent of his wife, to invest the same in certain specified securities, and pay the annual income of the legacy, and the investments thereof, including in such income the interest payable in respect of such legacy to his wife for life, with remainders over. Interest was paid to the widow up to the day when, pursuant to an order of the Court, the bequeathed sum was invested in stocks, on some of which five months' dividend had then accrued, it was held that the Apportionment Act did not apply, and that the widow was entitled to the whole of the dividends when received upon the purchased stock.

The provisions of the Act are by section 7 not to extend to any case in which it is or shall be expressly stipulated that no apportionment shall take place; so where shares were bequeathed to trustees, on trust for sale with power of post-ponement, and settled on persons in succession, with a declaration that every share bequeathed by the will, should carry the dividend

 ⁽a) Jones v. Ogle, L. R. 8 Ch. 192;
 and see per *Malins*, V.-C., in Capron v.
 C., 17 Eq. 288.

⁽b) Jones v. Ogle, L. R. 8 Ch. 192. See also Re Cox's Trusts, 9 C. D. 159; Re Griffith, 12 C. D. 655.

⁽c) Re Lysaght, (1898) 1 Ch. 115;

Re Oppenheimer, (1907) 1 Ch. 399.

⁽d) Re Griffith, 12 C. D. 655.

⁽e) Ibid.

⁽f) Clive v. C., L. R. 7 Ch. 433.

⁽g) 18 C. D. 160; cf. Bulkeley v. Stephens, (1896) 2 Ch. 241.

accruing thereon at the testator's death, and the dividends were payable annually, it was held that there was no apportionment against the trustees, and that the dividend for the year in which the testator died was payable to the tenant for life (a).

The stipulation must presumably be contained in the will; a provision in the Articles of Association of the company in which shares are held is not enough (b).

As to apportionment in gifts of residue in succession, see note to Howe v. Lord Dartmouth at pp. 90 et seq.

13. How far Parol Evidence admissible to determine whether Legacies are Specific or not.

Parol evidence of the state and value of a testator's property is not admissible, save under special circumstances (c), in order to determine whether a legacy is specific or general (d).

Where there is a specific bequest parol evidence is admissible to shew what property there is answering to the description of it; but if, on that evidence, it appears that there is property correctly answering the description, no evidence can be adduced to shew that it was intended to apply to other property (e).

If a testator makes a specific bequest of a thing which he once had, but which he had not at the date of the will, evidence is admissible to shew how the mistake arose, and the fact that the subject-matter of the bequest had been exchanged for something else before the date of the will, and in such case the legatee will be entitled to a sum of money equal in value to the specific legacy at the death of the testator, although if he had made the exchange after the date of the will the legacy would have been clearly adeemed. See Selwood v. Mildmay (f). There the testator gave

- (a) Re Lysaght, (1898) 1 Ch. 115
 (C. A.); Re Meredith, (1898) W. N. 48; 67 L. J. Ch. 409.
- (b) Re Oppenheimer, (1907) 1 Ch. 399.
- (c) See the dissenting judgment of Rigby, L. J., in Re Grainger, (1900) 2 Ch. (C. A.) 756, at pp. 768 et seq.
- (d) Higgins v. Dawson, (1902) A. C. 1, reversing Re Grainger, C. A., preceding note. Since this decision Fonnereau v. Poyntz, 1 Bro. Ch. 471;

Boys v. Williams, 2 Russ. & M. 689, are no longer of authority. A.-G. v. Grote, 2 Russ. & M. 690, may be supported on the grounds stated by Rigby, L. J., in Re Grainger, at p. 764.

(e) Horwood v. Griffith, 4 De G. M. & G. 700.

(j²) 3 V. 306; and see Lindgren v. L., 9 B. 358; Goodlad v. Burnett, 1 K. & J. 341; Findlater v. Lowe, (1904) 1 Ir. 519.

1,2501., part of his Four per cent. Bank annuities, to his wife for life, and after her decease to several relations. The testator had no such stock at the date of his will, having previously sold it all, and invested the produce in Long annuities. Evidence to prove these facts having been admitted, it was held by Alvanley, M. R., that the legatees of the 1,2501 stock were entitled to their legacies out of the testator's personal estate. "It is clear," said his Lordship, "that the testator meant to give a legacy, but he mistook the fund. He acted upon the idea that he had such stock. The distinction is this: if he had had the stock at the time it would have been considered specific, and that he meant that identical stock; and any act of his destroying that subject would be proof of animus revocandi, but if it is a denomination, not the identical corpus, in that case if the thing itself cannot be found, and there is a mistake as to the fund out of which it is to arise, that will be rectified."

But if the subject-matter of such a bequest had been a ring or a picture and it could not be found, "the Court could not rectify that" (a).

Where, however, a testator makes a specific bequest, as for instance of a sum of stock "standing in his name," and has not the stock described, nor any other stock, the legacy altogether fails, even although the testator may have intended to buy such stock but never $\operatorname{did}(b)$.

14. Abatement of Legacies.

In the administration of assets, general legacies are not applicable in payment of debts, until after the general residuary personal estate, real estates devised for payment of debts, real estates descended, and real estates charged with payment to debts, have been exhausted; after which general legacies, in priority to specific legacies, are applicable; or if the whole amount of them is not wanted for that purpose, they must abate among themselves pro ratâ.

But a testator may shew his intention that a general pecuniary legacy is to be paid out of his specific legacies, and in that case the specific legatees could not call on the pecuniary legatee to abate. Suppose for instance the testator left all his personal estate at X. to A. and all his personal estate at Y. to B., and afterwards gave 300l.

⁽a) Selwood v. Mildmay, supra.

Sm. 717; Millar v. Woodside, 6 Ir. R

⁽b) Evans v. Tripp, 6 Madd. 91. And see Waters v. Wood, 5 De G. &

Eq. 546; cf. Collison v. Carling, 9 Cl. & Fin. 88.

out of his personal estate to C., if the testator had no personal estate except at X. and Y., the 300l. would be payable out of the specific bequest of the personal property at those places (a).

A legacy at first sight appearing to be residuary, may be shewn by the testator's intention to be specific, in which case it will only abate with other specific legacies.

As for instance where a testator estimates a specific sum in money and gives definite portions of it, a gift of the rest will be as specific as if he had stated the actual amount. See Page v. Leapingwell (b), There a testator devised land upon trust to sell, but not for less than 10,000l., and gave legacies thereout amounting to 7,800l., and "the overplus monies," to A. and B. The estate sold for less than 7,000l.; Grant, M. R., held that the other legatees ought to abate equally with A. and B., his Honour being of opinion, that the inference to be drawn from the expressions in the will was, that the testator did not mean by the word "overplus" what it usually imports, viz., whatever shall turn out to be the overplus; but that he was contemplating a certain overplus, and was making his disposition accordingly. "I conceive," he added, "the true intention to have been that these persons should take as specific legatees; and, therefore, they must abate among themselves" (c). And upon the same principle, where a testator, giving the residue of a specific fund, estimates that residue in money the gift of the residue will be specific, although the testator sweeps into that residue any future additions to the fund (d).

Where, however, a testator neither knows, nor assumes to know the amount of a fund, and after bequeathing certain portions thereof, he makes a bequest of the residue, the latter is not specific, and must be applied first in payment of debts (e).

(a) See Sayer v. S., Pr. Ch. 392, 393.

(b) 18 V. 463; 11 R. R. 234.

(c) See also Laurie v. Clutton, 15 B. 65; Wright v. Weston, 26 B. 429; Duncan v. D., 27 B. 386; Haslewood v. Green, 28 B. 1; Elwes v. Causton, 30 B. 554; Re Jeffery's Trust, 2 Eq. 68; Walpole v. Apthorp, 4 Eq. 37; Miller v. Huddlestone, 6 Eq. 65.

(d) Haslewood v. Green, 28 B. 1; Walpole v. Apthorp, 4 Eq. 37, sed vide

De Lisle v. Hodges, 17 Eq. 440.

(e) See Williams v. Armstrong, 12 Ir. R. Eq. 356 Petre v. P., 14 B. 197; Vivian v. Mortlock, 21 B. 252; De Lisle v. Hodges, supra; cf. Re Tunno, 45 C. D. 66. And see Carter v. Taggart, 16 Si. 423; Loscombe v. Wintwingham, 12 B. 46; Booth v. Alington, 6 De G. M. & G. 613; Greenwood v. Jemmett, 26 B. 479; Baker v. Farmer, L. R. 3 Ch. 537, reversing S. C., 4 Eq. 382

So if a fund is given, subject to debts, the gift of the residue will not be specific (a).

A question sometimes arises between pecuniary and residuary legatees, where there has been a devastavit by the executor, whether (there being at the decease a residue of a certain sum) the pecuniary legatees ought not to share the loss proportionably with the residuary legatees. The better opinion (in opposition to that of Lord Cowper, in Dyose v. D. (b)) is, that they ought not (c).

But the case may be varied by the dealings of the pecuniary legatees with the executor, as by suffering their legacies to remain in his hands, and receiving interest thereon, thus making him their debtor; for then they may be considered to have waived their priority under the will, and will only be entitled to have what is left divided between them and the residuary legatees, in the proportion of the amount of their legacies, and of the residue, as it was computed at the death of the testator, with interest on each (d). In other words, "If all the legatees have consented that they will have the fund out of which their legacies are payable appropriated as a specific sum, it is the same as if the testator had appropriated it; and if any part of the fund is lost they must all suffer rateably. But unless there is this common consent, we must look to the intention of the testator and to nothing afterwards" (e).

Where, moreover, one of several residuary legatees, or next of kin, has received his share of the estate of a testator or an intestate, the others cannot call upon him to refund if the estate is subsequently wasted (f); but if part of the estate has been previously wasted, the person so paid can be called upon to refund, the rule being that what is available when one is paid, should be equally divisible among all (g).

But where one residuary legatee calls upon another to refund, upon the ground of being overpaid, the burden of proof lies upon

- (a) Harley v. Moon, 1 Dr. & Sm.623; Baker v. Farmer, L. R. 3 Ch.537.
 - (b) 1 P. W. 305.
- (c) See Fonnereau v. Poyntz, 1 Bro. Ch. 478; Humphreys v. H., 2¢Cox, 184; Page v. Leapingwell, 18 V. 466; and Wilmott v. Jenkins, 1 B. 401; Re Lyne's Estate, 8 Eq. 482.
 - (d) Ex p. Chadwin, 3 Swans. 380;

- see and consider Mallory v. French, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 376.
- (e) Per Lord Justice Wood, in Baker v. Farmer, L. R. 3 Ch. 541; see as to executors' right to appropriate, infra, note 17.
- (f) Peterson v. P., 3 Eq. 111, 114 Morris v. Livie, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 380.
- (g) Peterson v. P., 3 Eq. 411, 114; Re Winslow, 45 C. D. 249.

the person requiring the money to be refunded, to shew that the payment was made in excess (a).

Where some of the legatees have been paid, and the assets which were sufficient for the payment of the other legatees have neither been applied nor appropriated in a manner equivalent to payment of the legatees, but have been wasted by the trustees, if other assets should unexpectedly fall in, they ought to be first applied in payment of the last-mentioned legatees (b).

Where a legacy is charged on real estate should the personal estate be insufficient to pay it, if the personal estate was sufficient for that purpose at the time of the testator's death, and became inadequate in consequence of a devastavit, the legacy will not be a charge on the real estate (c). Secus, if the devisees of the real estate were the same persons as those who wasted the personal estate (d).

As a rule, general legacies and annuities stand upon an equal footing, all taking precedence of a residuary gift (e), and upon a deficiency of assets, general legacies and annuities must abate rateably, and the *onus* lies on any legatee or annuitant seeking priority to make out clearly and conclusively that such priority was intended (f).

Where the testator's intention is clearly to prefer one legate to another, preference will of course be given (g), but not where it is at all doubtful whether he intended to give such preference (h).

And where a testator bequeaths legacies to creditors, when debts have been already satisfied by compositions for less than what was really owing (i), or bequeaths money to pay the debts of others (k),

- (a) Peterson v. P., supra.
- (b) Wilmott v. Jenkins, 1 B. 401.
- (c) Richardson v. Morton, 13 Eq. 123.
- (d) Howard v. Chaffers, 2 Dr. & Sm. 236; Humble v. H., 2 Jur. 696.
- (e) See Croly v. Weld, 3 De G. M. & G. 995.
- (f) Miller v. Huddlestone, 3 Mac. & G. 513; Thwaites v. Forman, 1 Coll. 409; Brown v. B., 1 Keen, 275; and see Coore v. Todd, 7 De G. M. & G. 520.
- (g) Lewin v. L., 2 Ves. Sen. 415; Marsh v. Evans, 1 P. W. 668; A.-G.
- v. Robins, 2 P. W. 23; Beeston v. Booth, 4 Madd. 161, 170; Stammers v. Halliley, 12 Si. 42; Brown v. B., 1 Keen, 275; and see Weir v. Chomley, 1 Ir. Ch. R. 295; Haynes v. H., 3 De G. M. & G. 590; Re Hardy, 17 C. D. 798.
- (h) See Blower v. Morret, 2 Ves. Sen.
 420; Eavestaffe v. Austin, 19 B. 591; and See Coore v. Todd, 23 B. 92, 7 De
 G. M. & G. 520; Wright v. Weston, 26
 B. 429; Haslewood v. Green, 28 B. 1;
 Elwes v. Causton, 30 B. 554.
 - (i) Coppin v. C., 2 P. W. 296.
 - (k) Shirt v. Westby, 16 V. 396.

such legacies, being purely voluntary, must abate with other legacies. See also *Turner* v. *Martin* (a).

It may be here mentioned that a legacy is not entitled to priority over others because it is given to a wife or child of the testator (b); to servants (c); charities (d); executors for their care and trouble (e); or for a mourning ring (f); and it must abate with other general legacies.

Priority will be given to legatees for life, when it is directed that the legacies on their deaths are to go in payment of other legacies (q).

Merely introductory words such as "in the first place," "in the next place," "afterwards," will not create any priority between the legacies they precede (h).

Where a general legacy is given in consideration of the relinquishment of dower by a widow (i), it will be entitled to priority over all other merely voluntary legacies. And this priority as to legacies given in satisfaction of dower is preserved by the Dower Act (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105), s. 12. By analogy it was considered that a legacy given in consideration of a debt owing to the legatee had the like priority (k), but a recent decision is to the contrary (l).

Where, however, the husband leaves no real estate at all (m), or none out of which his widow is dowable, as, for instance, where it has all been conveyed by him to uses in bar of dower (n), or where the testator by the will devises the real estate so as to bar dower (o), the widow will not be entitled to priority over other legatees in

- (a) 7 De G. M. & G. 429.
- (b) Blower v. Morret, 2 Ves. Sen. 420; Miller v. Huddlestone, 3 Mac. & G. 526—529; but see Re Hardy, 17 C. D. 798, 50 L. J. Ch. 241; and see Re Schweder's Estate, (1891) 3 Ch. 44, where Chitty, J., dissented from Re Hardy.
 - (c) A.-G. v. Robins, 2 P. W. 25.
 - (d) A.-G. v. Hudson, 1 P. W. 675.
- (e) Ibid., and see Fretwell v. Stacy,
 2 Vern. 434; Heron v. H., 2 Atk. 171;
 Duncan v. Watts, 16 B. 204; cf. Re
 White, (1898) 2 Ch. 217.
 - (f) Apreece v. A., 1 V. & B. 364.
- (g) Brown v. B., 1 Keen, 275; Haynes v. H., 3 De G. M. & G. 590.
 - (h) Thwaites v. Forman, 1 Coll.

- 409; Beeston v. Booth, 4 Madd. 161; Whitehouse v. Insole, 7 L. T. 400, but see Re Hardy, 50 L. J. Ch. 241.
- (i) Burridge v. Bradyl, 1 P. W. 126; Blower v. Morret, 2 Ves. Sen. 420; Davenhill v. Fletcher, Amb. 244; Heath v. Dendy, 1 Russ. 543; Norcott v. Gordon, 14 Si. 258; Stahlschmidt v. Lett, 1 Sm. & G. 421; Bell v. B., 6 Ir. R. Eq. 239.
- (k) See Davies v. Bush, 1 Younge, 341; Williams, Executors (1904), 1093.
 - (l) Re Wedmore, (1907) 2 Ch. 277.
 - (m) Acey v. Simpson, 5 B. 35.
 - (n) Roper v. R., 3 C. D. 714.
- (o) Greenwood v. G., (1892) 2 Ch. 295, disapproving of dictum to the contrary in Roper v. R., supra.

respect of a legacy which her husband may have given to her in lieu of dower, because there is nothing of which she is a purchaser.

Upon the same principle, in Davies v. Bush (a), where a testator had given a legacy to a person, on condition of his executing a general release of all claims which he (the legatee) had on the testator, Lord Lyndhurst was of opinion, that if there was not a debt actually due to the legatee, he could not be considered as a purchaser of the legacy, so as to avoid an abatement with the other legatees. If no debt were due, and the release were required merely for the sake of peace, then unquestionably the legatee could not be treated as a purchaser.

Where annuities are made payable out of a sum to be set apart for that purpose, and eventually to sink into the residue, if such sum prove insufficient for that purpose on the death of one of the annuitants, the surviving annuitants will be entitled to have the deficiencies of their annuities satisfied out of the released fund before it sinks into the residue (b); secus, where the testator directs that upon a deficiency of the sum set apart to meet the annuities they

are to be rateably reduced (c).

Where legacies and annuities are charged on real estate, the fact that powers of distress and entry are conferred on the annuitants will not give them priority over the legatees (d).

An annuity charged on the personal estate by a testator, being a general legacy, on a deficiency of assets, as before mentioned, abates

proportionably with the general legacies (e).

In such cases a value is put upon the annuity, and then a proportional abatement is made between the annuity and the legacies, and then the annuitant, although it is only a life annuity, or his representative, if he be dead, is entitled at once to receive a sum equal in amount to the valuations so abated (f).

But if annuities are given as gifts of specific interests in the real estate, they will not abate with legacies charged on the real estate (g).

As annuities on a deficiency of assets abate with legacies, so they abate among themselves (h).

(a) 1 Younge, 341; but see Re Wedmore, (1907) 2 Ch. 277.

- (b) Arnold v. A., 2 My. & K. 374.
- (c) Farmer v. Mills, 4 Russ. 86.
- (d) Roper v. R., 3 C. D. 714.
 (e) Miller v. Huddlestone, 3 Mac. & G. 513.
 - (f) See this discussed, ante, pp. 851,

852.

(g) Creed v. C., 11 Cl. & Fin. 491, overruling the decision of Sugden, C., in 1 Dr. & War. 416; and see Re Briggs, 29 W. R. 925.

(h) Innes v. Mitchell, 1 Ph. 710; 2

Ph. 346.

When the corpus of an estate charged with annuities is insufficient to pay the arrears, it will be divided between the annuitants in proportion to the value of their respective annuities (a).

. If all the annuitants are *living* at the period of division, the value must be ascertained as at the death of the testator (b).

If all the annuitants are dead, the arrears of their annuities must be ascertained, and the fund divided in the proportion of those arrears (c).

If some are dead, and the others living, the value as to the former will be taken at the amount of their arrears, and as to the latter, at the amount of their arrears, added to the calculated value of the future payments (d): and it is immaterial that an annuity is reversionary, and falls into possession after the testator's death (e).

A bequest of an annuity to an executor for his trouble in the conduct and management of the testator's affairs will not be entitled to priority over other legacies (f).

Specific legacies, as has been shewn, are not applicable in the administration of assets in payment of debts, until after general legacies have been exhausted (ante, pp. 835, 836), nor are demonstrative legacies, that is to say, legacies payable out of a particular fund (g); except when they become general legacies by failure of the fund (h), and persons to whom specific and demonstrative legacies are bequeathed can compel devisees of land not charged with debt to abate or contribute with them, pro ratâ, towards their payment (i); and although a specific legacy be charged with debts and legacies, the general undisposed-of residue will be first applicable (k).

As to the lapse of legacies, see Elliot v. Davenport (l).

- (a) Wroughton v. Colquhoun, 1 De
 G. & Sm. 357; Todd v. Bielby, 27 B.
 356.
- (b) Todd v. Bielby, supra; Re Wilkins, 27 C. D. 703.
 - (c) Todd v. Bielby, supra.
- (d) Todd v. Bielby, supra; Heath v. Nugent, 29 B. 226.
- (e) Potts v. Smith, 8 Eq. 683; and see Fielding v. Preston, 1 De G. & J. 438; Innes v. Mitchell, 2 Ph. 346; Re Metcalf, (1903) 2 Ch. 424.
 - (f) Duncan v. Watts, 16 B. 204.

- (g) Roberts v. Pocock, 4 V. 150; Lambert v. L., 11 V. 607; Acton v. A., 1 Mer. 178.
- (h) Mullins v. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 210.
- (i) See Roberts v. Pocock, 4 V. 160; Long v. Short, 1 P. W. 403; Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. 490, 505, 506; Re Saunders-Davies, 34 C. D. 482, pp. 50 and 51, supra.
- (k) Hewett v. Snare, 1 De G. & Sm.
- (l) Lead. Cas. Real Prop., 4th ed. 475 and note.

15. To whom Legacies are to be Paid.

Where legatees are sui juris, legacies will be payable to them, care being taken that they answer the description given to them in the will.

As to the description of legatees, see Roper on Legacies, Vol. I., pp. 28, 30, 4th ed.; Williams on Executors, Vol. II. pp. 1137 et seq., 10th ed.

An executor, however, is not justified in paying a legacy left to an *infant* until he comes of age (a), unless there is express direction to pay while under age (b); nor will a payment thereof to a parent or any other relation (though testamentary guardian) in his behalf be good without the authority of the Court of Chancery (c), which has under special circumstances ordered a small legacy belonging to an infant to be paid to the father (d); and even in the case of an adult child payment to the father is not good, unless it were made by his consent, or were validated by a subsequent ratification (c).

But where the direction is to pay the legacy to a trustee for a child, or even to his father (who would, thereupon, become a trustee), such payment may be made by the executor (f).

An executor may free himself from all liability by paying the legacy of an infant into Court under the Trustee Act, 1893, s. 42. Before that statute he had a similar power under 36 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 32, repealed by the Trustee Act, 1893 (g).

If a legacy be given to an infant, payable when twenty-one, without intermediate interest, upon the death of the legatee before attaining twenty-one, his administrators will be entitled to the legacy, but they must wait until the time when the legatee would, if he had lived, have been twenty-one (h); but if intermediate interest be given, and the legatee die before twenty-one, they will be entitled to immediate payment of the legacy (i).

- (a) Philips v. Paget, 2 Atk. 80, 81.
- (b) Re Deneker, (1895) W. N. 28; 72 L. T. 220.
- (c) Dagley v. Tolferry, 1 P. W. 285;
 S. C., nom. Doyley v. Tollferry, 1 Eq.
 Ca. Abr. 300;
 S. C., nom. Dawley v.
 Ballfrey, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 103.
 - (d) Walsh v. W., 1 Drew. 64.
- (e) Cooper v. Thornton, 3 Bro. Ch. 96.
- (f) Cooper v. Thornton, 3 Bro. Ch. 96; Robinson v. Tickell, 8 V. 142.
- (g) See Re Salaman, (1907) 2 Ch. 46; (1908) 1 Ch. 5.
- (1/2) Anon., 2 Vern. 199; Chester v. Painter, 2 P. W. 336; Roden v. Smith, Amb. 588; Crickett v. Dolby, 3 V. 13.
- (i) Anon., 2 Vern. 199; Cloberry v. Lampen, Freem. 25 Hov. ed.; Crickett v. Dolby, 3 V. 13.

If, however, under similar circumstances, a legacy were payable at a future day out of land, with interest in the meantime upon the death of the legatee before the day of payment, the Court would not direct the legacy to be raised (a).

If a legacy be left to A. to be paid at twenty-three years of age, if he die before, to go over to B., upon the death of A. during minority the legacy will be presently payable to B., who will not be obliged to wait until such time as A. would, if he had lived, have been twenty-three (b).

Formerly, a legacy left to a married woman was payable to her husband, even though he was living apart from her (c), or they had been divorced a mensâ et thoro (d); but she was entitled to the payment thereof if she had obtained an order of protection under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21 (e).

The wife, however, before the legacy had been reduced into possession of the husband, might have claimed her equity to a settlement thereout (f).

A legacy left to a married woman for her separate use vested in her personally; and now, under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882(g), wherever a legacy left to her is her separate property, it will vest in her, and she can give a receipt for it.

When a legatee has been abroad for many years without having been heard of, the presumption may be raised by the Court that he is dead(h); but in some cases, upon payment of such legacy to the person entitled thereto in the event of the death of the legatee, security to refund, in case the legatee should return home, has been required (i).

The executor may, however, under such circumstances take advantage of the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1893, s. 42.

- (a) Gawler v. Standerwick, 2 Cox, 15; Parker v. Hodgson, 1 Dr. & Sm. 568; and cf. Evans v. Scott, 1 H. L. C. 57, and Taylor v. Lambert, 2 C. D. 181.
- (b) Papworth v. Moore, 2 Vern. 283; and see Laundy v. Williams, 2 P. W. 479.
 - (c) Palmer v. Trevor, 1 Vern. 261.
 - (d) Green v. Otte, 1 S. & S. 250.
- (e) See Re Kingsley's Trusts, 26 B. 84; Cooke v. Fuller, ibid., 99.

- (f) See note to Elibank v. Montolieu, p. 650.
 - (g) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.
- (h) Mainwaring v. Baxter, 5 V. 458;
 Dixon v. D., 3 Bro. Ch. 510; Re
 Lewes' Trust, 11 Eq. 236, affirmed in
 L. R. 6 Ch. 356.
- (i) Bailey r. Hammond, 7 V. 590; Cuthbert v. Purrier, 2 Ph. 199; Dowley v. Winfield, 14 Si. 277; and see Norris v. N., Rep. t. Finch, 419.

16. Appropriation of Legacies payable in Futuro.

Where a legacy is given payable in futuro, as upon the legatee attaining a certain age, or so many years after the death of the testator, the legatee may come into Court, and, without any suggestion of insolvency or wasting of assets on the part of the executor, pray that a sufficient sum be set apart to answer the legacy when it becomes due (a); and it is immaterial that the legacy is given on a contingency, upon the failure of the happening of which it is to sink into the residue (b). Save where either (1) the legacy, though payable in futuro, is vested and certainly payable at a future date; or (2) where the legacy, though contingent, yet carries interest in the meantime, the legatee has no right to insist upon an appropriation, nor will he be affected by an appropriation made by the executor (c).

The contingent legatee has the right to security, not to appropriation; and so in Webber v. W. (d), the whole residue was paid to the residuary legatee upon his giving satisfactory security for the payment of a contingent legacy (a sum of money) upon the happening of the contingency, the ground being that its exact payment could not be secured by an appropriation of stock.

It seems, however, as the result of the authorities, when an appropriation has been made with the sanction of the Court, that the legatee must bear the losses and enjoy the profits arising from any fluctuation in the price of stock (e).

Where, however, executors appropriate investments to satisfy a contingent cash legacy not bearing interest, this principle has no application. The legatee is entitled on the happening of the contingency to receive the full amount of the legacy in $\cosh(f)$. If,

- (a) Ferrand v. Prentice, Amb. 273; S. C., Dick. 568; Walker v. Cooke, 1 Bro. Ch. 105,-cited; Johnson v. Mills, 1 Ves. Sen. 282; S. C., nom. Johnson v. De la Creuze, 1 Bro. Ch. 105, cited; Re Hall, (1903) 2 Ch. 227; sed vide Gawler v. Standerwick, 2 Cox, 15, as to legacy payable out of land, ante, p. 890.
- (b) Green v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. 103; Carey v. Askew, 2 Bro. Ch. 58; Pullen v. Smith, 5 V. 21; Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Bro. Ch. 144, 145; The Governesses' Benevolent Institution v.

Rusbridger, 18 B. 467.

- (c) Re Hall, (1903) 2 Ch. 226 (C. A.).
- (d) 1 S. & S. 311; King v. Malcott, 9 Ha. 692, at p. 696; and see per Cozens-Hardy, L. J., Re Hall, supra, at p. 235.
- (e) Green v. Pigot, 1 Bro. Ch. 105, 106; Burgess v. Robinson, 3 Mer. 9, 10; Rock v. Hardman, 4 Madd. 254; Kimberley v. Tew, 4 Dr. & W. 139, 149; sed vide Sitwell v. Bernard, 6 V. 543
 - (f) Re Hall, supra.

however, the executor sets aside and invests a reasonable amount to secure the legacy, he may distribute the residue, and will not be liable if the investment subsequently, when the time of payment arrives, proves to be insufficient (a).

These cases, however, in no way affect the clear right of executors with the legatee's consent to appropriate any part of the residuary personal estate including leaseholds, and (semble) also real estate if there be a trust for conversion of the residuary real estate (b) in satisfaction of a legacy or share of residue (c).

If the transaction is fair and honest it cannot be impeached and is binding on all the beneficiaries. From the date of the appropriation the property ceases to be part of the testator's estate, it becomes the property of the legatee, and gain or loss in value will accrue, or fall upon him (d).

An appropriation may also be directed to secure an annuity charged by a testator on his residue (e). Where the annuity is payable out of the clear residuary estate of a testator the Court has jurisdiction to direct a sufficient sum to be set apart and the residue to be paid to the residuary legatee, but the annuitant may if necessary resort to the capital of the fund (f).

Where an annuity is given followed by a direction to set apart a fund to satisfy it or a direction is given to set apart a fund to produce an annuity, and in either case on the expiration of the annuity the fund is directed to fall into residue or is given as part of the residue, the annuity is regarded as charged upon the whole of the personal estate, and if the fund appropriated prove insufficient the annuity is payable out of the corpus of the estate (g).

Where, however, the capital of a fund directed to be provided or set apart to produce an annuity of a certain amount, is after the death of the annuitant specifically disposed of, and is not directed to fall into residue or disposed of as such, the annuitant on a deficiency of the fund cannot claim to have the annuity made up by the residuary estate, or by the *corpus* of the fund (h).

- (a) Cf. Re Salaman, (1907) 2 Ch. 46.
- (b) Re Beverly, (1901) 1 Ch. 681.
- (c) Re Lepine, (1892) 1 Ch. 210; Re Richardson, (1896) 1 Ch. 512; Re Brooks, 76 L. T. 771; Re Nickels, (1898) 1 Ch. 630.
 - (d) Re Lepine, supra.
 - (e) Slanning v. Style, 3 P. W. 336.
- (f) Harbin v. Masterman, (1896) Ch. 351.
- (g) May v. Bennett, 1 Russ. 370; Carmichael v. Gee, 5 A. C. 588; Gordon v. Bowden, 6 Madd. 342; Davies v. Wattier, 1 S. & S. 463; Boyd v. Buckle, 10 Si. 595.
- (h) Kendall v. Russell, 3 Si. 424;

It seems that if the annuitant clearly assented to the appropriation of some fund to provide for his annuity, and the income of the fund proved insufficient to answer the annuity, the loss would fall on the annuitant (a).

17. (A) Time of Payment of Legacies and Interest. (B) Contingent Legacies and Income. (C) Maintenance under Statute., (D) Rate of Interest. (E) Annuities. (F) Duties.

(A) Time of Payment of Legacies.

Assuming that an executor has paid debts and given his assent, expressed or implied, to a legacy, the question then arises, at what time it becomes payable, and interest thereon begins to run.

Specific Vested Legacies.

These are considered as severed from the bulk of the testator's property by the operation of the will, from the death of the testator, and are specifically appropriated, with their increase and emolument, for the benefit of the legatee from that period, the executor's assent thereto being deemed to relate back (b). Interest is computed on them from the death of the testator; and it is immaterial whether the enjoyment of the principal is postponed by the testator or not: 2 Rop. Leg. 1250, 4th ed. Thus, where there is a specific legacy of stock, the legatee will be entitled to the dividends from the death of the testator (c), although it may have been directed "to be paid within twelve calendar months" after the testator's decease (d).

Secus, in the case of contingent specific legatees not directed to be set apart (e).

If the thing specifically bequeathed be reversionary, the legatee will only be entitled to it upon the reversion falling into possession, and interest will run from that time (f).

and see Bague v. Dumergue, 10 Ha. 462; Baker v. B., 6 H. L. Cas. 616, 628; Hickman v. Upsall, 2 Gif. 124.

- (a) Arundell v. A., 1 My. & K. 316.
- (b) Saunders' Case, 5 Rep. 12 (a.); and see Re Pearce, (1909) 1 Ch. 819, where it was held that the cost of upkeep between the death and the assent must be borne by the specific legatee.
 - (c) Barrington v. Tristram, 6 V. 345;

see also Clive v. C., Kay, 600.

(d) Bristow v. B., 5 B. 289.

(e) See per Kay, J., Re Woodin, (1895) 2 Ch., p. 316; Guthrie v. Walrond, 22 C. D. 575.

(f) Earle v. Bellingham, 24 B. 443; Re Ludlam, 63 L. T. 330; Gibbon v. Chaytor, (1907) 1 Ir. 65; cf. Re White, 101 L. T. 780.

Demonstrative Legacies.

These are payable one year after the testator's death, and carry interest from that time, and not from the testator's death (a).

A demonstrative legacy, where the property out of which it is payable is reversionary, is only payable where the reversion falls in (b).

General Legacies.

Where the testator has fixed no time for their payment, as we have before seen, they will not be payable until a year after his decease(c); they will, therefore, as a general rule, carry interest only from that time, even though the legacy is to the testator's wife (d); a direction in the will to pay the legacy as soon as possible will make no difference (e); but interest will be due in such case even though the payment of the legacy be impracticable (f), and whether the assets are productive or not (g), and though a sale of estates directed for payment of the legacies may, in the discretion of the trustees, have been postponed (h).

And it has been held where a legacy was directed to be paid on a future contingency, "with interest," that the interest will be computed from the end of the year after the testator's death, but will not be payable until the time mentioned (i).

As, however, the rule for the payment of legacies a year after the testator's death was made for the convenience of executors, if they find the state of the testator's assets justifies such a course they may, if they think fit, pay the legacies at an earlier period (k).

And a person who some years after the testator's death becomes by substitution entitled to a legacy, may call for immediate payment as the year runs from the testator's death (l).

In an administration suit the Court ordinarily pays the particular

- (a) Mullins v. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm.210; Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves.Sen. 560, 563.
 - (b) Earle v. Bellingham, 24 B. 448.
 - (c) Wood v. Penoyre, 13 V. 333, 334.
- (d) Stent v. Robinson, 12 V. 461; Re Whittaker, 21 C. D. 662.
- (e) Webster v. Hale, 8 V. 410; Benson v. Maude, 6 Madd. 15.
- (f) Wood v. Penoyre, 13 V. 333, 334; Gibson v. Bott, 7 V. 96; see per Cairns, L. C., Lord v. L., L. B. 2 Ch., p.

- 789.
 - (g) Pearson v. P., 1 Sch. & L. 10.
- (h) Minors v. Battison, 1 A. C. 428, referring to Hutcheon v. Mannington, 1 V. 366; and see Scotch case of Kirkpatrick v. Bedford, 4 A. C. 96.
 - (i) Knight v. K., 2 Si. & S. 490, 492.
- (k) Pearson v. P., 1 Sch. & L. 12; Angerstein v. Martin, T. & R. 241; Garthshore v. Chalie, 10 V. 13.
- (l) Laundy v. Williams, 2 P. W 478.

legacies when a clear fund is ascertained, together with interest if due at 4 per cent. up to that time (a); but sometimes the Court, if it can be done with safety to creditors, will, by anticipation, direct proportional payments to be made to pecuniary legatees (a); and a jointure and annuities have been directed to be paid out of the income of the estate before decree, though payment of pecuniary legatees was refused (b).

Where an immediate legacy was given, subject to be divested on a future contingency, it has been held the legatee can call for payment of the legacy a year after the testator's death without giving security. Thus where a legacy was given to A., upon condition that if he succeeded to an estate on the death of B., without heirs of his body the legacy was to be void, payment was decreed in the life of A. without giving security (c).

Where, however, a legacy was given to a father, on condition that he did not interfere with the education of his daughter, on a bill by the father for his legacy, the Court required from him security to that effect to be approved by the Master, and directed the costs of the proceedings to be paid out of the legacy (d).

Exceptions from the General Rule.

- (1) Time fixed by testator. He may direct that interest shall be paid from the date of his death (e). On the other hand, where a clear intention is shewn that legacies are not to be paid until some fixed time, interest will only run from the time fixed for payment of the legacy, even though it is vested (f). Thus in Lord v. L. (g) a testatrix having a general power of appointment over property which was the subject of pending litigation, appointed it by will to J. Lord upon trust, "so soon as proceedings in law and equity should be terminated, and the same should come into his possession," to pay certain legacies, and as to the residue upon other trusts. It was held by the Lords Justices, affirming the decision of Lord Romilly, M. R., that the trust to pay the legacies did not arise,
- (a) Thomas v. Montgomery, 1 Russ. & M. 729.
 - (b) Digby v. Boycatt, 4 Ha. 444.
- (c) Fawkes v. Gray, 18 V. 131, and see Griffiths v. Smith, 1 V. 97; and Branstrom v. Wilkinson, 7 V. 421.
 - (d) Colston v. Morris, 6 Madd. 89.
- (e) Re Tinkler's Estate, 20 Eq. 456; Londesborough v. Somerville, 19 B.
- 295.
- (f) Lloyd v. Williams, 2 Atk. 108; Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 101; Tyrell v. T., 4 V. 1; Festing v. Allen, 5 Ha. 575; Gotch v. Foster, 5 Eq. 311; Lord v. L., L. R. 2 Ch. 782; Holmes v. Crispe, 18 L. J. Ch. 439.
 - (g) L. R. 2 Ch. 782.

and, consequently, that the legacies did not carry interest until the litigation ended, and the property came into the hands of J. Lord, which was not until more than eighteen years after the death of the testatrix.

If the time of payment arrives in the testator's lifetime, interest will run from his death (a).

Where a legatee is only entitled to the payment of a vested legacy at a certain time without intermediate interest, in the event of his death his personal representatives, who simply stand in his place, cannot demand payment at an earlier period (b).

A mere reference by the testator to the time when his personal estate shall be received, will not be a sufficiently clear indication of his intention, that the legacy is not to be paid before, and, consequently, that the interest is not to run until that date. See Wood v. Penoyre (c): there the testator gave a legacy of 900l., to be paid out of money due on an Irish mortgage, "when the same shall be recovered." Sir W. Grant, M. R., held that the words "when recovered" did not suspend or postpone the right to interest.

Although the testator directs legacies to be invested for legatees at a period beyond the expiration of one year from his own death, nevertheless, if the direction for investment is for the convenience of the estate, interest will be paid to the legatees upon the legacies, from a year after the testator's death, if the estate is sufficient then to pay them (d).

(2) Where the Court decrees a legacy to be a satisfaction for a debt (e). In that case interest will be given from the death, not merely from a year after the death, of the testator. In Shirt v. Westby(f) a charge of another's debt on real estate was held to carry interest from the testator's death, but this was apparently on the ground that it was only given as a charge on land.

And a devise upon trust to sell property, and divide the proceeds among such persons as "have any just or indisputable demand" upon a third party deceased, will entitle such persons to the interest due to them as far as the money arising from the sale will extend (g).

- (a) Coventry v. Higgins, 14 Si. 30; Pickwick v. Gibbes, 1 B. 271.
- (b) Roden v. Smith, Amb. 588; Chester v. Painter, 2 P. W. 336; Maher v. M., 1 L. R. Ir. 22.
 - (c) 13 V. 334.
 - (d) Varley v. Winn, 2 K. & J. 700;
- Re Olive, 53 L. J. Ch. 525, and reported on another point, 34 C. D. 70.
 - (e) Clark v. Sewell, 3 Atk. 99.
- (f) 16 V. 393; sed vide Askew v. Thompson, 4 K. & J. 620.
 - (g) Aston v. Gregory, 6 V. 151.



(3) Legacy Charged upon Land.—Where a legacy is charged on lands only, and no time is fixed for its payment, interest will be due from the testator's death (a).

Where real estate is devised upon trust for sale, and out of the proceeds to pay legacies, interest is only payable from the period of a year after the testator's death (b); and if the sale is directed to be made after the death of the tenant for life, interest is only payable from her death (c).

A legacy to wife in lieu of dower out of a mixed fund of proceeds of sale of real and personal estate has been held to carry interest only from the end of the year (d).

(4) Legacy to Infant Child.—The general rule is modified (e) in the case of a legacy whether vested or contingent given to an infant (f) legitimate (g) child by its father or mother (h) or to an infant by person in loco parentis (i), where no other provision is made by the testator for the child's maintenance (k).

In many of the older cases it is said that contingent legacies of this character bear or carry interest for the legatee from the testator's death (l). It was, however, decided in Re Bowlby (m), after an examination of all the authorities, that the infant legatee is only entitled to maintenance out of the income of the legacy. "The fact that the legacy is to bear interest for such a purpose [maintenance], though it may be, and often is, shortly referred to by saying that the legacy bears interest, does not make the legacy the less a contingent one or put the infant into the position of having an immediate vested life interest in the income of the legacy. All that the infant is entitled

- (a) Per Lord Redesdale, Pearson v.
 P., 1 Sch. & L., 10; and see Maxwell v.
 Wettenhall, 2 P. W. 26; Stonehouse v.
 Evelyn, 3 P. W. 254; Spurway v. Glynn,
 9 V. 483; Shirt v. Westby, 16 V. 393.
 - (b) Turner v. Buck, 18 Eq. 301.
 - (c) Re Waters, 42 C. D. 517.
 - (d) Re Bignold, 45 C. D. 496.
- (e) See on this exception generally, Re Bowlby, (1904) 2 Ch. 685.
- (f) Raven v. Waite, 1 Swans. 553; Wall v. W., 15 Si. 513; Re Crane, (1908) 1 Ch. 379.
- (g) Beckford v. Tobin, 1 Ves. Sen.
 310; Lowndes v. L., 15 V. 301; cf.
 Hill v. H., 3 V. & B. 183; Newman v.

Bateson, 3 Swans. 689.

- (h) Crickett v. Dolby, 3 V. 10; see Lord *Hardwicke's* general statement in Beckford v. Tobin, supra.
- (i) Wilson v. Maddison, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 372; Rogers v. Soutten, 2 Keen, 598; Russell v. Dickson, 2 Dr. & W. 133; Acherley v. Wheeler, 1 P. W. 783.
- (h) Donovan v. Needham, 9 B. 164; Re Moody, (1895) 1 Ch. 101, reviewing the cases.
- (l) E.g., Beckford v. Tobin, supra; and see the judgment of Vaughan Williams, L.J., in Re Bowlby, supra.
 - (m) Supra.

to have is maintenance" (a). Quære, whether where the legacy is vested, but without gift of interest, the infant has more than a right to maintenance out of the first year's interest (b).

The exception does not extend to other relatives than children, such as grand-children or nephews or nieces unless the testator has put himself in loco parentis (c), nor has the exception been extended to a wife (d).

Where, however there is a direction to apply a competent part of the interest on a legacy for the maintenance of a natural child (e), or of a stranger, even where the legacy is contingent (f), or merely a general intention expressed (g), interest will be payable from the testator's death.

Although the rule is well established that where a legacy is left by a parent or a person in loco parentis to an infant, in that case, whether the legacy be payable at a particular time, or be vested or contingent, maintenance will be allowed from the death of the testator (h), or if the child be en ventre sa mere, at the testator's death, from its birth (i), even though there be a direction to accumulate (k), yet this rule is subject to an exception, viz., maintenance will not be allowed out of a legacy to a child, where another fund is provided and is available for that purpose (l).

In Re Moody (m), Kekewich, J., discussed the cases, and refused to allow this exception to apply where the will only contained a power

- (a) Re Bowlby, supra, per Romer, L.J., at p. 706.
- (b) The decision in Re Bowlby was on a contingent legacy, but on principle the vested legatee does not seem entitled to more than maintenance.
- (c) Houghton v. Harrison, 2 Atk. 330; Desbrambes v. Tompkins, 4 Bro. Ch. 149 (n.), 1 Cox, 133; Festing v. Allen, 5 Ha. 579; Crickett v. Dolby, 3 V. 10.
- (d) Stent v. Robinson, 12 V. 461; Lowndes v. L., 15 V. 301; Freeman v. Simpson, 6Si. 75; Milltown v. Trench, 4 Cl. & Fin. 276, 11 Bligh (N. S.) 1; Re Whittaker, 21 C. D. 657.
- (e) Newman v. Eateson, 3 Swans. 689; Dowling v. Tyrell, 2 Russ. & M. 343.
- (f) Harris v. Finch, McClel. 141; Re Peek's Trust, 16 Eq. 221; Re Richards, Eq. 119; Chidgey v. Whitby, 41

- L. J. Ch. 699.
- (g) Pett v. Fellows, 1 Swans. 561 (n.); Lambert v. Parker, Coop. t. Eldon, 143; Leslie v. L., L. & G. 1; Re Churchill, (1909) 2 Ch. 431.
- (h) See case above cited and Harvey v. H., 2 P. W. 21; Chambers v. Goldwin, 11 V. 1; Brown v. Temperley, 3 Russ. 263.
 - (i) Rawlins v. R., 2 Cox, 425.
- (k) Mole v. M., Dick. 310; M'Dermott v. Kealy, 3 Russ. 265 (n.).
- (l) Chambers v. Goldwin, supra; Wynch v. W., 1 Cox, 433, 434; Wall v. W., 15 Si. 513; Donovan v. Needham, 9 B. 164; Rudge v. Winnall, 12 B. 357; Re Rouse's Estate, 9 Ha. 649; Re George, 5 C. D. 837; see Re George, discussed Re Dickson, 28 C. D. 291, 29 C. D. 331.
 - (m) (1895) 1 Ch. 101.

of advancement and a gift of a share of residue. He said: "The rule of law, as was said by the Lord Justice James in that case-Re George (a)—is well established, that a contingent legacy does not carry interest while it is in suspense, except in the case of a legacy by a parent, or one standing in loco parentis to the legatee; and that exception is subject to another exception, that the rule giving interest to the child does not take effect when the testator has provided another fund for his maintenance, so that the income of the legacy is supposed not to be required for the purpose. There the Lord Justice is really putting, in his own language, all that is said by Lord Hardwicke, Lord Kenyon, and Lord Langdale. . . . No case has been quoted where the other fund has been a share of residue given to the children, and until some case of that kind has been found, I should be extremely unwilling to construe that as coming within the exception mentioned by the Lord Justice James. A residue is an unascertained amount. It might be quite uncertain what the share of each child would be in the residue, and all the cases, as I understand them, go to this, that you must regard the question with reference to the money given to the child."

Where, however, a specific sum is given for maintenance, although it be less than the interest, no more can in general be claimed (b), unless, perhaps, it is clearly insufficient, and the legacy is vested (c).

(B) Contingent Legacies.

The general rule is that a specific or general (other than a residuary) legacy does not give the legatee any right to the income while the legacy is in suspense (d). The exception to this rule in the case of a legacy to a child by a parent or person in loco parentis has been dealt with above. The rule will, of course, be excluded by the expression of a contrary intention, and a direction to separate a fund from the rest of an estate to answer for a contingent legacy is equivalent to a contingent legacy of the fund plus its income (e), but out of that income the legatee, if an infant, would be entitled only to maintenance. "Apart from any question as to maintenance the income would be added to the corpus, and the legatee could only claim it if and when he became entitled to the corpus...

- (a) 5 C. D. 837.
- (b) Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk.
- 717; Long v. L., 3 V. 286 (n.).
- (c) Aynsworth v. Pratchett, 13 V. 321; Turner v. T., 4 Si. 430.
- (d) Re George, 5 C. D. 837; Guthrie
- v. Walrond, 22 C. D. 575.
- (e) See Hanson v. Graham, 6 V. 239; and see per Vaughan Williams, L.J., in Re Bowlby, supra, pp. 704 et seq.

the setting apart of the fund and the right of the child to maintenance cut of the income did not change the contingent nature of the child's legacy. The child did not acquire a vested interest during minority in the income" (a). Accordingly if on the fulfilment of the contingency the legatee does not become entitled to the corpus of the legacy, but only to a life interest therein, the legatee will become entitled merely to a life interest in the accretion to the corpus of income unapplied for maintenance pending the contingency (b).

A contingent legacy of residuary personalty carries the intermediate income (c). Where there is a contingent legacy of a fund carrying intermediate income to a class to be determined by its members attaining twenty-one, the member of the class who first attains that age does not become entitled to the whole of the income of the fund, but only to the income of the share vested in him, and the income of the shares remaining contingent can be applied for the maintenance of those contingently entitled thereto (c). The same rule applies where the class is capable of increase and the vested shares consequently capable of diminution (d). The rule does not apply to a contingent devise of real estate to such a class; there the first member of the class attaining a vested interest thereby becomes entitled to the whole income (e).

There is a distinction between a contingent legacy and a legacy vested but subject to be divested.

Where a legacy, either particular (f) or residuary (g), is given to an infant vested but to be divested on a contingent event, which happens, the legacy will carry interest until that time, from the end of the year after the death of the testator, and the infant, or his or her representatives, will be entitled thereto.

An executory gift of real estate, though residuary, does not carry income until the estate vests: *Hodgson* v. *Bective* (h). Lord

- (a) Per Romer, L.J., Re Bowlby, at p. 709.
- (b) Re Bowlby, supra, overruling Re Salt, (1902) 1 Ch. 918.
- (c) Re Holford, (1894) 3 Cls. 30 (residuary personal estate).
- (d) Re Jeffery, (1895) 2 Ch. 579 (residuary realty and personalty).
- (e) Re Averill, (1898) 1 Ch. 525.
- (f) Taylor v. Johnson, 2 P. W. 504; Re Buckley's Trusts, 22 C. D. 583;
- Re Humphreys, (1893) 3 Ch. 1; Thruston v. Anstey, 27 B. 335; Montgomerie v. Woodley, 5 V. 522; Branstrom v. Wilkinson, 7 V. 421; M'Donald v. Bryce, 2 Keen, 284; Barber v. B., 3 My. & C. 688; and see note to Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 102, by Sanders.
- (g) Montgomerie v. Woodley, 5 V. 522.
 - (h) 10 H. L. Cas. 656, 12 W. R. 625.

Westbury there stated that this rule was founded on the feudal doctrine that the freehold cannot be in suspense. The rule has, however, been applied to equitable interest, e.g., an equitable remainder in a freehold house specifically devised (a)—and other equitable interests (b).

On the other hand, an executory or future bequest of residue of personal estate, if it vests, carries the intermediate income if not otherwise expressly disposed of—Hodgson v. Bectiva, supra—although contingent (c).

In Genery v. Fitzgerald (d), it was decided that a gift of real and personal estate together follows the rule as to personal estate, and carries intermediate income if it vests, and this extends to separate gifts of residue of real and personal estate if the limitations are the same (e).

(C) Maintenance under Statute.

Under Lord Cranworth's Act(f), which applied to wills executed or confirmed after the 28th August, 1860, the whole or any part of the income of any legacy, to the income and capital of which an infant is contingently entitled, might be paid towards his maintenance in all cases.

That Act enabled the income of a legacy to be applied for maintenance, though the gift both of income and capital were contingent provided the legace would be entitled to income and capital if the legacy becomes vested (q).

It did not apply to a case where the legatee would not be entitled to the intermediate income in the event of the legacy becoming vested (h).

By the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, sect. 43, (1) (i), it is enacted that "where any property is held by trustees in trust for an infant, either for life, or for any greater interest, and

- (a) Re Eddel's Trusts, 11 Eq. 559; Re Averill, (1898) 1 Ch. 523.
- (b) Hopkins v. H., Cas. t. Talbot, 44, 53, and per Sugden, L.C., in Wills v. W., 1 Dr. & W. 455; and see Wade-Gery v. Handley, 1 C. D. 653, affirmed 3 C. D. 374.
- (c) Re Holford, (1894) 3 Ch. 30; Glanvill v. G., 2 Mer. 38; and see cases cited in note to Nicholls v. Osborn, 2 P. W. 419; Re Lindo, 59 L. T. 462.
- (d) Jac. 468.
- (e) Re Burton's Will, (1892) 2 Ch. 38; Re Dumble, 23 C. D. 360; see also Re Townsend, 34 C. D. 357.
- (f) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, sect. 26, repealed by 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 71.
- (**) Re Cotton, 1 C. D. 232; see Re Breed's Will, 1 C. D. 226.
- (h) Re George, 5 C. D. 837; Re Judkin's Trusts, 25 C. D. 743.
 - (i) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41.

whether absolutely or contingently on his attaining the age of twentyone years, or on the occurrence of any event before his attaining that age, the trustees may, at their sole discretion, pay to the infant's parent or guardian, if any, or otherwise apply for or towards the infant's maintenance, education or benefit, the income of that property, or any part thereof, whether there is any other fund applicable to the same purpose, or any person bound by law to provide for the infant's maintenance, education or not. (2) The trustees shall accumulate all the residue of that income in the way of compound interest, by investing the same and the resulting income thereof from time to time on securities on which they are by the settlement, if any, or by law authorised to invest trust money, and shall hold those accumulations for the benefit of the person who ultimately becomes entitled to the property from which the same arise; but so that the trustees may at any time if they think fit apply those accumulations or any part thereof, as if the same were income arising in the then current year. (3) This section applies only if and as far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the instrument under which the interest of the infant arises, and shall have effect subject to the terms of that instrument and to the provisions therein contained. (4) This section applies whether that instrument comes into operation before or after the commencement of this Act.

The object of the Act of 1881 was to shorten and simplify conveyances, and not to alter the devolution of property or affect the construction of wills. Hence it has been held that trustees cannot under sect. 43 of that Act apply the income of an infant's contingent legacy, for the benefit of the infant, unless the income will go along with the capital of the legacy, if and when such legacy vests (a).

Where the legatee on attaining majority will become absolutely entitled to the *corpus* of the legacy and intermediate income, there is no difficulty in applying sub-sect. 2 of sect. 43, supra. Where, however, the legatee has become entitled merely to a vested life interest in the *corpus* of the legacy great difficulties have arisen in the construction of that sub-sect. (b). It was decided in Re Bowlby (c) that where an infant contingent legatee is entitled to maintenance out of the intermediate income, but the whole of that

⁽a) See Re Judkin's Trusts, 25 C. D.
743; Re Dickson, 28 C. D. 291; S. C.,
(C. A.) 29 C. D. 331; cf. Re Bowlby,
(1904) 2 Ch. 685; see ante, p. 901, for like decisions under Lord Cranworth's

⁽b) See Re Scott, (1902) 1 Ch. 918 disapproved in Re Bowlby, supra.

⁽c) (1904) 2 Ch. 685.

income is not so applied in maintenance and the balance is accumulated under sub-sect. 2 (supra), the accumulations form an accretion to the *corpus* of the legacy, and that the infant legated acquiring on majority a vested life interest in the *corpus* takes merely a life interest in the accretion. Where, however, the infant's legacy is vested, such accumulations of income would go absolutely to the infant (a).

Where a gift of personal estate is severed from the bulk of a testator's property for the benefit of the legatees, it carries income, although the gift is future and contingent, and the income may be applied in maintenance (b). But the legatees of a severed fund will only be entitled to interest before vesting, when the severance arises from causes connected with the legacy itself, and not because other causes may render it necessary, as for instance, that the residue itself has become immediately payable (c).

(D) Rate of Interest.

By the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, by Order LV., r. 64, it is provided that where a judgment or order is made directing an account of legacies, interest shall be computed on such legacies after the rate of 4 per cent. per annum from the end of one year after the testator's death, unless otherwise ordered, or unless any other time of payment or rate of interest is directed by the will, and in that case according to the will.

But an executor may be charged 5 per cent. on a legacy where the capital has been employed by him in trade (see note to $Robinson \ v.$ Pett) (d) or there has been gross misconduct on his part, as by selling out stock, holding large balances in his hands (e).

Unless compound interest be directed by the will to be paid on legacies (f), interest will be computed on the principal, and not on the principal and interest (g), except under particular circumstances.

- (a) Re Wells, 43 C. D. 281; Re Humphreys, (7893) 3 Ch. 1.
- (b) Re Woodin, (1895) 2 Ch. 309; Re Bowlby, supra; and see Kidman v. K., 40 L. J. Ch. 369; Re Medlock, 55 L. J. Ch. 738; Re Clements, (1894) 1 Ch. 665; Guthrie v. Walrond, 22 C. D. 573; Dundas v. Wolfe-Murray, 1 Hem. & M. 425; Boddy v. Dawes, 1 Keen, 362; Johnston v. O'Neill, 3 L. R. Ir. 476; Re Smith, W. N., (1894) p. 115, 71 L. T. 318, 42
- W. R. 368.
- (c) Festing v. Allen, 5 Ha. 578; Re Inman, (1893) 3 Ch. 518.
 - (d) 3 P. W. 249.
- (e) Crackelt v. Bethune, 1 J. & W. 586; Mosley v. Ward, 11 V. 581; Jones v, Foxall, 15 B. 388; Knott v. Cottee, 16 B. 77.
 - (f) Arnold v. A., 2 My. & K. 365.
- (g) Perkyns v. Baynton, 1 Bro. Ch.
 574; Crackelt v. Bethune, 1 J. & W.
 586.

as where an executor neglects to obey an express direction to accumulate (a).

(E) Annuities.

Where an annuity is given by will, it commences to run from the testator's death and the first payment is made at the end of the year from the death (b), unless it be given to be payable, or commence at some other period, as monthly (c), or the first quarter day after the testator's death (d); and in the former case the annuity will be due at the end of the first month, in the latter it will be due at the first quarter day, after the death of the testator, but it will not be payable by the executor till the end of the year (c).

And if the testator directs the payment of an annuity to be made quarterly, a proportional part thereof becomes payable on the first quarter day (f).

And if the first payment of such an annuity is directed to be made at the end of eighteen months, a quarter's instalment is then payable (g).

The distinction between an annuity and a legacy for life is pointed out by Lord *Eldon* in a well-known case. "If," said his Lordship, "an annuity is given, the first payment is at the end of the year from the death: but if a legacy is given for life, with remainder over, no interest is due till the end of two years" (h).

An annuity may be postponed till debts and legacies are paid (i).

It may be here mentioned that as a general rule arrears of an annuity will not bear interest (k).

Where there is a *legacy of chattels to one for life* with remainder over, the tenant for life will be entitled to the possession thereof upon signing an inventory expressing that those things are in his custody, as given to him for life only, and that afterwards they shall be delivered and remain to the use and benefit of the

- (a) Raphael v. Boehm, 11 V. 92, 13
 V. 590; Dornford v. D., 12 V. 127;
 cf. Re Barclay, (1899) 1 Ch. 674.
- (b) Gibson v. Bott, 7 V. 96, 97; Fearns v. Young, 9 V. 553.
- (c) Houghton v. Franklin, 1 S. & S. 390.
 - (d) Storer v. Prestage, 3 Madd. 167.
 - (e) Ibid.
 - (f) Williams v. Wilson, 5 N. R. 267.
 - (g) Irvin v. Ironmonger, 2 Russ. &

- My. 531.
 - (h) Gibson v. Bott, 7 V. 96.
- (i) Astley v. Earl of Essex, L. R. 6
 Ch. 898; Rawson v. M'Causland, 7
 Ir. R. Eq. 284.
- (k) Anderson v. Dwyer, 1 Sch. & L. 301; Taylor v. T., 8 Ha. 120; Torre v. Browne, 5 H. L. Cas. 555; Wheatley v. Davies, 24 W. R. 818; Batten v. Earnley, 2 P. W. 163.

remainderman (a); and no security will be required unless it be shown that the chattels are in danger (b).

(F) Duties.

Legacy Duty.

Unless the testator directs to the contrary, *legacy duty* is always payable by the legatee, even where the legacy is to a creditor in payment of a debt due from a third person (c).

It has been held that the words "all the legacies left by my will and codicil to be paid free of legacy duty" amount to a direction that the legacy duty was to be paid out of the estate on all legacies as well pecuniary as specific (d).

Legacies will, however, be free from duty, when the testator has given them free from deduction, free from charge or expense, free from liability (e); and where he has given a clear sum or annuity, a gift clear of legacy duty is intended (f); so where the testator has given a fund to produce a clear annual sum, to be paid to the legatee (g).

Where, however, a fund is given to insure a *clear* annual sum, and to pay the *dividends of the stock*, and not the exact sum to the legatee, it will not be considered as a gift free from the legacy duty, as the term *clear* will be held to refer to the costs of investment, and not to the duty (h).

A direction to pay legacy duty upon either a specific or pecuniary legacy amounts to a general pecuniary legacy of the amount of the legacy duty, and in case of a deficiency of assets that legacy

- (a) Slanning v. Style, 3 P. W. 336; Bill v. Kynaston, 2 Atk. 82.
- (b) Foley v. Burnell, 1 Bro. Ch. 279; Leeke v. Bennett, 1 Atk. 471; Conduit v. Soane, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 502; see Jarman, (1893) p. 837, and see article in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 14, 307, by J. C. Gray.
- (c) Foster v. Ley, 2 Scott, 438, 2 Bing, N. C. 269.
- (d) Re Johnston, 26 C. D. 538, 554.See also Ansley v. Cotton, 16 L. J. Ch. 55.
- (e) Barksdale v. Gilliat, 1 Swans. 562; Courtoy v. Vincent, T. & R. 433; Gosden v. Dotterill, 1 My. & K. 56; Louch v. Peters, 1 My. & K. 489;

- Stow v. Davenport, 5 B. & Ad. 359; Warbrick v. Varley, 30 B. 241.
- (f) Gude v. Mumford, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 448; Haynes v. H., 3 De G. M. & G. 590.
- (g) Marris v. Burton, 11 Si. 161;
 Cole's Will, 8 Eq. 271; Re Dyet, 87 L.
 T. 744; and see as to succession duty on appointed fund, Re Saunders, (1898)
 1 Ch. 17; and see Re Currie, 59 L. T.
 200; Warbrick v. Varley, 30 B. 241.
- (t) Banks v. Braithwaite, 32 L. J. Ch. 35, questioned in Re Saunders, (1898) 1 Ch. 17; Sanders v. Kiddell, 7 Si. 536; but see Pridie v. Field, 19 B. 497.

must ahate accordingly (a). Where the duty on some legacies is charged upon the residuary estate, which proves insufficient for this purpose, the legatees must themselves bear the duty to the extent to which the residue proves insufficient to pay the same, and they cannot call upon other legatees whose legacies were not exempted from duty to abate in order to make such payment (b).

Settlement Estate Duty.

In the absence of provision to the contrary is payable out of the settled property (c). This duty is not a testamentary expense, and therefore a direction that testamentary expenses shall be paid out of residue or a designated fund will not exonerate the settled property (d); but a direction that "death duties" or "duties" shall be so paid will exonerate the settled fund (c). A direction to pay settlement estate duty is treated in the same way as a direction to pay legacy duty (f).

Income Tax.

A testator may direct the income tax upon an annuity to be paid out of his estate (g), but a direction to pay an annuity free from deductions will not be sufficient for that purpose unless there is a manifestation of intention that income tax shall be treated as a deduction (h). Where annuities not given free from income tax are paid by trustees out of the income of a fund paid to the trustees after deduction of income tax, it is a breach of trust if the trustees pay the annuities without deducting income tax (i).

- (a) Farrer v. St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, 16 Eq. 19; Re Turnbull, (1905) 1 Ch. 726; and see Re Wilkins, 27 C. D. 703, discussed in Re Turnbull.
- (b) Wilson v. O'Leary, 17 Eq. 419; Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 A. C. 215.
- (c) Re Maryon Wilson, (1900) 1 Ch. 565.
- (d) Re Lewis, (1900) 2 Ch. 176; Re King, (1904) 1 Ch. 363.
- (e) Re Cayley, (1904) 2 Ch. 781; Re Turnbull, (1905) 1 Ch. 726.

- (f) Re Turnbull, supra.
- (g) Festing v. Taylor, 3 B. & S. 217,
 235; Lord Lovat v. Duchess of Leeds,
 2 Dr. & Sm. 62; Re Bannerman's
 Estate, 21 C. D. 105.
- (h) Abadam v. A., 33 B. 475; Turner v. Mullineux, 1 J. & H. 334; Peareth v. Marriott, 22 C. D. 182; Gleadow v. Leetham, 22 C. D. 269; Re Bannerman's Estate, 21 C. D. 105; Re Buckle, (1894) 1 Ch. 286.
 - (i) Re Sharp, (1906) 1 Ch. 793.

18. Recovery of Legacy and Arrears of Interest—Statutes of Limitation —Express Trusts.

Recovery of Legacy.

The general rule under sect. 8 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, is that a legacy is only recoverable within twelve years after accruer of a present right to receive the same (a).

Where, however, the legacy is held upon an express trust, the section does not apply (b); and subject to sect. 10 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, time does not run in favour of the When an executor holds as executor time runs under sect. 8, supra. "An executor was always in a loose sense a trustee for creditors and legatees since he held for their personal benefit and not for his own, but such a trust does not take a case out of the statute. . . . It is necessary [for that purpose] to make out that he is an express trustee "(c). Time will accordingly run where he holds only on an implied or constructive trust (d). It is, however, clear that one who has commenced to hold as an executor may cease to hold as such and may come to hold as trustee upon express trusts (e). It is in many cases difficult to say at what moment precisely the change takes place; thus an executor will not by assenting to a residuary legacy by signing a residuary account constitute himself a trustee thereof (f). If, however, after completing the administration of the estate and being functus officio qua executor, he being also appointed trustee by the will, deals with property appropriated to a legacy he becomes a trustee thereof (g). Semble, the executor would become a trustee if he so acted though not appointed a trustee by the will. It may be here noted that there is no primâ facie duty on an executor to give notice to legatees of their rights under a will (h). If, however, the legacy secured by express trust is charged upon land, then sect. 10 of the Real Property Limitation

- (a) Waddelb v. Harshaw, (1905) 1 Ir. R. 416.
- (b) See Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub.-sect. 2; Watson v. Saul, 1 Giff. 188; Re Swain, (1891) 3 Ch. 233.
- (c) Per Lindley, L.J., Re Davis, (1891) 3 Ch. at p. 124; and see Re Lacy, (1899) 2 Ch. 149.
- (d) Re Davis, supra; cf. Re Barker, (1892) 2 Ch. 491; Re Owen, (1894) 3 Ch. 220.
- (e) See this discussed by Kekewich,
 J. in Re Timmis, (1902) 1 Ch. 176, at
 p. 182; and Re Mackay, (1906) 1
 Ch. 25, at p. 31.
 - (f) Re Rowe, 58 L. J. Ch. 203.
 - (g) Re Timmis, supra.
- (h) Re Lewis, (1904) 2 Ch. 656; cf. Re Mackay, supra; the dicta of Giffard, V.-C., in Brittlebank v. Goodwin, 5 Eq. 545, at p. 550, are apparently not law.

Act, 1874, applies, and the period of limitation applies which would have been applicable had there been no express trust.

It would appear that this section overrides sect. 25, sub-sect. 2, of the Judicature Act, 1873. By that section it is enacted that "No claim of a cestui que trust against his trustee for any property held on an express trust, or in respect of any breach of such trust, shall be held to be barred by any Statute of Limitations." But it is suggested that sect. 10 of the Real Property Act, 1874, applies only to the remedy of the legatee against the land, whilst sect. 25, sub-sect. 2, of the Judicature Act, preserves the remedy against the trustee (a).

Arrears of Interest.

Under sect. 42 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, a legatee is ordinarily entitled to recover only six years arrears of interest (b). Where, however, the legacy was given by way of express trust it was in several cases before the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, sect. 10, held that time was no bar to the recovery of arrears (c).

But if the beneficiary or his representatives allowed a very long time to elapse without attempting to enforce the trust, equity applied, as to interest on the legacy, the principle of the statute (d). In the case of legacies secured by express trust, but charged on land within the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, sect. 10, arrears of interest on such legacies are only recoverable within the period allowed by sect. 42 of the Act of 1833. Where, however, a trust legacy is not charged upon land, neither sect. 42 of the Act of 1833 nor sect. 10 of the Act of 1874 apply, and it seems that no rule of limitation applies to an action for arrears.

Where legatees, in a case where there has been no laches which can alter the rights of the parties, have waited for the payment of their legacies until after the falling in of a reversionary interest which could not, having regard to the interests of all parties, have been properly sold, they will be entitled, on the payment of their legacies,

- (a) See Williams' Executors, (1902) Vol. II., p. 1658; Lewin on Trusts, 11th ed., p. 1110; but cf. Carron, R. P. Stats., (1910) p. 208; and see Hughes v. Coles, 27 C. D. 231.
- (b) Hughes v. Williams, 3 Mac. & G. 683; Chappell v. Rees, 1 De. G. M. & G. 393; Re Walker, L. R. 7 Ch. 120.
- (c) See. e.g., Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 A. C. 215; Gough v. Bult, 16 Si. 45, 323; Cox v. Dolman, 2 De. G. M. & G. 592; Burrowes v. Gore, 6 H. L. C. 907.
- (d) Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 A. C. 215.

not merely to six years' arrears of interest, but to interest on their legacies from the expiration of one year after the death of the testator, although it may exceed that period(a). And any legatees who have received their legacies without interest are not barred by acquiescence, unless they have done some act to release the estate (b).

The foregoing statements as to the liability of a trustee both as to the *corpus* of the legacy and arrears of interest thereon must be read subject to the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1888, sect. 8 (c).

- (a) Re Blachford, 27 C. D. 676; and see Re Campbell, (1893) 3 Ch. 468.
 - (b) Ibid., 679.
 - (c) See Re Swain, (1891) 3 Ch. 233;

Re Page, (1893) 1 Ch. 304; How v. Earl Winterton, (1896) 2 Ch. 626; Re Timmis, (1902) 1 Ch. 176.

HOOLEY v. HATTON (a).

Repetition of Legacies.

A larger legacy given by a codicil held not to be a repetition of a smaller legacy given by a will, it being, in the absence of internal evidence to the contrary, accumulative.

The same specific thing or corpus cannot be given twice.

With regard to legacies of quantity, if a legacy of the same amount is given twice for the same cause, and in the same act, and totidem verbis, or only with small difference, it will not be double: but where in different writings there is a bequest of equal, greater or less sums, it is an augmentation.

THE Lady Isabella Finch, by her will (b), bearing date the 30th of August, 1768, gave to Lydia Hooley, her woman, the plaintiff, a legacy of 500l. The will was executed in the presence of two witnesses.

By a codicil, she gave Lydia Hooley 60l., to be paid to her.

She afterwards made a second codicil, dated the 28th of October, 1769, in these words: "I add this codicil to my will: I give Lydia

(a) 1 Bro. Ch. 390 (n.); S. C., Dick. 461; Lofft, 122, nom. Hatton v. Hooley.

(b) In this report of Hooley v. Hatton, the codicils of Lady Isabella Finch are not set forth in the order in which they ought to stand. By an extract from the registry of the Prerogative Court of Canterbucy, it appears that the legacy given to her maid was in these words:—"I give to my woman Lydia Hooley 500l., to be paid to her within three months after my decease."

The first codicil was in these words:

"October 28th, 1769.—This codicil I add to my will. I give 1,000*l*. to Lydia Hooley.—Cecilia Isabella Finch."

The second codicil was as follows:-

"I, Lady Cecilia Isabella Finch, do desire this paper writing may be accepted and taken as a codicil to my will. I give to my servant Lydia Hooley, over and besides what I have left her by my will, an annuity of 121. per annum for her life, to be paid quarterly, on the usual days of payment; the first of the said payments to commence on the first of the said days which shall happen after my decease. Lady Isabella Finch further orders the sum of 60% to be paid to Rebecca Hooley. — Cecilia Isabella Finch."—Note by Mr. Miller, 2, Russ. 269.

Hooley 1,000l." This was in her own handwriting, but not executed before witnesses.

The plaintiff filed her bill for the said legacies and annuity? The question was, whether the last legacy alone passed, or the legace should have both the 1,000l. and the 500l.

The Master of the Rolls (Sir Thomas Sewell) had decreed both to the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed to the Chancellor (Lord Apsley), who was assisted by the Lord Chief Baron Smythe, and Mr. Justice Aston (a). This case, after having been argued very much at large (b), stood over till Hilary Term, when the Court gave judgment.

Mr. Justice Aston.—There is in this case no internal evidence; therefore, we must refer to the general rule of law.

The counsel applied the rules laid down in the case of *The Duke* of St. Albans v. Beauclerk (c). It is evident those rules are not general, but go on the particular circumstances of that case. It was contended there, that the fourth codicil was to stand in the room of the first.

There are four cases of double legacies:

First, when the same specific thing is given twice, Cujacius takes a distinction between the same res and the same quantity. In the first case, it can take place but once, "at eadem quantitas sæpius præstari potest" (d).

Secondly, where the like quantity is given twice, Lord *Hardwicke*, in *The Duke of St. Albans* v. *Beauclerk* (e), alluding to the particular circumstances of the case, laid down, one only should be taken, unless an intention appeared to the contrary (f), but nothing can be collected from hence, as the title of the Digest must be attended to, which expressly says *animo adimendi* (g), where 100l. and 100l. [are given by different instruments], the legatee [is] entitled to both.

- (a) Sir S. S. Smythe, C.B., and Sir Richard Aston, J., had, previous to the Great Seal being delivered to Lord Apsley as Chancellor, been with him Lords Commissioners.
 - (b) Lofft, 122.
 - (c) 2 Atk. 636.

- (d) Dig. l. 22, tit. 3, l. 12; Cuj. op. t. 4, 381, 382.
 - (e) 2 Atk. 638.
 - (f) Dig. 34, tit. 4, 1. 9.
- (g) Godolphin's Orphan's Legacy, pt. 3, c. 26, s. 46; Swinb. 526, 530, edit. 1728.

The floctrine from repetition of two equal sums in one will being bad, and in a will and codicil being good, attributing the former to forgetfulness, is strange. The case of the Slaves (a), is upon entirely different principles. It would be strange to suppose Lord *Hardwicke* applied this as a general rule, which would be inconsistent with his recognising (as he did expressly) the authority of Swinburne, 526, 530; but said that the case before him was different, from the internal evidence.

In regard to the cases in the Roman law,—first, where equal sums are given in two distinct writings, both shall pass by the Roman law, and the decisions of this Court are agreeable thereto (b).

Thirdly, as to a less sum in the latter deed, as 100l. by will, and 50l. by the codicil, the legatee shall take both (c).

Fourthly, as to a larger sum after a less, Richard (d) says, where they are in the *same* instrument, the two sums are not blended, but the legatee has two legacies; and the heir must show that the one was meant to be blended with the other, the presumption being in favour of what is written (e).

The law seems to be, and the authorities only go to prove the legacy not to be double where it is given for the same cause in the same act, and totidem verbis, or only with small difference; but where in different writings there is a bequest of equal, greater, or less sums, it is an augmentation, and therefore Lydia Hooley is entitled to both the sums of 500l. and 1,000l.

LORD CHIEF BARON SMYTHE.—I am clearly of the same opinion and therefore shall be very short.

The intention is the clearest rule; but it is admitted on all hands.

- (a) Dig. 34, tit. 1, l. 18, and that in 2 D'Aguesseau, Pleading the First, p. 21
- (b) Dig. 22, tit. 3, 1. 12; and Gothofred's note in Diversis Scripturis, Dig. 30, tit. 1, 1. 34; in Eadem Scriptura, Cujacius, 4, 381, distinguishes between a corpus and quantity; Voet on the 31 & 32 Digest; Godolphin, pt. 3, c. 26, s. 46; Swinburne, 526; Ricard, Traité des Donations, Vol. 1, p. 419, 420, 421; Wallop v. Hewett, 2 Ch.
- R. 70; Newport v. Kynaston, Rep. t. Finch, 294; Menochius de Præsumptionibus, l. 4; 2 Ch. Rep. 58.
- (c) Godolphin, pt. 3, c. 25, s. 19; Ridout v. Payne, 1 Ves. Sen. 10; Pitt v. Pidgeon, 1 Ch. Ca. 301.
- (d) Vol. 1, p. 451 (Traité des Donations), folio edition.
- (e) Windham v. W., Rep. t. Finch, 267; Pitt v. Pidgeon, 1 Ch. Ca. 301; Masters v. M., 1 P. W. 421, 423; and see Curry v. Pile, 2 Bro. Ch. 225.

here is no internal evidence; we therefore must refer to the rule of law. The rule of law is different with respect to a *corpus* and to quantities.

On the other side was quoted *The Mayor of London* v. *Russell (a)*; where the words were satisfied by some goods. In *The Duke of St. Albans* v. *Beauclerk*, the last codicil was evidently the same as the first.

LORD CHANCELLOR APSLEY (b).—It would be sufficient for me to say, I am of the same opinion, if Mr. Justice Aston had not referred to me with respect to some of the cases.

By the civil law, where two pecuniary legacies were given by the same will, the legatee must prove it was to be doubled: but where the two bequests are in different writings, there the presumption shall be in favour of the legatee.

No argument can be drawn, in the present case, from internal evidence: we must therefore refer to the rule of the civil law.

In the case of The Duke of St. Albans v. Beauclerk, Lord Hardwicke laid down the rule as applicable to that case, and not as a general rule. "The question," said Lord Hardwicke, "divides itself into different parts. I am of opinion, that, upon the reason of the thing, and according to the best writers, these legacies, being in different writings, will make no difference in this case." Neither was it put upon being one instrument. Certainly, they are different: "And as the will and codicil make but one will." Lord Hardwicke quoted Gothofred, "immo hæres priorem probare inanem esse non tenetur," but did not speak of proving both will and codicil as he is represented to do in the report. Then Lord Hardwicke considered the internal evidence, and added, "By the power reserved in her will, she has shown her intent to make them one instrument" (c), which words are omitted in the report.

Lord Hardwicke probably thought that Sir Joseph Jekyll, in Masters v. M., gave two reasons, where he seems to give only one. I will hazard a conjecture upon the pointing of the report (d); the

words marked with inverted commas, from Lord Hardwicke's original note.

⁽a) Rep. t. Finch, 290.

⁽b) Lord Apsley was afterwards Earl of Bathurst.

⁽c) The Lord Chancellor read the w. & T.—VOL. I.

⁽d) 1 P. W. 424.

semicolen in the passage "should not be taken as a satisfaction unless so expressed; that it was," &c., was wrongly placed, and should be after the words "that it was;" by which means the passage would stand, "should not be taken as a satisfaction, unless so expressed that it was; as if both legacies had been given by the same will," &c. This case, therefore, is an authority in point, because there are two distinct writings.

So in Wallop v. Hewett (a), the Registrar's book shows that the case went upon the general doctrine of the civil law, and not on any internal evidence.

His Lordship further cited Windham v. W. (b), Mayor of London v. Russell (c), Newport v. Kynaston (d), Pitt v. Pidgeon (e), 3 Huber, Prælectiones Leg. Civ. 122, and Stirling's Case, in Scotland (f), and concluded with saying, I have therefore the satisfaction to think we confirm Lord Hardwicke's opinion.

The decree of the Master of the Rolls affirmed.

NOTES.

- 1. Generally.
- 2. Legacies of quantity given in different instruments, p. 915.
- 3. Legacies of quantity given by the same instrument, p. 919.
- 4. Extrinsic evidence of testator's intention, p. 920.
- 5. Incidents of original attach to substitutional legacies, p. 920.

1. Generally.

Hooley v. Hatton has usually been referred to as containing a sound exposition of the law as to the repetition of legacies, when the point to be determined is, whether a second legacy is to be taken as substitutional or accumulative (q).

The rules laid down in the principal case are (1) when the same

- (a) 2 Ch. R. 70.
- (b) Rep. t. Finch, 267.
- (c) Rep. t. Finch, 290.
- (d) Rep. t. Finch, 294.
- (e) 1 Ch. Ca. 301.
- (f) 2 Fountainhall, 231.
- (g) See per Lord Eldon in Heming v. Clutterbuck, 1 Bligh (N. S.) 479, at p. 492; and see Foy v. F., 1 Cox, 164;

Ridges v. Morrison, 1 Bro. Ch. 390; Coote v. Boyd, 2 Bro. Ch. 529; Barclay v. Wainwright, 3 V. 465; Suisse v. Lowther, 2 Ha. 432; Wilson v. O'Leary, 12 Eq. 531, L. R. 7 Ch. 448. See for the rules applicable when the presumption against double portions applies

Ex parte Pye, Vol. 2.

specific thing is given twice whether in the same or different instruments it is one gift (a).

But following the civil law our law takes a distinction between res and quantity, and the second rule is (2) that where legacies are given by different writings, the presumption is that they are cumulative whether the amount be equal, greater, or less (b).

(3) The third rule is that where legacies of the same amount are given by the same document, the presumption is that they are not cumulative. Mr. Justice Aston says (c), "The law seems to be, and the authorities only go to prove the legacy not to be double, where it is given for the same cause in the same act, and totidem verbis, or only with small difference." The first rule seems to follow ex necessitate rei, the only question to be decided is whether there are separate articles referred to.

Double gift of the same specific thing.—With regard to the first case mentioned by Mr. Justice Aston, it is clear that where the same specific thing or corpus is given, either in the same instrument or in different instruments, in the nature of the thing it can but be a repetition; where, for instance, there are two gifts of a ruby ring, and there is no pretence that there are two ruby rings (d).

The second is the principal and most important rule.

2. Legacies of Quantity given in Different Instruments.

Legacies of quantity given by different testamentary instruments (see p. 919), are $prim\hat{a}$ facie cumulative whether the second be of the same amount (e), or less (f), or as in the principal case larger (g) than the other.

A fortiori will the legatee be entitled to both legacies where there

- (a) The Duke of St. Albans v. Beauclerk, 2 Atk. 638; Ridges v. Morrison, 1 Bro. Ch. 3\(\frac{1}{2}\); Suisse v. Lowther, 2 Ha. 432; Roxburgh v. Fuller, 13 W. R. 39.
 - (b) See cases, Note 2.
 - (c) Principal case (see p. 912, supra).
 - (d) See cases to note (a), supra.
- (e) Wallop v. Hewett, 2 Ch. R. 70; Newport v. Kynaston, Rep. t. Finch, 294; Baillie v. Butterfield, 1 Cox, 392; Forbes v. Lawrence, 1 Coll. 495; Radburn v. Jervis, 3 B. 450; Lee v. Pain, 4 Ha. 201, 216; Roch v.
- Callen, 6 Ha. 531; Russell v. Dickson, 4 H. L. Cas. 304.
- (f) Pitt v. Pidgeon, 1 Ch. Ca. 301; Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 358; Townshend v. Mostyn, 26 B. 72; Wilson v. O'Leary, 12 Eq. 525, L. R. 7 Ch. 448; Walsh v. W., 4 Ir. R. Eq. 396.
- (g) Suisse v. Lowther, 2 Ha. 424; Hetford v. Lowther, 7 B. 107; Lyon v. Colville, 1 Coll. 449; Brennan v. Moran, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 126; Cresswell v. C., 6 Eq. 69, 76; Wilson v. O'Leary, 12 Eq. 525, L. R. 7 Ch. 448.

is any variation as to the mode or times of payment of each legacy, as, where the legacy given by a will, and that given by a codicil, are payable at different times, carry interest from different dates, are given over to different persons (a), or upon or for different trusts and purposes (b), or where the gifts are not ejusdem generis—e.g., a legacy and an annuity (c), share of a residue and a pecuniary legacy (d), a pecuniary and a specific legacy, although the codicil recited the bequest in the will (e). The fact that the legacies are given to different trustees may, however, assist in rebutting the presumption that the legacies are cumulative (f).

Of course, the rule is merely a rule of construction, and must yield to clear expression of contrary intention in the instruments or other *intrinsic* evidence of intention that one legacy is to be in substitution for the other; but the express statement that some legacies are to be "in addition," and the omission of those words as to others, is not sufficient to show that the latter are not to be cumulative (g).

As to what intrinsic evidence will be sufficient to exclude the rule, in an early case it was said that "simple repetition, where it is exact and punctual," is evidence that the second is substitutional (h); and in another case, that "where the same quantity has been given, and the same cause, or no additional reason" is given in the second instrument, the second is substitutional (i). The modern rule, however, appears to be somewhat narrower—namely, that when in both instruments a motive, and the same motive, is expressed for the gift, and the amount is identical, this will raise

- (a) Hodges v. Peacock, 3 V. 735, 737; Mackenzie v. M., 2 Russ. 262; Bartlett v. Gillard, 3 Russ. 149; Guy v. Sharp, 1 My. & K. 589; Wray v. Field, 6 Madd. 300; S. C., 2 Russ. 257; Watson v. Reed, 5 Si. 431; Strong v. Ingram, 6 Si. 197; Robley v. R., 2 B. 95; A.-G. v. George, 8 Si. 138; Lee v. Pain, 4 Ha. 201, 223.
- (b) Sawrey v. Rumney, 5 De G. & Sm. 698; Spire v. Smith, 1 B. 419.
 - (c) Masters v. M., 1 P. W. 421, 423.
- (d) Gordon v. Anderson, 4 Jur.(N. S.) 1097; Ledger v. Hooker, 18 Jur. 481.
 - (e) Guy v. Sharp, 1 My. & K. 589.
 - (f) Benyon v. B., 17 V. 34.
- (g) Moggridge v. Thackwell, 1 V. 464; Barclay v. Wainwright, 3 V. 466; Mackenzie v. M., 2 Russ. 273; Wray v. Field, 2 Russ. 257; Townshend v. Mostyn, 26 B. 72; and in Allen v. Callow, 3 V. 289. See also per Lord Sugden, C., in Russell v. Dickson, 2 Dr. & War. 133, 4 H. L. Cas. 293; Lee v. Pain, 4 Ha. 201; Watson v. Reed, 5 Si. 431; Sawrey v. Rumney, 5 De G. & Sm. 698; Spire v. Smith, 1 B. 419.
- (h) Per Lord Thurlow in Moggridge v. Thackwell, 1 V. 472.
- (i) Per Lord Thurlow in Ridges v. Morrison, 1 Bro. Ch. 388 at p. 391; and see comments of Sir W. Grant, in Benyon v. B., 17 V. 42.

the presumption that the second gift is substitutional; but no presumption will be raised if in either instrument there be no motive, or a different or additional motive expressed, although the sums be the same (a).

The fact that the repetition of a bequest in a codicil adapts the bounty of the testator to altered circumstances has been held sufficient to raise the presumption that it is substitutional (b).

Where a second instrument expressly refers to the first, although the legacies given in each to the same person may be of different amounts, it may appear—as in $Currie\ v.\ Pye\ (c)$, where the gift of a picture accompanied both bequests, and see per Lord Cranworth in $Russell\ v.\ Dickson\ (d)$ —that the latter gift was intended to be substitutional.

So, where a codicil furnishes intrinsic evidence that the testator is thereby revising, explaining, and qualifying his will, legacies may be construed to be substitutional (e). And where a testator in his codicil refers to a bequest therein as a *sufficient* provision, he may thereby sufficiently manifest his intention, that the legatee was to have nothing else (f).

In other cases, though there may be two documents in form, they may really be one, the second being substitutional for or explanatory of the earlier. Thus, where a later instrument as to the legacies appears to be a mere copy of the former, whether the dates be the same or different, it will so far be held substitutional for the former instrument and the legacies not cumulative (q).

In Roxburgh v. Fuller (supra, note (q)) the M. R. said: "The

- (a) Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 358;
 Benyon v. B., supra; and cf. Roch v.
 Callen, 6 Ha. 531; Suisse v. Lowther,
 2 Ha. 424; M'Kinnon v. Peach, 2
 Keen, 555; Wilson v. O'Leary, 12 Eq.
 525, L. R. 7 Cle 448; Lobley v. Stocks,
 19 B. 392; Lord v. Sutcliffe, 2 Si. 273.
- (b) Allen v. Callow, 3 V. 289; Osborne v. Duke of Leeds, 5 V. 369; see too Lee v. Pain, 4 Ha. 243; and Barclay v. Wainwright, 3 V. 462.
- (c) 17 V. 462; Mayor of London v.
 Russell, Rep. t. Finch, 290; Martin v.
 Drinkwater, 2 B. 215; Bristow v. B.,
 5 B. 289.
 - (d) 4 H. L. Cas. 305.
 - (e) Moggridge v. Thackwell, 1 V.

- 464, 3 Bro. Ch. 517; Benyon v. B., 17 V. 34, 43; Hinchcliffe v. H., 2 Dr. & Sm. 96; Fraser v. Byng, 1 Russ. & M. 90.
 - (f) Robley v. R., 2 B. 95.
- (g) Coote v. Boyd, 2 Bro. Ch. 521, Belt's edit.; Barclay v. Wainwright, 3 V. 462; A.-G. v. Harley, 4 Madd. 263; Hemming v. Gurrey, 2 S. & S. 311, 1 Bligh (N. S.) 479; Gillespie v. Alexander, 2 S. & S. 145; Campbell v. Lord Radnor, 1 Bro. Ch. 271; Tuckey v. Henderson, 33 B. 174; Hinchcliffe v. H., 2 Dr. & Sm. 96; Roxburgh v. Fuller, 13 W. R. 39; Whyte v. W., 17 Eq. 50; Hubbard v. Alexander, 3 C. D. 738.

question is similar to that decided in *Tuckey* v. *Henderson*, not whether one legacy is substitutional for the other, but whether the latter codicils were substituted for the earlier ones."

'The second document, though not a copy, may on the face of it appear to be a substitutionary disposition (a).

In Tuckey v. Henderson (b), a second will was held to be substitutional for a former will, though both were admitted to probate, and therefore legacies in the former will did not take effect; but it was held that an appointment by the first will under a power stood as well as a legacy to the appointee by the second will, as the appointment related to a separate fund, and the second will could not operate as an appointment of it.

It is observed in a note to Fraser v. Byng(c), that if different instruments are exactly co-extensive in their provisions, and in other respects are so nearly identical as to satisfy the Judge that they could never be intended to exist together, probate will be granted only of the latest in date, and the others will be held to be virtually revoked. So, in a recent case (d), the Court held the intention was to revoke the first codicil by a second and granted probate of the will and the second codicil only. And parol evidence will be resorted to, if necessary, to assist in determining the intention (e).

But where testamentary papers, very similar in form, and embracing the same general range of objects, still present such discrepancies that one cannot amount to more than a partial revocation or repetition of the rest, the Probate Court allows all of them to be proved, and leaves it to Courts of equity to exercise their own judgment on the question of addition or substitution, whenever those Courts are called upon to construe their effect for the purpose of determining the rights of legatees (f).

If probate has been granted as to two writings, as of a will and codicil, it is conclusive of the fact that they are distinct instruments, although they are both written on the same paper (g).

- (a) Kidd v. North, 14 Si. 463, 2 Ph.91; Jackson v. J., 2 Cox, 35.
 - (b) 33 B. 174.
 - (c) 1 Russ. & M. 102.
- (d) Chichester v. Quatrefages, (1895) P. 186; see also Re Carritt, 66 L. T. 379.
- (e) Fraser v. Byng, supra. And see Dempsey v. Lawson, 2 P. D. 98; Jenner v. Finch, 5 P. D. 107, and cases there
- cited; O'Leary v. Douglas, 3 L. R. Ir. 323; vide cases under note (e), p. 917, supra, and Hubbard v. Alexander, 3 C. D. 738.
- (f) Re O'Connor, 13 L. R. Ir. 406, and see Williams' Exors., (1905) p. 121.
- (g) Baillie v. Butterfield, 1 Cox, 392;
 but see Campbell v. Lord Radnor, 1
 Bro. Ch. 272; Walsh v. Gladstone, 1

But if two instruments have been admitted to probate as one testament, it has been held that they must for all purposes be considered as one instrument only, and a Court of construction is bound to consider them as such (a).

3. Legacies of Quantity given by the same Instrument.

Where legacies of quantity in the same instrument are given to the same person simpliciter, and are of equal amount, one only will be good, the repetition, according to the doctrine of the civil law, being considered (though strangely, in Mr. Justice Aston's opinion) to arise from forgetfulness; nor will small differences in the way in which the gifts are conferred afford internal evidence that the testator intended that they should be cumulative (b).

The rule is the same with regard to annuities of equal amount given by the same instrument (c).

The rule is also applicable where, although the legacies have been given by different instruments, they are so connected and incorporated one with the other, as to be treated as, and to be admitted to probate as one instrument (d).

Where, however, legacies given by the *same* instrument are of *unequal* amount, they are *primâ facie* cumulative, and this applies in whatever order they stand, and not merely, as might be inferred from Mr. Justice *Aston's* remarks, where a larger sum is given after a less (e).

This rule, as the others, must yield to intention if it appears that the second is not a distinct gift, as in Yockney v. Hansard (f), where

- Ph. 294; Martin v. Drinkwater, 2 B. 215; and cf. Hubbard v. Alexander, supra; Williams' Exors., (1905) p. 1036
- (a) Heming v. Clutterbuck, 1 Bligh (N. S.) 491, 492; Brine v. Ferrier, 7 Si. 549; The Duke of St. Albans v. Beauclerk, 2 Atk. 636; Williams' Exors., p. 1036.
- (b) Greenwood v. G., 1 Bro. Ch. 31 (n.); Garth v. Meyrick, 1 Bro. Ch. 30.
- (c) See Holford v. Wood, 4 V. 76; Manning v. Thesiger, 3 My. & K. 29; Brine v. Ferrier, 7 Si. 549; Early v. Benbow, 2 Coll. 342; Early v. Middleton, 14 B. 453.
- (d) See The Duke of St. Albans v. Beauclerk, 2 Atk. 636; Heming v. Clutterbuck, 1 Bligh (N. S.) 491, 492; see these cases discussed in Wilson v. O'Leary, L. R. 7 Ch. at p. 450; Brine v. Ferrier, 7 Si. 549; and see cases supra as to rules for determining whether two instruments are distinct or one.
- (e) Windham v. W., Rep. t. Finch, 267; Curry v. Pile, 2 Bro. Ch. 225; Hartley v. Ostler, 22 B. 449; and see Baylie v. Quin, 2 Dr. & War. 116; Adnam v. Cole, 6 B. 353; Yockney v. Hansard, 3 Ha. 622; Brennan v. Moran, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 126.
 - (f) 3 Ha. 620.

the Court held that the second gift, though apparently distinct, was merely a statement of what the daughters would have in certain events under the first gift.

•And the cases as to double gifts by the same instrument have no application to the case of a residue given to a person to whom previously a specific or pecuniary gift has been made (a).

Where * legacy is given by a codicil in substitution for a legacy given by a previous instrument, upon a revocation of the last legacy, the former will not be set up again (b).

4. Extrinsic Evidence of Testator's Intention.

In cases where a presumption is raised that the second legacy in a different instrument, is in substitution of a legacy in a former (c), extrinsic evidence of intention is admissible to rebut the presumption, and in support of, but not in opposition to, the expressions in the document (d), where on the construction of the instruments the legacies are cumulative, extrinsic evidence to rebut the construction is inadmissible (e). Where legacies given by the same instrument are on its construction held cumulative, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to alter the construction (f). Apparently the same rule applies, where applying present rules, legacies in the same instrument are held not to be cumulative, though this rule of construction was first treated as a presumption (g).

Extrinsic evidence is, however, admissible to show the circumstances of the testator at the time of making his will, so as to enable the Court to place itself in the position of the testator (h).

5. Incidents of Original attach to Substitutional Legacies.

As a rule, a legacy substituted for, or in addition to a previous legacy to the same person, is subject to the conditions (if any) and incidents attaching to the original legacy (i).

- (a) Kirkpatrick v. Bedford, 4 A. C. 96, 103.
 - (b) Boulcott v. B., 2 Drew. 25.
 - (c) See above, p. 916.
- (d) Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 361; Hall v. Hill, 1 Dr. & War. 116; Suisse v. Lowther, 2 Ha. 424; Lee v. Pain, 4 Ha. 216; Guy v. Sharp, 1 My. & K. 589.
 - (e) Note (d), supra; Roch v. Callen,

- 6 Ha. 531, 533; Wilson v. O'Leary,L. R. 7 Ch. 448.
- (f) Brennan v. Moran, 6 Ir. Ch. R. 126.
- (g) See principal case and Hawkins on Wills, 305.
- (h) Martin v. Drinkwater, 2 B. 215;Guy v. Sharp, 1 My. & K. 589.
- (i) See for statements of general rule, Re Boden, (1907) 1 Ch. at p. 149, per


But this rule does not apply where the substituted legacy is to a different person (a), nor when the conditions are by one document confined to legacies "hereafter" given (b), nor when the legatee is given the second legacy absolutely, but takes only a limited interest under the former legacy (c). The rule has apparently no application where the added or substituted legacy is of a different nature to the preceding legacy; as where a legacy of household furniture and effects is followed in the same will by a legacy of an annuity (d).

Where the rule applies "the cases have not gone further than this; where the subject of the first gift is given absolutely to the party or is made defeasible, the second gift has been held to be given upon similar terms; for example, if the former gift were absolute and free of legacy duty, the additional gift has been held to have all the same incidents; so, if the former gift is to be lost on a certain event, the additional gift is to be defeated on the same condition. In no case has it been held that the latter gift is to go to the parties entitled under the subsequent limitations of the former gift" (c).

Fletcher Moulton, L. J., and Re Joseph, (1908) 2 Ch. at p. 512, per Farwell, L. J.; Leacroft v. Maynard, 1] V. 279, 3 Bro. Ch. 233 (fund); Crowder v. Clowes, 2 V. 449 (fund); Shaftesbury v. Marlborough, 7 Si. 237 (legacy duty); Bristow v. B., 5 B. 289 (fund); Cookson v. Hancock, 2 My. & C. 606 (limitations of legacy); Day v. Croft, 4 B. 561 (separate use); Warwick v. Hawkins, 5 De G. & Sm. 481 (separate use); Johnstone v. Earl Harrowby, 1 De G. F. & J. 183, reversing S. C., 1 John. 425 (legacy duty and abatement); Re Lawrenson, (C. A.), (1891) W. N. 28 (restraint on anticipation); Fisher v. Brierley, 30 B. 267 (legacy duty); but see Alexander v. A., 5 B. 518; King v.

Tootel, 25 B. 23; Re Howe, (1910) W. N. 190.

- (a) Chatteris v. Young, 2 Russ. 184; Re Joseph, (1908) 2 Ch. 507.
- (b) Bonner v. B., 13 V. 379; Strongv. Ingram, 6 Si. 197; cf. Re Dealy, 85L. T. 451.
- (c) Re Mores' Trust, 10 Ha. 171; Mann v. Fuller, Kay, 624, 626; and see Alexander v. A., 5 B. 518; Haley v. Bannister, 23 B. 336; Hill v. Jones, 37 L. J. Ch. 465; Cookson v. Hancock, 2 My. & C. 606; Hargreaves v. Pennington, 12 W. R. 1047.
 - (d) Re Howe, (1910) W. N. 190.
- (e) Per Wood, V.-C., Mann v. Fuller, Kay, 626; Re Boddington, 25 C. D. 685. See also Overend v. Gurney, 7 Si. 128.



INDEX.

ABATEMENT OF LEGACIES, 882 et seq. annuities, 852, 885, 887 appropriated fund, 883 bequest of residue of a fund, ib. creditors, legacies to, 885, 886 demonstrative legacies, 836, 888 devastavit by executor, 884, 885 devises of land not charged with debt, abate when, 888 dower, 886, 887 executor must not prefer his own legacy, 888 general legacies, 885 intention governs, 882, 884 legacy on condition of legatee executing general release, 887 onus on legatee seeking priority, 884, 885 power of distress, 887 priority in what cases, 886 rule as to, 882 share received, estate subsequently wasted, 885 specific legacies, 888

ABROAD, actions. See Jurisdiction.

ACQUIESCENCE, 344 et seq.

And see Compromises; Reversionary Interests, dealings with; Undue Influence, Oppression.

ACT OF PARLIAMENT,

power to restrain application for, 798, 799

ACTIONS ABROAD. See LAND OUT OF THE JURISDICTION.

ADEMPTION OF LEGACIES, 864 et seq.
articles purchased but not sent home, 866
confirmation of a will by codicil, 864
debt, 866, 867
received by the testator, 866
demonstrative legacy, 20, 872
general legacy, 864
subsequently made specific, 872
household furniture, &c., 866

ADEMPTION OF LEGACIES—continued.

in loco parentis, by testator, 864 lease with covenant for renewal, 871 leaseholds, 870, 871

fee subsequently purchased, 871 general devise of, 874 legacy of specific chattels, subsequent loss or destruction, 864 mortgage debt, 867 partition, effect of, on, 871 partnership share, 869 payment directed out of a particular fund, 872 pecuniary legacy remaining a charge on land though revoked by general bequest of all personalty to another, ib. policy on life of another person, 867, 875 powers, gifts under, 871, 872 property subject to power of appointment, 871, 872 railway company serving notice to treat, 870 republication of will, 864 share of testator under will of another, 867 specific chattels, of, 864, 865 specific legacy, in general, 864, 865 of goods at a particular place, 865, 866 stock converted at option of holder, 869 converted by Act of Parliament, 868 repurchased, ib. standing in the name of a trustee, ib. transferred by tortious act, 865 stocks and shares, 868 et seq. unauthorised acts of parties, by, ib.

ADMINISTRATION. See Debts, Liability of Real and Personal Estate for; Married Woman; Marshalling of Assets; Order of Application of Assets in Administration.

underlessee taking assignment of original lease, 871

ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS,

Wills Act, effect of, ib.

stay of proceedings, in, 788-793

See also Land out of the Jurisdiction.

ADMIRALTY. See MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES.

AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY.

covenant to assign, subsequent bankruptcy raises right of proof, 137
validity assignment does not depend on specific performance, 118, 119
all after-acquired property, 119
covenants as to, construed as divisible, 119
effect of covenant to settle or charge, 120
And see Assignment of Chose in Action.

ALIEN,

conversion of land into money in case of, 359, 360 Naturalization Act, 1870, could not hold land against Grown before, 359

ALIMONY,

assignment of, 158

ANNUITY,

abatement of, 852, 885, 887, 888 annuitant acquiescing in payment not in full, 850 appropriation to secure, 892, 893 arrears of, will not bear interest, 904 bankruptcy or alienation, gift over on, 852 charged on residue, conversion in cases of, 79 corpus, when liable for, 849 et seq. death of annuitant after testator's death, before purchase, 852, 853 deficiency of, satisfied out of released fund before it sinks into residue, 887 devise of personal annuity to A. and the heirs of his body, 845 discretionary trust to purchase, 853 distinction between legacy for life and, 904 income tax, by whom payable, 906 legacy of, 845 of specific sum to be spent in purchase of, 851 out of rents or profits, &c., 849, 850 perpetual or for life, when, 846, 847, 848 postponement of payment of, 904 power of distress does not give priority to, 887 specific sum to be spent in purchase of, annuitant entitled to, when, 851, 852 time of payment of, 904

"ANY REVERSIONARY INTEREST," meaning of, under Sales of Reversions Act, 1867...332 et seq.

APPORTIONMENT,

tenant for life and remainderman of residue, between, 87, 90 And see TENANT FOR LIFE, ETC.

APPORTIONMENT ACT, 1870...879, 880, 881

APPONTIONMENT OF LEGACIES, 879 et seq. Apportionment Acts, to whom applicable, 879, 880, 881 bonus, profits, 879 dividends, ib. income of personalty specifically bequeathed when apportionable between legatee and estate, 879 share in private partnership, 880 2

"APPROBATION AND REPROBATION," doctrine of, 455 et seq.

APPROPRIATION OF LEGACIES, 891, et seq. in case of legacy given on contingency, 891

APPROPRIATION OF LEGACIES-continued.

losses and profits on, 891

residuary legatee, residue paid to, on giving security for the payment of a contingent legacy, ib.

ASSETS. See Administration; Marshalling of Assets; Order of Application of Assets in Administration.

ASSIGNEE

of debt bound by state of accounts between assignor and debtor, 142 et seq. suing in his own name, 140

ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION. And see After-acquired Property; Bankruptcy; Distringas; Floating Charge; Stop Order; Wife's Choses in Action.

I. COMMON LAW.

general rule no assignment possible, 104 exceptions at common law, 105 by statute, 106 et seq.

II. EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.

general principles governing, 105, 106 instances of, 112 et seq. not affected by Judicature Act, 1873...107 distringas, 134 stop order, ib. what interests are assignable.

general principle, 108 et seq.
both legal and equitable choses in action, 106
possibilities, 108
personal agreements not assignable, 109
salary for personal services assignable, 109
personal licence not assignable, 109, 112
right to sue for damages not assignable, 109
claims for misfeasance of directors, 162
non-existing property and possibilities, 108, 109
book debts, 109
future freight, 108
uncalled capital, 109, 111

See After-acquired Property. What amounts to an equitable assignment. no formal requirements, 111 writing not necessary, ib.

unless agreement within Statute of Frauds, ib. notice, assignment complete without, 106, 112, 115 of non-payment to debtor not necessary, 112

but assignee not giving notice liable, as for wilful default, 112 consideration, when necessary, 111, 112, 152 mandate distinguished from assignment, 115, 116, 117 opening a credit not assignment, 115 promise to pay money out of debts, when paid not assignment,

```
ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION—continued.
    II. EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT—continued.
      Notice.
         general rules as to priorities by notice, 120, 121,
                      have no application to shares, 133
                      apply to assignment of proceeds of sale of real
                        estate, 139
                      do not apply to interests in land, 139
                                      mortgage debts, 139
         debtor may pay in absence of, 121
        on sale of reversionary fund, 130
      Priorities between assignees.
         general principles, 121—127
         simultaneous assignments, 131
      How given.
             writing not necessary, 127
             not necessarily by assignee, ib.
             contents of notice, 131
      To whom.
             to the person accountable to assignor, 127, 128, 131, 132
             to one of several trustees sufficient, 126, 128
             quære where assignment subsequent to death of trustee
               having notice, 129
             if given to all trustees priority not lost by death of all, 128
             where assignor is both a trustee and beneficiary, 129
             when assignee is a co-trustee, 130
             where assignee is trustee, ib.
             commissions, on sale of, 131
             legacy, on assignment of, ib.
             solicitors of trustees, 132
      Priorities. See Notice, supra; DISTRINGAS; STOP ORDER.
      Effect of Assignment.
         Equities, assignee takes subject to, 142
                   existing at date of assignment, 142, 143
                   not subject to those arising subsequently to notice
                     of assignment, 145
                   companies lien for debts on shares, 144
                   cestui que trust, assignee of, position of, 145
                   set-off, 142
         defects in title, assignee takes subject to, 144
                         breaches of trust by trustee assignor, ib.
                        fraud of assignor, ib.
         assignee may take free from equities under the agreement
                between the debtor and the assignor, 145
             release of equities, ib.
             default of debtor, 145, 146
             negotiable instruments, 746, 147
    III. STATUTORY.
       Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 6.
         assignment, conditional, is excluded, 151
```

express notice of, must be given, 152

by whom, ib.

ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION—continued.

III. STATUTORY—continued.

Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 6—continued. assignment, mortgage may be by way of, 151

must be absolute, ib.

of definite sum, ib.

need not be for consideration, 152

of future debt, ib.

of right of litigation is bad, ib.

part of an entire debt, 151. And see ADDENDA. subject-matter of, must be a debt or other

legal chose in action, 151

all rights assignable in equity are assignable under the Act, ib.

benefit of covenant, contained in lease, assignable chose in action, 151

consideration, assignment need not be for, 152

personal contract, benefit of, is unassignable, 152

Real Property Amendment Act, 1845. assignment of possibilities, 106

BANKRUPTCY.

covenant to assign after-acquired property, subsequent bankruptcy raises right of proof, 137

discretionary trust for benefit of legatee, 862, 863

marshalling in cases of, 62, 63

reputed ownership in, 135

exception from, 135

statutory assignment of choses in action to trustee in, 136

stay of actions, 790, 791, 792, 793

trustee in, when entitled to legacy given for benefit of legatee,

And see Assignment; Married Woman; Marshalling of SECURITIES.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

indorsee of overdue, takes subject to all defects of title, 147 representation by drawer that bill will be met by drawer is not equitable assignment or specific appropriation of funds, 115

BOND,

donatio mortis causâ of, 434, 436

BOUNDARIES (ASCERTAINING),

charity lands, of, 191

collieries, of, 190

colonial lands, of, ib.

commission for, cases in which issued, 186 et seq. refused, 185, 186

compensation in proceedings for, 190

Copyhold Act, 1894, under, 191

corporation lands, 190

costs of proceedings for, ib.

distrain, right to, lost by confusion, 190, 191

BOUNDARIES (ASCERTAINING)—continued.

evidence, admissibility of various kinds of, 189
freeholds and copyholds, distinguishing, 190
Inclosure Acts, under, 191
issue to ascertain, 189
jurisdiction, equitable, origin and limits of, 184, 185
Judicature Act, 1873, under, 186
multiplicity of suits, prevention of, grounds jurisdiction, 189
parties necessary to proceedings for, 191
plaintiff's case, essentials of, 189
reference to Chambers, 190
under Arbitration Act, 1889, ib.
rents, past, account of, 190
tenant, duty of, to preserve boundaries, 186, 187

BUSINESS,

losses on, when carried on by receiver for benefit of successive tenants for life, 90

CALLS ON SHARES, legatee, when liable for, 875

CATCHING BARGAINS. See Expectants; Inadequacy of Price; Moneylenders Act, 1900; Oppression; Reversionary Interests, Dealings with; Undue Influence.

CHAMPERTY,

agreement by heir out of possession, 162
agreements and defences tainted by, 159, 160
definition of, 159
exceptions to doctrine, ib.
maintenance, distinguished from, 158
misfeasance claims, assignment of, not, 162
person with original good title may sue in spite of subsequent
champertous agreement, 161
solicitors, agreements with clients and, ib.

CHARITIES. See also Land out of the Jurisdiction.
marshalling in cases of, 54 et seq.
Mortmain Act, 1891, may take proceeds of sale of land bequeathed,
360, 361
secus formerly, 360

CHEQUES.

donatio mortis caus â of, 432-436

CHESTERFIELD'S TRUSTS, RE, RULE IN. See TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDERMAN.

CHILD.

interest on legacies to, 897, 898

CHILDREN. See GUARDIAN AND WARD; MARRIED WOMAN.

MOITOA NI SESCHO

See Assignment, Etc.; Wife's Choses in Action.

COMPANIES.

shares, assignment of, 133
See Land out of the Jurisdiction.

COMPANY,

compromise by, 252 debentures, assignee of, taking subject to equities between assignor and company, 143 estoppel with regard to, 486—489 misfeasance claims, assignment of, 162 priority between subsequent incumbrancers on shares in, 133 restraining proceedings against, 791, 792

COMPENSATION. See Election.

COMPROMISES,

absent parties, when they may be bound by, 252 acquiescence in, a bar to setting aside, 247 corporations and companies, powers of, to enter into, 252 counsel and solicitor, powers of, to enter into, 249, 250 disclosure, full, when necessary, 247 et seq. loctrine of equity as to, 240 et seq. good faith necessary, 248, 249 infants, and persons under disability, powers of Court to sanction comprises on behalf of, 250, 251 judicial, when and how enforced, 252, 253 married women, powers of Court to sanction compromises on behalf of, 251 mistake in cases of family arrangements, 244 et seq. of fact or of law as to private rights, common to all parties, 244 et seq. of law, when ground of relief from, 243, 244, 247

of law and mistake of fact, distinction between, 242
et seq.
private rights, of, 241, 242, 244
rectification of deed carrying into effect a compromise, 256
setting aside judicial compromises, 253, 254
"without prejudice," letters written, and with a view to a
compromise, 257
And see Family Arrangements.

CONFIRMATION.

incapable of, transactions, 345
Infants' Relief Act, 1874...345, 346
of contracts by persons under disability and election, 467
And see Election; Oppression; Reversionary Interests,
Dealings with; Undue Influence.

CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS, 792

CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD. See Acquiescence; Confirmation; Expectants; Inadequacy of Price; Moneylenders Act, 1900; Oppression; Reversionary Interests, Dealings with; Undue Influence; Voluntary Donations.

CONTINGENT LEGACY, 899 et seq. interest on, 893, 897 et seq. maintenance out of, for child, 897 et seq. to a class, 900

CONTRACT,

assignee of money to arise under, takes subject to condition of, 143

by married woman. See MARRIED WOMAN.

obtained by undue influence. See Undue Influence.

to purchase land in fee before death, rights of devisee or heir, 356 et seq., 362 et seq.

CONTRARY INTENTION,

within Real Estate Charges Acts, 27 et seq.

CONVERSION,

partition, in cases of, 223, 224 will, confined to purposes of, 400

And see Conversion of Land into Money and Money into Land; Tenant for Life, Etc.

CONVERSION OF LAND INTO MONEY AND MONEY INTO LAND,

death duties, doctrine in relation to, 369 et seq. discretionary power of sale, and imperative trust, 368 double conversion, 369

election to take property unconverted, 378 et seq.

delegated power of, 380

how made, 383 et seq.

injunction to prevent trustees selling so as to defeat right, 386

land directed to be converted into money, 379

married woman, by, 379, 380

money into land, 379

partition actions, in, 223, 224, 391, 392

remainderman, by, 381, 382

tenant in tail, by, 382, 383

tenants in common, by, 381

who may elect, 379 et seq.

general doctrine of, 353, 354

imperative, direction must be, in order to effect, 363 et seq.

direction so considered, where limitations adapted only

to realty, 365

notwithstanding power to invest

on other security, 365, 366

implied, direction for conversion may be, 369
infant's property, conversion of, by Court, 388 et seq. insurance moneys, doctrine in relation to, 391, 392
Irish Church Act, 1869, conversion under, 393

```
CONVERSION OF LAND INTO MONEY AND MONEY INTO LAND—continued.
```

fand agreed or directed to be sold, 359 et seq.

alien entitled to proceeds even before Naturalization Act, 1870...359, 360

alternative devise in unconverted state does not prevent conversion, 366, 367

charity may take, under Mortmain, &c., Act, 1891...360, 361

secus formerly, 360

foreign lands, 354

Locke King's Act, not within, 361

money, treated as, 359 et seq.

partnership land, 354

personal estate, passes by general bequest of, 359

representative, devolves on, though conversion postponed by will, *ib*.

rents before conversion, how applied, 362, 372, 373 Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, conversion under, 393 lunatic's property, conversion of, by Court, 386 et seq. money agreed or directed to be laid out in land, 354 et seq.

Court, money in, 355, 356

curtesy, subject to, 354

debts, now liable to simple contract, ib.

dower, whether subject to, 354, 355

escheat, not subject to, 355

heir of ancestor, when entitled as against personal representatives, 356 et seq.

entitled if prior outstanding equitable interest in another, 356, 357

secus if money "at home," 357, 358, 359

land, treated as, 354 et seq.

"lands," passes by devise of, 355

may be included under description of "hereditaments," 355

"money," when it passes by bequest of, ib.

real assets, 354

mortgagee selling under power, right to surplus, 365, 373 option to purchase, exercise of, when it effects retrospective conversion, 373 et seq.

optional direction for, effect of, 363 et seq.

particular purpose, conversion directed for, right to surplus, 391

Partition Act, 1868, conversion under, 223, 224, 391, 392 period at which conversion takes place, 361 et seq., 372 reconversion, 378 et seq., 386

"request," direction for conversion at, when and when not imperative, 367, 368

sale, conversion by contract for, 359, 361 et seq.

specific performance, relation of the, 361

tortious conversion by trustees does not affect rights of cestri que trust, 386

And see Election; Infant; Lunatic; Resulting Trust.

CONVEYANCE

by personal representative of land contracted to be sold before death, 363

COUNSEL,

compromises by, 249, 250

COURTS,

may elect for benefit of infant, 379, 465 restraining proceedings in. See JURISDICTION, ETC.

COVENANT (VOIDABLE)

election in case of, 466

COVERTURE,

election in case of, 465

CREDITORS,

abatement of legacies to, 885, 886 covenant to settle after-acquired property, when good against, 137 And see Marshalling of Assets.

CROWN.

as universal guardian, 517 election, doctrine of, as applied to, 449 escheats to Crown, under Intestates Estates Acts, 411 And see Marshalling of Securities.

CURTESY

not abolished, 746

CUSTODY

of infants and wards. See GUARDIAN AND WARD.

DEATH DUTIES. See Conversion of Land, Etc.

DEBTS.

demonstrative legacies contribute to, when, 836, 888 election in case of debts apportioned upon different funds, 462 forgiveness of, a legacy, 837 legacy of, 837, 838

money directed to be converted into land chargeable with, 354 specific legacies contribute to, when, 888

And see Assignment of Choses in Action; Debts, Liability of Real and Personal Estate for; Order of Application of Assets in Administration.

DEBTS, LIABILITY OF REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE FOR

exoneration of mortgaged estates in cases not within Real Estate Charges Acts, 22, 23

personal estate,

exonerated, in what cases, 12 et seq.

exoneration of,

burden of proof on parties contending for, 12 express words, by, 12, 13 expressions amounting to 17, 18

DEPOSIT NOTES,

DEVISE OF LAND,

donatio mortis causa of, 432, 433

land converted into money will not pass under, 359 et seq.

```
DEBTS, LIABILITY OF, ETC .- continued.
    personal estate—continued.
        exoneration of-continued.
            plain intention, by, 13, 14
            -testator's intention governs, 12
        intention to exonerate,
            extrinsic evidence inadmissible to prove, 12
            how shown, 13 et seq.
            implied from bequest to executor, not, 19
                                 of personalty specifically, 15, 16
                                    residue, whether, 14, 15
                          charge of debts on specific fund, 21
                                          simply, not, 13
                                    funeral and testamentary ex-
                                      penses, whether, 15
                                    legacies, whether, 19
                         creation of term for payment of debts, not,
                         devise subject to debts generally, semble
                           not, ib.
                         direction to pay debts out of part of realty,
                                     16, 18
                                  exempting personalty bequeathed,
                                     19
                         express charge of debts on personalty,
                            whether, 17
                          mixed gift of realty and personalty,
                            whether, 13, 14
                         trust to pay legacies, whether, 19, 20
                                      specific debts, 20
                               to sell for payment of debts, not, 13
            lapse, effect of, on, 18
        legatee of, appointment of, as executor, inference against
          exoneration, 16
        primary liability of, unless exonerated, 12
                           not affected by Land Transfer Act, 1897, ib.
    real and personal estate, when rateably liable, 13 et seq.
    real estate, charge of debts on, unaffected by Land Transfer Act,
      1897...12
        And see Administration; Real Estate Charges Acts.
DEEDS,
    election in cases of, 455, 456, 457
DELAY. See Undue Influence.
DEMONSTRATIVE LEGACY,
    not adeemed by failure of primary fund, 20, 836
      And see Abatement of Legacies.
```

DISCRETIONARY TRUST, LEGACY ON, 862 et seq. DISTRINGAS, 134

DIVIDENDS.

meaning of, under Apportionment Act, 1870...879 specific legatee, when entitled to, 877 tenant for life, when entitled to, 877, 878

DIVORCE. See GUARDIAN AND WARD; MARRIED WOMAN.

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA,

ambulatory, 425 condition may be annexed to, 429, 430 contemplation of death essential, 427 of suicide not sufficient, 427 Court will interfere to complete, 432

Court will interfere to complete, 432 death, contemplation of, 427 debts, subject to, 425

delivery of, necessary, 428, 429, 431 what is sufficient, 431 et seq.

doctrine of, generally, 424, 425 dominion must be parted with, 430, 431 election in cases of, 426 evidence upon which established, 437

executor's assent to, unnecessary, 425

general principles, 424, 427

gift inter vivos, how it differs from, 425 legacy, how it differs from, 425, 426

legacy may satisfy, 426. See Addenda.

legacy duty, subject to, 425

personal representatives of donor, when donee may sue in name of, 426

practice in cases of, ib.

probate of, unnecessary, 425 requisites of, 427 et seq.

delivery of property or of means of obtaining it required, 428, 429, 433, 437

need not be contemporaneous, 428 must be to donee or his agent, 429

where legal title does not pass on, 431, 432

revocable during donor's life, 425, 426, 428 revoked, cannot be, by subsequent will, 426. See Addenda. subject of, what may be, 434 et seq.

bank-notes, 434

banker's deposit note, ib.

bonds, ib.

mortgage deeds, 436

negotiable instruments, 434, 435

not certificate of investment, 234 not Post Office Savings Bank deposit-book, ib.

policy of insurance, 436

whether cheque on bankers, 434, 435 symbol, delivery of, not enough, 421, 428

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA—continued.

testamentary dispositions distinguished from, 426, 427
gift not supported as, 426
trust may be annexed to 429, 430
Wills Act does not abolish, 425

DOWER.

assignment of, widow's right to, 232 election in cases of, 464 money directed to be converted into land, whether liable to, 354, 255 partition, in cases of, 232, 233 priority of legacy given for, 886, 887

DUTIES UNDER STAMP ACTS, assignments of choses in action, 118 in relation to doctrine of conversion, 369 et seq.

EARNINGS OF WIFE. See MARRIED WOMAN.

EDUCATION OF INFANTS AND WARDS, 518, 545

account, persons compelled to elect may first have, 462

ELECTION,

appointments under powers, in case of, 459 et seq. approbation and reprobation, doctrine of, 455 et seq. bound by, what parties are, 464, 465 compensation where election against will, 446 et seq. against estate of deceased person who has elected, 446 ascertained as at death of testator, 446 assessed, on what principles, 447 compulsory, 462 confirmation of covenants by married women to settle, 448, 467 creditors, doctrine not applied to, 455 Crown grants, in case of, 449 death of person to elect without electing, 468 debt and legacy, between, 452 debts apportioned upon different funds, 462 deeds, in cases of, 455, 456, 457 derivative interests, in cases of, 448, 449 doctrine of, exclusion of, 454, 455 generally, 444 et seq. is doctrine of compensation, not forfeiture,

donatio mortis causa, in case of, 426
dowress, by, 464
election presumed against instrument where none in fact, 463
foreign lands, in case of, 459
general devise or bequest, in case of, 452 et seq.
heir, by, 456, 458, 463
ignorance of facts, need not be made in, 463, 464
implied, 463 et seq.
infant, by, as to taking under settlement, 466, 467
generally, 465

446 et seq.

INDEX.

ELECTION—continued.

inquiry, when directed, 463
intention governs, 449, 450, 451, 452, 454, 463
interests to which doctrine applicable, 447 et seq.
judgment compelling, 462
knowledge of rights necessary to, 463
legatee, election by, under appointments under power, 459, 460
lunatic, in case of, 466
married woman, by, 448, 465 et seq.
under will of, 458, 459

mistake, in case of, gift under, 449

made under, not binding, 462 next of kin of person who died without electing, by, 468 parol evidence not admitted, 449, 453 ratification distinguished from, 466, 467

release directed where election to take under will, 465 remainderman not bound by election of party having prior interest, ib.

remoteness, when gift void for, 461 settlement and will, between, 451

articles for, election in case of, 456 where set aside, 448, 456

testator's own property, several gifts of (onerous and beneficial), not a case of election, 457 time, lapse of, effect of, 464

voidable covenant, when held binding, 465 widow, by, 464

wills, in case of, 457 et seq.

And see Conversion of Land into Money and Money into Land; Donatio Mortis Causa.

ENLARGEMENT

of long term by married woman, 718

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. See ESTOPPEL, EQUITABLE.

EQUITY ACTS IN PERSONAM, 814

EQUITY AND LAW. See JURISDICTION.

EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT,

adequate settlement a defence, 678, 679 adultery of wife, 679, 680 amount of settlement, 668, 669 assignees, when bound by, 663 barred, when, 678 children, rights of, 666, 667 common law rights of husband, 659 form of settlement, 670—672 fraud of wife, 679 fund, value of, immaterial, 670 husband domiciled abroad, 680 legal estate, as to, 660, 661, 664

EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT—continued. life interest of wife, 664, 680, 681 mortgagees, when bound by, 681 possession, reduction into, 678 post-nustial settlement, 672-674 powers of trustees, 661 property affected by, 661, 664, 665 reduction into possession, 678 refusal to execute settlement, 672 reversionary property, as to, 665 right to receive property, binds, 660 settlement, 670-674, 678, 679 statutory amendments of, 659, 660 trustees, powers of, 661 value of fund immaterial, 670 waiver of, 667, 674—678 wife's reversionary interest falling into possession, 175

ESCHEAT.

ESTOPPEL, EQUITABLE, acquiescence, by, 475, 484

money directed to be converted into land, 355 resulting trust, in case of, 411

ESTATE DUTY. See DEATH DUTIES UNDER CONVERSION, ETC.

admission, distinguished from, 474 agent, by, 477, 484-486 ambiguous representation, by, 475 belief in representation necessary, 476, 477, 480 companies, as to, 486-489 concealment, by, 475 deceit, distinguished from, 473, 474, 476 definition of, 472, 474 director of company, as to, 487 estoppel against estoppel, 477 fact, must relate to a matter of, 474, 477 fraud, distinguished from, 473, 474, 476 "holding out," by, 475, 481 infants, as to, 491-493 landlord and tenant, between, 478-480 "lying by," by, 475, 479 married women, as to, 493, 494

negotiable instruments, as to, 489
partners, as to, 481
principal and agent, as to, 477, 484—486
recital, by, 480
silence, by, 475, 481, 482—484
volunteers, not aided by, 476
warranty, distinguished from, 474
of authority, distinguished from, 490

INDEX.

EVIDENCE,

donatio mortis causa, in cases of, 437
how far admissible to show whether legacy specific or general,
881
parol, not admissible to prove intention to exonerate, 12
in cases of election, 449, 453

EXECUTOR.

abatement of legacies in case of devastavit by, 884, 885 assent to donatio mortis causâ unnecessary, 425 assignee of executor's interest in will takes subject to equities attaching to assignor, 144 conversion of wasting securities, duty of, as to, 91 infant's legacy, payment of, 889 legatee of personalty, appointment of, as executor, no inference against exoneration, 19

And see Debts, Liability of Real and Personal Estate For; Order of Application of Assets in Administration.

EXONERATION. See Debts, Liability of Real and Personal Estate for; Real Estate Charges Acts.

EXPECTANTS.

meaning of term elastic, 323, 324

And see Reversionary Interests, Dealings with.

FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS,

creditors, may or may not be void against, 256
disentailing family estates, 254 et seq.
doctrine of equity as to, 254
execution of deed by all parties necessary, 256, 257
husband and wife, between, 257, 258, 284
implied without express writing, may be, 254
mistake of law in cases of, 244 et seq.
misunderstanding of rights, how far it affects, 256
undue influence, favourable construction placed on them in relation to doctrine of, 283, 284

And see Compromises; Husband and Wife; Reversionary
Interests, Dealings with.

FARMING STOCK, legacy of, 843

FATHER. See GUARDIAN AND WARD.

FEME COVERT, election in case of, 465

FIRE INSURANCE MONEYS,

and the rule in Laws v. Bennett, 375, 376, 377 settled property, in case of, 391, 392. See ADDENDA.

FLOATING CHARGE,

effect of provision does not prevent sale or mortgage, 110 nature of, 109 priority over mortgage, when and when not, 110 when floating charge attaches, 111

See Assignment.

FORECLOSURE. See LAND OUT OF THE JURISDICTION.

FOREIGN COURTS, restraining proceedings in, 793—798

FRAUD. See Acquiescence; Confirmation; Expectants; Inadequacy of Price; Moneylenders Act, 1900; Oppression; Reversionary Interests, Dealings with; Undue Influence; Voluntary Donations. See also Land out of the Jurisdiction.

FRAUD ON MARITAL RIGHTS. See MARRIED WOMAN.

FREIGHT,

future, assignable, 108 mortgage of, 138 priorities between mortgagees of, *ib*.

"FUNDED" PROPERTY, legacy of, 839

FUNERAL EXPENSES, charge of, on land, effect of, 15

GENERAL BEQUEST, money directed to be converted into land will not pass as money under, 355 et seq.

GENERAL DEVISE passes money directed to be converted into land, 355

GENERAL DEVISE OR BEQUEST, election in case of, 452 et seq.

GENERAL LEGACY, ademption of, 864

GIFTS. See MARRIED WOMAN.

GUARDIAN AND WARD,
abandonment of child, 558
abroad, infants, 554
taking ward, 546—548
access to ward by relatives, 545
appointment of guardian, by will, 532—537
by deed, 535
conditional, 534

```
GUARDIAN AND WARD-continued.
    appointment of guardian, form of, 535
                               revocable, 535
    attendance before Court, of guardian, 548
                             of ward, ib.
    Chancery Division, jurisdiction of, 517
    choice of residence by ward, 546
    consent to marriage of infant, 523, 524
    contempt of Court, 515, 525-527, 530, 547
    Court of Chancery, jurisdiction of, 517
    Crown as universal guardian, 517
    Custody of Children Act, 1891...558
    custody of infants, 545, 548-553
        enforcement of orders, as to, 553
        on divorce, &c., 557
        powers of Court, 551-553
    Custody of Infants Act, 1873...555
    desertion of child, 558
    disclaimer of office by testamentary guardian, 536
    divorce, custody of children after, 553, 557
    Divorce Division, jurisdiction of, 553
    education of child, 518, 551
                 ward, 545
    father, appointment of guardian by, 532, 533
           consent of, to marriage, 523, 524
           duty of, to maintain child, 558, 559
           giving up rights, by deed, 555
           jurisdiction of Court over, 537-543
           position under statutes, 555-558
           rights of, 517
               against mother, 519, 520
               duration, 518
               education, as to, 518
               how lost, 519, 520, 537 et seq.
               release of, 519
               religion, as to, 518
    foreign guardians, 554
    guardians, kinds of, 517, 518, 532
               testamentary, 532, 536, 537
    Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886...555-557
    habeas corpus, 548, 549, 551
    illegitimate child, 521, 551
    infant abroad, jurisdiction over, 554
                   taking, 546-548
           with or without property, 517
    information, duty of guardian to give Court, 548
    judicial separation, custody of children on, 557
    jurisdiction of Court, 517
        when ended, 530
        over father, 537—543
              guardian appointed by Court, 544-548
              infants abroad, 554
```

INDEX. GUARDIAN AND WARD—continued. jurisdiction of Court-continued. over testamentary guardians, 543-548 by statute, 555-558 jurisdiction, reciprocal, 544 taking wards out of, 546-548 marriage, age for, 522 • of infant, consent to, 523, 524 false declarations on, 523 of ward of Court, 523 without leave, 525, 530, 532 settlements of infants, 524, 525 wards of Court, 528-532 mother, appointment of guardian by, 532 consent of, to marriage, 523, 524 duty to maintain child, 559 rights of, 520 over illegitimate child, 521, 551 by statute, 521 next friend, 519 parent. See Father and Mother, supra. post nuptial settlements, 525 powers of Court under statutes, 555—559 punishment for marrying ward of Court, 525-527 religion, 518, 542, 551-553 removal of guardian, 543, 544, 545 residence, choice of, by ward, 546 settlements on marriage of infant, 524, 525

ward of Court, 528-532statutory powers of Court, 555-559 survivorship among testamentary guardians, 535 testamentary guardians, 532-537 unmarried woman as guardian, 534, 535, 544 voluntary donations between, set aside, 284, 285, 286 ward of Court, definition of, 521, 522 And see Undue Influence.

GUARDIANSHIP,

by appointment of spiritual Court, 518 in deed or will, 532-537 in chivalry, 517 by custom, 517 by election, 518 by nature and nurture, 517-521 in socage, 517 by statute, 518

HABEAS CORPUS.

as to infants and wards, 548, 549, 551

HEIR,

agreements contrary to public policy with, 162 conversion of money into land, 356 et seq.

HEIR-continued.

conversion of land into money, 359 et seq.

election by, 456, 458, 463

entitled to know all facts before, 463

entitled to have house finished at expense of personal estate, 363 to land contracted to be purchased by ancestor, 362

excluded in favour of residuary legatee on conversion of real estate into personal, when, 406 et seq.

HUSBAND AND WIFE. See MARRIED WOMAN; WIFE'S CHOSES IN ACTION.

choses in action, assignment of wife's, 167 et seq. estoppel, 493, 494

Huguenin v. Baseley, doctrine of, not applicable to, 284

interest of husband in wife's property prior to 1883...167

marshalling on mortgage of wife's estate by husband and wife, subsequent mortgage by one, 65

partition, proceeds of, receipt by husband, 224

reduction into possession (q.v.), 168 et seq.

separation deeds upheld as compromises, 257, 258

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD. See GUARDIAN AND WARD.

INADEQUACY OF PRICE

is evidence of undue influence, 296 what constitutes, 331 et seq.

And see REVERSIONARY INTERESTS, DEALINGS WITH.

INFANT,

compromise by Court on behalf of, 250, 251
conversion of property of, by Court, 388 et seq.
election, in case of, 465, 466, 467
estoppel, 491—493
partition suit, request for sale, how made, 231, 232
payment of legacy to, 889
support and maintenance of, out of legacy, 897, 898, 901, 902
And see GUARDIAN AND WARD.

INFERIOR COURTS.

restraining proceedings in. See Jurisdiction, Etc.

INJUNCTIONS

to restrain actions at law. See Jurisdiction, Etc.

INSOLVENT ESTATES,

administration by Court under Judicature Act, 1875, s. 10...35 in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Act, 1883...35

INSURANCE. See Fire Insurance Moneys; Married Woman
• Marshalling; Policies of Insurance.

INTEREST. See RATE OF INTEREST.

INTEREST IN LAND. See Assignment of Choses in Action. assignment of, not within rule in Dearle v. Hall, 139

INTEREST ON LEGACY, 893 et seq. administration suit, 894, 895 child, for maintenance of, 897, 898 legacy to, 897, 898, 899 computed on the principal, 903 contingent legacy, 899, 900 to a class, 900 executory bequest of personal estate, 901 gift of real estate, 900, 901 general legacies, no time fixed for payment, 894 gift of real and personal estate together, 901 legacy charged on land only, 897 legatees entitled to arrears of interest, when, 908, 909 rate of, 895, 903, 904 specific vested legacies, 893 testator fixing time for payment, 895, 896 time fixed for payment, 893, 894 under Lord Cranworth's Act, 901 Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 43...901 et seq.

INTESTATES' ESTATES ACT, 1884...411

INTESTATES' ESTATES ACT, 1890...411

JOINT TENANCY,

effect of marriage on, 177 election, case of, not raised against surviving joint tenant by general bequest of joint tenant, 453

JUDGMENT,

election compelled by, 462

JUDGMENT DEBTS. See Marshalling of Securities.

JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS, in partition actions, 225 et seq.

JUDICATURE ACT, 1873. See Assignment of Choses in Action.

JUDICIAL SEPARATION. See GUARDIAN AND WARD; MARRIED WOMAN.

JURISDICTION TO RESTRAIN PROCEEDINGS, Act of Parliament, applications for, 798, 799 administration actions, in, 788—791 Bankruptcy Court, legislation as to, 785 JURISDICTION TO RESTRAIN PROCEEDINGS—continued.

bankruptcy, stay of proceedings, 790 et seq.

company, 791, 792, 799

foreign courts, in, 791, 793-798

inferior courts, in, 785, 786

inherent jurisdiction, 791

injunction, by, ancient equity jurisdiction, 773, 782, 788

abolished as to High Court, 784

against instituting actions, 785 refused unless effectual, 797, 798

rules of equity to prevail, 784, 785

stay of proceedings, 784, 785, 788—793

transfer of actions in High Court, 786-788

vexatious proceedings, 794, 795

LAND,

liability of, for debts. See Debts, Liability of Real and Personal Estate for.

LAND OUT OF THE JURISDICTION, powers of Court,

administration actions, in, 818, 819

charities, as to, 821

companies, as to, 817

equity acts in personam, 814

between parties necessary, 815

foreclosure, as to, 816, 817

foreign sovereign or government, 826

fraud, as to, 817

general principles, 800, 814, 815

impossibility of giving effect to judgment considered, 823-826

lex loci considered, 822, 823—826

local and transitory actions, distinguished, 814, 825, 826

parties out of the jurisdiction, 825

partnership, as to, 817

receivers, appointment of, 818

redemption, as to, 817

refusal to exercise powers, 823

service out of the jurisdiction, 825

specific performance, as to, 816

trusts, as to, 820, 821

venue, local, abolished, 814

waste, as to, 817

LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897,

does not affect principle of exoneration, 12 make nugatory charge of debts on real estate, ib.

LANDLORD AND TENANT,

boundaries, commission to determine between, 186, 187

estoppel, 478—480

marshalling between landlord and mortgagee of tenants' chattels, 65, 66

LAPSE,

exoneration of personalty, effect of, on, 18

W. & T.—VOL. I.

60

LEASEHOLDS,

enjoyment in specie of, by tenant for life of residue, 84 liability of legatee tenant for life of, on covenants, 874 mortgage debt, incidence of, on devolution, 24, 30

LEGACY, 834 et seq. And see REPETITION OF LEGACIES. abatement of (q.v.), 882 et seq. accretions to, 876 et seq. ademption of (q.v.), 864 et seq. annuity (q.v.), 845 et seq. apportionment of (q.v.), 879 et seq. appropriation of legacies payable in futuro (q.v.), 891 et seq. arrears of interest, 908, 909 benefit of legatee, for, 860 et seq. bequest of property in particular locality or place, 854, 865 et seq. calls on shares, legatee, when liable for, 875 champerty with reference to, 160 charge on, notice of, to executor, 141 of, on real estate, effect of, 19 chattels to one for life with remainder over, 842, 843 consumable articles in residuary bequest, ib. cumulative and substitutional. See REPETITION OF LEGACIES. debts of, 837, 838 demonstrative (q.v.), 20, 834, 835, 836 devastavit, effect of, on, 884, 885 devise of land is specific, 843 upon trust to sell and divide creates specific, ib. direction to pay the legacy out of a particular fund, 845 discretion to trustees to apply money for specified purpose, 860 et seq. discretionary trust (q.v.), 862 et seq. distinction between legacy and donatio mortis causá, 425, 426 specific and demonstrative, 834 et seq. general specific and demonstrative, $\bar{i}b$. donatio mortis causa may be satisfied by legacy, 426. See Addenda. farming stock, 843 general, 834 pecuniary, ib. gift of part of proceeds to be received under policy, 840, 841 residue, 835 incidents of original, attach to substitutional legacies, 920 et seq. income tax, by whom payable, 906 infant, payment of, to, 889 infant's legacy paid into Court, ib. interest on (q.v.), 893 et seq. lapse, 888 lease for years of land, 844 legacy duty, by whom payable, 905, 906 legatee's bankruptcy, legacy payable to trustee, 862 legatee's right of selection, 860 Limitation, Statutes of, application of, to, 907, 908 maintenauce (q.v.), 897, 898, 901, 902 and education of infant, 901, 902

```
LEGACY-continued.
    money, of, 834, 835
    not specific unless clearly intended to be so, 836
     of quantity given in different instruments, 915 et seq.
                      in the same instrument, 919 et seq.
     parol evidence to determine whether legacies are specific or not
       881, 882
     part of a specific fund is specific, 840
     particular object, for, 860 et seq.
     payment of legacy to married woman, 890
              time of (q.v.), 893 et seq.
     personal chattels, of, 842
              estate acquired subsequent to date of the will, 854 et seq.
     power of distress does not give priority, 887
     presumption of death, 890
     priority of, 885 et seq.
     real estate made liable for payment of, 15, 16
     realty, connected with, 843, 844, 845
     recovery of, 907, 908
     registration of assignment of, unnecessary, 139
     rent, gift of, 844
     repetition of legacies (q.v.), 914 et seq.
     residuary, 835
          clause, bequest contained in, when specific or general, 853, 854
     residue, bequest of, when specific, 854
     satisfaction of, 864
     selection, right of, 860
     settlement estate duty, 906
     specific (q.v.), 835, 836, 873 et seq.
          bequest for life of consumable articles, 842, 843
          fund to be sold and divided is specific, 840
          thing afterwards adeemed, 864 et seq.
     stock, Government securities, &c., 838 et seq.
           purchased after death, 855 et seq.
     substitutional and cumulative legacies.
                                                   See REPETITION OF
     term of years, gift of, is specific, 844
     things ordered by and made for testator will pass by will when, 842
     tithes, 844
     to whom payable, 889 et seq.
     trust to raise a sum of money out of land, 844, 845
     trusts to pay debts out of land, effect of, 19, 20
     wearing apparel, 843
     Wills Act, effect of, upon specific bequests, 854 et seq.
           what bequest specific before, 854
```

LEGACY DUTY,

attaches to donatio mortis causâ, 425 by whom payable, 905, 906 gift of, payable on a legacy ranks as a pecuniary legacy, 905, 906 in cases of land directed to be converted into money, 371 And see Conversion of Land, Etc.

LEGATEE,

bankruptcy of, assignee when entitled to legacy, 862 in case of discretionary trust, 862, 863

discretionary legacy for benefit of, 862 et seq.
election by legatee in case of appointments under power

election by legatee in case of appointments under powers, 459 et seq.
marshalling between, 48, 49
in favour of, 49 et seq.

presumption of death, 890 restrained from proceeding to recover legacy, when, 790 right of selection, 860 share paid to, can be called to refund when, 884, 885

And see Legacy; Marshalling of Assets.

LETTERS "WITHOUT PREJUDICE," 257

LEX LOCI & LEX SITUS. See LAND OUT OF THE JURISDICTION.

LOCAL AND TRANSITORY ACTIONS, 814, 825, 826

LOCKE KING'S ACT. See REAL ESTATE CHARGES ACTS.

LUNATIC,

conversion, in cases of, 224, 387, 389, 391 election in case of, 466

MAINTENANCE. See CHAMPERTY.

MAINTENANCE OF LEGATEE,

infant contingent legatee, 897 et seq. infant legatee under Conveyancing Act, 1881...901, 902, 903 out of legacy, 897, 898 specific sum given for maintenance of child, 899 under Lord Cranworth's Act, 901

MALIN'S ACT, 177 et seq.

MARITAL RIGHTS, fraud on. See Married Woman.

MARRIAGE ARTICLES, election in case of, 456

MARRIAGE, CONDITIONS IN RESTRAINT OF,

common law and equity contrasted as to, 578, 581, 584 condition precedent in devise of land or interest therein, 581, 590 in bequest of personalty without gift over, 582, 583

conditions and limitations distinguished, 580, 584, 587 et seq.

MARRIAGE, CONDITIONS IN RESTRAINT OF—continued. condition subsequent in general restraint. quære, whether valid in devise, 583 invalid in bequest of personalty, though gift over, 585 in case of mixed fund, 585 condition subsequent in partial restraint, in bequest of personalty valid if gift over, 586 in terrorem, when construed as, 583, 586, 587 consent, conditions as to, 591 et seq. of guardians, 593 of trustees, 593 cannot be withdrawn, 592 informal, 591 satisfied by marriage in testator's lifetime, when, 591, Court, jurisdiction to relieve, 592, 595 devises of land, 578, 581, 583 equity follows the law, when, 581, 584 gift of residue not a bequest over, 587 over, effect of, in special cases, 583, 586 impossibility of performance, 593, 597, 598 in terrorem, 583, 586 mixed funds, 585

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. See GUARDIAN AND WARD; MARRIED WOMAN. election in case of, 456

unmarried children, construction of bequest to, 588 until marriage, bequests and contracts, 587

personalty, special equitable rules apply only to legacies of, 578

MARRIAGE, VOID AGREEMENTS AFFECTING, contracts hindering marriage, 598
for profit of parent or guardian void, 600
in fraud of marriage articles or agreements, ib.
marriage brokage contracts void, 599
when divisible valid portion enforceable, 598
And see Marital Rights, Fraud on; Separation Deeds.

MARRIED WOMAN. See Conversion, Etc.; Election; Equity to a Settlement; Estoppel, Equitable; Family Arrangements; Husband and Wife; Partition; Separation Deeds; Wife's Choses in Action.

action against husband, 624, 733, 742

administration of estate of deceased, 743, 744

agent of husband, as, 712

allowance, savings of, 747

ante-nuptial liabilities of,

action against husband and wife, 742

common law rule, 736

companies, as to, 741

extent of husband's liability, 737, 738, 739

husband, liability of, 737, 738, 739

MARRIED WOMAN—continued.

ante-nuptial liabilities of—continued.

judgment against husband and wife, 738, 739

wife, 739

liability of wife, after, 737

liability of wife, 736, 737
personal judgment against wife, 739
remedies against husband and wife, 739
statutory amendments, 737—740
anticipation, restraint upon, 749—757

And see RESTRAINT UPON ANTICIPATION. appointment, power of, 715, 718, 719—722 arrears of income, 731, 732

pin money, 769, 770 assignment by, 707, 713 attachment, 729, 730 bankruptcy of, 703

disposition, power of,

of husband, 735 notice, 703

breach of trust, 711, 726, 727, 752, 766, 767 capacity to contract, 703 child, liability to maintain, 710 concurrence of husband unnecessary, 707, 713 confirmation of settlement made by husband, 714, 759 contract of, 703, 724, 725, 726

with husband, 625, 733, 734
conveyance by, 707, 713
costs, liability for, 712, 767
credit, pledging husband's, 698, 699
criminal proceedings between husband and wife, 742, 749
curtesy not abolished, 746
deed acknowledged, 717
desertion by husband, 697—700
devolution of property, 702, 742 et seq.

accumulations, of, 716 power of appointment, 715, 718 deed acknowledged, 717 domicil abroad, 715 English wife of foreigner, 715 enlargement of long term, 718 equitable estate, as to, 716, 717 feme sole, married woman assigns as, 713 interest in reversion, as to, 715 leases by married woman, 717, 718 legal estate, as to, 716, 717 life interest, as to, 716 long term, enlargement of, 718 personalty, as to, 714-716 power of appointment by, 715-718 realty, as to, 716-718

reversionary interest, as to, 715

```
MARRIED WOMAN—continued.
    disposition, power of-continued.
        tenant for life, as, 718
         testamentary powers, 715, 716
         will, by, 715, 716
    divorce, settlement after, 699
    earnings are equitable assets, 744
    enlargement of long term, 718
    entail, barring, 750
    equitable assets, 695, 744
              estate, assignment of, 716, 717
    equity to a settlement. See Equity to a Settlement.
    estoppel, when not bound by, 752, 753, 764. And see ESTOPPEL.
     extent of liability of, 719-727
    feme sole, conveys and sues as, 713
     form of judgment against, 728
     fraud of, 679, 726, 727, 752
           on intended wife, 649
           on marital rights, 642-649
    gifts from husband, 689, 770
          to husband, 730-733
             arrears of income irrecoverable, 731
             assent to husband receiving income, 731, 732
             corpus of, 732
              evidence must be clear, 730
              income, of, 730, 731
              lunatic wife, by, 732
              onus of proof on husband, 730, 732
              presumption as to, 733
              trustee, husband may be treated as, 732, 733
     gift to husband, 730-733
     husband, action against, 742
              criminal proceedings against, 742, 749
               fraud on wife, 649
               insurance by, 708-710
               judgment against, 738, 739, 749
               liability of, 727, 737, 738, 739
               loans by wife to, 733
               remedies against, 739, 742
               rights of, an intestacy, 743-745
               summary proceedings against, 742
     immoral earnings of, 697
     impounding property restrained, 766, 767
     income restrained from anticipation, 750-752
             gift of, to husband, 730-733
     insurance, 707-710
     intestacy of, 743, 746
     investments of savings, 746, 747
     judgment against husband and wife, 738, 739
                        wife, 736, 737, 739
                             form of, 728
     judicial separation, 697, 698
```

```
MARRIED WOMAN-
                        continued.
    leases by, 717, 718
    legacy to, to whom payable, 890
    legal personal representative of, 745, 746
    hability of wife, ante-nuptial, 736-742
                    post-nuptial (1) apart from statute, 719-725, 726
                                       et seq.
                                  (2) under statute, 725, 726, 727
    loans to husband, 733 et seq.
        action against husband, 733
        administratrix, retainer as, 736
        bankrupt, when husband, 735
        contract with husband, 733, 734
        exoneration of wife's estate, 734, 735
        mortgage to secure, 734
        retainer of debt by wife, 736
    long term, enlargement of, by, 718
    lunatic wife, gifts by, 732
    maintenance of child by, 710
    marital rights, fraud on, 642-649
        acquiescence, 649
         by husband, 649
         general rule, 646
         seduction, 648
         widow before remarriage, by, 647
    marriage, date of, material, 704, 705
              settlement, 757—759
    mortgage to secure loan to husband, 734
    paraphernalia, 770—772
    personal judgment against, 736
    personalty, assignment of, by, 714-716
    pin money, 769, 770
    pledging husband's credit, 698, 699
    possession, reduction into, 678
    post-nuptial settlement, 672-674
    powers of, as tenant for life, 766
     property in the name of, 707
     protection order, 697
               of settlement, as, 714
     realty, conveyance of, by, 716-718
     reduction into possession, 678
     restraint upon anticipation. See RESTRAINT UPON ANTICIPATION.
     retainer of debt by widow administratrix, 736
     reversionary interest, conveyance of, 715
     seduction before marriage, 649
     separate estate. See SEPARATE ESTATE.
     separation, judicial, 697-699
     separation deed. See SEPARATION DEEDS.
     settlement, equity to a, 660-680, 699, 714, 757-759, 762, 763.
       And see Equity to a Settlement.
     summary process for marital disputes, 742
     tenancy by entireties, 680
```

953

tenant for life, as, 718, 766
testamentary powers, 713, 715, 716
torts, liability for, 726, 727, 741
trading apart from husband, 695, 703
trust, breaches of, 711, 726, 727, 752, 766, 767
estates, 713, 717, 766, 768
trustee, as, 713, 714, 768
trustees and equity to a settlement, 661
of separate estate unnecessary, 689
waiver of equity to a settlement, 667, 674—678
will of, 713, 715, 716, 718, 743—746
words creating restraint upon anticipation, 753
separate estate, 691—695

MARSHALLING,

between legatees, 48 et seq.
doctrine of, generally, 45 et seq.
conditions of application of, 46, 47
pleadings need not make case for, 47
third parties not to be prejudiced by, ib., 57
volunteers, none between mere, 47
not to be prejudiced by, 47, 59, 60
And see Marshalling of Assets; Marshalling of Securities.

MARSHALLING OF ASSETS,

charities, none in favour of, before Mortmain and Charitable Uses
Act, 1891...54 et seq.
this is a local English rule, 56
copyholds, between, and freeholds, before 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104...
47, 48
creditors, in favour of, before 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104, and 32 & 33
Vict. c. 46, ib.
debts, as to lands devised in trust to pay, 52
charged with, ib.

legatees, between, 48, 49
in favour of, as to lands descended, 52, 53
in cases not within Real Estate Charges
Acts, 51
against creditors, where legal order of assets
deranged, 49
against heirs, doctrine part of lex loci, ib.
general pecuniary, against devisees, not
unless realty charged, 50
specific, against devisees, not, ib.

lien, as to property affected by, 52, 56 mortgagor, exceptional administration formerly by Court of assets of deceased, 48 aparaphernalia, in favour of widow as to her, 53, 61

MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES,

Admiralty cases, in, 67 agent and principal, between, 64, 65

MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES-continued. anticipation, restraint on, one property subject to, 65 appointment, successive mortgages under a power of, 60 bankruptcy of mortgagor, in spite of, 62, 63 Grown, in case of extent by, 67 executor and legatee, where mortgagee is, of mortgagor, 61 first mortgagee, rights of, not affected, ib. husband and wife mortgaging wife's lands, 65 jointure charged on two mortgaged estates and portion on one only, 60, 61 judgmen debts, between settled and unsettled estates, 62 landlord and mortgagee of chattels, between, 65, 66 lien, one of two funds subject to, 66 maritime securities, between, 67 mortgage of part of a charged estate, 61 mortgages in general, application of doctrine to, 56, 61 notice of first mortgage, when immaterial, 57 partner, guarantee by, for debt of firm, 65 policy, mortgage of voidable, 63 portion, one of two mortgaged estates subject to, 60 portions, realty devised subject to, 66 recital, erroneous, that debts are discharged, 59, 60 second mortgagee and third, between, 57 et seq. settlement of incumbered and unincumbered estates, 59 of part of mortgaged estates with covenant against incumbrances, 60 subsequent mortgagee of one of two incumbered estates, rights of, surety, entitled to benefit of, 63, 64 cannot prevent, 64

MISTAKE,

election made under, not binding, 462 in case of gift under, 449

MONEY.

legacy of, 834, 835

MONEYLENDERS ACT, 1900, 336 et seq. bankruptcy proceedings, relation of Act to, 337, 340 interest, what is excessive, 338, 339, 340 moneylender, definition of, 341 registration, effect of non-compliance with provisions as to, \$40 re-open accounts, power of Court to, 339 scope of, 338, 339, 341, 342 sections set out, 337 et seq. And see, Oppression: Reversionary Interpress. Designed

And see Oppression; Reversionary Interests, Dealings with.

MORTGAGE,

assignment of right to further advances under, 115 charged on freeholds devised on trust for conversion, 24, 361 conversion under power of sale contained in, 373

MORTGAGE—continued.

held unconscionable bargain, though deed approved by married woman's solicitor and duly acknowledged, 344

And see Debts, Liability of Real and Personal Estate for; Marshalling of Securities; Real Estate Charges Acts.

MORTGAGE DEEDS.

donatio mortis causâ of, 436

MORTGAGEES,

Hinde Palmer's Act, rights of, under, 34
Locke King's Act, rights of, not affected by, 34
marshalling between, 56 et seq.
right of proof of, in administration by Court, 34
And see Insolvent Estates: Marshalling of Securities.

MOTHER. See GUARDIAN AND WARD.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,

assignment of, 146 et seq. donatio mortis causâ of, 432—435 instrument signed in blank by third party, 147

NEXT OF KIN,

accumulation void under Thellusson Act, 401 election by, 468 ${\it And~see}$ Resulting Trust.

NON-EXISTING PROPERTY. See Assignment.

NOTICE. See Assignment of Chose in Action.

ONUS OF PROOF,

exoneration of personalty from debts, 12 sale of reversionary interest, 323, 325 undue influence, in cases of, 281, 294

OPPRESSION,

confirmation of and acquiescence in oppressive bargains, 344 et seq. terms on which oppressive bargains set aside, 342 et seq.

And see Moneylenders Act, 1900; Reversionary Interests, Dealings with.

OPTION TO PURCHASE,

• conversion in cases of, 373 et seq. given to lessee of term, his executors and administrators, whether attached to lease, qu., 378

ORDER OF APPLICATION OF ASSETS IN ADMINISTRATION, generally, 31, 32 where mortgaged estate is exceptated, 32, 33

PARAPHERNALIA, 32, 53, 770-772 See Married Woman.

PAROL EVIDENCE. See EVIDENCE.

```
PARTITION,
   admission of plaintiff's title, inquiries directed on, 225
   admissions, in pleadings, order on, ib.
   advertisements on dispensing with service, 230
    advowsons of, 210, 215
               alternate presentations, 215
    aliquot share, partition may be of, 216
   allowances, account of rents with, 213, 214
    annuitant not necessary party to action for, 212, 215
    Chambers, partition in, 213
               Agterence to, ib.
    commission, partition by, ib.
    conversion by judgment for sale under Partition Acts, 223, 224
               interests of persons under disability, 223, 224, 391, 392
    conveyances on partition, 216
    coparceners, by, 210
    copyholds, jurisdiction to partition, 209
    costs of,
        disability, of parties under, charged on shares, 228
        discretion of Court as to, under s. 10 of Partition Act, 1868...
        incumbrancers in suit, of, 228
        shares, several, in respect of, ib.
        where title improperly disputed or parties sever in defence, ib.
   County Court, transfer of proceedings from or to, 229
   difficulty of, formerly no objection to a decree, 208
   discretion of Court as to ordering sale, 218
   disputed legal title, partition action not to be made means for
     trying, 209
   district registry, inquiries in, 225
   dower, in cases of, 232, 233
   election, request for sale by infant does not operate as, 224
   equality of partition, allowance for, 214
   further consideration of action, 225, 226
   Inclosure Acts, partition under, 232
   incumbrances, costs of incumbrancers in partition suit, 228
                  inquiry as to, in partition actions, 226
   infant, action by or against, 210, 211, 216
           declared trustee, 216
           request for sale by or on behalf of, 224, 231, 232
   inquiry as to persons interested, 213, 225
            special as to shares of parties, 213
            whether sale beneficial, 226, 227
   joint tenants, by, 210
   judgment in partition actions, 213 et seq.
   jurisdiction in equity to order, origin and history of, 207, 208
                under Partition Acts, 1868, 1876...217 et seq.
   leaseholds, of, right to, 209, 210
   legacy not adeemed by, 871
   legal title must be before the Court, 212
   lunatic, action by or against, 211
   manor, of, 210
```

```
PARTITION—continued
    mill, of, 215
    mortgaged lands, of, 211, 212
    mutual conveyances, directions for, 216
    notice of judgment, service of, 225
                         dispensing with, ib.
    occupation rents, accounts of, and inquiries as to, 214
                      charged on particular shares, ib.
    part of property, of, 226
    parties to action for, 211, 212
    payment of purchase-money into Court, 230
    possession, plaintiff must have legal or equitaby, 210, 211
    receiver, when appointed in partition action, 214
    reference to Chambers as to title, 213, 225
    rent-charges, partition of, 210
    rents, accounts and inquiries as to, 214
    repairs and improvements, allowance for, and inquiries as to, ib.
    sale under Partition Acts, 1868, 1876...217 et seq.
         at request of persons entitled to less than a moiety (s. 3)...
                                  217, 218, 219
                                interested in a moiety (s. 4)...220, 221
         before certificate irregular, 226
         contract for, adoption of, ib.
         conversion, judgment operating as, 223, 224, 391, 392
         discharge of purchaser, where proceedings irregular, 226
         distribution of proceeds of, 230
         hearing, at, 225
         immediate, order for, 213
         jurisdiction to order, under Act of 1868, ss. 3, 4, 5...217 et seq.
                              none formerly, 208
         liberty to bid at (s. 6)...222, 226
                      and to set off purchase-money, ib.
         out of Court, at request of beneficiaries (s. 8)...223
                       by trustees, ib.
         part of, and partition of part, 226
         request for, by infants, &c., 231, 232
         set-off of purchase-money of part against share of whole
           purchase-money, 226
         subsequent, participation in proceeds of, 231
         subsequent to advertisements, 230
    service, dispensing with, 212, 230
             notice of judgment of, 212
     Settled Estates Act, payment out of sale-moneys to be applied
       under, 223
     third parties, rights of, not to be affected by partition, 215
    tenant for life, by, 211, 232
           for years, by, 211
     tenants in common, by, 210, 214
     tithes of, 210
     title deeds, directions as to, 216, 217
     title, defendant's, 212
          plaintiff's, ib.
```

PARTITION - continued.

title, proof of, at hearing, 225

trust, overfiding, effect of, 208, 209

Trustee A., 1893, sect. 3, provisions of, applicable on judgment for partition or sale, 222, 223

parties declared trustees under, 216 person appointed to convey under, ib.

trustees, parties declared, 216 valuation, purchase of share at, 220, 221, 222 writ of, now obsolete, 208

PARTNERSHIP,

assignment of debts in, 136
conversion of real estate, 370
estoppel, 481
marshalling, 65
See also LAND OUT OF THE JURISDICTION.

PATENTS.

assignment of future patent rights, 108

PAYMENT INTO COURT,

infant's legacy, 889

PAYMENT OF LEGACIES, TIME OF, 893 et seq.

administration suit, 894, 895

demonstrative legacy, 894

exception to rule of payment of legacies, 895 et seq.

general legacies, where no time fixed by testator, 894

immediate legacy, subject to be divested on a future contingency, 895

legacy to wife in lieu of dower, 897

real estate upon trust for sale, 897

reversionary interest bequeathed, 892

specific vested legacies, ib.

PENSIONS AND SALARIES,

assignment of, rules as to, 156-158

PERSONAL CHATTELS,

legacy of, 842

PERSONAL ESTATE.

intention to exonerate from payment of debts, how shown, 12 et seq.

lapsed, no exoneration of, 18

primarily liable for debts if specific land given for payment of debts is insufficient, 13

primary liability of, for payment of debts, 12

And see Debts, Liability of Real and Personal Estate for; Order of Application of Assets in Administration.

PERSONAL LICENCE,

cannot be assigned, 109

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

conveys land contracted to be sold before death, 359